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THE  DIPLOMACY 

OF  THE 

WAR  OF  1914 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


BY 

ELLERY  C.  STOWELL 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  'INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY, 

Nothing  extenuate,  nor  set  down  aught  in  malice 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON   MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(£be  ftiberg*be  pr:«*g  C&mbribge 

'    r  •'.    ■     i  ibis  :  r'- 


COPYRIGHT,    1915,    BY   ELLERY    C.    STOWELL 
ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 

Published  June  iq/j 


v.  1 

CD?'* 


PREFACE 

In  this  brief  account  of  the  causes  of  the  War  of  1914, 
it  has  been  possible  to  touch  upon  only  the  more  impor- 
tant points.  After  the  war  is  over,  the  results  of  patient 
research  may  make  clear  the  truth  of  accusations  and 
counter-accusations.  I  have,  however,  made  an  effort  to 
present  the  questions  from  a  really  impartial  and  neutral 
point  of  view,  even  though  the  result  may  not  find  ap- 
proval from  the  partisans  of  either  side.  After  all,  man 
as  a  rational  being  is  most  deeply  concerned  in  the  ra- 
tional efforts  of  mankind  to  avoid  the  ills  the  political 
body  is  heir  to,  and  in  the  end  will  turn  from  the  din  of 
battle  to  that  preliminary  conflict  of  brains  and  policies 
as  portrayed  in  the  dispatches  of  the  diplomats. 

The  importance  of  the  official  documents  issued  by  the 
belligerent  Governments  has  been  questioned,  and  it  is 
well  to  remember  that  they  are  specially  prepared  for 
publication,  and  further,  that  the  diplomats,  when  report- 
ing to  their  Governments,  do  not  lose  from  sight  the  ad- 
vantage of  having  their  dispatches  in  a  form  suitable  for 
publication  at  short  notice.  The  most  secret  and  delicate 
negotiations  may  occasionally  be  effected  through  the 
intermediary  of  a  special  and  confidential  messenger  or 
by  means  of  the  telephone.  Nevertheless,  the  basis  and 
permanent  structure  of  the  British  diplomacy  is  doubtless 
to  be  found  in  the  papers  laid  before  the  Houses  of  Par- 
liament and  in  the  discussions  and  explanations  given  in 
Parliament.  If  any  doubt  as  to  the  value  of  these  public 
documents  has  existed,  it  must  have  been  dispelled  by  the 
recent  publication  of  the  Austrian  Red  Book,  which  con- 
firms in  a  most  remarkable  manner  almost  every  impor- 
tant statement  of  the  British  White  Paper.1 

1  Some  of  the  official  publications  relating  to  negotiations  preceding 
the  war  give  evidence  of  having  been  prepared  with  great  haste.   No.  141 


vi  PREFACE 

Documents  do  not,  however,  give  adequate  information 
of  the  personal  factor  which  is  so  important  in  all  matters 
of  diplomacy.  The  documents  are,  as  it  were,  the  skeleton 
which  needs  to  be  built  up  with  the  living  flesh  of  the  per- 
sonal characteristics  of  the  actors;  but  any  attempt  to  ac- 
complish this  successfully  must  await  the  results  of  long 
and  careful  investigations.  It  was  only  years  afterwards, 
through  the  publication  of  letters  and  memoirs,  that  the 
world  learned  the  truth  in  regard  to  Bismarck's  diplomacy 
during  the  formative  period  of  the  German  Empire. 

I  shall  not  attempt  in  this  book  to  do  anything  more 

of  the  French  Yellow  Book  speaks  of  the  time  limit  of  the  German  ultima- 
tum to  Belgium  as  seven  hours;  the  Belgian  Gray  Paper  shows  (no.  38) 
that  it  was  twelve  hours.  Again,  the  French  Yellow  Book  (no.  18)  speaks 
of  the  Russian  Ambassador  as  being  about  to  leave  for  the  country  (pour 
la  campagne),  whereas  he  was  really  leaving  for  his  own  country,  as  is 
shown  by  no.  55. 

In  another  case  it  is  interesting  to  note  how  the  same  incident,  M. 
Sazonof's  proposal  of  the  conditions  for  a  peaceful  settlement  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  is  treated  in  the  dispatches  of  three  different  countries. 
According  to  the  French  Yellow  Book  (no.  103),  M.  Sazonof  said  to  the 
German  Ambassador:  "The  Emperor  Nicholas  is  so  anxious  to  prevent 
war  that  I  am  going  to  make  a  new  proposal  to  you  in  his  name";  the 
Russian  Orange  Paper  (no.  60)  gives  M.  Sazonof's  own  statement  that  the 
German  Ambassador  asked  him  if  he  could  not  indicate  upon  what  con- 
ditions Russia  might  yet  agree  to  arrest  her  military  preparations;  in  the 
British  White  Paper  (no.  97)  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  re- 
ports: "German  Ambassador  had  a  second  interview  with  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  at  2  a.m.,  when  former  completely  broke  down  on  seeing 
that  war  was  inevitable.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonof  to  make  some  sug- 
gestion which  he  could  telegraph  to  German  Government  as  a  last  hope. 
M.  Sazonof  accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to  German  Ambassador  a 
formula  in  French  of  which  following  is  a  translation:  .  .  ."  The  English 
account,  though  fuller,  coincides  with  the  Russian,  while  the  French  con- 
veys a  different  impression. 

In  the  course  of  the  narrative  of  events  I  have  referred  to  some  other 
instances.  No.  5  of  the  French  Yellow  Book,  which  was  so  severely  criti- 
cized by  Drs.  Dernburg  and  Helfferich  (post,  p.  155),  is  not,  as  the  criticism 
might  lead  us  to  think,  a  document  containing  material  received  July  30, 
1913,  but  a  statement  drawn  up  at  the  French  Foreign  Office  summarizing 
the  correspondence  received  during  the  preceding  two  years  in  regard  to 
opinion  in  Germany.  An  examination  of  the  document  in  question  will  suf- 
fice to  make  this  clear.  (See  Sun,  February  2,  1915.)  Another  case  of 
error  is  found  in  the  case  of  enclosure  3  in  no.  105  of  the  British  White 
Paper  (post,  p.  285). 


PREFACE  vii 

than  draw  attention  to  the  more  salient  traits  of  the  im- 
portant personages,  as  disclosed  in  the  documents  them- 
selves; and  for  the  sake  of  clearness  shall  bring  certain  of 
the  statesmen  and  diplomatists  before  the  reader  by  their 
official  titles  only. 

In  the  analysis  of  the  documents,  it  has  seemed  better 
to  bring  out  each  successive  link  of  the  chain  forged  to 
involve  the  unhappy  powers  of  Europe  in  this  war.  Some 
repetition  has  been  necessary  for  the  sake  of  clearness, 
and  at  times  I  have  been  'obliged  to  sacrifice  the  chrono- 
logical order  so  as  to  adhere  to  a  logical  exposition  in  the 
unfolding  of  the  events  of  the  opening  scenes  in  the  great- 
est drama  of  human  history. 

I  have  reduced  as  much  as  possible  the  extracts  from 
the  various  official  papers  published  by  Great  Britain, 
France,  Germany,  Russia,  Belgium,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Servia.  It  is  my  belief  that  the  piecing  together  of  the 
documentary  evidence  under  logically  arranged  headings 
will  be  of  value  to  all  those  with  an  interest  in  international 
affairs,  since  the  perusal  of  the  documents  themselves 
to  get  at  the  gist  of  the  material  requires  a  considerable 
expenditure  of  time  on  the  part  of  even  an  experienced  dip- 
lomatist. Then,  too,  almost  every  one  of  the  original  docu- 
ments treats  of  a  number  of  different  matters  or  negotia- 
tions which  by  their  interrelation  confuse  the  reader.  No 
system  of  paraphrase  and  excerpt  can,  however,  replace 
the  use  of  the  original  documents.  To  facilitate  comparison 
with  the  original  source,  in  each  case  the  reference  has 
been  placed  in  parentheses  immediately  after  the  extract, 
so  as  to  save  constant  and  irritating  interruption  through 
the  use  of  footnotes.  I  must  warn  the  reader  that  citations 
not  referring  to  direct  or  " modified"  quotations  do  not 
necessarily  confirm  the  statements  which  they  follow,  as 
their  purpose  is  rather  to  direct  him  to  the  documents 
which  bear  upon  the  matter  under  discussion. 

In  the  "  modified  extracts"  from  the  British  White 


viii  PREFACE 

Paper,  the  German  White  Book,  the  Russian  Orange  Pa- 
per, the  Belgian  Gray  Paper,  the  French  Yellow  Book,  the 
Austrian  Red  Book,  and  the  Servian  Blue  Book,  the  exact 
sense  has  been  preserved  as  nearly  as  possible,  although 
it  has  often  been  necessary  to  transpose  or  modify  the 
quotation.  When  an  extract  has  been  so  treated  or  modi- 
fied, the  fact  is  indicated  by  the  marks  ("),  —  that  is,  one 
quotation  mark  at  the  beginning  and  one  at  the  end,  — 
and  in  addition  the  source  is  given  in  parentheses  im- 
mediately after,  with  the  words,  "modified  quotation." 
When  the  words  of  the  documents  are  quoted  verbatim, 
as  in  direct  quotation,  it  has  been  shown  by  the  ordinary 
quotation  marks  ("  "),  even  when  within  a  modified  quo- 
tation. In  the  case  of  a  quotation  within  a  quotation,  the 
usual  system  has  been  followed. 

These  extracts  were  made  from  the  original  documents, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  Servian  Blue  Book.  I  have  made 
use  of  the  official,  authorized  English  translation  of  the 
German  White  Book  except  where  the  English  was  either 
too  uncouth  or  else  not  clear,  when  I  have  retranslated  the 
original  German.  In  the  same  way  I  have  used  the  various 
translations  of  the  London  Times,  the  New  York  Times, 
the  official  translation  of  the  Austrian  Red  Book,  and 
the  translations  published  by  the  British  Government  as 
White  Papers,  attempting,  where  I  have  found  the  trans- 
lation faulty,  to  make  corrections  or  to  substitute  a  better. 
The  admirable  enterprise  of  the  New  York  Times  in  plac- 
ing the  important  official  documents  before  the  general 
public  has  been  of  immense  educational  value  to  the 
whole  country,  and  incidentally  has  rendered  it  unneces- 
sary to  encumber  the  appendix  of  this  book  by  adding 
reprints  of  these  publications.1 

1  The  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation  has  also 
reprinted  many  of  the  most  important  publications,  and  has  generously 
distributed  them  widely  and  free  of  cost.  The  American  Journal  of  Inter- 
national Law  prints  the  official  publications  in  its  Supplement,  vol.  8,  no. 
4  (October,  1914);  vol.  9,  no.  1  (January,  1915).  An  official  translation  of 
the  Austrian  Red  Book  has  been  placed  on  sale. 


PREFACE  ix 

Various  other  documents  of  general  interest,  bearing  on 
the  causes  of  the  war,  have  been  included  in  this  volume. 

I  do  not  attempt  to  mention  all  those  who  have  helped 
in  the  preparation  of  this  material.  I  cannot,  however, 
pass  over  without  acknowledgment  the  assistance  I  have 
received  from  Professors  Munroe  Smith  and  John  Bassett 
Moore,  of  Columbia  University,  to  whom  I  owe  more  than 
one  important  suggestion,  while  Professor  James  T.  Shot- 
well  also  has  given  me  the  benefit  of  his  valued  criticism 
of  the  subject-matter  and  the  arrangement  of  the  ma- 
terial. Mr.  Henry  F.  Munro  has  been  kind  enough  to  go 
over  the  proof,  and  Miss  Isadore  G.  Mudge,  of  the  Colum- 
bia University  Library,  has  greatly  facilitated  my  search 
for  material  and  examination  of  sources. 

E.  C.  S. 

Columbia  University, 
May,  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I:  INTRODUCTORY 

CHAPTER  I 
REVIEW  OF  EUROPEAN  HISTORY 

1.  The  European  Concert 3 

2.  Belgian  neutrality 4 

3.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente 7 

4.  Crises 9 

5.  Fashoda 10 

6.  The  Algeciras  Conference 12 

7.  The  Casablanca  affair 18 

8.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 19 

9.  Agadir 22 

10.  The  Turco-Italian  War 24 

11.  The  Balkan  Wars 26 

12.  The  situation  just  before  the  War  of  1914 34 

PART  II:  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  DOCUMENTS 

CHAPTER  II 

THE   AUSTRO-SERB  CONFLICT 

1.  The  terms  of  the  Austrian  note 41 

2.  Efforts  of  the  powers  to  secure  an  extension  of  the  time  limit     .       .  59 

3.  The  powers  influence  Servia  to  make  a  conciliatory  reply    ...  62 

4.  Servia's  reply 64 

5.  Austria  rejects  Servia's  reply 78 

6.  The  powers  urge  Austria  to  delay  military  operations  and  accept 

the  Servian  reply  as  a  basis  for  discussion 81 

7.  Austrian  assurances 84 

8.  Austria  declares  war  on  Servia 85 

9.  Austria  explains  the  purpose  of  her  action 89 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  DISCUSSIONS 

1.  Russia's  interest  in  the  Austro-Servian  conflict 96 

2.  Russia  believes  Austria's  action  is  directed  against  herself  .      .      .  105 


xii  CONTENTS 

3.  Russia  considers  immediate  action  necessary 108 

4.  Russia  partially  mobilizes  against  Austria 109 

5.  The  Tsar  asks  the  Kaiser  to  try  his  mediation 112 


CHAPTER  IV 
GERMANY'S  SITUATION 

1.  Germany's  interest  in  the  dispute 117 

2.  Germany  declares  that  the  Austrian  note  was  not  communicated  to 

her  beforehand 119 

3.  Germany  pledged  to  support  Austria 123 

4.  Germany  insists  upon  the  "localization"  of  the  Austro-Servian 

conflict 126 

5.  The  responsibility  Russia  will  incur  by  supporting  Servia     .       .  131 

6.  The  situation  between  Germany  and  Russia  becomes  acute     .       .  133 

7.  Germany  delivers  an  ultimatum  to  Russia 142 

CHAPTER  V 

FRANCE  SUPPORTS  RUSSIA 

1.  Germany  asks  France  to  use  her  influence  with  Russia  .       .       .  147 
v2.  Frapce  believes  Germany  intends  to  precipitate  a  war       .       .       .  155 

3.  Fra/nce  supports  her  ally 163 

4.  Military  preparations  in  Germany  and  France 166 

5.  The  German  ultimatum  to  France 174 

CHAPTER  VI 

MOBILIZATION 

1.  The  meaning  of  mobilization 178 

2.  The  issuance  of  the  order  for  general  mobilization      ....  181 

3.  Intermediate  military  preparations 183 

4. ,  The  fatal  succession  of  mobilizations 184 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE   BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  CONCERT 

1.  European  diplomacy  in  the  Balkans 195 

2.  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposes  a  conference  of  the  powers       .       .       .  197 

3.  Germany  makes  objection  to  mediation  205 

4.  Russia  proposes  to  Austria  to  enter  upon  "  conversations "      .       .  213 

5.  The  powers  employ  their  good  offices  at  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 

burg     227 


CONTENTS  xffi 

6.  Efforts  to  discover  a  formula  for  mediation 229 

7.  Germany  asked  to  "press  the  button" 231 

8.  The  San  Giuliano  suggestion  for  mediation  upon  Servia's  uncondi- 

tional acceptance  of  the  ultimatum 234 

9.  The  Cambon  suggestion  of  mediation  after  Austria's  occupation 

of  Belgrade 236 

10.  The  Grey  proposal  for  a  collective  guaranty  of  the  powers      .       .  239 

11.  Germany  asks  Russia  to  propose  a  formula 242 

12.  Austria  agrees  to  mediation 252 

13.  The  failure  to  reach  a  compromise 264 


CHAPTER  VIII 
SIR  EDWARD  GREY  AND  THE  ENGLISH  DIPLOMACY 

1.  The  important  role  of  England 268 

2.  Efforts  to  prevent  war 270 

3.  Efforts  to  organize  mediation 270 

4.  England  refuses  to  take  sides 273 

5.  The  Anglo-French  Entente     .       .       .       .  ' 282 

6.  England  declares  that  she  is  not  interested  in  a  Balkan  question   ,  293 

7.  England  warns  Germany  that  she  will  not  hold  aloof  if  France  is 

involved 295 

8.  Germany's  bid  for  English  neutrality 297 

9.  Divergence  of  opinion  in  England 303 

10.  England's  vital  interests 311 

11.  England's  inquiry  relative  to  Belgium's  neutrality      ....  316 

12.  England  asked  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France        .       .       .  328 

13.  Germany's  detention  of  English  vessels 336 

14.  Germany  invades  Luxemburg 337 

15.  England  agrees  to  protect  the  French  coast 339 

16.  The  British  ultimatum 352 

CHAPTER  IX 
BELGIAN   NEUTRALITY 


1.  The  history  of  Belgian  neutrality 

2.  The  obligation  to  respect  the  treaty  of  April  19,  1839 

3.  The  obligation  to  make  good  the  guaranty  of  neutrality 

4.  The  right  to  make  war  and  the  equality  of  states 

5.  Anglo-Belgian  conversations 

6.  Effect  of  Belgium's  preparations  against  Germany 

7.  Alleged  violations  of  Belgian  neutrality    .... 

8.  The  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 

9.  Some  considerations  concerning  Belgium's  right  to  resist 


371 
376 
387 
391 
395 
411 
415 
422 
431 


xiv  CONTENTS 

10.  Germany  accuses  England  of   misrepresentations  in  regard  to 

Belgium 441 

11.  Germany's  plea  of  necessity 445 

CHAPTER  X 
ITALY  REMAINS  NEUTRAL 

1.  Italy  desirous  for  peace 457 

2.  San  Giuliano's  helpful  suggestions 462 

3.  Italian  cooperation  with  England 465 

4.  Italy  declares  she  will  remain  neutral       .  467 

CHAPTER  XI 

CONCLUSION 

1.  The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  war 474 

2.  Suggested  and  alleged  causes  of  the  war 475 

3.  Displacement  of  the  balance  of  power 476 

4.  The  immediate  causes  of  the  war 479 

5.  The  determining  causes  of  the  war 491 

6.  The  world 's  answer  495 

7.  Formation  of  a  Super-Empire 496 

8.  The  "Peace  power" 500 

9.  Germany's  nationalistic  conception 502 

10.  Nationalism  and  internationalism 508 

11.  The  results  514 


PART  III:   DOCUMENTS  AND  EVIDENCE 

CHAPTER  XII 

Questions  and  answers 519 

Questions  without  answers 528 

CHAPTER  XIII 

DOCUMENTS 

POLITICAL  AIMS   OF   THE   POWERS 

Washington's  Farewell  Address,  September  17,  1796.   (Extract.)    .       .  530 
Bismarck's  Speech  in  the  Reichstag,  February  6,  1888.   (Extract.)     .  533 
Apocryphal  Will  of  Peter  the  Great  (the  Sokolnicki  Text)        .       .       .  537 
The  Declaration  of  the  American  Delegation  at  the  First  Hague  Con- 
ference        539 


CONTENTS  xv 

THE   ALLIANCES 

Treaty  of  Alliance  between  Austria  and  Germany,  October  7,  1879     .  540 

Agreement  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan,  July  13,  1911     .  541 

Anglo-American  cooperation  in  regard  to  American  affairs.  (Extract 
from  speech  of  the  Queen  on  the  opening  of  Parliament,  1896.)     .  542 

Anglo-American  Arbitration.  (Extract  from  speech  of  the  Queen  on  the 
opening  of  Parliament,  1897.) 543 

The  Monroe  Doctrine.  (Extract  from  American  Diplomacy,  by  John 
Bassett  Moore.) 543 

Declaration  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  France  respecting  Egypt 
and  Morocco,  April  8,  1904 544 

Convention  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia  concerning  the  interests 
of  their  states  on  the  continent  of  Asia,  August  31, 1907  ....  546 

Treaty  between  Japan  and  Russia  guaranteeing  the  present  territory  of 
each,  the  integrity  of  China,  and  the  principle  of  the  "open  door" 
in  that  empire,  August  14,  1907 550 

Convention  between  Russia  and  Japan  concerning  Manchuria,  July  4, 
1910 551 

The  Formation  of  the  Triple  Entente.  (Diplomatic  Correspondence  pub- 
lished by  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  1914.) ....  551 

ANGLO-GERMAN   RELATIONS 

A  German  Historian  predicts  War  with  England.  (Extract  from  an 
article  by  Hans  Delbruck,  1912.) 560 

The  Price  of  a  German-English  Entente.  (Extracts  from  an  article  by 
Hans  Delbruck,  1911.) 561 

References  to  the  Anglo-German  secret  treaty  of  1898  relative  to  the 
eventual  dismemberment  of  the  Portuguese  colonies  ....  562 

Anglo-German  Agreement  in  regard  to  the  African  possessions  of  Por- 
tugal, 1913 562 

Portugal  won't  sell  yet;  division  of  her  East  African  Colonies  when  she 
does.   (New  York  Times,  January  1,  1914.) 563 

Interview  of  October  28,  1908,  with  Emperor  William  II.  (London 
Telegraph) ...  563 

Colonial  Development  and  Removal  of  Conflicting  Interests,  by  Sir 
Harry  Johnston 566 

Commercial  and  Economic  Competition,  by  Karl  Rathgen     .      .      .  567 

Speech  of  the  German  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in 
the  Reichstag,  December  2,  1914 568 

Cardiff  Speech  of  the  British  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  October  2, 
1914 569 

THE   AUSTRO-SERVIAN   DISPUTE 

Article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  July  13,  1878 572 


xvi  CONTENTS 

Secret  Appendix  to  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Alliance  between  the 
Kingdom  of  Bulgaria  and  the  Kingdom  of  Servia,  February  29,  1912  572 

Note  addressed  to  the  Servian  Government  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government,  July  23,  1914 574 

Servia's  reply  to  the  Austrian  note,  July  25, 1914 576 

Negotiations  of  the  Spanish  and  American  Governments  following  the 
destruction  of  the  Maine 579 

Comparison  between  the  action  of  the  United  States  in  1898  and  Aus- 
tria in  1914 583 

The  Case  of  Servia.  (Extract  from  a  speech  by  Lloyd  George,  Sep- 
tember 21,  1914.) 586 

The  Austro-Servian  Conflict.  (Extract  from  an  article  by  Constantin 
Theodor  Dumba,  1914.) 587 

Criticism  of  Servia.   (Article  by  Count  Albert  Apponyi,  1914.)      .      .  588 


BELGIAN   NEUTRALITY 

Richelieu  rejects  a  proposal  for  the  partition  of  Belgium  and  suggests 
another  plan 595 

The  Barrier  Treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Holland,  October  29, 
1709 596 

Belgium  and  the  Balance  of  Power 597 

The  Barrier  Treaty  Vindicated,  by  Francis  Hare,  1712.    (Extract.)  .  598 

The  Neutralization  of  Belgium  by  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839;  inter- 
national treaties  regulating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  ....  600 

Treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Prussia  relative  to  the  independence 
and  neutrality  of  Belgium,  August  9,  1870 602 

Treaty  between  Great  Britain,  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands,  Prussia,  and  Russia  relative  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxemburg  and  the  Duchy  of  Limburg,  May  11,  1867  ....  603 

Declarations  made  by  France  and  Prussia  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Luxemburg,  July  17,  1870 605 

Extracts  from  Parliamentary  Debates  regarding  the  neutrality  of  Lux- 
emburg and  Belgium,  1867;  1870 606 

Belgian  Neutrality.  (Gladstone's  letter  to  Bright,  August,  1870).  .       .  624 

Anglo-Belgian  Military  Preparations.  Documents  made  public  by  the 
German  Government  after  taking  possession  of  the  Brussels  Archives : 

(1)  Report  of  General  Ducarme  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War; 

(2)  Report  of  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  his  Gov- 
ernment       626 

Remarks  introductory  to  the  Secret  Documents,  by  Bernhard  Dernburg  631 
Violation  of  Belgian   neutrality  by  England  and  Belgium.     (Semi- 
official view  expressed  in  the  North  German  Gazette.)      ....  634 
Statement  relative  to  the  publication  of  the  Belgian  Documents,  from 
M.  Havenith,  Belgian  Minister  at  Washington 635 


CONTENTS  xvii 

The  Nature  of  Neutrality,  etc.  (Extracts  from  World  Organization  as 
affected  by  the  Nature  of  the  Modern  State,  by  David  Jayne  Hill.)  .       .  638 

The  Alleged  Inherent  Right  of  Self- Preservation  (extract),  by  John 
Westlake 640 

The  Queen  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens 642 

Thucydides:  The  Melians'  Defense  of  their  Neutrality  against  the 
Athenians 645 

THE   WAR 

The  Hague  Convention  of  1907  relative  to  the  settlement  of  interna- 
tional disputes,  Article  in 651 

The  Hague  Convention  of  1907  relative  to  the  opening  of  hostilities  .  651 
The  Larger  Meanings  of  the    War.    (Extracts   from   an   article   by 

Franklin  H.  Giddings.) 652 

Appeal  to  the  Universities  of  America,  signed  by  Rudolf  Eucken  and 

Ernst  Haeckel 653 

America  and  the  Issues  of  the  European  War,  by  Charles  W.  Eliot      .  655 
Germany's  Treaty  Record:  a  letter  by  Bernhard  Dernburg  answering 
Dr.  Eliot 661 

APPENDIX 

Chronology 667 

List  of  Citations 686 

Index 693 


THE  PRINCIPAL  NEGOTIATORS1 

AT   LONDON 

Mr.  Asquith,  British  Prime  Minister. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador. 

AT  BERLIN 
Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  German  Chancellor. 
Herr  von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Sir  Edward  Goschen,  British  Ambassador. 
M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador. 

AT  ST.   PETERSBURG 
M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Sir  George  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador. 
Count  Pourtales,  German  Ambassador. 
Count  Szapary,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador. 

AT  VIENNA 
Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Herr  von  Tchirsky,  German  Ambassador. 

AT  PARIS 

M.  Poincar6,  President  of  France. 

M.  Viviani,  Premier  of  France,  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Baron  von  Schoen,  German  Ambassador. 

AT   ROME 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

AT  BELGRADE 
M.  PaBhitch,   Servian  Premier  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

1  In  this  list  are  included  only  the  most  important  names  which  it  may  be  expected  that 
the  reader  will  remember.  A  complete  listing,  under  both  name  and  office,  of  all  actors  in 
the  negotiations,  including  those  here  mentioned,  will  be  found  with  page  references  in  the 
index. 


LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 

The  abbreviations  used  to  denote  the  various  official  publications  are  the 
following:  ' 

(1)  B.  W.  P.  (British  White  Paper,  no.  6,  Miscellaneous,  1914.) 

(2)  G.  W.  B.  (German  White  Book,  authorized  translation.) 

(3)  R.  O.  P.  (Russian  Orange  Paper.) 

(4)  B.  G.  P.  (Belgian  Gray  Paper.) 

(5)  F.  Y.  B.  (French  Yellow  Book.) 

(6)  A.  R.  B.  (Austrian  Red  Book.) 

(7)  S.  B.  B.  (Servian  Blue  Book.) 

1  The  British  White  Paper  was  also  published  as  a  small  blue  book  and  the  Russian, 
Belgian  and  French  publications  have  been  issued  in  a  convenient  form  as  British  White 
Papers. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 

PART  I 

INTRODUCTORY 


THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE 
WAR  OF  1914 

CHAPTER  I 

REVIEW  OF  EUROPEAN  HISTORY 

The  European  Concert  —  Belgian  neutrality  —  The  Triple  Alliance  and 
The  Triple  Entente  —  Crises :  Fashoda  (1896);  Algeciras  (1906);  the 
Casablanca  affair  (1908);  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (1908);  Agadir  (1911); 
theTurco-Italian  War  (1911-12);  the  Balkan  Wars  (1912-13)  —  The  situa- 
tion just  before  the  War  of  1914. 

1 .  The  European  Concert 

It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  causes  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  present  war  without  some  knowledge  of  the  salient 
features  of  history  which  led  to  the  alignment  of  the  great 
powers  into  two  camps  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
the  Triple  Entente.  The  questions  of  the  present  moment, 
such  as  that  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  have  their  roots 
deep  in  the  past,  and  their  elucidation  must  be  sought  in 
the  history  of  the  relations  of  the  European  states. 

Modern  Europe,  as  we  know  it  to-day,  was  patched 
together  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815.  The  principal 
independent  states  of  Europe,  which  took  part  in  that 
settlement,  formed  the  European  Concert.  They  had  been 
drawn  together  by  the  common  danger  of  French  domina- 
tion and  had  succeeded  at  last  in  overwhelming  Napoleon. 
During  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  it  looked  as  if  the  jealousies 
over  the  spoils  stripped  from  France  would  divide  the  vic- 
tors into  two  camps,  and  start  another  war.  Russia,  wish- 
ing to  acquire  all  of  Poland,  offered  to  compensate  Prussia 
with  territory  taken  from  Saxony.  This  gave  Talleyrand 
his  opportunity,  and  France,  Austria,  and  England  agreed 
to  make  common  cause,  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary,  to 


4        THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

prevent  this  dangerous  aggrandizement  of  Russia  and 
Prussia.  But  the  powers  had  had  enough  of  war,  and  so 
found  a  way  to  settle  their  differences  by  a  ruthless  carv- 
ing-up  of  territories  in  disregard  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality, and  even  that  of  '  legitimacy,"  a  term  which  served 
the  same  purpose  of  a  shibboleth  that  the  "observance  of 
treaties"  now  fulfills.  The  able  diplomacy  of  Talleyrand 
took  advantage  of  this  disagreement  to  reestablish  the 
diplomatic  equality  of  France,  and  the  five  powers,  — 
England,  France,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  —  working 
together  as  the  Concert  of  Europe,  dictated  to  all  the  other 
states  and  completed  the  territorial  transformations  and 
adjustments  which  suited  their  counterbalancing  interests 
and  jealousies.  Proceeding  with  stumbling  and  halting 
gait,  constantly  in  danger  of  falling,  the  European  Concert 
continued  to  be,  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  1914, 
Europe's  supreme  hope  and  only  protection  against  the 
occurrence  of  a  general  war.  Although  acting  as  a  sort  of 
shock-absorber  to  break  the  force  of  the  territorial  trans- 
formations found  necessary  and  inevitable  in  the  course  of 
years,  the  European  Concert  has  neither  maintained  the 
status  quo  nor  perfected  the  balance  of  power,  but  by  com- 
promising between  the  two  has  managed  to  keep  the  peace. 
Throughout  this  long  period,  the  principal  concern  of  the 
European  Concert  has  been  to  watch  over  Balkan  affairs 
in  order  to  prevent  the  starting  of  a  conflagration  in  the 
Near  East. 

2.  Belgian  neutrality 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  which  stripped  France  of  the 
immense  possessions  she  had  acquired  since  1792,  divided 
them  up  so  as  to  meet  the  desires  and  secure  the  agreement 
of  the  coalition  which  had  overthrown  Napoleon.  Prussia, 
Austria,  and  Russia  received  their  parts  on  the  Continent, 
but  England  did  not  desire  to  place  hostages  there,  and 
made  no  demands  for  territory,  seeking  her  compensation 


I 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  5 

elsewhere.  It  was  natural  that  she  should  keep  the  colonial 
possessions  captured  from  France  by  her  fleets.  The  others 
could  not  refuse  her  what  she  already  held.  She  wished 
also  to  retain  certain  of  the  Dutch  possessions,  as  the  Cape 
Colony,  which  she  had  seized  when  Holland  was  incor- 
porated into  the  French  Empire;  at  Vienna  it  was  proposed 
to  give  the  Belgic  provinces  to  Holland  as  compensation. 
Austria  gladly  exchanged  her  provinces  for  territories 
nearer  Vienna.1  But  this  union  of  Belgium  and  Holland 
under  the  same  king  was  contrary  to  the  sentiments  of  the 
Belgian  people,  and  fifteen  years  later  they  revolted. 

France  was  very  anxious  to  take  them  over,  and  there 
was  some  Belgian  sentiment  favorable  to  this  plan;  but 
this  would  not  have  satisfied  one  of  England's  fundamental 
principles  of  policy,  which  for  centuries  had  been  to  keep 
the  Belgic  provinces  out  of  the  control  of  France.  Through 
these  provinces  and  Holland  flowed  some  of  the  principal 
rivers  of  Europe.  They  possessed  besides  great  importance 
as  industrial  centers.  Their  union  with  any  great  power 
would  inconvenience  England,  because  of  the  facility  of 
attack  afforded  by  the  proximity  of  Belgian  and  Dutch 
harbors  to  her  shores,  and  also  because  her  commerce 
might  thus  be  excluded  from  these  rich  territories  drained 
by  their  rivers.  Lord  Palmerston,  therefore,  in  1831, 
true  to  England's  traditional  policy,  strove  to  give  to  Bel- 
gium an  independent  position.  But  it  was  evident  that 
a  small,  rich  country  with  a  magnificent  strategic  position 
would  be  coveted  by  her  powerful  neighbors,  France  and 
Prussia;  in  the  course  of  future  campaigns  conducted 
across  her  territory,  she  might,  at  the  settlement  of  peace, 
fall  to  one  or  the  other.  The  interest  of  England  seemed 
best  served,  therefore,  by  making  her  perpetually  neutral; 

1  At  the  time,  Prussia  was  even  more  anxious  to  have  a  strong  "buffer" 
or  "stopper"  state  to  prevent  France  from  invading  her  territory,  and  the 
general  distrust  of  France  made  all  the  powers  ready  to  fall  in  with  the 
proposal. 


6        THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  other  powers  had  to  acquiesce  in  this  project  or  ac- 
knowledge ambitions  of  aggrandizement,  which  might  lead 
England  to  make  a  coalition  against  them  until  she  ob- 
tained assurances  that  such  designs  had  been  abandoned. 
Accordingly,  it  was  agreed  that  Belgium  should  be  per- 
petually neutral,  and  the  principal  powers  —  England, 
France,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia  —  joined  in  guaran- 
teeing her  independence  and  perpetual  neutrality. 

It  is  no  secret  that  France  still  pursued  the  main  purpose 
of  her  diplomacy  and  military  exertions  since  the  time  of 
Richelieu  —  that  is,  to  annex  the  neighboring  provinces  of 
Belgium  and  to  secure  her  natural  outlet  toward  the  north, 
thus  regaining  control  of  her  own  fluvial  arteries  of  com- 
merce. Under  the  great  Napoleon  she  had  accomplished 
the  union  of  Belgium  with  France  and  had  given  the  bene- 
fits of  her  reformed  judicial  system  to  a  country  which  was 
already  united  to  her  by  many  ties,  such  as  language  and 
religion.  But  England  came  and  put  asunder  these  two 
peoples  whom  the  evolution  of  history  had  united. 

In  the  course  of  years,  another  Napoleon  upon  the  throne 
of  France  had  hoped  again  to  incorporate  Belgium  into 
France,  as  was  done  at  the  epoch  of  the  Revolution,  and 
the  French  Ambassador,  Benedetti,  proposed  to  Bismarck 
a  partition  of  Belgium,  just  as  Russia  had  proposed  and 
successfully  brought  about  the  partition  of  Poland  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Bismarck  prevailed 
upon  Benedetti  to  write  out  this  proposal  in  his  own  hand, 
which  he  took  for  reference  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  on 
the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  exhibited  it  to 
the  diplomatic  corps  at  Berlin.  The  inevitable  result  was 
still  further  to  prejudice  England  against  the  brilliant  ad- 
venturer upon  the  throne  of  France.  Negotiations  were 
entered  into  with  each  of  the  belligerents,  and  a  separate 
treaty  signed  with  each  to  make  common  cause  against  the 
other  in  case  of  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.  During 
the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  perpetual  neutrality  of  Bel- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  7 

gium,  Luxemburg,  and  Switzerland,  the  only  perpetually 
neutralized  states  of  Europe,  was  faithfully  respected  by 
all  parties.  In  the  course  of  generations,  Europe  has  be- 
come accustomed  to  this  artificial  situation  and  has  taken 
for  granted  that  it  would  persist. 

The  general  public  has  not  appreciated  the  difference 
between  ordinary  neutrality  and  perpetual  neutrality.  In 
the  present  war  the  United  States  is  a  neutral  in  the  ordi- 
nary sense,  but  may  terminate  that  condition  at  any  mo- 
ment by  declaring  war  and  becoming  a  belligerent;  or  any 
other  power  may  declare  war  upon  the  United  States  with 
the  same  effect.  So  also  in  the  case  of  Holland,  Germany 
or  England  may  terminate  Dutch  neutrality  by  declaring 
war  against  her.  Switzerland,  Belgium,  and  Luxemburg, 
on  the  contrary,  are  placed  under  a  special  regime  based 
on  international  agreements  signed  by  the  powers  inter- 
ested, according  to  the  terms  of  which  their  territories  must 
remain  perpetually  neutral,  and  this  condition  may  not 
be  modified  to  suit  the  convenience  of  any  belligerent  or  of 
the  perpetually  neutral  country  itself.  Such  a  condition  is 
often  spoken  of  as  neutralization. 

8.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente 
The  Franco-German  War  was  the  most  important  event 
of  European  history  until  overshadowed  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war.  Prussia  emerged  from  it  at  the  head  of 
a  united  German  nation.  There  was  a  serious  dislocation 
of  the  old  political  relations  which  it  took  several  years  to 
adjust.  England,  for  a  time  at  least,  needed  not  to  fear 
the  rivalry  of  France  and  devoted  her  attention  to  check- 
ing the  ambitions  of  Russia.  Bismarck  made  the  center  of 
his  political  conception  a  firm  alliance  with  Austria.  When 
Prussia  defeated  her  in  1866,  Bismarck  held  back  the 
Prussians  from  making  a  triumphal  entry  into  Vienna  and 
was  most  considerate  of  Austrian  susceptibilities.  Later, 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 


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6        THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  other  powers  had  to  acquiesce  in  this  project  or  ac- 
knowledge ambitions  of  aggrandizement,  which  might  lead 
England  to  make  a  coalition  against  them  until  she  ob- 
tained assurances  that  such  designs  had  been  abandoned. 
Accordingly,  it  was  agreed  that  Belgium  should  be  per- 
petually neutral,  and  the  principal  powers  —  England, 
France,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia  —  joined  in  guaran- 
teeing her  independence  and  perpetual  neutrality. 

It  is  no  secret  that  France  still  pursued  the  main  purpose 
of  her  diplomacy  and  military  exertions  since  the  time  of 
Richelieu  —  that  is,  to  annex  the  neighboring  provinces  of 
Belgium  and  to  secure  her  natural  outlet  toward  the  north, 
thus  regaining  control  of  her  own  fluvial  arteries  of  com- 
merce. Under  the  great  Napoleon  she  had  accomplished 
the  union  of  Belgium  with  France  and  had  given  the  bene- 
fits of  her  reformed  judicial  system  to  a  country  which  was 
already  united  to  her  by  many  ties,  such  as  language  and 
religion.  But  England  came  and  put  asunder  these  two 
peoples  whom  the  evolution  of  history  had  united. 

In  the  course  of  years,  another  Napoleon  upon  the  throne 
of  France  had  hoped  again  to  incorporate  Belgium  into 
France,  as  was  done  at  the  epoch  of  the  Revolution,  and 
the  French  Ambassador,  Benedetti,  proposed  to  Bismarck 
a  partition  of  Belgium,  just  as  Russia  had  proposed  and 
successfully  brought  about  the  partition  of  Poland  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Bismarck  prevailed 
upon  Benedetti  to  write  out  this  proposal  in  his  own  hand, 
which  he  took  for  reference  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  on 
the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  exhibited  it  to 
the  diplomatic  corps  at  Berlin.  The  inevitable  result  was 
still  further  to  prejudice  England  against  the  brilliant  ad- 
venturer upon  the  throne  of  France.  Negotiations  were 
entered  into  with  each  of  the  belligerents,  and  a  separate 
treaty  signed  with  each  to  make  common  cause  against  the 
other  in  case  of  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.  During 
the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  perpetual  neutrality  of  Bel- 


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THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  7 

gium,  Luxemburg,  and  Switzerland,  the  only  perpetually 
neutralized  states  of  Europe,  was  faithfully  respected  by 
all  parties.  In  the  course  of  generations,  Europe  has  be- 
come accustomed  to  this  artificial  situation  and  has  taken 
for  granted  that  it  would  persist. 

The  general  public  has  not  appreciated  the  difference 
between  ordinary  neutrality  and  perpetual  neutrality.  In 
the  present  war  the  United  States  is  a  neutral  in  the  ordi- 
nary sense,  but  may  terminate  that  condition  at  any  mo- 
ment by  declaring  war  and  becoming  a  belligerent;  or  any 
other  power  may  declare  war  upon  the  United  States  with 
the  same  effect.  So  also  in  the  case  of  Holland,  Germany 
or  England  may  terminate  Dutch  neutrality  by  declaring 
war  against  her.  Switzerland,  Belgium,  and  Luxemburg, 
on  the  contrary,  are  placed  under  a  special  regime  based 
on  international  agreements  signed  by  the  powers  inter- 
ested, according  to  the  terms  of  which  their  territories  must 
remain  perpetually  neutral,  and  this  condition  may  not 
be  modified  to  suit  the  convenience  of  any  belligerent  or  of 
the  perpetually  neutral  country  itself.  Such  a  condition  is 
often  spoken  of  as  neutralization. 

3.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente 
The  Franco-German  War  was  the  most  important  event 
of  European  history  until  overshadowed  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war.  Prussia  emerged  from  it  at  the  head  of 
a  united  German  nation.  There  was  a  serious  dislocation 
of  the  old  political  relations  which  it  took  several  years  to 
adjust.  England,  for  a  time  at  least,  needed  not  to  fear 
the  rivalry  of  France  and  devoted  her  attention  to  check- 
ing the  ambitions  of  Russia.  Bismarck  made  the  center  of 
his  political  conception  a  firm  alliance  with  Austria.  When 
Prussia  defeated  her  in  1866,  Bismarck  held  back  the 
Prussians  from  making  a  triumphal  entry  into  Vienna  and 
was  most  considerate  of  Austrian  susceptibilities.  Later, 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 


8        THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

for  Austria  the  occupation,  administration,  and  control  of 
the  Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Austria 
had  also  to  recognize  that  German  support  would  protect 
her  from  the  extreme  demands  and  nationalistic  aspira- 
tions of  the  heterogeneous  elements  embraced  in  her  terri- 
tories. So  she  constructed  her  empire  on  the  double  basis 
of  the  German  and  the  strongest  non-German  element,  the 
Magyars,  and  looked  for  support  to  the  German  alliance 
to  maintain  the  bond  and  the  balance  between  these  two; 
Germans  and  Magyars  of  Austria,  united  and  backed  by 
the  support  of  Germany,  could  maintain  German  suprem- 
acy over  the  numerically  superior  Slav  elements  of  the 
Austrian  Empire. 

The  Dual  Alliance  between  Austria  and  Germany,  estab- 
lished in  1879,  was  joined  by  Italy  in  1883,  as  a  result  of 
Italian  pique  at  France's  acquisition  of  Tunis.  The  Ital- 
ians there  much  outnumbered  the  French,  and  Italy  had 
been  hoping  for  its  acquisition.  It  appears  that  the  per- 
mission to  occupy  Tunis  was  the  price  Bismarck  paid 
France  to  make  the  Congress  of  Berlin  a  success  by  her 
participation.  He  probably  realized  that  the  jealousy  of 
France  it  would  arouse  on  the  part  of  Italy  and  England 
would  strengthen  Germany's  position. 

The  effect  of  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  to 
draw  France  and  Russia  together.1  It  is  in  the  nature  of 
things  for  any  two  states,  separated  by  a  third  sufficiently 
strong  to  resist  conquest  and  partition,  to  combine  against 
the  medial  state,  but  this  natural  bond  between  France 
and  Russia  had  been  weakened  by  the  mistrust  of  the 
Emperor  Nicholas  I  of  the  radical  governments  of  France.2 

1  The  text  of  the  Dual  Alliance  between  Austria  and  Germany  was  first 
published  in  1888  to  check  Russia  from  any  attempt  at  aggression.  See 
Encyclopedia  Britannica,  11th  ed.,  vol.  n,  p.  889.  For  text  see  Documents, 
post,  chap.  xm. 

2  Another  ground  of  difference  resulted  from  France's  adhering  to  her 
traditionally  sympathetic  attitude  toward  Polish  independence,  while  Bis- 
marck joined  hands  with  Russia  in  stamping  out  Polish  insurrections  on 
either  side  the  border  by  an  exchange  of  Polish  political  refugees. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  9 

The  Franco-Russian  alliance  was  not  merely  political,  but 
was  further  strengthened  by  financial  ties  between  the 
parties.  Russia  found  a  market  in  which  she  could  borrow 
to  greater  advantage  and  the  thrifty  French  were  glad  of 
the  opportunity  of  securing  for  their  savings  a  high  rate  of 
interest  from  investments  approved  and  supported  by  the 
Republic.  It  is  estimated  that  as  early  as  1906,  France 
had  become  Russia's  creditor  to  the  extent  of  some  twelve 
billions  of  francs.1  The  alliance  was  signed  August,  1891, 
but  it  was  not  avowed  till  some  time  later,  and  its  terms 
have  never  been  disclosed. 

4-  Crises 

The  formation  of  the  Dual  Alliance  at  once  reestablished 
some  semblance  of  a  balance  of  power,  based  upon  a 
bipartite  division  of  continental  Europe,  in  place  of  the 
older  association  of  the  relatively  equal  principal  powers, 
which  had  formed  the  Concert  of  Powers  since  the  Congress 
of  Vienna.  How  perfect  a  balance  existed  could  only  be 
ascertained  after  testing  it  by  diplomacy  and  the  power  of 
arms.2 

Although  England  had  always  been  included  in  the 
Concert  of  European  Powers,  she  had  held  somewhat 
aloof,  and  avoided  in  any  way  limiting  her  freedom  of 
action. '  Her  unique  geographical  position  and  unchallenged 
control  of  the  sea  gave  her  a  peculiarly  potent  influence  on 
the  Continent  whenever  she  chose  to  exert  it.  When  Ger- 
many, Austria,  France,  and  Russia,  the  four  powers 
originally  forming  the  European  Concert,  together  with 

1  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliance,  p.  10. 

2  Von  Bulow  says  of  the  Triple  Alliance:  "The  three  mid-European  States 
are  bound  to  each  other  by  the  firm  resolve  to  maintain  the  existing  balance 
of  power  in  Europe,  and  should  a  forcible  change  be  attempted,  to  prevent 
it  if  need  be  by  force.  The  united  strength  of  Middle  Europe  stands  in  the 
path  of  any  revolution  —  any  European  policy  which  might  elect  to  follow 
the  courses  pursued  by  Louis  XIV  or  Napoleon  I.  This  alliance  is  like  a 
mighty  fortification  dividing  the  Continent  in  two."  (Imperial  Germany, 
p.  67,  New  York,  1914.) 


12       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

6.  The  Algeciras  Conference 
As  Russia  extended  farther  eastward,  she  aroused  the 
fears  of  England  regarding  Tibet  and  the  control  of  China. 
She  also  came  in  conflict  with  Japan.  The  Mikado's 
Empire  had  learned  from  bitter  experience  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Chino-Japanese  War  how  impotent  it  was  to 
withstand  a  European  coalition,  when  Port  Arthur  and 
the  Liao-tung  peninsula  had  to  be  given  back  at  the  de- 
mand of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany.  Hence  Japan  was 
desirous  of  reaching  some  agreement  with  Russia  with 
regard  to  the  extreme  East  and  the  control  of  Korea,  for 
which  she  had  just  fought  a  successful  war  with  China. 
But  Russia  thought  to  continue  her  triumphal  advance 
and  disdained  the  Japanese  offers.  The  Japanese  Embassy, 
headed  by  Marquis  Ito,  which  had  been  sent  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, then  proceeded  to  London,  hoping  to  find  there  in 
their  common  fear  of  Russia  a  bond  of  union.  On  January 
30,  1902,  an  alliance  was  signed,  according  to  the  terms  of 
which  Japan  agreed  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  England,  if 
she  were  attacked  by  more  than  one  power,  in  the  defense 
of  her  Eastern  possessions  and  interests.1  England's  sub- 
scription to  an  identical  obligation  insured  Japan  against 
a  European  coalition  similar  to  that  from  which  she 
had  suffered  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Chino-Japanese  War. 
England  now  felt  less  uneasy  about  Russian  aggression, 
and  met  halfway  the  conciliatory  advances  of  Delcasse,  the 
French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whose  diplomacy  was 
directed  toward  removing  the  vestiges  of  bitterness  left 
in  France  by  the  Fashoda  humiliation,  and  securing  a 
working  agreement  with  England  for  harmonious  action 
throughout  the  world.  In  this  he  was  assisted  by  Edward 
VII,  whose  ready  tact  and  real  liking  for  the  French 

1  See  Documents,  post,  chap,  xiii,  for  the  terms  of  the  alliance  entered 
into  in  1911.  With  some  modifications  this  reproduces  the  terms  of  the 
alliance  of  1902,  renewed  first  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1905. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  13 

enabled  him  to  further  the  plans  of  the  statesmen  in  both 
countries  working  toward  an  Anglo-French  accord.  But 
French  public  opinion  was  decidedly  cool,  and  whatever 
bonds  of  sympathy  there  were  did  not  embrace  any  great 
number  of  persons  in  either  country.  Nevertheless,  on 
April  8,  1904,  France  and  England  entered  upon  an  agree- 
ment settling  certain  of  their  disputes,  as  a  result  of  which 
the  century-old  conflict  in  regard  to  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries,  a  constant  source  of  irritation,  was  ended  by  a 
compromise.  Certain  other  understandings  were  reached 
as  to  the  divisions  between  the  French  and  English  pos- 
sessions in  Africa,  and  most  important  of  all,  France  gave 
assurances  that  she  would  abandon  the  policy  of  checking 
the  development  of  English  control  in  Egypt,  where  she 
had  hitherto  been  able  to  prevent  English  reorganization 
of  the  finances  and  economic  conditions  of  the  country 
through  her  recognized  treaty  right  to  veto  any  action 
which  might  affect  the  security  of  the  French  investments. 
In  return  it  was  understood  that  England  would  support 
France  in  her  designs  to  develop  Morocco. 

Germany,  of  course,  perceived  the  danger  of  the  situa- 
tion. Having  fully  outgrown  Bismarck's  distrust  of  a 
policy  of  settlement  colonies,  she  had  been  picking  up  such 
waste  places,  still  unappropriated,  as  she  could  lay  hands 
upon,  and  probably  hoped  for  some  favorable  occasion 
when  she  might  secure  control  of  Morocco.  In  any  event, 
she  had  the  same  interests  in  maintaining  the  open  door 
in  Morocco  as  we  have  in  China.  Besides  this,  she  realized 
the  danger  to  her  general  interests  of  an  agreement  be- 
tween France  and  England.  Hitherto,  in  spite  of  some 
minor  disagreements,  Germany  had  made  it  her  policy 
to  remain  on  good  terms  with  England.  She  feared  lest 
France,  allied  to  Russia,  should  become  the  close  friend  of 
England,  and  German  prestige  and  political  influence  be 
diminished,  or  occasion  found,  even,  by  which  France 
might  bring  about  the  war  of  revenge  to  recover  her  lost 


14       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

provinces.  Bismarck,  instead  of  following  the  usual  pat- 
tern of  German  constitutional  government,  and  either 
including  the  conquered  provinces  in  some  one  of  the 
states  of  the  German  Union  or  endowing  them  with  a 
separate  constitutional  government  within  the  German 
Federation,  designated  the  territory  taken  from  France 
as  "Reichsland"  or  "imperial  territory."1  Since  then  the 
prevailing  opinion  in  Germany  has  been  that  France 
would  tear  up  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  as  soon  as  she  felt 
strong  enough.  As  long  as  Germany  held  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  every  German  felt  he  must  keep  bright  his  sword 
to  defend  this  possession.  Germany's  conquest  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  has  been  up  to  the  present  time  a  constant  irri- 
tant in  the  body  politic  of  Europe.  France  looked  forward 
to  recovering  the  lost  provinces,  and  Germany  felt  she 
must  protect  herself  by  keeping  France  weak.  Pursuing 
this  policy,  the  German  strategists  were  anxious  to  pounce 
on  France  in  1875,  but  even  if  Bismarck  had  been  will- 
ing to  desert  his  precepts  and  enter  upon  a  campaign  of 
aggression,  it  would  not  have  been  possible,  as  in  1870,  to 
secure  from  the  other  powers  of  Europe  permission  to  pro- 
ceed.2   The  formation  of  the  Dual  Alliance  tended  to 

1  It  would  have  aroused  the  jealousies  of  the  other  German  states  if 
Prussia  had  appropriated  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  she  did  not  care  to  lessen 
her  superiority  by  turning  the  provinces  over  to  any  other.  To  have  made 
a  new  state  would  also  have  diminished  Prussia's  relative  position  and  made 
possible  in  future  a  stronger  combination  in  opposition  to  her  control  of  the 
affairs  of  the  Empire.  So  the  solution  adopted  was  inevitable  and  resulted 
in  giving  Prussia,  through  her  preponderating  position  in  the  Empire,  a 
consequent  control  of  the  acquired  provinces. 

2  Bismarck  always  made  it  a  cardinal  principle  of  his  policy  to  avoid  any 
appearance  of  aggression.  "According  to  Bismarck,  the  military  plan  of 
seizing  the  first  favorable  opportunity  of  crushing  France  was  not  aban- 
doned in  1875.  'Later  also,'  he  says,  this  plan  was  advocated;  but  he  re- 
mained convinced  that  it  was  impossible  to  say  that  any  war  was  inevitable. 
No  one,  he  said,  'can  look  into  the  cards  held  by  Providence.'  (Memoirs,  p. 
442;  translation,  vol.  n,  p.  103.)  And,  as  was  his  wont,  he  summed  up  his 
views  in  a  single  pregnant  phrase,  declaring  that  offensive  war  to  anticipate 
a  possible  attack  was, '  in  a  sense,  suicide  in  apprehension  of  death.'  "  (Mun- 
roe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy."  Political  Science  Quar- 
terly, vol.  xxx  [1915],  p.  63.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  15 

reestablish  the  balance  of  power  and  prevent  any  further 
"bleeding"  of  France.  France  for  her  part  seems  really  to 
have  given  up  any  active  intention  of  pursuing  a  policy  of 
revenge  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  gradual  centrali- 
zation of  political  control  in  the  hands  of  the  Radicals  and 
Socialists,  especially  those  of  southern  France,  directed 
attention  toward  social  reform  and  colonial  expansion  and 
development.  She  readily  accepted  as  a  condition  of  the 
alliance  with  Russia  the  understanding  that  the  latter's 
support  was  not  to  be  counted  upon  to  further  a  war  of 
revenge.  No  doubt  there  were  many  Frenchmen  who,  in 
the  words  of  Gambetta,  kept  silent  about  Alsace-Lorraine 
but  thought  of  it  always;  yet  in  any  event  the  Triple  and 
Dual  Alliances  seemed  to  be  too  nearly  balanced  to  hold 
out  any  certainty  of  success  in  a  war  of  aggression  or 
revenge.  England,  too,  in  her  splendid  isolation  might  be 
counted  upon  to  prevent  either  Russia  or  Germany  from 
gaining  any  additional  influence  in  the  control  of  European  I 
affairs.  From  this  time  on,  until  the  present  war,  Europe's  \ 
peace  rested  upon  the  balance  between  the  two  alliances, 
and  upon  England's  isolation  and  intention  to  check  the 
too  great  development  of  any  one  continental  power. 

As  soon,  therefore,  as  Germany  perceived  from  the  trend 
of  affairs  in  Morocco,  after  the  agreement  of  1904,  that 
France  had  not  only  received  permission  to  extend  her  I 
political  influence  in  northern  Africa,  but  at  the  same  time  1 
was  reaching  a  better  understanding  with  England,  she 
had  to  consider  her  own  safety  as  seriously  threatened. 
Nevertheless,  Germany  did  not  think  it  opportune  just 
then  to  enter  a  protest  against  the  Moroccan  arrangement. 
In  the  German  Reichstag,  in  answer  to  a  question  from 
Count  Reventlow  why  the  Government  did  not  take 
action  to  protect  Germany's  interests,  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  asked  whether  the  interpolator 
thought  the  Government  should  make  war  for  this  purpose. 
So  Germany  allowed  the  matter  to  He  without  protest,  and 


16       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

France  and  England  thought  that  they  had  successfully- 
carried  through  and  definitely  disposed  of  the  Moroccan 
deal.  The  fact  that  this  important  step  did  not  give  rise 
to  an  acute  crisis  would  indicate  either  that  the  balance 
in  Europe  was  thought  to  be  very  nearly  true  at  that 
moment  or  that  the  combination  against  Germany  was 
too  powerful  to  be  resisted. 

Meantime,  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  which  had  broken 
out  the  February  preceding  (1904),  began  in  the  winter  of 
1904-05  pitilessly  to  reveal  Russia's  military  weakness 
and  inefficiency.  Europe  was  surprised,  even  startled,  to 
hear  of  Japan's  conspicuous  success.  The  value  of  Russia's 
political  support' to  France  as  an  ally  was  much  diminished, 
and  there  were  indications  that  Russia's  dislike  of  the 
socialistic  and  radical  governments  in  control  of  France, 
and  of  the  French  criticism  of  Russia's  severity  in  dealing 
with  political  agitation,  had  considerably  weakened  the 
bonds  between  them  and  undermined  the  Dual  Alliance.1 
This  seemed  to  the  German  Government  a  good  occasion 
to  make  a  move  in  regard  to  Morocco.  Accordingly,  the 
German  Emperor  disembarked  at  Tangier  March  31, 1905, 
on  his  way  east,  and,  after  making  a  speech  and  remaining 
a  few  hours,  continued  his  voyage  on  to  Constantinople. 
The  attention  of  the  world  was  at  once  focused  upon  the 
Moroccan  dispute,  and  France  rushed  forward  military 
preparations  to  defend  her  eastern  frontier  against  an 
anticipated  attack  from  Germany. 

England  let  it  be  understood  that  Germany's  action 
in  attempting  to  block  France  in  Morocco  would  be 
looked  upon  as  interference  with  England  also,  since 
France,  acting  in  accordance  with  an  understanding 
reached  between  the  two  countries,  had  a  right  to  count 

1  The  ex-Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire  says:  "After  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  there  was  a  slight  coolness  in  Franco-Russian  relations, 
whereas  there  was  an  increase  of  warmth  in  those  between  Russia  and 
Germany."    (Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  p.  81.  New  York,  1914.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  17 

upon  English  support  in  Morocco.1  The  whole  question 
was  referred  to  a  diplomatic  conference  at  Algeciras  in 
which,  it  is  interesting  to  note,  the  United  States  took 
part.  Thanks  to  the  support  of  England  and  the  defec- 
tion of  Germany's  ally,  Italy,  France  emerged  from  the 
combat  of  wits  with  a  diplomatic  victory  to  her  credit. 
Far  from  separating  France  and  England,  Germany's  ac- 
tion only  drew  them  closer  together  and  disastrously  af- 
fected German  prestige,  by  demonstrating  at  Algeciras 
that  France  had  succeeded  in  forming  an  entente  cordiale,  J 
or  cordial  understanding,  with  England  without  in  any 
way  weakening  the  Dual  Alliance  with  Russia.  Little 
comfort  could  be  got  from  the  humiliation  of  France  in 
compelling  the  resignation  of  Delcasse,  whose  foresight 
and  unflagging  efforts  had  brought  the  foreign  policy  of 
France  to  such  a  successful  culmination.  Germany  had 
insisted  officially  upon  interpreting  the  purpose  of  his 
diplomacy  as  an  attack  against  herself,  and  had  secured 
his  dismissal  by  a  threat  of  immediate  recourse  to  arms. 
France  was  again  grievously  humiliated,  but  her  experi- 
ence this  time  differed  from  that  at  Fashoda,  for  she  re- 
tained in  her  grip  material  solace  in  her  position  in  Mo- 
rocco, now  made  more  secure,  so  as  to  offer  an  opportunity 
for  the  extension  of  French  influence  and  control. 

Gradually,  England  had  come  to  the  realization  that ' 
Germany  was  the  most  powerful  nation  on  the  Continent, 
and  her  most  active  rival  for  the  world's  commerce.  The 
great  development  of  Germany's  merchant  marine  and  her 
unprecedented  efforts  to  launch  a  navy  commensurate 
with  this  commerce  and  sufficient  to  defend  it,  had  aroused 
British  jealousy  and  had  influenced  England  to  appreciate 
still  more  highly  the  friendship  with  France. 

In  1907,  a  few  months  after  the  Algeciras  Conference, 
England  entered  into  a  convention  with  Russia  which,  like 
her  entente  with  France,  eliminated  some  of  their  long- 

1  Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  87.  See  post,  chap,  vm,  §  5. 


18       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

standing  grounds  of  difference.  Northern  Persia  was 
allotted  to  Russia  as  being  within  her  sphere  of  influence, 
while  the  southern  part  fell  to  England.  This  practically 
amounted  to  a  partition  of  this  small  weak  state  just  on  the 
point  of  instituting  veritable  reforms.  A  small  central  por- 
tion, it  is  true,  was  still  left  to  Persia  to  constitute  a  buffer 
state  between  Russia  and  England,  and  to  serve,  perhaps, 
as  a  sop  to  English  conceptions  of  international  morality. 
As  a  result  of  all  these  efforts,  the  Triple  Alliance  found 
itself  confronted  by  the  gradually  forming  Triple  Entente 
in  which  France  was  linked  by  an  alliance  with  Russia  and 
a  friendly  understanding  with  England.  Germany  felt 
herself  hemmed  in  on  every  side. 

7.     The  Casablanca  affair 

After  the  agreement  reached  at  Algeciras,  it  was  natural 
that  there  should  be  a  certain  animus  between  the  French 
and  Germans  in  Morocco,  and  in  1908,  in  the  course  of  the 
military  operations  which  the  French  were  conducting, 
six  of  the  members  of  the  French  Foreign  Legion  at 
Casablanca  fled  to  the  German  Consulate  and  were  there 
given  protection  by  virtue  of  the  privilege  of  extraterri- 
torial jurisdiction  which  the  consuls  of  the  different  powers 
enjoyed  in  Morocco.  The  German  Consul  had  intended 
to  extend  his  protection  only  to  German  nationals,  but  in 
point  of  fact  three  of  the  deserters  were  non-German.  The 
consul,  not  realizing  this,  signed  a  safe-conduct  for  all  six 
to  be  embarked  upon  a  German  ship.  While  on  the  way  to 
the  ship  under  the  protection  of  German  agents,  they  were 
arrested  by  French  officials  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the 
German  Consul,  and  in  the  melee  which  resulted,  the 
Chancellor  of  the  German  Consulate  and  one  of  its 
Moroccan  guards  were  roughly  handled.  This  led  to  an 
energetic  protest  from  the  German  Government  and  the 
demand  that  the  deserters  be  restored  to  the  German 
authorities.   For  a  while  the  situation  was  most  threaten- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  19 

ing.  Germany  contended  that  the  rights  of  her  consuls  to 
exercise  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  over  German  subjects 
in  Morocco  had  been  violated  by  the  French  officials. 
France,  admitting  the  validity  of  such  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction,  considered,  nevertheless,  that  the  right  of  an 
armed  force  to  control  its  members  took  precedence  over 
the  ordinary  right  to  exercise  extraterritorial  jurisdiction. 
France  refused  to  yield  to  the  German  demands,  but  was 
willing  to  refer  the  question  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The 
award  which  it  rendered  in  effect  sustained  the  French 
position,  though  the  language  in  which  it  was  couched  was 
evidently  intended  to  avoid  giving  offense  to  German  sus- 
ceptibilities and  to  reach  a  verbal  compromise.  The  de- 
cision was  accepted  by  both  parties. 

8.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 

When  the  German  Emperor  decided  to  cultivate  close 
relations  with  the  Turk,  a  great  transformation  was 
brought  about  in  the  situation  of  Europe.  This  policy  was 
really  determined  by  Austria's  opposition  to  Russia's 
ambitions  in  the  Balkans.  Since  Russia  was  known  to 
covet  the  possession  of  Constantinople  and  the  control  of 
the  Slav  states  of  the  peninsula,  Austria's  easiest  method 
of  defense  was  to  support  the  Sublime  Porte;  Germany, 
who  likewise  feared  Russian  aggression  along  her  unpro- 
tected frontier,  was  led  by  this  common  fear  to  form  the 
closest  of  alliances  with  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Thence- 
forth, Austria's  policy  toward  Turkey  became  her  own. 
Gradually  England  relinquished  her  role  of  protector  of 
the  Turk,  to  be  replaced  by  Germany.  The  secondary 
consequences  of  this  change  of  policy  were  important. 
Germany  prevented  Greece  from  acquiring  Crete,  and 
shielded  the  Sultan  from  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  the 
powers  to  protect  the  Christians  in  Macedonia.  Turkish 
military  prestige  was  high  after  her  defeat  of  Greece  in 
1896,  and  German  officers,  under  the  great  strategist,  Von 


20       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

der  Goltz,  trained  her  forces.  Germany  in  return  for  this 
assistance  was  able  to  count  Turkey  as  almost  an  integral 
part  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  to  secure  concessions  in  the 
rich  territory  of  Asia  Minor,  where  she  pushed  the  con- 
struction of  the  Baghdad  Railway  to  link  Constantinople 
with  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Suddenly  all  Germany's  plans  were  upset  by  the  revolu- 
tion of  July  24,  1908,  which  brought  the  Young  Turks  into 
power.  Imbued  with  liberal  doctrines,  they  turned  to 
England,  and  the  British  Ambassador  was  greeted  with 
cheers  wherever  he  went.  In  this  emergency  Baron  Mar- 
schall  von  Bieberstein,  Germany's  astute  Ambassador, 
was  worth  a  whole  army  to  her,  for  he  soon  was  able  to 
regain  for  Germany  the  position  which  she  had  before 
held. 

The  Young  Turks  did  not  show  political  wisdom  in  the 
conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Empire.  They  had 
irritated  Bulgaria  into  seizing  the  Roumelian  section  of 
the  Oriental  Railway  controlled  by  the  Turks;1  and  when 
Austria  found  that  delegates  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
were  preparing  to  send  representatives  to  sit  in  the  Turk- 
ish Chamber  of  Deputies,  she  considered  it  necessary  to 
reaffirm  her  virtual  sovereignty  over  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina by  proclaiming  their  annexation,  October  7,  1908. 
Austria  had  been  playing  second  fiddle  to  Germany  so 
long  that  her  prestige  as  a  great  power  had  suffered,  and 
Aerenthal,  backed  by  the  energetic  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand, thought  the  occasion  opportune  for  showing  Europe 
that  Austria  still  counted.  Germany  supported  her  ally 
loyally.  This  action  was  well  timed  to  make  the  Young 
Turks,  at  the  moment  they  were  turning  their  back  on 
Germany  and  German  influence,  feel  the  folly  of  their 
course;  at  the  same  time  it  was  a  unique  opportunity  to 

1  S.  P.  Duggan,  "The  Balkan  Problem,"  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
March,  1913,  p.  104.  This  article  gives  an  admirable  summary  of  recent 
events  in  the  Balkans. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  21 

allow  Austria  to  make  an  advantageous  readjustment 
without  laying  Germany  open  to  the  accusation  of  playing 
Turkey  false. 

Italy  was  irritated  by  the  annexation,  for  she  had  always 
feared  to  see  Austria  grow  too  strong  in  the  Balkans  and 
extend  her  power  along  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic ; 
but  Servia  most  of  all  was  injuriously  affected.  As  long  as 
Bosnia  remained  nominally  under  Turkish  sovereignty, 
she  had  hoped  a  favorable  opportunity  might  permit  her 
to  incorporate  its  large  Serb  population  into  a  Greater 
Servia.  Russia  obviously  would  come  to  the  assistance  of 
Servia,  or  any  other  state  opposed  to  Austria,  and  there 
was  a  possibility  of  her  attacking  Austria.  England  did  " 
not  wish  to  be  drawn  into  any  dispute  over  a  Balkan  mat- 
ter, but  was  disturbed  by  what  she  considered  Austria's  ^ 
disregard  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 

Russia  protested  against  this  violation  of  the  twenty- 
fifth  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  and  declared  that  the 
question  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  interested  all  Europe 
and  could  not  be  settled  without  the  assent  of  the  powers 
signatory  to  the  treaty.1  Sir  Edward  Grey  supported 
Russia  and  pointed  out  that  Austria  was  also  violating 
the  Treaty  of  London  of  1871,  the  terms  of  which  declare 
it  to  Be  "an  essential  principle  of  the  law  of  nations  that 
no  power  can  liberate  itself  from  the  engagements  of  a 
treaty  or  modify  the  stipulations  thereof  unless  with  the 
consent  of  the  contracting  powers  by  means  of  an  amicable 
arrangement."2 

Diplomatic  wrangling  was  ended  when,  on  March  22, 
1909,  Germany  announced  that  unless  Russia  consented 
to  the  abrogation  of  Article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
Austria  would  invade  Servia,  to  put  an  end  to  her  prepara- 
tions for  an  attack  upon  Austria.  Russia  was  unprepared 

1  For  the  terms  of  Article  25,  see  Documents,  post,  chap.  xiii. 

2  S.  P.  Duggan,  "The  Balkan  Problem,"  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
March,  1913,  p.  105. 


1 


22       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

for  war  and  had  to  submit,  especially  since  England  and 
France  were  not  ready  to  be  dragged  into  a  war  over  a 
Balkan  question. 

If  England  and  France  had  been  in  quest  of  an  oppor- 
tunity to  strike  Germany  and  Austria,  they  could  not  have 
found  a  better;  but  both  were  animated  by  peaceful  inten- 
tions, and  in  Russia  there  was  still  a  vivid  recollection  of 
the  recent  campaign  in  the  Far  East.  So  Russia  yielded  to 
the  calming  influence  of  France  and  England.  The  idea  of 
a  conference  was  abandoned.  Austria's  fait  accompli  was 
accepted,  and  Servia  was  even  compelled  (on  March  31, 
1909)  to  make  a  formal  declaration  that  she  would  accept 
the  situation,  desist  from  her  hostile  preparations  against 
Austria,  and  arrest  her  propaganda  looking  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Bosnia.  A  few  months  after  this,  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein  succeeded  in  reestablishing  German  influence 
in  Constantinople.  For  a  while  a  calmer  tone  prevailed  in 
European  affairs,  until  the  corruption  in  the  blood  of 
European  politics  came  to  a  head  again  at  Agadir. 

9.  Agadir 

The  convention  adopted  by  the  Algeciras  Conference  to 
regulate  the  situation  in  Morocco  has  generally  been  con- 
sidered as  a  defeat  of  German  pretensions.  Germany 
found  it  necessary  at  that  particular  moment  to  accept 
its  terms,  but  she  reserved  the  right  to  interpret  them  as 
best  she  might  in  her  own  interest;  and  just  as  France 
had  formerly  spent  every  effort  to  block  the  develop- 
ment of  British  control  in  Egypt,  Germany  now  em- 
ployed every  means  to  thwart  the  extension  of  French 
influence  in  Morocco.  She  had  seized  upon  the  Casablanca 
incident,  which  gave  her  some  reasonable  ground  of  com- 
plaint, to  cover  demands  for  a  modification  of  French 
policy  in  Morocco;  France,  by  offering  to  submit  the 
question  to  arbitration  and  letting  it  be  perceived  that  she 
would  resist  any  attempts  at  intimidation,  succeeded  in 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  23 

restricting  the  question  to  its  juridical  limits  and  eluding 
the  inconvenient  political  demands  of  Germany.1 

Germany's  only  resource,  then,  was  to  continue  a  policy 
of  diplomatic  obstruction  and  to  attempt  to  work  through 
Spain,  who,  because  of  her  proximity,  was  naturally  anx- 
ious to  retain  what  she  considered  her  legitimate  rights  to 
a  reasonable  influence  in  Moroccan  affairs.  France  con- 
tinued to  push  her  policy  of  extending  French  influence  and 
control,  which  necessitated  campaigns  to  overcome  the 
native  resistance.  As  France  secured  a  firmer  control,  Ger- 
many complained  that  she  was  ignoring  the  principle  of 
the  open  door,  and  interfering  with  the  rights  assured  to 
German  citizens.  July  1, 1911,  the  German  cruiser  Panther 
appeared  off  Agadir  just  as  France  was  pushing  a  campaign 
in  the  interior  of  Morocco.  Germany  claimed  that  it  was 
necessary  to  send  the  warship  to  protect  German  interests 
because  of  the  unrest  in  Morocco,  but  all  Europe  recognized 
that  she  was  putting  forth  a  claim  to  a  greater  interest  in 
the  Shereefian  Empire. 

The  Panther  was  soon  replaced  by  a  larger  German  war- 
ship, and  both  England  and  France  sent  ships  to  Agadir. 
Lloyd  George's  speech  of  July  22  made  it  clear  that  Eng- 
land would  support  France  against  German  aggression. 
For  some  weeks  the  situation  was  most  tense,  but  in  the 
end  an  acceptable  compromise  was  reached,  November  4, 
1911,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  settle  the  Moroccan 

1  Germany's  interest  in  the  fate  of  Morocco  was  more  than  commercial. 
To  quote  from  Von  Biilow:  "In  November,  1898,  the  Emperor  William  II 
had  said  in  Damascus:  'The  three  hundred  million  Mahommedans  who  live 
scattered  over  the  globe  may  be  assured  of  this,  that  the  German  Emperor 
will  be  their  friend  at  all  times.'  In  Tangier  the  Emperor  had  declared 
emphatically  in  favour  of  the  integrity  of  Morocco.  We  should  have  com- 
pletely destroyed  our  credit  in  the  Mahommedan  world,  if  so  soon  after 
these  declarations  we  had  sold  Morocco  to  the  French.  Our  Ambassador  in 
Constantinople,  Freiherr  von  Marschall,  said  to  me  at  the  time:  'If  we 
sacrifice  Morocco  in  spite  of  Damascus  and  Tangier,  we  shall  at  one  fell 
swoop  lose  our  position  in  Turkey,  and  therefore  all  the  advantages  and 
prospects  that  we  have  painfully  acquired  by  the  labor  of  many  years.'" 
(Imperial  Germany,  pp.  100,  101.   New  York,  1914.) 


24       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

question  once  for  all  on  the  understanding  that  Germany 
should  recognize  it  as  a  French  protectorate  and  no  longer 
oppose  French  designs.  In  return  Germany  received  a 
cession  of  part  of  the  French  Congo  —  Ubangi,  bordering 
on  her  possessions  of  the  Kamerun.  The  solution  was  a  big 
disappointment  to  both  countries;  Germany  had  hoped 
at  least  to  acquire  an  important  port  on  the  Moroccan 
coast  which  would  have  been  most  valuable  to  her  as  a 
way-station  on  the  commercial  routes  to  South  America 
and  South  Africa.  In  France  there  was  a  feeling  that  Ger- 
many, by  threatening  resort  to  force,  had  obliged  France 
to  give  up  part  of  her  possessions  for  a  mere  recognition 
of  what  she  already  was  entitled  to.  This  agreement,  how- 
ever, laid  the  Morrocan  specter. 

It  had  taken  three  crises  threatening  the  peace  of 
Europe  before  this  satisfactory  result  was  reached;  but 
Europe,  relieved  of  her  anxiety  in  this  quarter,  had  good 
reason  to  turn  her  attention  to  the  Near  East,  whence  have 
emanated  so  many  baleful  international  disagreements. 

10.  The  Turco-Italian  War 

We  have  already  noted  how  France's  seizure  of  Tunis 
drove  Italy  to  join  the  Dual  Alliance  of  Austria  and  Ger- 
many, which  thus  became  the  Triple  Alliance  or  Triplice. 
It  was  in  vain  that  France  intimated  that  Italy  might  con- 
sole herself  by  taking  Tripoli.  Italy  shut  her  eyes  to  the 
obvious  fact  that  England  and  France  would  never  allow 
her  to  cut  the  Mediterranean  in  two  and,  by  controlling 
the  passage  between  Sicily  and  the  coast  of  Tunis,  to 
establish  a  second  Gibraltar.  Italy  went  farther  afield  by 
attempting  a  luckless  policy  of  expansion.  Her  prestige 
was  lowered  by  a  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Abyssinia,  and 
when  the  great  powers  were  taking  possession  of  choice 
morsels  of  Chinese  territory  and  she  cried,  "Me  too," 
China  faced  about  and  by  an  emphatic  refusal  put  a 
quietus  on  her  demands. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  25 

Italy  had  been  more  successful  in  building  up  internally 
the  strength  of  her  country  and  began  to  consider  favor- 
ably the  plan  to  take  over  Tripoli.  In  1900,  at  the  time 
when  France  was  feeling  about  for  support,  Italy  came  to 
an  understanding  with  her  in  regard  to  the  occupation  of 
Tripoli;  and  now  that  Germany  seemed  likely  to  inherit 
the  land  of  the  Turk,  England  was  not  loath  to  have  a 
power  less  formidable,  like  Italy,  secure  a  good  parcel. 
Still  Italy  seemed  in  no  hurry  to  make  the  move  until  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria  in  1908 
spurred  her  on.  Thenceforth  Italy  pushed  the  pacific  pene- 
tration into  Tripoli  with  constantly  increasing  intolerance 
of  Turkish  opposition,  and  shortly  after  the  subsidence  of 
the  acute  phase  of  the  Moroccan  crisis,  she  took  definite 
action.  At  2.30  p.m.  on  September  28,  1911,  the  Italian 
Government  demanded  that  Turkey,  in  order  to  terminate 
the  disorders  due  to  her  neglect  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica, 
should,  within  twenty-four  hours,  consent  to  Italy's  occu- 
pying those  provinces.  Upon  Turkey's  refusal,  Italy  de- 
clared war  at  3  p.m.  September  29,  and  after  a  long  and 
difficult  campaign  occupied  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.  It  was 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  Germany  would  relish  this 
onslaught  on  her  Turkish  protege,  but  she  was  powerless 
to  object,  because  she  feared  that  Italy's  flirtation  with  the 
Entente  might  become  really  serious  and  amount  to  a 
desertion  of  her  partners  in  the  Triple  Alliance;  but  un- 
official criticism  of  what  was  called  Italy's  unprincipled 
and  greedy  action  was  not  lacking  in  the  Austrian  and 
German  press.  The  nearest  approach  to  an  objection  was 
Austria's  seeking  and  obtaining  an  assurance  that  the  war 
would  not  extend  to  European  Turkey.  After  several 
months  of  hostilities,  the  Turkish  and  Italian  plenipoten- 
tiaries met  in  Switzerland,  in  July,  1912,  to  arrange  the 
terms  of  peace;  Turkey,  following  her  usual  tactics,  at- 
tempted to  drag  out  the  negotiations.  Meantime  the 
exposure  of  Turkish  weakness  had  whetted  the  appetite 


26       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

of  the  Balkan  States,  and  they  were  preparing  an  alliance 
against  the  Sultan.  Italy,  taking  advantage  of  this  situa- 
tion, presented  a  demand  that  the  Porte  accept  her  con- 
ditions or  resume  the  war.  In  the  face  of  an  impending 
struggle  with  her  Balkan  neighbors,  Turkey  could  do 
nothing  but  yield,  and  agreed,  by  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne 
of  October  18,  1912,  to  cede  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  while 
Italy  was  to  return  the  iEgean  Islands  upon  the  under- 
standing that  certain  reforms  should  be  instituted  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Christian  inhabitants. 

So  skillfully  had  Italy  applied  her  diplomatic  anaesthesia 
to  the  Triple  Alliance,  that  it  did  not  struggle  during  the 
whole  operation.  Nevertheless,  it  felt  the  effects  of  the 
shock,  for  at  the  same  time  that  Italy  showed  up  the  weak- 
ness of  Turkey,  she  indicated  how  loosely  she  was  bound 
to  the  Triple  Alliance  and  how  free  she  still  felt  to  direct 
her  foreign  policy  in  patent  opposition  to  Germany's 
wishes. 

11.  The  Balkan  Wars 

Before  Turkey  had  settled  her  conflict  with  Italy,  Bul- 
garia, Greece,  Servia,  and  Montenegro  accomplished  what 
had  always  been  considered  an  impossible  feat :  an  alliance 
against  the  Porte.  A  long  experience  with  the  evils  of 
Turkish  rule,  and  the  still  greater  evils  of  their  own  mutual 
antagonisms,  had  done  much  for  their  political  education. 
The  Balkan  States  no  longer  looked  to  a  benevolent  Europe 
to  protect  them  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Turk  and  be- 
gan to  see  the  folly  of  their  own  ceaseless  and  bloody 
struggles  among  themselves.  They  realized  at  last  the 
necessity  and  the  feasibility  of  a  combination,  of  a  coali- 
tion to  rescue  their  brothers  in  Macedonia  from  their  in- 
tolerable situation.  They  realized  that  they  might  never 
again  find  the  Turk  so  weakened  as  after  the  Turko-Ital- 
ian  War;  they  might  wait  in  vain  for  another  occasion 
such  as  then  presented  itself,  when  jealousies  between  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  27 

two  groups  of  great  powers  and  the  bitter  memories  of  the 
recent  Agadir  incident  made  it  difficult  for  them  to  present 
a  united  front  against  the  allies'  attack  upon  Turkey. 

In  truth  the  powers  were  quick  to  realize  the  danger  to 
European  peace  which  a  break-up  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
might  entail,  and  on  October  8,  1912,  they  agreed  upon  a 
collective  note  which  they  presented  to  the  Balkan  allies, 
stating  that  in  event  of  war  they  would  permit  of  no  modi- 
fication of  the  status  quo. 

But  the  allies,  wise  in  their  generation,  estimated  these 
representations  of  the  great  powers  at  their  true  value,  and 
prosecuted  their  campaign  against  Turkey.  The  glorious 
successes,  first  of  Bulgaria  and  then  of  Servia  and  Greece, 
made  the  disastrous  rout  of  Turkey  complete.  This  unex- 
pected result  was  too  much  for  the  feeble  Concert  to  han- 
dle. The  Triple  Alliance  could  not  prevail  upon  all  the 
members  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  force  the  Balkan  States 
to  restore  to  the  Turkish  Empire  its  lost  possessions.  We 
have  not  here  to  follow  the  interesting  course  of  events 
leading  up  to  the  Treaty  of  London,  when  the  representa- 
tives of  Turkey  and  of  the  allies  met  to  discuss  terms  of 
peace,  while  at  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion  a  conference 
of  the  ambassadors  of  the  great  powers  carried  on  a  con- 
current exchange  of  views.  Turkey  wished  to  settle  with 
each  one  of  the  allies  separately,  but  they  decided  to  make 
their  terms  with  her  first,  and  later  on  to  divide  amongst 
themselves  the  ceded  territory.  Turkey  had  to  give  up  all 
of  Macedonia  and  most  of  her  territory  in  Europe,  except  a 
small  strip  about  Constantinople,  and  leave  to  the  decision 
of  the  great  powers  the  disposition  of  the  iEgean  Islands. 1 

1  "  The  introduction  of  our  last  Army  Bill,  which  had  its  origin  in  the 
change  of  situation  effected  by  the  Balkan  War,  shows  that  Turkey's  col- 
lapse was  a  blow  to  us.  I  never  had  any  illusions  about  the  limits  of  Turkish 
ability  to  act  with  effect.  For  that  very  reason  I  strove,  for  many  years 
successfully,  to  prevent  any  serious  conflict  in  the  Near  East.  In  1897, 
during  the  Cretan  affair,  in  1908-09,  during  the  crisis  caused  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia,  and  in  all  phases  of  the  Macedonian  question,  there  was 
great  danger  that  serious  trouble  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would  have  more 


26       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

of  the  Balkan  States,  and  they  were  preparing  an  alliance 
against  the  Sultan.  Italy,  taking  advantage  of  this  situa- 
tion, presented  a  demand  that  the  Porte  accept  her  con- 
ditions or  resume  the  war.  In  the  face  of  an  impending 
struggle  with  her  Balkan  neighbors,  Turkey  could  do 
nothing  but  yield,  and  agreed,  by  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne 
of  October  18,  1912,  to  cede  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  while 
Italy  was  to  return  the  iEgean  Islands  upon  the  under- 
standing that  certain  reforms  should  be  instituted  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Christian  inhabitants. 

So  skillfully  had  Italy  applied  her  diplomatic  anaesthesia 
to  the  Triple  Alliance,  that  it  did  not  struggle  during  the 
whole  operation.  Nevertheless,  it  felt  the  effects  of  the 
shock,  for  at  the  same  time  that  Italy  showed  up  the  weak- 
ness of  Turkey,  she  indicated  how  loosely  she  was  bound 
to  the  Triple  Alliance  and  how  free  she  still  felt  to  direct 
her  foreign  policy  in  patent  opposition  to  Germany's 
wishes. 

11.  The  Balkan  Wars 

Before  Turkey  had  settled  her  conflict  with  Italy,  Bul- 
garia, Greece,  Servia,  and  Montenegro  accomplished  what 
had  always  been  considered  an  impossible  feat :  an  alliance 
against  the  Porte.  A  long  experience  with  the  evils  of 
Turkish  rule,  and  the  still  greater  evils  of  their  own  mutual 
antagonisms,  had  done  much  for  their  political  education. 
The  Balkan  States  no  longer  looked  to  a  benevolent  Europe 
to  protect  them  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Turk  and  be- 
gan to  see  the  folly  of  their  own  ceaseless  and  bloody 
struggles  among  themselves.  They  realized  at  last  the 
necessity  and  the  feasibility  of  a  combination,  of  a  coali- 
tion to  rescue  their  brothers  in  Macedonia  from  their  in- 
tolerable situation.  They  realized  that  they  might  never 
again  find  the  Turk  so  weakened  as  after  the  Turko-Ital- 
ian  War;  they  might  wait  in  vain  for  another  occasion 
such  as  then  presented  itself,  when  jealousies  between  the 


If 


B  ■ 


atertl* 


Gf*J 


peace,  it 

of  the  at 


m 


■ 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


27 


two  groups  of  great  powers  and  the  bitter  memories  of  the 
recent  Agadir  incident  made  it  difficult  for  them  to  present 
a  united  front  against  the  allies'  attack  upon  Turkey. 

In  truth  the  powers  were  quick  to  realize  the  danger  to 
European  peace  which  a  break-up  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
might  entail,  and  on  October  8,  1912,  they  agreed  upon  a 
collective  note  which  they  presented  to  the  Balkan  allies, 
stating  that  in  event  of  war  they  would  permit  of  no  modi- 
fication of  the  status  quo. 

But  the  allies,  wise  in  their  generation,  estimated  these 
representations  of  the  great  powers  at  their  true  value,  and 
prosecuted  their  campaign  against  Turkey.  The  glorious 
successes,  first  of  Bulgaria  and  then  of  Servia  and  Greece, 
made  the  disastrous  rout  of  Turkey  complete.  This  unex- 
pected result  was  too  much  for  the  feeble  Concert  to  han- 
dle. The  Triple  Alliance  could  not  prevail  upon  all  the 
members  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  force  the  Balkan  States 
to  restore  to  the  Turkish  Empire  its  lost  possessions.  We 
have  not  here  to  follow  the  interesting  course  of  events 
leading  up  to  the  Treaty  of  London,  when  the  representa- 
tives of  Turkey  and  of  the  allies  met  to  discuss  terms  of 
peace,  while  at  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion  a  conference 
of  the  ambassadors  of  the  great  powers  carried  on  a  con- 
current exchange  of  views.  Turkey  wished  to  settle  with 
each  one  of  the  allies  separately,  but  they  decided  to  make 
their  terms  with  her  first,  and  later  on  to  divide  amongst 
themselves  the  ceded  territory.  Turkey  had  to  give  up  all 
of  Macedonia  and  most  of  her  territory  in  Europe,  except  a 
small  strip  about  Constantinople,  and  leave  to  the  decision 
of  the  great  powers  the  disposition  of  the  iEgean  Islands. ! 

1  "  The  introduction  of  our  last  Army  Bill,  which  had  its  origin  in  the 
change  of  situation  effected  by  the  Balkan  War,  shows  that  Turkey's  col- 
lapse was  a  blow  to  us.  I  never  had  any  illusions  about  the  limits  of  Turkish 
ability  to  act  with  effect.  For  that  very  reason  I  strove,  for  many  years 
successfully,  to  prevent  any  serious  conflict  in  the  Near  East.  In  1897, 
during  the  Cretan  affair,  in  1908-09,  during  the  crisis  caused  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia,  and  in  all  phases  of  the  Macedonian  question,  there  was 
great  danger  that  serious  trouble  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would  have  more 


28       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

When  it  came  to  the  division  of  the  spoils,  the  political 
sagacity  of  the  Balkan  allies  broke  down  under  the  strain. 
One  of  the  principal  difficulties  arose  from  the  inconvenient 
determination  of  the  great  powers  to  establish  an  inde- 
pendent Albania  on  the  Adriatic  coast,  south  of  Monte- 
negro, thus  cutting  Servia  off  from  her  outlet  on  the 
Adriatic,  and  robbing  Montenegro  of  her  long-cherished 
hope  of  securing  Scutari.  Both  Italy  and  Austria  had  no 
desire  to  complicate  their  political  situation  by  the  advent 
of  a  new  power  on  the  Adriatic  littoral,  so  they  seized 
upon  the  convenient  excuse  of  Albanian  nationality  to  es- 
tablish under  the  collective  protection  of  the  great  powers 
the  independent  state  of  Albania.  Servia  was  promised  the 
right  of  transit  and  commercial  use  of  port  facilities  on  the 
Adriatic,  but  she  recognized  that  the  tenure  of  such  a  privi- 
lege was  of  necessity  precarious,  and  she  felt  that  she  had 
been  robbed  of  the  hope  of  realizing  her  legitimate  aspira- 
tion for  an  outlet  on  the  sea.  For  her  disappointment  she 
hoped  to  find  some  compensation  elsewhere,  but  Bulgaria 
ungenerously  refused  to  modify  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
for  the  division  of  conquered  territory  entered  into  previ- 
ously to  the  war.  Greece,  for  her  part,  wished  to  retain 
territory  which  Bulgaria  considered  should  fall  to  her. 
Bulgaria  was  supported  by  Austria,  while  Servia  and 
Montenegro  relied  on  the  support  of  Russia.  Not  content 
with  making  enemies  of  her  two  allies,  Bulgaria  further 
antagonized  Rumania  by  refusing  to  give  any  satisfactory 
assurance  as  to  a  compensatory  rectification  of  their  com- 
mon frontier.  Rumania,  although  she  had  taken  no  part  in 
the  contest,  thought  that  she  should  receive  some  accession 
of  territory  to  retain  her  relative  position  in  the  Balkans, 
alleging  that  she  might  have  thrown  her  army  against  the 

unfavourable  than  favourable  results  for  us,  as  well  as  for  Austro-Hungary, 
and  would  not  make  the  European  situation  any  easier  for  us  to  deal  with. 
For  many  a  year  Turkey  was  a  useful  and  important  link  in  the  chain  of  our 
political  relations."  (Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  74,  75.  New  York, 
1914.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  29 

allies,  and  so  have  prevented  the  success  of  their  campaign. 
Turkey  also  joined  in  the  attack  upon  Bulgaria,  and  Ru- 
mania mobilized  her  forces.  Bulgaria's  pride  was  quickly 
humbled;  she  appealed  to  the  Rumanian  King  to  intercede 
with  Greece  and  Servia,  and  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Bukharest  of  August  6,  1913,  she  was  forced  to  yield  up  to 
Servia  and  Greece  larger  portions  of  the  conquered  terri- 
tories than  they  had  at  first  demanded,  at  the  same  time 
that  she  acknowledged  Rumania's  claim  to  a  strip  of  terri- 
tory of  small  extent  but  of  great  importance  from  a  strate- 
gic point  of  view.  Turkey,  too,  succeeded  in  regaining 
Adrianople. 

Russia  and  Austria  all  but  came  to  blows  over  the 
Albanian  question,  but  France  and  England  were  unwill- 
ing to  be  drawn  into  a  war  over  this  Balkan  question,  and 
considered  that  Servia  should  be  satisfied  with  her  large 
accessions  of  territory  even  though  Austria  and  Italy  had 
succeeded  in  thwarting  the  claims  of  Servia  and  Monte- 
negro to  the  Albanian  coast.1  Europe  felt  a  sense  of  relief 
that  the  map  of  the  Balkans  had  been  made  over  without 
the  outbreak  of  war  between  any  of  the  great  powers. 

Austria  with  Italy's  support  had  checked  Servia's  aspira- 
tions for  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  either  through  union 
with  Montenegro  or  by  the  acquisition  of  part  of  the  Alba- 
nian coast,  but  she  could  not  prevent  the  extension  of 
Servia's  territories,  which  brought  with  it  greater  prestige 
and  made  her  more  dangerous  as  the  champion  of  the  Pan- 
Serb  propaganda,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  incorporat- 
ing into  a  united  Servia  all  Serbs  under  the  Austrian  Em- 
pire. In  other  words,  Austria  could  no  longer  dictate  to 
Servia,  but  had  to  contend  with  a  neighbor  of  no  mean 
strength,  who  was,  besides,  backed  by  Russia.  Austria  was 
bitterly  disappointed  to  find  her  dreams  of  an  outlet  on  the 

1  Any  attempt  to  support  Servia  would  have  been  particularly  ill-advised, 
since  it  would  have  united  Italy  strongly  in  support  of  Germany  and  Austria 
and  probably  brought  on  a  European  war  under  conditions  very  unfavor- 
able to  the  Triple  Entente. 


32       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

The  powers  were  not  so  naive  as  to  expect  that  these 
promises  would  be  effective  in  restraining  Servia,  and  no 
doubt  whatever  efficacy  they  may  have  had  was  impaired, 
if  not  swept  away,  by  the  Balkan  War.  The  Minister  sent 
by  Russia  to  represent  her  at  Belgrade  became  the  center 
of  an  active  propaganda  to  extend  Slav,  that  is  Russian, 
influence.  Another  cause  of  anxiety  for  Austria  was  that  if 
Italy  should  once  secure  control  of  the  important  Albanian 
port  of  Avlona,  she  would  make  the  Adriatic  an  Italian 
sea,  control  the  commerce  of  Trieste,  and  deprive  the  Aus- 
trian base  at  Pola  of  its  strategic  value.  Italy,  being 
nearer  at  hand,  was  much  better  situated  for  bringing 
Albania  under  her  influence.  Austria  had  other  causes  for 
chagrin,  since  she  had  lost  prestige  and  direct  influence  by 
backing  the  losing  power  in  each  of  the  two  preceding 
wars.1  No  sooner  had  the  Turk  been  worsted  than  she 
hoped  to  find  in  Bulgaria  a  counterpoise  to  Russian  influ- 
ence in  the  Balkans,  but  her  support  of  Bulgaria's  preten- 
sions and  urging  her  to  take  an  unconciliatory  attitude 
had  only  been  the  latter's  undoing.  Embittered  by  succes- 
sive disappointments,  Austria  was  in  no  mood  to  bear  with 
patience  any  further  interference  with  the  development  of 
her  policy  in  the  Balkans.  She  felt  that  her  prestige  as  a 
great  power  required  that  she  pursue  with  success  some 
constructive  policy  to  reestablish  her  weakened  position.2 

In  Franz  Ferdinand,  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  fortu- 
nately what  had  been  lacking  for  generations  —  a  leader 

1  S.  P.  Duggan,  "The  Balkan  Adjustment,"  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
December  1913,  p.  627. 

2  This  attitude  on  Austria's  part  is  indicated  by  Count  Berchtold's 
remark  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  that,  "  though  he  had  been 
glad  to  cooperate  towards  bringing  about  the  settlement,  which  had  resulted 
from  the  ambassadorial  conferences  in  London  during  the  Balkan  crisis,  he 
had  never  had  much  belief  in  the  permanency  of  that  settlement,  which 
was  necessarily  of  a  highly  artificial  character,  inasmuch  as  the  interests 
which  it  sought  to  harmonise  were  in  themselves  profoundly  divergent." 
(B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  1914.)  These  remarks  should  be  consid- 
ered in  the  light  of  ex-Premier  Giolitti's  recent  disclosure  regarding  Aus- 
tria's intention  of  making  war  upon  Servia  in  August,  1913. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  33 

capable  of  taking  up  the  direction  of  the  Empire's  politi- 
cal affairs.  Had  he  not  recently  successfully  put  through 
the  Bosnia-Herzegovina  coup  which  had  done  so  much  to 
enhance  Austrian  prestige?  There  had  been  indications 
that,  realizing  the  hopelessness  of  maintaining  the  Ger- 
man-Magyar foundation  of  the  Empire,  he  was  ready  to 
broaden  the  basis  of  the  Government  and  give  to  the 
principal  groups  the  national  independence  at  present 
enjoyed  by  the  German  and  Magyar  alone.  This  would 
have  still  further  weakened  German  influence,  and  would 
have  lessened  the  racial-political  tie  with  Germany,  but  it 
might  have  made  possible  the  organization  in  the  Balkans 
of  a  great  federated  empire  with  Constantinople  as  its 
seat  of  government,  and  united  by  the  overshadowing 
fear  of  Russian  domination.1 

As  a  result  of  the  Balkan  wars,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria 
had  been  too  much  weakened  to  offer  any  effective  support 
against  Russian  aggression  or  the  spread  of  Russian  influ- 
ence in  the  peninsula.  The  Government  of  the  Tsar  could 
continue  to  rely  upon  the  loyalty  of  the  new  Servia, 
strengthened  and  filled  with  enthusiasm  by  two  successful 
campaigns  in  which  she  had  doubled  her  territory  and 
acquired  Uskub,  the  ancient  capital  of  the  Serb  Empire. 
In  Bosnia,  there  was  disaffection  toward  Austria  and  an 
ardent  desire  for  union  with  Servia.  As  Austria  would  not 
tolerate  any  open  expression  of  this  desire,  so  natural  on 
the  part  of  the  Serb  and  Serbo-Croat  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation in  the  provinces  bordering  on  the  Servian  frontier, 
it  was  inevitable  that  secret  organizations  and  conspira- 
cies should  spring  up.  It  was  easy  for  the  agitators  to  cross 
over  the  Servian  frontier  and  perfect  their  organization  and 
plans  undisturbed  by  the  ubiquitous  Austrian  police  offi- 
cers and  spies.  Furthermore,  Servia  did  nothing  to  restrain 

1  See  "The  War  in  Europe,"  The  Round  Table,  September,  1914.  A 
remarkably  interesting  and  suggestive  article  written  with  a  strong  anti- 
Magyar  bias. 


34       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

her  citizens  from  aiding  these  conspirators,  nor  did  she 
interfere  to  prevent  Servian  citizens  from  organizing  and 
carrying  on  an  active  propaganda  for  the  union  of  Bosnia 
with  Servia.  On  her  side,  Austria  redoubled  her  efforts  to 
prevent  any  outbreak  in  Bosnia. 

12.  The  situation  just  before  the  War  of  1914 
Such  was  the  condition  when  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his 
morganatic  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  decided  to 
make  a  journey  to  Serajevo.  The  Servian  Government, 
hearing  of  his  intentions,  warned  him  of  the  danger  of 
which  no  doubt  he  was  himself  fully  aware,  but,  as  it  might 
be  considered  to  Servia's  interest  to  prevent  his  journey,  no 
significance  seems  to  have  been  attached  to  the  warning. 
After  the  failure  of  the  first  attempt  on  his  life,  the  Arch- 
duke made  an  impassioned  speech,  in  which  he  notified  the 
authorities  that  they  would  be  held  responsible  for  his 
safety.  The  second  attempt  was  successful,  and  on  June 
28,  1914,  the  fateful  shot  of  Gavrilo  Princip  shattered  the 
dearest  hopes  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  The  news 
of  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  heir 
to  the  Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs,  and  his  wife,  at  the  hand  of 
political  conspirators  of  Servian  nationality  or  sympathy, 
was  flashed  over  the  wires  to  all  parts  of  the  world,  and 
every  intelligent  individual  realized  that  the  removal  of 
Franz  Joseph's  energetic  heir  would  have  some  effect  upon 
future  events,  but  there  was  no  general  appreciation  of  the 
serious  consequences  threatened  as  a  result  of  this  assassin- 
ation. Yet,  from  the  moment  the  Young  Turk  party  came 
into  power  in  1908  up  to  the  assassination  at  Serajevo, 
there  had  been  one  continuous  state  of  crisis  in  which  no 
one  could  tell  what  the  next  month  might  bring  forth.  The 
chancelleries  of  Europe  had  realized  already  the  gravity  of 
the  general  European  situation,  and  after  the  assassination 
they  prepared  with  apprehension  to  watch  attentively  the 
course  of  events. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  35 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Giolitti,  ex-Premier  of 
Italy,  has  made  public  that  Austria,  in  August  of  1913, 
notified  the  Italian  Government  that  she  intended  to 
declare  war  on  Servia  with  Germany's  consent.  This  indi- 
cates how  profoundly  she  had  been  affected  by  the  changes 
in  the  Balkans.  But  what  Austria  and  Germany  designated 
as  a  defensive  measure  Italy  considered  aggression,  and 
refused  to  make  common  cause  with  her  allies.  Whether 
Austria  after  waiting  so  long  would  have  commenced  a 
war  against  Servia  without  the  additional  friction  result- 
ing from  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  it  is  impossible  to  tell.  As 
Von  Billow  himself  has  said,  the  collapse  of  Turkey  was  a 
blow  to  Germany  and  made  necessary  the  introduction  of 
a  new  Army  Bill.  The  German- Austrian  Empires  were 
making  every  effort  to  regain  the  lost  ground.  But  the 
other  powers  were  naturally  not  willing  to  lose  their  advan- 
tage, and  France  replied  to  Germany's  extraordinary  war 
taxes  to  increase  her  armament,  by  lengthening  the  period 
of  military  service  from  two  to  three  years,  at  the  same 
time  that  she  lent  Russia  her  financial  aid  to  reorganize 
her  army,  to  build  her  fleet,  and  to  lay  down  strategic  rail- 
ways along  the  German  frontier.  The  German  strategists 
may  well  have  feared  that  England  also  would  turn  her 
attention  toward  her  army.  Germany  at  the  zenith  of  her 
military  effectiveness  was  obliged  to  contemplate  the  rapid 
increase  of  armament  in  Russia,  possibly,  too,  in  England. 
Another  very  important  factor  in  the  European  situation 
was  the  bitterness  so  general  in  Germany  after  Agadir. 

The  French  military  attache"  at  Berlin  writes: "  We  dis- 
cover every  day  how  deep  and  how  lasting  are  the  senti- 
ments of  wounded  pride  and  rancor  against  us,  provoked 
by  the  events  of  last  year.  The  treaty  of  November  4, 
1911,  is  a  profound  disappointment. 

"The  resentment  felt  in  every  part  of  the  country  is  the 
same.  All  Germans,  even  the  Socialists,  resent  our  having 
taken  their  share  in  Morocco."  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  1,  Annex  1.) 


36       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

It  is  a  curious  circumstance,  not  without  influence  on 
the  events  we  are  considering,  that  each  of  the  Entente 
Powers  was,  during  July,  in  the  throes  of  serious  internal 
difficulties.  Great  Britain  was  admitted  on  every  hand  to 
be  on  the  verge  of  a  civil  war;  St.  Petersburg  was  in  the 
midst  of  a  great  strike,  especially  dangerous  in  a  country 
which  represses  all  expression  of  political  opinion;  in 
France,  perhaps,  the  situation  was  most  serious  of  all.  The 
attempt  to  constitute  a  ministry  in  sympathy  with  the 
plans  to  strengthen  the  national  defense  had  failed  and  the 
direction  of  affairs  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Social- 
ist and  more  radical  groups.  The  Caillaux  affair  was  dis- 
astrously affecting  the  prestige  if  not  the  very  security  of 
the  Government,  and  the  Minister  of  War  chose  the  occa- 
sion to  confess  that  the  army  was  in  a  deplorable  state  of 
unpreparedness. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  Europe  between  the  assassina- 
tion, on  June  28,  and  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum,  July  23.  If  Germany  and  Austria  felt  war  was 
inevitable,  it  must  be  confessed  that  another  opportunity 
equally  favorable  could  hardly  be  expected.  Nevertheless, 
the  best-informed  opinion  could  not  believe  in  the  reality 
of  a  great  European  war.1 

For  a  few  days  following  the  crime,  there  was  a  calm 
such  as  often  precedes  a  terrific  tempest.  The  tone  of  the 
press  might  have  caused  alarm,  but  the  accusations  made 
in  the  Austrian  and  Servian  newspapers  were  looked  upon 
as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  emotion  aroused  by  the 
tragedy  of  Serajevo.  It  was  hoped  these  ebullitions  might 

1  After  the  event  is  the  day  of  the  scaremongers  who  proudly  point  to 
their  prophecies,  but  if  we  turned  back  a  few  months  we  should  find  count- 
less other  prophecies  unfulfilled.  The  same  is  true  of  the  interesting  military 
reports  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  There  must  be  many  such  reports  in 
every  Foreign  Office  of  especial  advantage  to  spur  on  the  legislators  to  vote 
the  supplies  for  increased  armaments.  Their  significance  depends  upon  the 
extent  to  which  they  are  borne  out  by  information  from  other  sources.  The 
critic  ought  also  to  be  able  to  compare  them  with  similar  reports  received 
in  previous  years. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  37 

afford  a  harmless  outlet  for  pent-up  feelings  and  allow  the 
excitement  to  subside.  In  any  event,  it  was  thought  no 
action  would  be  taken  until  the  results  of  the  investigation 
of  the  outrage  had  been  concluded  and  the  findings  made 
public.  But  less  than  a  month  after  the  assassination, 
Austria  startled  the  world  by  addressing  an  ultimatum  to 
Servia  without  any  previous  warning.  It  was  the  opening 
scene  of  the  most  tragic  drama  of  human  history. 


PART  II 

ANALYSIS  OF  THE  DOCUMENTS 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  AUSTRO-SERB  CONFLICT 

The  terms  of  the  Austrian  note  —  Efforts  of  the  powers  to  secure  an  exten- 
sion of  the  time  limit  —  The  powers  influence  Servia  to  make  a  conciliatory 
reply  —  Servia's  reply  —  Austria  rejects  Servia's  reply  —  The  powers  urge 
Austria  to  delay  military  operations  and  accept  the  Servian  reply  as  a  basis 
for  discussion  —  Austrian  assurances  —  Austria  declares  war  on  Servia  — 
Austria  explains  the  purpose  of  her  action. 

1.  The  terms  of  the  Austrian  note l 

Although  European  diplomatists  were  alive  to  the 
danger  of  possible  complications  between  Austria  and 
Servia  as  a  consequence  of  the  assassination  of  the  Arch- 
duke, there  was  no  suspicion  of  any  immediate  cause  for 
worry.  It  was  expected,  perhaps,  that  Austria  would  pre- 
sent an  angry  protest  to  Servia  and  that  negotiations 
would  be  continued  at  the  ordinary  halting  gait.  Europe 
looked  with  anxious  gaze  farther  south,  where  Austria  and 
Italy  were  engaged  in  a  diplomatic  duel  to  secure  control 
of  the  newly  constituted  state  of  Albania  with  its  magnifi- 
cent harbor  of  Avlona  (Vallona)  commanding  the  entrance 
to  the  Adriatic.  Even  in  Albania  it  seemed  that  the  very 
difficulty  of  the  situation  would  make  the  rivals  cautious, 
since  England  and  France  could  be  counted  upon  to 
throw  their  influence  for  peace,  and  Germany  would  not 
allow  either  of  her  allies  to  seize  Avlona,  which  lay  like  an 
apple  of  discord  between  them;  for  a  move  on  the  part  of 
either  to  gain  possession  would  have  meant  the  disruption 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  So  the  diplomats  took  their  usual 
vacations.  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British  Ambassador, 
was  absent  from  Berlin.  The  Russian  Ambassador  to 
Berlin  had  turned  over  his  office  to  a  charge.  The  Kaiser 

1  For  the  text  of  the  Austrian  note  and  Servia's  answer,  see  Documents, 
post,  chap.  xin. 


42       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

himself  was  on  his  annual  cruise  to  Norway,  while  Presi- 
dent Poincare  and  Premier  Viviani,  who  was  also  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  were  on  an  official  visit  to  the  Tsar  at 
St.  Petersburg.1 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  in  his  dispatch  of  September  1,  giving  an  account 
of  the  events  preceding  the  war,  says  in  substance:2  'The 
presentation  of  the  note,  on  July  23,  was  preceded  by  a 
period  of  absolute  silence  at  the  Ballplatz  (Austrian  For- 
eign Office),  and  with  the  exception  of  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, Von  Tchirsky,  who  must  have  been  aware  of  the 
tenor,  if  not  of  the  actual  words,  of  the  note,  none  of  his 
colleagues  was  allowed  to  see  through  the  veil.3  On  the  22d 

1  B.  w.  P.  no.  6. 

2  As  has  been  explained  in  the  Preface,  a  single  quotation  is  used  at  the 
beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  extracts  which  are  somewhat  modified  so  as 
to  make  it  possible  to  include  them  in  a  running  narrative  of  the  events.  In 
other  instances  the  modification  has  been  made  so  as  to  separate  out  from  a 
document  the  part  relating  to  the  question  under  discussion  in  the  text.  The 
words  "modified  quotation"  in  parenthesis  with  the  exact  reference  are 
placed  at  the  end  of  all  such  quotations  to  enable  the  reader  to  ascertain,  by 
referring  to  the  source,  how  faithfully  the  original  has  been  adhered  to. 
Where  the  ordinary  double  quotations  are  employed,  the  original  is  strictly 
followed.  The  word  "extract"  is  placed  in  the  parenthesis  after  a  direct 
quotation  when  a  part  only  of  the  document  is  quoted. 

3  M.  Jovanovitch,  Servian  Minister  at  Vienna,  stated  in  a  report  drawn 
up  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities :  "  In  spite  of  all,  it  was  known  that  a  note 
was  being  framed  to  the  Minister  which  should  contain  the  grievances  and 
claims  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia.  This  work  was  entrusted  to 
Count  Forgach,  formerly  Minister  from  Austria-Hungary  to  Servia.  It 
was  generally  believed  that,  of  the  representatives  of  foreign  countries,  only 
the  German  Ambassador,  Herr  von  Tchirsky,  had  been  kept  informed  of 
the  progress  of  this  work,  and  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  he  even  collab- 
orated in  drawing  up  the  note.  Representatives  of  states  favorable  to  us 
also  agreed  with  me  in  thinking  that,  drafted  by  these  two  authors,  the 
note  would  contain  very  hard  conditions  for  Servia,  and  not  such  as  she  could 
accept.  When  the  text  of  the  note  was  made  public,  they  were  all  taken  by 
surprise,  not  to  say  dismayed."   (Extract,  August  16,  S.  B.  B.  no.  52.) 

As  early  as  July  15  M.  Jovanovitch  telegraphed  to  Belgrade:  "From 
now  on,  one  thing  is  certain:  Austria-Hungary  will  make  diplomatic  rep- 
resentations (demarches)  at  Belgrade  as  soon  as  the  Serajevo  investigation 
has  been  completed  and  the  case  presented  to  the  tribunal."  (Extract, 
July  15,  S.  B.  B.  no.  23.) 

In  another  telegram  of  the  same  date  the  Servian  Minister  furnishes  his 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  43 

and  23d  of  July,  M.  Dumaine,  the  French  Ambassador, 
had  long  interviews  with  Baron  Macchio,  one  of  the  Under- 

Government  with  a  prophetic  analysis  of  the  plans  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment: — 

"What  steps  will  be  taken?  In  what  form?  What  demands  is  Austria- 
Hungary  about  to  make  on  Servia?  I  do  not  believe  that  even  at  Ballplatz 
clear  and  concise  replies  could  be  given  to  these  questions.  I  think  that  all 
this  is  being  worked  out  at  the  present  time/and  that  Count  Forgach  has 
become  the  principal  factor  in  the  matter. 

"In  one  of  my  previous  reports,  I  mentioned  that  Austria- Hungary  had 
to  choose  between  two  courses:  that  of  considering  the  outrage  at  Serajevo 
an  internal  affair  and  inviting  us  to  aid  her  in  discovering  and  punishing  the 
guilty;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  that  of  turning  the  tragedy  of  Serajevo  into 
a  case  against  Servians  and  Servia  and  even  against  the  Southern-Slav 
movement  (Jougo-Slave).  Judging  from  all  that  is  being  projected  and  all 
that  is  being  done,  it  seems  to  me  that  Austria-Hungary  will  choose  this 
second  course.  She  will  choose  it,  convinced  that  she  will  receive  the  ap- 
probation of  Europe;  why  not  profit  by  it  to  humiliate  us  and,  up  to  a  certain 
point,  justify  the  Friedjung  trial  and  that  of  Agram?  Besides,  she  would 
justify  to  her  own  people  and  to  Europe  the  severe  reactionary  measures 
she  intends  to  take  in  the  country  in  repressing  the  Pan-Servian  propaganda 
and  the  Southern-Slav  (jougo-Slave)  idea.  Finally,  this  Government  believes 
that  it  will  be  doing  something  also  for  its  own  prestige,  convinced  that  this 
will  increase  the  esteem  in  which  it  is  held  both  abroad  and  in  the  interior 
of  the  Monarchy. 

"I  think  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  will  draw  up  a  memo- 
randum, or  rather  an  indictment  of  Servia.  In  this  document  will  be  set 
forth  all  that  has  been  gathered  against  us  from  April,  1909,  to  to-day,  and 
I  believe  that  it  will  be  sufficiently  long.  This  indictment  the  Government 
will  send  to  the  Cabinets  of  the  European  powers,  adding  that  the  facts 
therein  set  forth  give  Austria  the  right  to  make  certain  diplomatic  repre- 
sentations at  Belgrade,  and  to  demand  that  Servia  fulfill  in  the  future  all 
the  obligations  of  a  loyal  neighbor.  At  the  same  time  the  Government  of 
Vienna  will  send  a  note  to  us  also,  in  which  will  be  rehearsed  all  that  the 
Dual  Monarchy  desires  us,  without  question,  to  perform."  (July  15,  S.  B.  B. 
no.  25.) 

Even  before  this,  on  July  7,  M.  Jovanovitch,  had  sent  a  report  of  a  similar 
tenor:  "In  this  matter  Austria-Hungary  will  have  to  choose  between  two 
solutions:  either  to  regard  the  crime  of  Serajevo  as  a  national  misfortune 
and  a  criminal  act  which  must  be  adjudged  according  to  established  proof, 
the  assistance  of  Servia  being  sought  in  this  task,  that  the  guilty  may  in  no 
way  escape  the  severest  punishment;  or  else  to  make  of  the  outrage  at 
Serajevo  a  Pan-Servian,  Southern-Slav  (jougo-Slave),  Pan-Slav  conspiracy, 
with  every  manifestation  of  hate  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  toward 
everything  Slav,  —  hate  which  up  to  this  time  has  been  dissembled.  There 
are  several  indications  that  those  competent  to  act  in  the  matter  are  being 
pressed  toward  this  second  solution,  and  it  is  for  that  reason  that  it  is  neces- 
sary to  be  prepared  for  defense.  In  case  the  first  solution  should  be  adopted, 
we  ought  to  rally  to  it  completely."    (Extract,  July  7,  S.  B.  B.  no.  17.) 


44       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Secretaries  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  by  whom  he  was 
left  under  the  impression  that  the  words  of  warning  he  had 
been  instructed  to  speak  to  the  Austrian  Government  had 
not  been  unavailing  and  that  the  note  which  was  being 
drawn  up  would  be  found  to  contain  nothing  with  which  a 
self-respecting  state  need  hesitate  to  comply.  At  the  sec- 
ond of  these  interviews  he  was  not  even  informed  that  the 
Austrian  note-  (ultimatum)  was  at  that  very  moment  being 
presented  at  Belgrade,  or  that  it  would  be  published  in 
Vienna  on  the  following  morning.  Count  Forgach,  the 
other  Under-Secretary  of  State,  had,  indeed,  Sir  Maurice 
says,  confided  to  him  the  true  character  of  the  note,  and 
the  fact  of  its  presentation  about  the  time  they  were 
speaking.1 

1  This  hardly  seems  in  agreement  with  the  following  consular  report, 
which  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  stated  (July  19)  was  "drawn  from 
a  source  which  commands  consideration"  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  13) :  — 

Vienna,  July  20,  1914. 

"I  hear  from  a  personage,  who  is  specially  well  informed  with  regard  to 
official  news,  that  the  French  Government  would  be  wrong  in  heeding  the 
optimism-mongers.  Much  will  be  demanded  of  Servia.  The  dissolution  of 
several  societies  engaged  in  national  propaganda  will  be  forced  upon  her. 
She  will  be  called  upon  to  repress  nationalism,  to  guard  the  frontier  in  collab- 
oration with  Austrian  commissaries,  to  police  her  schools  with  reference  to 
anti-Austrian  feeling,  and  it  is  really  difficult  for  a  Government  to  agree  to 
act  as  policeman  for  a  foreign  Government.  The  shifts  by  which  Servia  will 
no  doubt  wish  to  delay  a  direct  and  clear  reply  have  been  taken  into  account, 
and  that  is  why  a  brief  delay  will  be  fixed  for  her  to  notify  her  acceptance  or 
refusal.  The  tenor  of  the  note  and  its  imperative  air  make  it  almost  certain 
that  Belgrade  will  refuse.  Then  military  operations  will  follow. 

"There  is  here,  as  in  Berlin,  a  clan  which  accepts  the  idea  of  a  conflict  on 
a  general  scale  —  in  other  words,  a  conflagration.  The  governing  idea  prob- 
ably is  that  it  is  necessary  to  start  before  Russia  can  have  finished  the  great 
improvement  of  her  army  and  of  her  railways,  and  before  France  has  over- 
hauled her  military  organization. 

"  But  here  there  is  not  agreement  in  high  circles.  Count  Berchtold  and  the 
diplomats  want  at  most  a  localized  operation  against  Servia,  but  everything 
has  to  be  considered  possible  —  everything.  I  have  been  struck  by  a  curious 
fact.  Generally,  the  official  telegraph  agency,  in  its  summaries  of  the  views 
of  the  foreign  press,  disregards  all  but  the  official  newspapers  and  the  more 
important  organs;  it  omits  all  quotations  and  all  mention  of  the  others.  This 
is  a  rule  and  a  tradition.  For  the  last  ten  days  the  official  agency  has  daily 
supplied  to  the  press  of  Austria-Hungary  a  complete  review  of  the  whole 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  45 

1  So  little  had  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  Vienna  been 
made  aware  of  what  was  preparing,  that  he  actually  left 
Vienna  on  a  fortnight's  leave  of  absence  about  the  20th  of 
July.  He  had  only  been  absent  a  few  days  when  events 
compelled  him  to  return.  It  might  have  been  supposed 
that  Due  Avarna,  Ambassador  of  the  allied  Italian  King- 
dom, which  was  bound  to  be  so  closely  affected  by  fresh 

Servian  press,  giving  a  prominent  place  to  the  least  known,  the  smallest  and 
most  insignificant  newspapers,  who,  owing  to  their  very  insignificance,  use 
language  which  is  freer,  more  daring,  more  aggressive,  and  frequently  insult- 
ing. The  object  of  this  work  of  the  official  agency  is  evidently  to  arouse 
opinion,  to  create  an  opinion  favorable  to  war.  The  fact  is  significant." 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  14.) 

On  July  14,  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  of  Servia,  sent  a  telegram  to  the 
Servian  legations  explaining  this  activity  of  the  Austrian  Correspondence 
Bureau,  in  stirring  up  animosity  against  Servia,  by  the  dissemination  of 
reports  of  articles  published  in  the  Servian  press.  The  dispatch  closes 
with  the  remark:  "No  one  in  Europe  would  know  anything  of  what  our 
own  newspapers  print,  if  the  Correspondence  Bureau  of  Vienna  did  not  give 
it  wide  circulation  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  Servia."  (Extract,  July  14, 
S.  B.  B.  no.  20.) 

Only  two  days  after  the  assassination,  M.  Jovanovitch,  Servian  Minister 
at  Vienna,  had  sent  the  following  warning  to  the  Servian  Government: 
"More  and  more  evident  is  the  tendency  in  Vienna  to  give  Europe  the 
impression  that  the  outrage  committed  against  the  hereditary  Archduke  of 
Austria-Hungary  is  the  outcome  of  a  conspiracy  hatched  in  Servia.  It  is 
their  intention  to  use  it  as  a  political  means  against  us.  It  is  necessary, 
therefore,  to  guard  with  the  greatest  care  the  language  of  our  newspapers 
about  the  affair  at  Serajevo."    (June  30,  S.  B.  B.  no.  2.) 

As  early  as  July  11,  the  French  Consul  at  Budapest  informed  his  Govern- 
ment :  — 

"Everything  is  for  peace  in  the  newspapers,  but  the  mass  of  the  public 
believes  in  war  and  fears  it.  Moreover,  persons  in  whom  I  have  every  reason 
to  have  confidence  have  told  me  that  they  know  that  every  day  guns  and 
ammunition  have  been  sent  in  large  quantities  to  the  frontier.  True  or  not 
true,  this  rumor  has  been  reported  to  me  from  various  quarters  with  corrobo- 
rative details.  It  shows,  at  any  rate,  the  nature  of  the  general  preoccupa- 
tions. The  Government,  whether  it  be  seriously  desirous  of  peace  or  whether 
it  be  preparing  a  coup,  is  now  doing  everything  it  can  to  allay  this  anxiety. 
That  is  why  the  tone  of  the  Government  newspapers  has  been  lowered  first 
by  one  note  and  then  by  two,  until  now  it  has  become  almost  optimistic. 
But  the  Government  newspapers  themselves  have  carefully  spread  the  alarm. 
Their  optimism  to  order  is  really  without  an  echo.  The  nervousness  of  the 
Bourse,  a  barometer  one  cannot  neglect,  is  a  sure  proof  of  that.  Stocks, 
without  exception,  have  fallen  to  improbably  low  prices.  The  Hungarian 
4  per  cent  was  yesterday  quoted  at  79.95,  a  price  which  has  never  been  quoted 
since  the  first  issue."   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  11;  cf.  S.  B.  B.  no.  22.) 


46       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

complications  in  the  Balkans,  would  have  been  taken  fully 
into  the  confidence  of  Count  Berchtold  during  this  critical 
time.  In  point  of  fact  His  Excellency  was  left  completely 
in  the  dark.1  As  for  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen  himself,  no 
indication  was  given  him  by  Count  Berchtold  of  the  im- 
pending storm,  and  it  was  from  a  private  source  that  he 
received  on  the  15th  of  July  the  forecast  of  what  was  about 
to  happen,  which  he  telegraphed  to  his  Government  the 
following  day.2  It  is  true  that  during  all  this  time  the  Neue 
Freie  Presse  and  other  leading  Viennese  newspapers  were 
using  language  which  pointed  unmistakably  to  war  with 
Servia.3    The  official  Fremdenblatt,  however,  was  more 

1  Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  38. 

2  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  no  mention  of  this  dispatch  of  the  16th  is  found 
in  the  British  White  Paper.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  warning 
Sir  Maurice  gave  his  Government.  The  omission  of  the  dispatch  leaves  the 
reader  with  the  impression  that  Downing  Street  (British  Foreign  Office)  had 
received  no  information  of  the  forthcoming  note  to  Servia. 

3  The  London  Times  of  July  23  published  a  dispatch  of  July  22  from  their 
Vienna  correspondent,  that  'contrary  to  expectation,  Count  Tisza,  Hun- 
garian Prime  Minister,  did  not  answer  that  evening  Count  Andrassy's  inter- 
pellation on  the  Austro-Servian  situation,  stating,  before  the  interpellation 
was  brought,  he  was  unable  for  the  time  being  to  reply  to  it,  not  considering 
it  in  the  interests  of  the  country  that  the  matter  should  be  ventilated  at  that 
moment.  Count  Tisza's  declaration,  which  was  completely  unexpected,  was 
stated  to  have  occasioned  great  surprise  in  parliamentary  circles  in  Buda- 
pest. The  day  before,  the  Austrian  funds  fell  below  79|,  the  lowest  that 
Government  stock  had  ever  touched.'   (Modified  quotation.) 

The  Times  correspondent  further  gave  an  account  of  two  important  articles 
which  appeared  in  the  Vienna  newspapers  that  day,  July  22:  'The  first, 
which  appeared  in  the  Neues  Wiener  Tageblatt,  read  as  though  it  were  in- 
tended to  prepare  Servia  for  what  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  would  demand 
of  her.  This  journal,  often  in  close  touch  with  the  Ballplatz,  advised  com- 
petent quarters  in  Belgrade  to  take  steps  that  the  points  at  issue  between 
Austria  and  Servia  might  be  placed  in  a  proper  light  before  the  Servian 
people,  since  the  "clarification  of  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  is  abso- 
lutely necessary,  and  we  admit  that  the  process  will  not  be  a  pleasure  for 
Servia;  for  it  will  naturally  entail  a  large  sacrifice  of  amour  propre  and  cannot 
fail  to  wound  the  exalted  vanity  of  the  adherents  of  the  Greater  Servia  idea." 
Servia, the  article  continued,  was  possessed  by  an  "incomprehensible  megalo- 
mania," which  made  her  strive  to  take  rank  with  the  great  powers.  She  must, 
however,  make  up  her  mind,  in  spite  of  all  her  politicians  and  generals,  "to 
remain  a  middle  state."  Empty  promises,  Servia  was  warned,  would  not 
suffice  this  time,  and  the  article  concluded:  "The  demands  which  our  Gov- 
ernment will  make  are  not  as  yet  known,  but  when  they  are  presented, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  47 

cautious,  and,  till  the  note  was  published,  the  prevailing 
opinion  among  the  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  was 
that  Austria  would  shrink  from  courses  calculated  to  involve 
her  in  grave  European  complications.'  (Modified  quotation, 
September  1,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  1914.) 

We  learn  from  the  report  which  the  Servian  Minister 
at  Vienna  sent  to  his  Government  on  July  20,  that  he 
was  expecting  a  war.   He  stated :  — 

"It  is  very  difficult,  almost  impossible,  to  get  hold  of 
anything  definite  here  in  regard  to  the  real  intentions  of 
Austria-Hungary.  The  watchword  in  regard  to  every- 
thing that  is  going  on  is  absolute  secrecy.  To  judge  from 
what  our  newspapers  write,  Belgrade  is  optimistic  in  re- 
gard to  our  relations  with  Austria-Hungary.  But  it  is  not 
possible  to  be  optimistic.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Austria- 
Hungary  meditates  something  serious.  What  is  most  to 
be  feared  and  what  is  very  likely  is  that  she  meditates  war 
against  Servia.  The  general  conviction  here  is  that  for 
Austria-Hungary  once  again  to  take  no  action  against 
Servia  would  be  equivalent  to  suicide.  Moreover,  the  idea 
that  Servia,  after  two  wars,  is  completely  exhausted,  and 
that  a  war  undertaken  against  her  would  be  nothing  more 
than  an  expedition  ending  in  prompt  occupation,  has  taken 
still  deeper  root.  It  is  believed  also  that  such  a  war  would 
be  over  before  Europe  could  intervene. 

Servia  will  certainly  feel  that  it  is  not  her  fate  to  become  a  great  power  at 
our  expense,  and  that  she  has  already  reached  the  utmost  limits  of  her 
growth.  .  .  .  We  are  very  desirous  that  the  necessary  discussion  which  is 
impending  may  find  public  opinion  in  Servia  in  a  state  of  mind  to  understand 
all  this." 

'The  other  article  was  published  in  the  Reichspost,  and  was  of  interest 
inasmuch  as  it  summed  up  some  of  the  arguments  adduced  in  quarters  which 
demanded  the  adoption  by  the  Monarchy  of  a  very  energetic  attitude  in 
Belgrade.  These  were  briefly  that  "the  acceptance  of  anything  short  of  an 
unconditional  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  orderon  the  southern  frontier 
of  the  Monarchy"  would  be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  weakness,  not  only  by 
Servia,  but  also  by  the  adversaries  and  the  friends  of  Austria-Hungary  in 
Europe.  In  other  words,  this  opportunity  must  be  taken  to  demonstrate  to 
the  world  the  strength  of  Austria-Hungary  as  a  great  power.'  (Modified 
quotation,  London  Times,  July  23,  1914.) 


48       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"Military  preparations,  which  are  being  made  especially 
on  the  Servian  frontier,  are  a  proof  that  the  intentions  of 
Austria  are  serious."   (July  20,  S.  B.  B.  no.  31.) 

On  July  23,  the  very  day  on  which  the  Austrian  note  was 
presented,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  gave  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  understand  that  he  would  give  him  next 
day  a  paper  which  would  '  include  proof  of  the  complicity 
of  some  Servian  officials  in  the  plot  to  murder  the  Arch- 
duke Franz  Ferdinand,  and  a  long  list  of  demands  conse- 
quently made  by  Austria  on  Servia.'  l 

To  this  Sir  Edward  replied  that  he  would  not  'make  any 
comment  until  he  had  an  official  communication,  and  it 
seemed  to  him  probably  a  matter  on  which  he  should  not 
be  able  to  make  any  comment  on  first  sight.'  But  when  the 
Ambassador  added  that '  he  supposed  there  would  be  some- 
thing in  the  nature  of  a  time  limit,  which  was  in  effect  akin 
to  an  ultimatum,  Sir  Edward  regretted  it  very  much.  To 
begin  with,  because  a  time  limit  might  inflame  opinion  in 
Russia,  it  would  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  give 
more  time  even  if  after  a  few  days  it  should  appear  that,  by 
giving  more  time,  there  would  be  a  prospect  of  securing  a 
peaceful  settlement  and  getting  a  satisfactory  reply  from 
Servia.  Sir  Edward  admitted  that,  if  there  were  no  time 
limit,  the  proceedings  might  be  unduly  protracted,  but  he 
urged  that  a  time  limit  could  always  be  introduced  after- 
ward; and  if  the  demands  were  made  without  a  time  limit 
in  the  first  instance,  Russian  public  opinion  might  be  less 
excited.  After  a  week  it  might  have  cooled  down,  and  if  the 
Austrian  case  was  very  strong,  it  might  be  found  that  the 
Russian  Government  would  be  disposed  to  use  its  influence 
in  favor  of  securing  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Servia.  A 
time  limit  was  generally  a  thing  to  be  used  only  in  the  last 
resort,  after  other  means  had  been  tried  and  failed. 

'The  Austrian  Ambassador  replied  that  if  Servia,  in  the 

1  Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  74,  enclosure.  This  material,  with  several  important 
annexes,  is  given  in  the  Austrian  Red  Book,  no.  19. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  49 

interval  that  had  elapsed  since  the  murder  of  the  Arch- 
duke, had  voluntarily  instituted  an  inquiry  on  her  own 
territory,  all  this  complication  might  have  been  avoided.1 

1  The  Austrian  Councilor  of  Legation  at  Belgrade,  on  the  second  day 
(June  30)  following  the  tragedy,  'directed  to  the  General  Secretary  of  the 
Servian  Foreign  Office,  M.  Gruic,  the  very  pertinent  inquiry  as  to  what 
measures  the  Servian  police  had  taken  or  contemplated  taking  in  order  to 
follow  the  threads  of  the  assassination,  which  notoriously  led  over  into 
Servia. 

(M.  Gruic's  reply  was  that  the  Servian  police  had,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
given  the  matter  no  consideration.'  (Modified  quotation,  June  30,  A.  R. 
B.  no.  2.) 

In  his  dispatch  of  July  23,  Count  Berchtold  instructed  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  London  to  point  out  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  when  he  communi- 
cated the  Austrian  Circular  Note  on  the  24th  instant  that  "Servia  would 
have  had  it  in  her  power  to  ward  off  the  vigorous  action  which  we  must  have 
been  expected  to  take  if  she  had  spontaneously  on  her  own  account  taken  the 
necessary  steps  to  establish  an  investigation  on  Servian  territory  against 
the  Servian  participants  in  the  assassination  of  June  28,  and  to  investigate 
the  clews  which,  in  connection  with  the  assassination,  have  been  proved  to 
lead  from  Belgrade  to  Serajevo. 

"The  Servian  Government  has  till  to-day,  despite  the  fact  that  a  number 
of  notoriously  familiar  indications  point  toward  Belgrade,  not  only  under- 
taken nothing  in  this  matter,  but  it  has  rather  sought  to  wipe  out  the  traces 
at  hand. 

"Thus  it  can  be  gathered  from  a  telegraphic  report  of  our  [the  Austrian] 
Embassy  at  Belgrade  that  the  Servian  State  official  Ciganovic,  who  has 
been  compromised  by  the  common  testimony  of  the  assassins,  still  so- 
journed in  Belgrade  on  the  day  of  the  assassination,  but  that  three  days 
thereafter,  when  his  name  was  mentioned  in  the  newspapers,  he  had  already 
quitted  the  city.  It  is  well  known,  too,  that  the  Servian  Chief  of  the  Press 
has  already  declared  that  Ciganovitch  is  utterly  unknown  in  Belgrade." 
(Extract,  June  23,  A.  R.  B.  no.  9.) 

M.  Pashitch,  the  Servian  Prime  Minister,  in  a  telegram  of  July  19,  to  the 
Servian  Missions  abroad,  stated:  — 

"From  the  beginning  the  Servian  Government  has  declared  itself  ready 
to  bring  before  the  courts  of  justice  every  Servian  subject  shown  to  have 
taken  part  in  the  outrage  of  Serajevo.  Furthermore,  the  Government  has 
declared  that  it  had  prepared  a  bill  to  render  more  efficacious  the  measures 
already  taken  against  any  misuse  of  explosives.  This  bill  had  already 
been  submitted  to  the  Council  of  State,  but  could  not  be  presented  to  the 
Skoupchtina,  that  body  having  been  dissolved.  Finally,  the  Servian  Gov- 
ernment has  declared  that  it  is  ready,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  to  fulfill 
all  those  neighborly  duties  devolving  upon  it  as  a  European  state. 

"Since  the  outrage  was  committed,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
has  at  no  time  addressed  itself  to  the  Servian  Government  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  its  concurrent  action  in  regard  to  the  matter  of  the  outrage.  It 
has  not  demanded  that  one  of  the  accomplices  be  subjected  to  a  preliminary 


50       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

In  1909,  Servia  had  said  in  a  note  that  she  intended  to  live 
on  terms  of  good  neighborhood  with  Austria;  but  she  had 
never  kept  her  promise.  She  had  stirred  up  agitation,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  disintegrate  Austria,  and  had  made 
it  absolutely  necessary  for  Austria  to  protect  herself. 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  that  he  would  not  comment  upon 
or  criticize  what  the  Austrian  Ambassador  had  told  him 
that  afternoon,  but  he  could  not  help  dwelling  upon  the 
awful  consequences  involved  in  the  situation.  Great  appre- 
hension had  been  expressed  to  him,  not  only  by  the  French 
and  Russian  Ambassadors,  but  also  by  others,  as  to  what 
might  happen,  and  it  had  been  represented  to  him  that  it 
would  be  very  desirable  that  those  who  had  influence  in 
St.  Petersburg  should  use  it  on  behalf  of  patience  and  mod- 
eration.1 _He  had  replied  that  the  amount  of  influence  that 
could  be  used  in  this  sense  would  depend  upon  how  rea- 
sonable were  the  Austrian  demands,  and  how  strong  the 

examination  or  be  brought  to  trial.  Once  only  it  asked  for  particulars  in 
regard  to  the  present  address  of  some  students  who  had  been  expelled  from 
the  primary  normal  school  of  Pakrac  and  who  had  come  to  Servia  to  con- 
tinue their  studies.  All  the  information  on  this  subject  which  could  be 
gathered  was  forwarded  to  the  Austrian  Government. 

"Nevertheless,  the  campaign  against  Servia  is  continued  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  press  and  public  opinion  against  Servia  is  being  excited  in 
Austria-Hungary  and  in  Europe.  .  .  .  We  shall  welcome  the  claims  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary in  case  she  may  demand  that  certain  accomplices  in  Servia 
—  should  any  such  be  found  —  be  brought  before  our  own  independent 
courts  to  receive  judgment."   (Extract,  July  19,  S.  B.  B.  no.  30.) 

Servia's  action  in  not  instituting  any  investigation  was,  under  the  circum- 
stances, not  merely  discourteous  to  Austria,  but  really  insulting.  When,  on 
July  4,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris  transmitted  to  M.  Poincare  the 
thanks  of  his  Government  for  his  sympathy  at  the  tragic  bereavement  of 
the  imperial  house,  the  president  of  the  Republic  had  '  expressed  the  convic- 
tion that  the  Servian  Government  would  come  to  meet  Austria  with  the 
greatest  possible  degree  of  conciliation  in  respect  to  the  judicial  investiga- 
tion and  prosecution  of  those  found  to  be  accomplices.  No  state  could,  he 
said,  evade  such  a  duty.'    (Modified  quotation,  July  4,  A.  R.  B.  no.  4.) 

1  It  may  perhaps  seem  somewhat  far-fetched  to  remark  that  the  words  of 
the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors,  being  members  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
would  not,  of  course,  have  seemed  to  the  Austrian  representative  so  signifi- 
cant as  this  veiled  hint  at  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor, who  is  easily  understood  as  included  among  "others."  (See  B.  W.  P. 
no.  11.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  51 

justification  that  Austria  might  have  discovered  for  mak- 
ing her  demands.  The  possible  consequences  of  the  present 
situation  were  terrible.  If  as  many  as  four  great  powers  of 
Europe,  say  Austria,  France,  Russia,  and  Germany,  were 
engaged  in  war,  it  seemed  to  him  that  it  must  involve  the 
expenditure  of  so  vast  a  sum  of  money  and  such  an  inter- 
ference with  trade  that  a  war  would  be  accompanied  or 
followed  by  a  complete  collapse  of  European  credit  and 
industry.  In  these  days,  in  great  industrial  states,  this 
would  mean  a  state  of  things  worse  than  that  of  1848,  and, 
irrespective  of  who  were  victors  in  the  war,  many  things 
might  be  completely  swept  away. 

1  The  Austrian  Ambassador  did  not  demur  to  this  state- 
ment of  the  possible  consequences  of  the  present  situation, 
but  said  that  all  would  depend  upon  Russia. 

1  Sir  Edward  made  the  remark  that,  in  a  time  of  difficul- 
ties such  as  the  present,  it  was  just  as  true  to  say  that  it 
required  two  to  keep  the  peace  as  it  was  to  say,  ordinarily, 
that  it  took  two  to  make  a  quarrel.  He  hoped  very  much 
that,  if  there  were  difficulties,  Austria  and  Russia  would  be 
able  in  the  first  instance  to  discuss  them  directly  with  each 
other. 

'The  Austrian  Ambassador  said  that  he  hoped  this 
would  be  possible,  but  he  was  under  the  impression  that 
the  attitude  in  St.  Petersburg  had  not  been  very  favorable 
recently.'   (Modified  quotations,  July  23,  B.  W.  P.  no.  3.) 

The  next  day,  July  24,  the  Austrian  Government  com- 
municated the  contents  of  their  note  and  the  reasons  for 
its  presentation.1 

1  The  note  was  also  published  in  the  Vienna  newspapers 
the  same  day,  and  by  common  consent  it  was  at  once 
styled  an  ultimatum.'2  (Modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P., 

1  The  texts  of  the  Austrian  note  of  July  23,  and  the  Servian  reply  of  July 
25,  will  be  found  among  the  Documents;  see  post,  chap.  xm. 

2  The  effect  of  an  ultimatum  is  to  put  an  end  to  discussion  by  the  offering 
of  final  terms  to  be  accepted  or  rejected. 


52       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  1914.)  The  Austrian  note  to  Ser- 
via  began  as  follows:  "On  the  31st  of  March,  1909,  the 
Servian  Minister  in  Vienna,  on  the  instructions  of  the 
Servian  Government,  made  the  following  declaration  to 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government :  — 

"'Servia  recognizes  that  the  fait  accompli  regarding 
Bosnia  has  not  affected  her  rights,  and  consequently  she 
will  conform  to  the  decisions  that  the  powers  may  take  in 
conformity  with  Article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  In 
deference  to  the  advice  of  the  great  powers  Servia  under- 
takes to  renounce  from  now  onward  the  attitude  of  protest 
and  opposition  which  she  has  adopted  with  regard  to  the 
annexation  since  last  Autumn.  She  undertakes,  moreover, 
to  modify  the  direction  of  her  policy  with  regard  to  Austria- 
Hungary  and  to  live  in  future  on  good  neighborly  terms 
with  the  latter.' "  (Extract,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  4;  cf.  A. 
R.  B.  no.  8.) 

In  diplomatic  parlance  this  statement,  referred  to  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Austrian  note,  was  equivalent  to  an  agree- 
ment to  abandon  any  active  support  of  the  Pan-Serb  prop- 
aganda, and  not  to  permit  the  Servian  territory  to  be  made 
use  of  for  any  such  purpose;  but  this  engagement  was 
taken  before  the  Balkan  War  had  added  so  materially  to 
the  strength  of  the  Servian  state  and  before  the  hearts  of 
her  people  had  been  embittered  by  Austria  and  Italy's 
blocking  their  access  to  the  sea  by  way  of  the  Albanian 
coast.  Russia  objected  that  this  agreement  by  Servia  was 
made  "in  deference  to  the  advice  of  the  great  powers"  and 
was  not  given  to  Austria  alone.  Consequently,  its  enforce- 
ment should  likewise  have  been  considered  a  concern  of 
all  the  powers.  There  is  much  truth  in  this  remark.  Be- 
sides, every  Balkan  question  has  always  been  looked  upon 
as  of  general  concern. 

The  Austrian  note  or  ultimatum  then  went  on  to  com- 
plain that  Servia  had  not  carried  out  this  undertaking 
formally  entered  into,  and  had  made  it  necessary  for 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  53 

Austria  to  put  an  end  to  the  intrigues  which  menaced  her 
tranquillity  by  demanding  a  formal  assurance  from  Servia. 
To  this  effect  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  insisted 
upon  imposing  the  terms  in  which  Servia  should  make  an 
official  and  most  public  condemnation  of  the  propaganda 
complained  of,  and  express  regret  at  its  ghastly  conse- 
quences. In  addition  the  note  formulated  ten  demands. 
Servia  was  required  to  answer  by  six  o'clock  of  Saturday 
evening,  July  25,  only  two  days  after  its  presentation.  To 
the  note  was  attached  a  memorandum  dealing  with  the 
results  of  the  magisterial  inquiry  at  Serajevo  in  as  far  as  it 
related  to  the  complicity  of  the  Servian  officials  mentioned 
in  the  demands. 

The  memorandum  explaining  the  complicity  of  the 
Servian  officials  seems  to  have  been  a  mere  statement  of 
what  the  Austrian  officials  considered  to  be  the  facts 
which,  if  adequately  supported  by  copies  of  depositions, 
etc.,  would  have  borne  out  the  statements  of  the  note.  In 
other  words,  it  added  nothing  to  the  say-so  of  the  Austrian 
Government,  which  was  submitted  in  writing  to  the  Serv- 
ian Government  to  be  accepted  as  true  and  acted  upon 
within  forty-eight  hours,  without  its  being  furnished  with 
anything  worthy  of  the  name  of  proof  in  the  broadest  sense 
of  the  word.1 

In  communicating  this  note  to  the  powers,  Austria 
accompanied  it  with  explanations  of  the  nature  of  the 

1  When  M.  Sazonof  asked  the  Austrian  Ambassador  to  explain  whether 
or  not  it  had  been  proved  that  the  series  of  outrages  he  mentioned  originated 
in  Belgrade,  the  latter  emphasized  the  fact  that  they  were  the  result  of 
Servian  instigation.    (A.  R.  B.  no.  14.) 

In  a  note  of  July  1,  sent  to  all  the  Servian  representatives,  the  Servian 
Prime  Minister,  M.  Pashitch  had  defended  his  Government  from  such  an 
imputation:  "At  the  moment  when  Servia  was  making  every  effort  to  bring 
about  better  and  more  friendly  relations  with  her  neighbor,  the  Monarchy, 
it  would  be  absurd  to  think  that,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  she  could  have 
inspired  such  acts.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  to  the  vital  interest  of  Servia 
herself  that  this  crime  should  not  have  taken  place.  Unfortunately  that 
was  a  matter  beyond  her  power,  the  two  authors  of  the  outrage  being  Aus- 
trian subjects."    (Extract,  July  1,  S.  B.  B.  no.  8.) 


54       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Servian  propaganda  of  which  she  complained.  It  was 
stated  that '  the  Servian  Government  had  failed  in  the  duty 
imposed  on  it  by  the  solemn  declaration  of  March  31, 1909, 
and  had  acted  in  opposition  to  the  will  of  Europe  and  the 
undertaking  given  to  Austria-Hungary.  The  British  Gov- 
ernment was  informed  that  the  Austrian  Government  held 
at  its  disposal  a  dossier  elucidating  the  Servian  intrigues 
and  the  connection  between  these  intrigues  and  the  murder 
of  the  28th  of  June.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  4.  Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  75,  Annex;  A.  R.  B.  no.  19.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  remarked  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
that  it  seemed  a  matter  for  great  regret  that  a  time  limit, 
and  such  a  short  one  at  that,  had  been  insisted  upon  at  this 
stage  of  the  proceedings.  The  murder  of  the  Archduke  and 
some  of  the  circumstances  respecting  Servia  quoted  in  the 
note  aroused  sympathy  with  Austria,  as  was  but  natural, 
but  at  the  same  time  he  had  never  before  seen  one  state 
address  to  another  independent  state  a  document  of  so 
formidable  a  character.  Demand  number  5  would  be 
hardly  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  Servia's  inde- 
pendent sovereignty  if  it  were  to  mean,  as  it  seemed  that 
it  might,  that  Austria-Hungary  was  to  be  invested  with  a 
right  to  appoint  officials  who  would  have  authority  within 
the  frontiers  of  Servia.  'Sir  Edward  added  that  he  felt 
great  apprehension,  and  that  he  would  concern  himself 
with  the  matter  simply  and  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  peace  of  Europe.  The  merits  of  the  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia  were  not,  he  said,  the  concern  of  the 
British  Government,  and  such  comments  as  he  had  previ- 
ously made  had  not  been  made  in  order  to  discuss  those 
merits. 

'  He  ended  by  saying  that  doubtless  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  enter  into  an  exchange  of  views  with  other 
powers,  and  that  he  must  await  their  views  as  to  what 
could  be  done  to  mitigate  the  difficulties  of  the  situation.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  5.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  55 

In  the  absence  of  the  Russian  Ambassador  the  Russian 
Charge"  at  Vienna  called  upon  Count  Berchtold  the  morn- 
ing after  the  note  was  presented,  before  there  had  been 
time  for  instructions  from  St.  Petersburg  to  arrive,  and  told 
him  '  as  his  own  personal  view,  that  the  Austrian  note  was 
drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering  it  impossible  of  acceptance  as 
it  stood,  and  that  it  was  both  unusual  and  peremptory  in 
its  terms.' 1  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  7; 
cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  17,  32.) 

The  Servian  Government  informed  the  British  repre- 
sentative that  'they  considered  the  Austrian  demands 
absolutely  unacceptable.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  8;  cf.  S.  B.  B.  no.  35;  R.  O.  P.  nos.  1,  6.) 

The  experienced  diplomat,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  thought 
'the  Servians  could  not  possibly  accept  the  Austrian  de- 
mand.' (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10;  cf. 
B.  W.  P.  no.  16.) 

'In  a  long  conversation  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
on  July  26,  M.  Sazonof  pointed  out  how  some  of  the  de- 
mands were  absolutely  inexecutable,  even  in  case  the 
Servian  Government  should  declare  its  willingness  to  ac- 

1  "Until  Austrian  diplomacy  emerged  into  publicity  with  the  ultimatum 
to  Servia  on  July  23,  the  Dual  Monarchy  appeared  to  have  strong  claims  on 
neutral  sympathy.  Continued  hostile  agitation  in  Servia;  alleged  intrigues 
in  Austria's  Slav  provinces;  pledges  of  more  neighborly  behavior  repeatedly 
broken;  finally,  the  murder  of  the  successor  to  the  throne,  through  a  con- 
spiracy asserted  to  have  been  framed  in  the  Servian  capital  and  to  have  been 
abetted  by  Servian  officials  —  these  were  indeed  grievances.  Neutral  sym- 
pathy was  sensibly  lessened  by  the  far-reaching  demands  formulated  in  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  and  even  more  by  the  unusual  and  peremptory  tone  of 
this  undiplomatic  communication.  From  the  diplomatic  point  of  view,  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  quite  justified  in  saying  that  its  form 
was  'scarcely  clever'  (peu  habile).  (Russian  Orange  Paper,  no.  25.)  Even 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  confessed  that  'the  note  left  much  to  be 
desired  as  a  diplomatic  document.'  (British  Blue  Book,  no.  18.)  Neutral 
sympathy  began  to  shift  to  the  other  side  in  consequence  of  Servia's  unex- 
pectedly conciliatory  reply  and  Austria's  refusal  to  recognize  Servia's  con- 
cessions as  a  possible  basis  for  negotiation  or  mediation.  Instead  of  turning 
away  wrath,  Servia's  soft  answer  elicited  a  declaration  of  war."  (Munroe 
Smith,  "  Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
vol.  xxx,  [1915]  no.  1,  pp.  55-56.) 


56       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

cept  them.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  25; 
cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  44.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador,  after  his  return  to  Vienna, 
told  Count  Berchtold  that  'they  were  absolutely  inac- 
ceptable  by  any  independent  state,  no  matter  how  small.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  R.  0.  P.  no.  41 ;  R.  0.  P.  no. 
77.)  Even  the  German  Secretary  of  State  '  admitted  that 
the  Servian  Government  could  not  swallow  certain  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  demands.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18.)  In  fact  the  Secretary  'confessed  pri- 
vately he  thought  the  note  left  much  to  be  desired  as  a 
diplomatic  document  and  he  repeated  very  earnestly  that, 
though  he  had  been  accused  of  knowing  all  about  the  con- 
tents of  the  note,  he  had  in  fact  had  no  such  knowledge.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18;  see  also 
B.  W.  P.  no.  25.) 

Russia's  official  protest,  dated  the  24th,  was  directed 
'against  the  note's  leaving  a  period  to  the  powers  quite 
insufficient  to  enable  them  to  take  any  steps  which  might 
help  to  smooth  away  the  difficulties  that  had  arisen.  A 
refusal  to  prolong  the  term  of  the  ultimatum  would,  the 
Russian  Government  said,  render  nugatory  the  proposals 
made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  the  powers, 
and  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  very  bases  of  inter- 
national relations.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  13;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  4.) 

Previously  to  the  presentation  of  the  note  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  London  had,  as  was  said  above,  admitted 
that  the  Austrian  note '  would  have  something  in  the  nature 
of  a  time  limit  which  was  in  effect  akin  to  an  ultimatum.' 
(Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  3.)  But  two  days  later  'he  was  authorized 
to  explain  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  step  taken  at 
Belgrade  was  not  an  ultimatum,  but  a  demarche  with  a 
time  limit,  and  that  if  the  Austrian  demands  were  not 
complied  with  within  the  time  limit,  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian Government  would  break  off  diplomatic  relations  and 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  57 

begin  military  preparations,  not  operations.'1  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  with  evident  satisfaction  at  this  characterization  of 
the  note,  instructed  the  British  representatives  at  Paris 
and  St.  Petersburg,  '  in  case  the  Austrian  Government  had 
not  there  given  the  same  information,  to  inform  the  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs  as  soon  as  possible;  as  it  made  the 
immediate  situation  rather  less  acute.'  (Modified  quota- 
tions, July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  14;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  25,  26; 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  36;  R.  0.  P.  no.  16.)  That  same  day  the  report 
came  back  from  Paris  that  the  'French  Government  had 
not  yet  received  such  an  explanation  from  the  Austrian 
Government,  while  at  the  Russian  capital  M.  Sazonof  told 
the  British  Ambassador  the  explanations  of  the  Austrian 
Government  did  not  quite  correspond  with  the  informa- 
tion which  had  reached  him  from  German  quarters.'  2 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  nos.  15,  17.) 

1  According  to  the  Austrian  Red  Book  this  information  was  given  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  in  confidence.  This  would  look  as  though  the  Austrians  ex- 
pected England  to  remain  quiet  while  they  derived  the  full  benefit  of  their 
unjustifiable  coup.  Such  a  course  on  England's  part  would  not  have  been 
loyal.  Count  Berchtold's  instructions  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, in  his  telegram  of  July  24,  were:  — 

"  Try  to  make  it  clear  at  once  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  our  demarche  of 
yesterday  in  Belgrade  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  formal  ultimatum,  but  that 
it  is  a  matter  of  a  demarche  with  a  term  of  grace  (delay),  which,  as  Your  Ex- 
cellency will  communicate  in  strictest  confidence  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  —  in 
case  the  term  of  grace  expires  without  result,  —  will  be  followed  for  the 
time  being  only  by  a  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  and  by  the  beginning 
of  necessary  military  preparations,  since  we  are  absolutely  determined  to 
carry  out  our  justified  demands. 

"Your  Excellency  is  authorized  to  add  that  certainly  if  Servia,  after  the 
expiration  of  the  term  of  grace,  will  yield  only  under  pressure  of  our  military 
preparation,  we  must  hold  it  to  account  for  the  costs  that  have  accrued 
to  us.  As  is  well  known,  we  were  twice  [1908  and  1912]  obliged  to  mobilize 
on  account  of  Servia."    (July  24,  A.  R.  B.  no.  17.) 

2  When  the  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asked  the  German 
Ambassador  "whether  the  Austrian  note  bore  the  character  of  a  mere  raise 
en  demeure  for  allowing  of  discussion  or  of  an  ultimatum,  the  latter  replied 
that  he  had  no  personal  view  on  this  point."  (Extract,  July  24,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  28;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  18.)  All  this  discussion  as  to  whether  the  Austrian 
note  was  a  demarche  (that  is,  a  simple  presentation  of  views  with  a  re- 
quest added  for  an  answer)  with  a  time  limit,  or  an  ultimatum,  is  of  real 
importance  because  it  indicates  that  the  Austrian  Government  was  either 


58       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

What  are  we  to  think  of  this  discrepancy?  Was  Austria 
trying  to  deceive  England  for  the  purpose  of  arresting  her 
efforts  toward  diplomatic  intervention,  or  did  she  wish  to 
offer  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  an  explanation  which  might  assist 
the  British  Government  to  quiet  public  opinion  and  resist 
being  drawn  in?  In  any  event,  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  it  would  seem  to  show  either  an  inefficient  system 
of  diplomacy  and  double  currents  in  the  Government,  or 
an  attempt  to  steal  a  march  on  the  other  powers  and 
put  them  face  to  face  with  a  fait  accompli  —  a  policy  she 
had  so  successfully  engineered  in  the  case  of  the  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  coup. 

On  the  other  hand,  refreshingly  frank  is  the  statement 
of  the  German  Secretary  of  State,  Von  Jagow,  that '  he  did 
not  know  what  Austria-Hungary  had  ready  on  the  spot, 
but  he  admitted  quite  freely  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  wished  to  give  the  Servians  a  lesson,  and  that 
they  meant  to  take  military  action.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 

'  The  general  opinion  in  diplomatic  circles  at  Vienna  was 

undecided  what  its  action  would  be  or  was  trying  to  convey  a  different  im- 
pression of  its  action  at  London  than  at  the  other  capitals. 

On  July  11,  several  days  before  the  Austrian  note  was  presented,  the 
French  Consul-General  at  Budapest  sent  the  following  report  to  his  Gov- 
ernment :  — 

"Questioned  in  the  Chamber  on  the  state  of  the  Austro-Servian  ques- 
tion, M.  Tisza  explained  that  before  everything  else  it  was  necessary  to  wait 
for  the  result  of  the  judicial  inquiry,  as  to  which  he  refused  at  the  moment 
to  make  any  disclosure  whatsoever.  And  the  Chamber  has  given  its  full  ap- 
proval to  this.  He  also  showed  himself  equally  discreet  as  to  the  decisions 
taken  at  the  meeting  of  Ministers  at  Vienna,  and  did  not  give  any  indica- 
tion whether  the  project  of  a  demarche  at  Belgrade,  with  which  all  the  papers 
of  both  hemispheres  are  full,  would  be  followed  up.  The  Chamber  assented 
without  hesitation. 

"With  regard  to  this  demarche  it  seems  that  the  word  has  been  given  to 
minimize  its  significance;  the  anger  of  the  Hungarians  has,  as  it  were,  evap- 
orated through  the  virulent  articles  of  the  press,  which  is  now  unanimous  in 
advising  against  this  step,  which  might  be  dangerous.  The  semi-official  press 
especially  would  desire  that  for  the  word  '  demarche, '  with  its  appearance  of 
a  threat,  there  should  be  substituted  the  expression  'pourparlers,'  which 
appears  to  them  more  friendly  and  more  courteous.  Thus,  officially,  for  the 
moment  all  is  for  peace."  (Extract,  July  11,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  11.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  59 

that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  were  determined 
on  war,  and  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  had  been  so 
drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  27,  B.  W.  P.  nos.  40  and  41.) 

2.  Efforts  of  the  powers  to  secure  an  extension  of  the  time  limit 

The  powers  did  not,  however,  lose  much  time  in  futile 
protests  against  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note,  but  em- 
ployed all  the  means  at  their  disposal  toward  preventing 
the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Austria  and 
Servia.  For  they  felt,  as  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambas- 
sador to  London,  said  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  that  'Russia 
would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opinion  to  take  action  as 
soon  as  Austria  attacked  Servia,  and,  therefore,  once  the 
Austrians  had  attacked  Servia,  it  would  be  too  late  for  any 
mediation.'   (Modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.) 

As  soon  as  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  were 
known,  England,  Russia,  and  France  made  every  effort  to 
secure  an  extension  of  the  period  of  forty-eight  hours  which 
Austria  had  imposed  as  the  time  limit  for  the  receipt  of  the 
Servian  answer.  While  evincing  a  certain  sympathy  with 
Austria's  difficulties,  the  powers  besought  her  to  extend 
the  time  limit.  At  St.  Petersburg,  the  British  Ambassador 
expressed  to  M.  Sazonof  the  opinion  'that  the  important 
point  was  to  induce  Austria  to  extend  the  time  limit,  and 
that  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to  bring  influence  to  bear  on 
Austria  with  that  end  in  view.'  His  colleague,  the  French 
Ambassador,  did  not  agree  with  this,  saying,  'either  Aus- 
tria had  made  up  her  mind  to  act  at  once  or  she  was  bluff- 
ing. Whichever  it  might  be,  he  considered  the  only  chance 
of  averting  war  was  to  adopt  a  firm  and  united  attitude. 
There  was  not,  he  thought,  time  to  carry  out  the  British 
Ambassador's  suggestion.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  6.) 

On  the  same  date,  probably  just  after  that  conversation, 
M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  the  Russian  Charge  at  Vienna 


60       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

instructions  to  present  the  following  vigorous  protest : '  The 
communication  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to 
the  powers  the  day  after  the  presentation  of  the  ultimatum 
to  Belgrade  leaves  to  the  powers  a  delay  entirely  insuffi- 
cient to  undertake  any  useful  steps  whatever  for  the 
straightening  out  of  the  complications  that  have  arisen. 
To  prevent  the  incalculable  consequences,  equally  disas- 
trous for  all  the  powers,  which  may  result  from  the  action 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  it  seems  to  us 
above  all  indispensable  that  the  delay  allowed  Servia  to 
reply  should  be  extended.  Austria-Hungary,  in  declaring 
herself  disposed  to  inform  the  powers  of  the  results  of  the 
inquiry  upon  which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
bases  its  accusations,  should  at  least  give  them  the  time  to 
consider  them.  If  after  such  consideration  the  powers 
should  be  convinced  that  certain  of  the  Austrian  demands 
were  well  founded,  they  would  be  in  a  position  to  advise 
the  Servian  Government  accordingly.  A  refusal  to  extend 
the  period  of  the  ultimatum  would  render  worthless  the 
step  taken  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  in  regard 
to  the  powers  and  would  be  contrary  to  the  basic  principles 
governing  international  relations.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  13;  July  24,  R.  O.  P.  no.  4;  cf.  A.  R. 
B.  no.  21.)  In  communicating  this  protest  to  the  powers, 
Russia  expressed  the  hope  that  similar  instructions  might 
be  given  their  representatives  at  Vienna. 

The  Russian  note  sets  forth  plainly  that  such  an  insuffi- 
cient interval  allowed  no  time  for  the  powers  to  consider 
the  reasonableness  of  the  Austrian  complaint,  and  so  was 
nugatory  of  the  very  purpose  of  the  explanations  offered, 
and  contrary  to  the  basic  principles  of  international  rela- 
tions. 

Von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  upon  receipt,  at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July 
25,  of  a  telegram  from  the  German  Ambassador  at  London, 
'immediately  instructed  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vi- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  61 

enna  to  "pass  on"  to  the  Austrian  Government  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  suggestion  to  secure  an  extension  of  the  time  limit,' 
but,  due  to  the  unfortunate  absence  of  Count  Berchtold  at 
Ischl,  '  there  would,  he  thought,  be  delay  and  difficulty  in 
getting  the  time  limit  extended.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18;  R.  O.  P.  no.  14.) 

The  Russian  Charge  at  Vienna,  '  seeing  the  impossibility 
of  arriving  at  Ischl  in  time,  telegraphed  the  proposal  to 
extend  the  delay  of  the  ultimatum'  (modified  quotation, 
July  25,  R.  O.  P.  no.  11)  and  received  from  the  Austrian 
Government  an  answer  refusing  to  do  so.1  (July  25,  R.  0. 
P.  no.  12.) 

The  Italian  Ambassador  had  been  given  instructions  to 
support  the  Russian  request,  but  they  arrived  too  late. 
(July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  40.)  The  French  Ambassador 
received  similar  instructions,  so  that  both  at  Vienna  and 
at  Berlin  every  effort  of  diplomacy  was  made  without 
avail  to  secure  an  extension. 

After  the  failure  of  this  effort,  the  Russian  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  thought  it  was  useless  to  press  further  for  an 
extension  of  the  time  limit.2    (July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  40.) 

1  'Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  Baron  von  Macchio,  the  Department 
Chief  of  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office,  instructions  to  answer  the  Russian 
Charg6  d'Affaires  in  his  name  that  Austria  could  not  agree  to  an  extension  of 
the  time  limit.  Baron  von  Macchio  was  further  directed  to  add  that  Servia 
could  reach  a  peaceful  solution,  even  after  the  breaking-off  of  diplomatic 
relations,  by  unreservedly  accepting  the  Austrian  demands,  but  that  the 
Austrian  Government  would  be  constrained  in  such  case  to  demand  from 
Servia  indemnification  for  all  the  expenses  and  damages  forced  upon  them 
through  the  undertaking  of  military  measures.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
25,  A.  R.  B.  no.  20;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  17.) 

2  An  explanation  of  the  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Government  is  found  in 
Count  Berchtold's  dispatch  of  July  25  to  Count  Szapary,  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg:  — 

"For  Your  Excellency's  information  and  for  the  regulation  of  your 
remarks. 

"The  Russian  Charg6  d'Affaires  appeared  this  morning  before  the  First 
Department  Chief  in  order  to  express  in  the  name  of  his  Government  the 
wish  that  the  time  limit  set  in  our  note  to  Servia  be  extended. 

"This  request  was  made  because  it  was  said  that  the  powers  had  been 
surprised  by  our  step  and  that  the  Russian  Government  would  consider  it  a 


62       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

3.  The  powers  influence  Servia  to  make  a  conciliatory  reply 

The  powers  could  hardly  have  had  much  hope  of  the 
success  of  their  request  for  an  extension  of  the  time  limit, 
and  as  soon  as  it  was  certain  that  Austria  would  refuse, 
another  effort  was  made  to  prevail  upon  Austria  to  delay 
recourse  to  hostilities  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit, 
and  the  receipt  of  Servia's  reply.  (B.  W.  P.  nos.  10  and  11.) 
It  was  evident,  however,  that  Austrian  action  would  de- 
pend in  great  measure  upon  the  nature  of  the  Servian  re- 
ply. Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  the  Austrian  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  when  he  handed  the  ultimatum  to  the  Servian 
Minister,  had  '  added  verbally  that  in  case  the  note  should 
not  be  accepted  in  its  entirety  within  a  delay  of  forty-eight 
hours,  he  had  orders  to  leave  Belgrade  with  the  staff  of 
the  Legation.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  23,  R.  0.  P. 
no.  1.) 

The  Italian  Secretary-General  thought  'Austria  would 
only  be  restrained  by  the  unconditional  acceptance  of  her 
note  by  the  Servian  Government.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  19.) 

The  only  chance  appeared,  then,  Ho  lie  in  avoiding  an 
absolute  refusal,  and  prevailing  upon  Servia  to  reply  favor- 
ably to  as  many  points  as  the  time  limit  allowed.'  (Modi- 
natural  token  of  consideration  from  the  Vienna  Cabinet  toward  the  other 
Cabinets  if  the  latter  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  study  the  grounds 
of  our  announcement  to  the  powers  and  our  dossier  on  the  subject. 

"The  First  Department  Chief  replied  to  the  Charge^  d' Affaires  that  he 
would  bring  his  statements  immediately  to  my  knowledge,  but  could  tell 
him  even  then  that  there  was  no  hope  of  the  granting  of  a  longer  time  on  our 
part.  As  for  the  reasons  stated  by  the  Russian  Government  for  its  request, 
he  said  that  they  apparently  were  based  on  mistaken  assumptions.  Our  note 
to  the  powers  was  not  intended  to  invite  them  to  make  known  their  objec- 
tive conception  of  it,  but  partook  merely  of  the  nature  of  an  announcement 
which  we  had  considered  a  duty  imposed  on  us  by  international  courtesy. 
Moreover,  we  looked  upon  our  action  as  a  matter  concerning  only  ourselves 
and  Servia,  to  which  we  had  been  forced,  in  spite  of  the  patience  and  for- 
bearance evinced  by  us  for  years,  by  the  development  of  the  situation  which 
necessitated  our  defending  our  most  vital  interests  much  against  our  will." 
(July  25,  A.  R.  B.  no.  21.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  63 

fied  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  12.)  Accordingly,  the 
British  and  French  representatives  at  Belgrade  were  in- 
structed to  use  their  influence  with  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment to  work  for  such  a  result.  (B.  W.  P.  nos.  12  and  15; 
cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  13.  )  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambas- 
sador at  London,  had  declared  that  'Austria  might  be  ex- 
pected to  move  when  the  time  limit  expired  unless  Servia 
could  give  an  unconditional  acceptance  of  Austrian  de- 
mands in  toto.  Speaking  privately,  he  had  suggested  that  a 
negative  reply  must  in  no  case  be  returned  by  Servia;  he 
counseled  that  a  reply  favorable  on  some  points  be  sent  at 
once,  so  that  an  excuse  against  immediate  action  might  be 
afforded  to  Austria.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  11.) 

It  is  of  interest  to  learn,  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's  instruc- 
tions to  the  British  representative  at  Belgrade,  his  opinion 
that  'Servia  ought  to  promise  that,  if  it  was  proved  that 
Servian  officials,  however  subordinate,  were  accomplices  in 
the  murder  of  the  Archduke  at  Serajevo,  she  would  give 
Austria  the  fullest  satisfaction  and  that  she  certainly  ought 
to  express  concern  and  regret.  Although  the  Servian  Min- 
ister at  London  had  begged  the  British  Government  to 
express  their  views,  Sir  Edward  was  not  willing  to  incur  the 
responsibility  of  saying  more  and  did  not  like  to  say  even 
that,  without  knowing  what  was  being  said  at  Belgrade  by 
the  French  and  Russian  Governments.  Accordingly,  he 
directed  the  British  representative  to  consult  his  French 
and  Russian  colleagues  as  to  repeating  what  his  views  were, 
as  expressed  above,  to  the  Servian  Government.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  12.) 

The  same  day,  July  24,  the  British  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  in  a  conference  with  M.  Sazonof  and  the 
French  Ambassador,  said  that  'it  seemed  desirable  to 
know  just  how  far  Servia  was  prepared  to  go  to  meet  the 
demands  formulated  by  Austria  in  her  note.  M.  Sazonof 
replied  that  he  must  first  consult  his  colleagues  on  that 


64       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

point,  but  that  doubtless  some  of  the  Austrian  demands 
could  be  accepted  by  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  6.) 

The  situation  was  difficult,  for  it  was  probable  that  a 
revolution  would  have  broken  out  in  Servia  if  the  '  Govern- 
ment were  to  accept  the  Austrian  demands  in  their  en- 
tirety.' (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  16.) 
The  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  truly  re- 
marked that  'no  independent  state  could  be  expected  to 
accept  the  political  demands  which  had  been  put  forward.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 

The  attitude  of  Servia  was  most  tractable;  the  Prince 
Regent  telegraphed  the  Tsar :  ' '  We  are  ready  to  accept  the 
Austro-Hungarian  conditions  which  are  compatible  with 
the  situation  of  an  independent  state,  as  well  as  those  the 
acceptance  of  which  may  be  advised  by  Your  Majesty." 
(Extract,  July  24,  R.  O.  P.  no.  6.) 

4-  Servia' s  reply l 

Saturday  afternoon,  July  25,  at  5.58  p.m.,  only  two 
minutes  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  (cf .  A.  R.  B. 
no.  24),  the  Servian  Government  handed  to  the  Austrian 
Minister  at  Belgrade  their  answer  to  the  harsh  terms  of 
the  Austrian  ultimatum.  The  Servian  reply  accepted  the 
greater  part  of  what  Austria  demanded,  and  offered,  'in 
case  the  Austrian  Government  should  not  be  satisfied  with 
their  answer,  to  refer  the  question  to  the  Hague  Tribunal 
or  to  the  mediation  of  the  great  powers  that  had  taken  part 
in  the  drawing  up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Servian 

1  To  bring  the  emphasis  in  the  right  place,  to  economize  space,  and  spare 
the  reader  unnecessary  effort,  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  the 
Servian  reply,  and  the  Austrian  rejoinder  or  comment  have  been  combined 
under  this  heading.  The  text  of  the  Austrian  note  and  Servian  reply  will  be 
found  among  the  Documents;  see  post,  chap.  xiii.  No.  84  of  the  publications 
of  the  Association  for  International  Conciliation  gives  a  very  interesting 
comparison  of  the  original  texts  of  the  Austrian  note  and  the  Servian  reply 
arranged  in  parallel  columns  with  annotations. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  65 

Government  March  31, 1909.'  x  (Modified  quotation,  July 
27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  39.) 

In  spite  of  the  conciliatory  nature  of  the  Servian  reply, 
the  Austrian  Government,  nevertheless,  considered  it  un- 
satisfactory and  the  Austrian  Minister,  accompanied  by 
his  staff,  withdrew  from  Belgrade.  (Cf.  A.  R.  B.  nos.  22, 
24;  S.  B.  B.  no.  40.) 

"As  soon  as  it  was  known  later  that  evening  that  the 
Servian  reply  had  been  rejected  and  that  Baron  Giesl  had 
broken  off  relations  at  Belgrade,  Vienna  burst  into  a  frenzy 
of  delight,  vast  crowds  parading  the  streets  and  singing 
patriotic  songs  till  the  small  hours  of  the  morning."  (B.  W. 
P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  1914.)  To  justify  their  stand, 
the  Austrian  Government  published  a  detailed  criticism  of 
the  Servian  reply  to  show  that  it  was  insincere  and  only 
"a  play  for  time." 

The  Servian  Government  in  their  reply  began  by  stating 
that  they  were  not  conscious  that  any  protests,  such  as 
were  made  in  the  national  assembly  and  by  the  responsible 
representatives  of  the  Government  until  cut  short  by  the 
declaration  of  the  Servian  Government  of  March  31,  1909, 
had  since  been  made  against  Austria's  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  against  their  continuance 
under  the  actual  political  and  legal  conditions  which  the 
annexation  had  created.  They  further  pointed  out  that  the 
Austrian  Government  had  made  no  representations,  except 
one  concerning  a  school-book,  which  was  explained  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Austrian  Government. 

The  Servian  Government  did  not  consider  that  they 
could  be  held  responsible  for  the  opinions  expressed  by  pri- 

1  When  the  Servian  Minister  appealed  to  the  French  Foreign  Office  for 
advice,  it  was  suggested  that  Servia  might  seek  "to  escape  from  the  direct 
clutch  of  Austria  by  declaring  herself  ready  to  submit  to  the  arbitration  of 
Europe."  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  26.)  The  Russian  Charge  at  Paris  reported  that 
'when  the  Director  of  Political  Affairs  of  the  French  Foreign  Office  com- 
municated to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  the  contents  of  the  Servian  reply, 
the  latter  did  not  conceal  his  astonishment  that  it  had  not  satisfied  the  Aus- 
trian Minister  at  Belgrade.'   (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  R.  O.  P.  no.  27.) 


66       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

vate  individuals,  such  as  articles  appearing  in  the  press  and 
in  the  ordinary  peaceful  proceedings  and  activities  of  socie- 
ties, similar  to  what  take  place  in  nearly  every  country  and 
which  are  not,  as  a  general  rule,  subjected  to  official  control. 

The  Servian  Government  further  expressed  pain  and 
surprise  at  the  assertion  that  citizens  of  Servia  were  con- 
cerned in  the  perpetration  of  the  Serajevo  outrage.  They 
declared  that  they  had  expected  to  cooperate  in  the  inves- 
tigation of  the  crime  and  that  they  were  ready  to  proceed 
against  all  persons  about  whom  communications  might  be 
addressed  to  them.  In  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the 
Austrian  Government,  the  Servian  Government  expressed 
a  willingness  to  turn  over  to  the  judicial  authorities  any 
individual,  without  regard  to  official  position  or  rank, 
against  whom  any  proof  of  complicity  in  the  Serajevo  out- 
rage should  be  adduced.  As  for  the  official  publication  of 
the  demanded  apology,  the  Servian  Government  agreed  to 
make,  on  the  first  page  of  their  official  publication,  a  state- 
ment including  the  following :  — 

"The  Royal  Servian  Government  condemns  the  propa- 
ganda directed  against  Austria-Hungary;  that  is  to  say, 
all  efforts  designed  ultimately  to  sever  from  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  any  territory  of  which  it  is  consti- 
tuted, and  sincerely  regrets  the  sad  consequences  which 
have  resulted  from  such  criminal  machinations."  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  39;  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  25;  R.  0.  P.  no.  13.) 

The  Austrian  Government  declared,  in  an  official  re- 
joinder to  the  Servian  reply  published  in  the  German 
White  Book,  that  no  objection  in  regard  to  the  action  of 
the  Servian  Government  or  Servian  officials  had  been 
raised  by  Austria,  but  that  Servia  had  been  charged  with 
disregarding  the  above-mentioned  promise,  in  that  she  had 
not  suppressed  the  unofficial  agitation  directed  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Austria.  Servia  was,  according  to 
the  view  of  the  Austrian  Government,  under  an  obligation 
to  change  her  attitude  and  the  entire  trend  of  her  policies 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  67 

by  entering  into  friendly  and  neighborly  relations  with 
Austria-Hungary  —  merely  to  refrain  from  interfering 
with  Austrian  control  of  Bosnia  was  not  enough. 

As  for  the  activity  of  the  Servian  press  and  patriotic 
societies,  the  Austrian  Government  considered  that  the 
Government  of  Servia  and  other  states  exercised  a  certain 
control  over  the  press  and  provided  for  the  supervision  of 
the  organizations  of  individuals.  The  Servian  Govern- 
ment were  to  blame  for  omitting  altogether  to  exercise  this 
supervision  in  so  far  as  the  action  of  the  press  and  organi- 
zations disclosed  a  purpose  hostile  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

As  to  the  complicity  of  certain  individuals  in  the  Sera- 
jevo  conspiracy,  the  Austrian  Government  declared  that 
Servia's  assertion  was  not  correct,  since  the  Government 
at  Belgrade  had  been  accurately  informed  of  the  suspicion 
attaching  to  certain  specified  individuals,  so  that  it  was 
not  only  able,  but  under  an  obligation  under  their  own 
laws,  voluntarily  to  institute  an  investigation,  yet  the 
Servian  Government  had  taken  no  such  action. 

And  as  for  the  expression  of  regret  to  be  officially  pub- 
lished in  the  Official  Journal  and  publicly  announced  as 
the  order  of  the  day  to  the  army,  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment objected  that  the  Servian  formula  lacked  in  sincerity 
and  had  altered  the  words  of  the  Austrian  note  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  imply  that  a  propaganda  directed  against 
Austria-Hungary  did  not  really  exist,  so  that  later  the 
Servian  Government  might  use  this  as  a  subterfuge  by 
saying  that  they  had  not  condemned  the  existing  propa- 
ganda or  acknowledged  it  to  be  hostile  to  Austria.  This 
would  amount  to  a  contention  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment that  they  were  under  no  obligation  to  suppress  in 
future  any  propaganda  similar  to  that  being  carried  on  at 
present. 

When  we  come  to  consider  Austria's  criticism  of  the 
Servian  replies  to  the  ten  specific  demands  contained  in 


68       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

the  Austrian  ultimatum,  we  find  similar  quibbling  on  Aus- 
tria's part. 

First  demand.  Servia  agreed  to  pass  laws  prohibiting  the 
publication  in  the  press  of  articles  inciting  to  hatred  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  or  directed  against  the  territorial  integrity 
of  Austria.  Servia  also  agreed  to  amend  her  constitution  so 
as  to  permit  the  enactment  of  the  legislation  necessary  for 
the  suppression  of  such  publications.  (Cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  25; 
S.  B.  B.  no.  30.) 

Austria  replied  that  she  had  demanded  the  suppression 
of  every  publication  which  incited  to  hatred  and  contempt 
for  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  which  was  intended  to  influ- 
ence the  taking  of  action  directed  against  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Monarchy.  Austria  had  asked  the  Servian 
Government  to  agree  to  enforce  such  provisions,  whereas 
Servia  only  offered  to  pass  legislation  with  this  end  in  view. 
The  reply  did  not  even  indicate  when  such  legislation 
would  be  passed,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  would  leave  every- 
thing as  it  was,  especially  in  the  event  of  the  resignation  of 
the  Government. 

Second  demand.  The  Servian  Government  declared  they 
had  no  proof,  nor  did  the  Austrian  note  furnish  any,  that 
the  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  other  similar 
societies  had  been  guilty  of  carrying  on  a  propaganda 
against  the  Dual  Monarchy,  but  the  Servian  Government 
agreed,  nevertheless,  to  dissolve  the  society  and  any  other 
which  might  direct  its  action  against  Austria.  (Cf .  S.  B.  B. 
no.  16.) 

The  comment  of  the  Austrian  Government  on  this  was 
that  it  was  impossible  to  accept  Servia's  statement  that 
she  was  unaware  of  the  hostile  propaganda  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  and  affiliated  societies  against  Austria,  since  it 
permeated  the  entire  political  life  of  Servia.  Furthermore, 
what  the  Austrian  Government  had  asked  for  was  not  only 
the  dissolution  of  the  societies  mentioned,  but  also  the 
confiscation  of  their  means  of  propaganda,  and  the  pre- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  69 

vention  of  the  reorganization  of  the  societies  under  other 
names  to  continue  their  activity.1 

Third  demand.  The  Servian  Government  agreed,  as  soon 
as  the  proofs  should  be  furnished  by  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, to  eliminate  without  delay  from  the  public  instruc- 
tion in  the  schools  any  passages  in  the  textbooks  which 
might  be  considered  as  likely  to  foment  the  propaganda 
against  Austria. 

The  Austrian  Government  objected  that  Servia  was  well 
aware  that  the  textbooks  used  in  the  schools  contained 
objectionable  matter.  The  reply  also  ignored  the  essential 
demand  for  the  dismissal  of  those  teachers  engaged  in 
carrying  on  the  propaganda  complained  of,  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  teachers,  according  to  Austria's  statement, 
being  found  in  the  ranks  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and 
affiliated  societies. 

Fourth  demand.  The  Austrian  Government  had  de- 
manded that  Servia  dismiss  from  her  army  and  the  govern- 
mental employ  in  general  all  officers  and  officials  found  to 
be  guilty  of  taking  part  in  the  propaganda,  the  Austrian 
Government  communicating  their  names  and  the  evidence 
relating  to  such  complicity. 

The  Servian  Government  agreed  to  do  so  in  the  case  of 
those  officers  and  officials  whose  guilt  should  be  established 

1  See  extract  from  article  in  the  Outlook,  by  Theodor  Constantin  Dumba, 
Ambassador  of  Austria-Hungary  to  the  United  States,  August  29,  1914,  in 
which  he  explains  how  this  very  thing  had  occurred  in  his  own  experience 
when  Minister  at  Belgrade. 

The  Austrian  memorandum  (A.  R.  B.  no.  19;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  75,  Annex;  see 
posi,  chap,  xiii;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  9)  to  the  powers  contains  a  very  interesting 
and  specific  account  of  the  activities  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  which  seems 
to  show  clearly  the  insincerity  of  the  Servian  answer  on  this  head.  Never- 
theless, can  any  instance  be  found  where  one  Government  has  answered  the 
ultimatum  of  another  by  confessing  its  fault?  However  much  we  may  sym- 
pathize with  Austria  in  her  efforts  to  resist  dissolution,  we  cannot  blame  the 
Serbs  for  carrying  on  an  active  propaganda  to  incorporate  their  brothers  in  a 
Greater  Servia.  When  M.  Sazonof  was  discussing  the  Austrian  demands 
with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  he  "spoke  with  utmost 
vigor  against  the  dissolution  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  which  Servia  would 
never  undertake."   (July  24,  A.  R.  B.  no.  14.) 


70       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

as  a  result  of  a  judicial  investigation,  assisted  by  Austria's 
communication  of  the  names  of  the  officers  and  officials 
and  the  evidence  against  them. 

But  again  the  Austrian  Government  objected  that  Ser- 
via  agreed  to  dismiss  only  those  officers  found  guilty  by 
judicial  procedure,  which  would  limit  the  application  to 
those  cases  where  a  statutory  crime  was  charged,  whereas 
the  propaganda  complained  of  was  not  punishable  under 
Servian  law.  Austria  might  also  have  objected  that  Servia 
had  ignored  that  part  of  the  fourth  demand  in  which  the 
Austrian  Government  communicated  to  the  Servian  Gov- 
ernment the  names  of  the  officers  and  officials  who  were 
to  be  dismissed.  To  accept  this  demand  would  have  been 
equivalent  to  agreeing  that  Austria  herself  should  have  the 
right  to  specify  the  names  of  the  Servian  officers  and  offi- 
cials to  be  dismissed  as  objectionable  to  Austria.  Of  course, 
Servia  could  not  have  allowed  that.  The  acceptance  and 
putting  into  effect  of  such  a  demand  would  make  the  ten- 
ure of  every  position  under  the  Government,  whether  civil 
or  military,  dependent  upon  Austrian  favor.  It  would  have 
resulted  in  placing  the  political  control  of  Servia  in  Aus- 
trian hands  and  Servia  would  have  become  henceforth  a 
political  dependency  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Austrian 
reply  —  can  it  be  from  shame?  —  passes  over  the  failure  to 
comply  with  this  part  of  its  original  demand.1 

Fifth  demand.  Austria's  fifth  demand  was  that  Servia 
accept  in  Servia  the  collaboration  of  agents  (des  organes) 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  in  the  suppression 
of  the  subversive  movement  directed  against  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

Servia  replied  that  she  did  not  understand  exactly  the 
meaning  of  the  terms  employed,  but  that  she  was  ready  to 
accept  such  collaboration  as  should  conform  to  the  princi- 

1  M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  made  this  de- 
mand one  of  the  grounds  for  his  objection  to  the  Austrian  note.  (Cf.  A.  R. 
B.  no.  31.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  71 

pies  of  international  law  and  criminal  procedure,  and  help 
to  promote  good  neighborly  relations. 

The  Austrian  rejoinder  declared  that  the  question  in  no 
way  concerned  international  law  and  criminal  procedure, 
but  related  purely  to  the  exercise  of  the  police  powers  of 
the  state  and  might  properly  be  settled  by  special  agree- 
ment.1 

Sixth  demand.  The  sixth  demand  was  to  take  judicial 
proceedings  (enquete  judiciaire)  against  the  accessories  to 
the  conspiracy  of  June  28,  found  on  Servian  territory, 
and  to  permit  representatives  (des  organes  delegues)  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  take  part  in  the  investi- 
gation (recherches)  relating  thereto. 

1  '  Count  Mensdorff ,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  admitted  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  that,  on  paper,  the  Servian  reply  might  seem  to  be  satisfactory;  but 
the  Servians  had,  he  said,  refused  the  one  thing  —  the  cooperation  of  Aus- 
trian officials  and  police  —  which  would  be  a  real  guaranty  that  in  practice 
the  Servians  would  not  carry  on  their  subversive  campaign  against  Austria.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  48.)  It  is  probably  in  reference  to 
this  same  demand  that  the  German  memorandum  says:  "...  The  Servian 
Government  made  a  reply  which,  though  complying  in  some  points  with  the 
conditions  of  Austria-Hungary,  yet  showed  in  all  essentials  the  endeavor, 
through  procrastination  and  new  negotiations,  to  escape  from  the  just 
demands  of  the  Monarchy,  .  .  ."  (G.  W.  B.  p.  5.)  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
opinion  of  the  fifth  demand  has  been  given  already.  M.  Jules  Cambon, 
French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  said  to  the  German  Secretary  of  State: 
".  .  .  If  Peter  I  [of  Servia]  humiliates  himself ,  Servia  will  probably  be  given 
over  to  internal  troubles."  (July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  30.)  M.  Sazonof  told  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that '  the  putting  into  effect  of  the 
fourth  and  fifth  demands  might  result  disastrously  and  lead  even  to  the 
attempted  assassination  of  members  of  the  royal  family  and  the  Premier, 
M.  Pashitch.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  R.  O.  P.  no.  25;  cf.  A.  R.  B. 
nos.  10,  11.) 

Count  Berchtold's  telegram  of  July  25,  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  cov- 
ers this  point:  "Since  Point  5  of  our  demands,  concerning  the  participation 
of  Austro-Hungarian  officials  in  stamping  out  the  subversive  movement  in 
Servia,  has  aroused  special  objections  from  M.  Sazonof,  will  Your  Excel- 
lency express  yourself  confidentially  in  strong  terms  on  this  point  to  the 
effect  that  the  inclusion  of  this  point  was  due  solely  to  practical  considera- 
tions and  in  no  way  owing  to  any  contemplated  impairment  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  Servia.  In  Point  5  we  had  in  mind  a  '  collaboration '  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  secret  bureau  de  surete  at  Belgrade,  to  work  along  the  lines 
of  the  similar  Russian  organizations  in  Paris,  and  cooperate  with  the  Servian 
police  and  administration  officials."    (July  25,  A.  R.  B.  no.  27.) 


72       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

In  reply,  Servia  declared  that  she  considered  it  her  duty 
to  take  proceedings  against  all  those  who  were  involved  in 
the  conspiracy  of  June  28,  but  that  she  could  not  permit 
the  participation  of  Austrian  agents  or  officials  specially 
delegated  by  the  Austrian  Government;  as  it  would  be  a 
violation  of  her  constitution,  and  of  her  legislation  relative 
to  criminal  procedure.  Servia  considered,  however,  that  in 
certain  cases  the  results  of  the  investigation  might  be  com- 
municated to  the  agents  of  the  Austrian  Government. 

Austria  thereupon  explained  that  her  demands,  clear 
and  unmistakable,  had  been :  — 

1.  That  Servia  institute  criminal  proceedings  against 
those  concerned  in  the  outrage; 

2.  That  she  allow  the  participation  of  Austrian  officials 
in  the  preliminary  examinations  (recherche)  and  not 
in  the  judicial  investigation  (enquete  judiciaire),  it 
never  having  entered  the  mind  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  that  its  officials  would  partici- 
pate in  the  proceedings  before  the  Servian  tribunal. 
Their  cooperation  was  intended  to  be  limited  to  the 
preliminary  examination  for  the  purpose  of  discover- 
ing and  preparing  the  material  for  the  investigation. 

The  Austrian  rejoinder  accused  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment of  having  deliberately  misunderstood  the  Austrian 
demand,  and  of  having  ignored  the  clear  distinction  be- 
tween court  proceedings  in  the  nature  of  a  trial  (enquete 
judiciaire)  and  a  simple  preliminary  examination  con- 
ducted by  the  police.  The  rejoinder  considered  that  the 
purpose  of  this  insincerity  on  Servia's  part  was  to  grasp 
the  only  plausible  excuse  that  she  could  find  for  refusing 
the  cooperation  of  the  Austrian  officials,1  in  order  to  get 
rid  of  any  check  upon  the  honesty  of  the  investigation, 

1  The  Austrian  comment  states,  "precedents  for  such  police  intervention 
exist  in  great  number."  Cf .  the  statement  of  Vice-Consul  Fischerauer,  note, 
p.  76,  and  the  case  of  the  Maine.  See  post,  chap.  xin.  See  also  Ernest 
Ludwig,  Austria-Hungary  and  the  War,  pp.  64-71. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  73 

which  would,  if  properly  pursued,  have  led  to  disclosures 
that  the  Servian  Government  was  most  anxious  to  avoid. 
To  the  impartial  observer,  however,  it  does  not  seem 
surprising,  in  view  of  Austria's  third,  fourth,  and  fifth 
demands,  that  Servia  should  misunderstand  Austria's 
intent  in  asking  permission  to  participate  in  the  action 
taken  against  the  accessories  to  the  assassination.  The 
participation  which  the  Servian  answer  understood,  though 
denied  in  the  Austrian  rejoinder  as  that  intended,  would 
seem  to  interfere  less  with  the  independence  of  Servia  than 
did  the  third  demand  relating  to  the  dismissal  of  Servian 
teachers  in  the  schools.  For  the  investigation  of  the  con- 
spiracy in  question  was  but  a  single  incident  which  might 
soon  be  settled,  whereas  Austria,  if  the  third  and  fourth 
demands  were  agreed  to,  might  have  renewed  whenever 
she  chose  her  demands  for  the  dismissal  of  any  official  she 
objected  to,  until  the  entire  Servian  army  and  bureau- 
cracy came  under  her  control.1  This  is  the  significance  of 
the  statement  made  by  the  Servian  Minister  at  London 
on  the  day  the  ultimatum  was  presented,  that  the  Servian 
Government  '  was  perfectly  ready  to  meet  any  reasonable 
demands  of  Austria-Hungary  so  long  as  such  demands 
were  kept  on  the  terrain  juridique.2  If  the  results  of  the 
inquiry  at  Serajevo  —  an  inquiry  conducted  with  so  much 
mystery  and  secrecy  —  should  disclose  the  fact  that  there 
were  any  individuals  conspiring  or  organizing  plots  on 
Servian  territory,  the  Servian  Government  would,  he  said, 
be  quite  ready  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  give  satis- 
faction; but  if  Austria  transported  the  question  on  to  the 
political  ground,  and  said  that  Servian  policy,  being  incon- 
venient to  her,  must  undergo  a  radical  change,  and  that 
Servia  must  abandon  certain  political  ideals,  no  inde- 
pendent state  would,  or  could,  submit  to  such  dictation.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  30.) 

1  Lloyd  George  emphasized  this  in  the  extract  from  his  speech  placed 
among  the  Documents;  see  post,  chap.  xiii. 

*  That  is,  confined  to  considerations  of  a  judicial  nature. 


74       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Seventh  demand.  The  seventh  demand  related  to  the 
arrest  of  the  commander  Tankositch  and  one  Cigano- 
vitch,  in  the  employ  of  the  Servian  Government,  and  the 
Austrian  rejoinder  accused  Servia  of  bad  faith  in  shielding 
Ciganovitch  by  allowing  him  to  escape,  and  then  announc- 
ing that  'it  had  as  yet  been  impossible  to  locate  him.'1 

Eighth  demand.  The  eighth  demand  related  to  the  smug- 
gling of  arms  and  explosives  across  the  Servian  frontier, 
and  the  punishment  of  the  officials  who  had  aided  the  con- 
spirators by  permitting  them  to  cross  the  frontier.  Servia's 
reply,  giving  ample  promises,  seems  to  have  been  approved 
and  is  passed  over  without  comment. 

Ninth  demand.  The  ninth  demand  is  for  explanations  as 
to  unwarranted  expressions  of  hostility  toward  Austria  on 
the  part  of  certain  high  Servian  officials  since  the  Serajevo 
assassination. 

The  Servian  Government  expressed  itself  as  ready  to 
give  the  desired  explanations  in  regard  to  any  such  remarks 
as  should  be  brought  to  its  attention  by  the  Austrian 
Government,  with  proof  of  their  having  proceeded  from 
Servian  officials.  The  Servian  Government  on  its  own 
behalf  promised  to  collect  proof  and  press  the  conviction 
of  any  such  officials. 

Again  the  Austrian  Government  declared  the  Servian 
response  to  be  insincere,  since  it  was  futile  for  the  Servian 
Government  to  pretend  it  was  not  aware  of  the  remarks  in 
question.  The  requiring  of  proof  by  Austria  was  taken  as 
indicating  an  intention  not  to  comply  with  the  demand.2 

1  Cf.  the  statement  of  the  Servian  Minister  at  London  (B.  W.  P.  no.  30). 

2  The  London  Times  of  July  20  publishes  under  the  heading  "  GREATER 
SERVIA  SCARE,"  the  following  from  their  Vienna  correspondent:  — 

"The  Press  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier  is  taking  pains  not  to  allow  public 
interest  in  Austro-Servian  relations  to  flag. 

"To-day,  considerable  exception  was  taken  by  the  newspapers  of  the 
Monarchy  to  various  recent  utterances  from  Servian  official  sources.  These 
consist,  on  the  one  hand,  of  statements  represented  to  have  been  made  by 
M.  Pashitch  to  a  correspondent  of  the  Leipziger  Neueste  Nachrichten  and 
hitherto  not  denied  by  the  Servian  Prime  Minister,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  75 

Tenth  demand.  The  tenth  and  last  demand  required 
Servia  to  notify  the  Austrian  Government  without  delay 
of  the  execution  of  the  preceding  demands,  and,  in  as  far 
as  they  were  not  already  covered  by  her  answer,  the  Ser- 
vian Government  agreed  to  notify  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment of  the  putting  into  effect  of  the  measures  in  question 
as  soon  as  accomplished. 

The  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  'speaking  of 
Austria's  long  official  explanation  of  the  grounds  on  which 
the  Servian  reply  had  been  considered  inadequate,  told  the 
British  Ambassador  he  thought  many  points  besides  the 
explanation  —  such  as  a  slight  verbal  difference  in  the  sen- 
tence regarding  the  renunciation  of  the  propaganda  — 
quite  childish.'  l  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  64.) 

of  two  articles  dealing  with  the  'Greater  Servian'  idea  and  the  Serajevo 
crime  which  have  appeared  in  the  Servian  Government  organ  Samouprava. 
Among  other  statements,  M.  Pashitch  is  represented  to  have  said  that 
Servians  are  so  accustomed  to  see  their  compatriots  in  Hungary  oppressed 
and  treated  in  an  unfriendly  manner  that  they  no  longer  grow  excited  about 
it.  'We  do  not  participate  in  conspiracies,  but  we  know  that  time  is  working 
for  us.'  Servia  wanted  to  be  left  alone,  and,  he  added,  she  would  not  stand 
isolated  if  a  Great  Power  attacked  her. 

"The  Samouprava  counters  Austro-Hungarian  complaints  of  a  'Greater 
Servian'  propaganda  by  declaring  that  complaints  of  this  kind  would  be 
much  more  justified  if  made  by  Servia  who  finds  herself  perpetually  face  to 
face  with  a  'Greater  Austrian'  propaganda.  A  second  article  in  the  same 
journal  affirmed  that  the  origin  of  the  Serajevo  crime  is  to  be  found  in  the 
Monarchy  itself,  and  denies  that  Belgrade  is  a  fountain-head  of  assassina- 
tions. 

"These  utterances  have  called  forth  replies  the  tone  of  which  is  in  some 
cases  somewhat  minatory.  Thus  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  declares  that,  as  the 
remarks  attributed  to  M.  Pashitch  are  not  denied,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  at  Belgrade  will  have  to  ask  for  their  exact  text  in  order  that 
proper  steps  may  be  taken  to  prevent  the  Minister  from  approving  conspira- 
cies directed  against  the  Monarchy  by  saying  that  time  is  working  for  the 
attainment  of  aims  for  which  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  was  mur- 
dered. 

"The  Reichpost  brands  the  utterances  of  the  Samouprava  as  rank  ingrati- 
tude for  the  present  of  the  Sanjak  made  to  Servia  by  the  Monarchy,  and 
concludes  its  article  by  asking,  '  Do  our  statesmen  not  yet  realize  what  the 
position  is,  and  what  they  have  to  do?'" 
.  l  Among  the  documents  at  the  end  of  this  volume  will  be  found  an  Eng- 


76      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

It  is  true  that  Servia  did  not  accept  word  for  word  the 
demands  of  the  Austrian  note,  but  she  did  go  as  far  as  was 

lish  view  of  the  Austrian  demands  and  the  Servian  reply,  taken  from  the 
speech  of  Lloyd  George  of  September  21.  The  Austrian  view  of  Servia's 
reply  has  been  further  explained  in  an  extract  of  an  article  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  also  to  be  found  among  the 
documents  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

The  New  York  Sun  of  October  8,  1914,  quotes  Dr.  Fritz  Fischerauer, 
Austrian  Vice-Consul,  as  saying:  — 

"  By  1909,  the  two  provinoes  [Bosnia  and  Herzegovina]  had  reached  a 
level  of  culture  and  development  which  could  not  be  duplicated  on  the 
Servian  side  of  the  frontier.  Then  came  unexpected  events  in  the  wake  of 
the  Ottoman  declaration  of  a  constitutional  order,  which,  as  every  one 
knows  now,  was  but  another  name  for  a  military  dictatorship.  Relying  upon 
its  nominal  sovereignty  rights  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the  Young  Turk 
organization  started  a  movement  to  recover  the  garden  which  Austria  had 
made  out  of  the  former  Turkish  wilderness. 

"For  its  own  interests  and  those  of  civilization,  Austria  had  to  meet  this 
movement  with  energetic  action.  This  action  took  the  form  of  annexation. 
But  even  in  this  apparently  aggressive  act  the  Dual  Monarchy  acted 
strictly  on  the  defensive. 

"The  tragic  climax  to  the  Servian  campaign  of  violence  was  reached  on 
June  28  last,  when  the  hand  of  a  young  Serb  who  had  been  led  to  believe  he 
was  performing  a  patriotic  duty  laid  low  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand 
and  his  consort  in  Serajevo.  The  event  convinced  the  Austrian  Government 
that  it  must  act  with  energy,  and  act  at  once,  to  check  a  subversive  move- 
ment carried  on  from  without  its  borders,  which  had  degenerated  into  a 
campaign  of  assassination.  It  demanded  that  Servia  put  an  immediate  stop 
to  the  agitation  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  that  it  place  the  stamp  of  its 
formal  disapproval  upon  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  and  that  it  punish  the  auth- 
ors of  that  revolting  offense  against  civilization  and  comity. 

"Austria  did  not  impose  any  terms  in  its  ultimatum  which  could  be 
regarded  as  a  blow  at  Servian  sovereignty.  There  is  even  a  parallel  in  history 
in  which  the  roles  were  reversed;  when  m  1861  Milos  Obrenovic,  then  the 
reigning  Prince  of  Servia,  was  assassinated  in  the  Park  of  Topschider  near 
Belgrade  by  the  adherents  of  the  present  reigning  family  of  Karageorgevich, 
the  trail  of  the  plot  was  traced  to  Hungary.  The  Hungarian  Government 
at  the  time  invited  the  Servian  authorities  for  a  cooperation  of  the  Servian 
police  in  the  investigation,  and  this  cooperation  actually  took  place  in  the 
police  investigation  on  Hungarian  territory. 

"Another  parallel  is  furnished  by  the  case  of  William  S.  Benton,  the 
Englishman  who  was  murdered  in  Mexico  last  year.  The  British  and 
the  United  States  Governments  demanded  to  be  permitted  to  cooperate 
in  the  investigation  in  Mexico  of  that  murder. 

"Servia  assented  to  all  the  other  terms  of  the  ultimatum,  but  in  every 
instance  evaded  the  basic  admission  of  the  charge  that  a  crime  had  been 
committed  against  a  neighboring  state,  and  that  it  had  been  committed  by 
a  Servian  nationalist  organization  having  its  central  body  in  Belgrade.  Aus- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  77 

possible  for  the  government  of  any  independent  state,  and 
evinced  a  most  conciliatory  spirit.  Even  admitting  that 
she  knew  of  the  hostile  remarks  against  Austria,  and  the 
anti-Austrian  propaganda,  she  could  hardly  confess  to 
them  publicly  in  her  answer  to  Austria,  and  make  it  possi- 
ble for  Austria  both  to  disdain  her  reply  and  use  the  con- 
fession as  an  excuse  for  aggression.  Such  a  confession,  at 
most,  concerned  their  past  relations;  what  was  important 
to  the  security  of  Austria  was  that  Servia  should  punish 
the  conspirators  and  restrain  in  future  any  hostile  propa- 
ganda of  whatever  nature  or  designation. 

Every  statesman  in  Europe  would  have  admitted  that 
Austria  was  justified  in  taking  some  action  to  protect  her- 
self against  Servia,  whose  Government  was  unwilling  or 
unable  to  restrain  a  widespread  and  dangerous  propa- 
ganda openly  directed  against  the  integrity  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  Such  action  is  nothing  but  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  a  state  to  protect  itself  against  potential  aggression. 
At  the  same  time  every  state  owes  it  to  the  general  inter- 
ests of  all  the  other  states  not  to  have  recourse  to  force 
until  every  reasonable  effort  has  been  made  to  secure  the 
desired  result  by  peaceful  means.1  Austria  referred  to 
Servia's  violation  of  her  promise  of  March  31,  1909,  as 
indicating  that  her  promises  could  not  be  relied  upon,  but 

trian  participation  in  the  inquiry,  Servia  denied  by  evasion.  Now  this  clause 
in  the  ultimatum  was  a  vital  part  of  it.  The  Austrian  authorities  recalled 
that  one  of  the  men  chiefly  implicated  in  the  assassination  of  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  consort  had  been  quietly  warned  out  of  Servia  by 
the  Servian  police  after  the  Austrians  had  requested  his  arrest." 

1  In  the  absence  of  any  organized  machinery  for  determining  what  con- 
stitutes international  law  and  enforcing  a  respect  therefor,  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  the  forms,  ceremonies,  and  even  courtesies  of  international 
intercourse  be  strictly  observed.  In  the  early  history  of  legal  development 
within  each  state,  the  necessity  of  an  unswerving  respect  for  legal  forms  was 
well  understood.  At  the  present  time  in  the  affairs  of  nations,  the  greatest 
protection  against  the  abuse  of  force  and  disastrously  precipitate  action  is  a 
strict  observance  of  the  forms  of  procedure.  Baron  von  Macchio,  the  Aus- 
trian General  Secretary  of  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  not  correct 
in  saying:  "Interest  was  sometimes  an  excuse  for  not  being  courteous." 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  45.) 


78       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

in  the  five  years  that  had  elapsed  since  Servia  had  been 
obliged  to  make  that  promise,  the  whole  Balkan  situation 
had  been  completely  changed  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan 
War.  Since  the  national  aims  of  Servia  and  Austria's  pol- 
icy to  preserve  the  political  integrity  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy were  in  conflict,  it  was  necessary,  for  the  maintenance 
of  peace,  either  that  the  Servian  Government  should 
restrain  the  people,  or  that  they  should  be  arrested  by  the 
fear  of  Austria.  Servia's  Government  was  powerless  in  the 
face  of  an  all-pervading  national  enthusiasm  for  the  Pan- 
Serb  propaganda,  and  the  fear  of  Austria  was,  to  a  certain 
degree,  paralyzed  by  the  reliance  placed  upon  Russian 
support.  If  Austria  would  not  rely  on  Servia's  promises, 
the  only  remaining  possibility  of  preserving  the  peace  lay 
in  the  calming  influence  of  other  powers.  It  may  be  said 
that  the  hope  of  Europe  lay  in  the  mediation  of  the  less 
interested  powers.  The  course  of  the  subsequent  events 
shows  how  Austria  ignored  this  situation,  and,  trading  on 
the  sympathy  of  the  world  for  whatever  real  grounds  of 
complaint  she  might  have,  attempted  to  subjugate  her 
weaker  neighbor  under  the  guise  of  exacting  satisfaction. 
It  is  quite  possible  that  Servia,  advised,  that  is  to  say, 
directed,  by  the  powers,  might  have  been  ready  to  give 
and  live  up  to  assurances  adequate  to  satisfy  the  reason- 
able demands  of  Austria.  If  Austria,  because  of  her  pecu- 
liarly perilous  situation,  considered  it  impossible  to  discuss 
the  question  and  to  examine  whether  the  proposed  guaran- 
ties would  not  be  adequate,  we  must  conclude  her  action 
to  be  a  confession  that  she  was  herself  unable  to  live  up  to 
her  international  obligations. 

5.  Austria  rejects  Servia's  reply 

Influenced  by  Russia  (B.  W.  P.  nos.  22  and  46),  Servia 
had  met  the  advice  of  the  powers  more  than  halfway 
(B.  W.  P.  nos.  21  and  30),  and  the  powers  of  the  Entente 
had  been  justified  in  feeling  satisfied  with  their  efforts  and 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  79 

in  hoping  that  a  reply  so  conciliatory  would  prove  accept- 
able to  Austria  (cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  33).  'Servia's  attitude  had 
been  such  as  to  produce  the  best  impression  in  Europe.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  27.)  Sir  Edward 
Grey  said  that  'the  Servian  reply  went  further  than  could 
have  been  expected  to  meet  the  Austrian  demands.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  46;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no. 
42.)  Yet  Von  Tchirsky,  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  did  not  blush  when  he  asked  his  British  colleague 
'whether  he  had  been  informed  that  a  pretense  of  giving 
way  at  the  last  moment  had  been  made  by  the  Servian 
Government.  The  Servian  concessions  he  considered  all  a 
sham,  and  Servia  proved  that  she  well  knew  that  they  were 
insufficient  to  satisfy  the  legitimate  demands  of  Austria- 
Hungary  by  the  fact  that  before  making  her  offer  she  had 
ordered  mobilization  and  the  retirement  of  the  Govern- 
ment from  Belgrade.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  32.)  From  St.  Petersburg  it  was  learned  that 
the  German  Ambassador  there  also  'considered  the  Ser- 
vian reply  insufficient.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  54.) 

Count  Berchtold  instructed  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
London  to  make  clear  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  '  Servia's 
complaisance  was  only  apparent  and  was  calculated  to 
deceive  Europe  without  giving  any  guaranty  as  to  the 
future.  Since  the  Servian  Government  knew  that  only  an 
unqualified  acceptance  of  the  demands  could  satisfy  Aus- 
tria, Servian  tactics  could  be  easily  understood:  Servia  in 
order  to  influence  the  public  opinion  of  Europe,  was  to 
accept  some  of  the  demands  with  all  sorts  of  reservations, 
trusting  that  she  would  never  be  called  upon  to  fulfill  her 
agreements.  The  Ambassador  was  asked,  in  his  conversa- 
tion with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  to  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that 
the  full  mobilization  of  the  Servian  army  was  ordered  for 
July  25  at  3  p.m.,  whereas  the  answer  to  the  Austrian  note 
was  only  handed  in  just  before  the  expiration  of  the  time 


80       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

limit;  i.e.,  a  few  minutes  before  6.  Before  that,  the  Aus- 
trian Government  had  made  no  military  preparations,  but 
were  forced  to  make  them  by  Servia's  mobilization.'  1 
(Modified  quotation,  July  28,  A.  R.  B.  no.  39;  cf.  A.  R.  B. 
no.  40.) 

July  28,  the  Russian  Government  learned  from  their 
charge  at  Berlin  that '  the  Wolff  Press  Agency  had  not  pub- 
lished the  text  of  the  Servian  reply  which  had  been  com- 
municated to  it,  and  that  up  to  the  time  of  sending  the 
dispatch  the  note  had  not  appeared  in  extenso  in  any  of  the 
local  newspapers,  which  evidently  did  not  wish  to  print  it 
because  they  realized  what  a  calming  effect  its  publication 
would  have  upon  the  German  public.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  R.  0.  P.  no.  46.)  This  attitude  on  the  part  of 
the  'German  Government  was  most  alarming'  (modified 
quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  54)  in  view  of  the  extremely 
conciliatory  nature  of  the  Servian  reply.  For  it  began  to 
look  as  though  it  lacked  the  will  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  spoken  when  he  remarked  to 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  that  'in  times  of  difficulty  like 
the  present,  it  was  just  as  true  to  say  that  it  required  two 
to  keep  the  peace  as  it  was  to  say,  ordinarily,  that  it  took 
two  to  make  a  quarrel.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  23, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  3.) 

The  powers  must  have  foreseen  that  Austria,  having 
refused  to  extend  the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum,  would 
probably  refuse  to  accept  the  Servian  reply,  conciliatory 
as  it  was,  and  they  tried  to  prevail  upon  Austria  to  refrain 
from  having  immediate  recourse  to  force  while  they  tried 
to  find  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  difficulty.  July  24, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  'urged  upon  the  German  Ambassador 
that  Austria  should  not  precipitate  military  action/ 
(Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  12.)  'When  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  the  day  following,  was  authorized 

1  According  to  the  Servian  Blue  Book  this  mobilization  did  not  occur  till 
later.   (S.  B.  B.  no.  41.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  81 

to  inform  Sir  Edward  that  the  Austrian  method  of  proce- 
dure upon  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  would  be  to 
break  off  diplomatic  relations  and  commence  military  prep- 
arations, but  not  military  operations,'  it  was  natural  that 
the  British  Secretary  should  say, '  in  informing  the  German 
Ambassador,  that  in  accordance  with  what  he  had  urged 
the  day  before,  it  interposed  a  stage  of  mobilization  before 
the  frontier  was  actually  crossed.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  25.)  To  the  Ambassador  at  Vienna 
Sir  Edward  telegraphed:  " Since  the  telegram  to  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  was  sent,  it  has  been  a  re- 
lief to  hear  that  the  steps  which  the  Austrian  Government 
were  taking  were  to  be  limited  for  the  moment  to  the  rup- 
ture of  relations  and  to  military  preparations,  and  not 
operations.  I  trust,  therefore,  that  if  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  consider  it  too  late  to  prolong  the  time 
limit,  they  will  at  any  rate  give  time  in  the  sense  and  for 
the  reasons  desired  by  Russia  before  taking  any  irretriev- 
able steps."  (Extract,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  26;  cf.  R.  O.  P. 
no.  16;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  40.)  The  telegram  referred  to  is  that 
from  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  asking  for 
an  extension  of  the  time  limit.   (R.  0.  P.  no.  4.) 

6.  The  powers  urge  Austria  to  delay  military  operations  and  accept 
the  Servian  reply  as  a  basis  for  discussion 

In  the  mean  time  the  negotiations  at  St.  Petersburg  be- 
tween M.  Sazonof  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  gave 
some  reason  to  hope  for  a  pacific  solution.  The  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  said  that  '  in  fact  they  had  prac- 
tically reached  an  understanding  as  to  the  guaranties  which 
Servia  might  reasonably  be  asked  to  give  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary for  her  future  good  behavior.'  x  (Modified  quotation, 
July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  56.)  So  that  even  though  Austria 
should  refuse  to  accept  the  reply,  it  was  hoped  that  'it 

1  This  optimistic  statement  of  Russia's  optimistic  representative  does  not 
find  any  corroboration  in  the  published  correspondence. 


82       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

might  constitute  a  fair  basis  of  discussion  during  which 
warlike  operations  might  remain  ill  abeyance.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  62.) 

In  the  mean  time,  the  British  representative  at  Belgrade 
had  been  urging  the  'greatest  moderation  pending  efforts 
being  made  toward  a  peaceful  solution.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  65.)  Russia  had  been  pursuing 
a  similar  course.  In  the  Tsar's  telegram  to  Prince  Alex- 
ander, he  said,  "I  have  no  doubt  that  Your  Highness  and 
the  Royal  Government  wish  to  facilitate  this  task  by  neg- 
lecting nothing  to  arrive  at  a  solution  which  would  pre- 
vent the  horrors  of  a  new  war  while  at  the  same  time  safe- 
guarding the  dignity  of  Servia.  So  long  as  there  is  the  least 
hope  of  avoiding  bloodshed,  all  our  efforts  must  tend 
toward  this  object.  If,  despite  our  most  sincere  desire,  we 
do  not  succeed,  Your  Highness  may  be  assured  that  in  no 
case  will  Russia  be  unconcerned  regarding  the  fate  of  Ser- 
via." (Extract,  July  27,  R.  0.  P.  no.  40.)  Also  the  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  assured  the  British  Ambassador 
that '  he  would  use  all  his  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  the 
Servian  Government  to  go  as  far  as  possible  in  giving  satis- 
faction to  Austria,  but  that  her  territorial  integrity  must 
be  guaranteed  and  her  rights  as  a  sovereign  state  respected, 
so  that  she  should  not  become  Austria's  vassal.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  55.)  A  similar  assurance 
was  given  at  Vienna,  where  the  Russian  Ambassador  said 
'he  would  do  all  he  could  to  keep  the  Servians  quiet  pend- 
ing any  discussions  that  might  yet  take  place,'  and  he 
assured  the  British  Ambassador  that  '  he  would  advise  his 
Government  to  induce  the  Servian  Government  to  avoid 
any  conflict  as  long  as  possible,  and  to  fall  back  before  an 
Austrian  advance.  Time  so  gained  should,  it  was  hoped, 
suffice  to  enable  a  settlement  to  be  reached.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  56.) 

The  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  perhaps  better 
informed  as  Austria's  ally  than  the  members  of  the  Entente, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  83 

'saw  no  possibility  of  Anc+v-'r  v'^  >{*  from  any  point 
laid  down  in  her  noie  to  feervia,  but  oelieved  that,  if  Servia 
would  even  then  accept  it,  Austria  would  be  satisfied,  and 
if  she  had  reason  to  think  that  such  would  be  the  advice  of 
the  powers  to  Servia,  Austria  might  defer  action.  Servia, 
he  thought,  might  be  induced  to  accept  the  note  in  its 
entirety  on  the  advice  of  the  four  powers  invited  to  the 
conference  and  this  would  enable  her  to  say  that  she  had 
yielded  to  Europe  and  not  to  Austria-Hungary  alone.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  57.) 

When  the  British  Government  had  learned,  July  25 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  21),  how  conciliatory  the  Servian  reply 
would  be,  it  tried  to  use  every  means  available  to  prevail 
upon  Austria  to  accept  it.  The  forecast  of  the  reply  was 
communicated  to  the  German  Ambassador,  and  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  said  that,  'if  the  Servian  reply  when  received 
at  Vienna  corresponded  to  the  forecast,  he  hoped  the  Ger- 
man Government  would  feel  able  to  take  a  favorable  view 
of  it.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  27.) 
This  conversation  was  communicated  to  the  British  repre- 
sentatives at  Berlin,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburg,  so  that 
they  might  exert  themselves  to  secure  action  along  the 
same  line.  As  soon  as  the  substance  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
remarks  had  been  communicated  to  Italy,  July  28,  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  immediately  telegraphed  the 
Italian  representatives  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  '  in  precisely 
similar  terms.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  63.)  Sir  Edward  Grey  probably  expressed  the  opinion 
of  the  Entente  Powers,  and  Italy  as  well,  when  he  told  the 
German  Ambassador  that,  'if  Austria  put  the  Servian 
reply  aside  as  being  worth  nothing  and  marched  into 
Servia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined  to  crush  Servia 
at  all  costs,  being  reckless  of  the  consequences  that  might 
be  involved.  The  Servian  reply  should,  he  said,  at  least 
be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  pause.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  46.) 


84       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

7.  Austrian  assurances 

But  'Austria  refused  to  accept  any  discussion  on  the 
basis  of  the  Servian  note'  (modified  quotation,  July  29, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  81;  cf.  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  1914, 
p.  2),  and  to  all  the  efforts  of  the  powers  to  induce  her  to 
postpone  hostilities,  she  replied  by  "amending  the  justness 
and  necessity  of  her  action,  and  by  giving  repeated  assur- 
ances as  to  her  designs.  (Cf.  G.  W.  B.  exhibits  5;  10;  A. 
R.  B.  no.  30.) 

Count  Berchtold,  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
told  the  Russian  Charge"  at  Vienna,  on  July  24,  that  'the 
Dual  Monarchy  entertained  no  thought  of  conquest  of 
Servia.  Austria  would  not,  he  said,  claim  Servian  territory, 
but  insisted  merely  that  the  action  taken  was  meant  to 
check  effectively  Serb  intrigues.  Impelled  by  force  of  cir- 
cumstances, Austria  must  have  a  guaranty  for  the  con- 
tinuation of  amicable  relations  with  Servia.  It  was  far 
from  his  purpose  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Balkans.'  (Modified  quotation,  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  3;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  18.) 

The  statements  of  the  German  representatives  at  the 
different  capitals  to  the  same  effect  had  the  double  purpose 
of  guaranteeing  the  Austrian  promises  and  of  indicating 
Germany's  firm  intention  to  back  up  her  ally.  At  St. 
Petersburg  the  German  Ambassador  stated  under  instruc- 
tions that  Germany  would  be  'all  the  more  able  to  sup- 
port Russia's  wish  not  to  allow  the  integrity  of  the  Servian 
Kingdom  to  be  called  into  question,  since  Austria  herself 
did  not  call  this  integrity  into  question.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  26,  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  7.)  July  27,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Baron  von  Schoen,  con- 
firmed in  writing  his  declaration  of  the  day  before,  namely, 
'  that  Austria  had  declared  to  Russia  that  she  did  not  seek 
acquisitions  and  was  not  attacking  the  integrity  of  Servia.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  R.  0.  P.  no.  35;  cf.  A.  R. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  85 

B.  no.  32.)  July  28,  he  stated  that  'Austria  would  respect 
the  integrity  of  Servia,  but  when  asked  whether  her  in- 
dependence also  would  be  respected,  he  gave  no  assur- 
ance.' (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  59.) 

S.  Austria  declares  war  on  Servia 

In  answer  to  all  these  efforts  to  persuade  Austria  directly 
and  through  Berlin,  the  Austrian  Government  replied, 
July  27,  'As  peaceable  means  had  been  exhausted,  the 
Austrian  Government  must  at  last  appeal  to  force.  They 
had  not  taken  this  decision  without  reluctance.  Their 
action,  which  had  no  sort  of  aggressive  tendency,  could  not 
be  represented  otherwise  than  as  an  act  of  self-defense. 
Also  they  thought  that  they  would  serve  a  European  inter- 
est if  they  prevented  Servia  from  being  henceforth  an  ele- 
ment of  general  unrest,  such  as  she  had  been  for  the  last 
ten  years.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  48; 
cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  37.)  July  28,  Count  Berchtold  told  the 
Russian  Ambassador  that  'the  crisis  had  become  so  acute, 
and  that  public  opinion  had  risen  to  such  a  pitch  of  excite- 
ment, that  the  Government,  even  if  they  wished  it,  could 
no  longer  recede  or  enter  into  any  discussion  about  the 
terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  93;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  61.) 

In  a  telegram  to  St.  Petersburg  Count  Berchtold  re- 
lated how,  '  in  reply  to  the  statement  of  the  Russian  Am- 
bassador  to  the  effect  that  Austria  would  not  decrease, 
but  rather  increase,  the  undeniably  hostile  attitude  of 
Servia  by  having  recourse  to  warlike  measures,  he  had 
given  him  some  light  on  those  relations  existing  between 
Austria  and  Servia  which  had  made  it  inevitable  for  the 
former  state  to  declare  to  her  restless  neighbor  with  the 
requisite  emphasis,  that,  quite  against  her  will  and  with- 
out any  selfish  motives,  she  was  no  longer  willing  to  toler- 
ate the  continuance  of  a  movement  directed  against  her- 
self and  acquiesced  in  by  the  Servian  Government.    The 


86      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Austrian  Minister  added,  moreover,  that  the  behavior  ol 
Servia  after  receiving  the  Austrian  note  was  not  calcu- 
lated to  bring  about  a  peaceful  solution,  since  Servia, 
even  before  handing  the  Austrian  Government  her  un- 
satisfactory answer,  had  ordered  complete  mobilization 
and  had  thus  committed  a  hostile  act  ajgvnst  that  Govern- 
ment; but  that  Austria,  nevertheless,  had  waited  three 
days.  The  Austrian  Minister  further  remarked  that  the 
Servians  had  the  day  before  opened  hostilities  against 
Austria  on  the  Hungarian  border,  thereby  making  it 
impossible  for  Austria  to  continue  her  patient  course  with 
Servia,  or  bring  about  any  thorough  yet  peaceable  set- 
tlement of  her  difficulties  with  that  country,  —  Austria 
could  not,  therefore,  do  otherwise  than  meet  the  Servian 
challenge  in  a  manner  befitting  the  dignity  of  the  Mon- 
archy.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  A.  R.  B.  no.  40.) 

Previously,  July  26,  Austria  had  declared  that  the  with- 
drawal of  her  Minister  from  Belgrade  did  not  imply  a 
declaration  of  war.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  35.) 

But  the  German  White  Book  (p.  6)  states  that,  from  the 
moment  Austria  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Servia, 
a  state  of  war  actually  existed.  It  is  perhaps  more  correct 
to  say  that  at  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  of  the  ulti- 
matum, and  after  the  formal  breaking-off  of  all  negotia- 
tions, Austria  might  have  considered  herself  at  liberty  to 
commence  hostilities  without  further  notice.1  There  could 
have  been  no  doubt  as  to  this,  had  it  not  been  for  Austria's 
assurances  'that  her  note  to  Servia  was  not  an  ultima- 
tum, but  only  a  demarche 2  (inquiry)  with  a  time  limit  at- 

1  A  London  cable  of  July  26,  published  in  the  New  York  Sun  of  July  27, 
1914,  declared  that  General  Pulnik,  Servian  Chief-of-Staff,  was  arrested  in 
Hungary,  July  25.  He  was  traveling  with  his  daughter  in  his  private 
capacity  on  their  return  from  a  vacation. 

2  A  demarche  in  diplomatic  parlance  is  a  word  very  difficult  to  translate. 
It  may  mean  an  inquiry  or  a  request  for  an  explanation  or  answer  in  regard 
to  a  certain  matter;  it  may  likewise  include  a  representation  or  mild  protest 
made  to  any  other  Government.  Sometimes  it  denotes  simply  action  taken, 
i.e.,  proceedings  or  even  procedure. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  87 

tachecf.'  (B.  W.  P.  no.  14.)  It  would  appear  that  actual 
hostilities  did  follow  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations. 
For  the  British  Government  publish  in  the  White  Paper 
a  telegram,  dated  July  28,  from  their  representative  at 
Belgrade  that  'two  Servian  steamers  had  been  fired  on 
and  damaged  and  two  Servian  merchant  vessels  captured 
by  a  Hungarian  monitor  at  Orsova.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  65.) 

To  avoid  any  doubt  as  to  their  compliance  with  the 
terms  of  Article  I  of  the  Hague  Convention  of  October  18, 
1907,  Relative  to  the  Opening  of  Hostilities,1  Austria  de- 
livered, on  July  28,  the  following  formal  declaration  of  war 
against  Servia,  giving  her  reasons,  as  required  by  the 
Hague  Convention:  "In  order  to  bring  to  an  end  the  sub- 
versive intrigues  originating  from  Belgrade  and  aimed  at 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  delivered  to 
the  Royal  Servian  Government  a  note  in  which  a  series  of 
demands  were  formulated,  for  the  acceptance  of  which  a 
delay  of  forty-eight  hours  was  allowed  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment. The  Royal  Servian  Government  not  having  an- 
swered this  note  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  are  obliged  themselves  to  see  to  the 
safeguarding  of  their  rights  and  interests,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose to  have  recourse  to  force  of  arms."  (July  28,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  50;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  37;  S.  B.  B.  no.  45.)  Austria  may 
also  have  intended  by  this  course  to  pursue  her  favorite 
fait-accompli  policy  and  to  make  still  clearer  to  the  powers 
that  she  would  brook  no  mediation  in  her  dispute  with 
Servia. 

The  same  day,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  re- 
ported to  his  Government  that  'Austria-Hungary  had  ad- 
dressed to  Servia  a  formal  declaration,  according  to  Article 
I  of  the  Convention  of  18th  of  October,  1907,  Relative  to 
the  Opening  of  Hostilities,  and  considered  herself  from 
1  See  Documents,  post,  chap.  xm. 


88      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

then  on  in  a  state  of  war  with  Servia.  Austria-Hungary 
would  conform,  provided  Servia  did  so,  to  the  stipulations 
of  Hague  Conventions  of  18th  of  October,  1907,  and  to  the 
Declaration  of  London  of  26th  February,  1909.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  73.) 

It  is  not  quite  clear  why  Austria  should  have  referred  to 
the  London  Declaration  in  her  note,  for  Servia,  having  no 
navy,  would  be  obliged  to  submit  to  any  system  of  dealing 
with  neutral  commerce  which  Austria  might  apply.  Per- 
haps Austria  hoped,  by  giving  official  support  to  the 
Declaration,  to  help  to  secure  its  general  adoption.  She 
may  have  been  preparing  for  the  general  war  about  to 
occur,  and  thought  the  immunity  of  trade  in  conditional 
contraband  shipped  to  belligerents  through  neutral  ports 
would  be  an  inducement  for  England  to  keep  out  of  the 
war. 

'The  demeanor  of  the  people  at  Vienna,  and,  as  the 
British  Ambassador  was  informed,  in  many  other  prin- 
cipal cities  of  the  Monarchy,  showed  plainly  the  popu- 
larity of  the  idea  of  war  with  Servia,  and  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that  the  small  body  of  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
statesmen  by  whom  the  momentous  step  was  adopted, 
gauged  rightly  the  sense,  and  it  may  even  be  said  the 
determination  of  the  people,  except,  presumably,  in  por- 
tions of  the  provinces  inhabited  by  the  Slav  races.'  1 
(Modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10, 1914.) 

1  The  depth  of  the  hostile  feeling  toward  Servia  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
following  incident  as  recounted  by  the  Servian  Minister  at  Vienna:  "  Yes- 
terday, the  day  when  the  remains  of  the  Archduke  Francois- Ferdinand  and 
his  wife  were  taken  from  Serajevo,  I  caused  to  be  raised  and  placed  at  half- 
mast  on  my  residence  the  national  flag.  This  gave  rise  to  protests  last 
evening  from  the  doorkeeper,  the  tenants,  the  manager,  and  even  the 
owner  of  the  property,  all  of  whom  demanded  that  the  flag  be  removed. 
Explanations  serving  no  purpose,  recourse  was  had  to  the  police,  who  asked, 
though  not  officially,  the  removal  of  the  flag  in  order  to  prevent  disorder. 
The  flag  was  kept  flying,  and  this  circumstance  provoked  violent  demon- 
strations in  front  of  the  legation  last  night.  The  police  were  active  and  no 
damage  was  done  either  to  the  building  or  to  the  flag.  Toward  two  o'clock 
in  the  morning  those  who  had  been  engaged  in  this  manifestation  were 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  89 

After  Austria's  declaration  of  war  and  the  publication 
next  morning  of  the  Emperor's  appeal  to  his  people,  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  agreed  with  his  French  and 
Italian  colleagues  in  thinking  there  was  '  at  present  no  step 
they  could  take  to  stop  war  with  Servia.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  79.) 

9.  Austria  explains  the  purpose  of  her  action 
The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London,  speaking  on  his 
own  account,  really  expressed  the  view  of  his  Government 
when  he  said  that  'as  long  as  Servia  was  confronted  with 
Turkey,  Austria  never  took  very  severe  measures  because 
of  her  adherence  to  the  policy  of  the  free  development  of 
the  Balkan  States.  Now  that  Servia  had  doubled  her  ter- 
ritory and  population  without  any  Austrian  interference, 
the  repression  of  Servian  subversive  aims  was  a  matter 
of  self-defense  and  self-preservation  on  Austria's  part.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  48.) 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  told  Sir  Edward  Grey  that 
'the  war  with  Servia  must  proceed.  Austria  could  not  con- 
tinue to  be  exposed  to  the  necessity  of  mobilizing  again  and 
again,  as  she  had  been  obliged  to  do  in  recent  years.  She 
had  no  idea  of  territorial  aggrandizement,  and  all  she 
wished  was  to  make  sure  that  her  interests  were  safe- 
guarded.' (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  91 ; 
cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  18.) 

The  same  day  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London 
told  the  British  Government  of  the  views  and  intentions 
of  Austria,  the  German  Chancellor  informed  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  that  'the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, to  whom  he  had  at  once  communicated  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  opinion,  had  answered  that  events  had  marched  too 

driven  away  from  my  residence.  The  papers  to-day,  especially  those  of  a 
clerical-popular  tendency,  have  published  articles  under  the  caption  'Pro- 
vocative Acts  of  the  Servian  Minister,'  misrepresenting  the  whole  affair." 
(Extract,  July  3,  S.  B.  B.  no.  11.) 


\k 


90      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

rapidly  and  that  it  was  therefore  too  late  to  act  upon  Sir 
Edward's  suggestion  that  the  Servian  reply  might  form  the 
basis  of  discussion.  He  had,  he  said,  on  receiving  their 
reply,  dispatched  a  message  to  Vienna,  in  which  he  had 
said  that,  although  a  certain  desire  had,  in  his  opinion, 
been  shown  in  the  Servian  reply  to  meet  the  demands  of 
Austria,  he  understood  entirely  that,  without  some  sure 
guaranties  that  Servia  would  carry  out  in  their  entirety  the 
demands  made  upon  her,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment could  not  rest  satisfied  in  view  of  their  past  experi- 
ence. He  had  then  gone  on  to  say  that  the  hostilities  which 
were  about  to  be  undertaken  against  Servia  had  presum- 
ably the  exclusive  object  of  securing  such  guaranties,  see- 
ing that  the  Austrian  Government  had  already  assured  the 
Russian  Government  that  they  had  no  territorial  designs. 
He  advised  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  should 
this  view  be  correct,  to  speak  openly  in  this  sense.  The 
holding  of  such  language  would,  he  hoped,  eliminate  all 
possible  misunderstandings.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  75.   Cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  44.) 

If  this  important  communication  had  been  made  to  the 
Austrian  Government  earlier  and  had  been  followed  up,  it 
might  have  influenced  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  accept  in 
time  Servia's  conciliatory  reply,  and  Austria  would  un- 
doubtedly have  secured  guaranties  which,  while  preserving 
Servian  independence,  would  have  checked  her  Pan-Serb 
propaganda.  This  would  have  constituted  a  diplomatic 
victory  for  Austria,  have  rendered  her  Empire  more 
secure,  and  have  added  to  the  prestige  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance. It  would  also  have  been  useful  as  a  precedent  to 
determine  the  limits  within  which  one  state  may  allow  a 
political  agitation  directed  against  its  neighbor  to  be 
carried  on. 

But  every  one  knows  that  promises  made  at  a  time  of 
crisis  are  not  always  observed  after  successful  military 
operations,  and  the  high-handed  manner  in  which  Austria 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  91 

had  proceeded  did  not  indicate  that  she  was  prepared  to 
give  much  heed  to  the  wishes  or  views  of  the  powers.  The 
British  representative  at  Constantinople  was  so  mistrust- 
ful of  Austria's  real  intentions  as  to  telegraph  Sir  Edward 
Grey:  "I  understand  that  the  designs  of  Austria  may  ex- 
tend considerably  beyond  the  Sanjak1  and  a  punitive 
occupation  of  Servian  territory.  I  gathered  this  from  a 
remark  let  fall  by  the  Austrian  Ambassador  here,  who 
spoke  of  the  deplorable  economic  situation  of  Salonika 
under  Greek  administration  and  of  the  assistance  on 
which  the  Austrian  army  could  count  from  the  Mussul- 
man population  discontented  with  Servian  rule."  (July  29, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  82;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  19;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  31.) 
At  the  time  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  presented,  the 
view  was  expressed  at  the  Italian  Foreign  Office  that  '  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  conviction  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  their  prestige,  after  many  disillusions  which  the  turn 
of  events  in  the  Balkans  had  occasioned,  to  score  a  definite 
success.'2  (Modified  quotation,  July  23,  B.  W.  P.  no.  38; 
cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  61;  S.  B.  B.  no.  25.)  This  is  supported  by 
the  statement  of  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  re- 
ferring to  popular  feeling,  in  which  he  said  that  'there 
had  been  much  disappointment  in  many  quarters  at  the 
avoidance  of  war  with  Servia  during  the  annexation 
crisis  in  1908  and  again  in  connection  with  the  recent 

1  By  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878),  Austria-Hungary  was  empowered  to 
garrison  certain  towns  in  the  Sanjak  (Turkish  province)  of  Novibazar, 
though  Turkey  kept  the  entire  civil  administration.  The  following  extract 
from  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  (11th  ed.,  1911  vol.  xix,  p.  840)  makes 
clear  the  situation  of  the  Sanjak,  as  it  is  called,  in  the  political  geography  of 
the  Balkans:  "The  Sanjak  is  of  great  strategic  importance,  for  it  is  the  N.W. 
part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  on  the  direct  route  between  Bosnia  and  Sa- 
lonika, and  forms  a  wedge  of  Turkish  territory  between  Servia  and  Monte- 
negro. The  union  of  these  powers,  combined  with  the  annexation  of  Novi- 
bazar, would  have  impeded  the  extension  of  Austrian  influence  towards 
Salonika."  As  a  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  Servia  received  this  important 
territory,  three  fourths  of  the  inhabitants  of  which  are  Christian  Serbs. 

«  See  post,  p.  107. 


92       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Balkan  War.  Count  Berchtold's  peace  policy  had  met 
with  little  sympathy  in  the  Delegation.  Now  the  flood- 
gates were  opened,  and  the  entire  people  and  press  clam- 
ored impatiently  for  immediate  and  condign  punishment 
of  the  hated  Servian  race.  The  country  certainly  believed 
that  it  had  before  it  only  the  alternative  of  subduing 
Servia  or  of  submitting  sooner  or  later  to  mutilation  at  her 
hands.  ...  So  just  was  the  cause  of  Austria  held  to  be, 
that  it  seemed  to  her  people  inconceivable  that  any  coun- 
try should  place  itself  in  her  path,  or  that  questions  of 
mere  policy  or  prestige  should  be  regarded  anywhere  as 
superseding  the  necessity  which  had  arisen  to  exact  sum- 
mary vengeance  for  the  crime  of  Serajevo.'  (Modified 
quotation,  September  1,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10, 
1914.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  London  said  that '  the  view 
of  the  German  Government  was  that  Austria  could  not 
by  force  be  humiliated,  and  could  not  abdicate  her  position 
as  a  great  power.'  Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  that  'he  en- 
tirely agreed,  but  it  was  not  a  question  of  humiliating 
Austria,  it  was  a  question  of  how  far  Austria  meant  to 
push  the  humiliation  of  others.  There  must,  of  course,  be 
some  humiliation  of  Servia,  but  Austria  might  press  things 
so  far  as  to  involve  the  humiliation  of  Russia.'  When 
the  German  Ambassador  remarked  that  'Austria  would 
not  take  Servian  territory,'  Sir  Edward  'observed  that, 
without  taking  territory  and  while  leaving  nominal  Ser- 
vian independence,  Austria  might  turn  Servia  practically 
into  a  vassal  state,  and  this  would  affect  the  whole  position 
of  Russia  in  the  Balkans.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  90.)  At  Berlin  the  French  Ambassador  made 
suggestions  as  to  the  possibility  of  securing  guaranties  satis- 
factory to  Austria  without  impairing  the  independence  of 
Servia.  (July  29,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  92.)  Sir  Edward  Grey  re- 
peated to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  his  statement  to  the 
German  Ambassador  'that  it  would  be  quite  possible, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  93 

without  nominally  interfering  with  the  independence  of 
Servia  or  taking  away  any  of  her  territory,  to  turn  her  into 
a  sort  of  vassal  state.'  This  the  Ambassador  deprecated, 
and  '  in  reply  to  some  further  remarks  of  Sir  Edward's  as 
to  the  effect  that  the  Austrian  action  might  have  upon  the 
Russian  position  in  the  Balkans,  said  that,  before  the 
Balkan  War,  Servia  had  always  been  regarded  as  being  in 
the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence.'  l  (Modified  quotation, 
July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  91.) 

This  last  remark  touches  the  very  crux  of  the  question. 
Servia,  as  a  consequence  of  the  Balkan  War,  had  escaped 
from  the  position  of  a  political  vassal  of  Austria,  and,  from 
the  Austrian  point  of  view,  it  was  perfectly  natural  that 
every  effort  should  be  made  to  reestablish  over  her  Aus- 
trian influence  and  political  dictation.  So,  when  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  said  that  the  German 
Government  was  'willing  to  guarantee  that  Servian  in- 
tegrity would  be  respected  by  Austria,'  M.  Sazonbf  replied 
that  'this  might  be  so,  but  nevertheless  Servia  would  be- 
come an  Austrian  vassal,  just  as,  in  similar  circumstance, 
Bokhara  had  become  a  Russian  vassal.  There  would  be  a 
revolution  in  Russia  if  she  were  to  tolerate  such  a  state  of 
affairs.'    (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  97.) 

The  German  Memorandum,  issued  when  war  with 
Russia  was  certain,  gives  a  frank  explanation  of  Austria's 
motives  and  states  that  "  Russia,  soon  after  the  events 
brought  about  by  the  Turkish  revolution  of  1908,  endea- 
vored to  form  under  Russian  patronage  a  union  of  the 
Balkan  States  directed  against  Turkish  integrity.  This 
union,  which  succeeded  in  1911  in  depriving  Turkey  of  a 
greater  part  of  her  European  possessions,  came  to  grief 
over  the  question  of  the  distribution  of  spoils.  Russia  was 

1  "The  unanimous  feeling  in  Ottoman  political  circles  is  that  Austria, 
with  the  support  of  Germany,  will  attain  her  objects  and  that  she  will  make 
Servia  follow  Bulgaria  and  enter  into  the  orbit  of  the  Triple  Alliance." 
(Extract,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  65.) 


94       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

not  dismayed  by  this  failure  of  her  policies.  The  Russian 
statesmen  adopted  the  plan  of  forming  a  new  Balkan 
union  under  Russian  patronage,  directed  no  longer  against 
Turkey,  now  crowded  out  of  the  Balkans,  but  against  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  It  was  intended  that  Ser- 
via,  in  return  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  acquired  at  the 
expense  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  should  make  over  to  Bul- 
garia the  parts  of  Macedonia  which  she  had  acquired  in 
the  last  Balkan  War.  To  oblige  Bulgaria  to  fall  in  with  this 
plan  she  was  to  be  isolated,  Rumania  was  to  be  attached 
to  Russia  by  means  of  a  French  propaganda,  and  Servia 
was  to  be  promised  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 

"  Under  these  circumstances  Austria  could  not  consider 
it  compatible  with  her  dignity  and  the  preservation  of  her 
national  security  longer  to  view  supinely  the  working-out 
of  this  plan  across  the  border."  (G.  W.  B.,  Memoran- 
dum, p.  4.) 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  as  soon  as  he  learned  that 
the  Russian  Government  had  announced  at  Berlin  her 
partial  mobilization,  thought  the  time  was  'past  for  any 
further  discussions  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  note.'  The 
utmost  he  hoped  for  was  that  Germany  might  'use  her 
influence  at  Vienna  to  prevent  or  moderate  any  further 
demands  on  Servia'  (modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  86),  which  meant  that  she  might  influence  Austria  not 
to  make  any  further  demands  or  take  any  action  which 
would  interfere  with  the  maintenance  of  Servia's  independ- 
ence, thereby  affecting  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans, 
and  making  a  general  war  inevitable. 

Meantime,  the  question  of  Austria's  mobilization  became 
so  important  as  to  overshadow  that  of  the  Austro-Servian 
relations,  but  as  the  question  of  the  military  preparations 
involves  the  relations  of  all  the  powers,  it  will  be  best  to 
lay  it  aside  until  we  take  up  the  consideration  of  Russia's 
reply  to  Austria's  attack  upon  Servia. 

To  the  impartial  observer  who  has  followed  the  course 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  95 

of  Austria's  action  to  this  point,  it  may  seem  inexplicable, 
even  in  the  face  of  a  most  serious  grievance  against  her 
weaker  neighbor,  that  a  civilized  state  should  wish  to  pro- 
ceed so  far  in  the  abuse  of  force  before  there  had  been  any 
opportunity  for  an  unbiased  investigation.  It  will,  per- 
haps, help  to  understand  the  national  psychology  to  com- 
pare our  own  conduct,  not  so  very  many  years  ago,  in 
circumstances  somewhat  analogous,  when  the  American 
nation  was  stirred  by  the  loss  of  the  Maine.1 

1  Among  the  documents  at  the  end  of  this  volume  has  been  placed  a 
re'sume'  of  the  negotiations  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  follow- 
ing the  destruction  of  the  Maine  and  a  comparison  between  the  action  of  the 
United  States  in  1898  and  that  of  Austria-Hungary  in  1914. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  DISCUSSIONS 

Russia's  interest  in  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  —  Russia  believes  Aus- 
tria's action  is  directed  against  herself  —  Russia  considers  immediate 
action  necessary  —  Russia  partially  mobilizes  against  Austria  —  The  Tsar 
asks  the  Kaiser  to  try  his  mediation. 

1.  Russia's  interest  in  the  Austro-Servian  conflict 

From  the  date  of  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, the  efforts  which  the  powers  had  directed  toward 
settling  the  Austro-Servian  controversy  had,  of  course,  the 
object  of  preventing  Russia's  entry  upon  the  scene.  It  was 
an  A  B  C  of  European  politics  that  Russia  was  deeply 
interested  in  the  fate  of  the  Slav  states  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula. 

Before  taking  his  departure  on  leave  of  absence,  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  assured  his  British  col- 
league that  'any  action  taken  by  Austria  to  humiliate 
Servia  could  not  leave  Russia  indifferent.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  7.) 

Count  Berchtold  received  Prince  Kudachef,  the  Rus- 
sian Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna,  the  morning  after  the 
presentation  of  the  ultimatum  and  '  assured  him  that  he 
laid  special  weight  upon  notifying  him  as  soon  as  possible 
of  the  steps  they  had  taken  in  Belgrade  and  making  clear 
to  him  their  point  of  view  in  this  connection. 

'Prince  Kudachef,  in  thanking  Count  Berchtold  for  this 
attention,  did  not  conceal  from  the  Austrian  Minister  his 
uneasiness  about  Austria's  categorical  procedure  toward 
Servia,  remarking  in  this  connection  that  they  had  been 
continuously  preoccupied  at  St.  Petersburg  in  considering 
whether  the  Austrian  demarche  would  take  the  form  of  a 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  97 

humiliation  for  Servia,  which  could  not  take  place  with- 
out affecting  Russia. 

'Count  Berchtold  took  occasion  to  calm  the  Russian 
Charge"  in  this  respect.  Their  goal,  he  told  him,  was  to 
clear  up  the  untenable  attitude  of  Servia  toward  the  Mon- 
archy and  for  this  purpose  to  influence  the  Government 
there,  on  the  one  hand,  publicly  to  disavow  the  currents 
directed  against  the  present  stability  of  the  Monarchy  and 
to  suppress  them  by  administrative  measures,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  offer  the  Austrian  Government  the  pos- 
sibility of  assuring  itself  of  the  conscientious  execution  of 
these  measures.  He  furthermore  dwelt  upon  the  danger 
which  a  further  tolerance  of  the  Greater  Servian  propa- 
ganda would  entail,  not  only  for  the  integrity  of  the  Mon- 
archy, but  also  for  the  balance  of  power  and  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  how  much  all  dynasties,  and  not  least  of 
them  the  Russian,  seemed  to  be  threatened  by  a  popular 
adoption  of  this  view  that  a  movement  which  made  use  of 
murder  as  a  nationalist  means  of  battle  could  remain  un- 
punished. 

'Finally,  Count  Berchtold  pointed  out  that  they  did 
not  seek  for  an  acquisition  of  territory,  but  merely  for  the 
conservation  of  that  which  existed,  a  point  of  view  which, 
he  considered,  should  be  understood  by  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  A.  R.  B.  no.  18.) 

As  early  as  July  24,  the  British  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg  had  sounded  M.  Sazonof  as  to  the  course 
Russia  would  pursue,  supposing  Austria,  even  though  the 
powers  'joined  in  making  a  communication  to  the  effect 
that  her  active  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Servia 
could  not  be  tolerated,  should  nevertheless,  in  spite  of 
their  representations,  proceed  to  embark  on  military 
measures  against  Servia.  The  Russian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  replied  that  he  thought  that  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion would  at  any  rate  have  to  be  carried  out,  but  that  a 
Council  of  Ministers  was  being  held  that  afternoon  to  con- 


98       THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

sider  the  whole  question,  and  that  a  further  council  would 
be  held,  probably  on  the  morrow,  at  which  the  Tsar  would 
preside,  and  that  then  a  decision  would  be  reached.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  6.) 

M.  Sazonof,  according  to  the  report  of  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  'made  wild  complaints 
against  Austria-Hungary  and  was  much  excited.  What  he 
said  most  definitely  was  this:  that  Russia  could  not  pos- 
sibly permit  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  to  be  confined  to 
the  parties  concerned.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24, 
G.  W.  B.  exhibit  24.) 

In  the  Austrian  Red  Book,  Count  Szapary,  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  gives  the  following  account 
of  this  interview  of  July  24,  with  M.  Sazonof:  "The  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  received  me,  telling  me  that  he 
knew  what  led  me  to  him  and  that  he  would  declare  to  me 
at  the  outset  that  he  would  take  no  attitude  toward  my 
demarche.  I  began  with  the  reading  of  my  instructions. 
The  Minister  interrupted  me  the  first  time  upon  the  men- 
tion of  the  series  of  outrages  and  asked  me  to  explain 
whether  or  not  it  had  been  proved  that  all  these  originated 
in  Belgrade.  I  emphasized  the  fact  that  they  were  the 
result  of  Servian  instigation.  In  the  further  course  of  the 
reading  he  said  that  he  knew  what  was  at  issue;  we  wanted 
to  make  war  upon  Servia,  and  this  was  to  be  the  pretext. 
I  replied  that  our  attitude  in  recent  years  afforded  ample 
proof  that  we  neither  sought  nor  needed  pretexts  in 
Servia's  case."   (Extract,  July  24,  A.  R.  B.  no.  14.) 

The  Russian  Government,  in  a  communique  of  July  25, 
stated  that  it  was  '  carefully  following  the  evolution  of  the 
Austro-Servian  conflict  to  which  it  could  not  remain  in- 
different.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  R.  O.  P.  no.  10.) 

Several  days  later,  July  31,  M.  Sazonof  said  that  'during 
the  Balkan  crisis  he  had  made  it  clear  to  the  Austrian 
Government  that  war  with  Russia  must  inevitably  follow 
an  attack  on  Servia.  It  was  clear  that  Austrian  domination 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  99 

of  Servia  was  as  intolerable  for  Russia  as  the  depend- 
ence of  the  Netherlands  on  Germany  would  be  to  Great 
Britain.  It  was,  in  fact,  for  Russia  a  question  of  life 
and  death.' 1  (Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
139.) 

When  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  urged 
upon  M.  Sazonof  the  danger  of  precipitating  a  German 
attack  if  Russia  should  mobilize,  he  'replied  that  Russia 
could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush  Servia  and  become  the 
predominant  power  in  the  Balkans.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 

On  July  27,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  having 
just  returned  from  St.  Petersburg,  and  being  'well  ac- 
quainted with  the  views  of  the  Russian  Government  and 
the  state  of  Russian  public  opinion,'  assured  the  Austrian 
Government  'that  if  actual  war  broke  out  with  Servia  it 
would  be  impossible  to  localize  it,  for  Russia  was  not  pre- 
pared to  give  way  again,  as  she  had  done  on  previous  oc- 
casions, and  especially  during  the  annexation  crisis  of 
1909.'  (Modified  quotations,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  56.) 
No  wonder  Sazonof  complained  to  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment that  its  action  had  caused  in  his  country  a  feeling  of 
'profound  surprise  and  general  reprobation.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  R.  O.  P.  no.  41.) 

That  Servia  was  well  aware  of  Russia's  interest  is  indi- 
cated by  Prince  AJexander's  telegraphing  an  appeal  for 
aid  to  the  Tsar.  (July  24,  R.  0.  P.  no.  6.)  In  another  tele- 
gram to  the  Tsar,  Prince  Alexander  of  Servia  says:  "These 
painful  moments  can  only  strengthen  the  bonds  of  the 
deep  attachment  which  unites  Servia  to  Holy  Slav  Russia, 
and  the  sentiments  of  eternal  gratitude  for  the  aid  and 
protection  of  Your  Majesty  will  be  piously  preserved  in 

1  "From  the  political  point  of  view,  it  is  not  by  annexation  alone  that  the 
balance  of  power  is  affected.  If,  as  a  result  of  war,  Servia  became  politically 
dependent  on  Austria,  or  France  were  seriously  weakened,  the  balance  of 
power  would  be  disturbed."  (Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus 
Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  pp.  75-76.) 


100     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  souls  of  all  Servians."  (Extract,  July  29,  R.  0.  P.  no. 
56 ;  cf .  S.  B.  B.  no.  44.)  The  Tsar,  in  answer  to  this  appeal 
telegraphed:  "So  long  as  there  is  the  least  hope  of  avoiding 
bloodshed,  all  our  efforts  must  tend  toward  this  object. 
If,  despite  our  most  sincere  desire,  we  do  not  succeed,  Your 
Highness  may  be  assured  that  in  no  case  will  Russia  be 
unconcerned  regarding  the  fate  of  Servia."  (Extract,  July 
27,  R.  0.  P.  no.  40.) 

In  a  telegram  of  July  28,  the  Servian  Minister  at  St. 
Petersburg  informed  his  Government  of  the  manner  in 
which  he  had  informed  M.  Sazonof  of  the  Austrian  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Servia:  — 

"I  have  the  honor  of  informing  you  that  I  have  just 
received  from  M.  M.  Pashitch,  President  of  the  Council, 
the  following  urgent  telegram  sent  from  Nish  to-day  at 
2.10  p.m.:  — 

'The  Government  of  Austria-Hungary  declared 
war  to-day  at  noon  in  an  open  [en  clair]  telegram 
addressed  to  the  Servian  Government.' 

'PASm-TCH.' 

"In  bringing  to  your  attention  this  act  which  a  great 
power  unhappily  has  had  the  courage  to  commit  upon 
a  little  Slav  country  just  now  barely  emerging  from  a 
long  series  of  struggles  as  heroic  as  they  have  been  exhaust- 
ing, I  take  the  liberty,  in  circumstances  so  serious  to  my 
country,  of  expressing  the  hope  that  this  act,  which  shat- 
ters the  peace  of  Europe  and  shocks  its  conscience,  will  be 
disapproved  by  the  whole  civilized  world  and  severely 
punished  by  Russia,  protector  of  Servia. 

"I  pray  Your  Excellency  be  pleased  to  bear  to  the  throne 
of  His  Majesty  this  prayer  of  the  whole  Servian  people, 
and  to  accept  the  assurance  of  my  devotion  and  respect." 
(July  28,  S.  B.  B.  no.  47.) 

When  the  Russian  Charge  at  Belgrade  communicated 
to  M.  Pashitch  the  Tsar's  promise  of  protection,  the 
Servian  Minister  exclaimed:  "Seigneur,  the  Tsar  is  great 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  101 

and  clement"  (extract,  July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  57),  and, 
unable  to  restrain  his  emotion,  embraced  the  Charge. 

Count  Berchtold  showed  that  he  realized  how  vitally 
Russia  was  concerned  by  summoning  the  Russian  Charge^ 
the  day  after  the  presentation  of  the  ultimatum,  '  in  order 
to  explain  to  him  in  detail  and  in  friendly  terms  the  posi- 
tion of  Austria  regarding  Servia.  After  going  over  the  his- 
torical developments  of  the  last  few  years,  he  laid  stress  on 
the  statement  that  the  Monarchy  entertained  no  thought 
of  conquest  of  Servia.  He  said  that  Austria-Hungary 
would  demand  no  territory;  that  the  step  was  merely  a 
definitive  measure  against  Servian  intrigue;  that  Austria- 
Hungary  felt  herself  obliged  to  exact  guaranties  for  the 
future  friendly  behavior  of  Servia  toward  the  Monarchy; 
that  it  was  far  from  his  intention  to  bring  about  a  change 
in  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans.  The  Charge* 
d' Affaires,  who  as  yet  had  no  instructions  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, took  the  explanations  of  the  Minister  ad  referendum, 
promising  to  transmit  them  immediately  to  M.  Sazonof.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  24,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  3;  cf.  A. 
R.  B.  no.  18.) 

Herr  von  Tchirsky,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
'doubted  if  Russia,  who  had  no  right  to  assume  a  protec- 
torate over  Servia,  would  act  as  if  she  made  any  such 
claim.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  32.) 
To  the  British  Ambassador  he  expressed  his  confident 
belief  that  'Russia,  having  received  assurances  that  no 
Servian  territory  would  be  annexed  by  Austria-Hungary, 
would  keep  quiet  during  the  chastisement  of  Servia,  which 
Austria-Hungary  was  resolved  to  inflict.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  32;  cf.  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellane- 
ous, no.  10,  1914.)  When  asked  'whether  the  Russian 
Government  might  not  be  compelled  by  public  opinion  to 
intervene  on  behalf  of  a  kindred  nationality,  he  said  that 
everything  depended  on  the  personality  of  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  could  resist  easily,  if  he 


102     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

chose,  the  pressure  of  a  few  newspapers.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  days  of  Pan-Slav  agitation  in  Russia  were  over, 
and  that  Moscow  was  perfectly  quiet.  The  Russian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  would  not,  he  thought,  be  so  im- 
prudent as  to  take  a  step  which  would  probably  result  in 
many  frontier  questions  in  which  Russia  was  interested, 
such  as  the  Swedish,  Polish,  Ruthene,  Rumanian,  and 
Persian  questions  being  brought  into  the  melting-pot. 
France,  too,  was  not  at  all  in  a  condition  for  facing  a  war.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  32.) 

Similarly,  the  German  Under-Secretary  of  State,  learn- 
ing from  St.  Petersburg  that  Russia  would  not  remain 
indifferent  'if  Austria  annexed  bits  of  Servian  territory,' 
drew  the  conclusion  'that  Russia  would  not  act  if  Austria 
did  not  annex  territory.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  33.) 

The  German  Memorandum  admits,  however,  that 
'Germany  was  fully  aware  in  this  connection  that  warlike 
moves  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia 
would  bring  Russia  into  the  question  and  might  draw  Ger- 
many into  a  war  in  accordance  with  her  duty  as  Austria's 
ally.'   (Modified  quotation,  G.  W.  B.  p.  4.) 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  had  previously,  in  a  con- 
versation with  the  French  representative  at  Rome,  said 
that  'unfortunately  in  this  whole  affair  it  had  been  and 
still  was  the  conviction  of  Austria  and  Germany  that 
Russia  would  not  move.  In  this  connection  he  read  a  dis- 
patch from  the  Italian  representative  at  Berlin  reporting 
an  interview  he  had  had  that  day  with  the  German  Secre- 
tary for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  the  latter  again  repeated 
that  he  did  not  believe  Russia  would  move,  basing  his  be- 
lief on  the  fact  that  the  Russian  Government  had  only  just 
sent  an  agent  to  Berlin  to  arrange  about  certain  financial 
matters.  Furthermore,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Berlin 
had  told  his  English  colleague  that  he  did  not  believe  in  a 
general  war,  Russia  being  in  neither  a  mood  nor  a  condition 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  103 

to  make  war.  The  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  did 
not  share  this  opinion,  but  considered  that  if  Austria  con- 
fined her  action  to  humiliating  Servia  and  to  exacting  in 
addition  to  the  acceptance  of  the  note,  certain  material 
advantages  not  affecting  Servia' s  territorial  integrity, 
Russia  would  still  be  able  to  find  ground  for  a  settlement 
with  her.  If,  however,  Austria  wished  either  to  dismember 
Servia  or  destroy  her  position  as  an  independent  state,  he 
thought  it  impossible  for  Russia  not  to  intervene  with 
armed  force.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
96.) 

Public  opinion  in  Austria  well  understood  Russia's  atti- 
tude, for  during  the  orderly  patriotic  demonstrations  which 
followed  the  news  of  the  rejection  of  the  Servian  reply,  'one 
or  two  attempts  to  make  hostile  manifestations  against  the 
Russian  Embassy  were  frustrated  by  the  strong  guard  of 
police  which  held  the  approaches  to  the  principal  embassies 
during  those  days'  (modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscel- 
laneous, no.  10, 1914),  and  in  Berlin  'after  the  reception  of 
the  news  of  the  mobilization  of  the  Austrian  army  against 
Servia,  a  large  crowd,  composed,  according  to  the  newspa- 
pers, partly  of  Austrians,  indulged  in  a  series  of  noisy  man- 
ifestations in  favor  of  Austria.  At  a  late  hour  in  the  even- 
ing the  demonstrators  gathered  several  times  in  front  of 
the  Russian  Embassy,  uttering  cries  against  Russia.  The 
police  were  practically  absent  and  took  no  steps.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  30.) 

'At  St.  Petersburg,  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  begged  the  German  Ambassador  to  point  out  the 
danger  of  the  situation  to  his  Government.  He  refrained, 
however,  from  alluding  to  the  step  which  Russia  would 
doubtless  be  led  to  take  if  the  independence  or  territorial 
integrity  of  Servia  should  be  threatened.  The  evasive 
replies  and  recriminations  of  the  German  Ambassador 
made  an  unfavorable  impression  upon  M.  Sazonof,  who 
nevertheless  gave  evidence  of  his  moderation  when  he  re- 


104     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

marked  to  the  French  Ambassador  that  they  must  avoid 
everything  which  might  precipitate  the  crisis,  and  that, 
even  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  should  pro- 
ceed to  action  against  Servia,  they  ought  not  to  break 
off  negotiations.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  38.) 

July  27,  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  in- 
formed his  Government:  "M.  Sazonof  has  used  concilia- 
tory language  to  all  my  colleagues.  In  spite  of  public  feel- 
ing the  Russian  Government  is  endeavoring  with  success  to 
restrain  the  press.  Great  moderation  in  particular  has  been 
recommended  toward  Germany."  (Extract,  July  27,  F.  Y. 
B.  no.  64.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  was  instructed  to 
point  out  to  Count  Berchtold  'how  desirable  it  would  be 
to  find  a  solution  which,  while  consolidating  the  good  rela- 
tions between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  should  give  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  serious  guaranties  for 
its  future  relations  with  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  28,  R.  0.  P.  no.  45;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  18.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  reported 
that  M.  Sazonof  in  a  previous  interview  (July  26)  with 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  had  been  visibly  calmed  by  the 
latter's  assurance  that  'Austria  Hungary  was  planning 
no  conquests,  and  simply  wished  to  secure  peace  at  last 
on  her  frontiers.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  5.) 

These  extracts  show  that  Russia  was  ready  to  acquiesce 
in  some  plan  by  which  Austria  might  be  relieved  of  the 
constant  menace  to  her  security  resulting  from  the  Pan- 
Serb  propaganda.  But  when  the  Austrian  Government 
was  unwilling  to  discuss  with  the  other  powers  the  condi- 
tions of  the  settlement  of  her  difference  with  Servia,  M. 
Sazonof  felt  that  Russia  must  prepare  to  insist  that  she  be 
heard. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  105 

2.  Russia  believes  Austria's  action  is  directed  against  herself 

Russia  employed  all  her  efforts  to  obtain  a  pacific  issue 
which  would  be  acceptable  to  Austria,  and  satisfy  her 
amour-propre  as  a  great  power.  (August  2,  R.  O.  P.  no.  77.) 

St.  Petersburg  considered  that  'Austria's  action  was  in 
reality  directed  against  Russia.  She  aimed  at  overthrow- 
ing the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  and  establishing 
her  own  hegemony  there.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  17;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  65;  B.  W.  P.  nos.  90,  91; 
R.  O.  P.  no.  75.)  Russia  seemed  to  be  justified  in  this 
view  by  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  and  Austria's  refusal 
to  modify  them,  as  well  as  by  the  hostile  demonstrations 
before  the  Russian  Embassies  in  Vienna  and  Berlin.1 
(July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  25.)  Austrian  and  German  expres- 
sions of  opinion  that  '  Russia  neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a 
position  to  make  war'  (modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  71 ;  cf .  F.  Y.  B.  no.  96)  confirm  this  impression. 

The  attitude  of  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs is  indicated  in  the  following  report  which  Count 
Szapary,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  sent 
to  Count  Berchtold  on  July  27:  "Have  just  had  a  long 
interview  with  M.  Sazonof.  I  told  the  Minister  that  I  had 
received  the  impression  that  there  was  misunderstanding 
in  Russia  regarding  the  nature  of  our  action,  that  we  were 
accused  of  wishing  to  undertake  an  advance  in  the  Bal- 

1  This  is  indicated  by  the  following  extract  from  a  cable  dispatch  of 
July  25  from  Berlin  to  the  New  York  Sun,  July  26:  '"  Down  with  Russia,' 
resounds  to-night  in  Unter  den  Linden,  where  vast  throngs  of  excited  thou- 
sands are  moving  from  the  Imperial  Palace  down  past  the  Brandenburger 
Gate  to  the  famous  Avenue  of  Victory,  around  the  column  of  Victory,  which 
is  largely  composed  of  French  cannon  captured  in  1870.  This  is  faced  by 
huge  statues  of  Prince  Bismarck,  Field  Marshal  von  Moltke,  and  Field 
Marshal  von  Roon.  The  immense  crowds  are  singing  the  'Watch  on  the 
Rhine,'  'Deutschland  Ueber  Alles,'  and  the  German  and  Austrian  national 
hymns.  In  front  of  the  Russian  Embassy  on  Unter  den  Linden  there  are 
constant  shouts  of  'Down  with  Russia!'  while  across  the  street  and  almost 
opposite  there  are  jeers  at  the  French  Embassy.  The  police  are  trying  to 
keep  the  crowds  constantly  moving." 


106     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

kans,  and  a  march  to  Saloniki  or  even  Constantinople. 
Others,  I  added,  went  so  far  as  to  see  in  our  action  the 
beginning  of  a  preventive  war  against  Russia.  I  said  all 
this  was  a  mistake,  nay,  absurd  in  part ;  that  the  purpose 
of  our  action  was  self-preservation  and  self-defense  against 
a  hostile  propaganda  of  words,  writings,  and  deeds  which 
was  threatening  our  national  integrity.  I  said  that  no- 
body in  Austria-Hungary  thought  of  threatening  Russian 
interests  or  even  of  picking  quarrels  with  Russia,  but 
that  we  were  absolutely  resolved  to  achieve  the  goal 
which  we  had  set  ourselves  and  that  the  road  we  had 
chosen  seemed  to  us  the  best.  I  added  that  as  it  was  a  mat- 
ter of  self-defense,  however,  I  would  not  attempt  to  con- 
ceal from  him  that  we  could  not  allow  ourselves  to  be 
turned  aside  by  any  consideration  of  the  consequences, 
no  matter  what  they  might  be.  M.  Sazonof  agreed  with 
me.  He  considered  that  our  purpose,  such  as  I  had  ex- 
plained it  to  him,  was  perfectly  legitimate,  but  it  was  his 
opinion  that  the  way  we  had  chosen  to  achieve  it  was 
not  the  safest;  that  the  note  which  we  had  sent  was  not 
happy  in  its  form.  He  said  that  he  had  studied  it  mean- 
while, and  that  if  I  had  time  he  wished  to  go  through  it 
again  with  me.  I  remarked  that  I  was  at  his  disposal,  but 
was  not  authorized  either  to  discuss  the  text  of  the  note 
with  him  nor  to  interpret  it;  that,  however,  his  remarks 
would  be  naturally  of  interest.  The  Minister  then-  took 
up  all  the  points  of  the  note,  and  found  to-day  that  seven 
out  of  the  ten  might  be  accepted  without  great  difficulty 
and  that  only  the  two  points  dealing  with  the  partici- 
pation of  Austro- Hungarian  officials  in  Servia  and  that 
which  dealt  with  the  dismissal  of  officers  and  officials  to  be 
named  by  us  were  unacceptable  in  their  present  form. 
As  to  the  first  two  points,  I  was  in  a  position  to  give  an 
authentic  interpretation  of  them,  in  the  light  of  Your 
Excellency's  telegram  of  the  25th  inst. ;  as  to  the  third,  I 
expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  a  necessary  demand; 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  107 

moreover,  I  said  that  matters  were  taking  their  course; 
that  the  Servians  had  already  mobilized  yesterday;  and 
that  I  was  unaware  of  what  might  have  happened  since." 
(July  27,  A.  R.  B.  no.  31.) 

To  Russia's  proposal  for  collaboration  in  finding  a 
solution  acceptable  to  Russia  and  Austria,  Count  Berch- 
told  had  replied  that '  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 
which  had  only  reluctantly  decided  upon  the  energetic 
measures  which  it  had  taken  against  Servia,  could  now 
neither  withdraw  nor  enter  upon  any  discussion  of  the 
terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  R.  0.  P.  no.  45.)  'The  prestige  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  prevent  a 
conflict.'  l  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
61;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  44.)  In  an  interview  of  July  29,  M. 
Sazonof,  referring  to  the  Austrian  demands,  told  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  Count  Szapary,  that,  "so  far  as 
acquisition  of  territory  was  concerned,  he  had  allowed  him- 
self to  be  convinced;  but,  as  to  sovereignty,  he  was  obliged 
to  keep  to  the  viewpoint  that  the  imposition  of  our  de- 
mands would  put  Servia  in  the  position  of  our  vassal.  He 
added  that  this  would  imperil  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Balkans,  which  constituted  the  Russian  interests  in  ques- 

1  "It  is  an  interesting  and  possibly  significant  fact  that  the  one  European 
power  whose  'prestige'  seems  to  have  been  in  question  was  Austria.  In  the 
entire  diplomatic  correspondence  published  by  the  different  Governments 
we  find  the  word  used  only  in  reference  to  this  power.  It  was  employed  to 
explain  the  Austrian  attitude,  not  only  by  Italian,  French,  and  Russian 
diplomatists  (British  Blue  Book,  nos.  38,  76,  and  Russian  Orange  Paper, 
no.  14),  but  by  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  himself,  who  told 
the  British  ambassador  at  Vienna,  July  28,  that  the  'prestige  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  now  prevent  conflict'  with 
Servia  (British  Blue  Book,  no.  61).  Without  using  the  word  'prestige,'  the 
German  Foreign  Office  indicated  the  existence  at  Vienna  of  a  degree  of 
touchiness  closely  related  to  the  soldier's  and  duelist's  sense  of  honor: 
Germany  hesitated  to  urge  Austria  to  moderation,  because  'any  idea  that 
they  were  being  pressed  would  be  likely  to  cause  them  to  precipitate  mat- 
ters.' (British  Blue  Book,  nos.  76,  107,  and  Russian  Orange  Paper,  no.  51.) " 
(Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  p.  70.  Cf.  also  S.  B.  B.  no.  25.) 


108     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tion.  He  then  returned  to  the  discussion  of  the  note,  the 
action  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  etc.,  and  wished  to  tell  me  again 
that,  though  he  recognized  our  legitimate  interests  and 
wished  to  satisfy  us  thoroughly,  our  demands  should  be 
clothed  in  a  form  possible  of  acceptance  by  Servia.  I  said 
that  this  was  not  a  matter  concerning  Russia,  but  Servia, 
upon  which  M.  Sazonof  stated  that  Russian  interests  in 
this  matter  were  identical  with  Servia's,  so  that  I  put  an 
end  to  the  vicious  circle  (circulus  vitiosus)  by  changing  to 
another  subject."  (Extract,  July  29,  A.  R.  B.  no.  47;  cf. 
F.  Y.  B.  nos.  52,  96.)  Thus  Austria  not  only  insisted  upon 
taking  drastic  action  against  Servia,  but  refused  to  allow 
Russia  or  the  powers  to  consider  the  question. 

3.  Russia  considers  immediate  action  necessary 

The  British  Ambassador  expressed  the  hope  that  Russia 
would  not '  do  anything  to  precipitate  a  conflict  and  would 
defer  the  mobilization  ukase  as  long  as  possible.'  In  reply 
the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  'until 
the  issue  of  the  Imperial  ukase  no  effective  steps  toward 
mobilization  could  be  taken,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  would  profit  by  delay  in  order  to  complete 
her  military  preparations,  if  it  were  deferred  too  long.' 
(Modified  quotations,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  44.) 

Russia  felt  that  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia 
was  urgently  necessary,  and  that  meantime  'the  military 
action  of  Austria  against  Servia  should  be  immediately 
suspended,  otherwise  mediation  would  only  serve  as  a  pre- 
text to  delay  inordinately  the  solution  of  the  question,  and 
give  Austria  an  opportunity  of  crushing  Servia  completely 
and  securing  a  dominant  situation  in  the  Balkans.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  28,  R.  O.  P.  nos.  48;  53.)  M.  Sazonof 
declared  to  the  British  Ambassador  that  'if  Servia  were 
attacked,  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any  engage- 
ment which  Austria  might  take  in  respect  to  Servia's  integ- 
rity and  independence,  and  that  the  order  for  mobilization 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  109 

against  Austria  would  be  issued  on  the  day  that  Austria 
crossed  the  Servian  frontier.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  72.)  Russia  received  notice  of  Austrian 
mobilization  from  her  consular  and  diplomatic  representa- 
tives in  different  parts  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  Rus- 
sian Consul-General  at  Fiume  telegraphed  his  Government 
'that  a  "state  of  siege"  had  been  proclaimed  in  Slavonia, 
in  Croatia,  and  at  Fiume,  and  at  the  same  time  the  reserv- 
ists of  all  classes  had  been  mobilized.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  R.  0.  P.  no.  44.)  From  Vienna  the  Russian 
Ambassador  had  telegraphed  his  Government  that  'the 
decree  of  general  mobilization  had  been  signed.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  28,  R.  0.  P.  no.  47.) 

The  effect  of  these  measures  and  Austria's  declaration  of 
war  against  Servia  on  opinion  in  Russia  was  great.  (Cf. 
G.  W.  B.,  exhibit  21.)  The  view  of  Russia's  ally  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
in  a  short  resume  of  the  situation  communicated  to  the 
French  representatives  in  which  he  declares  that  'in  the 
Austrian  capital  they  wish  to  keep  St.  Petersburg  amused 
by  the  illusion  that  an  understanding  might  result  from 
direct  conversations  while  they  in  the  mean  time  are  tak- 
ing action  against  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  85;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  53.) 

If..  Russia  partially  mobilizes  against  Austria 

On  July  29,  Russia,  as  had  been  expected  and  feared, 
replied  to  the  Austrian  mobilization  by  partial  mobiliza- 
tion. (July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78.)  M.  Sazonof  told  the 
British  Ambassador  that  'had  not  Russia  by  mobilizing 
shown  that  she  was  in  earnest,  Austria  would  have  traded 
on  Russia's  desire  for  peace,  and  would  have  believed  that 
she  could  go  to  any  lengths,'  but  at  the  same  time  gave 
him  to  understand  that '  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war 
by  crossing  the  frontier  immediately,  and  a  week  or  more 
would,  in  any  case,  elapse  before  the  mobilization  was 


110     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

completed.  In  order  to  find  an  issue  out  of  a  dangerous 
situation  he  considered  it  necessary  that  in  the  interim 
they  should  all  work  together.'  (Modified  quotations, 
July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78.)  When  the  British  Ambassador 
referred  to  Germany's  fear  of  being  "taken  by  surprise" 
(July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  43),  M.  Sazonof  explained  that  'the 
mobilization  would  be  directed  against  Austria  only.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78.)  At  Vienna 
the  Russian  Ambassador  '  expressed  the  hope  that  Russian 
mobilization  would  be  regarded  by  Austria  as  what  it  was, 
namely,  a  clear  intimation  that  Russia  must  be  consulted 
regarding  the  fate  of  Servia,  but  he  did  not  know  how  the 
Austrian  Government  were  taking  it.  He  said  that  Russia 
must  have  an  assurance  that  Servia  would  not  be  crushed, 
but  she  would  understand  that  Austria-Hungary  was  com- 
pelled to  exact  from  Servia  measures  which  would  secure 
her  Slav  provinces  from  the  continuance  of  hostile  propa- 
ganda from  Servian  territory.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  95.) 

Turning  to  the  German  point  of  view,  we  find  that,  as 
early  as  July  25,  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg had  telegraphed  his  Government  his  opinion  that 
'  all  preparations  had  been  made  for  mobilization  against 
Austria.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit 
6.)  '  July  26,  the  German  military  attache  reported  mobili- 
zation at  Kieff  and  Odessa  as  certain,  while  at  Warsaw 
and  Moscow  he  considered  it  doubtful,  and  elsewhere  re- 
ported it  had  probably  not  been  ordered.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  26,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  7.) 

The  next  day,  July  27,  the  Minister  of  War,  acting  at 
the  request  of  M.  Sazonof,  explained  the  situation  to  the 
German  military  attache,  and  '  gave  his  word  of  honor  that 
as  yet  no  mobilization  order  had  gone  forth;  that  for  the 
time  being  merely  preparatory  measures  were  being  taken, 
but  that  not  one  reservist  had  been  summoned  nor  a  single 
horse  requisitioned.   He  said  that  if  Austria  should  cross 


THE  BEGINNINGS   OF  THE  WAR  111 

the  Servian  frontier,  the  military  districts  in  the  direction 
of  Austria  —  Kieff,  Odessa,  Moscow,  Kazan  —  would  be 
mobilized,  but  that  those  on  the  side  of  Germany  —  War- 
saw, Vilna,  St.  Petersburg  —  would  not  be  under  any 
circumstances.'  The  attache  told  the  Minister  that  his 
Government  appreciated  Russia's  friendly  attitude  to- 
ward them,  but  must  'look  upon  mobilization  against 
Austria  alone  as  very  menacing.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  27,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  11.)  That  same  day  the  German 
Consul  in  the  district  telegraphed,  ''State  of  war  declared 
in  Kovno."  (July  27,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  8.)  In  an  interview 
which  he  had,  on  July  29,  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador, 
M.  Sazonof  concluded  by  informing  the  Ambassador, 
'that  a  ukase  would  be  issued  that  day  ordering  a  some- 
what extended  mobilization,  but  that  he  could  assure  him 
absolutely  officially  that  these  troops  were  not  destined 
to  attack  Austria,  but  would  only  be  held  armed  and  ready 
in  case  Russia's  interests  in  the  Balkans  should  be  imperiled. 
He  added  that  an  explanatory  note  would  announce  this, 
since  what  was  contemplated  was  only  a  precautionary 
measure  which  the  Tsar  had  considered  to  be  justified, 
not  only  because  Austria  had  the  advantage  of  being  able 
to  mobilize  more  quickly,  but  also  because  she  already 
had  so  long  a  start.  The  Austrian  Ambassador  called 
M.  Sazonof's  attention  earnestly  to  the  impression  which 
such  a  step  would  make  in  his  country,  remarking  that 
he  could  but  doubt  whether  the  explanatory  note  would 
soften  this  impression;  whereupon  the  minister  once  more 
gave  assurances  of  the  harmlessness  (!)  of  the  measure.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  A.  R.  B.  no.  47.)  The  Rus- 
sian Ambassador,  returning  to  Berlin  on  July  29,  informed 
the  German  Government  that  '  Russia  was  mobilizing  in 
the  four  southern  districts.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 


112     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

5.  The  Tsar  asks  the  Kaiser  to  try  his  mediation 

While  this  mobilization  had  been  going  on,  the  Tsar 
telegraphed  the  Kaiser:  "I  am  glad  that  you  are  back  in 
Germany.  In  this  serious  moment  I  ask  you  urgently  to 
help  me.  A  disgraceful  war  has  been  declared  on  a  weak 
nation;  the  indignation  at  this,  which  I  fully  share,  is  im- 
mense in  Russia.  I  fear  that  soon  I  shall  no  longer  be  able 
to  withstand  the  pressure  that  is  being  brought  to  bear 
upon  me,  and  that  I  shall  be  forced  to  take  measures  which 
will  lead  to  war.  In  order  to  prevent  such  a  calamity  as  a 
European  war  would  be,  I  ask  you  in  the  name  of  our  old 
friendship  to  do  all  in  your  power  to  restrain  your  ally  from 
going  too  far."  (July  29,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  21.)  The  Ger- 
man Emperor  responded  to  this  appeal  and  made  efforts 
at  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia.  (R.  O.  P.  no. 
49;  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  23.) 

On  July  29,  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg 
assured  M.  Sazonof  that  'up  to  that  morning  there  had 
been  no  news  that  the  Austrian  army  had  crossed  the 
Servian  frontier.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  93  (2) ;  July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  49.) 

To  prevent  Russia's  further  mobilization,  the  sincerity 
of  Austria's  assurances  in  regard  to  her  designs  on  Servia 
were  emphasized,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that  'Austria- 
Hungary  had  mobilized  only  against  Servia,  and  at  that 
she  had  mobilized  a  part  only  of  her  army.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  30,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  23;  cf  A.  R.  B.  no.  50.) 
M.  Sazonof,  'informing  the  German  Ambassador  of  the 
military  measures  taken  by  Russia,  said  that  none  of  them 
were  directed  against  Germany,  and  added  that  they  did 
not  indicate  aggressive  intentions  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, since  they  were  to  be  explained  by  the  mobilization 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  29,  R.  0.  P.  no.  49.) 

That  same  day,  Wednesday,  July  29,  the  German  mili- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  113 

tary  attache  at  St.  Petersburg  reported  that  the  '  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Russian  army  had  told  him  that 
he  had  just  come  from  the  Tsar,  and  had  been  requested  by 
the  Minister  of  War  to  reiterate  once  more  that  every- 
thing had  remained  in  the  same  state  as  the  Minister  had 
informed  him  two  days  ago.  The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
offered  him  a  written  confirmation  and  gave  him  his  word 
of  honor  in  the  most  formal  manner  that  mobilization  had 
begun  nowhere,  that  is  to  say,  not  a  single  man  or  horse 
had  been  levied  up  to  that  hour,  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. He  stated  that  he  could  not  answer  for  the  future, 
but  could  declare  most  emphatically  that  no  mobilization 
was  desired  by  His  Majesty  in  the  districts  touching  on 
the  German  frontier.  But  as  the  attache  had  received 
many  items  of  news  concerning  the  calling  out  of  the  re- 
serves in  different  parts  of  the  country,  including  Warsaw 
and  Vilna,  he  told  the  General  that  his  statements  were 
a  riddle  to  him.  On  his  honor  as  an  officer,  the  General 
replied  that  the  information  received  by  the  attache  was 
incorrect,  though  possibly  here  and  there  a  false  alarm 
might  have  been  given.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29, 
G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  pp.  10-11.)  The  attache,  inform- 
ing his  Government,  commented  that  'in  view  of  the 
abundant  and  positive  information  which  reached  him 
about  the  calling  out  of  reserves,  he  considered  this  con- 
versation as  an  attempt  to  mislead  the  German  Govern- 
ment as  to  the  extent  of  the  measures  hitherto  taken.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  G.  W.  B.  p.  11.) 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know  how  far  this  report  of 
the  German  military  attache  was  responsible  for  Germany's 
preparations  and  accusations  against  Russia.  There  is  as 
yet  no  available  evidence  to  determine  what  justification 
the  attache"  had  for  these  statements.  He  might  well  be 
expected  to  emphasize  the  military  preparations,  and  if, 
like  many  of  the  militarists,  he  was  really  anxious  to  bring 
on  a  war,  his  inclination  would  have  been  veiy  likely  to 


114     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

influence  his  judgment,  however  sincere  his  intention.  He 
would  have  been  held  responsible  if  Russia  had  really  got 
a  start  toward  mobilization  without  Germany's  knowledge. 
Before  such  a  crushing  load  of  responsibility  it  would  take 
a  man  of  iron  nerves  not  to  pass  on  for  fact  what  might 
upon  closer  investigation  have  been  found  to  be  mere 
rumors,  or  exaggerations  at  least.  Perhaps  the  very  effi- 
ciency of  the  Governments  in  keeping  secret  their  military 
preparations  or  arrangements  gave  rise  to  baneful  rumors, 
and  these,  believed  and  serving  as  ground  for  counter- 
preparations,  quickly  complicated  the  situation. 

Even  as  late  as  July  31,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris 
informed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that '  the  Russian  Ambassador 
was  not  aware  that  any  general  mobilization  of  the  Rus- 
sian forces  had  taken  place.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  117.) 

But  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris, 
M.  Sazonof  said:  " Since  we  cannot  accede  to  the  desire 
of  Germany  [in  regard  to  arresting  military  preparation]  it 
only  remains  for  us  to  accelerate  our  own  armament,  and 
to  take  measures  for  the  probable  inevitability  of  war." 
(July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  58.) 

July  31,  Sir  Edward  Grey  learned  from  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  that  'it  had  been  decided  to 
issue  orders  for  general  mobilization.  This  decision  was 
taken  in  consequence  of  a  report  received  from  the  Russian 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  Austria  was  deter- 
mined not  to  accept  the  intervention  of  the  powers,  and 
that  she  was  moving  troops  against  Russia  as  well  as 
against  Servia.  Russia  had  also  reason,  he  said,  to  believe 
that  Germany  was  making  active  preparations,  and  could 
not  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  113.) 

I  July  31,  Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphed  Sir  Edward 
Grey  that  'the  Chancellor  had  informed  him  that  his 
efforts  to  preach  peace  and  moderation  at  Vienna  had  been 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  115 

seriously  handicapped  by  the  Russian  mobilization  against 
Austria.  He  had  done  everything  possible  to  attain  his 
object  at  Vienna,  perhaps  even  rather  more  than  was  alto- 
gether palatable  at  the  Ballplatz  (Austrian  Foreign  Office). 
He  could  not,  however,  leave  his  country  defenseless  while 
time  was  being  utilized  by  other  powers;  and  if,  as  he  had 
learned  was  the  case,  military  measures  were  being  taken 
by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  remain  quiet.  The  Chancellor  said  he  wished  to 
tell  him  that  it  was  quite  possible  that  in  a  very  short  time, 
that  same  day,  perhaps,  the  German  Government  would 
take  some  very  serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the 
point  of  going  to  have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor. 
The  Chancellor  added  that  the  news  of  the  active  prepara- 
tions on  the  Russo-German  frontier  had  reached  him  just 
when  the  Tsar  had  appealed  to  the  Emperor,  in  the  name 
of  their  old  friendship,  to  mediate  at  Vienna,  and  when  the 
Emperor  was  actually  conforming  to  that  request.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  108.) 

In  reply  to  the  Kaiser's  telegram  pointing  out  'the 
threatening  character  of  the  Russian  mobilization,'  the 
Tsar  answered,  July  31,  that  it  was  'a  technical  impossi- 
bility for  Russia  to  halt  her  military  preparations  which 
had  been  rendered  necessary  through  Austria's  mobiliza- 
tion; that  Russia  was  far  from  desirous  of  war.  So  long  as 
the  negotiations  continued  with  Austria  concerning  Servia, 
his  troops  would  not  undertake  any  challenging  action.  To 
that  he  solemnly  pledged  his  word.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  31,  G.  W.  B.  p.  12.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  informed  the  German  Ambassador 
that,  'as  regards  military  preparations,  he  did  not  see  how 
Russia  could  be  urged  to  suspend  them  unless  some  limit 
were  put  by  Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops  into 
Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  110.) 
At  the  same  time  he  suggested  that  'if  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment objected  to  the  Austrians'  mobilizing  eight  army 


116     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

corps,  it  might  be  pointed  out  that  this  was  not  too  great  a 
number  against  400,000  Servians.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  31,  B.W.  P.  no.  110.) 

But  on  August  1,  the  British  Ambassador  reported  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  as  saying  that  'the  so- 
called  mobilization  of  Russia  amounted  to  nothing  more 
than  that  Russia  had  taken  military  measures  correspond- 
ing to  those  taken  by  Austria,  and  that  Russia  would  even 
now  be  satisfied  with  assurance  respecting  Servian  integ- 
rity and  independence,  and  had  no  intention  of  attacking 
Austria.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
141.) 


CHAPTER  IV 

GERMANY'S  SITUATION 

Germany's  interest  in  the  dispute  —  Germany  declares  that  the  Austrian 
note  was  not  communicated  to  her  beforehand  —  Germany  pledged  to  sup- 
port Austria  —  Germany  insists  upon  the  "localization"  of  the  Austro- 
Servian  conflict  —  The  responsibility  Russia  will  incur  by  supporting  Servia 
—  The  situation  between  Germany  and  Russia  becomes  acute  —  Germany 
delivers  an  ultimatum  to  Russia. 

1.  Germany's  interest  in  the  dispute 

After  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  had  widened  into  an 
Austro-Russian  conflict,  the  next  consequence  was  the 
entanglement  of  Germany  because  of  her  alliance  with 
Austria. 

Defining  its  views,  the  German  Government  declared  in 
a  confidential  communication  to  the  states  of  the  German 
Empire:  "The  attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  in 
this  question  is  clearly  indicated.  The  agitation  carried 
on  by  the  Pan-Slavs  in  Austria-Hungary  has  for  its  goal 
the  destruction  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  which 
carries  with  it  the  shattering  or  weakening  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  and,  in  consequence,  the  complete  isolation  of  the 
German  Empire.  Our  nearest  interests,  therefore,  summon 
us  to  the  support  of  Austria-Hungary."  (Extract,  July  28, 
G.  W.  B.  exhibit  2.) 

The  German  Memorandum  says:  "If  the  Serbs  con- 
tinued with  the  aid  of  Russia  and  France  to  menace  the 
existence  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  gradual  collapse  of  Aus- 
tria and  the  subjection  of  all  the  Slavs  under  the  scepter 
of  Russia  would  be  the  consequence,  thus  making  unten- 
able the  position  of  the  Teutonic  race  in  central  Europe. 
A  morally  weakened  Austria  under  the  pressure  of  Russian 
Pan-Slavism  would  be  no  longer  an  ally  on  whom  we  could 


118     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

count  and  in  whom  we  could  have  confidence,  such  as  we 
must  have,  in  view  of  the  increasingly  menacing  attitude 
of  our  neighbors  on  the  east  and  on  the  west."  (Extract, 
G.  W.  B.  memorandum,  p.  5.) 

The  attitude  of  Austria  toward  Servia  and  the  intense 
popular  feeling  which  had  been  aroused  by  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Archduke  were  well  understood  by  all  the 
statesmen  of  Europe.  The  uncertain  factor  of  the  situation 
was  the  attitude  which  Germany  would  take.  In  breath- 
less anticipation  Europe  waited  to  see  to  what  extent  Ger- 
many was  prepared  to  support  and  assume  responsibility 
for  the  uncompromising  attitude  adopted  by  Austria.  It 
was  generally  believed,  and  the  opinion  was  openly  ex- 
pressed in  many  quarters,  that  Germany  had  urged 
Austria  to  precipitate  a  crisis  by  presenting  demands 
against  Servia  which  she  would  find  it  impossible  to  accept. 
However  little  foundation  there  may  have  been  for  such 
belief,  it  was  generally  considered  that  Austria  could  not 
have  taken  so  decisive  a  step  without  coming  to  a  previ- 
ous understanding  with  her  mighty  ally.  The  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  'Austria's  conduct 
was  both  provocative  and  immoral,  and  that  she  would 
never  have  taken  such  action  unless  Germany  had  been 
first  consulted.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  6.) 

The  statesmen  of  Europe  accordingly  waited  with 
anxiety  to  see  whether  Germany  would  back  up  Austria, 
as  she  had  at  the  time  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  or  whether  she  would  discuss  the  question 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  European  powers,  as  she 
had  done  in  the  more  recent  Balkan  settlement  of  1913, 
when  the  Albanian  question  so  seriously  threatened  the 
peace  of  Europe. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  119 

2.  Germany  declares  that  the  Austrian  note  was  not  communicated 
to  her  beforehand 

The  German  Government  was  fully  aware  that  the  other 
powers  would  consider  that  she  had  had  a  hand  in  the 
preparation  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  she  hastened  to 
enter  a  complete  denial.  The  German  Ambassador  read 
Sir  Edward  Grey  a  telegram  from  his  Government  saying 
that  'they  had  not  known  beforehand,  and  had  had  no 
more  than  the  other  powers  to  do  with  the  stiff  terms  of  the 
Austrian  note  to  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  25;  cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  19.) 

At  Paris  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Schoen, 
informed  a  number  of  reporters,  and  called  at  the  Foreign 
Office  to  say,  that  'there  had  been  no  agreement  between 
Austria  and  Germany  over  the  Austrian  note,  of  which  the 
German  Government  had  been  ignorant;  although  subse- 
quently it  had  approved  it,  on  receiving  communication  of 
it  at  the  same  time  as  the  other  powers.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  25,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  36.) 

On  July  24,  the  day  after  the  presentation  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin,  sent  his  Government  the  following  report  of 
an  interview  which  he  had  had  with  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs:  — 

"I  to-day  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  in  an  interview 
I  had  with  him  if  it  was  true,  as  was  stated  in  the  news- 
papers, that  Austria  had  sent  a  note  to  the  powers  dealing 
with  her  differences  with  Servia ;  if  he  had  received  it,  and 
what  he  thought  of  it. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  replied  affirmatively,  adding  that  the 
note  was  forceful,  and  that  he  approved  it,  the  Servian 
Government  having  long  since  exhausted  Austria's  pa- 
tience. He  considers,  moreover,  that  the  question  relates 
to  the  internal  affairs  of  Austria,  and  hopes  that  it  will  be 
localized.  I  continued  by  saying  that,  not  having  received 


120     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

any  instructions,  I  only  wished  to  have  with  him  an  en- 
tirely personal  exchange  of  views.  I  then  asked  him  if  the 
Berlin  Cabinet  had  really  been  in  complete  ignorance  of 
the  Austrian  demands  before  they  were  communicated  to 
Belgrade,  and,  as  he  replied  that  this  was  so,  I  expressed 
my  surprise  that  he  should  thus  undertake  to  support 
pretensions,  of  the  limits  and  nature  of  which  he  was 
ignorant. 

"'It  is  only,'  said  Herr  von  Jagow,  interrupting  me, 
'because  we  are  having  a  personal  talk  together  that  I  al- 
low you  to  say  that  to  me.' "  (Extract,  July  24,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  30;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  15;  B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 

On  July  23  the  French  Minister  at  Munich  reported  to 
his  Government  that  the  Bavarian  Government  were 
acquainted  with  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note.1  (F.  Y.  B. 
no.  21.) 

On  July  30,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  informed 
Sir  Edward  Grey  that, '  although  he  was  unable  to  verify  it, 
he  had  private  information  that  the  German  Ambassador 
knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  before  it  was  dis- 
patched, and  telegraphed  it  to  the  German  Emperor.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  95.) 

According  to  the  remarks  of  the  Italian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  to  the  Belgian  Minister,  'the  Italian  Government 
was  surprised,  to  say  the  least,  not  to  have  been  consulted 
in  regard  to  the  whole  affair  by  her  two  allies.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  25,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  35;  cf.  B.  W.  P.,  Miscel- 
laneous, no.  10,  p.  1.) 

On  July  27,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  the  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  assured  M.  Barrere,  the 
French  Ambassador,  that  'he  had  not  had  any  previous 
knowledge  of  the  note.  Although  he  knew  that  the  note 
would  be  strong  and  forceful,  he  had  no  idea  it  would  take 

1  Cf.  statement  in  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  relative  to  the 
denial  made  by  the  Bavarian  Government.  (Translation,  War-Chronicle, 
December,  1914,  p.  19.   Published  by  M.  Berg,  Berlin.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  121 

such  a  form.' !  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  72;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  56.) 

On  July  25,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin  told  the 
French  Ambassador  that  'he  did  not  believe  in  the  pre- 
tended ignorance  of  the  German  Government  on  the  sub- 
ject of  Austria's  demarche.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  35.) 

This  solicitude  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  explain  her 
ignorance  of  the  Austrian  note  seems  out  of  proportion  to 
its  significance.  (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  137.)  As  M.  Jules 
Cambon  remarked — "It  is  not  less  striking  to  note  the 
care  which  Herr  von  Jagow  and  all  the  other  officials  under 
him  take  to  tell  every  one  that  they  were  ignorant  of  the 
nature  of  the  Austrian  note  delivered  to  Servia."  (Extract, 
July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  30.) 

The  motive  was,  undoubtedly,  to  give  to  Germany's 
support  of  Austria  a  more  disinterested  aspect  than  it 
would  have  appeared  to  have  had  she  herself  taken  part  in 
planning  a  note  couched  in  such  terms.  The  powers,  realiz- 
ing the  intimate  relations  between  the  two  allies,  would  be 
much  less  disturbed  by  German  support  of  a  note,  the 
terms  of  which  she  did  not  approve,  than  they  would  have 
been  if  Germany  herself  had  taken  part  in  drawing  it  up. 
If  Germany  had  admitted  her  complicity,  it  might  have 
been  more  difficult  for  Austria  to  maintain  that  the  ques- 
tion was  a  matter  entirely  between  herself  and  Servia. 

There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  we  should  not  accept 
the  statements  of  the  officials  of  the  German  Government 
that  they  had  not  received  a  previous  communication  of 

1  July  23,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  'gathered  that  the  Italian 
Government  had  been  made  cognizant  of  the  terms  of  the  communication 
which  would  be  addressed  to  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  23,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  38.)  Probably  the  information  of  the  Italian  Government  only 
extended  to  a  general  and  accurate  appreciation  of  the  situation  and 
the  probable  terms  of  the  note,  such  as  was  indicated  in  the  report  from 
the  French  Consul  at  Budapest.  (July  11,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  11.)  Because 
of  the  previous  negotiations,  recently  disclosed  by  Giolitti,  Italy  could  ac- 
curately gauge  Austria's  intentions. 


122     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

the  contents  of  the  Servian  note.  They  make  this  state- 
ment without  qualification.  We  learn  from  the  statement 
of  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
that  the  contents  of  the  note  were  communicated  to  him 
at  about  the  time  of  its  presentation  at  Belgrade.  (Cf. 
B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10,  p.  1.)  It  seems  likely,  how- 
ever, that  the  note  was  shown  to  Von  Tchirsky,  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  in  his  private  if  not  in  his  official 
capacity.  It  will  doubtless  be  a  matter  of  particular  inter- 
est to  ascertain  what  is  the  ground  for  the  statement  of 
Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen  that  Von  Tchirsky,  disregarding 
the  procedure  of  responsible  Governments,  telegraphed 
the  contents  of  the  note  directly  to  the  Kaiser.  If  there 
should  prove  to  be  any  truth  in  this  allegation,  it  would 
have  an  important  bearing  upon  the  responsibility  of  the 
Kaiser,  and  show  that  Germany  was  afflicted  with  a  secret 
or  irresponsible  diplomacy  similar  to  that  which  was  the 
curse  of  the  old  regime  in  France. 

In  any  event,  accepting  the  statements  of  the  German 
officials  at  their  full  face  value,  and  having  due  regard  for 
the  care  which  they  took  to  emphasize  their  ignorance,  we 
are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  German  Government 
took  particular  pains  to  be  in  a  position  where  it  could  pro- 
claim its  innocence  of  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note.  One 
explanation  would  be  that  the  German  Government  con- 
sidered that  it  would  then  be  in  a  better  position  to  say  to 
the  other  powers,  "We  have  kept  out  of  this  affair  because 
it  is  a  matter  between  Austria  and  Servia,  and  we  expect 
the  other  powers  to  assume  the  same  attitude."  This  stand 
on  the  part  of  Germany  would  be  less  dictatorial  than  if  she 
had  had  a  previous  acquaintance  with  the  note,  and  had 
then  insisted  upon  holding  off  the  powers  from  any  inter- 
vention. In  such  a  case  she  would  seem  to  be  a  party  with 
Austria  in  the  chastisement  of  Servia.  Such  an  attitude 
would  have  aroused  still  more  the  resentment  of  Russia, 
and  precipitated  a  conflict.    Yet  this  very  precipitancy 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  123 

was  the  thing  above  all  others  which  Germany  needed  if 
she  were  really  planning  a  war.  True,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  German  Government  had  to  take  care  not  to  proceed 
in  such  a  way  as  to  lose  the  confidence  of  the  German 
people,  in  seeming  to  force  a  war  by  its  aggressive  action. 
It  does  not  seem  likely,  however  —  if  those  who  actually 
controlled  the  destinies  of  Germany  were  determined  to 
have  a  war  at  that  particular  moment  —  that  they  would 
have  been  at  such  pains  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  an  ac- 
tion which  would  have  helped  to  force  the  issue  and  bring 
on  the  conflict. 

Germany's  solicitude  to  avoid  too  great  an  appearance 
of  aggression  may  have  been  with  an  eye  to  securing  Brit- 
ish neutrality.  It  seems  most  probable  that  Germany  did 
not  really  wish  to  force  a  war,  and  that  her  real  purpose 
was  to  secure  a  diplomatic  triumph  and  force  the  Entente 
Powers  to  recognize  the  paramount  influence  of  Austria 
in  Servia.  If  Germany  had  been  successful  in  carrying 
through  this  programme,  German  prestige  would  have 
been  greatly  enhanced  in  the  Balkans,  at  the  expense  of 
Russia.  By  accepting  her  dictation  in  this  matter,  the 
Entente  Powers  would  have  practically  opened  the  way 
for  Austria  to  expand  her  influence  toward  the  iEgean, 
and  have  permitted  the  German  Empire  to  develop  its 
great  project  of  expansion  in  Asia  Minor  along  the  line 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

3.  Germany  pledged  to  support  Austria 

The  German  Memorandum,  setting  forth  the  circum- 
stances under  which  Germany  promised  Austria  her  sup- 
port, goes  on  to  relate  how  "  Russian  policy  soon  after  the 
events  following  the  Turkish  revolution  of  1908  was  di- 
rected towards  bringing  about,  under  her  patronage,  a 
coalition  of  the  Balkan  States  armed  against  the  integrity 
of  Turkey.  This  coalition,  which  succeeded  in  1911  in 
driving  Turkey  from  the  greater  part  of  her  European 


124     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

possessions,  came  to  grief  over  the  question  of  distributing 
the  spoils.  Russia  was  not  discouraged  by  this  failure  of 
her  plans.  According  to  the  idea  of  the  Russian  statesmen, 
a  new  Balkan  league  under  Russian  patronage  should  be 
brought  about,  directed  no  longer  against  Turkey,  now 
dislodged  from  the  Balkans,  but  against  the  integrity  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  It  was  proposed  that 
Servia  should  cede  to  Bulgaria  those  parts  of  Macedonia 
which  she  had  received  during  the  last  Balkan  War,  in 
exchange  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  were  to  be 
taken  from  Austria.  To  oblige  Bulgaria  to  fall  in  with  this 
plan,  she  was  to  be  isolated;  Rumania  was  to  be  attached 
to  Russia  through  the  aid  of  a  French  propaganda,  and 
Servia  was  promised  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

"Under  these  circumstances  it  was  clear  that  Austria 
had  to  recognize  that  she  could,  with  due  regard  for  the 
dignity  and  preservation  of  the  Monarchy,  no  longer  view 
with  unconcern  this  agitation  across  the  border.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  imparted  their  views  to 
the  German  Government,  and  asked  for  our  opinion. 
We  were  able  to  agree  most  heartily  with  our  ally's  esti- 
mate of  the  situation,  and  assure  her  that  any  action  she 
considered  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  the  movement  in 
Servia  directed  against  the  integrity  of  the  Monarchy 
would  meet  with  our  approval. 

"  We  were  perfectly  aware  that  the  event  of  any  warlike 
preparations  by  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia  might 
bring  Russia  into  the  field,  and  that  it  might  therefore 
involve  us  in  a  war,  in  accordance  with  our  duty  as  allies. 
Recognizing,  however,  that  Austria's  vital  interests  were 
at  stake,  we  could  not  advise  our  ally  to  yield  in  a  manner 
incompatible  with  her  dignity,  or  deny  her  our  assistance 
at  this  trying  time.  We  were  still  less  able  to  do  so  since 
our  own  interests  were  most  seriously  threatened  by  the 
continuation  of  the  Serb  agitation.  We  therefore  left 
Austria  an  absolutely  free  hand  in  dealing  with  Servia, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  125 

and  we  took'no  part  in  her  preparations."  (G.  W.  B.,  Mem- 
orandum, pp.  4-6.) 

On  July  24,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  in  a  dispatch  to  his  Government  said :  — 

"Herr  von  Jagow  asked  me  if  I  really  considered  the 
situation  serious.  'Assuredly,'  I  replied,  'for,  if  what  is 
going  on  has  been  pondered  over,  I  do  not  understand  why 
people  have  cut  their  bridges  behind  them.' 

"Everything  shows  that  Germany  is  prepared  to  sup- 
port in  a  thoroughly  energetic  manner  the  attitude  of 
Austria.  The  weakness  displayed  for  some  years  past  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  ally  has  undermined  the  confidence 
placed  in  her  here.  She  was  found  heavy  to  move.  The 
foolish  trials,  such  as  the  Agram  and  Friedjung  affairs, 
made  her  police  odious  by  covering  it  with  ridicule.  All 
that  was  asked  of  her  was  that  she  should  be  strong,  but 
it  is  now  thought  sufficient  that  she  should  be  brutal. 

"An  article  which  appeared  in  the  Lokal  Anzeiger  re- 
veals a  state  of  mind  in  the  German  Chancellery,  to  which 
we  in  Paris  are  naturally  not  inclined  to  pay  enough  atten- 
tion. I  refer  to  the  feeling  of  monarchical  solidarity.  I  am 
convinced  that  this  point  of  view  must  be  largely  taken 
into  account,  in  appreciating  the  attitude  of  the  Emperor 
William,  whose  impressionable  nature  must  have  felt  the 
murder  of  a  Prince  who  had  received  him  a  few  days  ear- 
lier." (Extract,  July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  30.  Cf.  G.  W.  B. 
Exhibit  20;  A.  R.  B.  nos.  13,  18.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  declared  at  the 
French  Foreign  Office  that  'Austria  had  presented  her 
note  without  any  previous  understanding  with  Berlin, 
but  nevertheless  Germany  approved  of  Austria's  views 
and  that  certainly  "the  arrow  once  flown,"  to  use  the 
Ambassador's  own  words,  Germany  would  have  to  be 
guided  in  her  action  by  the  consideration  only  of  her  duties 
as  an  ally.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  R.  0.  P.  no. 19; 
cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  25.) 


126     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Von  Tchirsky,  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  de- 
clared to  his  British  colleague  that  'Germany  knew  very 
well  what  she  was  about  in  backing  up  Austria-Hungary  in 
the  matter.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  32.) 

4-  Germany  insists  upon  the  "localization"  of  the  Austro-Servian 

conflict 

The  German  Government  did  not  limit  its  support  of 
Austria  to  a  declaration  in  general  terms,  but  even  before 
the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  the  views  of 
the  Government  were  understood  by  the  diplomats  and 
could  be  discerned  through  semi-official  or  inspired  articles 
in  the  press.1  (Cf.  July  4,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  9;  July  21,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  16.) 

This  attitude  that  Austria  was  entitled  to  take  measures 
to  protect  herself  found  a  sympathetic  echo  in  England, 
where  the  London  Times,  in  its  editorial  columns,  argued 
that  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  was  no  concern  of  Eng- 
land's and  should  be  left  to  the  parties  immediately  con- 
cerned; the  article  did  conclude,  however,  with  a  warning 
to  Austria  against  any  attempt  to  use  force.2 

1  The  London  Times  of  July  20  published  a  dispatch  of  July  19  from  their 
Berlin  correspondent  under  the  heading  "PEACE  OF  EUROPE  PARA- 
MOUNT":— 

"  The  North-German  Gazette  observes  that  the  European  Press  is  recogniz- 
ing more  and  more  that  Austria-Hungary's  demand  for  a  'clarification'  of 
her  relations  with  Servia  is  warranted,  and  proceeds : '  We  associate  ourselves 
with  the  hope  expressed  in  more  than  one  quarter  that  a  serious  crisis  will 
be  averted  by  the  Servian  Government's  giving  way  in  good  time.  In  any 
case,  the  interests  of  Europe  as  a  whole,  which  have  asserted  themselves 
hitherto  throughout  the  long  Balkan  crisis  in  the  maintenance  of  peace 
among  the  great  powers,  make  it  appear  desirable  and  necessary  that  any 
discussion  which  may  ensue  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia  should 
remain  localized.'  On  the  Bourse,  the  impression  seems  to  be  gaining  ground 
that  the  Austrian  demarche  at  Belgrade  will  be  such  as  to  cause,  at  the  least, 
severe  tension,  and  nervousness  is  aggravated  by  uncertainty  as  to  Russia's 
attitude." 

These  remarks  are  significant,  since  the  North-German  Gazette  is  generally 
recognized  as  a  semi-official  organ  of  the  Government. 

2  London  Times,  July  16,  1914. 

A  pamphlet  issued  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Consulate-General,  New 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  127 

On  July  23,  the  day  of  the  presentation  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum,  the  German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  sent  the  following  instructions  to  the  German 
Ambassadors  at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburg :  — 

"The  publications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment concerning  the  circumstances  under  which  the  assas- 
sination of  the  Austrian  successor  to  the  throne  and  his 
consort  took  place,  disclose  clearly  the  aims  of  the  Pan- 
Serb  propaganda  and  the  means  which  it  employs  for  their 
realization.  After  the  publication  of  the  facts,  the  last 
doubt  must  disappear  that  the  efforts  for  the  separation  of 
the  Southern  Slavic  provinces  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  their  union  with  Servia  are  directed  from 
Belgrade,  with  the  connivance,  to  say  the  least,  of  Govern- 
ment officials  and  officers  of  the  army. 

"The  Servian  intrigues  date  back  several  years,  but 
Pan-Serb  chauvinism  manifested  itself  in  an  accentuated 
form  during  the  Bosnian  crisis.  Thanks  to  the  perfect  self- 
restraint  and  moderation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment and  the  intervention  of  the  powers,  the  provocations 
to  which  Austria-Hungary  was  at  that  time  subjected  on 
the  part  of  Servia,  did  not  lead  to  a  conflict.  The  assur- 
ances of  future  good  behavior,  which  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment gave  at  that  time,  have  not  been  kept.  Under  the 
very  eyes,  and  with  the  tacit  permission,  at  least,  of  Ser- 
vian officials,  the  Pan-Serb  propaganda  has  meanwhile  in- 
creased in  scope  and  intensity;  at  its  door  must  be  laid  the 

York,  entitled  "  Austria- Hungary  and  the  War,"  (p.  32)  states:  "The 
aggressiveness  of  Servia  toward  her  neighbors  was  condemned,  shortly 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  crisis,  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  said 
in  a  conversation  with  a  foreign  statesman :  '  Servia  is  a  perpetual  danger  to 
European  peace;  its  groundless  aspirations  continually  threaten  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  world.  The  present  dynasty  must  have  external  success  to 
remain  in  power.'  On  the  eve  of  the  crisis  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Vienna,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  observed  to  the  editor  of  the  Freie  Presse  '  that  the 
entire  English  nation  condemns  the  crime  of  Serajevo.  No  single  English- 
man has  any  sympathy  left  for  Servia.  We  are  thoroughly  weary  of  being 
thrown  into  disquietude  by  this  little  country,  and  there  is  no  Englishman 
who  does  not  wish  heartily  that  Servia  receive  a  rough,  sound  lesson.'  " 


128     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

blame  for  the  latest  crime,  the  traces  of  which  lead  to  Bel- 
grade. It  has  become  evident  that  it  is  compatible  neither 
with  the  dignity  nor  with  the  self-preservation  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  longer  to  view  supinely  the 
doings  across  the  border  which  constitute  a  constant  men- 
ace to  the  safety  and  the  integrity  of  the  Monarchy.  In 
such  a  state  of  affairs,  the  action  and  the  demands  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  can  only  be  considered  as 
justifiable.  Nevertheless,  the  expressions  of  opinion  in 
Servia  and  the  attitude  of  the  Government  give  rise  to 
apprehension  that  the  Servian  Government  may  decline 
to  accede  to  these  demands  and  allow  itself  to  be  carried 
away  into  assuming  a  provocative  attitude  toward  Austria- 
Hungary.  In  such  an  event  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, unless  prepared  forever  to  renounce  its  position  as  a 
great  power,  would  have  no  choice  but  to  press  its  demands 
upon  the  Servian  Government,  and,  if  need  be,  enforce 
them  by  the  employment  of  military  measures,  the  nature 
of  which  must  be  left  for  its  decision. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  request  you  to  express  yourself  in 
the  sense  indicated  above  [to  the  present  representative 
of  M.  Viviani,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  M.  Sazonof],  and  there- 
with give  special  emphasis  to  the  view  that  this  question 
relates  to  matters  which  should  be  settled  solely  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  that  it  must  be  the 
earnest  endeavor  of  the  powers  to  insure  that  it  be  so  re- 
stricted. We  anxiously  desire  the  localization  of  the  con- 
flict because  any  intervention  on  the  part  of  another  power 
would,  because  of  the  various  treaty  stipulations  of  alli- 
ance, lead  to  inconceivable  consequences. 

"I  shall  await  with  interest  a  telegraphic  report  of  the 
result  of  your  interview."  (July  23,  G.  W.  B.,  exhibit  16; 
cf.  Memorandum,  p.  6.) 

In  communicating  this  note,  a  copy  of  which  he  was  not 
willing  to  leave,  to  the  French  Government,  the  German 
Ambassador  dwelt  with  particular  emphasis  on  the  last 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  129 

paragraphs,  to  the  effect  that  the  question  was  a  matter  to 
be  settled  between  Austria  and  Servia  alone,  and  that  the 
German  Government  ardently  desired  that  the  conflict  be 
localized,  as  any  intervention  by  a  third  power  would  be 
of  a  nature  to  entail  incalculable  consequences.1  (Cf. 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  28.)  In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  the 
Chancellor  a  similar  communication  was  made  at  London 
(cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  9)  and  at  St.  Petersburg  (cf.  R.  O.  P.  no. 
18). 

Throughout  the  period  of  crisis  the  German  Govern- 
ment continued  to  insist  upon  the  "localization"  of  the 
conflict.  (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  2,  9,  40,  43,  48,  55,  62;  R.  0.  P. 
nos.  8,  18,  28,  34,  41;  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  pp.  6,  10, 
exhibits  1,  2,  10.) 

Germany  justified  her  action  not  only  on  the  ground  of 
her  obligation  as  Austria's  ally,  but  from  the  general  point 
of  view  that  Austria's  action  was  taken  in  defense  of  her 
very  existence.  (B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10  [1914], 
p.  2;  B.  W.  P.  nos.  7,  48,  61;  91;  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum, 
p.  6,  exhibit  1;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  93.)  German  representatives 
asserted  that  if  Servia  did  not  yield  to  Austria's  just  de- 
mands, she  would  have  against  her  European  public  opin- 
ion and  would  be  condemned  by  the  judgment  of  the  whole 
civilized  world.    (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  9.) 

1  The  attitude  of  the  German  Government  is  well  illustrated  in  the 
interview,  between  Dr.  Spalaikovitch,  Servian  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales,  as  reported  by  the  former 
in  his  dispatch  to  Belgrade  July  24  : — 

"On  leaving  the  office  of  M.  Sazanof  whom  I  acquainted  with  the  text 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  I  met  the  German  Ambassador.  He 
appeared  to  be  in  very  good  humor.  In  the  conversation  which  ensued  on 
the  subject  of  the  step  which  Austria-Hungary  had  taken,  I  asked  Count 
Pourtales  to  indicate  to  me  a  way  out  of  the  situation  created  by  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian ultimatum.  The  ambassador  answered  that  it  all  depended 
on  Servia,  since  it  was  a  question  which  ought  to  be  settled  by  Austria 
and  Servia  alone,  and  in  which  no  one  else  could  interfere.  I  replied  to 
Count  de  Pourtales  that  he  was  mistaken  and  that  before  long  he  would 
be  convinced  that  it  was  not  a  question  merely  between  Servia  and  Aus- 
tria, but  a  European  question."  (July  24,  S.  B.  B.  no.  36.) 


130     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

In  a  confidential  communication  to  the  Governments 
of  the  German  states  the  Chancellor  stated:  "In  view  of 
the  facts  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has 
published  in  its  note  to  the  Servian  Government,  the  last 
doubt  must  disappear  that  the  outrage  to  which  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  successor  to  the  throne  and  his  wife  have 
fallen  victims  was  prepared  in  Servia,  with  the  connivance, 
to  say  the  least,  of  members  of  the  Servian  Government 
and  army.  It  is  a  product  of  the  Pan-Serb  intrigues  which 
for  a  series  of  years  have  become  a  source  of  permanent 
disturbance  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the 
whole  of  Europe."   (July  28,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  2.) 

The  German  view  is  summed  up  in  their  Memorandum : 
"From  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  we  took  the  stand 
that  the  question  was  one  which  concerned  Austria,  and  it 
would  have  to  be  left  for  her  to  settle  alone  with  Servia. 
Accordingly,  we  devoted  our  efforts  to  securing  the  local- 
ization of  the  war  and  convincing  the  other  powers  that 
Austria-Hungary  had,  through  the  force  of  circumstances, 
been  obliged  to  decide  upon  an  appeal  to  arms  in  legitimate 
self-defense."   (G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  7.) 

In  response  to  the  declaration  that  they  desired  and 
aimed  at  the  "localization"  of  the  conflict,  the  German 
Memorandum  states  that  the  French  and  English  Govern- 
ments promised  action  in  the  same  direction.1  (G.  W.  B., 
Memorandum,  p.  6;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  5,  25.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  summed  up  the 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  that  he  was  not  concerned  in  a  Balkan  ques- 
tion. I  do  not  find  any  such  statement  made  by  the  French.  On  the  con- 
trary, M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  advised  Sir 
Edward  Grey  that  it  was  necessary  to  intervene  between  Austria  and 
Servia.    (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.) 

The  German  Chancellor  has  stated:  "  From  the  first  moment  of  the  Aus- 
trian conflict  we  strove  and  labored  that  this  conflict  might  be  confined  to 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  All  the  Cabinets,  notably  the  English  Cab- 
inet, took  the  same  ground,  only  Russia  insisted  that  she  would  have  to  say 
a  word."  (Extract  from  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  speech  in  the 
Reichstag,  August  4,  1914.  From  What  Germany  Wants,  by  Edmund  von 
Mach,  p.  147.  See  also  International  Conciliation  Pamphlet,  no.  84.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  131 

situation  when  he  said  that  it  was  not,  according  to  his 
opinion,  a  question  of  "localizing"  the  conflict,  but  of 
preventing  it.   (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  83.) 

5.  The  responsibility  Russia  will  incur  by  supporting  Servia 

The  German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
when  refusing  to  discuss  the  Servian  note  with  the  British 
Ambassador,  said  that  'Austria's  standpoint,  with  which 
he  agreed,  was  that  her  quarrel  with  Servia  was  a  purely 
Austrian  concern,  with  which  Russia  had  nothing  to  do.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  71.)  This  did 
not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  German  Government  was 
ignorant  of  the  importance  to  Russia  of  the  maintenance  of 
their  prestige  in  the  Balkans.  In  fact  the  German  Govern- 
ment said:  "We  are  perfectly  aware  that  the  possibility  of 
warlike  operations  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  toward 
Servia  may  bring  Russia  into  the  field,  and  that  we  may, 
therefore,  in  accordance  with  our  duty  as  allies,  become 
involved  in  the  war."  (Extract,  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum, 
p.  5.) 

To  quote  from  the  Chancellor's  instructions  to  the 
German  representatives:  "Some  exponents  of  Russian 
opinion  regard  it  as  a  self-evident  right  and  as  the  task  of 
Russia  to  take  action  in  support  of  Servia  in  the  conflict 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  For  the  European 
conflagration  which  would  result  from  such  a  step  by 
Russia,  the  Novoe  Vremja  believes  itself  justified  in  hold- 
ing Germany  responsible  in  so  far  as  she  does  not  induce 
Austria-Hungary  to  yield.  In  this  the  Russian  press  re- 
verses the  situation.  It  is  not  Austria-Hungary  that  has 
evoked  the  conflict  with  Servia,  but  it  was  Servia  that, 
through  an  unscrupulous  fostering  of  Pan-Serb  aspirations, 
even  in  the  territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
has  threatened  her  very  existence  and  created  conditions, 
which  eventually  found  expression  in  the  criminal  act  at 
Serajevo.   If  Russia  believes  that  she  must  champion  the 


132     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

cause  of  Servia  in  this  conflict,  she  certainly  has  a  perfect 
right  to  do  so.  However,  she  must  realize  that  by  so  do- 
ing she  accepts  the  Servian  activities  for  the  undermining 
of  the  existence  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  as  her 
own,  and  that  she  alone  becomes  responsible,  if  out  of  the 
Austro-Servian  affair,  which  all  other  great  powers  de- 
sire to  localize,  there  should  arise  a  European  war.  This 
responsibility  of  Russia's  is  perfectly  evident  and  weighs 
all  the  heavier  since  Count  Berchtold  has  officially  declared 
to  Russia  that  Austria-Hungary  has  no  intention  of  ac- 
quiring Servian  territory  or  of  assailing  the  stability  of 
the  Servian  Kingdom,  but  only  desires  peace  through  the 
cessation  of  the  Servian  intrigues  which  threaten  her  exist- 
ence. 

"The  attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  this  ques- 
tion is  clearly  marked  out  in  advance.  The  agitation  con- 
ducted by  the  Pan-Slavs  against  Austria-Hungary  has  for 
its  goal,  through  the  destruction  of  the  Monarchy  of  the 
Danube,  the  sundering  or  weakening  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  in  consequence  the  complete  isolation  of  the  German 
Empire.  Our  own  nearest  interest  therefore  calls  us  to  the 
side  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  duty,  likewise,  of  keeping 
Europe  from  a  universal  war,  if  at  all  possible,  points  to 
our  supporting  those  endeavors  which  aim  at  the  localiza- 
tion of  the  conflict,  faithful  to  the  policies  which  we  have 
carried  out  successfully  for  forty-four  years  in  the  interest 
of  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

"If,  however,  contrary  to  what  we  hope,  the  fire  should 
be  spread,  through  Russia's  intervention,  as  faithful  allies, 
we  should  have  to  support  the  neighboring  monarchy  with 
all  the  power  of  the  Empire.  Only  under  compulsion  shall 
we  grasp  the  sword,  but  when  we  do,  it  will  be  with  a  clear 
consciousness  that  we  are  not  to  blame  for  the  calamity 
which  war  must  bring  upon  the  peoples  of  Europe."  (Ex- 
tract, July  28,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  2.) 

Russia's  answer  to  these  arguments  of  Germany  is  ex- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  133 

pressed  in  the  objection  which  she  opposed  to  Austria's 
action  in  regard  to  Servia  as  has  been  already  discussed.1 

6.  The  situation  between  Germany  and  Russia  becomes  acute 

The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  as  early  as 
July  25,  'said  all  he  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  warned  him  that  if  Russia 
mobilized,  Germany  would  not  be  content  with  mere  mo- 
bilization or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but  would 
probably  declare  war  at  once.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.)  This  situation  was  perfectly  well 
understood  by  all  the  powers.  In  studying  the  events  and 
negotiations  preceding  the  war,  it  must  always  be  borne  in 
mind  that,  whether  justified  or  not,  a  general  mobilization 
on  Russia's  part  would  bring  on  war  at  once. 

On  July  26,  the  German  Chancellor  telegraphed  the 
German  Ambassador  at  London:  'According  to  reports 
reaching  here,  Russia  is  about  to  summon  several  bodies 
of  reservists  immediately,  which  would  be  equivalent  to 
mobilization  against  us.  If  this  news  is  corroborated,  we 
shall  be  forced  against  our  will  to  take  measures  to  meet 
it.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  10.) 
The  next  day  (July  27)  Von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  told  the  British  Ambassador  that 
'if  Russia  mobilized  against  Germany  she  would  have  to 
follow  suit.'  Sir  Edward  Goschen  asked  him  what  he 
meant  by  "mobilization  against  Germany."  He  replied 
that  'if  Russia  only  mobilized  in  the  south,  Germany 
would  not  mobilize,  but  if  she  mobilized  in  the  north,  Ger- 
many would  have  to  do  so  too,  and  the  Russian  system  of 
mobilization  was  so  complicated  that  it  might  be  difficult 
exactly  to  locate  her  mobilization.  Germany  would  there- 
fore have  to  be  very  careful  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise.' 
(Modified  quotations,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  43.) 

On  July  27,  when  the  Russian  Minister  of  War  had  ex- 

1  See  ante,  chap,  in,  sees.  1  and  2. 


134     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

plained  to  the  German  military  attache  that  the  military- 
preparations  did  not  constitute  mobilization,  which  would 
under  no  circumstances  be  undertaken  on  the  German 
frontier,  the  latter  had  remarked  that  'though  Germany 
appreciated  Russia's  friendly  intentions  toward  her,  they 
must  consider  mobilization  against  Austria  even  as  very 
menacing.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  11.)  Germany  heard  of  preparations  on  her  fron- 
tier; beside  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  war  in  Kovno 
(July  27,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  11),  it  was  reported  that  the 
Warsaw  garrison  had  departed,  and  that  the  garrison  at 
Alexandrovo  had  been  strengthened.    (G.  W.  B.  p.  8.) 

When  the  Austrian  Government  learned  that  Russia 
would  mobilize  in  the  districts  bordering  on  Austria,  as 
a  counter-measure  if  Austrian  troops  crossed  the  Servian 
frontier,  Count  Berchtold,  on  July  28,  telegraphed  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  go  at  once  to  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  or  Secretary  of  State  and  inform  him 
of  the  preparations  Russia  was  making. 

"Under  these  circumstances,"  Count  Berchtold  further 
said,  "I  wish  urgently  to  request  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to 
consider  whether  it  should  not  be  intimated  to  Russia  in 
a  friendly  manner  that  the  mobilization  of  the  districts 
above  referred  to  would  constitute  a  threat  against  Austria- 
Hungary  and,  should  it  actually  occur,  must  therefore 
be  answered,  on  the  part  of  the  Monarchy  and  her  ally, 
the  German  Empire,  by  the  most  extensive  military  coun- 
ter-measures. 

"In  order  to  make  it  easier  for  Russia  to  acquiesce,  it 
seems  to  us  better  that  such  a  step  should  first  be  under- 
taken by  Germany  alone,  though,  of  course,  we  would  be 
willing  to  take  part  in  it  with  her. 

"It  seems  to  me  that  at  this  moment  plain  language 
would  be  the  most  efficacious  means  for  bringing  to  Rus- 
sia's attention  the  consequences  of  assuming  a  threaten- 
ing attitude."   (Extract,  July  28,  A.  R.  B.  no.  42.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  135 

On  July  29,  M.  Sazonof  informed  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor of '  the  military  measures  made  necessary  by  the  mobili- 
zation of  the  greatest  part  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  ex- 
plained that  none  of  them  were  directed  against  Germany.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  49.) 

On  July  29,  M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Paris  that '  the  German  Ambassador  had  commu- 
nicated to  him  the  resolution  taken  by  his  Government  to 
mobilize  if  Russia  did  not  stop  her  military  preparations, 
which  M.  Sazonof  declared  Russia  only  took  in  conse- 
quence of  the  mobilization  Austria  had  already  proceeded 
with,  and  in  view  of  the  evident  absence  on  Austria's  part 
of  any  desire  to  find  some  method  of  effecting  a  pacific 
solution  of  her  conflict  with  Servia.  Since  Russia  was  un- 
able to  accede  to  Germany's  wishes,  the  only  remaining 
course  was  to  accelerate  the  Russian  armament  and  to 
make  preparations  for  a  war  which  was  probably  inevita- 
ble.' »   (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  R.  0.  P.  no.  58.) 

On  that  same  day  (July  29)  Count  Berchtold  sent  the 
following  telegram  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin:— 

"I  have  just  been  informed  by  Herr  von  Tchirsky  that 
the  Russian  Ambassador  communicated  to  him  that  he  had 
been  told  by  his  Government  that  the  military  districts 
of  Kief,  Odessa,  Moscow,  and  Kazan  had  been  mobilized, 

1  It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  course  pursued  by  the  German  gov- 
ernment with  what  Bismarck  said  regarding  the  course  to  be  pursued  in 
1888:  — 

"  You  will  ask: '  If  that  is  so,  what  is  the  use  of  this  expensive  allocation 
of  the  Russian  troops? '  That  is  one  of  the  questions  for  which  one  hardly 
can  expect  an  answer  from  a  ministry  of  foreign  affairs,  itself  vitally  in- 
terested. If  we  should  begin  to  ask  for  explanations,  we  might  receive 
forced  replies,  and  our  surrejoinders  would  also  have  to  be  forced.  That 
is  a  dangerous  path  which  I  do  not  like  to  tread.  Allocations  of  troops 
are  things  for  which  one  does  not  take  the  other  country  to  task,  asking 
for  categorical  explanations,  but  against  which  one  takes  counter-precau- 
tions with  equal  reserve  and  circumspection."  (Speech  of  Bismarck, 
February  6,  1888;  from  What  Germany  Wants,  by  Edmund  von  Mach, 
p.  84.) 


136     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

that  Russia's  honor  as  a  great  power  had  been  impugned, 
and  that  she  had  been  forced  to  take  the  requisite  steps. 
The  Russian  mobilization  is  confirmed  by  the  command- 
ers of  our  Galician  corps,  and,  following  a  report  from  the 
Austro-Hungarian  military  attaches,  it  was  also  not  denied 
to-day  by  M.  Sazonof  to  the  German  Ambassador. 

"I  request  Your  Excellency  to  bring  the  above  imme- 
diately to  the  attention  of  the  German  Government  and 
to  emphasize  in  this  connection  that  if  the  Russian  mo- 
bilization measures  are  not  immediately  stopped  our 
general  mobilization  will  be  made  necessary  at  once  for 
military  reasons. 

"  As  a  last  resort,  to  prevent  European  war,  I  considered 
it  desirable  that  our  representative  and  the  German  re- 
presentative in  St.  Petersburg,  and  possibly  in  Paris,  be 
at  once  instructed  to  inform  those  Governments  in  a 
friendly  manner  that  the  continuation  of  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion would  occasion  counter-measures  in  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary,  which  must  necessarily  lead  to  serious 
consequences. 

"Your  Excellency  will  please  add  that  it  is  self-evident 
that  we  naturally  will  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  deflected 
in  our  hostile  attitude  toward  Servia. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors  in  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Paris  are  being  instructed  to  make  a  similar 
statement  as  soon  as  their  German  colleague  receives  like 
instructions."  (July  29,  A.  R.  B.  no.  48 ;  cf .  A.  R.  B.  no.  46.) 

The  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  reporting 
the  interview  referred  to  above,  between  Count  Pourtales 
and  M.  Sazonof  on  July  29,  said  that  'the  German  Am- 
bassador stated  that  if  Russia  did  not  stop  her  military 
preparations,  the  German  army  would  receive  the  order 
to  mobilize.  M.  Sazonof  replied  that  the  Russian  prepara- 
tions had  been  due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  persistently 
uncompromising  attitude  of  Austria;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  the  fact  that  eight  Austro-Hungarian  army  corps 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  137 

were  already  mobilized.  The  tone  with  which  Count  de 
Pourtales  performed  this  task  had  decided  the  Russian 
Government  to  order  that  very  evening  the  mobilization 
of  the  thirteen  corps  destined  to  operate  against  Austria.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  100;  cf.  R.  O.  P. 
nos.  49,  58;  G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  10.) 

On  July  30,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  tele- 
graphed his  Government  that  '  the  decree  of  mobilization 
of  the  German  army  and  fleet  had  just  been  promulgated.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  30,  R.  O.  P.  no.  61.)  But  he 
immediately  afterwards  informed  his  Government  that 
'the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  just  telephoned  him 
to  communicate  to  him  that  the  news  just  given  of  the 
mobilization  of  the  German  army  and  fleet  was  false;  that 
the  newspapers'  slips  were  printed  in  advance  in  view  of  all 
eventualities  and  put  on  sale  at  mid-day,  but  that  now 
they  had  been  confiscated.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30, 
R.  O.  P.  no.  62.) 

It  would  be  interesting  to  learn  whether  this  was  merely 
a  typical  example  of  journalistic  enterprise,  or  an  effort  to 
stir  up  an  irresistible  war  spirit  so  as  to  hasten  the  declara- 
tion of  war.  When  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  similarly  dis- 
tributed extras  with  the  unauthorized  statement  that 
England  had  declared  war  against  Germany,  Von  Jagow, 
apologizing  to  the  British  Ambassador,  said  it  was  the 
fault  of  the  " pestilential  Tageblatt."  (B.  W.  P.,  Miscella- 
neous, no.  8,  1914.) 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  telegraphed  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey:  'President  of  the  Republic  tells  me  that  the 
Russian  Government  have  been  informed  by  the  German 
Government  that  unless  Russia  stopped  her  mobilization 
Germany  would  mobilize.  But  a  further  report,  since  re- 
ceived from  St.  Petersburg,  states  that  the  German  com- 
munication had  been  modified,  and  is  now  a  request  to  be 
informed  on  what  conditions  Russia  would  consent  to  de- 
mobilization. The  answer  given  was  that  she  agreed  to  do 


138     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

so  on  condition  that  Austria-Hungary  gave  an  assurance 
that  she  would  respect  the  sovereignty  of  Servia  and  sub- 
mit certain  of  the  demands  of  the  Austrian  note,  which 
Servia  had  not  accepted,  to  an  international  discussion. 
The  President  thinks  that  these  conditions  will  not  be  ac- 
cepted by  Austria.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  99.) 

On  July  31,  the  German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  telegraphed  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Pe- 
tersburg: "In  spite  of  still  pending  mediatory  negotiations, 
and  although  we  ourselves  have  up  to  the  present  moment 
taken  no  measures  for  mobilization,  Russia  has  mobilized 
her  entire  army  and  navy;  in  other  words,  mobilized 
against  us  also.  By  these  Russian  measures  we  have  been 
obliged,  for  the  safeguarding  of  the  Empire,  to  announce 
that '  danger  of  war '  threatens  us,  which  does  not  yet  mean 
mobilization.  Mobilization,  however,  must  follow  unless 
Russia  ceases  within  twelve  hours  all  warlike  measures 
against  us  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  gives  us  definite 
assurance  thereof.  Kindly  communicate  this  at  once  to 
M.  Sazonof  and  wire  hour  of  its  communication  to  him." 
(July  31,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  24.) 

That  same  day,  the  British  Ambassador,  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  'spent  an  hour  with  Von  Jagow,  the  German 
Secretary  of  State,  urging  him  to  accept  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
proposal  for  mediation  of  the  four  disinterested  powers  (cf . 
B.  W.  P.  no.  Ill);  but  Von  Jagow,  though  he  expressed 
himself  as  sympathizing  with  Sir  Edward's  proposal  and 
appreciating  his  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  said 
it  was  impossible  for  the  German  Government  to  consider 
any  proposal  until  they  had  received  an  answer  from  Rus- 
sia to  their  communication  made  that  day.  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  asked  the  Secretary  why  the  German  demand  had 
been  made  even  more  difficult  for  Russia  to  accept  by  ask- 
ing her  to  demobilize  in  the  south  as  well,  and  was  told  that 
it  was  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  that  all  her  mobiliza- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  139 

tion  was  directed  only  against  Austria.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  121.) 

When  the  German  military  attache"  at  St.  Petersburg 
learned  through  Prince  Troubetzkoy  that  '  Russia  felt  she 
could  not  forego  her  mobilization,  he  told  him  the  blame 
for  the  terrible  consequences  must  be  laid  to  the  premature 
mobilization  against  Austria,  engaged  after  all  in  a  merely 
local  war  with  Servia.  Germany's  situation  was  clear,  and 
the  responsibility  rested  upon  Russia  for  disregarding 
Austria's  assurances  that  she  had  no  territorial  ambitions 
in  Servia.  Austria,  he  said,  had  mobilized  against  Servia 
and  not  against  Russia,  and  there  was  no  cause  for  immedi- 
ate action  on  Russia's  part.  He  further  added  that  after 
the  horrible  crime  of  Serajevo,  it  was  impossible  for  Ger- 
many to  understand  Russia's  declaration  that  she  could 
not  desert  her  brethren  in  Servia;  and  finally  he  told  the 
Prince  he  need  not  be  surprised  if  Germany's  army  were  to 
be  mobilized.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  18;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  50.) 

'That  evening,  July  30,  the  German  Ambassador  came 
again  and  urged  on  M.  Sazonof,  but  in  less  categorical 
terms,  that  Russia  should  cease  her  military  preparations, 
and  affirmed  that  Austria  would  not  infringe  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B. 
no;  103.) 

On  July  30,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  reports  his  interview  with  the  German  Secretary 
of  State.  Herr  von  Jagow  said  that  "  he  feared  that  Austria 
might  mobilize  completely  in  consequence  of  the  partial 
mobilization  of  Russia,  which  might  bring  about  the  an- 
swering blow  of  total  Russian  mobilization,  and,  in  con- 
sequence, that  of  Germany. 

"I  pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that  he  himself 
had  said  to  me  that  Germany  would  not  consider  herself 
forced  to  mobilize  unless  Russia  mobilized  upon  the  Ger- 
man frontier,  and  that  such  was  not  the  case.  He  replied 


140     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

that  that  was  true,  but  that  the  heads  of  the  army  insisted 
that  all  delay  was  a  loss  of  strength  to  the  German  army, 
and  that  'the  words  I  recalled  did  not  constitute  a  firm 
engagement  on  his  side.'  This  interview  gave  me  the  im- 
pression that  the  chances  of  peace  were  still  further  dimin- 
ished." x   (Extract,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  109.) 

July  30,  M.  Sazonof  told  the  French  and  British  Am- 
bassadors that  the  Russian  Government  had  absolute 
proof  that  Germany  was  making  military  and  naval  pre- 
parations against  Russia  —  more  particularly  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  The  Minister  said  that  if 
Austria  rejected  the  proposal  he  had  submitted  at  Ger- 
many's request,  'preparations  for  general  mobilization 
would  be  proceeded  with,  and  the  inevitable  result  would 
be  a  European  war.  Public  opinion  in  Russia  was  stirred 
to  such  a  pitch  that  if  Austria  refused  to  make  a  conces- 
sion, Russia  could  not  hold  back,  and  now  that  she  knew 
Germany  was  arming,  she  could,  for  strategical  reasons, 
hardly  postpone  converting  partial  into  general  mobiliza- 
tion.'   (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  97.) 

'The  news  of  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade  during  the 
night  and  morning  of  the  30th  provoked  very  deep  feeling 
in  Russia.  The  French  Ambassador  found  it  hard  to  un- 

1  At  first  appearance  this  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  Herr  von 
Jagow  lays  him  open  to  the  charge  of  insincerity.  It  has  been  suggested 
by  Professor  Munroe  Smith  that  this  dispatch  shows  that  the  German 
Secretary  was  overborne  by  the  strategists  and  prevented  from  adhering 
to  the  plans  worked  out  by  the  diplomatists.  (See  "  Military  Strategy 
versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  pp.  71- 
72.)  There  seems  to  have  been  some  sinister  influence  at  work  which  over- 
balanced the  sincere,  though  hesitating  and  awkward,  efforts  of  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  toward  peace.  Perhaps  history  will  show  the  existence 
of  a  court  camarilla  of  military  authorities,  seconded  by  Von  Tchirsky  at 
Vienna,  and  working  to  precipitate  a  war.  This  will  explain  the  most  ex- 
traordinary admission  of  the  German  Under-Secretary  of  State  that  'the 
Foreign  Office  regretted  the  sudden  return  of  the  Emperor,  acting  on  his  own 
initiative,  for  fear  his  sudden  return  might  cause  speculation  and  excite- 
ment.' (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  33.)  May  not  the 
German  Foreign  Office  have  feared  that  they  could  no  longer  control  undis- 
turbed the  negotiations  in  progress? 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  141 

derstand  the  attitude  of  Austria,  whose  provocations,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  had  followed  without  fail  Rus- 
sia's efforts  at  conciliation,  and  the  satisfactory  conver- 
sations exchanged  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  113.) 

Germany  for  her  part  felt  that  she  must  reply  to  Russian 
mobilization  (cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  98).  Von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  told  Sir  Edward  Goschen  that '  he  could  not  leave  his 
country  defenseless  while  time  was  being  utilized  by  other 
powers;  and  that  if  military  measures  were  being  taken 
by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  remain  quiet.  He  said  that  it  was  quite  possible 
that  in  a  very  short  time,  perhaps  to-day,  the  German 
Government  would  take  some  very  serious  step,  and  that 
he  was  just  on  the  point  of  going  to  have  an  audience  with 
the  Emperor.  The  Chancellor  added  that  the  news  of  the 
active  preparations  on  the  Russo-German  frontier  had 
reached  him  just  when  the  Tsar  had  appealed  to  the  Em- 
peror, in  the  name  of  their  old  friendship,  to  mediate  at 
Vienna,  and  when  the  Emperor  was  actually  conforming 
to  that  request.'1  (Modified  quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  108.) 

Later  on  in  the  same  day  the  German  Chancellor,  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  told  Sir  Edward  Goschen  that  they 
were  informed  by  their  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that 
'the  Russian  army  and  fleet  were  being  mobilized,  and  that 
Germany  would  at  once  proclaim  Kriegsgefahr  (danger 
of  war),  since  the  Russian  general  mobilization  could  be 
directed  only  against  Germany.  The  Chancellor  explained 
that  Kriegsgefahr  signified  the  taking  of  certain  pre- 
cautionary measures  consequent  upon  strained  relations 
with  a  foreign  country.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  31, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  112;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  52.) 

Von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 

1  The  telegrams  exchanged  between  the  two  Emperors  and  King  George 
are  discussed  further  on. 


142     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Affairs,  told  the  Russian  Ambassador  that '  the  pourparlers 
[negotiations]  between  the  two  countries,  which  had  been 
difficult  enough  in  consequence  of  the  mobilization  against 
Austria,  became  increasingly  so  in  the  presence  of  the  seri- 
ous military  measures  Russia  was  taking  against  Germany; 
news  regarding  these,  according  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  been  received  in  Germany  from 
every  side,  and  must  inevitably  provoke  analogous  meas- 
ures on  the  part  of  Germany.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
31,  R.  0.  P.  no.  68.)  'If  the  German  Government  had 
failed  to  meet  the  imminent  peril  confronting  them,  as  a 
result  of  Russia's  mobilizing  her  entire  land  and  naval 
forces,  it  would  have  jeopardized  the  safety  and  even  the 
existence  of  Germany.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1, 
G.  W.  B.  exhibit  26.) 

7.  Germany  delivers  an  ultimatum  to  Russia 

On  August  1,  M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  the  Russian  repre- 
sentatives abroad:  —  "At  midnight  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, acting  upon  the  instructions  of  his  Government, 
declared  to  me,  that  if  within  twelve  hours,  that  is  by 
mid-day  of  Saturday,  we  had  not  begun  to  demobilize,  not 
only  against  Germany,  but  also  against  Austria,  the  Ger- 
man Government  would  be  forced  to  give  the  order  for 
mobilization.  To  my  inquiry  whether  this  meant  war, 
the  Ambassador  replied  in  the  negative,  but  added  that 
we  were  very  near  it."  (August  1,  R.  0.  P.  no.  70;  cf. 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  120.) 

After  the  presentation  of  Germany's  ultimatum  to 
Russia,  M.  Sazonof  declared  to  the  British  Ambassador 
that '  the  action  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and 
the  German  preparations  had  forced  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment to  order  mobilization.  He  said  he  had  forwarded  to 
Vienna  his  telegram  modified  in  an  attempt  to  meet  the 
suggestion  of  the  British  Government,  and  that  he  would 
adhere  to  it  if  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  obtain  its  acceptance 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  143 

before  the  frontier  was  crossed  by  German  troops,  and 
that  in  no  case  would  Russia  first  begin  hostilities.  The 
British  Ambassador  informed  Sir  Edward  that  he  now  saw 
no  possibility  of  a  general  war  being  avoided  unless  the 
agreement  of  France  and  Germany  could  be  obtained  to 
keep  their  armies  mobilized  on  their  own  sides  of  the  fron- 
tier, as  Russia  had  expressed  her  readiness  to  do,  pending 
a  last  attempt  to  reach  a  settlement  of  the  present  crisis.' 
(Modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P.  no.  139.) 

The  Ambassador  must  have  known  such  a  course  could 
have  little  possibility  of  fulfillment  under  the  circum- 
stances, unless  Germany  should  suddenly  decide  to  change 
her  course  upon  finding  that  England  was  likely  to  sup- 
port the  Entente  Powers. 

This  same  day  Sir  Edward  Goschen  tried  to  convince 
the  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  since  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  were,  'as  was  evident,  ready  to  discuss 
matters,  and  since  Germany  did  not  desire  war  on  her  own 
account,  it  seemed  to  him  only  logical  that  Germany  should 
hold  her  hand  and  continue  to  work  for  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment. Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  Austria's  readiness 
to  discuss  was  the  result  of  German  influence  at  Vienna, 
and,  had  not  Russia  mobilized  against  Germany,  all  would 
have  been  well.  But  Russia,  by  abstaining  from  answer- 
ing Germany's  demand  that  she  should  demobilize,  had 
caused  Germany  to  mobilize  also.  Russia  had  said  that 
her  mobilization  did  not  necessarily  imply  war,  and  that 
she  could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilized  for  months  with- 
out making  war.  This  was  not  the  case  with  Germany. 
She  had  the  speed  and  Russia  had  the  numbers,  and  the 
safety  of  the  German  Empire  forbade  that  Germany  should 
allow  Russia  time  to  bring  up  masses  of  troops  from  all 
parts  of  her  wide  dominions.  The  situation  now  was  that, 
though  the  Imperial  Government  had  allowed  her  sev- 
eral hours  beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia  had  sent  no 
answer.    Germany  had,  therefore,  ordered  mobilization, 


144     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

and  the  German  representative  at  St.  Petersburg  had 
been  instructed  within  a  certain  time  to  inform  the  Rus- 
sian Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  must 
regard  their  refusal  to  answer  as  creating  a  state  of  war.' 
(Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  138.) 

The  German  Chancellor  accordingly  sent  the  following 
telegram,  dated  "August  1, 5  p.m.,  Urgent,"  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg:  — 

'In  case  the  Russian  Government  gives  no  satisfactory- 
answer  to  our  demand,  Your  Excellency  will  please  trans- 
mit at  5  o'clock  this  afternoon  (Central  European  time) 
the  following  statement :  — 

'The  Imperial  Government  has  endeavored  from  the 
beginning  of  the  crisis  to  bring  it  to  a  peaceful  solution. 
In  accordance  with  a  wish  expressed  to  him  by  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many, in  cooperation  with  England,  took  upon  himself 
the  role  of  mediator  between  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg;  but  Russia,  without  awaiting  the  out- 
come, proceeded  to  mobilize  her  entire  land  and  naval 
forces. 

'As  a  consequence  of  this  threatening  measure,  occa- 
sioned by  no  military  preparation  on  the  part  of  Germany, 
the  German  Empire  found  itself  confronted  by  a  serious 
and  imminent  peril.  If  the  Imperial  Government  had 
failed  to  meet  this  peril,  it  would  have  jeopardized  the 
safety  and  even  the  existence  of  Germany.  Consequently, 
the  German  Government  was  obliged  to  address  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias  and  insist  upon 
the  cessation  of  all  these  military  measures.  Russia  having 
refused  to  accede  to  (not  having  thought  it  should  reply 
to) *  this  demand,  and  having  manifested  by  this  refusal 
(this  attitude)  that  her  acts  were  directed  against  Ger- 

1  The  Russian  Orange  Paper  states:  "The  words  between  parentheses 
are  in  the  original.  It  is  to  be  supposed  that  two  variations  had  been  pre- 
pared in  advance  and  that  by  error  they  were  both  inserted  in  the  note." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  145 

many,  I  have  the  honor,  by  order  of  my  Government  to 
make  known  to  Your  Excellency  the  following  communi- 
cation :  — 

'His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  my  august  sovereign,  in  the 
name  of  the  Empire,  takes  up  the  defiance  and  considers 
himself  in  a  state  of  war  against  Russia. 

'I  urgently  ask  you  to  wire  the  hour,  according  to 
Russian  time,  of  arrival  of  these  instructions,  and  of  their 
carrying  out. 

'  Kindly  ask  for  your  passports  and  hand  over  the  pro- 
tection of  German  interests  to  the  American  Embassy.' 
(Modified  quotations,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  26;  R.  0.  P.  no. 
76.) 

The  German  orders  'for  the  general  mobilization  of  the 
navy  and  army,  issued  August  1,  made  August  2  the  first 
day  of  mobilization.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  142.) 

August  2,  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  telegraphed  Sir  Edward  Grey :  '  Secretary  of  State l 
has  just  informed  me  that,  owing  to  certain  Russian  troops 
having  crossed  frontier,  Germany  and  Russia  are  now  in 

1  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  German  Chancellor,  in  his  speech 
to  the  Reichstag  on  August  4,  described  the  events  leading  up  to  the  rup- 
ture of  peace  as  follows :  — 

"As  soon  as  the  first  definite  information  about  military  preparations  in 
Russia  reached  us,  we  informed  St.  Petersburg  in  a  friendly  but  pressing 
manner  that  military  measures  against  Austria  would  find  us  on  the  side  of 
our  ally  and  that  military  preparations  against  ourselves  would  oblige  us  to 
take  counter-measures.  But  mobilization  would  be  close  to  actual  war. 

"  Russia  formally  assured  us  of  her  desire  for  peace  and  declared  that  she 
was  making  no  military  preparations  against  us. 

"  In  the  mean  time,  England,  warmly  assisted  by  us,  tried  to  mediate 
between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 

"  On  the  28th  of  July,  the  Emperor,  by  telegram,  asked  the  Tsar  to  con- 
sider that  Austria-Hungary  had  the  duty  and  the  right  to  defend  herself 
against  the  Pan-Serb  agitation  which  undermined  her  existence.  The  Em- 
peror called  the  Tsar's  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  all  mon- 
archs  must  be  identical  in  face  of  the  murder  of  Serajevo.  He  asked  him  to 
personally  assist  him  and  to  smooth  over  the  divergence  between  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburg.  About  the  same  time  and  before  receipt  of  this  tele- 
gram, the  Tsar  asked  the  Emperor  to  help  him  and  to  induce  Vienna  to 
moderate  her  demands. 


146     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

a  state  of  war.'   (Modified  quotation,  August  2,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  144;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  57.) 

"  The  Emperor  accepted  the  role  of  a  mediator. 

"  But  scarcely  had  the  action  begun,  according  to  his  orders,  when  Rus- 
sia mobilized  all  her  forces  directed  against  Austria,  while  Austria-Hun- 
gary only  had  mobilized  those  of  her  corps  which  were  directed  against 
Servia.  To  the  north  she  had  mobilized  only  two  of  her  corps,  far  from  the 
Russian  frontier. 

"The  Emperor  immediately  informed  the  Tsar  that  this  mobilization  of 
the  Russian  forces  against  Austria  rendered  the  role  of  a  mediator,  which 
he  had  accepted  upon  the  Tsar's  request,  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 

"  Still  we  continued  to  mediate  in  Vienna,  a  mediation  which  in  its  form 
went  as  far  as  would  appear  permissible,  even  for  an  ally. 

"  During  this  time  Russia  of  her  own  accord  renewed  her  assurances  that 
she  was  making  no  military  preparations  against  us. 

"  The  31st  of  July  has  come.  The  decision  is  to  fall  in  Vienna.  We  have 
already  learned,  thanks  to  our  representations,  that  Vienna  again  has 
started  the  direct  conversation  with  St.  Petersburg  which  had  already  suf- 
fered an  interruption.  But  before  the  final  decision  is  taken  in  Vienna,  the 
news  arrives  that  Russia  has  mobilized  her  entire  army  and  navy,  therefore 
also  against  us  !  The  Russian  Government,  which  knew  from  our  repeated 
statements  what  mobilization  on  our  frontiers  meant,  did  not  notify  us  of 
this  mobilization  nor  did  it  even  vouchsafe  any  explanation.  Only  in  the 
afternoon  of  July  31,  a  telegram  of  the  Tsar  to  the  Emperor  arrived  in 
which  he  guaranteed  that  his  army  would  take  no  provocative  attitude 
toward  us.  But  the  mobilization  on  our  frontiers  was  in  full  swing  since  the 
night  from  the  30th  to  the  31st  of  July. 

"  While  we  are  mediating  in  Vienna  in  compliance  with  Russia's  request, 
the  Russia?i  host  arises  all  along  our  extended  and  open  frontier,  and  France, 
though  not  mobilizing,  must  admit  that  she  makes  military  preparations. 

"We  had  ourselves,  up  to  then,  not  called  in  a  single  man,  for  the  sake  of 
the  peace  of  Europe.  Were  we  now  to  patiently  wait  until  the  nations,  be- 
tween which  our  country  is  situated,  selected  the  moment  for  their  attack? 
It  would  have  been  a  crime  to  expose  Germany  to  such  peril.  Therefore, 
on  the  31st  of  July,  we  demanded  demobilization  from  Russia  as  the  only 
means  to  still  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  Imperial  Ambassador  in 
St.  Petersburg  was  besides  instructed  to  inform  the  Russian  Government 
that  in  case  of  our  demand  meeting  with  a  refusal,  we  would  have  to  con- 
sider the  state  of  war  as  existent. 

"The  Imperial  Ambassador  followed  these  instructions.  What  Russia 
answered  to  our  demand  of  demobilization,  we  have  not  learned  up  to  this  day. 
Telegraphic  reports  on  this  question  have  not  reached  us  even  though  the 
wire  still  transmitted  much  less  important  information. 

"Therefore,  the  time  limit  having  long  since  expired,  the  Emperor  saw 
himself  obliged  to  mobilize  our  forces  on  the  1st  of  August,  at  5  p.m."  (Inter- 
national Conciliation  Pamphlet,  no.  84.) 


IL(V^(ru 


CHAPTER  V 

FRANCE  SUPPORTS  RUSSIA 

Germany  asks  France  to  use  her  influence  with  Russia  —  France  be- 
lieves Germany  intends  to  precipitate  a  war  —  France  supports  her  ally  — 
Military  preparations  in  Germany  and  France  —  The  German  ultimatum  to 
France. 

1.  Germany  asks  France  to  use  her  influence  with  Russia 
At  the  present  time  France  no  longer  plays  such  an  im- 
portant role  as  formerly  in  Balkan  affairs.  As  in  the  case  of 
England,  the  necessity  of  looking  after  more  immediately 
important  questions  has  lessened  her  relative  interest  in 
Near-Eastern  affairs.  As  long  as  the  protection  of  the 
large  French  financial  interests  in  this  region  is  secured, 
France  is  not  immediately  concerned  with  the  settlement 
of  the  intricate  political  questions  which  arise  in  the  Near 
East.  Like  England,  she  has  been  content  to  leave  Balkan 
questions  to  the  bi-partisan  control  of  Austria  and  Russia. 
If  the  other  powers  had  left  Austria  and  Russia  to  settle 
Balkan  questions  without  their  support  or  interference, 
Russia's  superior  strength  would  have  placed  Austria  at 
a  disadvantage  in  conducting  negotiations  and  made  it 
possible  for  Russia  to  secure  the  paramount  position  in 
the  Balkans. 

The  important  event  modifying  this  situation  in  favor  of 
Russia  was  the  assassination  of  King  Alexander  and  Queen 
Draga  of  Servia.  Thenceforth  the  policy  of  Servia  was 
frankly  Russophile.  Although  the  proximity  of  Austria 
kept  Servia  still  in  the  condition  of  economic  dependency 
upon  Austria,  she  partially  escaped  as  a  result  of  a  tariff 
war  which  opened  up  new  outlets  for  her  commerce  through 
Bulgaria.  This  condition  of  hostility  between  Austria 
and   Servia   smouldered   until   Austria's   annexation   of 


148     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  stirred  up  the  little  kingdom, 
and  public  opinion  clamored  for  a  war  against  Austria 
to  effect  what  the  Servians  considered  would  be  the  lib- 
eration of  their  fellow-nationals  and  their  incorporation 
into  the  Servian  Kingdom.  They  counted  upon  the  aid 
of  Russia,  where  public  opinion  accorded  them  enthusi- 
astic support. 

England,  though  she  resented  what  she  considered 
Austria's  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  probably  had 
to  acknowledge  to  herself  that  Austria's  action  had  not  in 
reality  changed  the  situation  in  the  Balkans,  and  she  was 
not  willing  to  become  involved  in  a  contest,  the  purpose  of 
which  was  clearly  to  dismember  the  Austrian  Empire  in 
Servia's  favor. 

France  very  properly  gave  Russia  to  understand  that, 
loyal  as  she  was  to  her  alliance  and  the  support  of  Russia's 
vital  interests,  public  opinion  would  not  justify  her  in 
participating  in  a  war,  the  immediate  purpose  of  which 
was  the  dislocation  of  the  status  quo.  Unfortunately  for 
Russia,  her  desire  to  protect  her  sister  state  and  to  foster 
the  expansion  of  Slav  and  Russian  influence  in  the  Bal- 
kans appeared  to  the  impartial  observer  as  a  campaign 
for  prestige  not  warranted  by  any  attack  upon  her  vital 
interests. 

England  and  France  might  grumble  at  Austria's  action 
and  extend  to  Russia  an  expression  of  their  sincere  sym- 
pathy, but  in  their  hearts  they  had  to  recognize  that 
Germany  was  justified  in  standing  "in  shining  armor" 
beside  her  ally  to  protect  her  from  aggression  by  Servia 
supported  by  Russia.  Russia  was  bitterly  disappointed, 
but  could  not,  so  soon  after  her  defeat  by  Japan,  undertake 
a  new  war  against  Austria  and  Germany  combined;  so  she 
had  to  yield. 

The  advantage  however  which  Austria  derived  from 
her  diplomatic  success  was  short-lived.  The  kaleidoscopic 
changes  of  the  successive  Balkan  Wars  from  1912  to  1913 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  149 

brought  to  Servia  a  great  accession  of  territory,  while  Aus- 
tria, for  her  part,  had  been  unsuccessful  in  saving  Turkey 
from  dismemberment  and  was  again  disappointed  in  her 
efforts  at  establishing  a  Greater  Bulgaria  as  a  "stopper" 
state  to  the  extension  of  Russian  influence  in  the  Bal- 
kans. All  her  plans  had  miscarried,  and  she  found  herself 
hemmed  in  from  any  advance  in  the  Balkans  by  Servia's 
recent  accession  of  territory.  Austria  then  tried  to  obtain  a 
modification  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  which  had  estab- 
lished these  territorial  modifications  in  the  Balkans;  but 
Germany  would  only  support  her  diplomatically,  and  was 
not  willing  to  encourage  her  to  undertake  a  war  to  effect 
her  purpose. 

Throughout  this  crisis  resulting  from  the  Balkan  set- 
tlements, the  less  interested  powers,  Italy,  Germany, 
France,  and  England,  cooperated  in  a  common  aim  to 
preserve  the  peace,  and  although  Austria  was  discontented 
with  the  result,  Russia  also  had  to  swallow  her  pill  when 
the  conference  disappointed  the  hopes  of  Servia  and  Mon- 
tenegro and  established  an  independent  Albania  under  the 
collective  control  of  the  great  powers.  We  may  well  believe 
that  in  the  succeeding  months  Austria  availed  herself 
of  every  argument  to  prevail  upon  Germany  to  give  her 
better  support  in  regard  to  Balkan  affairs.  Russia  no 
doubt  was  making  a  similar  plea  to  France  and  England. 

WTe  are  too  close  to  the  event  to  know  what  interesting 
conversations  may  have  passed  in  regard  to  the  settlement 
of  the  rivalries  in  the  Near  East.  We  can  only  form  our 
opinions  of  the  understandings  reached  from  the  attitude 
assumed  by  the  powers  in  the  negotiations  during  the 
recent  crisis;  from  the  very  start  we  find  Germany  em- 
phasizing her  intention  to  support  Austria  in  the  localiza- 
tion of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute,  and  requesting  France 
to  help  her  by  exerting  her  influence  on  Russia. 

On  July  24,  acting  upon  his  instructions,  Baron  von 
Schoen,    German   Ambassador   at   Paris,    informed   M. 


150     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Bienvenu-Martin,  the  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  of  the  German  position,  and  laid  particular  em- 
phasis upon  the  German  view  that  the  matter  concerned 
only  Austria  and  Servia,  and  that  the  effort  of  the  great 
powers  should  be  to  endeavor  to  restrict  it  to  them,  for 
any  interference  of  another  power  would  lead  to  incal- 
culable consequences.  (July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  28.) 

The  next  day  the  German  Ambassador  called  again  at 
the  Foreign  Office,  greatly  concerned  at  an  article  in  the 
Echo  de  Paris  which  had  designated  his  procedure  of  the 
day  before  as  a  German  threat.  Baron  von  Schoen  denied 
that  there  was  any  thought  of  a  threat,  and  declared  that 
'  the  German  Government  had  merely  indicated  that  they 
thought  it  desirable  to  localize  the  dispute,  and  that  there 
was  risk  of  aggravating  it  should  other  powers  intervene.' 
M.  Berthelot,  Acting  Political  Director,  remarked  that, 
'as  no  confidential  communication  had  been  made  to  any 
representative  of  the  press,  the  Echo  de  Paris  alone  was 
responsible  for  the  publication  referred  to,  and  that  the 
fact  of  publication  merely  indicated  that  the  action  taken 
by  Germany  appeared  to  have  been  known  outside  of  the 
officials  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Baron  von  Schoen  made  no 
reply  to  this  allusion.' x  (Modified  quotations,  July  25, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  36.) 

1  The  intimation  of  M.  Berthelot  is  evidently  that  the  German  Ambas- 
sador had  tried  to  use  the  press  to  influence  French  public  opinion  in  favor 
of  interference  at  St.  Petersburg.  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich,  German  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  in  a  most  important  and  interesting  commentary  on  the 
official  publications  relating  to  the  war  (New  York  Times,  March  14,  1915), 
says:  "When,  after  the  transmission  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum 
to  Servia,  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  gave  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment the  correct  and  faithful  explanation  that  the  German  Government 
regarded  the  matter  as  one  that  should  be  settled  exclusively  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  desired  urgently  the  localization  of  the 
conflict,  since  every  intervention  of  another  power  might,  by  the  natural 
play  of  the  existing  alliances,  bring  on  incalculable  consequences,  the  echo 
of  this  communication  was  an  article  in  the  Echo  de  Paris,  the  intimate 
relations  of  which  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  are  well  known.  In  this  article,  the 
step  of  the  German  Ambassador  was  branded  as  a  menace  allemande. 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  36.) " 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  151 

The  next  day,  July  26,  the  German  Chancellor  tele- 
graphed Baron  von  Schoen  as  follows :  — 

"Austria-Hungary  having  declared  officially  to  Russia 
that  she  purposed  no  acquisition  of  territory,  and  did  not 
mean  to  affect  the  integrity  of  the  kingdom,  the  decision 
whether  a  European  war  shall  break  out  rests  only  with 
Russia,  who  must  accept  the  whole  responsibility.  We 
rely  upon  France,  with  whom  we  know  ourselves  to  be  one 
in  the  wish  for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of  Europe, 
to  bring  to  bear  her  calming  [in  beruhigendem  sinne]  influ- 
ence at  St.  Petersburg."   (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  10a.) 

When,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  the  German  Ambas- 
sador called  at  the  French  Foreign  Office  to  communicate 
the  views  of  his  Government  as  indicated  in  the  preceding 
telegram,  he  added  that  '  the  prevention  of  war  depended 
upon  the  decision  of  Russia,  and  that  Germany  felt  that 
she  was  at  one  with  France  in  the  ardent  desire  that  peace 
might  be  maintained,  and  did  not  doubt  that  France  would 
use  her  influence  for  peace  at  St.  Petersburg.'  1  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  62.) 

'To  this  "suggestion,"  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  the  French 

1  The  exact  language  employed  by  the  German  Ambassador  in  convey- 
ing this  message  of  his  Government,  as  well  as  the  intonations  of  his  voice, 
would  be  of  the  very  greatest  importance  as  indicating  whether  Germany 
intended  to  ask  for  a  friendly  cooperation  toward  the  maintenance  of  peace, 
or  to  threaten  France  with  the  consequences  of  war  if  she  did  not  restrain 
her  ally.  As  we  have  no  information  on  these  points,  it  seems  important, 
in  lieu  of  more  detailed  information,  to  repeat  here  the  terms  of  the  Ger- 
man communication  in  the  exact  words  of  the  dispatch  in  which  the  French 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  informed  M.  Viviani  of  the  interview: 
"  En  ce  moment,  la  decision,  si  une  guerre  europeenne  doit  eclater,  depend 
uniquement  de  la  Russie.  Le  Gouvernement  Allemand  a  la  ferme  confiance 
que  le  Gouvernement  Francais,  avec  lequel  il  se  sait  solidaire  dans  l'ar- 
dent  desir  que  la  paix  europeene  puisse  etre  maintenue,  usera  de  toute  son 
influence  dans  un  esprit  apaisant  aupres  du  Cabinet  de  Petersbourg." 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  62.) 

The  Russian  Charge  at  Paris  in  a  telegram  to  his  Government  gave  the 
ambassador's  words  as  follows:  "L'Allemagne  se  sent  solidaire  avec  la 
France  dans  le  d£sir  ardent  de  conserver  la  paix  et  espere  fermement  que 
la  France  usera  de  son  influence  a  Petersbourg  dans  un  sens  moderateur." 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  28.) 


152     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Minister,  replied  that  Russia  was  moderate,  that  she  had 
taken  no  step  such  as  to  cause  any  doubt  of  her  modera- 
tion, and  that  the  French  Government  were  in  accord  with 
her  in  attempting  to  urge  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  dis- 
pute. M.  Bienvenu-Martin  said  that  it  appeared  to  them 
that  Germany  on  her  side  ought  to  act  at  Vienna,  where 
her  action  would  certainly  be  effective,  with  a  view  to  pre- 
venting military  operations  looking  toward  the  occupation 
of  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  56.) 

While  the  German  Government,  through  its  ambas- 
sadors at  Paris  and  Vienna,  was  urging  France  and  Great 
Britain  to  influence  Russia,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French 
Ambassador  at  London,  said  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  '  if 
there  was  a  chance  of  mediation  by  the  four  powers,  he 
had  no  doubt  his  Government  would  be  glad  to  join  in  it, 
but  he  pointed  out  that  England  and  France  could  not 
say  anything  at  St.  Petersburg  until  Russia  had  expressed 
some  opinion  or  taken  some  action.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.) 

Just  what  M.  Cambon  meant  by  this  is  not  clear,  but 
apparently  he  was  anxious  to  forestall  the  making  of  any 
formal  representations  to  Russia.  For  if  this  should  be 
done,  the  conciliatory  attitude  on  the  part  of  Russia  would 
be  misunderstood  and  thought  to  be  imposed  by  the  diplo- 
matic intervention  of  England  and  France.  It  was  very 
natural  that  France  should  not  wish  to  weaken  the  in- 
fluence of  her  ally  in  such  an  important  question  by  taking 
action  before  Russia  had  had  a  chance  to  indicate  what 
were  her  views  in  regard  to  a  matter  recognized  as  one 
which  primarily  concerned  her.  There  was,  however,  no 
reason  why  France  and  England  should  not  in  an  informal 
and  confidential  manner  make  any  suggestion  to  Russia 
which  they  thought  likely  to  be  of  use.  The  powers  had 
just  been  making  similar  informal  suggestions  to  Austria, 
hoping  to  influence  her  against  adopting  too  drastic  a 
course  with  Servia. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  153 

The  Russian  Charge"  at  Paris  reported  to  his  Govern- 
ment (July  26)  that  '  the  Director  of  Political  Affairs  had 
declared  that  it  was  his  personal  opinion  that  Germany's 
course  of  procedure  at  Paris  was  intended  to  intimidate 
France  and  bring  about  her  intervention  at  St.  Petersburg.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  29.) 

The  next  day,  July  27,  the  Russian  Ambassador,  M. 
Isvolsky,  immediately  after  his  return  to  Paris,  had  an 
interview  with  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at 
which  M.  Berthelot,  Acting  Director  of  Political  Affairs, 
was  also  present.  Both  of  them  confirmed  the  information 
respecting  the  action  taken  by  Baron  von  Schoen,  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador,  which  the  Russian  Charge  had  already 
reported  to  his  Government.  That  morning  the  German 
Ambassador  confirmed  in  writing  his  declaration  of  the 
day  before :  — 

'1.  That  Austria  has  declared  to  Russia  that  she  seeks 
no  territorial  acquisitions  and  that  she  harbors  no  designs 
against  the  integrity  of  Servia.  Her  sole  object  is  to  secure 
her  own  peace  and  quiet. 

'  2.  That  consequently  it  rests  with  Russia  to  avoid  war. 

'3.  That  Germany  and  France,  entirely  at  one  in  their 
ardent  desire  to  preserve  peace,  should  exercise  their  mod- 
erating influence  upon  Russia. 

'  Baron  von  Schoen  laid  special  emphasis  on  the  expres- 
sion of  solidarity  of  Germany  and  France.  The  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  was 
convinced,'  so  M.  Isvolsky  reported  to  his  Government, 
that  'these  steps  on  the  part  of  Germany  were  taken  for 
the  evident  purpose  of  alienating  Russia  and  France,  of 
inducing  the  French  Government  to  make  representa- 
tions at  St.  Petersburg,  and  of  thus  affecting  Russia's 
confidence  in  her  ally;  !  and  finally,  in  the  event  of  war, 
of  throwing  the  responsibility,  not  on  Germany,  who  was, 
to  believe  her  own  statements,  making  every  effort  to 

1  "  Compromettre  ainsi  notre  alli£  a  nos  yeux." 


154     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

maintain  peace,  but  on  Russia  and  France.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  R.  0.  P.  no.  35;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  62; 
also  F.  Y.  B.  no.  61.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  transmitted  to  his 
Government,  on  July  29,  a  short  summing-up  of  the  situa- 
tion which  the  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs had  prepared  for  President  Poincare  upon  his  arrival : 
"Austria,  fearing  internal  disintegration,  seized  upon  the 
assassination  of  the  Archduke  as  an  excuse  for  an  attempt 
to  obtain  guaranties,  which  may  assume  the  form  of  an 
occupation  of  Servian  military  lines  or  even  Servian  terri- 
tory. Germany  is  supporting  Austria.  The  preservation 
of  peace  depends  upon  Russia  alone,  for  the  question  at 
issue  must  be  'localized'  between  Austria  and  Servia;  that 
is  to  say,  the  question  concerns  the  punishment  of  Servia 
for  her  previous  policy  and  the  obtaining  of  guaranties  for 
the  future.  Germany  concludes  from  this  that  a  moderat- 
ing influence  should  be  exerted  at  St.  Petersburg.  This 
sophism  has  been  refuted  both  in  Paris  and  in  London. 
In  Paris,  Baron  von  Schoen  vainly  endeavored  to  induce 
France  to  agree  to  undertake  joint  action  with  Germany 
to  influence  Russia  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  The 
same  attempts  were  made  in  London.  In  both  capitals 
the  answer  was  given  that  it  was  at  Vienna  that  action 
should  be  taken,  since  it  was  Austria's  excessive  de- 
mands, her  refusal  to  discuss  Servia's  few  reservations, 
and  her  declaration  of  war,  that  threatened  to  provoke  a 
general  war.  France  and  England  cannot  exert  any  pres- 
sure upon  Russia  to  cause  her  to  moderate  her  action, 
for  so  far  she  has  shown  the  greatest  moderation,  more 
particularly  in  her  advice  to  Servia  to  accept  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  Austrian  note.  Apparently  Germany  has 
now  given  up  the  idea  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  upon 
Russia  only,  and  inclines  toward  mediatory  action  both 
at  St.  Petersburg  and  at  Vienna,  but  at  the  same  time 
both  Germany  and  Austria  are  endeavoring  to  have  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  155 

question  drag  along.  Germany  is  opposing  the  conference 
without  suggesting  any  other  practical  course  of  action. 
Austria  is  continuing  discussions  at  St.  Petersburg,  mani- 
festly with  the  object  of  procrastinating.  At  the  same  time 
she  is  taking  action,  and  if  permitted  to  continue,  her 
claims  will  increase  proportionately.  It  is  highly  desirable 
that  Russia  should  give  entire  support  to  the  proposal 
for  mediation  which  will  be  made  by  Sir  E.  Grey.  Other- 
wise, Austria,  under  the  guise  of  'guaranties,'  will  be 
able,  in  effect,  to  alter  the  territorial  status  of  eastern 
Europe."  (July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  53.    Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  85.) 

2.  France  believes  Germany  intends  to  precipitate  a  war 

The  first  few  dispatches  in  the  French  Yellow  Book 
indicate  that  for  several  months  preceding  the  Serajevo 
assassination,  many  of  the  French  officials  had  considered 
that  Germany  was  preparing  for  a  proximate  war,1  and 
this  opinion  was  strengthened  after  the  assassination  of 
Franz  Ferdinand  (June  28). 

On  July  2,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  reported 
that  'the  investigation  of  the  origin  of  the  crime  which 
it  was  the  desire  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  exact 
from  Servia  under  conditions  impossible  for  her  to  submit 
to  with  dignity,  would,  it  was  said,  in  case  of  a  refusal, 
furnish  the  grounds  to  justify  a  recourse  to  military  meas- 
ures.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  8.) 

1  In  the  noteworthy  article,  referred  to  above,  by  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich, 
German  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  published  in  the  New  York  Times, 
Sunday,  March  14,  1915,  he  says:  "...  in  the  case  of  the  French  Yellow 
Book  the  proof  can  be  regarded  as  furnished  that  certain  documents  there 
republished  were  belated  fabrications."  In  a  note  he  gives  the  following: 
"Thus  the  Yellow  Book,  in  its  first  chapter,  entitled  ' Avertissements,' 
contains  a  series  of  documents  which,  beginning  from  March,  1913,  are 
intended  to  prove  a  growing  war  sentiment  in  Germany.  Among  them, 
designated  as  no.  5,  dated  July  30,  1913,  is  a  note  of  the  French  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  is  said:  — 

"  M.  von  Kiderlen  fut  l'homme  le  plus  hai  de  l'Allemagne,  l'hiver  dernier. 
Cependant  il  commence  a  n'6tre  plus  que  d6consider6,  car  il  laisse  entendre 
qu'il  prendra  sa  ravanche.'  (Herr  von  Kiderlen  was  last  winter  the  best- 


156     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

A  consular  report  of  July  20,  which  the  French  Am- 
bassador forwarded  from  Vienna,  contains  the  following 
account  of  the  situation  shortly  before  the  presentation  of 
the  Austrian  note:  "  There  is  here,  and  at  Berlin  as  well,  a 
group  in  favor  of  a  conflict  of  wide  extent,  in  other  words, 
a  conflagration.  The  controlling  motive  is  probably  the 
necessity  of  taking  action  before  Russia  has  completed  the 
extensive  improvements  of  her  army  and  her  system  of 
railways,  and  before  France  has  perfected  her  military 
organization.  But  here  [at  Vienna]  there  is  no  general 
agreement  in  high  circles :  Count  Berchtold  and  the  diplo- 
matists do  not  wish  anything  more  than  local  operations 
against  Servia,  but  anything  may  be  considered  as  possible. 
A  singular  fact  is  pointed  out.  Ordinarily  the  official  tele- 
graph agency  in  its  summaries  and  reviews  of  the  foreign 
press  pays  attention  only  to  the  semi-official  newspapers 
and  most  important  publications.  It  omits  all  quotations 
and  all  mention  of  the  others.  This  is  a  traditional  rule; 
but  during  the  last  ten  days  the  official  agency  has  fur- 
nished each  day  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  a  complete 
review  of  the  whole  Servian  press,  giving  a  prominent  place 
to  the  smallest  and  most  insignificant  newspapers  which 
for  that  very  reason  express  themselves  more  aggressively 
and  often  more  insultingly.  This  work  is  undertaken  by 
the  official  agency  with  the  obvious  intention  of  stirring  up 
public  feeling  and  creating  a  sentiment  favorable  to  war. 
The  fact  is  significant."  (Extract,  July  20,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  14; 
cf.  S.  B.  B.  no.  20.) 

From  its  Ambassador  at  Berlin  the  French  Govern- 
ment learned,  July  21,  the  extreme  weakness  of  the  Berlin 

hated  man  in  Germany.  At  present  he  is  beginning  to  be  only  disliked 
[instead  of  hated],  for  he  allows  it  to  be  understood  that  he  will  take  his 
revenge  [for  Morocco].) 

"Secretary  of  State  von  Kiderlen,  who,  according  to  this,  began  to  medi- 
tate vengeance  in  July,  1913,  had  already  died  in  December,  1912,  a  fact 
which  was  manifestly  not  realized  by  that  official  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
who  belatedly  fabricated  this  Yellow  Book  document."  (See  above,  Preface, 
p.  vi,  note.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  157 

Bourse  the  day  before.  This  M.  Cambon  attributed  to  the 
anxiety  in  regard  to  the  Servian  question.  The  ambassador 
reported  that  'he  had  very  good  reason  to  believe  that, 
when  Austria  made  the  communication  at  Belgrade  which 
she  considered  necessary  in  consequence  of  the  Serajevo 
assassination,  Germany  would  stand  back  of  her  with  the 
weight  of  her  influence,  without  seeking  to  play  the  part  of 
mediator.'   (Modified  quotation,  July  21,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  16.) 

This  impression  of  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  was 
deepened  when  the  French  Government  learned  the  terms 
of  the  Austrian  note  and  the  vigorous  support  it  received 
from  the  German  Government.  In  the  absence  of  many  of 
the  ambassadors  from  Berlin  the  charges  came  to  see  M. 
Jules  Cambon  the  morning  after  the  presentation  of  the 
Austrian  note.  The  Russian  Charge  remarked  with  bit- 
terness that  '  Austria  had  chosen  a  moment  to  deliver  her 
note  when  the  President  of  France  and  M.  Viviani  had  left 
St.  Petersburg.  He  thought  that  public  opinion  in  Ger- 
many, in  great  part,  favored  war  and  wished  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  this  opportunity  when  Austria  would  no  doubt 
be  found  more  united  than  in  the  past,  and  when  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  would  be  less  inclined,  because  of  his  feeling 
of  common  monarchical  interest  and  horror  at  the  assassi- 
nation, to  show  a  conciliatory  disposition.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  29.) 

This  last  observation  relative  to  monarchical  solidar- 
ity seems  to  have  impressed  the  French  Ambassador, 
for  in  another  dispatch  sent  that  same  day  (July  24)  to 
his  Government,  M.  Jules  Cambon  states:  "An  article 
which  appeared  in  the  Lokal  Anzeiger  this  evening  shows 
also  that  at  the  German  Chancery  there  exists  a  state  of 
mind  to  which  we  in  Paris  are  naturally  not  inclined  to  pay 
sufficient  attention,  I  mean  the  feeling  that  monarchies 
must  stand  together  (sentiment  de  la  solidarite  monarchique) . 
I  am  convinced  that  great  weight  must  be  attached  to  this 
point  of  view  in  order  to  appreciate  the  attitude  of  the 


158     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Emperor  William,  whose  impressionable  nature  must  have 
been  affected  by  the  assassination  of  a  prince  whose  guest 
he  had  been  a  few  days  previously."  (Extract,  July  24, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  30;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  18.) 

On  July  24,  also,  the  French  Government  received  a 
report  from  M.  Paul  Cambon  at  London,  that  'Count 
Benckendorff,  the  Russian  Ambassador,  told  him  how 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  on  his  return  from  Berlin  about  a 
month  ago,  had  expressed  pessimistic  views  in  regard  to  the 
relations  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin.  The  Prince 
had  remarked  the  uneasiness  caused  at  the  German  capital 
by  the  rumors  of  a  naval  agreement  between  Russia  and 
England,  by  the  visit  of  the  Tsar  to  Bukharest,  and  by  the 
strengthening  of  the  Russian  army.  From  this  the  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  had  concluded  that  Germany  would  not 
be  averse  to  a  war  with  Russia.  The  British  Under-Secre- 
tary of  State  had  been  struck,  as  were  they  all,'  M.  Cambon 
remarked, '  by  Prince  Lichnowsky's  air  of  anxiety  since  his 
return  from  Berlin.  The  Under-Secretary  considered  that 
Germany,  if  she  had  wished,  could  have  prevented  the 
delivery  of  the  ultimatum.  In  view  of  these  considerations, 
the  French  Ambassador  considered  the  situation  very  seri- 
ous, and  informed  his  Government  that  they *  saw  no 
means  of  arresting  the  course  of  events.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  24,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  32.) 

The  French  Government  considered  that  one  of  the 
most  alarming  indications  of  Germany's  aggressive  inten- 
tions lay  in  her  refusal  to  join  with  the  other  less  directly 
interested  powers  in  a  consideration  of  the  means  by 
which  the  difficulty  might  be  settled.  Although  the  Ger- 
man Government  had  refused  to  take  part  in  any  media- 
tion in  regard  to  the  Austro-Servian  dispute,  they  declared, 
in  a  telegram  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  that  'they  accepted 

1  When  M.  Cambon  speaks  of  "they"  ["we"]  here,  he  evidently  refers 
to  the  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  consultation  with  the  Ambassadors  of 
France  and  Russia,  to  find  some  means  of  avoiding  the  conflict. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  159 

the  distinction  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  between  an 
Austro-Servian  and  an  Austro-Russian  conflict.  They 
insisted  that  the  question  be  localized,  by  virtue  of  all 
the  powers  refraining  from  intervention,  and  they  were 
prepared,  in  the  event  of  an  Austro-Russian  controversy, 
— reserving  their  duty  as  an  ally,  —  to  join  the  other  pow- 
ers in  undertaking  mediation  between  Russia  and  Austria.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  13;  cf. 
B.  W.  P.  no.  25.) 

That  same  day  the  German  Secretary  of  State  informed 
the  British  Charge1  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  that  'if  the  rela- 
tions between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threatening,  he 
was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  Sir  Edward  Grey's  sug- 
gestion as  to  the  four  powers  working  in  favor  of  modera- 
tion at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  reported  that  'this 
formula,  —  i.e.,  "mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia," 
—  to  which  it  seemed  that  Germany  might  agree,  had  the 
disadvantage  of  admitting  that  there  was  a  conflict  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  which  up  to  that  time  did  not 
exist.'    (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  83.) 

The  French  and  Russian  Governments  considered  that 
Germany  and  Austria  were  trying  to  prolong  discussions  so 
as  to  permit  Austria  to  accomplish  her  purpose  of  crush- 
ing Servia  before  the  other  powers  could  intervene.  (Cf. 
R.  O.  P.  nos.  48,  53.)  The  French  Yellow  Book  and  the 
Russian  Orange  Paper  do  not  make  clear  exactly  what 
advantage  it  could  be  to  Germany  and  Austria  to  prolong 
negotiations  rather  than  secure  the  great  advantage  which 
would  be  theirs  from  an  immediate  recourse  to  arms.  At 
first  appearance  this  statement  seems  somewhat  incon- 
sistent with  the  accusation  that  Germany  wished  to  force 
the  war.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  meant  that  Germany 
and  Austria  intended  to  secure  a  complete  diplomatic 
triumph,  or  failing  that,  to  have  recourse  to  arms,  the 


160     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

inconsistency  might  disappear;  for  Austria,  under  the 
pretext  of  engaging  in  punitive  measures  against  Servia, 
might  complete  her  mobilization,  while  Germany,  with 
all  the  influence  she  could  bring  to  bear  at  St.  Petersburg, 
restrained  Russia  from  any  corresponding  preparations. 
Russia  was  perhaps  afraid  that  if  Austria  were  allowed  to 
complete  her  mobilization  and  commence  her  attack  upon 
Servia,  the  powers  might  decide  to  make  the  best  of  the 
situation  and  bring  influence  to  bear  at  St.  Petersburg  in 
an  attempt  to  get  the  Government  of  the  Tsar  to  remain 
passive  while  Austria  subjugated  Servia. 

The  views  of  the  French  Government  are  set  forth  by 
the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  a  dispatch  which 
he  sent  on  July  27  to  M.  Viviani  and  the  French  Ambas- 
sadors :  — 

"The  three  steps  taken  by  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Paris  seem  characteristic:  On  Friday  he  reads  a  note  in 
which  the  German  Government  categorically  place  them- 
selves between  Austria  and  the  powers,  approving  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  and  adding  that  '  Germany 
warmly  desires  that  the  dispute  should  remain  localized, 
since  any  intervention  of  another  party  is  bound,  because 
of  its  alliances,  to  provoke  incalculable  consequences';  — 
the  second  day,  Saturday,  the  effect  having  been  produced, 
and  the  powers  having,  on  account  of  the  surprise,  the 
shortness  of  the  time-limit,  and  the  risks  of  a  general  war, 
advised  Servia  to  yield,  Herr  von  Schoen  returns  to  mini- 
mize this  step,  pretending  to  be  astonished  at  the  impres- 
sion produced,  and  protests  that  intentions  are  attributed 
to  Germany  which  she  does  not  harbor,  'since/  he  says, 
'  there  was  neither  concert  before  nor  threat  afterwards ' ; 
—  the  third  day,  Sunday,  the  result  having  been  obtained, 
since  Servia  has  yielded,  one  might  almost  say,  to  all  the 
Austrian  demands,  the  German  Ambassador  reappears 
on  two  occasions,  to  lay  stress  on  Germany's  peaceful 
intentions,  and  on  her  warm  desire  to  cooperate  in  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  161 

maintenance  of  peace,  after  having  secured  the  Austrian 
success  which  closes  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis. 

"The  situation  at  the  moment  of  writing  continues 
to  cause  anxiety,  because  of  Austria's  incomprehensible 
refusal  to  accept  Servia's  submission,  and  further  be- 
cause of  Austrian  mobilization  operations,  and  her  threats 
to  invade  Servia.  The  attitude  which  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment has  assumed  from  the  beginning,  with  German 
support,  and  her  refusal  to  enter  into  any  conversation 
with  the  powers,  practically  prevents  them  from  effec- 
tively intervening  at  Vienna,  except  through  Germany 
as  an  intermediary.  But  time  presses,  for  if  the  Austrian 
army  crosses  the  frontier,  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  set 
limits  to  the  crisis,  as  it  does  not  appear  possible  that 
Russia  should  tolerate  the  occupation  of  Servia,  after  the 
latter  has  in  reality  accepted  the  Austrian  note,  and  given 
every  satisfaction  and  guaranty.  Germany,  from  the 
very  fact  of  her  taking  the  stand  she  has,  is  in  a  position 
to  intervene  effectively  at  Vienna  and  to  gain  a  hearing; 
if  she  does  not  do  this,  she  will  have  justified  all  the 
suspicions  [which  have  been  aroused]  and  will  take  upon 
herself  the  responsibility  for  the  war."  (Extract,  July  29, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  61.) 

The  German  Government  must  have  realized  perfectly 
what  views  France  entertained  in  regard  to  Germany's  in- 
tentions. As  an  assurance  of  this  we  have  only  to  recall  how 
M.  Berthelot,  of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  speaking,  with 
the  permission  of  the  German  Ambassador,  unofficially 
and  as  man  to  man,  said  to  him  that '  to  any  simple  mind 
Germany's  attitude  was  inexplicable  unless  she  aimed  to 
bring  about  a  war.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  57.)  Similarly  M.  Jules  Cambon,  speaking  to  the  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State,  asked  him  "whether  Germany 
wished  for  war."   (July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  74.) 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  in  his  dispatch 
of  July  28,  remarked  apropos  of  Austria's  declaration  of 


162     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

war  against  Servia:  "Among  the  suspicions  aroused  by 
Austria's  sudden  and  violent  decision,  the  most  disquiet- 
ing is  that  Germany  has  urged  her  on  to  take  aggressive 
action  against  Servia  in  order  to  enable  Germany  herself 
to  enter  into  war  with  Russia  and  France,  in  circumstances 
which  she  supposes  ought  to  be  most  favorable  to  herself 
and  under  conditions  which  have  been  thoroughly  con- 
sidered."  (Extract,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  83.) 

From  their  Ambassador  at  Berlin  the  French  Govern- 
ment received  a  dispatch  of  the  same  date  betraying  a 
similar  mistrust  of  Germany.  In  it  M.  Jules  Cambon 
suggests  that  'in  consequence  of  the  repugnance  shown 
by  Herr  von  Jagow  toward  the  making  of  any  demarche 
at  Vienna,  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  put  him  in  a  dilemma, 
by  asking  him  to  state  himself  precisely  how  diplomatic 
action  by  the  powers  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  war  could 
be  brought  about.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  81.) 

Two  days  later  (July  30)  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  German 
Secretary  of  State,  said  to  M.  Jules  Cambon  that  'in  re- 
sponse to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  request  that  Germany  draw 
up  a  formula  for  the  intervention  of  the  disinterested 
powers,  he  had,  "to  save  time,"  asked  Austria  directly  to 
state  the  manner  in  which  the  conversations  with  her 
might  be  entered  into.  M.  Cambon  considered  that  this 
was  a  pretext  for  eliminating  England,  France,  and  Italy, 
and  entrusting  the  duty  of  persuading  Austria  to  adopt  a 
conciliatory  attitude  to  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vi- 
enna, Herr  von  Tchirsky,  whose  Pan-Germanist  and  Russo- 
phobe sentiments  were  well  known.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  30,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  109.) 

M.  Viviani's  dispatch  of  July  31  to  the  French  Am- 
bassadors contains  a  severe  arraignment  of  the  German 
Government:  "When  we  consider  what  has  been  the  con- 
stant attitude  of  Germany,  and  how,  since  the  beginning 
of  the  conflict,  though  she  never  ceased  to  affirm  to  each 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  163 

one  of  the  powers  her  .peaceful  intentions,  she  has  act- 
ually, by  her  dilatory  or  negative  attitude,  caused  the  fail- 
ure of  all  attempts  at  agreement;  when  we  know  how  she 
has  not  ceased,  through  her  Ambassador,  to  encourage 
Vienna  to  maintain  an  uncompromising  attitude;  when 
we  perceive  how  the  German  military  preparations  were 
begun  on  the  25th  of  July  and  have  been  continued 
subsequently  without  cessation;  and  when  we  remember 
Germany's  immediate  objection  to  the  Russian  formula, 
which  Berlin  declared  unacceptable  to  Austria  even  before 
that  power  had  been  consulted,  we  cannot  escape  the  con- 
viction, driven  home  by  all  the  impressions  derived  from 
Berlin  that  Germany  has  sought  to  humiliate  Russia,  to 
disrupt  the  Triple  Entente,  and  that  she  was  prepared  if 
she  could  not  effect  her  purpose,  to  make  war."  l  (Extract, 
July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  114.) 

3.  France  supports  her  ally 
If  the  German  diplomats  really  did  entertain  the  hope 
of  separating  France  and  Russia,  they  made  a  signal  fail- 
ure. From  the  very  first  the  French  Government  strength- 
ened Russia's  hand  by  its  unswerving  support.2 

1  This  translation  had  to  be  somewhat  free,  because  of  the  peculiar  con- 
struction of  the  original. 

1  On  July  28,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  communicated  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  the  contents  of  a  telegram  of  July  27  from  M.  Sazonof,  in  the 
closing  paragraph  of  which  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  said:  "I  wish, 
however,  to  put  an  end  from  this  day  forth  to  a  misunderstanding  which 
might  arise  from  the  answer  given  by  the  French  Minister  of  Justice  to 
the  German  Ambassador  regarding  counsels  of  moderation  to  be  given  to  the 
Imperial  Cabinet."  (Extract,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  53.)  Strange  to  say,  the 
Russian  Orange  Paper,  no.  32,  reproduces  the  first  three  paragraphs  of  this 
note,  but  omits  this  concluding  statement.  I  do  not  understand  to  what 
M.  Sazonof  refers  unless  it  is  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin's  remark  about  the 
conditions  of  France's  making  representations  at  St.  Petersburg.  (See  F. 
Y.  B.  nos.  56,  62;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  28.)  Perhaps  M.  Sazonof  wished  to  head 
off  any  such  possibility,  for  fear  Russia  might  be  forced  to  yield  as  she  had 
been  in  1908.  This  may  explain  why  Russia  preferred  direct  conversations 
with  Austria  to  the  mediation  of  the  four  less  interested  powers.  (See  chap, 
vn,  §  4.)  In  the  Austrian  Red  Book  just  published  we  find  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin  telling  the  German  Ambassador  that '  the  French  Government  was 


164     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

When  the  German  Secretary  of  State  said,  by  way  of 
excuse  for  not  taking  part  in  the  proposed  mediation, 
that  Germany  had  engagements  with  Austria,  the  French 
Ambassador  replied  that  the  relations  of  Germany  with 
Vienna  were  no  closer  than  those  of  France  with  Russia. 
(See  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  74.) 

On  July  29,  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  France  tele- 
graphed to  M.  Sazonof :  "Viviani  has  just  assured  me  of 
the  firm  determination  of  the  French  Government  to  act 
in  accord  with  us.  This  decision  finds  the  most  general 
support  in  all  circles  and  all  parties,  including  the  Radical 
Socialists,  who  have  just  made  him  a  declaration  express- 
ing the  absolute  confidence  and  the  patriotic  dispositions 
of  the  group.  Upon  his  arrival  in  Paris,  Viviani  rushed 
through  a  telegram  to  London,  saying  that,  in  view  of  the 
cessation  of  direct  pourparlers  between  St.  Petersburg 
and  Vienna,  it  was  necessary  that  the  London  Cabinet 
should  renew  as  soon  as  possible,  in  one  form  or  another, 
its  proposal  for  the  mediation  of  the  powers.  Before  see- 
ing me  to-day,  Viviani  received  the  German  Ambassador, 
who  renewed  the  assurance  of  Germany's  pacific  inten- 
tions. Viviani  having  pointed  out  that  if  Germany  de- 
sired peace,  she  should  hasten  to  adhere  to  the  British 
proposal  for  mediation,  Baron  von  Schoen  replied  that 
the  words  'conference'  or  'arbitration'  frightened  Aus- 
tria. Viviani  answered  him  that  it  was  not  a  question  of 
words,  and  that  it  would  be  easy  to  find  another  form  of 
mediation.  According  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  in  order  that 
the  negotiations  between  the  powers  might  succeed,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  ascertain  what  Austria  was  going 
to  demand  from  Servia.  Viviani  replied  that  the  Berlin 
Cabinet  might  very  easily  inquire  about  this  from  Aus- 

of  the  opinion  that  the  Austro-Servian  controversy  concerned  only  Belgrade 
and  Vienna,  and  that  it  was  hoped  at  Paris  that  the  question  might  find  a 
direct  and  peaceful  solution.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  A.  R.  B.  no.  13; 
cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  11.  See  contra,  E.  Durkheim  and  E.  Denis,  Who  Wanted 
War  t   Colin,  Paris,  1915,  p.  15.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  165 

tria,  but  that  in  the  mean  time  the  Servian  note  of  reply 
might  serve  as  a  basis  of  discussion;  he  added  that  France 
was  sincerely  desirous  of  peace,  but  that  she  was  at  the 
same  time  determined  to  act  in  full  harmony  with  her 
allies  and  friends,  and  that  he  (Baron  von  Schoen)  must 
have  convinced  himself  that  this  decision  would  meet  with 
the  heartiest  approval  of  the  country."  (July  29,  R.  0.  P. 
no.  55.) 

That  same  day  M.  Sazonof  'instructed  the  Russian 
Ambassador  to  the  French  Government  to  express  to  the 
French  Government  Russia's  sincere  gratitude  for  the 
declaration  the  Ambassador  of  France  had  made  him  in  its 
name  to  the  effect  that  Russia  could  count  with  assurance 
upon  the  assistance  of  her  ally,  France.1  In  the  present 

1  This  assurance  of  support,  which  France  gave  to  Russia  on  July  29, 
is  of  the  utmost  significance.  The  Russian  Government  had  every  reason 
to  believe  that  France  would  stand  behind  her  ally,  but  a  sudden  explosion 
of  anti-war  sentiment  would  have  embarrassed  the  French  Government. 
The  purpose  of  the  latter  was  to  strengthen  the  hand  of  Russia  without 
encouraging  her  to  take  aggressive  action;  in  pursuing  this  policy  public 
opinion  in  France  and  the  attitude  of  the  English  Government  had  to  be 
considered.  Although  France  was  perfectly  justified  in  supporting  the  Rus- 
sian Government  to  the  extent  to  which  she  did,  it  seems  that  she  was  so 
convinced  of  Germany's  insincerity  and  intention  to  provoke  a  war  that 
she  failed  to  make  Russia  realize  the  imperative  need  of  keeping  always 
one  step  behind  Germany  in  her  defensive  measures.  Russia's  mobiliza- 
tion in  the  south  was  a  justifiable  counter-move.  We  cannot,  however, 
make  the  same  statement  in  regard  to  Russia's  order  for  a  general  mobili- 
zation on  July  31  —  before  she  had  received  the  German  ultimatum. 

Dr.  Karl  Helfferich  states  his  reasons  for  thinking  this  assurance  of  France 
to  support  Russia  was  given  only  after  France  was  convinced  that  England 
would  support  the  Entente  :  — 

"From  no  document  of  the  French  Yellow  Book,  and  as  little  from  the 
Russian  Orange  Book  and  the  English  Blue  Book,  does  it  appear  that 
France  at  any  stage  ventured  to  give  the  Russian  Government  an  earnest 
counsel  in  a  pacific  sense,  unless  it  be  considered  that  the  expression  of  the 
wish  that  Russia  might  avoid  measures  which  could  give  Germany  a  pretext 
for  mobilization  (Yellow  Book,  no.  102)  be  regarded  as  a  sincere  mediation 
for  peace,  while  as  a  matter  of  fact  such  wishes  are  more  properly  to  be  re- 
garded as  tactical  hints  to  detain  Germany  until  the  assurance  of  armed  help 
from  England,  toward  which  France  was  at  that  time  working  with  all 
means  at  its  disposal,  should  be  attained. 

"The  unconditional  safeguarding  of  the  English  alliance,  not  any  media- 
tory activity  whatsoever,  was  in  those  critical  days  the  goal  of  the  labors  of 


166     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

circumstances,  M.  Sazonof  said,  this  declaration  was  par- 
ticularly precious  to  Russia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
29,  R.  0.  P.  no.  58;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  101.) 

Jf..  Military  'preparations  in  Germany  and  France 

Two  days  before  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, M.  Jules  Cambon  reported  from  Berlin  that  '  he 
had  been  assured  that  the  preliminary  notices  for  mobili- 
zation, the  object  of  which  was  to  place  Germany  in  an 
attitude  of  " attention,"  as  it  were,  in  times  of  tension,  had 
been  sent  out  to  those  classes  of  reservists  which  would  re- 
ceive them  in  such  circumstances.  This  was  a  measure  to 
which,  on  account  of  the  conditions  existing  in  Germany, 
the  Government  could  have  recourse  without  giving  away 
its  intentions  and  without  exciting  the  people.  The  meas- 
ure was  not  of  a  sensational  nature,  nor  was  it,  as  had 
been  shown,  necessarily  followed  by  actual  mobilization. 
Nevertheless,  it  was,  as  the  Ambassador  remarked,  signifi- 
cant.' l  (Modified  quotation,  July  21,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  15.) 

'  On  July  27  the  first  reports  of  preparatory  measures  by 
France  arrived  in  Germany.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  dis- 
continued its  maneuvers  and  returned  to  garrison  duty.' 

French  diplomats;  and  as  long  as  this  goal  was  not  attained,  the  decisive 
word  to  Russia  was  also  not  uttered.  No  matter  if  the  impression  is  given 
a  hundred  times  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  that  French  assistance  of 
Russia  was  axiomatic,  so  axiomatic  that  a  special  declaration  on  this  point 
to  Russia  —  which  one  seeks  in  vain  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  —  was  not 
at  all  necessary  —  the  Russian  Orange  Book  knows  better.  In  this  there 
is  contained  a  telegraphic  statement  of  Sazonof  to  Isvolsky,  printed  as  of 
July  29  (Orange  Book,  no.  58),  and  that,  too,  as  the  last  of  the  ten  docu- 
ments dated  July  29,  so  that  we  may  assume  that  this  telegram  was  dis- 
patched only  late  in  the  evening  of  July  29. 

"From  this  [citations  from  R.  O.  P.  no.  58]  it  appears  that  France,  on  the 
evening  of  July  29,  not  earlier  and  not  later,  gave  to  Russia  expressly  and 
without  conditions  its  declaration  of  armed  assistance. 

"Why  not  earlier?  And  why  did  France  on  July  29  find  the  ability  to 
make  up  its  mind  to  this  decisive  step? 

"The  key  lies  with  ENGLAND."   (New  York  Times,  March  14,  1915.) 

1  For  other  reports  of  German  military  preparations  see  F.  Y.  B.  nos. 
59,  60,  88,  89. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  167 

(G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  8.)  While  these  preparations 
were  in  progress,  the  German  Memorandum  recounts  how 
the  German  Government  continued  its  mediatory  action 
between  Austria  and  Russia  (G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p. 
9,  and  exhibit  23) ,  though  it  does  not  appear  that  any  real 
steps  toward  mobilization  were  undertaken  until  France 
considered  that  Germany's  action  rendered  it  necessary; 
for  President  Poincare"  told  the  British  Ambassador,  July 
30,  that  '  France  was  pacific,  that  she  did  not  desire  war, 
and  that  all  she  had  done  up  to  the  present  was  to  make 
preparations  for  mobilization  so  as  not  to  be  taken  un- 
awares.'   (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  99.) 

On  the  previous  day  (July  29) ,  the  German  Chancellor 
sent  the  following  instructions  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  Paris:  "News  received  here  regarding 
French  preparations  of  war  grows  from  hour  to  hour.  I  re- 
quest that  you  call  the  attention  of  the  French  Government 
to  this  and  accentuate  the  fact  that  such  measures  would 
call  forth  counter-measures  on  our  part.  We  should  have 
to  proclaim  threatening  state  of  war  [drohende  Kriegsge- 
fahr],  and  while  this  would  not  mean  a  call  for  the  reserves 
or  mobilization,  yet  the  tension  would  be  aggravated.  We 
continue  to  hope  for  the  preservation  of  peace."  (Extract, 
July  29,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  17;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  45;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  101.) 

When  the  situation  became  threatening,  M.  Paul  Cam- 
bon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  told  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  on  July  29,  that  'he  anticipated  a  demand  from  Ger- 
many that  France  should  be  neutral  while  Germany  at- 
tacked Russia.  This  assurance  France,  of  course,  could  not 
give,  being  bound  to  help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  87.) 

On  July  30,  Von  Jagow,  the  German  Secretary  of  State, 
speaking  of  the  '  Russian  mobilization  and  French  military 
measures  which  he  heard  were  being  taken  in  France,  said 
that  when  they  mobilized  they  would  have  to  mobilize  on 


168     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

three  sides  at  once.  He  said  he  regretted  this,  as  he  knew 
France  did  not  desire  war,  but  it  would  be  a  military  neces- 
sity.'   (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  98.) 

That  same  day,  July  30,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French 
Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  his  Government :  — 

"Herr  von  Jagow  telephoned  to  me  at  2  o'clock  that  the 
news  of  the  German  mobilization  which  had  spread  an 
hour  before  was  false,  and  asked  me  to  inform  you  of  this 
without  delay;  the  Imperial  Government  is  confiscating 
the  extra  editions  of  the  papers  which  announced  it.  But 
neither  this  communication  nor  these  steps  diminish  my 
apprehension  with  regard  to  the  plans  of  Germany. 

"It  seems  certain  that  the  Extraordinary  Council,  held 
yesterday  evening  at  Potsdam  with  the  military  authori- 
ties under  the  presidency  of  the  Emperor,  decided  on  mob- 
ilization, and  this  explains  the  preparation  of  the  special 
edition  of  the  Lokal  Anzeiger,  but  that  from  various  causes 
(the  declaration  of  England  that  she  reserved  her  entire 
liberty  of  action,  the  exchange  of  telegrams  between  the 
Tsar  and  William  II),  the  serious  measures  which  had  been 
decided  upon  were  suspended. 

"One  of  the  ambassadors  with  whom  I  have  very  close 
relations  saw  Herr  von  Zimmerman  at  2  o'clock.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  the  military  authorities 
are  very  anxious  that  mobilization  should  be  ordered,  be- 
cause every  delay  makes  Germany  lose  some  of  her  advan- 
tages. Nevertheless,  up  to  the  present,  the  haste  of  the 
General  Staff,  which  sees  war  in  mobilization,  has  been 
successfully  restrained.  In  any  case  mobilization  may  be 
decided  upon  at  any  moment.  I  do  not  know  who  has  is- 
sued in  the  Lokal  Anzeiger,  —  a  paper  which  is  usually 
semi-official,  —  premature  news  calculated  to  cause  excite- 
ment in  France. 

"Further,  I  have  the  strongest  reasons  to  believe  that 
all  the  measures  for  mobilization  which  can  be  taken  before 
the  publication  of  the  general  order  of  mobilization  have 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  169 

already  been  taken  here,  and  that  they  are  anxious  here  to 
make  us  publish  our  mobilization  first  in  order  to  attribute 
the  responsibility  to  us."  (Extract,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
105.) 

Still  another  dispatch  of  that  same  day  which  M.  Vivi- 
ani  sent  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, instructed  him  to  inform  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the 
situation  relative  to  the  French  and  German  military  prep- 
arations, so  that  England  might  see  that,  although  France 
was  prepared  to  defend  herself  (est  resolue),  it  was  not  she 
who  was  undertaking  aggressive  action.  The  telegram 
continued :  — 

"You  will  direct  the  attention  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to  the 
decision  taken  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  this  morning; 
although  Germany  has  made  her  covering  dispositions 
a  few  hundred  metres  from  the  frontier  along  the  whole 
front  from  Luxemburg  to  the  Vosges,  and  has  transported 
her  covering  troops  to  their  war  positions,  we  have  kept 
our  troops  ten  kilometres  from  the  frontier  and  forbidden 
them  to  approach  nearer. 

"Our  plan,  though  based  upon  the  idea  of  attack,  pro- 
vided, nevertheless,  that  the  fighting  positions  of  our  cover- 
ing troops  should  be  as  near  to  the  frontier  as  possible.  By 
leaving  a  strip  of  territory  undefended  against  the  sudden 
aggression  of  the  enemy,  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
hopes  to  prove  that  France  does  not  bear,  any  more  than 
Russia,  the  responsibility  for  the  attack. 

"In  order  to  be  convinced  of  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  com- 
pare the  steps  taken  on  the  two  sides  of  our  frontier;  in 
France,  soldiers  who  were  on  leave  were  not  recalled  until 
we  were  certain  that  Germany  had  done  so  five  days  before. 

"In  Germany,  not  only  have  the  garrison  troops  of 
Metz  been  pushed  up  to  the  frontier,  but  they  have  been 
reinforced  by  units  transported  by  train  from  garrisons  in 
the  interior  such  as  Treves  or  Cologne;  nothing  of  this 
nature  has  been  done  in  France. 


170     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

"The  making  ready  of  the  positions  on  the  frontier  (clear- 
ing of  trees,  placing  of  armament,  construction  of  batter- 
ies, and  protection  of  railway  junctions)  was  begun  in  Ger- 
many on  Saturday,  the  25th;  in  France  we  are  going  to 
begin  it,  for  we  can  no  longer  refrain  from  taking  similar 
measures. 

"The  railway  stations  were  occupied  by  the  military  in 
Germany  on  Saturday,  the  25th;  in  France  on  Tuesday, 
the  28th. 

"Finally,  in  Germany  the  reservists  by  tens  of  thousands 
have  been  recalled  by  individual  summons,  those  living 
abroad  (the  classes  of  1903  to  1911)  have  been  recalled,  the 
officers  of  reserve  have  been  summoned ;  in  the  interior  the 
roads  are  closed,  motor-cars  circulate  only  with  permits. 
These  measures  constitute  the  last  stage  before  mobiliza- 
tion.  None  of  them  has  been  taken  in  France. 

"The  German  army  has  its  outposts  on  our  frontier;  on 
two  occasions  yesterday x  German  patrols  penetrated  our 
territory.  The  whole  16th  Army  Corps  from  Metz,  rein- 
forced by  part  of  the  8th  from  Treves  and  Cologne,  occu- 
pies the  frontier  from  Metz  to  Luxemburg;  the  15th  Army 
Corps  from  Strassburg  is  massed  on  the  frontier. 

"Under  penalty  of  being  shot,  the  inhabitants  of  the  an- 
nexed parts  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  forbidden  to  cross  the 
frontier."   (Extract,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106.) 

On  July  31,  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  German  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  sent  for  the  French  Ambassador  and  told 
him  he  was  very  sorry  to  inform  him  that '  in  the  face  of  the 
total  mobilization  of  the  Russian  army,  Germany,  in  the 
interests  of  the  security  of  the  Empire,  would  have  to  take 
serious  precautionary  measures;  that  what  was  called 
Kriegsgefahrzustand  (state  of  danger  of  war)  allowed  the 
authorities,  if  they  deemed  it  expedient,  to  proclaim  a  state 
of  siege,  to  suspend  some  of  the  public  services,  and  to  close 
the  frontier.  At  the  same  time  he  informed  the  ambassa- 

1  For  a  discussion  of  the  date  of  these  occurrences  see  the  Preface,  and 
post,  p.  285. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  171 

dor  that  a  demand  was  being  made  at  St.  Petersburg  that 
Russia  should  demobilize  on  the  Austrian  as  well  as  on  the 
German  side,  otherwise  Germany  would  be  obliged  to 
mobilize  also.  Herr  von  Jagow  said  that  instructions  had 
been  sent  to  Baron  von  Schoen  to  inform  the  French  Gov- 
ernment of  the  decision  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  and  to  ask 
them  what  attitude  they  intended  to  adopt.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  116.) 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  1,  the  French  Minister  of 
War  informed  the  British  Military  Attache*  at  Paris  that 
'orders  had  been  given  at  3.40  for  a  general  mobilization  of 
the  French  army.  This  became  necessary,  the  minister 
said,  because  he  knew  that  under  the  system  of  Kriegs- 
gefahrzustand  the  Germans  had  called  up  six  classes. 
Three  classes  were  sufficient  to  bring  their  covering  troops 
up  to  war  strength,  the  remaining  three  being  the  reserve. 
This  he  said,  being  tantamount  to  mobilization,  was  mo- 
bilization under  another  name.  The  French  forces  on  the 
frontier  had  opposed  to  them  eight  army  corps  on  a  war 
footing  and  an  attack  was  expected  at  any  moment.  It  was, 
therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance  to  guard  against  this. 
A  zone  of  ten  kilometres  had,  he  said,  been  left  between 
the  French  troops  and  the  German  frontier.  The  French 
troops  would  not  attack,  and  the  Minister  of  War  was 
anxious  that  it  should  be  explained  that  this  act  of  mobili- 
zation was  one  for  purely  defensive  purposes.'  (Modified 
quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  136;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no. 
140.) 

In  his  speech  before  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  on 
August  4,  M.  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  speaking 
of  the  situation  at  this  time  when  Russia  had  in  part  mo- 
bilized,1 and  Germany  was  maintaining  a  negative  attitude 

1  M.  Viviani  Bays  that  the  German  ultimatum  was  addressed  to  Russia 
on  July  31,  "on  the  pretext  that  Russia  had  ordered  a  general  mobiliza- 
tion." (August  4,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  159.)  The  "pretext"  seems  to  have  been  a 
reality. 


172     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

toward  the  suggestions  brought  forward  with  the  hope  of 
reaching  a  peaceful  solution,  said:  "This  was  a  disquieting 
situation  which  made  it  probable  that  there  existed  at  Ber- 
lin intentions  which  had  not  been  disclosed.  Some  hours 
afterwards  this  alarming  suspicion  was  destined  to  become 
a  certainty.  In  fact  Germany's  negative  attitude  gave 
place  thirty-six  hours  later  to  positive  steps  which  were 
truly  alarming.  On  the  31st  July,  Germany,  by  proclaim- 
ing '  a  state  of  war,'  cut  the  communications  between  herself 
and  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  obtained  for  herself  complete 
freedom  to  pursue  against  France  in  absolute  secrecy  mili- 
tary preparations  which,  as  you  have  seen,  nothing  could 
justify.  For  some  days  past,  and  in  circumstances  difficult 
to  explain,  Germany  had  been  preparing  for  the  transition 
of  her  army  from  a  peace  footing  to  a  war  footing." 

Farther  along  in  the  same  speech  he  enumerated  the 
following  acts  of  hostility  committed  by  Germany  against 
France  on  the  same  day  (July  31)  she  delivered  her  ultima- 
tum to  Russia:  "The  rupture  of  communications  by  road, 
railway,  telegraph  and  telephone,  the  seizure  of  French 
locomotives  on  their  arrival  at  the  frontier,  the  placing  of 
machine  guns  in  the  middle  of  the  permanent  way  which 
had  been  cut,  and  the  concentration  of  troops  on  this  fron- 
tier. From  this  moment  we  were  no  longer  justified  in  be- 
lieving in  the  sincerity  of  the  pacific  declarations  which  the 
German  representative  continued  to  shower  upon  us.  We 
knew  that  Germany  was  mobilizing  under  the  shelter  of 
the  'state  of  danger  of  war.'  We  learned  that  six  classes  of 
reservists  had  been  called  up,  and  that  transport  was  being 
collected  even  for  those  army  corps  which  were  stationed  a 
considerable  distance  from  the  frontier.  As  these  events 
succeeded  one  another,  the  Government,  watchful  and 
vigilant,  took  from  day  to  day,  or  rather  from  hour  to 
hour,  the  precautions  which  the  situation  required;  the 
general  mobilization  of  our  forces  on  land  and  sea  was 
ordered."   (Extracts,  August  4,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  159.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  173 

The  German  Chancellor  gives  a  different  account  of  the 
violation  of  French  territory :  ' '  Concerning  the  one  excep- 
tion I  mentioned,  I  have  received  the  following  report 
from  the  General  Staff :  'As  regards  the  French  complaints 
of  our  crossing  their  frontier,  only  one  case  we  have  to 
acknowledge.  Contrary  to  express  orders  a  patrol  of  the 
14th  Army  Corps,  led,  it  would  seem,  by  an  officer,  crossed 
the  frontier  on  August  2.  It  appears  that  all  were  shot 
except  one  man,  who  returned.  But  long  before  this  iso- 
lated instance  of  crossing  the  frontier  occurred,  French 
aviators  had  dropped  bombs  on  our  railway  tracks  far 
into  southern  Germany,  and  near  the  Schluchtpass  French 
troops  had  made  an  attack  upon  our  frontier  guards.  Our 
troops  have  obeyed  orders  and  merely  defended  them- 
selves.' Such  is  the  report  of  the  General  Staff."  *  (Extract 

1  M.  Jules  Cambon,  in  a  dispatch  which  was  sent  from  Copenhagen 
August  6,  when  the  ambassador  was  returning  to  France,  gives  the  French 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  following  account  of  an  interview  with  the 
German  Secretary  of  State,  Herr  von  Jagow,  relative  to  this  incident: 
"  On  the  morning  of  Monday,  the  3d  of  August,  after  I  had,  in  accordance 
with  your  instructions,  addressed  to  Herr  von  Jagow  a  protest  against  the 
acts  of  aggression  committed  on  French  territory  by  German  troops,  the 
Secretary  of  State  came  to  see  me.  Herr  von  Jagow  came  to  complain  of  acts 
of  aggression  which  he  alleged  had  been  committed  in  Germany,  especially 
at  Nuremberg  and  Coblenz  by  French  aviators,  who  according  to  his  state- 
ment 'had  come  from  Belgium.'  I  answered  that  I  had  not  the  slightest 
information  as  to  the  facts  to  which  he  attached  so  much  importance  and 
the  improbability  of  which  seemed  to  me  obvious;  on  my  part  I  asked  him 
if  he  had  read  the  note  which  I  had  addressed  to  him  with  regard  to  the 
invasion  of  our  territory  by  detachments  of  the  German  army.  As  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  said  that  he  had  not  yet  read  this  note  I  explained  its  con- 
tents to  him.  I  called  his  attention  to  the  act  committed  by  the  officer  com- 
manding one  of  the  detachments  who  had  advanced  to  the  French  village 
of  Joncherey,  ten  kilometres  within  our  frontier,  and  had  blown  out  the 
brains  of  a  French  soldier  whom  he  had  met  there.  After  having  given  my 
opinion  of  this  act  I  added :  '  You  will  admit  that  under  no  circumstances 
could  there  be  any  comparison  between  this  and  the  flight  of  an  aeroplane 
over  foreign  territory  carried  out  by  private  persons  animated  by  that  spirit 
of  daring  for  which  aviators  are  conspicuous. 

"'An  act  of  aggression  committed  on  the  territory  of  a  neighbor  by 
detachments  of  regular  troops  commanded  by  officers  assumes  an  import- 
ance of  quite  a  different  nature.'  [See  also  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  136,  139,  148.] 

"Herr  von  Jagow  explained  to  me  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
facts  of  which  I  was  speaking  to  him,  and  he  added  that  it  was  difficult 


174     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

from  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  speech  in  the 
Reichstag,  August  4,  1914.) 

5.  The  German  ultimatum  to  France 
On  July  31,  M.  Viviani  telegraphed  the  French  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburg:  "The  German  Government  de- 
cided at  mid-day  to  take  all  military  measures  implied  by 
the  condition  known  as  the  '  state  of  danger  of  war.'  In 
communicating  this  decision  to  me  at  7  o'clock  this  even- 
ing, Baron  von  Schoen  added  that  the  Government  was 
at  the  same  time  requiring  that  Russia  demobilize.  If  the 
Russian  Government  does  not  give  a  satisfactory  reply 
within  twelve  hours,  Germany  in  her  turn  will  mobilize.  I 
replied  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  I  had  no  informa- 
tion at  all  about  an  alleged  total  mobilization  of  the  Rus- 
sian army  and  navy  which  the  German  Government  in- 
voked as  the  reason  for  the  new  military  measures  which 
they  are  taking  to-day.  Baron  von  Schoen  finally  asked 
me,  in  the  name  of  his  Government,  what  the  attitude  of 
France  would  be  in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and 
Russia.  He  told  me  that  he  would  come  for  my  reply  to- 
morrow (Saturday)  at  1  o'clock.  I  have  no  intention  of 
making  any  statement  to  him  on  this  subject,  and  I  shall 
confine  myself  to  telling  him  that  France  will  consider  her 
interests.1  The  Government  of  the  Republic  is,  indeed, 

for  events  of  this  kind  not  to  take  place  when  two  armies  filled  with  the 
feelings  which  animated  our  troops  found  themselves  face  to  face  on  either 
side  of  the  frontier."    (Extract,  August  6,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  155.) 

1  An  editorial  in  the  Journal  des  Debats,  Paris,  contains  the  remarks: 
"Under  the  pretext  of  being  at  war  with  Russia,  Germany  called  on  France 
either  to  proclaim  her  neutrality  or  declare  war  on  Germany.  But  when  we 
replied  that  we  would  remain  faithful  to  our  alliance  with  Russia,  Germany 
did  not  officially  follow  up  these  demands.  This  reply  of  ours  disconcerted 
her.  She  wished  us,  in  pursuance  of  our  alliance  with  Russia,  to  declare  war 
on  Germany,  so  that  she  might  say  to  her  own  people  and  to  the  Italian 
Government  that  France  had  been  the  aggressor.  She  wished  at  one  stroke 
to  rouse  public  opinion  in  Germany,  which  seems  much  less  enthusiastic, 
and  to  make  operative  the  casus  foederis  of  the  Italian-German  Alliance." 
(August  4,  1914,  Journal  des  Debats,  "La  ruee  germanique  et  le  devoir  des 
nations.") 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  175 

under  no  obligation  to  give  an  account  of  its  intentions  to 
any  one  except  its  ally.  I  request  you  to  inform  M.  Sazonof 
of  this  immediately.  As  I  have  already  told  you,  I  have  no 
doubt  that  the  Imperial  Government,  in  the  highest  inter- 
ests of  peace,  will  do  everything  on  their  part  to  avoid  any- 
thing that  might  render  a  crisis  inevitable  or  precipitate 
it."   (July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  117.) 

The  German  Chancellor's  instructions  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris  to  make  the  anticipated  demand  were 
as  follows:  'Kindly  ask  the  French  Government  whether 
it  will  remain  neutral  in  a  Russo-German  war.  Answer 
must  come  within  eighteen  hours.  Wire  at  once  hour  that 
inquiry  is  made.  Act  with  the  greatest  possible  dispatch.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  31,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  25.) 

The  Director  of  Political  Affairs  at  the  French  Foreign 
Office,  speaking  the  next  day  of  the  German  demand,  told 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  that, '  although  there  were 
no  differences  at  issue  between  France  and  Germany,  the 
German  Ambassador  had  made  a  menacing  communica- 
tion to  the  French  Government  and  had  requested  an 
answer  the  next  day,  intimating  that  he  would  have  to 
break  off  relations  and  leave  Paris  if  the  reply  were  not 
satisfactory.  The  Ambassador  was  informed  that  the 
French  Government  considered  this  an  extraordinary  pro- 
ceeding. The  German  Ambassador,  who  was  to  see  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  again  that  evening,  had  said 
nothing  about  demanding  his  passports,  but  stated  that  he 
had  packed  up.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  126.)  While  it  is  true  that  a  menacing  tone  for  the 
German  communication  was  unnecessary,  its  general  tenor 
could  hardly  have  occasioned  any  real  surprise,  especially 
in  the  light  of  what  M.  Jules  Cambon  had  said.  So  that 
this  part  of  the  dispatch  seems  meant  more  for  publication 
than  to  convey  any  important  information. 

To  the  repeated  inquiry  of  the  German  Ambassador  as 
to  whether  France  in  case  of  a  Russo-German  war  would 


176     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1911 

remain  neutral,  the  French  Premier  Viviani  made  the  non- 
committal reply  that '  France  would  take  such  action  as  her 
interests  might  require.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1, 
G.  W.  B.  exhibit  27.) 

On  August  1,  M.  Viviani,  in  a  telegram  to  the  French 
Ambassadors,  said : ' '  The  attitude  of  Germany  proves  that 
she  wishes  for  war.  And  she  wishes  for  war  against  France. 
Yesterday  when  Herr  von  Schoen  came  to  the  Quai  d'Or- 
say  to  ask  what  attitude  France  proposed  to  take  in  case 
of  a  Russo-German  conflict,  the  German  Ambassador,  al- 
though there  has  been  no  direct  dispute  between  France 
and  Germany,  and  although  from  the  beginning  of  the 
crisis  we  have  employed  all  our  efforts  for  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion and  are  still  continuing  to  do  so,  added  that  he  asked 
me  to  present  his  respects  and  thanks  to  the  President  of 
the  Republic,  and  asked  that  we  would  be  good  enough 
to  make  arrangements  for  him  personally  (des  dispositions 
pour  sa  propre  personne) ;  we  know  also  that  he  has  already 
provided  for  the  safety  of  the  archives  of  the  Embassy. 
These  indications  of  his  intention  to  break  off  diplomatic 
relations  without  any  direct  dispute,  and  even  though  he 
has  not  received  any  definitely  negative  answer,  are  in  keep- 
ing with  Germany's  determination  to  make  war  against 
France.  The  want  of  sincerity  in  her  peaceful  protesta- 
tions is  shown  by  the  rupture  which  she  is  forcing  upon 
Europe  at  a  time  when  Austria  had  at  last  agreed  to  begin 
negotiations  with  Russia."  (Extract,  August  1,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  120.) 

In  spite  of  what  seemed  the  beginning  of  a  rupture  of 
peaceful  negotiations,  the  German  Ambassador  remained 
at  Paris  some  time  longer.  On  August  3,  he  asked  for 
his  passports.  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  148.)  Germany  in  taking  this 
anomalous  course *  was  probably  influenced  by  the  hope  of 

1  It  is,  indeed,  hard  to  explain  the  reason  why  so  many  ambassadors  re- 
mained at  capitals  of  states  with  which  their  own  states  or  their  allies  were 
at  war.    (Cf.  Bunsen's  Report,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10  [1914].) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  177 

placing  her  action  in  a  more  favorable  light,  especially  in 
regard  to  Italy.  Undoubtedly  any  indignity  offered  to 
the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  would  have  greatly 
strengthened  Germany's  position  with  Italy. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MOBILIZATION 

The  meaning  of  mobilization  —  The  issuance  of  the  order  for  general 
mobilization  —  Intermediate  military  preparations  —  The  fatal  succession 
of  mobilizations. 

1.  The  meaning  of  mobilization 

Mobilization  is  a  system  by  which  a  country  is  enabled 
to  pass  from  its  ordinary  condition  of  peace  into  a  state  of 
full  preparation  for  war.  The  speed  and  order  with  which 
this  operation  can  be  effected  are  the  first  considerations. 
The  rapidity  of  mobilization  is  a  prime  factor  of  the  mili- 
tary strength  of  a  country,  for  whether  the  preparation  be 
for  aggression  or  defense,  the  country  which  can  mobilize 
most  rapidly  will  be  able  to  strike  its  adversary  while  it  is  in 
the  peculiarly  disorganized  condition  incident  upon  mobil- 
ization. The  tremendous  transformation  which  occurs  in  a 
state  passing  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing  is  one  of  the 
most  complex  and  rapid  in  human  society.  It  is  like  some 
of  those  marvelous,  almost  instantaneous,  metamorphoses 
of  the  insect  world.  The  plans  have  been  previously 
worked  out  in  every  detail,  and  each  individual  has  re- 
ceived the  requisite  drill  and  an  individual  copy  of  the 
written  instructions  informing  him  of  the  part  he  is  to 
play.  When  the  order  is  given  by  the  head  of  the  state, 
every  prospective  soldier,  wherever  he  may  be,  knows 
where  to  go.  The  system  depends  upon  every  individual's 
performing  his  part  faithfully  and  expeditiously. 

What  each  state  desires  is  to  escape  all  unnecessary  mili- 
tary burdens  by  reducing  the  number  of  effectives  as  far 
as  possible  in  time  of  peace.  The  more  rapid  and  more 
efficient  the  mobilization,  the  less  extensive,  under  normal 
conditions,  need  be  the  military  preparations  and  burdens. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  179 

Rapidity  of  mobilization,  however,  is  not  easy  to  obtain, 
for  with  every  gain  in  time  goes  a  disproportionate  in- 
crease in  expense,  not  to  speak  of  additional  burdens  put 
upon  the  organizing  faculty  of  the  Government.  It  would 
be  disastrous  to  have  the  system  of  mobilization  break 
down  and  leave  the  country  at  the  mercy  of  a  neighbor 
able  to  complete  his  own  mobilization  in  an  orderly  even 
though  less  rapid  manner. 

The  political  situation  of  each  state  determines  in  gen- 
eral the  military  economy  which  it  will  adopt.  Between 
the  two  great  neighboring  countries,  Russia  and  Germany, 
the  contrast  is  most  striking.  Russia  has  none  of  the  facili- 
ties for  rapid  mobilization.  She  lacks  railways  and  mili- 
tary stores,  and  above  all,  she  has  no  bureaucratic  organi- 
zation sufficiently  perfected  to  mobilize  great  masses  of 
men  with  rapidity.  To  offset  these  disadvantages,  Russia 
has  unlimited  resources  in  good  fighting  men  whom  she  can 
place  in  the  field  without  disorganizing  the  economic  life 
of  the  nation,  and  if  Germany  or  Austria  should,  through 
their  rapidity  in  mobilization  or  any  other  cause,  gain  an 
initial  advantage,  Russia  could  retire  toward  the  interior 
and  oblige  her  adversaries  to  attempt  what  Napoleon 
failed  to  accomplish  —  an  invasion  and  conquest  of  Russia. 
Even  if  successful,  the  invader  could  keep  the  country  in 
subjugation  only  by  an  immense  army  of  occupation.  Just 
as  some  of  the  less  highly  developed  forms  of  life  recover 
from  mutilation  and  continue  their  normal  life,  Russia, 
when  the  invader  had  tired  of  his  efforts  permanently  to 
subjugate  the  country,  would  resume  her  customary  na- 
tional life.  As  a  consequence  of  these  conditions,  Russia 
has  less  reason  to  dread  the  advent  of  war,  for  she  risks 
less  than  the  other  powers. 

In  Germany  we  find  the  exact  antithesis  of  the  condi- 
tions just  described.  Military  organization  and  prepara- 
tion have  been  carried  to  the  highest  point  of  perfection, 
and  the  best  thought  and  effort  of  an  efficient  bureaucracy 


180     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

are  utilized  to  mobilize  and  maintain  the  military  strength 
of  the  country.  Germany  has  a  network  of  strategic  rail- 
ways along  her  frontiers  and  has  worked  out  every  minute 
detail  of  the  plans  for  passing,  in  the  shortest  possible  time, 
from  a  peace  footing  to  complete  armament. 

Since  the  formation  of  the  Dual  Alliance  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  bonds  of  the  Triple  Entente,  Germany 
has  considered  that  her  security  against  a  combination 
overwhelming  in  numbers  lay  in  her  ability  to  complete 
her  mobilization  and  strike  her  adversaries  while  they 
were  still  in  the  disorganized  state  which  necessarily 
accompanies  the  transformation  from  a  peace  footing  to 
that  of  war.  The  French  system,  though  slower  than  that 
of  Germany,  lags  behind  by  a  few  days  only,  so  that  Ger- 
many in  case  of  war  must  lose  no  time  and  strike  her  at 
once  with  irresistible  force,  otherwise  she  would  lose  the 
advantage  of  her  rapidity  of  mobilization.  When  France 
should  have  been  crushed,  Germany  considered  that  she 
would  still  have  time  to  transfer  her  forces  to  her  eastern 
frontier  and  strike  Russia  before  she  had  completed  her 
military  preparations. 

The  danger  of  this  situation  was  not  lost  on  France,  and 
she  well  recognized  that  Germany  intended  to  make  her 
bear  the  brunt  of  any  conflict  which  should  occur  —  make 
her  the ' '  hostage ' '  for  Russia's  good  behavior.  France  might 
have  attempted  to  meet  Germany  on  her  own  ground 
by  developing  plans  for  a  mobilization  equally  rapid,  and 
to  this  result  she  would  have  been  helped  by  the  great 
advantage  she  possesses  in  having  only  one  extent  of 
frontier  open  to  attack,  and  that  relatively  short.  Except 
for  the  Franco-German  boundary  she  is  indeed  secure  from 
attack.  The  Pyrenees  and  the  Alps  cover  all  but  two 
vulnerable  localities  bordering  on  Belgium  and  on  Switzer- 
land, and  the  perpetual  neutralization  of  those  states  con- 
stituted a  barrier  between  herself  and  her  powerful  neigh- 
bor.   Even  if  this  neutralization  should  be  disregarded, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  181 

France  might  count  on  several  days  before  the  German 
forces  could  break  through  to  her  frontier.  Such  a  policy, 
however,  would  have  imposed  burdens  which  the  French 
taxpayers  were  unwilling  to  bear.  Having  no  desire  to 
launch  upon  an  aggressive  policy  of  revenge,  they  felt  that 
the  Dual  Alliance  with  Russia  would  make  Germany  hesi- 
tate before  commencing  an  attack.  Everything  considered, 
the  nation  preferred  to  compromise  and  to  maintain  their 
military  organization  on  such  a  basis  as  to  afford  an  effec- 
tive and  vigorous  resistance  to  Germany,  without  attempt- 
ing to  develop  a  mobilization  and  a  power  of  attack  to 
equal  Germany's.  They  trusted  to  the  skillfully  con- 
structed fortifications  on  their  border  to  delay  the  German 
onslaught  until  the  French  forces  behind  this  barrier 
should  have  completed  their  mobilization.  Of  course,  mil- 
itary authorities  had  to  take  into  consideration  the  possi- 
bility that  Germany  would  not  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  or  Switzerland;  but  in  that  event,  it  was  evident 
that  France  would  almost  certainly  be  able  to  secure  the 
assistance  of  England.  These  various  considerations  were 
responsible  for  the  situation  in  which  we  find  France  upon 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  military  experts  on  neither 
side  of  the  frontier  seem  to  have  realized  how  easy  it  would 
be  for  the  perfected  German  artillery  to  break  down  any 
existing  system  of  fortifications.  When  war  became  inev- 
itable, Germany's  problem  was  then  to  find  some  way, 
before  France  had  mobilized,  of  crushing  her  with  sufficient 
celerity  to  allow  time  to  turn  against  Russia,  before  the 
latter  could  collect  her  forces.  The  solution  which  Ger- 
many adopted  is  bound  up  with  the  question  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  under  which  we  shall  consider  it  more  at  length. 

2.  The  issuance  of  the  order  for  general  mobilization 

The  plans  of  mobilization  adopted  in  the  different  coun- 
tries are,  thanks  to  an  extensive  system  of  espionage, 
known  to  the  general  staffs  of  all  the  European  powers. 


182     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

The  respective  Governments  are  able,  therefore,  to  gauge 
the  time  at  which  a  full  or  partial  mobilization  begins. 
It  is  also  perfectly  well  understood  that,  unless  Germany 
is  willing  to  forego  the  advantage  which  she  derives  from 
her  superior  speed,  she  must  undertake  her  own  mobiliza- 
tion the  moment  either  of  her  neighbors  begins.  But,  as 
soon  as  general  mobilization  has  started,  it  is  not  practi- 
cable to  arrest  it  before  completion,  since  all  the  individ- 
uals withdrawn  from  their  normal  activity  would  have  to 
retrace  their  steps.  While  this  return  to  a  peace  footing 
was  going  on,  and  until  the  country  had  resumed  its  former 
situation,  it  could  not  begin  to  mobilize  again  and  com- 
plete its  preparations  according  to  the  plans  devised,  until 
sufficient  time  had  elapsed  to  return  to  the  peace  footing. 
Consequently,  in  the  interval  elapsing  between  the  mo- 
ment of  arresting  mobilization  and  the  complete  return  to 
the  normal  peace  footing,  the  country  would  be  in  a  most 
vulnerable  condition,  which  would  have  disastrous  conse- 
quences, should  it  be  the  object  of  attack.  When,  there- 
fore, the  mobilization  decree  had  once  been  issued  and 
the  preparations  had  begun  to  run  their  course,  Germany 
could  no  longer  delay,  but  would  have  to  strike  at  France 
before  the  latter  had  finished  her  mobilization.  In  other 
words,  from  the  moment  France  or  Germany  issues  a  de- 
cree for  general  mobilization,  it  might  be  regarded  that 
war  was  almost  as  certain  as  though  a  formal  declaration 
had  been  made;1  and  when  Germany  felt  that  she  was 
confronted  by  the  danger  of  a  Franco-Russian  coalition 
against  her,  she  considered  that  her  only  feasible  plan  of 
campaign  consisted,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  in  attempt- 
ing to  crush  France  before  Russia  should  have  completed 
her  mobilization.2 

1  Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  50. 

2  In  this  discussion  I  am  explaining  the  military  situation  and  basing 
conclusions  on  strategic  considerations  alone.  There  are  other  practical 
considerations  of  great  weight  which  might  have  deterred  Germany  from 
threatening  France  even  if  France  would  not  agree  to  remain  neutral. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  183 

This  situation  makes  it  necessary,  from  the  moment 
that  a  conflict  with  Russia  is  inevitable,  that  Germany 
should  have  an  assurance  from  France  that  she  will  re- 
main neutral,  failing  which  Germany  must  without  delay 
declare  war  against  her.  This  is  a  very  inconvenient  situa- 
tion for  Germany,  for  it  forces  upon  her  the  appearance 
of  being  the  aggressor  against  France  whenever  her  own 
mobilization  is  necessitated  by  Russia's  military  prepara- 
tions. 

It  is  evident  from  this  review  of  the  military  situation  of 
the  Continental  powers  that  the  decree  for  general  mobil- 
ization on  the  part  of  any  one  of  them  must,  because  of  the 
system  of  alliances,  make  almost  certain  a  general  Euro- 
pean conflict.  This  important  fact  gives  us  the  explanation 
why  the  diplomatic  negotiations  preceding  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war  are  so  intimately  related  with  the  question 
of  mobilization. 

3.  Intermediate  military  preparations 

The  country  which  was  able  to  make  the  most  extensive 
preparations  without  the  conspicuously  hostile  act  of  issu- 
ing a  decree  of  general  mobilization  would  gain  a  consider- 
able advantage  from  this  priority  of  its  military  prepara- 
tions. The  operations  of  mobilization  being  so  extensive 
and  so  interrelated  with  every  activity  of  the  community, 
it  is  naturally  very  difficult  to  specify  just  where  the 
maintenance  of  the  normal  military  strength  ceases  and 
immediate  preparation  for  war  begins.  For  instance,  the 
purchase  of  supplies  and  draft  animals  is  a  very  important 
factor  in  putting  a  country  on  a  war  footing,  yet,  unaccom- 
panied by  mobilization  of  troops,  it  in  no  way  constitutes 
a  menace  for  a  neighboring  state.  In  a  time  of  tension,  the 
various  efforts  made  to  strengthen  the  military,  financial, 
and  economic  condition  of  the  country  are  apt  to  be  inter- 
preted as  indicating  an  intention  to  have  recourse  to  arms, 
and  these  suspicions  stimulate  similar  military  prepara- 


184     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

tions  on  the  other  side.  Worst  of  all,  this  distrust  is 
magnified  by  the  efforts  of  each  Government  to  conceal 
whatever  preparations  it  thinks  expedient  to  undertake. 
It  is  very  possible  that  the  difficulty  of  gauging  exactly 
what  was  occurring  in  Russia  caused  Germany  to  use  such 
vigorous  language  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment might  well  consider  the  threatening  tone  of  the 
German  remonstrance  as  an  indication  of  a  hostile  atti- 
tude. The  distrust  between  France  and  Germany  reached 
its  culmination  when  Germany  declared  Kriegsgefahrzu- 
stand.  Although  the  German  Chancellor  was  careful  to 
explain  that  this  did  not  constitute  mobilization,  the 
French  Premier  declared  that  it  made  it  possible  to  effect 
important  military  preparations  which  appertained  to 
mobilization.  The  French  Premier,  M.  Viviani,  said  in  his 
speech  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  August  4:  "We 
knew  that  Germany  was  mobilizing  under  cover  of  the 
'state  of  danger  of  war'  [Kriegsgefahrzustand].  We  learned 
that  six  classes  of  reservists  had  been  called  up  and  that 
transport  was  being  collected  even  for  those  army  corps 
which  were  stationed  a  considerable  distance  from  the 
frontier."  (Extract,  August  4,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  159.)  On  the 
other  hand,  these  assertions  were  contradicted  by  the  Ger- 
man authorities.  No  doubt  it  was  impossible  for  Germany 
to  place  herself  on  a  war  footing  before  the  issuance  of  the 
mobilization  decree,  though  she  could  mass  the  troops 
already  under  arms  wherever  she  considered  it  advanta- 
geous. 

4-  The  fatal  succession  of  mobilizations 

We  can  now  sum  up  and  apply  what  has  been  said  about 
mobilization  to  the  situation  just  prior  to  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war.  As  a  result  of  actual,  suspected,  and  an- 
ticipated mobilizations,  Germany  and  Russia  had  been 
brought  to  the  brink  of  war.  The  hope  of  preserving  peace 
was  gone.   The  contagion  of  "mobilitis"  had  overspread 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  185 

all  Europe  and  threatened  to  traverse  the  English  Channel 
as  well. 

To  understand  this  situation,  the  first  and  fundamental 
consideration  to  keep  in  view  is  that  Germany,  having,  as 
the  German  Secretary  later  told  the  British  Ambassador, 
the  speed,  would  not  be  likely  to  allow  this  advantage  to 
escape  her.  Even  if  the  German  Government  sincerely 
desired  peace,  the  principal  hope  of  success,  as  soon  as 
war  appeared  likely  or  inevitable,  lay  in  taking  advantage 
of  her  wonderfully  perfected  plans  for  mobilization,  and 
striking  before  her  adversaries  should  be  ready.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  138.) 

It  is  evident  that  this  facility  of  striking  before  there  had 
been  time  to  organize  resistance  might  be  as  important  for 
German  success  as  it  would  be  to  double  the  reserves  upon 
which  she  could  draw.  Germany  has  always  looked  upon 
this  speed  in  mobilizing  as  her  greatest  military  asset, 
and  has  never  felt  that  she  could  allow  it  to  be  taken  from 
her.  Hence,  —  and  mark  it  well,  —  the  moment  she  per- 
ceives mobilization  has  been  begun  by  either  of  her  neigh- 
bors, Russia  or  France,  she  may  be  expected  to  insist  that 
it  be  arrested,  and  if  her  demand  is  not  immediately  ac- 
quiesced in,  she  is  almost  certain  to  declare  war  with  all 
dispatch.  Otherwise  every  hour's  delay  will  put  her  more 
and  more  at  a  disadvantage.  To  allow  either  Russia  or 
France  to  commence,  continue,  and  complete  mobilization 
would  have  bereft  Germany  of  half  her  strength. 

The  second  important  consideration  to  bear  in  mind  is 
that  Germany,  when  confronted  with  a  war  against  Rus- 
sia and  France  combined,  could  count  upon  three  to  five 
weeks  before  Russia  could  complete  her  mobilization, 
which  would  leave  Germany  ample  time  to  strike  France 
before  Russia  could  complete  her  preparations,  and  if  suc- 
cessful in  crushing  her,  transport  the  German  troops  to  the 
eastern  frontier  to  attack  Russia.1  All  the  diplomats  at  the 

1  It  seems  from  the  reports  received  that  Russia  succeeded  in  mobilizing 


186     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

various  capitals  thoroughly  understood  this  situation,  for 
it  had  been  obvious  to  Europe  for  years.  Therefore  Russia 
was  perfectly  aware  that  her  mobilization  against  Austria 
might  bring  on  a  general  European  war.1  On  the  other 
hand,  assuming  that  Russia  did  not  have  such  a  purpose,  if 
she  remained  quiescent,  she  feared  that  Austria  would  take 
advantage  of  the  situation  to  settle  affairs  with  Servia  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  by  imposing  condi- 
tions entirely  unacceptable  to  St.  Petersburg. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  had  recognized  the  course  which  Rus- 
sia must  pursue  when  he  declared,  on  July  25,  that  'the 
sudden,  brusque,  and  peremptory  character  of  the  Aus- 
trian demand  made  it  almost  inevitable  that  in  a  very 
short  time  both  Russia  and  Austria  would  have  mobilized 
against  each  other.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  24.)  But  this  did  not  prevent  the  British  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg  from  expressing  to  M.  Sazonof  the  hope 
that  'the  Russian  Government  would  defer  the  mobiliza- 
tion ukase  as  long  as  possible,  and  not  allow  troops  to 
cross  the  frontier  even  when  it  was  issued.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  44.) 

In  the  dilemma  in  which  Russia  found  herself,  she  tried  I 
first  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  mobilizing  at  all  by  making  ; 
it  perfectly  clear  that  she  would  mobilize  as  soon  as  Aus- 
tria attacked  Servia.   The  powers  could  not  consider  this  \ 
anything  more  than  justifiable  action  to  maintain  her 
right  to  be  consulted  in  the  settlement  of  all  Balkan  affairs^i 
As  was  expected,  the  powers  did  their  best  to  restrain 
Austria,  even  Germany  acquiescing  to  a  certain  degree  in 
the  representations  made  at  Vienna.  When,  nevertheless, 
on  July  28,  Austria  partially  mobilized  (R.  0.  P.  no.  47), 
as  she  declared,  for  an  attack  upon  Servia,  Russia  con- 
sidered the  mobilization  as  directed  against  herself  and 

more  quickly  than  was  expected.    See  Professor  Hans  Delbriick:  "Ger- 
many's Answer,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1915. 
1  Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  67,  101. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  187 

felt  that  she  must  take  action.  In  the  hope  of  not  alarming 
Germany  and  causing  her  to  make  a  counter-move,  Russia 
announced,  July  29,  that  she  would  mobilize  her  four 
southern  districts  lying  in  the  direction  of  the  Austrian 
frontier.  (G.  W.  B.  Memorandum,  p.  9;  R.  0.  P.  no.  49.) 
Thereupon  Germany,  instigated  by  Austria  (A.  R.  B.  nos. 
42,  48),  declared  Russia's  action  unjustifiable,  since  Aus- 
tria's mobilization  was  itself  undertaken  only  in  reply  to 
Servian  mobilization  (R.  O.  P.  no.  51).  Von  Jagow,  German 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  told  Sir  Edward  Gos- 
chen,  two  days  before,  that  'if  Russia  mobilized  only  in  the 
south,  Germany  would  not  mobilize,  but  he  added  that 
the  Russian  system  of  mobilization  was  so  complicated 
that  it  might  be  difficult  exactly  to  locate  her  mobilization, 
and  that  Germany  would  therefore  have  to  be  very  careful 
not  to  be  taken  by  surprise.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  43.)  When  Germany,  however,  learned  of 
Russia's  mobilization  in  the  south  against  Austria,  she 
notified  Russia  of  her  intention  to  mobilize  if  Russia  did 
not  arrest  her  military  preparation.  This  threat,  instead 
of  deterring  Russia,  only  made  her  the  more  anxious  to 
hasten  her  preparation  to  complete  her  armament.  (July 
29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  58.) 

Meantime  each  Government  had  been  laying  at  the  door 
of  another  the  blame  for  its  own  preparations.  Russia 
blamed  Austria  (R.  0.  P.  no.  51) ;  Austria  blamed  Servia 
(R.  0.  P.  no.  51) ;  and  Germany  blamed  Russia  and  France 
(July  30,  B.  W.  P.  nos.  96  and  98).  Each  in  turn  explained 
or  denied  the  truth  of  the  accusations  in  regard  to  its  own 
preparations,  but  was  unshaken  in  assertions  regarding 
the  mobilization  of  its  neighbors.  Out  of  this  confusion  of 
accusation  and  counter-accusation  one  fact  was  clear,  that 
whoever  might  be  at  fault,  Europe  on  a  slippery  incline  was 
quickly  sliding  into  war,  and  yet  who  wanted  war?  Vienna, 
perhaps,  was  enthusiastic  for  a  campaign  against  Servia, 
and  at  Berlin,  too,  "Geht's  los?"  was  asked  on  all  sides 


188     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

amid  suppressed  excitement,  when  the  relations  with 
Russia  became  strained.  But  all  through  Germany  the 
people  were  praying  for  peace.1  A  vote  of  the  whole  Aus- 
trian people  would  almost  certainly  have  been  overwhelm- 
ingly against  war.  Even  the  German  officials  admitted 
that  France  did  not  want  war.  England  was  doing  every- 
thing to  prevent  it.  And  all  the  time  Europe  was  sliding 
down  the  incline  faster  and  faster,  to  be  engulfed  in  war. 
To  her  statesmen  and  diplomats  alone  she  looked  to  save 
her.  First  they  had  tried  to  prevent  the  counter-mobiliza- 
tions by  restraining  Servia,  but  in  the  face  of  Austria's 
note  and  her  openly  avowed  intention  to  chastise  Servia,  it 
was  impossible  to  forbid  Servia' s  doing  what  she  could  to 
defend  herself,  and  when  she  mobilized,  the  diplomats 
could  not,  without  the  aid  of  Germany,  interfere  to  re- 
strain Austria.  The  eight  army  corps  which  she  mobilized 
were  not,  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  remarked,  excessive  against 
400,000  Servians.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  110.) 

Once  Austria  had  mobilized  these  eight  army  corps,  the 
next  move  was  Russia's.  Would  she  reply  in  such  a  way 
as  to  bring  in  Germany?  Europe  was  in  suspense.  In  1908, 
Servia  had  been  left  unassisted,  and  had  had  to  agree  to 
the  declaration  of  March  31,  1909,  for  Russia  had  re- 
ceived no  encouragement  from  France  or  England,  while 
her  recent  experience  in  the  Far  East  in  the  war  against 
Japan  had  made  her  cautious.  Now,  however,  she  de- 
clared that  she  would  not  submit  to  Austrian  dictation 
again  as  meekly  as  she  had  then  done.  Had  she  again  been 
as  complaisant,  the  bipartisan  Austro-Russian  direction  of 
Balkan  affairs  would  have  been  replaced  by  an  Austrian 
hegemony,  and  Russia's  prestige  as  a  great  power  would 
have  suffered.    So  France  and  England,  anxious  as  they 

1  When  we  say  Germany  wanted  war  or  Germany  wanted  peace,  we 
have'  to  define  what  we  mean  by  "  Germany"  and  what  we  mean  by 
"  wanted."  Every  one  wants  peace  if  he  can  have  peace  on  his  own  terms. 
Nine  tenths  of  the  people  might  want  peace,  yet  in  a  time  of  crisis  it  is  the 
great  cities  that  are  taken  as  the  interpreters  of  public  opinion. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  189 

were  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe,  could  not  advise 
Russia  to  remain  quiescent  while  Austria  worked  her  will 
upon  Servia.  As  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  London,  on  July  23,  i  the  amount  of  influence 
that  could  be  used  at  St.  Petersburg  on  behalf  of  patience 
and  moderation  would  depend  upon  how  reasonable  were 
the  Austrian  demands  and  how  strong  the  justification 
that  Austria  might  have  discovered  for  making  her  de- 
mands.' (Modified  quotation,  July  23,  B.  W.  P.  no.  3.) 
When,  however,  the  astonished  diplomats  learned  the 
nature  of  Austria's  demands,  which  she  presented  without 
having  allowed  them  to  examine  the  evidence  in  support 
of  her  assertions,  Sir  Edward  Grey  expressed  the  general 
opinion  of  the  less  interested  powers,  in  the  remarks  he  said 
he  purposed  to  make  to  the  German  Ambassador,  that  'he 
felt  that,  if  Russia  took  the  view  of  the  ultimatum  which  it 
seemed  to  him  that  any  power  interested  in  Servia  would 
take,  he  should  be  quite  powerless,  in  the  face  of  the  terms 
of  the  ultimatum,  to  exercise  any  moderating  influence  at 
St.  Petersburg  in  accordance  with  Prince  Lichnowsky's 
request  made  privately  some  days  before.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.)  From  St.  Peters- 
burg the  British  Ambassador  reported  that  '  France  and 
Russia  were  determined  to  make  a  strong  stand.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  6.)  Nevertheless,  the 
British  Ambassador  did  express  to  M.  Sazonof  the  earnest 
hope  that '  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war  by  mobilizing 
until  Sir  Edward  had  had  time  to  use  his  influence  in  favor 
of  peace.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 
If  Russia  had  really  wanted  war,  she  found  it  obligingly 
thrust  upon  her  in  accordance  with  the  famous  recipe  of 
Bismarck.1   That  she  did  not,  however,  want  war,  we  have 

1  "I  have  always  opposed  the  theory  which  says  'Yes';  not  only  at  the 
Luxemburg  period,  but  likewise  subsequently  for  twenty  years,  in  the  con- 
viction that  even  victorious  wars  cannot  be  justified  unless  they  are  forced 
upon  one,  and  that  one  cannot  see  the  cards  of  Providence  far  enough  ahead 


190     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

as  evidence  the  expressed  opinion  of  high  German  offi- 
cials x  and  the  consensus  of  public  opinion  throughout 
the  world;  but  whether  she  wished  for  war  or  hoped  to 
avoid  it,  her  move  in  reply  to  Austria  seemed  forced  upon 
her.  She  felt  that  she  must  make  evident  the  sincerity  of 
her  intentions  to  protect  her  vital  interests  in  the  Balkans 
by  mobilizing  (July  29)  her  four  southern  districts  in  reply 
to  Austria.  (G.  W.  B.  Memorandum,  p.  9;  R.  O.  P.  no. 
49.)  This  move  put  an  end  to  Austria's  hope  of  being 

to  anticipate  historical  development  according  to  one's  own  calculation.  It 
is  natural  that  in  the  staff  of  the  army  not  only  younger  active  officers,  but 
likewise  experienced  strategists,  should  feel  the  need  of  turning  to  account 
the  efficiency  of  the  troops  led  by  them,  and  their  own  capacity  to  lead,  and 
of  making  them  prominent  in  history.  It  would  be  a  matter  of  regret  if  this 
effect  of  the  military  spirit  did  not  exist  in  the  army;  the  task  of  keeping  its 
results  within  such  limits  as  the  nation's  need  of  peace  can  justly  claim  is  the 
duty  of  the  political,  not  the  military,  heads  of  the  state.  That  at  the  time 
of  the  Luxemburg  question,  during  the  crisis  of  1875,  invented  by  Gortchak- 
off  and  France,  and  even  down  to  the  most  recent  times,  the  staff  and  its 
leaders  have  allowed  themselves  to  be  led  astray  and  to  endanger  peace,  lies 
in  the  very  spirit  of  the  institution,  which  I  would  not  forego.  It  only  be- 
comes dangerous  under  a  monarch  whose  policy  lacks  sense  of  proportion 
and  power  to  resist  one-sided  and  constitutionally  unjustifiable  influences." 
(Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman;  being  the  Reflections  and  Reminis- 
cences of  Otto  Prince  von  Bismarck,  Written  and  Dictated  by  Himself  after  his 
Retirement  from  Office.  Translated  by  A.  J.  Butler.  Vol.  u,  pp.  101  and  102. 
London,  1898.) 

Cf .  also  what  Bismarck  said  in  1888 :  — 

"This  was  in  1866,  and  in  1867  the  Luxemburg  problem  arose,  when  only 
a  somewhat  firmer  reply  was  needed  to  bring  about  the  great  French  war 
in  that  year,  —  and  we  might  have  given  it,  if  we  had  been  so  strong  that 
we  could  have  counted  on  success.  From  then  on,  during  1868,  1869,  and 
up  to  1870  we  were  living  in  constant  apprehension  of  war,  and  of  the  agree- 
ments which  in  the  time  of  Mr.  von  Beust  were  being  made  in  Salzburg  and 
other  places  between  France,  Italy,  and  Austria,  and  which,  we  feared, 
were  directed  against  us.  The  apprehension  of  war  was  so  great  at  that 
time  that  I  received  calls  —  I  was  the  president  of  the  Cabinet  —  from 
merchants  and  manufacturers,  who  said :  '  The  uncertainty  is  unbearable. 
Why  don't  you  strike  the  first  blow?  War  is  preferable  to  this  continued 
damper  on  all  business! '  We  waited  quietly  until  we  were  struck,  and  I  be- 
lieve we  did  well  to  arrange  matters  so  that  we  were  the  nation  which  was 
assailed  and  were  not  ourselves  the  assailants."  (Extract  from  Speech  of 
Bismarck,  February  6,  1888,  from  What  Germany  Wants,  by  Edmund  von 
Mach,  pp.  92,  93.  See  also  Bismarck's  Speech,  chap,  xill.) 

1  At  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  crisis,  Germany  expressed  this  opinion. 
Cf.  also  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  50,  96. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  191 

permitted  to  deal  with  Servia  without  interference,  and 
made  the  situation  at  once  most  critical. 

As  soon  as  Russia  had  mobilized,  and  Austria  had  re- 
plied by  extending  her  mobilization  to  Galicia  it  was  Ger- 
many's turn  to  move.  Von  Jagow,  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  declared  on  July  27,  that 
Germany  would  not  mobilize  so  long  as  Russia  mobilized 
only  against  Austria;  that  is  to  say,  only  in  the  south  (B. 
W.  P.  no.  43).  It  must  be  observed  that  if  Germany  had 
wanted  a  general  war  from  the  start,  she  would  never  have 
allowed  Russia  to  begin  even  partial  mobilization,  even 
against  Austria  alone.  The  statement  of  Von  Jagow  above 
referred  to  is  one  of  the  strongest  proofs  that  the  German 
Foreign  Office  hoped  to  avoid  war.  If  she  had  insisted  that 
no  move  toward  mobilization  should  be  made  by  either 
Russia  or  France  as  long  as  Germany  herself  took  no  action, 
she  would  have  forced  at  once  the  issue  of  war,  or  an  agree- 
ment to  allow  Austria  to  deal  directly  with  Servia.  Pos- 
sibly she  was  restrained  from  taking  this  stand  by  the  fear 
that  such  action  would  seem  so  unreasonable  as  to  make 
it  appear  that  Germany  was  claiming  the  right  to  dictate 
to  Europe.  Germany  would  realize  that  such  a  pretense  to 
a  Teutonic  hegemony  of  Europe  would  rally  England  to 
the  support  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  balance  of  power.  Whatever  the  reason,  Germany, 
though  she  blamed  Russia  for  her  unwarranted  move  and 
denied  that  Austria  had  furnished  any  motive,  did  not  at 
first  make  Russia's  mobilization  in  the  south  a  casus  belli. 
Germany  had  previously  warned  Russia  that  the  German 
Government  would  have  to  be  very  careful  not  to  be  taken 
by  surprise. 

On  July  29,  Germany  notified  Russia  of  her  intention  of 
mobilizing  if  Russia  did  not  stop  her  military  preparation. 
(July  29,  R.  0.  P.  no.  58.)  Again  it  was  Russia's  move. 
She  might,  perhaps,  have  made  a  conciliatory  reply  to 
Germany.  Consider,  however,  that  if  Russia  had  not  been 


192     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

making  the  preparations  Germany  accused  her  of,  she 
doubtless  would  think  Germany,  in  making  this  unfounded 
charge,  was  looking  for  a  pretext  to  declare  war,  and  must 
have  considered  it  necessary  to  redouble  her  efforts  to 
prepare  for  the  conflict.  As  M.  Sazonof  said  in  his  an- 
nouncement respecting  the  events  leading  up  to  the  war: 
".The  failure_Qf  mir  proposals  for  peace  compelled  us  to 
fwf^rjirj_thg_sr!npft  of  our  prpr.fl.nt.ionary  measures.' ?  (Ex- 
tract, August  2,  R.  O.  P.  no.  77.)  Almost  immediately 
after  this,  Germany  began  to  complain  that  Russia  was 
also  mobilizing  along  the  German  frontier,  and  she  was 
troubled  by  the  reports  received  from  France  and  Russia. 
Even  if  the  sincerity  of  these  reports  should  be  questioned 
and  later  found  unsubstantiated,  the  important  point  to 
note  was  their  great  significance  as  indicating  on  Ger- 
many's part  either  a  belief  that  war  was  inevitable  or  an 
intention  to  make  it  so. 

According  to  the  dispatch  of  the  Belgian  Minister  at 
St.  Petersburg,  dated  July  30,  and  published  in  the  Ger- 
man White  Book  (German  Edition,  exhibit  28)  there  had 
been  a  difference  of  opinion  in  the  meeting  of  the  Minis- 
terial Council  which  took  place  at  an  early  hour  July  29, 
and  this  difference  had  caused  the  postponement  of  mobil- 
ization. Since  then,  however,  there  had  been  a  change  of 
sentiment  due  to  the  belief  that  England  would  certainly 
support  France.  This  conviction  that  England  could  be 
relied  upon  to  support  the  Entente  had,  according  to  the 
Belgian  Minister,  given  the  war  party  the  upper  hand,  and 
early  July  30  (4  a.m.)  the  general  mobilization  of  the  Rus- 
sian forces  was  announced.1 

1  M.  P.  Price  in  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War  (Scribner's :  1914, 
p.  103),  sums  up  the  results  of  his  very  careful  and  impartial  examination 
of  the  documents  and  other  sources  of  information  relative  to  Russia's 
Mobilization  as  follows:  — 

"Stated  concisely,  the  decision  of  Russia  to  mobilize  partially  was  taken 
on  the  24th,  directly  after  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia.  This  was  confirmed 
on  the  25th,  and  during  the  week-end  all  military  preparations  except  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  193 

The  next  day,  July  31,  Germany  declared  Kriegsge- 
fahrzustand,  demanded  of  France  what  she  intended  to 
do,  and  delivered  her  ultimatum  to  Russia.  On  August  1, 
Germany  and  Russia  were  in  a  state  of  war. 

If  Russia,  prior  to  the  issuance  of  her  mobilization  order, 
really  made  the  preparations  against  which  Germany  pro- 
tested, the  reason  must  have  been  either  that  Russia 
wanted  war  or  else  that  she  was  convinced  that  Germany 
was  preparing  to  force  the  issue.  In  a  situation  like  that, 
if  either  Russia  or  Germany  wanted  war,  it  would  have 
been  most  difficult  to  have  avoided  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
neither  really  wanted  to  precipitate  the  conflict,  there 
was  room  for  the  mediation  of  a  friend  of  both  parties. 
England  and  Italy,  though  deeply  interested  and  to  a 
certain  degree  partisan,  were  nevertheless  the  only  great 
powers  that  were  not  immediately  involved.  Hence  they 
alone  were  able  to  offer  some  assistance.  Even  though 
Russia  or  Germany,  one  or  both  of  them,  were  intent  upon 
war,  a  possible  way  out  might  have  been  found  if  Italy  and 
England  had  been  willing  to  commit  themselves  either 
singly  or  conjointly  by  saying  at  this  last  moment  to  Rus- 
sia: "Demobilize  or  at  least  arrest  your  preparations,  and 
we  will  guarantee  an  adequate  consideration  for  your 
interests  and  for  the  protection  of  the  independence  of 

calling  up  of  reservists  were  made,  and  partial  mobilization  orders  signed 
but  not  issued.  In  spite  of  rumors  there  is  no  direct  evidence  that  reser- 
vists were  on  the  move  on  Monday  the  27th.  On  the  28th  several  corres- 
pondents agree  that  mobilization  was  in  progress,  but  that  it  was  partial, 
and  one  definite  statement  comes  from  Reuter  that  a  partial  mobilization 
order  was  issued  on  the  night  of  the  28th.  On  the  29th  it  was  officially 
announced,  and  all  through  this  day  proceeded  steadily.  Rumors  grew 
that  the  districts  on  the  German  frontier  were  being  affected,  but  we  have 
only  one  definite  statement  to  this  effect  from  the  Temps  on  the  29th,  and 
two  other  less  definite  ones.  On  the  30th,  late,  a  general  mobilization  order 
was  issued,  thus  bringing  officially  the  whole  military  machinery  of  the 
Empire  into  action.  It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  Russia  began  to  put 
her  army  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing  early  in  the  week  that  preceded  the 
outbreak  of  the  general  European  war,  gradually  extending  the  operations 
till  by  the  31st  the  whole  machinery  was  in  progress." 


194     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Servia  in  any  settlement  which  may  result.  Otherwise  we 
will  join  Germany  against  you.  We  insist  that  Germany 
also  arrest  her  preparations  and  come  into  a  conference 
to  settle  the  Austro-Servian  question,  unless  Russia  and 
Austria  can  settle  their  differences  by  direct  negotiations 
according  to  the  usual  method!" 

Looking  back,  we  can  see  that  a  firm  stand  taken  by 
England  and  Italy  at  this  eleventh  hour  might  possibly 
have  avoided  the  conflict,  but  independent  countries  are 
not  willing  to  involve  themselves  to  such  a  degree  and  make 
it  very  likely  that  they  will  be  drawn  into  a  war,  the  pri- 
mary cause  of  which  did  not  in  the  slightest  interest  them. 
What  could  Sir  Edward  Grey  have  said  to  the  British 
Cabinet,  and  the  Cabinet  to  Parliament,  if  by  acting  with 
sufficient  promptness  he  had  thus  involved  England  in 
a  war?  It  is  just  possible  that  the  country  might  have 
disavowed  him  and  refused  to  follow  such  an  adventur- 
ous policy;  and  when  Germany  had  firmly  declared  that 
Austria  must  be  left  to  settle  the  Austro-Servian  dispute 
without  interference,  would  she  have  backed  down  before 
a  threat?  And  if  she  had  consented,  while  Russia  refused, 
we  should  have  been  treated  to  the  anomalous  spectacle  of 
Germany  and  England  combined  against  France  and  Rus- 
sia to  humble  them  after  they  had  made  every  reasonable 
effort  to  preserve  the  peace  threatened  by  the  uncompro- 
mising stand  of  Austria,  backed  by  Germany.  We  may, 
then,  I  think,  conclude  that  at  this  last  moment  nothing 
could  have  been  done  to  intervene  between  Germany 
and  Russia  to  break  the  fateful  chain  of  mobilizations;  and 
so,  uninterrupted,  the  mobilizations  and  the  futile  nego- 
tiations accompanying  them  must  needs  proceed  to  their 
termination. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  CONCERT 

European  diplomacy  in  the  Balkans  —  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposes  a  con- 
ference of  the  powers  —  Germany  makes  objection  to  mediation  —  Russia 
proposes  to  Austria  to  enter  upon  "conversations"  —  The  powers  employ 
their  good  offices  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  —  Efforts  to  discover  a 
formula  for  mediation  —  Germany  asked  to  "press  the  button"  —  The 
San  Giuliano  suggestion  for  mediation  upon  Servia's  unconditional  accept- 
ance of  the  ultimatum  —  The  Cambon  suggestion  of  mediation  after  Aus- 
tria's occupation  of  Belgrade — The  Grey  proposal  for  a  collective  guaranty 
of  the  powers  —  Germany  asks  Russia  to  propose  a  formula  —  Austria 
agrees  to  mediation  —  The  failure  to  reach  a  compromise. 

1.  European  diplomacy  in  the  Balkans 

The  ordinary  course  of  procedure,  when  a  diplomatic 
difficulty  has  arisen  in  Europe,  has  been  to  submit  it  form- 
ally or  informally  to  a  conference  of  the  powers.  This  has 
been  the  usual  method  followed  since  the  establishment  of 
the  Concert  of  Europe  after  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon. 
In  the  course  of  the  last  hundred  years,  the  powers  have 
taken  counsel  together  from  time  to  time  to  avoid  recourse 
to  arms;  and  this  method  of  procedure  has  been  consid- 
ered as  peculiarly  appropriate  whenever  affairs  of  the  Near 
East  were  concerned.  Up  to  very  recent  years,  the  rivalry 
of  England  and  Russia  was  focused  in  the  Balkans,  and  all 
the  threads  of  European  politics  were  gathered  at  Constan- 
tinople ;  but  Russia  was  weakened  as  a  result  of  her  war  with 
Japan,  and  Turkey's  affiliation  with  the  Triple  Alliance 
enabled  her  to  check  any  Muscovite  designs  upon  her  capi- 
tal. These  modifications  in  the  political  situation  relieved 
England  of  the  burden  of  checking  Russian  advance  on  Con- 
stantinople. British  statesmen  could  likewise  count  upon 
the  Balkan  States  and  Russia  to  thwart  any  designs  Ger- 
many's ally,  Austria,  might  have  on  Turkish  territory,  more 
particularly  on  Salonika.  England  felt  sure,  in  the  presence 


196     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

of  the  balanced  rivalries  and  immediately  conflicting  inter- 
ests of  Austria  and  Russia,  that  the  balance  in  the  Balkans 
would  be  maintained.  Her  diplomatic  intervention  could 
always  be  counted  upon  to  prevent  either  Austria  or  Rus- 
sia from  acquiring  too  great  an  advantage,  but  England 
could  be  expected  to  keep  her  hands  off  unless  the  influence 
of  either  seemed  likely  to  become  predominant.  This  trans- 
formation and  substitution  of  a  bipartisan  Austro-Russian 
supervision  of  Balkan  affairs,  in  place  of  the  time-honored 
Concert  of  European  Powers,  explains  in  part  why  the  last 
Balkan  War  was  undertaken  in  open  defiance  of  the  pow- 
ers. The  Balkan  States  found  it  possible  to  get  between 
Austria  and  Russia.1  England  made  an  attempt,  it  is  true, 
to  prevent  that  conflict,  fearing  that  it  might  cause  a  gen- 
eral European  war,  but  when  it  resulted  in  the  disruption 
of  Turkey  by  the  other  Balkan  powers,  the  new  situation 
must  have  fallen  in  marvelously  with  her  plans,  for  the  out- 
come of  it  was  the  creation  of  stronger  Balkan  States  able 
to  offer  some  resistance  to  either  Russia  or  Austria  and  to 
prevent  a  possible  Austro-Russian  partition  of  the  pen- 
insula. Besides,  the  weakening  of  Turkey  had  left  her  less 
valuable  as  an  ally  to  Germany.  Thenceforth  the  strength- 
ening of  the  international  control  and  protection  of  Con- 
stantinople would  be  more  necessary  than  ever  to  the  Turk 
to  resist  the  ambitious  designs  of  his  neighbors.  Hence, 
England,  wishing  to  maintain  this  condition,  was  not  will- 
ing to  take  part  in  a  collective  effort  to  force  the  Balkan 
States  to  disgorge.  As  a  result  of  these  changes,  England, 
having  no  longer  the  same  immediate  concern  in  Balkan 
questions,  preferred  to  economize  her  efforts  by  leaving 
them  to  the  obviously  inefficient  bipartisan  control  of 
Austria  and  Russia.  The  recognition  of  this  system  as  part 
of  the  European  political  situation  explains  the  lack  of  in- 

1  In  reality  Russia  sympathized  with  the  Allies,  though  she  continued  to 
cooperate  with  the  other  great  powers.  This  explains  why  the  Balkan 
States  were  not  interfered  with. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  197 

terest  that  England  took  in  the  events  preceding  the  pre- 
sentation of  the  Austrian  ultimatum.1  Even  as  early  as 
the  first  week  in  July,  it  was  recognized  by  the  public  in 
Austria-Hungary,  and  conceded  in  government  circles 
elsewhere,  that  the  assassination  of  Franz  Ferdinand  must 
inevitably  result  in  some  action  against  Servia.  The  unex- 
pected harshness  of  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
at  once  made  it  evident  that  Austria  intended  to  break 
with  the  policy  of  bipartisan  control  of  Balkan  questions, 
at  least  as  far  as  Servia  was  concerned.  The  danger  of  a 
general  war  at  once  loomed  up  threateningly. 

In  their  efforts  to  preserve  peace,  the  corps  of  diplomats, 
like  an  army,  took  up  the  simultaneous  defense  of  their 
strongest  points,  and  as  one  after  another  fell  before  the 
advance  of  war,  they  transferred  their  forces  to  the  re- 
doubts still  remaining.  When  they  had  failed  to  secure 
an  extension  of  the  time  limit,  they  tried  to  prevent  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Austria  and  Servia,  and  to 
prevail  upon  Austria  to  make  the  Servian  reply  the  basis 
of  negotiations  between  herself  and  Russia.  When  these 
attempts  had  ended  in  failure,  they  returned  to  the  sug- 
gestion made  at  the  very  first :  to  refer  the  dispute  to  the 
mediation  of  the  powers  less  directly  interested  in  the 
Balkan  question,  in  the  hope  of  preventing  an  immediate 
clash  between  Austria  and  Russia.  It  will  be  of  interest  to 
trace  these  successive  steps. 

2.  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposes  a  conference  of  the  powers 

In  a  conversation  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
London,  following  his  communication  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, and  the  reasons  leading  up  to  it,  Sir  Edward  Grey 

1  This  is  a  real  weakness  in  England's  Balkan  policy  —  of  trying  to 
shelve  responsibility  so  as  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  some  future  altercation 
over  a  Balkan  question.  In  point  of  fact,  this  action  left  it  to  Russia  to  take 
up  the  care  of  British  interests,  and,  as  there  is  not  the  same  confidence  in 
Russia  as  in  England,  it  made  the  diplomacy  of  the  Balkans  still  more  diffi- 
cult and  perilous,  as  the  result  showed. 


198     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

ended  by  saying  that  'doubtless  they  should  enter  into 
an  exchange  of  views  with  other  powers,  and  that  they 
must  await  their  views  as  to  what  could  be  done  to  miti- 
gate the  difficulties  of  the  situation.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  5.) 

That  same  day  (July  24)  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the 
French  Ambassador,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  that  'during  the 
afternoon  he  was  to  see  the  German  Ambassador,  who 
some  days  ago  had  asked  him  privately  to  exercise  a  mod- 
erating influence  in  St.  Petersburg;  and  his  intention  was 
to  say  to  him  that,  of  course,  if  the  presentation  of  the  ulti- 
matum to  Servia  did  not  lead  to  trouble  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  the  British  Government  need  not  concern  it- 
self therein;  but  that  if  Russia  took  the  view  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum,  which  it  seemed  to  him  that  any  power 
interested  in  Servia  would  take,  he  would  be  quite  power- 
less, in  the  face  of  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum,  to  exercise 
any  moderating  influence.  He  would  say  that  he  thought 
the  only  chance  of  any  mediating  or  moderating  influ- 
ence being  exercised  was  that  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and 
Great  Britain,  who  had  no  direct  interests  in  Servia,  should 
act  together  for  the  sake  of  peace,  simultaneously,  in  Vi- 
enna and  St.  Petersburg. 

'M.  Cambon  replied  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  medi- 
ation by  the  four  powers,  he  had  no  doubt  his  Government 
would  be  glad  to  join  in  it;  but  he  pointed  out  that  they 
could  not  say  anything  in  St.  Petersburg  till  Russia  had 
expressed  some  opinion  or  taken  some  action.  But  when 
two  days  had  gone  by,  Austria  would  march  into  Servia, 
for  the  Servians  could  not  possibly  accept  the  Austrian  de- 
mand; and  Russia  would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opin- 
ion to  take  action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked  Servia; 
therefore,  once  the  Austrians  had  attacked  Servia,  it  would 
be  too  late  for  any  mediation. 

'Sir  Edward  Grey  said  that  he  had  not  contemplated 
anything  being  said  in  St.  Petersburg  until  after  it  was 


tTHE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  199 

clear  that  there  must  be  trouble  between  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia. His  thought  was  that  if  Austria  did  move  into  Servia, 
and  Russia  then  mobilized,  it  would  be  possible  for  the  four 
powers  to  urge  Austria  to  stop  her  advance,  and  Russia 
also  to  stop  hers,  pending  mediation.  But  it  would  be  es- 
sential, for  such  a  step  to  have  any  chance  of  success,  that 
Germany  should  participate  in  it. 

'M.  Cambon  considered  that  it  would  be  too  late  after 
Austria  had  once  moved  against  Servia.  The  important 
thing  was  to  gain  time  by  mediation  in  Vienna.  The  best 
chance  of  this  being  accepted  would  be  that  Germany 
should  propose  it  to  the  other  powers. 

'Sir  Edward  Grey  understood  M.  Gambon  to  mean  a 
mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia.1 

*M.  Gambon  replied  that  that  had  been  his  mean- 
ing. 

'And  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  that  he  would  talk  to  the 
German  Ambassador  that  afternoon  on  the  subject.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.) 

This  extract  from  the  British  White  Paper  gives,  like  an 
overture  to  a  tragedy,  a  presage  of  the  subsequent  events. 
We  note  how  England  is  not  concerned  unless  the  presen- 
tation of  the  note  leads  to  trouble  with  Russia,  yet  Sir 
Edward  Grey  could  not  consider  it  as  in  conformity  with 
due  respect  for  Russia's  legitimate  and  vital  interests  to 
exercise  diplomatic  pressure  and  "moderating  influence" 
to  restrain  her  freedom  of  action  in  the  face  of  such  a  note. 
Sir  Edward  considered  that  the  only  hope  of  peace  was 

1  It  would  seem  that  the  first  idea  of  France  and  Russia  was  to  suggest 
that  England  mediate  between  Austria  and  Servia.  This  is  borne  out  by  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin's  telegram,  in  which  he  states  that  Sazonof  had  advised 
the  Servian  Government  to  ask  for  the  mediation  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, and  instructs  the  French  Charge"  to  urge  the  British  Government  to 
accept.  (July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  53;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  50.)  It  appears,  however, 
that  Servia  was  disposed  to  appeal  to  the  powers,  and  that  when  Sir  Edward 
Grey  learned  of  this  from  St.  Petersburg,  he  adopted  the  idea  and  proposed 
a  conference  of  the  four  powers.  (July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  68;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
69;  S.  B.  B.  no.  35.) 


200     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

mediation  of  the  four  less  interested  powers  simultaneously 
at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 

M.  Cambon  agreed  to  the  idea  of  mediation,  but  thought 
it  would  savor  of  political  dictation  to  interfere  at  St. 
Petersburg  before  Russia  had  given  some  sign;  yet  before 
she  had  had  time  to  do  so  and  the  powers  to  offer  their 
mediation,  the  time  limit  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  would 
have  expired,  and  since  the  Servians  could  not  accept  the 
Austrian  terms,  Austria  would  force  Russia  to  take  action. 
It  would  then  be  too  late  for  mediation. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  foresaw  this,  but  hoped  that  the  medi- 
ation of  the  four  powers  might  prevail  on  Austria  and 
Russia  to  arrest  their  advance;  but  he  recognized  that  Ger- 
many's cooperation  was  essential  to  the  success  of  the  plan. 

M.  Cambon  feared,  and  the  event  proved  the  truth  of 
his  fear,  that  it  would  be  too  late  for  successful  mediation 
once  Austria  had  attacked  Servia.  The  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Servia  seemed  to  him  to  offer  the  best  chance 
of  success,  especially  if  proposed  by  Germany,  and  Sir 
Edward  promised  to  talk  the  matter  over  with  the  German 
Ambassador. 

Assuming  that  France  and  her  ambassador  were  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  avoiding  war,  it  is  difficult  to  understand 
why  M.  Cambon  thought  that  Germany  would  be  willing 
to  make  such  a  proposal  to  Austria,  when  the  very  terms  of 
the  ultimatum  seemed  to  indicate  that  every  precaution 
had  been  taken  to  forestall  any  attempt  at  mediation  be- 
tween Austria  and  Servia.  As  for  Germany's  making  the 
proposal,  what  was  meant  evidently  was  that  Germany 
should  be  invited  to  invite  the  powers  to  invite  Austria  and 
Servia  to  accept  their  mediation.  In  this  way,  Austria 
would  have  the  guaranty  of  Germany  that  she  would  re- 
ceive an  equitable  treatment,  and  the  fact  of  Germany's 
making  the  suggestion  would  avoid  any  appearance  of 
compulsion  on  Austria  with  consequent  loss  of  prestige. 

That  same  day,  Sir  Edward  Grey  accordingly  repeated 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  201 

to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  at  London, 
almost  the  same  views  in  almost  the  identical  words  that 
had  just  passed  between  him  and  M.  Cambon;  and  Lich- 
nowsky on  his  part  urged  the  necessity  of  securing  as 
favorable  a  reply  as  possible  from  Servia.  (July  24,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  11.) 

M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
thought  that  'in  event  of  the  Austrians  attacking  Servia, 
the  Servian  Government  would  abandon  Belgrade  and 
withdraw  their  forces  into  the  interior,  while  they  would  at 
the  same  time  appeal  to  the  powers  to  help  them.  He  was 
in  favor  of  their  making  this  appeal,  and  would  like  to  see 
the  question  placed  on  an  international  footing,  as  the 
obligations  taken  by  Servia  in  1909,  to  which  reference 
was  made  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  were  given  not  to 
Austria,  but  to  the  powers. 

'  If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  powers,  Russia  would  be 
quite  ready  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the 
hands  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy.  It  was 
possible,  in  his  opinion,  that  Servia  might  propose  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  arbitration.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17;  cf .  F.  Y.  B.  no.  26.)  These  words  of  the 
Russian  Minister  forecast  the  Servian  reply  and  show  how 
earnestly  Russia  was  working  for  peace. 

When  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  'ex- 
pressed his  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate 
war  by  mobilizing  until  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  time  to  use 
his  influence  in  favor  of  peace,  M.  Sazonof  assured  him 
that  Russia  had  no  aggressive  intentions,  and  that  she 
would  take  no  action  until  it  was  forced  upon  her,  though 
Austria's  action  was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia.  She 
aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  status  quo  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  establishing  her  own  hegemony  there.  He  did  not 
believe  Germany  really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  would 
be  decided  by  that  of  England.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 


202     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  was  authorized  to 
inform  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  'the  Austrian  method  of 
procedure  on  expiration  of  the  time  limit  would  be  to  break 
off  diplomatic  relations  and  commence  military  prepara- 
tions, but  not  military  operations.'  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in- 
forming the  German  Ambassador,  '  said  this  interposed,  as 
he  had  urged,  a  state  of  mobilization  before  the  frontier 
was  actually  crossed.'  Assured  of  this,  Sir  Edward  'felt 
that  he  had  no  title  to  intervene  between  Austria  and 
Servia,  but  as  soon  as  the  question  became  one  as  between 
Austria  and  Russia  the  peace  of  Europe  was  affected,  in 
which  case  all  the  powers  must  take  a  hand.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  25.)  In  other  words,  Eng- 
land could  resume  her  former  position  that  she  was  not 
concerned  in  a  dispute  confined  to  the  Balkans,  and  could 
employ  all  her  diplomatic  efforts  directly  to  eliminating 
any  cause  of  dispute  between  Russia  and  Austria,  with  the 
object  of  preventing  an  outbreak  between  them. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  impressed  upon  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor at  London  that  '  in  the  event  of  Russian  and  Austrian 
mobilization,  the  participation  of  Germany  would  be  es- 
sential to  any  diplomatic  action  for  peace.  Alone,  England 
could  do  nothing.  The  French  Government  were  traveling 
at  the  moment,  and  he  had  had  no  time  to  consult  them, 
and  could  not,  therefore,  be  sure  of  their  views,  but  he  was 
prepared,  if  the  German  Government  agreed  with  his  sug- 
gestion, to  tell  the  French  Government  that  he  thought  it 
the  right  thing  to  act  upon.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  25;  see  also  R.  O.  P.  no.  22.)  In  so  doing,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  practically  offered  to  make  himself  surety 
that  France  would  accept  the  proposed  mediation  by  the 
four  powers  if  Germany  would  agree.  It  is  to  be  remem- 
bered that  this  offer  came  when  there  might  have  been 
some  fear  of  Russia's  also  throwing  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
settling  the  Russo-Austrian  difference  through  mediation. 
England  was  asking  the  closest  friend  and  ally  of  each  of 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  203 

the  principals  in  dispute  to  agree  to  mediation,  naturally 
expecting  each  one  to  use  its  influence  to  bring  the  princi- 
pals to  accept  this  method  of  procedure. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  a  telegram  (July  25)  informing  the 
British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  of  the  view  he  took 
of  the  situation,  said:  "The  sudden,  brusque,  and  peremp- 
tory character  of  the  Austrian  demarche  makes  it  almost 
inevitable  that  in  a  very  short  time  both  Russia  and  Aus- 
tria will  have  mobilized  against  each  other.  In  this  event, 
the  only  chance  of  peace,  in  my  opinion,  is  for  the  other 
four  powers  to  join  in  asking  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
Governments  not  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  give  time  for 
the  four  powers  acting  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  to  try 
and  arrange  matters.  If  Germany  will  adopt  this  view  I 
feel  strongly  that  France  and  ourselves  should  act  upon  it. 
Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly  cooperate.  No  diplomatic 
intervention  or  mediation  would  be  tolerated  by  either 
Russia  or  Austria  unless  it  was  clearly  impartial,  and  in- 
cluded the  allies  or  friends  of  both.  The  cooperation  of 
Germany  would,  therefore,  be  essential."  (Extract,  July 
25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  24;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  50.) 

July  26,  Sir  Edward  Grey  instructed  the  British  Ambas- 
sadors in  Paris,  Berlin,  and  Rome  to  ask  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  whether  'he  would  be  disposed  that  his 
ambassador  at  London  join  with  the  representatives  of 
England  and  the  other  powers  for  the  purpose  of  discover- 
ing an  issue  which  would  prevent  complications.  If  the 
minister  consented  to  do  so,  it  was  suggested  that  the  rep- 
resentatives of  these  powers  should,  at  the  same  time  that 
they  notified  the  Governments  at  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and 
St.  Petersburg,  be  authorized  to  request  that  all  active 
military  operations  be  suspended  pending  the  results  of  the 
conference.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
36.) 

France  agreed  to  this  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's,  and 
sent  instructions  'to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to 


204     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

concert  with  his  British  colleague  as  to  the  advisability  of 
their  speaking  jointly  to  the  German  Government.  The 
French  Government  remarked,  however,  that  until  it  was 
known  that  the  Germans  had  spoken  at  Vienna  with  some 
success,  it  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  be  dangerous  for  the  French,  Italian,1  and  British 
Ambassadors  to  do  so.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27, 
B.  W.  P.  nos.  42,  51.) 

In  confirmation,  the  French  Embassy  at  London  com- 
municated on  the  day  following  a  note  declaring:  "The 
Government  of  the  Republic  accepts  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
proposal  in  regard  to  intervention  by  Great  Britain, 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  ac- 
tive military  operations  on  the  frontiers  of  Austria,  Russia, 
and  Servia;  and  they  have  authorized  M.  P.  Cambon  to 
take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the  four  representatives 
at  the  meeting  which  is  to  be  held  in  London."  2  (Extract, 
July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  52.) 

Italy  likewise  agreed,  and  the  '  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano 
was  ready  to  recommend  warmly  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment the  suggestion  of  asking  Russia,  Austria,  and  Servia 
to  suspend  military  operations  pending  the  results  of  the 
conference'  (modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  49), 
and  telegraphed  an  acceptance  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pro- 
posal.3  (July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  35.) 

1  The  British  White  Paper  has  "Russian,"  perhaps  meaning  "Italian." 

2  The  French  note  calls  the  action  intervention,  but  if  Germany  con- 
sented, it  could  hardly  have  been  anything  but  mediation. 

*  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  a  dispatch  of  July  28,  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  stated:  "I  am  ready  to  put  forward  any  practical  proposal 
that  would  facilitate  this  [direct  exchange  of  views],  but  I  am  not  quite 
clear  as  to  what  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  proposes  the 
Ministers  at  Belgrade  should  do.  Could  he  not  first  mention  in  an  exchange 
of  views  with  Austria  his  willingness  to  cooperate  in  some  such  scheme? 
It  might  then  take  more  concrete  shape."  (Extract  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
69.)  This  suggestion  is  referred  to  in  B.  W.  P.  no.  78,  where  M.  Sazonof 
says  he  thinks  the  proposal  "was  one  of  secondary  importance."  This  may 
have  some  relation  to  M.  Jules  Cambon's  remarks  about  collective  action 
in  Servia.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  92.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  205 

3.  Germany  makes  objection  to  mediation 

In  the  case  of  a  serious  difference  between  two  states  it 
has  been  generally  acknowledged  that  it  falls  to  the  part  of 
third  states  to  try  to  help  the  states  at  variance  to  come  to 
some  agreement  which  will  be  acceptable  to  both  sides  and 
preserve  the  peace.  The  first  step  is  for  a  friendly  power  or 
powers  to  employ  its  good  offices,  which  simply  means  to 
take  whatever  informal  and  friendly  diplomatic  means  it 
considers  will  be  helpful.  When  a  third  state  is  on  most 
cordial  footing  with  both  states  it  may  perhaps  make  in- 
formal suggestions,  or  the  parties  may  decide  to  entrust  the 
question  to  the  mediation  of  the  third  state.  Such  media- 
tion, if  agreed  to,  only  means  that  the  parties  are  prepared 
to  consider  carefully  and  in  conciliatory  spirit  any  sugges- 
tion which  their  common  friend  may  put  forward  as  a  basis 
of  agreement  or  compromise.  Neither  party  is  bound  to 
accept  the  proposal ;  but  consideration  for  the  friendly  ac- 
tion of  the  mediator  does  exercise  a  certain  moral  pres- 
sure upon  the  parties,  so  that  in  certain  instances  a  state 
may  prefer  to  retain  its  entire  liberty  of  action  by  refus- 
ing to  accept  offers  of  mediation.  Under  the  guise  of  media- 
tion, one  or  more  third  states  may  really  dictate  a  solution, 
but  whenever  there  is  any  exercise  of  pressure,  mediation 
ceases  and  intervention  takes  place.1  The  facility  with 
which  intervention  is  disguised  under  a  cloak  of  mediation 
is  another  reason  why  states  are  very  cautious  in  accepting 
it  when  proffered. 

Recourse  to  mediation  in  the  case  of  a  conflict  such  as 
that  between  Austria  and  Servia  would  ordinarily  have 
followed  the  rupture  of  negotiations,  and  when  the  Aus- 
trian Minister  withdrew  from  Belgrade,  Servia  did  ap- 
peal to  the  mediation  of  the  powers ;  but  Austria  had  let 
it  be  known  for  weeks  preceding  the  presentation  of  her 

1  If  the  pressure  goes  no  further  than  diplomatic  pressure,  it  is  called 
diplomatic  intervention. 


206     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ultimatum  that  she  intended  to  settle  her  difference  with 
Servia  alone.1  There  was,  however,  another  basis  of  medi- 
ation, which  was  to  prevent  an  Austro-Russian  conflict 
resulting  from  Austria's  enforcing  of  her  demands  against 
Servia.  Whether  the  mediation  was  between  Austria  and 
Servia,  or  between  Austria  and  Russia,  it  was  evident  that 
it  had  no  chance  of  success  without  the  cooperation  of 
Germany  (B.  W.  P.  no.  25),  for  even  though  Italy  was 
Austria's  ally,  they  had  such  serious  grounds  of  differ- 
ence as  to  make  impossible  any  real  sympathy  between 
them.  Accordingly,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  confident  that  he 
could  rely  upon  the  support  of  the  other  powers,  Russia 
included,  launched  his  proposal  for  an  ambassadorial  con- 
ference at  London.  The  invitation  as  issued  had  not 
stated  whether  the  mediatory  action  was  to  be  between 
Austria  and  Servia,  or  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Sir 
Edward  had  simply  asked  the  representatives  of  the  less 
interested  powers  to  meet  at  London  in  a  conference 
"for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue  which  would 
prevent  complications"  (July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  36);  but 
that  mediation  was  to  include  all  three  of  the  states  imme- 
diately concerned  is  indicated  by  the  suggestion  that  the 
powers  accepting  should  'authorize  their  representatives 
at  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg  to  request  that  all 
active  military  preparations  should  be  suspended  pending 
the  result  of  the  conference.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  36;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  76.) 

M.  Viviani,  French  Premier  and  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  returning  from  Russia  on  the  France,  had  learned 
from  telegrams  received  at  Copenhagen  and  a  wireless  dis- 
patch from  the  Eiffel  Tower  of  the  "twofold  English  pro- 
posal," received  July  28.  He  telegraphed  in  reply:  "I 
entirely  approve  the  combination  suggested  by  Sir  Edward 

1  The  publication  of  the  French  Yellow  Book  shows  the  pains  the  Entente 
Powers  took  to  impress  upon  Austria  directly  and  through  Germany  that 
she  ought  not  to  have  recourse  to  force,  and  that  she  should  show  modera- 
tion in  dealing  with  Servia.   (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.,  nos.  10,  15,  17.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  207 

Grey,  and  I  am  asking  M.  Paul  Cambon  directly  to  ac- 
quaint him  with  this  fact."  (Extract,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
76.) 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Italian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  informed  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome 
that  he  '  greatly  doubted  whether  Germany  would  be  will- 
ing to  invite  Austria  to  suspend  military  action  pending 
the  conference,  but  he  had  hopes  that  military  action 
might  be  practically  deferred  by  the  fact  of  the  conference 
meeting  at  once.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  57.) 

In  reply  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  statement  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  on  July  24, 
that  'if  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not  lead  to 
trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia  he  had  no  concern  with 
it'  (modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  11),  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor  (in  a  telegram  to  Prince  Lichnowsky) 
agreed  that '  the  distinction  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  be- 
tween the  Austro-Servian  and  Austro-Russian  conflict  was 
quite  correct.  Germany  wished  as  little  as  England  to  mix 
in  an  Austro-Servian  dispute;  and  first  and  last,  took  the 
ground  that  this  question  must  be  localized  by  the  absten- 
tion of  all  the  powers  from  intervention  in  it.  It  was,  there- 
fore, their  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  refrain  from  any 
active  intervention,  conscious  of  her  responsibility  and  of 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation.  If  an  Austro-Russian  dis- 
pute should  arise,  they  were  ready,  with  the  reservation  of 
their  known  duties  as  allies,  to  cooperate  with  the  other 
great  powers  in  mediation  between  Russia  and  Austria.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  13.)  Sim- 
ilarly Von  Jagow  told  the  British  Charge  at  Berlin  that  'if 
the  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threat- 
ening, he  was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  Sir  Edward's  sug- 
gestion as  to  the  four  powers  working  in  favor  of  modera- 
tion at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 


208     THE  DIPLOMACY   OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

On  July  27,  —  that  is,  the  day  after  Sir  Edward  Grey 
instructed  the  British  representatives  to  extend  to  the 
powers  the  invitation  to  the  ambassadorial  conference,  — 
the  German  Chancellor  telegraphed  Lichnowsky,  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  London :  ' '  Nothing  is  known  here  as 
yet  concerning  a  suggestion  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  hold  a 
quadruple  conference  in  London.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
drag  our  ally  before  a  European  court  for  the  settlement  of 
her  difference  with  Servia.  Our  mediatory  activity  must 
be  confined  to  the  danger  of  a  Russo-Austrian  conflict."1 
(July  27,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  12;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  35.) 

Later  that  same  day,  when  the  proposal  was  officially 
presented,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Von  Jagow,  declined  it,  saying  that  'a  conference 
such  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  suggested  would  practically 
amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in  his  opin- 
ion, be  called  together  except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and 
Russia.  He  could  not,  therefore,  fall  in  with  Sir  Edward's 
suggestion,  desirous  though  he  was  to  cooperate  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  Sir  Edward  Goschen  said  that  he 
was  sure  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  idea  had  nothing  to  do 
with  arbitration,  but  meant  that  the  representatives  of  the 
four  nations  not  directly  interested  should  discuss  and  sug- 
gest means  for  avoiding  a  dangerous  situation.  Von  Jagow 
maintained,  however,  that  such  a  conference  as  Sir  Edward 
Grey  proposed  was  not  practicable,  and  added  that  news  he 
had  just  received  from  St.  Petersburg  showed  that  there  was 
an  intention  on  the  part  of  M.  Sazonof  to  exchange  views 
with  Count  Berchtold.  He  thought  that  this  method  of 
procedure  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result,  and  that  it 
would  be  best,  before  doing  anything  else,  to  await  the  out- 

1  The  French  Charge1  at  London  informed  his  Government:  "It  would 
be  understood  that,  during  the  sittings  of  this  little  conference,  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Servia  would  abstain  from  all  active  military  operations.  Sir 
A.  Nicolson  has  spoken  of  this  suggestion  to  the  German  Ambassador,  who 
has  shown  himself  favorable  to  it."  (Extract,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  68;  cf. 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  69.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  209 

come  of  the  exchange  of  views  between  the  Austrian  and 
Russian  Governments.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  B. 
W.  P.  no.  43;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  67;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  73;  B.  G.  P. 
no.  6.) 

The  same  day  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  argued 
forcibly  to  prevail  upon  Germany  to  agree  to  the  quad- 
ruple mediation  and  tactfully  proposed  'that  the  powers 
advise  Vienna  "to  abstain  from  any  act  which  might  ag- 
gravate the  situation  at  the  present  hour,"  as  this  veiled 
formula  obviated  the  need  of  mentioning  the  necessity  of 
refraining  from  invading  Servia;  but  Von  Jagow  returned  a 
categorical  refusal  to  the  proposal,  in  spite  of  the  insistence 
of  the  French  Ambassador,  who  pointed  out  the  advantage 
of  this  suggestion  in  that  the  powers  would  be  so  grouped 
as  to  avoid  the  opposing  of  the  Alliance  by  the  Entente,  of 
which  Von  Jagow  himself  had  so  often  complained.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  27,  R.  O.  P.  no.  39;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  74; 
R.  O.  P.  no.  34.) 

In  reference  to  the  English  proposal,  M.  Jules  Cambon, 
French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  to  his  Government, 
on  July  28:  — 

"  I  to-day  supported  the  step  of  my  British  colleague 
with  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  latter  replied  to  me,  as 
he  did  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  that  he  could  not  possibly 
accept  the  idea  of  a  sort  of  conference  in  London  between 
the  ambassadors  of  four  powers,  and  that  another  form 
would  have  to  be  given  to  the  British  suggestion  if  it  were 
to  be  realizable.  I  pointed  out  the  danger  of  a  delay  which 
might  lead  to  war,  and  asked  him  if  he  wanted  war.  He 
protested,  and  added  that  direct  conversations  between 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  were  begun,  and  that  from  now 
on  he  expected  a  favorable  result.  The  British  and  Italian 
Ambassadors  came  together  to  see  me  this  morning,  in 
order  to  discuss  with  me  the  conversations  they  had  yes- 
terday with  Herr  Von  Jagow  on  the  subject  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  proposal.  The  Secretary  of  State  said,  on  the  whole, 


210     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

pretty  much  what  he  said  to  me;  he  accepted  the  prin- 
ciple of  joining  in  a  demarche  common  to  Italy,  England, 
and  ourselves,  but  rejected  all  idea  of  a  conference.  We 
are  of  opinion,  my  colleagues  and  I,  that  there  is  in  this 
nothing  but  a  question  of  form,  and  the  British  Ambas- 
sador is  going  to  suggest  to  his  Government  that  it  should 
give  another  label  to  its  proposal,  which  might  take  the 
character  of  a  diplomatic  demarche  in  Vienna  and  in  St. 
Petersburg."   (Extract,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  81.) 

The  German  Chancellor  sent  word  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
that  'he  had  not  been  able  to  accept  his  proposal  for  a 
conference  of  representatives  of  the  great  powers  because 
he  did  not  think  that  it  would  be  effective,  and  because 
such  a  conference  would  in  his  opinion  have  had  the  ap- 
pearance of  an  "Areopagus,"  consisting  of  two  powers  of 
each  group  sitting  in  judgment  upon  the  two  remaining 
powers.'  1  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  71; 
cf.  G.  W.  B.  Memorandum,  p.  8.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  attempted  to  remove  the  German 
objection  to  the  proposed  mediation  by  declaring  that  'it 
would  not  be  an  arbitration,  but  a  private  and  informal 
discussion  to  ascertain  what  suggestion  could  be  made  for 
a  settlement.  No  suggestion  would,  it  was  declared,  be 
put  forward  that  had  not  previously  been  ascertained  to 
be  acceptable  to  Austria  and  Russia,  with  whom  the  medi- 
ating powers  could  easily  keep  in  touch  through  their 
respective  allies.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  67;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  43.) 

After  the  first  breakdown  of  direct  conversations  between 
Austria  and  Russia  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg reported  to  his  Government  that  'when  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  tried  to  persuade  him  that  he 
should  urge  his  Government  to  participate  in  a  quadruple 
conference  for  the  purpose  of  finding  means  to  induce  Aus- 
tria to  forego  those  demands  which  affected  Servian  sover- 

1  See  statement  in  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  September  25, 1914. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  211 

eignty,  he  had  pointed  out  how  Russia  was  asking  Ger- 
many to  take  in  regard  to  Austria  the  very  action  which 
the  latter  was  blamed  for  taking  against  Servia,  i.e.,  a  vio- 
lation of  her  sovereignty.'  x  (Modified  quotation,  G.  W. 
B.  Memorandum,  pp.  9-10.) 

In  view  of  this  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  German 
Government,  it  is  hard  to  understand  what  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  meant  when  he  informed  Sir  Edward  Grey  (July 
27)  that  'the  German  Government  accepted  in  principle 
mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  powers. 
At  the  same  time,  he  urged  Sir  Edward  to  use  his  influence 
at  St.  Petersburg  to  localize  the  war  and  keep  the  peace  of 
Europe.  To  which  the  British  Secretary  replied  that  if 
Austria  put  the  Servian  reply  aside  as  being  worth  nothing 
and  marched  into  Servia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined 
to  crush  Servia  at  all  costs,  being  reckless  of  the  conse- 
quences that  might  be  involved.  The  Servian  reply  should 
at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  pause.  Sir 
Edward  said  that  the  German  Government  should  urge 
this  at  Vienna.  Continuing,  he  recalled  what  the  German 
Government  had  said  as  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation  if 
the  war  could  not  be  localized,  and  observed  that  if  Ger- 
many assisted  Austria  against  Russia  it  would  be  because, 
without  any  reference  to  the  merits  of  the  dispute,  Ger- 
many could  not  afford  to  see  Austria  crushed.  Just  so, 
other  issues  might  be  raised  that  would  supersede  the  dis- 
pute between  Austria  and  Servia,  and  would  bring  other 
powers  in,  and  the  war  would  be  the  biggest  ever  known; 
but  as  long  as  Germany  would  work  to  keep  the  peace,  Sir 
Edward  said  he  would  keep  closely  in  touch.  He  repeated 
that  after  the  Servian  reply,  it  was  at  Vienna  that  some 
moderation  must  be  urged.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  46;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  66.)  The  emphatic,  almost 
threatening,  manner  in  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke 

1  For  M.  Sazonof's  account  of  this  interview  see  R.  0.  P.  no.  49;  B.  W.  P. 
no.  93  (2). 


212     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

seems  to  have  borne  fruit,  for  the  German  Ambassador  was 
not  long  in  informing  him  that  '  the  German  Government 
had  taken  action  in  the  sense  of  their  conversation.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  67.) 

In  reply,  Count  Berchtold  requested  the  German  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna,  Von  Tchirsky,  to  express  to  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  his  thanks  for  the  communication  of 
the  English  proposal  of  mediation  on  the  basis  of  the 
Servian  note,  but  he  added  that,  '  after  the  commencement 
of  hostilities  by  Servia  and  Austria's  subsequent  declara- 
tion of  war,  the  step  appeared  belated.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  28,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  16;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  76; 
A.  R.  B.  nos.  43,  44.) 

That  same  day,  July  28,  'the  English  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  in  a  most  tactful  manner  and  avoiding  the  word 
mediation,  spoke  directly  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  hopes  that  conversations  in 
London  between  the  four  less  interested  powers  might 
yet  lead  to  an  arrangement  which  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  could  accept  as  satisfactory  and  as  rendering 
actual  hostilities  unnecessary.  He  also  said  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward regarded  the  Servian  reply  as  having  gone  far  to 
meet  Austria's  just  demands  and  that  he  thought  it  con- 
stituted a  fair  basis  of  discussion  during  which  warlike 
operations  might  remain  in  abeyance.  Count  Berchtold 
replied  that  no  discussion  would  be  accepted  on  the  basis 
of  the  Servian  note,  that  war  would  have  to  be  declared, 
and  that  it  was  a  matter  that  must  be  settled  directly  be- 
tween the  parties  immediately  concerned.' *  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  62.) 

1  Count  Berchtold,  according  to  the  Austrian  Red  Book  (no.  41),  said 
in  part:  "Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestions  concerning  the  possibility  of  pre- 
venting an  outbreak  of  hostilities  are  somewhat  belated,  since,  as  early  as 
yesterday,  the  Servians  opened  fire  on  our  frontier-guards,  and  also  be- 
cause we  declared  war  upon  Servia  to-day.  Referring  to  the  idea  of  an  ex- 
change of  views  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  response,  I  have  to  decline  the 
suggestion.  We  demanded  an  unqualified  acceptance.  Servia  has  endeavored 
to  extricate  herself  from  an  embarrassing  situation  by  means  of  quibbles. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  213 

In  fine,  Germany  took  the  stand  that  she  could  not 
bring  pressure  to  bear  to  induce  Austria  to  accept  the 
mediation  of  the  powers,  since  Austria  had  been  obliged 
to  take  action  in  consequence  of  the  unjustifiable  conduct 
of  Servia.  After  Austria  had  declared  that  the  settlement 
of  the  dispute  must  be  left  to  the  parties  concerned,  —  that 
is  to  say  to  Austria  and  Servia,  —  Germany  felt  that  the 
prestige  of  her  ally  would  suffer  should  she  yield  on  that 
point.  'Besides,  Germany  felt  that  she  had  to  be  very 
careful  in  giving  advice  to  Austria,  as  any  idea  that  she 
was  being  pressed  would  be  likely  to  cause  her  to  pre- 
cipitate matters  and  place  them  in  the  presence  of  a  fait 
accompli.  The  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  was  not  sure,  he  said,  that  his  communication 
to  Austria  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion  that  the  Serv- 
ian reply  should  serve  as  a  basis  for  discussion  had  not  had 
such  a  result  in  hastening  the  declaration  of  war.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  76;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
11;  R.  0.  P.  no.  51;  B.  W.  P.  no.  107.) 

4-  Russia  proposes  to  Austria  to  enter  upon  "conversations" 

While  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  making  the  effort  to 
constitute  a  mediatory  conference,  the  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  had  been  attempting  to  reach  a  solu- 
tion by  direct  negotiations  with  Austria. 

On  July  26,  the  day  following  Austria's  rupture  of  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  Servia,  the  French  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  sent  the  following  report  of  M.  Sazonof's 
efforts  at  conciliation :  — 

"The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  continues  with  praise- 
worthy perseverance  to  seek  means  to  bring  about  a  peace- 
ful solution.  '  I  shall  show  myself  ready  to  negotiate  up  to 
the  last  instant/  he  said  to  me. 

"It  is  in  this  spirit  that  he  has  asked  Count  Szapary 

With  such  tactics  we  are  only  too  familiar."    (Extract,  July  28,  A.  R.  B. 
no.  41.) 


214     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

[Austrian  Ambassador]  to  come  and  see  him  for  a  '  frank 
and  loyal  explanation.'  In  his  presence  M.  Sazonof  dis- 
cussed the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  article  by  arti- 
cle, showing  clearly  the  insulting  character  of  the  different 
clauses.  'The  intention  which  inspired  this  document,'  he 
said,  'is  legitimate  if  you  pursue  no  other  aim  but  the 
protection  of  your  territory  against  the  agitation  of  Serv- 
ian anarchists,  but  the  step  to  which  you  have  had  re- 
course is  not  defensible.'  He  concluded,  'Take  back  your 
ultimatum,  modify  its  form,  and  I  will  guarantee  the  re- 
sult.' 

"The  Austrian  Ambassador  appeared  to  be  touched  by 
his  language,  but  pending  instructions  he  reserved  the 
opinion  of  his  Government.  M.  Sazonof,  without  being 
discouraged,  has  decided  to  suggest  this  evening  to  Count 
Berchtold  the  opening  of  direct  conversations  between 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  with  regard  to  the  changes  to 
be  made  in  the  ultimatum.  This  friendly  and  semi-official 
interposition  of  Russia  between  Austria  and  Servia  has 
the  advantage  of  being  expeditious.  I  therefore  think  it 
preferable  to  any  other  procedure,  and  I  think  it  is  likely 
to  succeed."   (July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  54.) 

July  26,  M.  Sazonof,  informing  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna  of  this  same  conversation  which  he  had 
had  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  said 
that  'in  the  interest  of  the  preservation  of  peace,  which, 
according  to  the  Ambassador's  statements,  was  precious 
to  Austria  in  the  same  degree  as  to  all  the  powers,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  put  a  stop  as  soon  as  possible  to  the 
strained  situation  of  the  moment.  With  this  object  in 
view,  it  seemed  very  desirable  that  the  Ambassador  of 
Austria-Hungary  should  be  authorized  to  enter  into  an 
exchange  of  private  views  with  him,  with  the  object  of 
making  in  common  an  alteration  (remaniemenl)  of  some 
of  the  clauses  of  the  Austrian  note.  This  proceeding  would, 
the  Russian  Minister  thought,  perhaps  permit  of  finding  a 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  215 

formula  acceptable  for  Servia  while  at  the  same  time  giving 
satisfaction  to  Austria  as  to  the  basis  of  her  demands.  Ac- 
cordingly he  instructed  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  enter 
into  prudent  and  friendly  explanation  with  Count  Berch- 
told  in  conformity  with  these  views.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  26,  R.  O.  P.  no.  25;  cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  26;  B.  W.  P. 
no.  56.) 

As  soon  as  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  learned 
of  M.  Sazonof 's  proposal,  he  telegraphed  the  Minister:  — 

"Pray  telegraph  me  if  in  your  opinion  your  direct  pour- 
parlers with  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  are  in  line  with  Grey's 
proposal  concerning  the  mediation  of  the  four  Govern- 
ments. Having  learned  from  the  Ambassador  of  England 
at  St.  Petersburg  that  you  were  disposed  to  accept  this 
combination,  Grey  decided  to  give  it  the  form  of  an  official 
proposal,  which  he  made  last  night  to  Berlin,  Paris,  and 
Rome."   (Extract,  July  27,  R.  O.  P.  no.  31.) 

The  British  White  Paper  does  not  appear  to  contain  any 
record  of  Russia's  having  given  her  assent  to  the  British 
mediation  proposal  before  it  was  officially  presented,  but 
M.  Sazonof  had  said  to  the  British  Ambassador,  July  25 : 
"If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  powers,  Russia  would  be 
quite  ready  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the 
hands  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy."  (Extract, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.)  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  also  that 
same  day,  July  25,  sent  to  Sir  George  Buchanan,  the  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  telegram  express- 
ing his  view,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  effect  that  '  the  sud- 
den, brusque,  and  peremptory  character  of  the  Austrian 
demarche  made  it  almost  inevitable  that  in  a  very  short 
time  both  Russia  and  Austria  would  have  mobilized 
against  each  other.  In  that  event,  the  only  chance  of 
peace,  in  Sir  Edward's  opinion,  was  for  the  other  four 
powers  to  join  in  asking  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Govern- 
ments not  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  give  time  for  the 
four  powers  acting  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  to  try  to 


216     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

arrange  matters.  If  Germany  would  adopt  that  view,  he 
felt  strongly  that  France  and  England  should  act  upon  it. 
Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly  cooperate.  No  diplomatic 
intervention  or  mediation  would  be  tolerated  by  either 
Russia  or  Austria  unless  it  was  clearly  impartial,  and  in- 
cluded the  allies  or  friends  of  both.  The  cooperation  of 
Germany  would,  therefore,  be  essential.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  24.) 

July  27,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  the  British  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  telegraphed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  M. 
Sazonof  '  said  that  he  did  not  know  whether  Austria  would 
accept  the  friendly  exchange  of  views  which  he  had  pro- 
posed, but,  if  she  did,  he  wished  to  keep  in  close  contact 
with  the  other  powers  throughout  the  conversations  that 
would  ensue.  He  again  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  obliga- 
tions undertaken  by  Servia  in  1909, x  alluded  to  in  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  were  given  to  the  powers.  The  Am- 
bassador then  asked  him  if  he  had  heard  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  proposal  with  regard  to  a  conference  of  the  four 
powers,  and  on  his  replying  in  the  affirmative,  Sir  George 
told  him  confidentially  of  Sir  Edward's  instructions  to 
him,  and  inquired  whether  instead  of  such  a  conference 
he  would  prefer  a  direct  exchange  of  views,  which  he  had 
proposed.  The  German  Ambassador,  to  whom  Sir  George 
had  just  spoken,  had  expressed  his  personal  opinion  that 
a  direct  exchange  of  views  would  be  more  agreeable  to 
Austria-Hungary. 

*M.  Sazonof  replied  that  he  was  perfectly  ready  to 
stand  aside  if  the  powers  accepted  the  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference, but  he  trusted  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  would  keep 
in  touch  with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  the  event  of  its 
taking  place.2  (Modified  quotations,  July  27,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  55.) 

1  The  text  of  the  British  White  Paper  has  1908. 

2  The  Russian  Minister  lost  valuable  time  in  not  at  once  throwing  his 
whole  influence  on  the  side  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  mediation, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  217 

The  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  informed  the 
Russian  Ambassadors  at  London  and  Paris  of  this  inter- 
view with  the  British  Ambassador  in  the  following 
terms :  — 

"The  Ambassador  of  England  called  to  ascertain  if  we 
thought  it  useful  that  England  should  take  the  initiative 
in  convoking  at  London  a  conference  of  the  representatives 
of  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  in  order  to  study 
a  solution  of  the  present  situation. 

"I  replied  to  the  Ambassador  that  I  had  opened  pour- 
parlers with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  under 
conditions  that  I  hope  are  favorable.  However,  I  have  not 
yet  received  a  reply  to  the  proposal  I  made  for  a  revision 
of  the  note  between  the  two  Cabinets. 

"If  direct  explanations  with  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  prove 
impracticable,  I  am  ready  to  accept  the  English  proposal 
or  any  other  calculated  to  bring  about  a  favorable  solu- 
tion of  the  conflict."   (July  27,  R.  O.  P.  no.  32.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  showed  a  total  absence  of  pique  that 
his  formal  proposal  should  be  set  aside l  and  telegraphed 
the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg:  — 

but,  no  doubt,  he  felt  that  Austria's  ignoring  of  recognized  Russian  inter- 
ests in  the  Balkans  would,  if  allowed  to  pass  unopposed,  affect  Russia's 
prestige.  Even  though  the  united  influence  of  the  powers  in  conclave  should 
prevent  a  war,  it  would  appear  that  they,  and  not  Russia,  were  the  pro- 
tectors of  the  small  states  of  the  Balkans  against  Austrian  aggression.  M. 
Sazonof's  last  remark  about  "keeping  in  touch"  shows  some  apprehension 
lest  the  quadruple  intervention  might  impose  a  solution  objectionable 
to  Russia.  It  may  have  been  an  appeal  to  England  to  protect  Russia's 
interests  in  case  of  mediation. 

1  On  July  27,  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  a  statement  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons in  regard  to  the  European  situation  and  the  steps  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  taking  to  preserve  the  peace.   He  concluded  as  follows:  — 

"The  time  allowed  in  this  matter  has  been  so  short  that  I  have  had  to 
take  the  risk  of  making  a  proposal  without  the  usual  preliminary  steps  of 
trying  to  ascertain  whether  it  would  be  well  received.  But,  where  matters 
are  so  grave  and  the  time  so  short,  the  risk  of  proposing  something  that  is 
unwelcome  or  ineffective  cannot  be  avoided.  I  cannot  but  feel,  however, 
assuming  that  the  text  of  the  Servian  reply  as  published  this  morning  in 
the  press  is  accurate,  as  I  believe  it  to  be,  that  it  should  at  least  provide  a 
basis  on  which  a  friendly  and  impartial  group  of  powers,  including  powers 


218     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

"It  is  most  satisfactory  that  there  is  a  prospect  of  direct 
exchange  of  views  between  the  Russian  and  Austrian  Gov- 
ernments, as  reported  in  your  telegram  of  the  27th  of  July. 

"I  am  ready  to  put  forward  any  practical  proposal  that 
would  facilitate  this,  but  I  am  not  quite  clear  as  to  what 
the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  proposes  the 
Ministers  at  Belgrade *  should  do.  Could  he  not  first  men- 
tion in  an  exchange  of  views  with  Austria  his  willingness  to 
cooperate  in  some  such  scheme?  It  might  then  take  more 
concrete  shape."   (July  28,  B.  W.  P.  nos.  69,  78.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  also  informed  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
at  Berlin  of  his  agreement  with  the  views  expressed  by  the 
German  Government  '  that  a  direct  exchange  of  views  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia  was  the  most  preferable  method 
of  all,  and  as  long  as  there  was  any  prospect  of  such  an 
exchange,  he  said  he  would  suspend  every  other  sugges- 
tion.' 2  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  67;  cf. 
B.  W.  P.  no.  68.) 

As  early  as  July  23,  before  he  knew  the  terms  of  the 
Austrian  note,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  said  to  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  London  that  he  '  hoped  very  much  that, 
if  there  were  difficulties,  Austria  and  Russia  would  be  able 
in  the  first  instance  to  discuss  them  directly  with  each 
other';  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  had  replied  that  'he 

who  are  equally  in  the  confidence  of  Austria-Hungary  and  of  Russia,  should 
be  able  to  arrange  a  settlement  that  would  be  generally  acceptable. 

"It  must  be  obvious  to  any  person  who  reflects  upon  the  situation  that 
the  moment  the  dispute  ceases  to  be  one  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia  and  becomes  one  in  which  another  great  power  is  involved,  it  can 
but  end  in  the  greatest  catastrophe  that  has  ever  befallen  the  Continent  of 
Europe  at  one  blow;  no  one  can  say  what  would  be  the  limit  of  the  issues 
that  might  be  raised  by  such  a  conflict;  the  consequences  of  it,  direct  and 
indirect,  would  be  incalculable."    (London  Times,  July  28,  1914.) 

1  This  seems  to  refer  to  some  proposal  of  collective  intervention  or  media- 
tion at  Belgrade.    See  above  p.  204,  note  3. 

2  The  German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  is  quoted  as  hav- 
ing made  the  statement:  "  By  dropping  her  idea  of  a  conference  England 
made  it  appear  that  she  wished  Austria-Hungary,  through  Germany's 
mediation,  to  yield."     (The  New  York  Times,  January  15,  1915,  p.  3.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  219 

hoped  it  would  be  possible,  but  he  was  under  the  impres- 
sion that  the  attitude  in  St.  Petersburg  had  not  been  very 
favorable  recently.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  23,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  3.) 

At  Berlin  the  Russian  Charge  'urged  the  German  Sec- 
retary for  Foreign  Affairs  to  support  the  Russian  proposal. 
Von  Jagow  replied  that  he  shared  the  opinion  of  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  since  Count 
Szapary,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  had  begun  this  con- 
versation he  might  very  well  continue  it.1  He  said  he 
would  telegraph  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to 
this  effect;  but  when  the  Russian  Charge*  begged  him  to 
urge  Vienna  with  more  insistence  to  adopt  this  conciliatory 
procedure,  Von  Jagow  answered  that  he  could  not  advise 
Vienna  to  yield.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  R.  0.  P. 
no.  38.) 

'July  28,  in  the  afternoon,  M.  Sazonof  received  the 
German  and  Austrian  Ambassadors.  The  impression  he 
received  from  his  double  interview  was  bad.  "Decidedly," 
he  said  to  the  French  Ambassador,  "Austria  does  not  wish 
to  talk."  As  a  result  of  a  conversation  that  the  latter  had 
with  his  two  colleagues,  he  received  the  same  pessimistic 
impression.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
82;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  43.) 

When,  on  July  28,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
'acting  upon  M.  Sazonof 's  instructions,  brought  to  the 
notice  of  Count  Berchtold  how  desirable  it  was  to  find  a 
solution  which,  while  consolidating  good  relations  be- 
tween Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  would  give  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  genuine  guaranties  for  its 
future  relations  with  Servia,  the  Austrian  Minister  re- 
plied that  he  was  well  aware  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
and  of  the  advantages  of  a  frank  explanation  with  the 

1  Ordinarily  the  Government  which  makes  the  proposal  would  entrust 
the  whole  negotiations  to  its  representative  at  the  capital  where  the  pro- 
posal was  made. 


220     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

St.  Petersburg  Cabinet,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government,  having  decided,  much 
against  their  will,  on  the  energetic  measures  which  they  had 
taken  against  Servia,  could  no  longer  recede  or  enter  into 
any  discussion  about  the  terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
note.' 1  (Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  93  (1); 
R.  O.  P.  no.  45.) 

When  the  Russian  Government  learned  of  Austria's 
declaration  of  war  against  Servia,  M.  Sazonof  telegraphed 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London:  "On  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  between  Austria  and  Servia,  it  is  necessary 
for  England  without  delay  to  try  her  mediation.  At  the 
same  time  Austrian  military  operations  against  Servia 
should  be  immediately  suspended.  Otherwise  mediation 
would  only  serve  as  a  pretext  to  drag  out  the  settlement  of 
the  question,  and  afford  Austria  in  the  mean  time  a  pos- 
sibility of  crushing  Servia  completely  and  acquiring  a 
predominating  position  in  the  Balkans."  (July  28,  R.  0.  P. 
no.  48;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  70  (2),  74.) 

1  The  Austrian  Red  Book  gives  the  following  account  of  this  interview : 
"The  Imperial  Russian  Ambassador  waited  on  me  to-day  to  announce 
to  me  his  return  from  a  short  leave  of  absence  in  Russia  and  at  the  same 
time  to  carry  out  instructions  sent  to  him  by  M.  Sazonof  by  telegraph. 
He  said  that  he  later  had  informed  him  that  he  had  had  a  long,  friendly 
interview  with  Your  Excellency  (Your  Excellency's  telegram  of  July  27), 
during  which  Your  Excellency  had  with  great  willingness  discussed  the 
various  points  of  the  Servian  reply.  He  said  that  M.  Sazonof  thought  that 
Servia  had  met  our  wishes  to  a  great  extent,  but  that  certain  demands 
seemed  to  him  quite  unacceptable  and  that  he  had  not  concealed  this  be- 
lief from  you.  Under  the  circumstances,  he  said,  it  seemed  to  him  that  the 
Servian  reply  was  suitable  for  being  made  the  basis  for  an  understanding, 
toward  which  the  Russian  Government  would  willingly  cooperate.  There- 
fore, he  said,  M.  Sazonof  wished  to  propose  to  me  that  his  exchanges  of  views 
with  Your  Excellency  might  continue  and  that  Your  Excellency  might 
for  this  purpose  be  provided  with  instructions. 

"  In  reply  I  said  emphatically  that  I  could  not  agree  to  such  a  suggestion. 
No  one  here  would  understand  or  tolerate  that  we  should  enter  into  dis- 
cussions regarding  the  wording  of  a  reply  already  designated  by  us  as  un- 
satisfactory; that  such  a  course  was  all  the  more  impossible  since  public 
opinion  was  already  deeply  stirred,  as  the  ambassador  knew,  and  that,  more- 
over, we  had  declared  war  against  Servia  to-day."  (Extract,  July  28, 
A.  R.  B.  no.  40.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  221 

On  July  29,  before  M.  Sazonof  had  heard  of  the  Austrian 
Minister's  rejection  of  his  proposal,  he  sent  off  a  telegram 
informing  the  Russian  Charge"  at  Berlin  of  a  conversation 
with  the  German  Ambassador  in  which  he  had  said  that  he 
was  '  in  favor  of  the  direct  explanation  between  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg,  provided  the  conciliatory  counsel  from 
Berlin  to  which  he  referred  met  with  a  response  from 
Vienna.  At  the  same  time  M.  Sazonof  indicated  that  Rus- 
sia was  prepared  to  accept  the  proposed  conference  of  the 
four  powers,  which  Germany,  it  seemed,  did  not  entirely 
approve.  The  Minister  further  said  that  in  his  opinion  the 
best  way  to  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  effect 
a  peaceful  solution  would  be  to  parallel  the  direct  nego- 
tiations between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  pourparlers  of 
the  four  powers,  Germany,  France,  England,  and  Italy, 
united  in  a  conference,  similarly  to  what  was  done  at  the 
most  critical  moment  of  last  year's  crisis.'  l  (Modified 
quotation,  July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  49;  cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  50; 
B.  W.  P.  no.  93  (2).) 

As  soon,  however,  as  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  received  the  telegram  from  Vienna,  telling  of 
Count  Berchtold's  refusal  of  the  Russian  proposal,  he  sent 
a  second  telegram  to  Berlin  explaining  that '  at  the  time  of 
his  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador,  referred 
to  in  his  last  telegram  (R.  0.  P.  no.  49),  he  had  not  re- 
ceived word  from  Vienna  of  the  refusal  of  the  Austrian 
Government  to  enter  upon  a  direct  exchange  of  views  with 

1  I  find  it  difficult  to  reconcile  R.  O.  P.  no.  50  with  B.  W.  P.  no.  70  (2), 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  48),  which  is  dated  July  28.  According  to  B.  W.  P.  no.  70  (2), 
Sazonof  on  July  28  took  the  same  stand  that  direct  negotiations  were  at  an 
end,  as  R.  O.  P.  no.  50  indicates  he  took  only  after  he  heard  that  his  offer 
for  direct  conversations  had  been  refused  by  Austria.  Perhaps  the  ex- 
planation of  this  discrepancy  may  be  that  when  Sazonof  heard  of  Austria's 
declaration  of  war  against  Servia  he  sent  the  telegram  (R.  O.  P.  no.  48)  to 
London,  making  it  emphatic  to  impress  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  after  that 
(July  29)  he  had  an  interview  with  the  German  Ambassador  which  made 
him  hopeful  of  continuing  negotiations  with  Austria,  until  he  learned  of 
Berchtold's  refusal.  (R.  O.  P.  no.  45.) 


222     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  Russian  Government.  After  that  the  only  course  left 
open  to  the  Russian  Government  was,  M.  Sazonof  said,  to 
leave  to  the  initiative  of  the  English  Government  the 
undertaking  of  such  action  as  it  should  consider  advisable.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  R.  O.  P.  no.  50;  cf.  B.  W.  P. 
nos.  93  (3),  74.)  Yet  that  same  day  (July  29)  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London  was  instructed  to  inform  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  that  '  Austria  and  Russia  seemed  to  be  in  con- 
stant touch,  and  that  the  German  Chancellor  was  endeav- 
oring to  make  Vienna  explain  in  a  satisfactory  form  at  St. 
Petersburg  the  scope  and  extent  of  the  Austrian  proceed- 
ings in  Servia.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
84;  cf.  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  22.)  This  amounted  to  saying  that 
Austria  was  willing  to  continue  to  negotiate  with  Russia; 
but  that  she  was  not  willing  to  discuss  the  terms  of  her 
note  to  Servia,  which  she  persisted  in  considering  as  a 
question  purely  between  herself  and  Servia.  (Cf.  B.  W.  P. 
no.  62.) 

In  a  dispatch  of  July  29  to  Count  Berchtold,  Count 
Szapary,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  states:  — 

"On  information  received  from  the  German  Ambassador 
that  M.  Sazonof  appeared  greatly  disturbed  by  your 
apparent  unwillingness  to  continue  discussions  with  Russia 
and  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  order  of  mobilization,  which 
appears  to  him  to  exceed  the  necessary  scope  and  therefore 
is  believed  to  be  directed  against  Russia,  I  called  upon  the 
Minister  in  an  attempt  to  clear  up  misconceptions  which 
seemed  to  exist. 

"The  Minister  asserted  that  Austria-Hungary  had  re- 
fused point-blank  to  discuss  matters  any  further.  In  ac- 
cordance with  your  telegram  of  the  28th  instant,  I  ex- 
plained that  in  view  of  recent  events,  you  certainly  had 
refused  to  discuss  any  further  the  wording  of  the  notes  and 
our  conflict  with  Servia  in  general;  that,  on  the  other  hand, 
I  had  to  state  that  I  was  in  a  position  to  open  a  much  wider 
field  for  discussion  by  declaring  that  we  do  not  wish  to  in- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  223 

terfere  with  any  Russian  interests  and  that  we  do  not  in- 
tend to  take  any  Servian  territory;  provided,  always,  that 
the  conflict  be  localized  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia;  that,  moreover,  we  did  not  intend  to  violate 
Servia's  sovereignty.  I  expressed  my  firm  conviction  that 
you  would  always  be  willing  to  keep  in  touch  with  St. 
Petersburg  with  regard  to  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian 
interests."    (Extract,  July  29,  A.  R.  B.  no.  47.) 

The  German  Memorandum  states:  "Inasmuch  as  the 
Russian  Government,  in  reply  to  the  several  inquiries 
regarding  the  reasons  for  its  threatening  attitude,  several 
times  alluded  to  the  circumstance  that  Austria-Hungary 
had  not  yet  begun  any  conversations  in  St.  Petersburg,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  at  our  request,  was  di- 
rected on  July  29  to  begin  the  conversations  with  M.  Saz- 
onof.  Count  Szapary  was  authorized  to  make  known  to 
the  Russian  Minister  the  contents  of  the  note  to  Servia 
which  has  been,  as  it  were,  overtaken  by  the  declaration  of 
war,  and  to  receive  any  suggestions  that  might  still  come 
from  the  Russian  side,  as  well  as  to  discuss  with  M.  Sazonof 
all  questions  touching  directly  on  the  Austro-Russian 
relations."  (Extract,  G.  W.  B.  Memorandum,  p.  11;  cf. 
A.  R.  B.  no.  49.) 

Between  the  28th  and  30th,  Austria  undoubtedly  as- 
sumed a  much  more  conciliatory  attitude,  for  on  the  latter 
date  Count  Berchtold  '  again  received  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador in  a  perfectly  friendly  manner  and  gave  his  consent 
to  the  continuance  of  the  conversations  at  St.  Petersburg.' 
(Modified  quotation,  B.  W.  P.  Miscellaneous,  no.  10 
[1914];  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  110.) 

On  July  30  the  German  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  sent  the  following  instructions  to  Herr  von 
Tchirsky,  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna:  — 

"The  report  of  Count  Pourtales  does  not  harmonize 
with  the  account  which  Your  Excellency  has  given  of  the 
attitude  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.    Appar- 


224     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

ently  there  is  a  misunderstanding,  which  I  beg  you  to  clear 
up.  We  cannot  expect  Austria-Hungary  to  negotiate  with 
Servia,  with  which  she  is  in  a  state  of  war.  The  refusal, 
however,  to  exchange  views  with  St.  Petersburg  would  be 
a  grave  mistake.  We  are  indeed  ready  to  fulfil  our  duty. 
As  an  ally  we  must,  however,  refuse  to  be  drawn  into  a 
world  conflagration  through  Austria-Hungary  not  respect- 
ing our  advice.  Your  Excellency  will  express  this  to  Count 
Berchtold  with  all  emphasis  and  great  seriousness."  l 

On  July  30,  Count  Berchtold  sent  the  following  telegram 
to  Count  Szapary,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg: "In  reply  to  Your  Excellency's  telegram  of  July  29: 

1  This  telegram  was  published  in  the  Westminster  Gazette  August  1.  See 
also  M.  P.  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  p.  251.  Mr.  Price  (pp. 
&-7)  gives  the  following  summary  of  Germany's  mediatory  efforts  at  Vienna: 

"On  the  other  hand,  there  is  evidence  to  the  effect  that  during  the  nego- 
tiations after  the  Austrian  Note  to  Servia,  Germany,  however  stupidly  and 
supinely  she  handled  the  Austro-Servian  dispute,  was  fully  alive  to  the 
danger  to  Europe  of  a  Russo-Austrian  conflict.  Thus  the  telegrams  passing 
between  the  London,  Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Paris  Foreign  Offices  show 
that  although  Germany  refused  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion  of  a  Four 
Power  Ambassadorial  Conference  in  London,  nevertheless  she  supported 
the  mediation  of  Four  Powers  not  immediately  concerned  at  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg,  with  a  view  to  inducing  Austria  and  Russia  to  come  to  terms 
with  each  other.  Indeed,  Germany  was  on  more  than  one  occasion  the 
means  of  conveying  to  Austria  proposals  concerning  the  need  of  moderation 
in  Vienna  and  about  the  guarantees  which  Servia  could  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  give.  (B.  W.  P.  nos.  18,  95,  98.)  The  pressure  brought  to  bear  on 
Austria  by  Germany  during  the  last  few  days  of  negotiations  is  also  seen  in 
the  German  Denkschrift  and  in  the  Westminster  Gazette  correspondent's 
telegram  of  August  1st.  In  addition  to  these,  numerous  British  Press  cor- 
respondents in  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  between  July  25th  and  30th, 
show  that  Germany,  so  far  from  being  an  instigator,  was  doing  all  she  could, 
having  regard  to  the  difficult  position  in  which  she  was  placed,  to  make  her 
ally  come  to  terms  with  Russia. 

"  Germany's  great  initial  blunder  was  that  she  refused  to  regard  the  Austro- 
Servian  dispute  as  one  that  concerned  any  other  but  those  two  countries, 
and  would  not  recognize  the  claim  of  Russia  to  be  consulted  about  the  fate 
of  Servia.  Hence  her  interpretation  of  Four  Power  mediation  was  not  the 
same  as  Russia's.  She  wanted  mediation  to  aim  at  securing  for  Austria  a 
'free  hand.'  Russia  wanted  mediation  which  would  give  her  a  chance  of 
settling  the  Servian  question  according  to  her  ideas." 

Sir  Valentine  Chirol  has  attacked  the  authenticity  of  this  communication. 
See  Price:  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War,  p.  51. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  225 

I  am  naturally  ready  now,  as  I  was  before,  to  allow 
Your  Excellency  to  elucidate  to  M.  Sazonof  the  various 
points  of  the  note  addressed  by  us  to  Servia,  though  it  has 
been  superseded  by  later  events.  In  this  connection  I 
would  also  make  a  point  of  discussing  in  a  frank  and 
friendly  way  the  questions  directly  concerning  our  rela- 
tions with  Russia,  in  accordance  with  the  suggestion  trans- 
mitted to  me  by  M.  Schebeko,  which  might  bring  about 
a  clearing  up  of  the  doubtful  points  and  a  safeguarding  of 
the  peaceful  development  that  is  so  desirable  in  our  neigh- 
borly relations."   (July  30,  A.  R.  B.  no.  49.) 

Count  Berchtold  sent  another  telegram  of  the  same  date 
(July  30)  for  Count  Szapary's  information:  "I  have  ex- 
plained to  M.  Schebeko  to-day,  that  it  had  been  reported 
to  me  that  M.  Sazonof  was  painfully  impressed  by  my  flat 
rejection  of  his  suggestion  of  a  conference  between  you  and 
himself,  and  also  because  no  exchange  of  views  had  taken 
place  between  myself  and  M.  Schebeko.  With  regard  to 
the  first  proposal,  I  had  already  instructed  you  by  tele- 
graph to  give  M.  Sazonof  any  explanation  he  might  re- 
quire concerning  our  note,  although  recent  events  have  su- 
perseded that  note.  Such  explanation,  however,  could  not 
go  further  than  a  belated  elucidation,  since  we  had  never  in- 
tended to  abate  any  point  in  the  note.  I  also  stated  that  I 
had  authorized  you  to  make  our  relations  with  Russia  the 
subject  of  an  amicable  exchange  of  views  with  M.  Sazonof. 
The  complaint  that  there  had  been  no  conference  between 
myself  and  Schebeko  must  be  based  on  a  misunderstand- 
ing, as  we  —  Schebeko  and  I  —  discussed  the  pending 
questions  only  two  days  ago.  The  Ambassador  confirmed 
this  and  said  that  he  had  sent  a  full  report  of  our  interview 
to  M.  Sazonof."   (Extract,  July  30,  A.  R.  B.  no.  50.) 

On  July  30,  also,  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  reported  to  his  Government:  "With  regard  to  the 
settlement  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute,  it  has  been 
agreed  that  the  pourparlers  shall  be  resumed  in  St.  Peters- 


226     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

burg  between  M.  Sazonof  and  Count  Szapary.  Their 
interruption  was  due  to  a  misunderstanding,  Count  Berch- 
told  believing  that  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
demanded  that  his  interlocutor  should  be  given  powers  en- 
abling him  to  modify  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum. 
Count  Szapary  will  only  be  authorized  to  discuss  what 
arrangement  would  be  compatible  with  the  dignity  and 
prestige  of  the  two  empires,  which  are  to  both  of  them  an 
object  of  equal  care.  For  the  moment,  therefore,  it  will  be 
in  this  direct  form,  confined  to  the  two  most  interested 
parties,  that  the  examination  of  the  situation  will  take 
place  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed  should  be  under- 
taken by  the  four  not  directly  interested  powers.  Sir  M.  de 
Bunsen,  who  was  with  me,  at  once  told  M.  Schebeko  that 
the  Foreign  Office  would  entirely  approve  of  this  new 
procedure.  Repeating  the  expose  he  made  at  the  Ballplatz, 
the  Russian  Ambassador  stated  that  his  Government 
would  pay  much  more  regard  to  the  demands  of  the  Mon- 
archy than  was  supposed.  M.  Schebeko  neglected  nothing 
to  convince  Count  Berchtold  of  the  sincerity  of  Russia's 
desire  to  reach  an  understanding  acceptable  to  the  two 
empires.  The  interview  was  conducted  in  a  very  friendly 
tone,  and  gave  rise  to  the  belief  that  all  hope  of  localizing 
the  conflict  was  not  lost,  and  then  the  news  of  the  German 
mobilization  reached  Vienna."  (Extract,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  104;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  96,  110.) 

On  July  31,  'Count  Berchtold  begged  the  Russian  Am- 
bassador to  do  his  best  to  remove  the  wholly  erroneous 
impression  in  St.  Petersburg  that  the  "door  had  been 
banged"  by  Austria  on  all  further  conversations.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  137.) 

The  day  following,  —  that  is,  the  day  Germany  de- 
clared war  against  Russia,  —  Sir  Edward  Grey,  encour- 
aged by  this  friendly  attitude  of  Austria,-  telegraphed  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  that '  he  still  believed  that  it 
might  be  possible  to  secure  peace  if  only  a  little  respite  in 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  227 

time  could  be  gained  before  any  great  power  began  war. 
The  Russian  Government  had  communicated  to  him  the 
readiness  of  Austria  to  disouss  with  Russia,  and  the  readi- 
ness of  Austria  to  accept  a  basis  of  mediation  which  was 
not  open  to  the  objections  raised  in  regard  to  the  formula 
which  Russia  originally  suggested.  Things  ought  not,  he 
thought,  to  be  hopeless  so  long  as  Austria  and  Russia  were 
ready  to  converse,  and  he  hoped  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment might  be  able  to  make  use  of  the  Russian  communi- 
cations referred  to  above,  in  order  to  avoid  tension.' 
(Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  131.) 

5.  The  powers  employ  their  good  offices  at  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg 

While  these  conversations  were  going  on  at  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Vienna,  between  M.  Sazonof  and  the  Austrian 
Ambassador,  and  between  Count  Berchtold  and  the  Rus- 
sian Ambassador,  the  less  interested  powers  were  trying  to 
use  their  good  offices  1  at  the  two  capitals  to  facilitate  the 
course  of  the  conversations  or  direct  negotiations  and  to 
prevail  upon  Austria  and  Russia  to  agree  to  some  method 
to  settle  their  difference,  which  threatened  to  involve  all 
Europe. 

Although  Germany  supported  Austria  in  insisting  upon 
the  " localization"  of  her  dispute  with  Servia,  the  German 
Government  did  nevertheless  'instruct  Von  Tchirsky  on 
July  26  to  "pass  on"  to  the  Austrian  Government  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  hopes  that  they  might  take  a  favorable 
view  of  the  Servian  reply  if  it  corresponded  to  the  forecast 
contained  in  the  telegram  of  July  25  from  the  British  rep- 
resentative at  Belgrade.2  The  German  Government  con- 

1  "Good  offices"  merely  means  the  ordinary  friendly  diplomatic  activity 
which  a  power  carries  on  with  one  or  both  of  the  powers  in  disagreement. 
Such  action  consists  in  offering  suggestions  or  giving  explanations  and 
friendly  counsel,  which  may  lessen  the  tension  or  induce  the  Governments 
concerned  to  come  to  an  agreement  directly,  or  to  entrust  to  one  or  more 
third  powers  the  more  formal  office  of  mediator. 

2  B.  W.  P.  no.  20. 


228     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

sidered  that  the  very  fact  of  their  making  this  communi- 
cation to  the  Austrian  Government  implied  that  they 
associated  themselves,  to  a  certain  extent,  with  the  hope 
expressed  by  Sir  Edward.  The  German  Government  could 
not  see  their  way  of  going  beyond  that.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  26,  B.  W.  P.  no.  34.) 

Two  days  later  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  told  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  that  'Sir  Edward  Grey  could  be 
assured  that  he  was  doing  his  very  best  both  at  Vienna  and 
at  St.  Petersburg  to  get  the  two  Governments  to  discuss 
the  situation  with  each  other  and  in  a  friendly  way.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no.  71 ;  cf .  G.  W.  B. 
exhibits  14,  15,  22;  R.  0.  P.  nos.  38,  51.)  When  the  Aus- 
trian Government  replied  with  a  polite  refusal,  the  Chan- 
cellor 'advised  them  to  speak  openly  to  assure  Russia 
regarding  the  object  of  the  hostilities  about  to  be  under- 
taken against  Servia.  After  going  so  far  in  giving  advice 
at  Vienna,  the  Chancellor  expressed  the  hope  that  Sir 
Edward  would  realize  that  he  was  sincerely  doing  all  in  his 
power  to  prevent  the  danger  of  European  complications/ 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  75.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  appreciatively  of  these  efforts 
on  the  part  of  the  Chancellor,  and  said  that  'if  he  could 
induce  Austria  to  satisfy  Russia  and  to  abstain  from  going 
so  far  as  to  come  into  collision  with  her,  they  should  all 
join  in  deep  gratitude  to  him  for  having  saved  the  peace  of 
Europe.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  77.) 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  reply  to  a  suggestion  from  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giuliano  as  to  a  possibly  acceptable  basis  for  media- 
tion, said  that  'he  could  do  nothing  in  the  face  of  Austria's 
refusal  to  accept  any  form  of  mediation  as  between  Aus- 
tria and  Servia,  but  that  he  should  be  glad  if  a  favorable 
reception  were  given  to  any  suggestion  he  could  make 
there.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  81;  cf. 
B.  W.  P.  nos.  64,  90.)  England,  France,  and  Italy  realized 
that  Germany,  and  Germany  alone,  could  speak  at  Vienna 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  229 

with  any  chance  of  being  listened  to.  (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no. 
111.)  Accordingly,  while  they  had  been  urging  upon  the 
German  Government  the  imperative  necessity  of  exercis- 
ing its  influence  in  favor  of  moderation  at  Vienna  if  it  was 
hoped  to  avoid  an  Austro-Russian  conflict  (cf .  R.  0.  P.  no. 
42),  they  had  kept  begging  the  Russian  Government  not 
to  precipitate  a  crisis  by  mobilizing.  (Cf .  B.  W.  P.  no.  104 ; 
F.Y.  B.  101.) 

6.  Efforts  to  discover  a  formula  for  mediation 

The  powers  continued  to  exercise  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg  the  same  restraining  influence  that  they  had 
from  the  first  brought  to  bear  at  Belgrade  to  induce  Servia 
to  return  a  conciliatory  reply  to  the  Austrian  note,  but 
they  realized  how  much  more  effective  would  be  their 
restraining  action  if  they  could  succeed  in  giving  whatever 
counsel  was  offered  the  united  support  of  the  four  less 
interested  powers.   (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  11.) 

Even  in  the  face  of  Germany's  refusal  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  proposal  for  an  ambassadorial  conference  at  Lon- 
don, Italy,  France,  and  Russia  continued  to  urge  Germany 
to  reconsider  her  decision.  Present  in  the  minds  of  the 
diplomats  was  the  success  of  the  same  plan  when  adopted 
during  the  Balkan  crisis  the  year  preceding.  At  that  time 
the  delicate  question  of  Albania  and  the  Servian  frontier 
had  been  peacefully  settled  by  means  of  direct  negotia- 
tions between  the  two  great  powers  most  immediately 
interested,  Austria  and  Russia,  while  at  London  an  ambas- 
sadorial conference  of  the  less  interested  powers  had  col- 
laborated to  reach  an  acceptable  compromise.  The  happy 
result  of  those  negotiations  made  the  diplomatists  hope  to 
employ  again  that  parallel  system  consisting  of  direct  con- 
versations between  Austria  and  Russia,  advised  and  re- 
strained by  the  collective  counsel  of  the  ambassadorial  con- 
ference. (R.  O.  P.  nos.  50,  69;  B.  W.  P.  nos.  93  (2),  80,  81, 
120,  139;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  84.)   The  advice  of  the  powers  was 


230     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

all  the  more  difficult  for  Austria  and  Russia  to  reject  in 
1913,  because  it  was  the  resultant  of  the  views  of  powers 
possessing  different  interests  and  divided  sympathies,  and 
was  therefore  a  compromise  between  the  views  of  the  two 
powers  immediately  interested  in  the  fate  of  Servia.  But, 
as  Count  Berchtold  remarked,  Austria  considered  the  solu- 
tion then  adopted  as  "highly  artificial,"  which  means  that 
the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  considered  it 
unsatisfactory  to  Austria.  Entertaining  such  a  view,  he 
wished,  as  we  understand,  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  pro- 
cedure which  had  forced  Austria  to  acquiesce  in  the  solu- 
tion adopted  in  1913.  (B.  W.  P.  Miscellaneous,  no.  10, 
1914;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  70.)  In  1913,  Germany  had  been  willing 
to  join  the  other  powers  in  carrying  through  the  parallel 
procedure  of  an  advisory  ambassadorial  conference  at  Lon- 
don, but  in  1914  she  announced  that  she  could  not  drag 
her  ally  before  a  "European  Areopagus"  in  which  the  pow- 
ers should  sit  in  judgment  on  Austria,  and  in  which  the 
judges  opposed  to  her  would  outvote  those  interested  in 
securing  the  protection  of  her  interests. 

When  Germany  was  pressed,  she  said  that  she  would 
join  the  other  powers  in  exercising  a  mediatory  influence 
between  Austria  and  Russia  (B.  W.  P.  no.  18),  but  she  con- 
tinued emphatically  to  refuse  to  participate  in  a  conference 
to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Austria  to  induce  her  to  recon- 
sider and  modify  the  terms  of  her  note  to  Servia.  (R.  0.  P. 
no.  53;  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  13,  Memorandum,  p.  9;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  81.) 

In  the  face  of  this  firm  stand  of  Germany,  the  other  pow- 
ers sought  to  replace  the  proposed  ambassadorial  confer- 
ence at  London  by  another  method  of  mediation  which 
might  be  effective  in  helping  Austria  and  Russia  to  find 
some  acceptable  compromise  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  81) ;  what  the 
diplomats  designated  as  the  finding  of  a  "formula." 

For  a  moment,  when  it  was  thought  that  Austria  had 
refused  to  continue  the  direct  "conversations"  with  Rus- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  231 

sia  regarding  the  settlement  of  the  Servian  question,  the 
exercise  of  the  mediatory  or  moderating  influence  of  the 
powers  seemed  the  only  hope  of  peace,  —  though  a  slender 
one.  (R.  O.  P.  no.  50;  B.  W.  P.  nos.  93  (3),  74,  78;  R.  0.  P. 
no.  54.)  But  it  was  quickly  explained  that  Austria  had  not 
"banged  the  door,"  and  the  "  conversations  "  or  pourparlers 
were  renewed.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  137;  A.  R.  B.  no.  53.) 

7.  Germany  asked  to  "press  the  button" 

Finding  it  impossible  to  bring  forward  any  suggestion 
acceptable  to  Germany,  on  July  28,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
telegraphed  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin:  "German 
Government  having  accepted  principle  of  mediation  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  powers,  if  necessary 
I  am  ready  to  propose  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State 
should  suggest  the  lines  on  which  this  principle  should  be 
applied.1  I  will,  however,  keep  the  idea  in  reserve  until  we 

1  The  following  extract  from  a  dispatch  of  July  27,  sent  by  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  French  represen- 
tatives, shows  the  feeling  of  the  French  Government:  — 

"The  powers,  particularly  Russia,  France,  and  England,  have  by  their 
urgent  advice  induced  Belgrade  to  yield;  and  thus  have  done  their  part; 
it  is  now  for  Germany,  who  alone  is  in  a  situation  to  obtain  a  speedy  hear- 
ing at  Vienna,  to  give  advice  to  Austria,  who  has  obtained  satisfaction  and 
cannot  be  permitted,  for  the  sake  of  a  matter  of  detail  easy  to  adjust,  to 
bring  about  a  general  war. 

"These  are  the  circumstances  in  which  the  proposal  made  by  the  London 
Cabinet  has  been  brought  forward:  M.  Sazonof  having  said  to  the  British 
Ambassador  that  as  a  consequence  of  the  appeal  of  Servia  to  the  powers, 
Russia  would  agree  to  stand  aside,  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  formulated  the  fol- 
lowing suggestion  to  the  Cabinets  of  Paris,  Berlin,  and  Rome :  the  French, 
German,  and  Italian  Ambassadors  at  London  would  be  instructed  to  seek 
with  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  means  of  resolving  the  present  difficulties,  it  being 
understood  that  during  this  conversation  Russia,  Austria,  and  Servia  would 
abstain  from  all  active  military  operations.  Sir  A.  Nicolson  [of  the  British 
Foreign  Office]  has  spoken  of  this  suggestion  to  the  German  Ambassador, 
who  showed  himself  favorable  to  it ;  it  will  be  equally  well  received  in  Paris, 
and  also,  according  to  all  probability,  at  Rome.  Here  again  it  is  Germany's 
turn  to  speak,  and  she  has  an  opportunity  to  show  her  good-will  by  other 
means  than  words. 

"I  would  ask  you  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  your  English  col- 
league, and  to  support  his  proposal  with  the  German  Government  in  what- 
ever form  appears  to  you  opportune."   (Extract,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  61.) 


232     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

see  how  the  conversations  between  Austria  and  Russia 
progress."  (July  28,,  B.  W.  P.  no.  68;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  43, 
46,  60.) 

On  July  29,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  pointed 
out  the  inconsistency  between  Sir  Edward  Grey's  telegram 
to  Sir  Edward  Goschen  of  July  27,  in  which  he  relates  that 
'the  German  Government  accepted  mediation  in  princi- 
ple' (modified  quotation,  July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  46),  and  Sir 
Edward  Goschen's  dispatch  of  the  same  date  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  to  the  effect  that  'Germany  could  not  accept  the 
suggestion  which  the  Secretary  of  State  considered  would 
amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  43.) 

At  Rome  the  Italian  Government,  he  reported,  had 
received  information  that '  what  created  the  difficulty  was, 
so  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  thought,  the  "  conference," 
rather  than  the  principle,  and  the  Marquis  was  going  to 
urge,  in  a  telegram  which  he  was  sending  to  Berlin  that 
night,  adherence  to  the  idea  of  an  exchange  of  views  in 
London.  He  suggested  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State 
might  propose  a  formula  acceptable  to  his  Government.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  80.) 

July  29,  Sir  Edward  Grey  urged  upon  Prince  Lichnow- 
sky  that  'the  German  Government  should  suggest  any 
method  by  which  the  influence  of  the  four  powers  could  be 
used  together  to  prevent  war  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
France  agreed.  Italy  agreed.  The  whole  idea  of  mediation 
or  mediating  influence  was  ready  to  be  put  into  operation 
by  any  method  that  Germany  thought  possible,  if  only 
Germany  would  "press  the  button"  in  the  interests  of 
peace.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  84; 
cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  92,  100;  R.  0.  P.  nos.  53,  54.) 

July  30,  Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphed  Sir  Edward 
Grey  from  Berlin  that '  he  did  not  know  whether  the  Ger- 
man Government  had  made  any  reply  to  Sir  Edward's 
proposal  asking  whether  they  could  not  suggest  any 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  233 

method  by  which  the  four  powers  could  use  their  mediating 
influence  between  Russia  and  Austria.  He  was  informed 
the  night  before  that  the  German  Government  had  not 
had  time  to  send  an  answer  yet.  The  same  day,  July  30, 
in  reply  to  an  inquiry  from  the  French  Ambassador  as  to 
whether  the  Imperial  German  Government  had  proposed 
any  course  of  action,  the  Secretary  of  State  said  that  he 
felt  that  time  would  be  saved  by  communicating  with 
Vienna  direct,  and  that  he  had  asked  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  Government  what  would  satisfy  them.  No  answer 
had,  however,  been  returned  yet. 

'The  Chancellor  had  told  him,  the  night  before,  that  he 
was  "pressing  the  button"  as  hard  as  he  could,  and  that  he 
was  not  sure  whether  he  had  not  gone  so  far  in  urging 
moderation  at  Vienna  that  matters  had  been  precipitated 
rather  than  otherwise.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  107.) 

On  July  30,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  gave  the  but- 
ton a  good  push  by  instructing  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  '  to  impress  upon  Count  Berchtold  with  great 
seriousness  that  Germany  would  have  to  refuse  to  be 
drawn  into  a  general  war  resulting  from  Austria's  disregard 
of  Germany's  counsel.'     (See  above,  p.  224.) 

On  the  morning  of  July  31,  the  last  day  of  European 
peace,  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the  German  Ambassador, 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  that  'if  Germany  could  get  any  rea- 
sonable proposal  put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that 
Germany  and  Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European 
peace,  and  that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable 
if  they  rejected  it,  he  would  support  it  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  Paris,  and  go  the  length  of  saying  that  if  Russia  and 
France  would  not  accept  it,  the  British  Government  would 
have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  consequences;  otherwise, 
he  told  the  German  Ambassador  that  if  France  became 
involved,  they  should  be  drawn  in.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  Ill ;  cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  42.)  It  is  much  to 


234     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

be  regretted  that  Germany  was  unable  to  reply  to  this  bid 
for  her  cooperation  in  maintaining  the  peace  by  suggesting 
some  feasible  plan. 

8.  The  San  Giuliano  suggestion  for  mediation  upon  Servians 
unconditional  acceptance  of  the  ultimatum 

July  28,  Sir  Edward  Grey  received  a  telegram  from  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  the  effect  that  '  the  Mar- 
quis di  San  Giuliano,  as  at  present  informed,  saw  no  pos- 
sibility of  Austria's  receding  from  any  point  laid  down  in 
her  note  to  Servia,  but  he  believed  that  if  Servia  would 
even  then  accept  it,  Austria  would  be  satisfied,  and  that  if 
she  had  reason  to  think  that  such  would  be  the  advice  of 
the  powers,  Austria  might  defer  action.  Servia  might  be 
induced  to  accept  the  note  in  its  entirety  on  the  advice  of 
the  four  powers  invited  to  the  conference,  and  this  would 
enable  her  to  say  that  she  had  yielded  to  Europe  and  not 
to  Austria-Hungary  alone.' 1  (Modified  quotation,  July 
27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  57;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  64;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  72.) 
Even  this  proposal,  worthy  of  the  astute  and  tactful  Ital- 
ian, does  not  seem  to  have  found  favor  with  Germany  or 
Austria. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  when  showing  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor at  London  the  telegrams  exchanged  about  the  San 
Giuliano  suggestion,  remarked  that  'he  had  begun  to 
doubt  whether  even  a  complete  acceptance  of  the  Austrian 
demands  by  Servia  would  now  satisfy  Austria,  but  that 
there  appeared,  from  what  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano 

1  The  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Government  is  shown  by  the  following 
telegram  which  Baron  von  Macchio,  of  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office,  received 
from  Count  Berchtold:  "Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  telegraphs  me  that  he 
has  been  urgently  instructed  by  his  Government  to  ask  an  extension  of  time 
on  the  ultimatum  to  Servia.  I  ask  Your  Excellency,  therefore,  to  answer 
him,  in  my  name,  that  we  cannot  agree  to  an  extension  of  the  time.  Your 
Excellency  will  please  add  that  Servia  can  reach  a  peaceful  solution,  even 
after  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  by  unreservedly  accepting 
our  demands,  but  that  we  should  be  constrained  in  such  case  to  demand 
from  Servia  indemnization  for  all  the  expenses  and  damages  incurred  by 
reason  of  our  military  measures."   (July  25,  A.  R.  B.  no.  20.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  235 

had  said,  to  be  a  method  by  which,  if  the  powers  were  al- 
lowed to  have  any  say  in  the  matter,  they  might  bring 
about  complete  satisfaction  for  Austria,  if  only  the  latter 
would  give  them  an  opportunity.  Sir  Edward  said  he  could, 
however,  make  no  proposal,  and  could  only  give  what  the 
Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  said  to  the  German 
Ambassador  for  information,  as  long  as  it  was  understood 
that  Austria  would  accept  no  discussion  with  the  powers 
over  her  dispute  with  Servia.1  As  to  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  Sir  Edward  said  it  could  not  take 
the  form  simply  of  urging  Russia  to  stand  aside  while 
Austria  had  a  free  hand  to  go  to  any  length  she  pleased. 
That  would  not  be  mediation,  it  would  simply  be  putting 
pressure  upon  Russia  in  the  interests  of  Austria.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  90.) 

The  German  Ambassador,  according  to  the  dispatch  of 
the  British  Secretary,  did  not  comment  on  the  San  Giu- 
liano  proposal,  but  after  expressing  his  views  as  to  Aus- 
tria's situation,  in  conclusion  'said  emphatically  that  some 
means  must  be  found  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  90.) 

M.  Sazonof,  when  'asked  if  he  would  raise  objections  if 
the  Italian  suggestion  were  carried  out,  replied  that  he 
would  agree  to  anything  arranged  by  the  four  powers,  pro- 
vided it  was  acceptable  to  Servia;  as  he  could  not  be  more 
Servian  than  Servia.  He  thought,  however,  that  some  sup- 
plementary statement  or  explanations  would  have  to  be 
made  in  order  to  tone  down  the  sharpness  of  the  ultima- 
tum.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78.) 

1  German  critics  have  impugned  the  sincerity  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
efforts  toward  peace  because  he  was  not  more  ready,  at  this  stage,  to  urge 
mediation.  (See  above,  p.  218,  note  2.)  Having  formally  invited  thepowersto 
a  conference  at  London,  only  to  have  the  proposal  refused  by  Germany  and 
Austria,  Sir  Edward  very  properly  felt  he  could  not  make  a  new  proposal  un- 
less there  was  some  chance  of  its  being  accepted. 


236     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

9.  The  Cambon  suggestion  of  mediation  after  Austria's 
occupation  of  Belgrade 

On  July  29,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  suggested 
anew  to  the  German  Under-Secretary  of  State  that  'it 
seemed  to  him  that  when  Austria  had  entered  Servia,  and 
so  satisfied  her  military  prestige,  the  moment  might  then 
be  favorable  for  the  four  disinterested  powers  to  discuss 
the  situation  and  come  forward  with  suggestions  for  pre- 
venting graver  complications.  The  Under-Secretary  of 
State  seemed  to  think  the  idea  worthy  of  consideration, 
as  he  replied  that  that  would  be  a  different  matter  from 
the  conference  proposed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 

That  same  day,  whether  or  not  in  consequence  of  the 
Cambon  suggestion,  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed  to  the 
German  Ambassador  at  London  that,  since  it  was  'too 
late  for  all  military  operations  against  Servia  to  be  sus- 
pended, it  might  be  possible  to  bring  some  mediation  into 
existence,  if  Austria,  while  saying  that  she  must  hold  the 
occupied  territory  until  she  had  complete  satisfaction  from 
Servia,  stated  that  she  would  not  advance  further,  pending 
an  effort  of  the  powers  to  mediate  between  her  and  Rus- 
sia.'1 (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  88;  cf. 
B.  W.  P.  no  100.)  As  soon  as  Von  Jagow,  German  Secre- 
tary of  State,  learned  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal,  he 
asked  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  whether  they 
would  be  willing  to  accept  mediation  on  the  basis  of  the 
occupation  by  Austrian  troops  of  Belgrade  or  some  other 
point,  and  issue  their  conditions  from  there.  After  expres- 
sing fears  that  Russia's  mobilization  might  make  it  diffi- 

1  Mediation  or  intervention  on  the  basis  of  the  occupation  of  Belgrade 
was  indicated  by  M.  Sazonof's  remark  as  early  as  July  25,  when  he  expressed 
the  thought  that  the  Servian  Government  might  retire  from  Belgrade  and 
appeal  to  the  powers.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  17.)  I  have  called  it  the  Cambon  sug- 
gestion so  as  to  distinguish  it,  and  because  it  was  put  forward  by  M.  Jules 
Cambon. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  237 

cult  for  Austria,  who  had  'as  yet  mobilized  only  against 
Servia,  but  would  probably  find  it  necessary  also  against 
Russia,'  the  Secretary  said  that  if  Sir  Edward  could  'suc- 
ceed in  getting  Russia  to  agree  to  the  above  basis  for  an 
arrangement  and  in  persuading  her  in  the  mean  time  to 
take  no  steps  which  might  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  aggres- 
sion against  Austria,  he  still  saw  some  chance  that  Euro- 
pean peace  might  be  preserved.'  (Modified  quotations, 
July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  98.) 

According  to  the  German  Memorandum,  the  German 
Government,  thinking  Russia  would  agree,  forwarded  to 
Vienna  as  a  basis  of  negotiation  the  proposal  brought  for- 
ward by  England  that  Austria  should  dictate  her  condi- 
tions from  Servia,  i.e.,  after  having  marched  into  Servia. 
(G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  11.) 

That  same  day,  July  30,  the  German  Ambassador  in- 
formed Sir  Edward  Grey  that  "the  German  Government 
would  endeavor  to  influence  Austria,  after  taking  Bel- 
grade and  Servian  territory  in  region  of  the  frontier,  to 
promise  not  to  advance  farther,  while  the  powers  en- 
deavored to  arrange  that  Servia  should  give  satisfaction 
sufficient  to  pacify  Austria.  Territory  occupied  would  of 
course  be  evacuated  when  Austria  was  satisfied."  (Ex- 
tract, July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  103.) 

After  this  interview  Sir  Edward  Grey,  following  up  this 
plan  of  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia  on  the  basis 
of  Austria's  occupation  of  Belgrade,  and  the  cessation  of 
further  aggression,  telegraphed  the  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  in  an  effort  to  secure  Russia's  consent  to 
this  arrangement  and  acquiescence  in  an  agreement  to 
'suspend  further  military  preparations  on  all  sides.'  Re- 
ferring to  the  Russian  offer  of  terms  at  the  request  of  the 
German  Ambassador  as  a  last  effort  toward  peace,  Sir 
Edward  hoped,  in  spite  of  the  Russian  Ambassador's  be- 
lief that  the  terms  could  not  be  modified,  that  'if  the  Aus- 
trian advance  were  stopped  after  the  occupation  of  Bel- 


238     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

grade,  the  Russian  [Sazonof]  formula !  might  be  changed 
to  read,  that  the  powers  would  examine  how  Servia  could 
fully  satisfy  Austria  without  impairing  Servian  rights  or 
independence.' 2  (Modified  quotations,  July  30,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  103.) 

M.  Viviani,  in  accordance  with  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
request,  agreed  to  the  English  suggestion  (Cambon's 
suggestion),3  and  instructed  the  French  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  as  follows :  — 

"Please  inform  M.  Sazonof  urgently  that  the  suggestion 
of  Sir  E.  Grey  appears  to  me  to  furnish  a  useful  basis  for 
conversation  between  the  powers,  who  are  equally  desirous 
of  working  for  an  honorable  arrangement  of  the  Austro- 
Servian  conflict,  and  of  averting  in  this  manner  the  dangers 
which  threaten  general  peace. 

"The  plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  by  stopping  the  advance  of  the  Austrian 
army  and  by  entrusting  to  the  powers  the  duty  of  examin- 
ing how  Servia  could  give  full  satisfaction  to  Austria  with- 
out endangering  the  sovereign  rights  and  the  independence 
of  the  kingdom,  by  thus  affording  Russia  a  means  of  sus- 
pending all  military  preparations,  while  the  other  powers 
are  to  act  in  the  same  way,  is  calculated  equally  to  give 
satisfaction  to  Russia  and  to  Austria  and  to  provide  for 
Servia  an  acceptable  means  of  issue  from  the  present 
difficulty. 

"  I  would  ask  you  carefully  to  be  guided  by  the  foregoing 
considerations  in  earnestly  pressing  M.  Sazonof  to  give  his 

1  The  Russian  formula  here  referred  to  is  that  first  offered  by  M .  Sazonof 
at  the  request  of  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.    (See  post, 

Hi.) 

2  As  Mr.  Price  very  truly  remarks:  "The  difference  between  this  and  the 
first  [Russian]  formula  is  that  the  powers  are  specially  mentioned  as  arbi- 
trators to  decide  upon  those  points  concerning  the  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence of  Servia."  (C.  M.  Price:  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War, 
p.  57.) 

3  That  M.  Viviani  refers  here  to  the  Cambon  suggestion  and  not  to  the 
Grey  suggestion  appears  from  F.  Y.  B.  no.  104;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  103. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  239 

adherence  without  delay  to  the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  of 
which  he  will  have  been  himself  informed."  (Extract, 
July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  112;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  104.) 

This  mediation,  on  the  basis  of  the  occupation  of  Bel- 
grade, may  have  been  suggested  by  what  M.  Sazonof 
remarked  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
July  25,  that  he  'thought  from  a  conversation  which  he 
had  had  with  the  Servian  Minister  the  day  before,  that  in 
the  event  of  the  Austrians  attacking  Servia,  the  Servian 
Government  would  abandon  Belgrade,  and  withdraw  their 
forces  into  the  interior,  while  they  made,  at  the  same  time, 
an  appeal  to  the  powers  to  help  them.  The  Russian  Min- 
ister declared  that  he  was  in  favor  of  their  making  that 
appeal.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 
The  day  before  the  proposal  was  brought  forward  by  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  Von  Tchirsky,  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  '  told  his  British  colleague  that  he 
thought  Germany  would  be  able  to  prevent  Austria  from 
making  any  exorbitant  demands  if  Servia  could  be  in- 
duced to  submit,  and  to  ask  for  peace  early,  say,  as  soon 
as  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  had  been  accomplished.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  100.) 

10.  The  Grey  proposal  for  a  collective  guaranty  of  the  powers 
During  the  two  days  preceding  Germany's  declaration  of 
war  against  Russia,  the  diplomatic  activity  of  the  powers 
in  their  efforts  to  avoid  war  seems  to  have  been  redoubled 
and  the  overlapping  of  the  various  proposals  made  and 
supported  by  the  different  powers  makes  it  very  difficult  to 
unravel  the  web.  We  have  already  seen  how,  on  July  30, 
Austria  agreed  to  renew  direct  conversations  with  Russia, 
while  England,  with  the  support  of  France,  brought  for- 
ward the  suggestion  originally  made  by  M.  Jules  Cambon 
at  Berlin. 

On  July  30,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  told  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Rome  that  he  was  'telegraphing  to  the 


240     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Italian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  ask  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  suggest  that  the  idea  of  an  exchange  of  views 
between  the  four  powers  should  be  resumed  in  any  form 
which  Austria  would  consider  acceptable.  It  seemed  to 
him  that  Germany  might  invite  Austria  to  state  exactly 
the  terms  which  she  would  demand  from  Servia,  and  give  a 
guaranty  that  she  would  neither  deprive  her  of  independ- 
ence nor  annex  territory.  It  would  be  useless  to  ask  for 
anything  less  than  was  contained  in  the  Austrian  ultima- 
tum, and  Germany  would  support  no  proposal  that  did 
not  imply  success  for  Austria.  It  might,  on  the  other  hand, 
be  ascertained  from  Russia  what  she  would  accept,  and 
once  they  knew  the  standpoints  of  these  two  countries, 
discussions  could  be  commenced  at  once.  There  was  still 
time  so  long  as  Austria  had  received  no  check.  He  in  any 
case  was  in  favor  of  continuing  an  exchange  of  views  with 
the  English  Government,  if  the  idea  of  discussions  between 
the  four  powers  was  impossible.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  106;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  79.) 

In  line  with  this  suggestion  Sir  Edward  Grey  tele- 
graphed, July  31,  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen:  "I  hope  that 
the  conversations  which  are  now  proceeding  between 
Austria  and  Russia  may  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result.  The 
stumbling-block  hitherto  has  been  Austrian  mistrust  of 
Servian  assurances  and  Russian  mistrust  of  Austrian 
intentions  with  regard  to  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  Servia.  It  has  occurred  to  me  that,  in  the  event  of  this 
mistrust  preventing  a  solution  being  found  by  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg,  Germany  might  sound  Vienna,  and  I  would 
undertake  to  sound  St.  Petersburg,  whether  it  would  be 
possible  for  the  four  disinterested  powers  to  offer  to  Aus- 
tria that  they  would  undertake  to  see  that  she  obtained 
full  satisfaction  of  her  demands  on  Servia,  provided  that 
they  did  not  impair  Servian  sovereignty  and  the  integrity 
of  Servian  territory.  As  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  Aus- 
tria has  already  declared  her  willingness  to  respect  them. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  241 

Russia  might  be  informed  by  the  four  powers  that  they 
would  undertake  to  prevent  Austrian  demands  going  the 
length  of  impairing  Servian  sovereignty  and  integrity.  All 
powers  would,  of  course,  suspend  further  military  opera- 
tions or  preparations.  You  may  sound  the  Secretary  of 
State  about  this  proposal." 

The  dispatch  goes  on  to  recount  the  previously  men- 
tioned offer  to  collaborate  with  Germany,1  and  to  with- 
draw from  the  conflict  unless  France  and  Russia  were 
ready  to  accept  any  reasonable  proposal  put  forward,  and 
concludes:  "You  can  add  this  when  sounding  Chancel- 
lor or  Secretary  of  State  as  to  proposal  above."  (July  31, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  111.) 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  reported  the  result 
of  this  commission  as  follows :  — 

"I  spent  an  hour  with  Secretary  of  State  urging  him 
most  earnestly  to  accept  your  proposal  and  make  another 
effort  to  prevent  terrible  catastrophe  of  a  European  war. 

"He  expressed  himself  very  sympathetically  toward 
your  proposal,  and  appreciated  your  continued  efforts  to 
maintain  peace,  but  said  it  was  impossible  for  the  Imperial 
Government  to  consider  any  proposal  until  they  had  re- 
ceived an  answer  from  Russia  to  their  communication  of 
to-day  (July  31);  this  communication,  which  he  admitted 
had  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  being  that,  unless  Russia 
could  inform  the  Imperial  Government  within  twelve 
hours  that  she  would  immediately  countermand  her  mo- 
bilization against  Germany  and  Austria,  Germany  would 
be  obliged  on  her  side  to  mobilize  at  once. 

"I  asked  His  Excellency  why  they  had  made  their  de- 
mand even  more  difficult  for  Russia  to  accept  by  asking 
them  to  demobilize  in  south  as  well.  He  replied  that  it  was 
in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  all  her  mobilization 
was  only  directed  against  Austria. 

"His  Excellency  said  that  if  the  answer  from  Russia 

1  See  ante,  p.  233;  (B.  W.  P.  111.) 


242     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

was  satisfactory  he  thought  personally  that  your  proposal 
merited  favorable  consideration,  and  in  any  case  he  would 
lay  it  before  the  Emperor  and  Chancellor,  but  he  repeated 
that  it  was  no  use  discussing  it  until  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment had  sent  in  their  answer  to  the  German  demand. 

"He  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor  William, 
at  the  request  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  German 
Foreign  Office  had  even  up  till  last  night  been  urging  Aus- 
tria to  show  willingness  to  continue  discussions  —  and  tele- 
graphic and  telephonic  communications  from  Vienna  had 
been  of  a  promising  nature  —  but  Russia's  mobilization 
had  spoiled  everything."    (July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  121.) 

What  form  of  collective  guaranty  the  powers  had  in 
mind  is  perhaps  indicated  in  the  conversation  which  M. 
Jules  Cambon  had  with  Herr  Von  Jagow,  July  29:  "The 
Secretary  then  remarked  that  with  Eastern  peoples  one 
could  never  have  enough  guaranties,  and  that  Austria 
wished  to  have,  over  the  execution  of  the  promises  made 
to  her,  a  control  which  Servia  refused  to  give.  This,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  is  the  capital  point.  I 
replied  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  if  Servia  desired  to  remain 
independent,  she  was  bound  to  reject  the  control  of  a  single 
power,  but  that  an  international  commission  would  not 
present  the  same  character.  There  was  more  than  one  in 
the  Balkan  States,  beginning  with  the  financial  commission 
in  Athens.  One  might,  for  example,  I  said,  imagine  among 
other  combinations  a  provisional  international  commission 
entrusted  with  the  duty  of  controlling  the  police  inquiry 
demanded  by  Austria.  It  was  clear  from  this  example  that 
the  Servian  reply  opened  the  door  to  conversations,  and 
did  not  justify  a  rupture."  (Extract,  July  29,  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  92.) 

11.  Germany  asks  Russia  to  propose  a  formula 

When  M.  Sazonof,  on  July  29,  had  received  from  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  information  which  he  con- 


'  THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  243 

sidered  as  indicating  Austria's  definite  refusal  to  discuss 
with  Russia  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note  (B.  W.  P.  no. 
93),  he  had  told  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg 
that  'he  purposed,  when  informing  the  German  Ambas- 
sador of  this  refusal  of  Austria's,  to  urge  that  a  return 
should  be  made  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference of  four  ambassadors,  or  at  all  events  for  an  ex- 
change of  views  between  the  three  ambassadors  less 
directly  interested,  Sir  Edward,  and  also  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador if  Sir  Edward  thought  it  advisable.  Any  arrange- 
ment approved  by  France  and  England  would,  he  said,  be 
acceptable  to  him,  and  he  did  not  care  what  form  such 
conversations  took.  No  time  was  to  be  lost,  and  the  only 
way  to  avert  war  was  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  succeed  in 
arriving,  by  means  of  conversations  with  ambassadors, 
either  collectively  or  individually,  at  some  formula  which 
Austria  could  be  induced  to  accept.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78;  cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  48.) 

Accordingly,  when,  shortly  after,1  the  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  had  a  conversation  with  the  German 
Ambassador,  he  urged  him  to  agree  to  an  ambassadorial 
conference  in  London  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  a  media- 
tory influence,  at  the  same  time  that  direct  negotiations 
were  being  carried  on  between  Austria  and  Russia;  but 
the  German  Ambassador  objected  that  the  mobilization 

1  There  seems  to  be  a  confusion  in  regard  to  this  matter.  In  B.  W.  P. 
no.  93  (2),  identical  with  R.  O.  P.  no.  49,  both  dated  July  29,  M.  Sazonof 
proposed  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  direct  conversations  with  Aus- 
tria should  be  paralleled  by  discussions  of  the  four  powers.  In  B.  W.  P. 
no.  93  (3),  which  is  identical  with  R.  O.  P.  no.  50,  M.  Sazonof  says  that  at 
the  time  he  made  that  suggestion  he  had  not  learned  from  M.  Schebeko 
of  Austria's  refusal  to  agree  to  a  direct  exchange  of  views  (B.  W.  P.  no.  93 
(1),  identical  with  R.  O.  P.  no.  45).  Yet  no.  48  of  the  Russian  Orange  Book, 
sent  on  July  28,  seems  to  indicate  that  the  Russian  Government  had  al- 
ready heard  of  Austria's  military  action  against  Servia.  From  B.  W.  P. 
no.  78,  dated  July  29,  we  learn  that  M.  Sazonof  had  heard  of  the  Austrian 
refusal  to  agree  to  direct  conversations,  and  that  he  told  the  British  Am- 
bassador that  he  intended,  when  informing  the  German  Ambassador  of 
this  refusal,  to  urge  upon  him  a  return  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  of  a 
conference  of  the  four  powers. 


244     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Russia  had  undertaken  would  render  this  very  difficult, 
and  remarked  that  Russia  was  asking  Germany  to  take  in 
regard  to  Austria  the  very  step  which  she  blamed  Austria 
for  taking  in  regard  to  Servia.  Nevertheless  he  agreed  to 
transmit  the  conversation.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  93  (2) ;  R.  0.  P. 
no.  49;  G.  W.  B.  Memorandum,  pp.  9-10.) 

The  same  day,  July  29,  Von  Tchirsky,  the  German  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna,  said,  as  has  been  noted  above,  that 
"if  proposals  were  put  forward  which  opened  any  prospect 
of  possible  acceptance  by  both  sides,  he  personally  thought 
that  Germany  might  consent  to  act  as  mediator  in  concert 
with  the  three  other  powers."  (Extract,  July  29,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  94.) 

This  effort  to  maintain  direct  negotiation,  paralleled  by 
mediation  or  diplomatic  intervention1  through  an  ambas- 
sadorial conference,  was  wrecked  by  Austria's  refusal, 
July  28,  to  continue  any  discussion  with  Russia  relative  to 
the  modifications  of  the  terms  laid  down  in  her  note,  and 
by  her  bombardment  of  Belgrade.  As  soon  as  M.  Sazonof 
learned  (July  29)  of  Austria's  refusal,  he  considered  that 
England  alone  could  preserve  the  peace  by  exercising  her 
mediatory  action.  It  was  under  these  circumstances  that 
the  German  Ambassador  on  July  30  2  had  a  second  inter- 
view with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  When  the  Ambassador  perceived 
that  war  was  inevitable,  he  broke  down  completely  and 

1  If  Austria  had  really  acquiesced,  it  would  have  been  mediation.  If  Ger- 
many had  joined  the  other  powers  and  forced  her  to  yield,  the  ambassado- 
rial conference  would  have  constituted  diplomatic  intervention.  The  term 
"diplomatic  intervention"  is  often  used  for  any  diplomatic  suggestion  re- 
garding the  relations  of  other  states.  It  is  sometimes  hard  to  distinguish 
from  "good  offices,"  except  that  diplomatic  intervention  supposes  the  pos- 
sibility that  suggestions  made  may  be  supported  by  force. 

2  According  to  R.  O.  P.  no.  63,  it  would  seem  that  this  conversation  must 
have  taken  place  on  July  29,  but  R.  O.  P.  no.  60  confirms  July  30  as  the 
correct  date.  As  the  interview  took  place  at  2  a.m.  and  was  sent  immediately 
(d'urgence)  to  Berlin,  the  dispatch  may  have  reached  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  at  the  same  time  as  one  sent  July  29.  This  may  account 
for  the  confusion. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  245 

appealed  to  M.  Sazonof  to  make  some  suggestion  which 
he  could  telegraph  to  the  German  Government  as  a  last 
hope.  M.  Sazonof  accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to  the 
German  Ambassador  a  formula  in  French,  of  which  the 
following  is  a  translation :  — 

"If  Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict  with  Servia 
has  assumed  the  character  of  a  question  of  European 
interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate  from  her 
ultimatum  points  which  violate  the  principle  of  sover- 
eignty of  Servia,  Russia  engages  to  stop  all  military 
preparations." 
The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  in  trans- 
mitting this  formula,  informed   Sir  Edward  Grey  that 
'preparations   for   general   mobilization   would   be  pro- 
ceeded with,  if  this  proposal  was  rejected  by  Austria,  and 
the  inevitable  result  would  be  a  European  war.  The  excite- 
ment at  St.  Petersburg  had,  the  Ambassador  said,  reached 
such  a  pitch  that,  if  Austria  refused  to  make  a  concession, 
Russia  could  not  hold  back,  and  now  that  she  knew  that 
Germany  was  arming,  she  could  hardly  postpone,  for 
strategical  reasons,  converting  partial  into  general  mobil- 
ization.'    (Modified   quotation,    and   extract,    July   30, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  97.) 

In  the  telegram  which  was  immediately  dispatched  to 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  inform  him  of  this 
formula  suggested  by  M.  Sazonof  at  the  request  of  the 
German  Ambassador,  M.  Sazonof  instructs  the  Ambas- 
sador 'to  telegraph  him  at  once  the  attitude  of  the  Ger- 
man Government  after  this  new  proof  of  the  desire  of  the 
Russian  Government  to  do  everything  possible  to  reach  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  question,  for,  says  the  Minister,  we 
cannot  permit  negotiations  such  as  these  to  serve  only  the 
purpose  of  affording  Germany  and  Austria  time  to  make 
their  military  preparations.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
30,  R.  O.  P.  no.  60.) 
In  other  words,  this  formula  was  something  in  the 


246     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

nature  of  a  last  word  or  ultimatum  from  Russia.  It  is 
most  important  to  note  that  according  to  the  documents 
(R.  O.  P.  nos.  49;  50),  this  change  of  tone  occurred  at  or 
after  the  interview  of  the  German  Ambassador  with  M. 
Sazonof  on  July  29.  The  Russian  Foreign  Minister  seems 
to  have  taken  umbrage  at  the  tone  employed  by  the  Am- 
bassador upon  that  occasion,  for  he  said,  speaking  of  the 
interview,  that  'he  feared  that  the  German  Ambassador 
would  not  help  to  smooth  matters  over  if  he  used  to  his 
own  Government  the  same  language  he  had  when  speaking 
to  him.1  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  78; 
cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  100.)  In  a  telegram  sent  that  day,  July  29, 
to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  he  also  said,  'since 
they  [Russia]  could  not  arrest  their  military  preparations 
as  Germany  desired,  it  only  remained  for  them  to  accel- 
erate their  armament  and  to  take  measures  for  the  prob- 
able inevitability  of  war.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29, 
R.  O.  P.  no.  58.) 

Although  M.  Sazonof  was  not  unwilling  to  continue  at 
this  time  his  efforts  toward  conciliation  and  cooperation 
with  the  other  powers  in  an  attempt  to  reach  a  peaceful  so- 
lution (cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  49),  it  appears  beyond  doubt  that 
the  war  party  was  gaining  headway.2  Then  came  word  of 
Austria's  refusal  to  continue  discussions  (R.  O.  P.  no.  50), 
and  M.  Sazonof  informed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  only 
hope  for  peace  lay  in  England's  initiative.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  93.) 

The  German  point  of  view  is  that  Russia's  change  of 

1  On  July  28,  Count  Berchtold  instructed  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  to  urge  the  German  Government  to  threaten  Russia  with  a  counter- 
mobilization  if  she  persisted  in  mobilizing  the  four  southern  districts  against 
Austria.  In  closing,  Count  Berchtold  remarks:  "It  seems  to  me  that  at  this 
moment  plain  language  would  be  the  most  efficacious  means  to  make 
Russia  realize  all  the  consequences  of  assuming  a  threatening  attitude." 
(Extract,  July  28,  A.  R.  B.  no.  42;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  48.)  The  plain  language 
to  which  the  Austrian  Minister  refers  does  not  seem  to  have  been  taken  in 
good  part  by  M.  Sazonof  when  delivered  the  next  day  (July  29). 

s  Cf.  Report  of  the  Belgian  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  ante,  p.  192. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  247 

attitude  was  due  to  the  conviction  that  England  would 
back  her  up.1  Doubtless  this  belief  may  have  stiffened  her 
attitude,  but  that  is  not  the  question,  as  long  as  this  stiff- 
ening went  no  further  than  a  proper  respect  for  her  dignity 
and  interests,  and  did  not  constitute  a  withdrawal  of  her 
cooperation  with  less  interested  powers  in  reaching  a 
peaceful  solution. 

This  change  of  attitude  on  England's  part  is  indicated 
by  the  telegram  of  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London, 
July  30,  giving  an  account  of  his  interview  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey :  — 

"Have  communicated  the  contents  of  your  telegrams  of 
the  29th  and  30th  July  to  Grey,  who  considers  the  situa- 
tion very  serious,  but  desires  to  continue  the  pourparlers. 
I  observed  to  Grey  that,  since  you  had  proposed  to  him  to 
accept  anything  he  might  propose  in  favor  of  the  main- 
tenance of  peace,  provided  that  Austria  would  not  profit 
by  the  delays  to  crush  Servia,  the  situation  in  which  you 
found  yourself  was  apparently  modified.  At  that  period 
our  relations  with  Germany  were  not  compromised.  After 
the  declaration  of  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg concerning  the  German  mobilization,2  these  relations 
had  changed,  and  her  demand  had  received  from  you  the 
only  reply  which  a  great  power  could  give.  When  the 
Ambassador  of  Germany  returned  to  you  and  asked  for 
your  conditions,  you  formulated  them  in  altogether  special 
circumstances.  I  at  the  same  time  again  insisted  with 
Grey  on  the  necessity  of  taking  into  consideration  the  new 
situation  created  by  the  fault  of  Germany  in  consequence 

1  See  above,  p.  192. 

2  The  motive  of  this  action  of  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg is  explained  in  the  Austrian  Red  Book  (no.  42),  which  shows  that 
Austria  urged  Germany  to  threaten  Russia  with  a  counter-mobilization 
if  she  mobilized  even  partially  and  only  against  Austria.  The  paramount 
interest  of  the  peace  of  Europe  required  that  M.  Sazonof  should,  like 
Bismarck,  remember  that  it  was  a  case  in  which  "Le  plus  sage  cede"  (the 
wiser  yields),  and  not  allow  German  threats  to  hasten  or  increase  Russia's 
preparations. 


248     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

of  the  action  of  the  German  Ambassador.  Grey  replied 
that  he  understood  it,  and  that  he  would  take  these  argu- 
ments into  consideration."   (July  30,  R.  O.  P.  no.  64.) 

When  the  Ambassador  said  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the 
Russian  conditions  had  been  formulated  under  exceptional 
circumstances,  it  was  equivalent,  in  diplomatic  language, 
to  saying  that  it  was  tantamount  to  an  ultimatum.  It  was 
at  least  a  "  near  "-ultimatum,  even  if  not  as  "near"  as  was 
the  Austrian  note  to  Servia.  The  conditions  laid  down  by 
Russia  are  seen  to  be  that  Austria  should  agree  to  allow 
the  powers  to  discuss  and  modify  the  terms  of  her  note  to 
Servia.  To  have  agreed  to  this  would  have  humbled  Aus- 
tria in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  The  Russian  Minister  cannot 
for  one  moment  have  thought  that  Austria  would  accept 
such  a  formula.  President  Poincare'  expressed  to  the  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  his  opinion  that  the  '  conditions  laid  down 
by  Russia  would  not  be  accepted.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  99.)  The  German  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  he  con- 
sidered the  Russian  (Sazonof)  formula  unacceptable  for 
Austria.   (July  30,  R.  O.  P.  no.  63.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  speaking  of  the  Sazonof  formula  in  a 
dispatch  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  said 
that  the  Russian  Ambassador  feared  that  the  conditions 
laid  down  could  not  be  modified,  but  Sir  Edward's  opinion 
was  that  '  if  the  Austrian  advances  were  stopped  after  the 
occupation  of  Belgrade,  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs'  formula  might  be  changed  to  read  that  the  powers 
would  examine  how  Servia  could  fully  satisfy  Austria 
without  impairing  Servian  sovereign  rights  or  independ- 
ence. 

'If  Austria,  having  occupied  Belgrade  and  neighboring 
Servian  territory,  declared  herself  ready,  in  the  interest  of 
European  peace,  to  cease  her  advance  and  to  discuss  how 
a  complete  settlement  could  be  arrived  at,  he  hoped  that 
Russia  would  also  consent  to  a  discussion  and  suspension 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  249 

of  further  military  preparations,  provided  that  the  other 
powers  did  the  same. 

'It  was  a  slender  chance  of  preserving  peace,  but  the 
only  one  he  could  suggest  if  J;he  Russian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  could  come  to  no  agreement  at  Berlin.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  103.) 

Upon  receipt  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  request,  M.  Sazonof 
'sent  for  the  British  and  French  Ambassadors  and  asked 
them  to  telegraph  to  their  respective  governments  the  fol- 
lowing formula,  as  best  calculated  to  amalgamate  the  pro- 
posal made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  his  telegram  of  July  30 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  103)  with  the  formula  the  Russian  Minister 
had  previously  offered:  "If  Austria  will  agree  to  check 
the  advance  of  her  troops  on  Servian  territory;  if,  recogniz- 
ing that  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  has  as- 
sumed a  character  of  European  interest,  she  will  allow  the 
great  powers  to  look  into  the  matter  and  determine 
whether  Servia  could  satisfy  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment without  impairing  her  rights  as  a  sovereign  state 
or  her  independence,  Russia  will  undertake  to  maintain  her 
waiting  attitude." '  1  (Modified  quotation  and  extract, 
July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  120;  R.  O.  P.  no.  67.) 

August  1,  Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  the  modified 
Russian  proposal  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen  at  Berlin,  and  it 
was  communicated  to  the  other  powers.  (B.  W.  P.  no. 
132.) 

It  must  be  remarked  that  this  revised  formula  substi- 
tutes for  Russia's  original  offer  "to  stop  all  military  opera- 
tions" a  promise  "to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude."  This 
significant  modification  may  have  been  due  to  the  previ- 

1  The  original  French  text  is  as  follows:  "Si  l'Autriche  consent  a  arreter 
la  marche  de  ses  armies  sur  le  territoire  Serbe  et  si,  reconnaissant  que  le 
conflit  austro-serbe  a  assume'  le  caractere  d'un  question  d'int6r£t  europden, 
elle  admet  que  les  Grandes  Puissances  examinent  la  satisfaction  que  la 
Serbie  pourrait  accorder  au  gouvernement  d'Autriche-Hongrie  sans  laisser 
porter  atteinte  a  ses  droits  d'Etat  souverain  et  a  son  independance,  —  la 
Russie  s'engage  a  conserver  son  attitude  expectante."  (July  31,  R.  O.  P. 
no.  67.) 


250     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ous  issuance  of  an  order  for  the  general  mobilization  of  the 
Russian  forces,1  which  would  have  made  it  impracticable 
to  arrest  the  measures  when  once  begun.  The  Russian 
Government  may  also  have  felt  more  confident  of  Eng- 
lish support  and  been  unwilling  to  make  a  real  concession 
for  the  sake  of  peace.  Those  who  sympathize  with  Russia 
will  consider  M.  Sazonof's  action  in  modifying  what  was 
virtually  an  ultimatum  as  a  most  conciliatory  action  on  his 
part,  while  the  Russophobes  will  declare  this  action  was 
only  taken  to  secure  England's  support,  and  that  its  in- 
sincerity was  shown  by  Russia's  making  no  effort  to  arrest 
her  mobilization.  The  impartial  critic  must  remember 
that  Germany  could  not  possibly  allow  Russia  to  under- 
take a  general  mobilization,  so  that  Russia's  promise  not 
to  commence  the  war  or  commit  any  act  of  aggression  has 
the  appearance  more  of  an  attempt  to  deceive  the  ignorant 
than  of  an  effort  to  calm  the  apprehensions  of  Germany. 
At  the  very  commencement  of  the  crisis,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  warned  the  Russian  Government  that  Germany,  to 
avoid  a  surprise,  must  attack  Russia  if  Russia  mobilized, 
and  Von  Jagow  merely  repeated  what  all  intelligent  ob- 
servers knew,  when  he  said  to  M.  Jules  Cambon  that  'the 
heads  of  the  army  were  insisting  on  mobilization,  for  every 
delay  was  a  loss  of  strength  for  the  German  Army.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  30,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  109;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
105.) 

Opinions  may  differ  as  to  whether  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria had  given  Russia  cause  for  her  action,  but  I  believe  an 
examination  of  the  events  and  the  documents  must  lead  to 
the  conclusion  — 

(1)  That  Russia,  up  to  the  29th  of  July,  did  everything 
that  could  reasonably  be  expected  of  her  to  satisfy  Austria, 
and  preserve  the  peace.  It  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that 
the  first  responsibility  of  allowing  the  difference  to  come  to 
a  rupture  must  be  laid  at  the  door  of  Germany  and  Austria. 

1  See  above,  chap,  iv,  §  7;  chap,  vi,  §  4. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  251 

(2)  That  when,  between  July  29  and  31,  Germany 
might  perhaps  have  been  ready  to  agree  to  the  proposal 
for  mediation  on  the  basis  of  Austria's  occupation  of  Bel- 
grade, Russia  by  undertaking  more  extensive  military 
preparations,  practically  forced  Germany's  retaliatory  dec- 
laration of  war. 

I  know  that  it  will  be  urged  that  Germany  might  still 
have  made  some  proposal  to  avert  the  rupture  instead 
of  embittering  the  relations  between  the  two  countries 
through  the  accusations  of  her  Ambassador  and  the  insinu- 
ations of  her  military  attache.  If  Germany  on  the  one 
hand  had  accepted  at  the  last  minute  the  English  proposal 
for  mediation  on  the  basis  of  Austria's  occupation  of  Bel- 
grade, she  might  very  possibly  have  prevented  war.  Rus- 
sia on  the  other  hand  was  in  a  position  to  refrain  from 
mobilizing  until  she  was  actually  attacked,  especially  since 
the  very  condition  of  her  slowness  in  mobilizing  made  it 
relatively  of  small  importance  whether  or  not  she  gained 
a  start  of  a  few  hours  more  or  less  on  her  adversary. 

In  one  other  respect  we  must  criticize  the  Russian  state- 
ments; that  is,  when  they  accuse  the  Germans  of  wishing 
to  drag  matters  out  until  they  had  completed  military 
preparations.  This  charge  might  have  had  some  slight 
foundation  in  regard  to  Austria's  invasion  of  Servia,  for  un- 
doubtedly, if  Austria  could  have  crushed  Servia  before  she 
had  to  cope  with  Russia,  it  would  have  been  a  very  con- 
siderable advantage;  but  the  Servians,  by  retiring  to  the 
mountains,  would  have  made  it  impossible  to  vanquish 
them  quickly,  and  anyway,  if  Russia  had  taken  more 
pains  to  make  it  clear  that  she  would  restrict  her  mobiliza- 
tion to  the  Austrian  frontier,  she  could  have  blocked  this 
move  of  Austria's.  As  regards  Germany,  it  does  seem 
unreasonable  that  she  should  be  accused  of  delaying  mat- 
ters for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  her  position,  when 
it  is  an  almost  self-evident  fact  that  every  hour  of  delay 
would  cost  her  dear.  No;  we  can  only  explain  what  Russia 


252     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

would  designate  as  German  temporization,  on  the  ground 
either  that  Germany  thought  it  possible  that  an  accept- 
able solution  might  be  found  without  recourse  to  arms,  or 
else  that  she  feared  to  have  her  action  appear  so  aggres- 
sive as  to  alienate  a  large  part  of  her  people.  It  hardly 
seems  that  the  latter  reason  had  much  force,  and  we  must 
conclude  that  up  to  the  date  of  Russia's  more  extensive 
mobilization  Germany  believed  in  the  possibility  of  main- 
taining peace. 

12.  Austria  agrees  to  mediation 

We  have  seen  how  Russia,  acting  on  the  suggestion  of 
Germany,  first  proposed  direct  conversations  in  place  of 
the  mediation  conference  at  London  to  which  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  invited  the  powers,  and  how  Sir  Edward  held 
his  proposal  in  abeyance  to  await  the  result  of  the  direct 
negotiations,  while  the  powers  continued  at  the  same  time 
to  exert  their  influence  for  peace  and  moderation  at 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  Austria,  however,  was  deter- 
mined to  prevent  any  mediation  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
cussing and  modifying  her  note  to  Servia;  accordingly  she 
refused  to  accept  the  idea  of  the  conference  first  suggested 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  rejected  Russia's  proposal  for 
direct  conversations.  Then  from  the  powers  came  various 
formulas  or  suggestions  as  bases  for  mediation,  and  Ger- 
many at  the  same  time  continued  her  efforts  to  prevail 
upon  Austria  to  accept  direct  negotiations; !  but  just  when 

1  The  German  White  Book  gives  a  series  of  telegrams  exchanged  between 
the  Kaiser  and  the  Tsar.  On  July  28  at  10.45  p.m.,  the  Kaiser  sent  a  telegram 
informing  the  Tsar  of  his  efforts  to  induce  Austria  to  "come  to  a  frank  and 
satisfactory  understanding  with  Russia."  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  20.)  The 
Kaiser  emphasized  their  common  interest  in  repressing  regicide  and  ap- 
pealed to  the  Tsar  to  cooperate  with  him.  This  telegram  seems  to  have 
crossed  with  one  the  Tsar  sent  the  Kaiser  next  day  (July  29)  at  1  p.m.,  in 
which  he  expressed  great  indignation  at  Austria's  action  in  declaring  war  on 
Servia,  and  asked  the  Kaiser  to  help  him  '  in  the  name  of  their  old  friend- 
ship to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  prevent  his  ally  from  going  too  far.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  21.)  To  this  the  German 
Emperor  replied  that  same  afternoon  (July  29)  at  6.30  p.m.,  defending 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  253 

this  had  been  accomplished,1  Russia's  attitude,  so  extraor- 
dinarily conciliatory  hitherto,  changed,  and  in  reply  to  the 

Austria's  action  and  declaring  his  opinion  that  Russia  might  remain  an 
onlooker  while  the  Austro-Servian  War  continued.  He  further  warned  the 
Tsar  that  military  preparations,  which  might  be  construed  as  a  menace  to 
Austria,  would  be  apt  to  precipitate  a  crisis  and  undermine  the  Kaiser's 
mediatory  action,  which  the  Kaiser  said  he  had  willingly  undertaken  upon 
the  Tsar's  appeal  to  his  friendship  for  assistance.  (July  29,  G.  W.  B.  ex- 
hibit 22.)  This  was  followed  a  few  hours  later  (July  30,  1  a.m.)  by  another 
telegram  in  which  the  Kaiser,  having  received  notice  of  the  Russian  mobili- 
zation against  Austria,  warned  the  Tsar  that  such  action  on  Russia's  part 
might  make  his  position  as  mediator  impossible.  The  Kaiser  ended  by  de- 
claring that  the  responsibility  of  deciding  for  war  or  peace  lay  with  the 
Tsar.  (July  30,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  23.)  On  this  same  day  (July  30,  at  1.20 
p.m.)  the  Tsar  sent  another  telegram.  (This  was  evidently  dispatched  by  the 
Tsar  before  he  had  received  the  Kaiser's  telegram  of  July  30,  since  Nich- 
olas thanked  the  Kaiser  for  his  quick  reply  which  must  refer  to  the  Kaiser's 
telegram  of  July  29.)  Therein  the  Tsar  explained  that  the  measures  taking 
place  had  been  decided  upon  five  days  ago  and  were  necessary  in  response 
to  Austria's  preparations.  He  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Kaiser  would 
not  let  them  affect  his  mediatory  action,  which  Russia  appreciated  very 
highly  (July  30,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  23a).  On  the  next  day  (July  31),  the 
Kaiser  and  Tsar  each  sent  telegrams  at  2  p.m.,  which  therefore  crossed. 
The  Tsar  declared  that  it  was  impossible  to  arrest  the  mobilization,  but 
that  his  troops  would  not  undertake  any  provocative  action  (G.  W.  B. 
memorandum,  p.  8.)  The  Kaiser  accused  Russia  of  making  serious  prepa- 
rations for  war  on  his  eastern  frontier,  thus  forcing  Germany  to  have  re- 
course to  counter-measures  of  defense.  (G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  8.) 
It  is  possible  that  the  menacing  tone  of  the  Kaiser's  last  telegram  influ- 
enced the  Russian  Government  to  take  the  premature  and  ever-to-be- 
regretted  step  of  ordering  a  general  mobilization. 

The  Russian  Government  did  not  apprise  France  or  England  of  the  issu- 
ance of  her  order  for  general  mobilization,  but  telegrams  were  exchanged 
between  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  and  King  George,  on  July  30,  and  on  the 
next  day  the  Kaiser  telegraphed  King  George  that  Russia  had  ordered  the 
mobilization  of  her  entire  fleet  and  army.  (See  pp.  28-29  of  the  Authorized 
American  Edition  of  the  German  White  Book  published  by  the  Fatherland.) 
August  1,  at  1.30  in  the  morning,  Mr.  Asquith  was  received  by  King  George 
(London  Times,  Aug.  3),  and  two  hours  later  (3.30  a.m.)  Sir  Edward  Grey 
telegraphed  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  apply  at  once 
for  an  audience  with  the  Tsar  and  to  convey  to  him  the  following  personal 
message  from  the  King:  — 

"  My  Government  has  received  the  following  statement  from  the  German 
Government :  — 

On  July  29,  the  Russian  Emperor  requested  the  German  Emperor  by 
telegraph  to  mediate  between  Russia  and  Austria.  The  Emperor  immedi- 
ately declared  his  readiness  to  do  so.    He  informed  the  Russian  Emperor 

1  See  above,  §4. 


254     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

menacing  words  of  Count  Pourtales,  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor, relative  to  Russia's  mobilization,  she  stated,  almost  in 

of  this  by  telegraph,  and  took  the  required  action  at  Vienna.  Without 
waiting  for  the  result  of  this  action  Russia  mobilized  against  Austria.  By 
telegraph  the  German  Emperor  pointed  out  to  the  Russian  Emperor  that 
hereby  his  attempt  at  mediation  would  be  rendered  illusory.  The  Emperor 
further  asked  the  Russian  Emperor  to  suspend  the  military  operations 
against  Austria.  This,  however,  did  not  happen.  In  spite  of  this  the  Ger- 
man Government  continued  its  mediation  in  Vienna.  In  this  matter  the  Ger- 
man Government  have  gone  to  the  farthest  limit  of  what  can  be  suggested 
to  a  Sovereign  State  which  is  the  ally  of  Germany.  The  proposals  made  by 
the  German  Government  in  Vienna  were  conceived  entirely  on  the  lines 
suggested  by  Great  Britain,  and  the  German  Government  recommended 
them  in  Vienna  for  their  serious  consideration.  They  were  taken  into 
consideration  in  Vienna  this  morning.  During  the  deliberations  of  the 
(?  Austrian)  Cabinet,  and  before  they  were  concluded,  the  German  Am- 
bassador in  St.  Petersburg  reported  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  Russian 
army  and  fleet.  Owing  to  this  action  on  the  part  of  Russia,  the  Austrian 
answer  to  the  German  proposals  for  mediation,  which  were  still  under  con- 
sideration, was  not  given.  This  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  is  also  directed 
against  Germany  —  that  is  to  say,  the  power  whose  mediation  had  been 
invoked  by  the  Russian  Emperor.  We  were  bound  to  reply  with  serious 
counter-measures  to  this  action,  which  we  were  obliged  to  consider  as  hostile, 
unless  we  were  prepared  to  endanger  the  safety  of  our  country.  We  are  un- 
able to  remain  inactive  in  face  of  the  Russian  mobilization  on  our  frontier. 
We  have  therefore  informed  Russia  that,  unless  she  were  prepared  to  sus- 
pend within  twelve  hours  the  warlike  measures  against  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria, we  should  be  obliged  to  mobilize,  and  this  would  mean  war.  We  have 
asked  France  if  she  would  remain  neutral  during  a  German-Russian  war.' 

"I  cannot  help  thinking  that  some  misunderstanding  has  produced  this 
deadlock.  I  am  most  anxious  not  to  miss  any  possibility  of  avoiding  the 
terrible  calamity  which  at  present  threatens  the  whole  world.  I  therefore 
make  a  personal  appeal  to  you  to  remove  the  misapprehension  which  I  feel 
must  have  occurred,  and  to  leave  still  open  grounds  for  negotiation  and  pos- 
sible peace.  If  you  think  I  can  in  any  way  contribute  to  that  all-important 
purpose,  I  will  do  everything  in  my  power  to  assist  in  reopening  the  inter- 
rupted conversations  between  the  powers  concerned.  I  feel  confident  that 
you  are  as  anxious  as  I  am  that  all  that  is  possible  should  be  done  to  secure 
the  peace  of  the  world." 

To  this  the  Tsar  replied :  — 

"I  would  gladly  have  accepted  your  proposals  had  not  German  Ambas- 
sador this  afternoon  presented  a  note  to  my  Government  declaring  war. 
Ever  since  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade,  Russia  has  devoted 
all  her  efforts  to  finding  some  pacific  solution  of  the  question  raised  by  Aus- 
tria's action.  Object  of  that  action  was  to  crush  Servia  and  make  her  a 
vassal  of  Austria.  Effect  of  this  would  have  been  to  upset  balance  of  power 
in  Balkans,  which  is  of  such  vital  interest  to  my  Empire.  Every  proposal, 
including  that  of  your  Government,  was  rejected  by  Germany  and  Austria, 
and  it  was  only  when  favorable  moment  for  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  255 

the  form  of  an  ultimatum  to  Austria,  what  would  be  her 
conditions.  According  to  the  terms  of  these,  Austria  must 
agree  to  the  mediation  of  the  powers  for  the  purpose  of 
modifying  the  Austrian  note.  From  the  beginning  Austria 
had  refused  all  such  proposals  and  there  was  little  likeli- 
hood that  she  would  accept  the  first  Sazonof  formula ;  the 
modified  Sazonof  formula,  however,  was  less  humiliating 
for  her. 

On  July  30,  Count  Berchtold  told  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna  that  "he  had  no  objection  to  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg  continuing  their  conversations,  although 
he  did  not  say  that  they  could  be  resumed  on  the  basis  of 
the  Servian  reply."  (Extract,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  96; 
cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  104.) 

Count  Berchtold  sent  instructions  that  same  day  (July 
30)  to  Count  Szapary,  the  Austrian  Ambassadorjat  St. 
Petersburg,  to  "  elucidate  to  M.  Sazonof  the  various 
points  of  the  note  addressed  to  Servia,  though  it  has  been 
superseded  by  later  events."  (Extract,  July  30,  A.  R.  B. 
no.  49.) 

On  July  31,  M.  Sazonof  instructed  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  London  that  'he  thought  it  was  only  at  London 

Austria  had  passed  that  Germany  showed  any  disposition  to  mediate. 
Even  then  she  did  not  put  forward  any  precise  proposal.  Austria's  declara- 
tion of  war  on  Servia  forced  me  to  order  a  partial  mobilization,  though,  in 
view  of  threatening  situation,  my  military  advisers  strongly  advised  a 
general  mobilization  owing  to  quickness  with  which  Germany  can  mobilize 
in  comparison  with  Russia.  I  was  eventually  compelled  to  take  this  course 
in  consequence  of  complete  Austrian  mobilization,  of  the  bombardment  of 
Belgrade,  of  concentration  of  Austrian  troops  in  Galicia,  and  of  secret  mili- 
tary preparations  being  made  in  Germany.  That  I  was  justified  in  doing 
bo  is  proved  by  Germany's  sudden  declaration  of  war,  which  was  quite  un- 
expected by  me,  as  I  had  given  most  categorical  assurances  to  the  Emperor 
William  that  my  troops  would  not  move  so  long  as  mediation  negotiations 
continued. 

"In  this  solemn  hour  I  wish  to  assure  you  once  more  that  I  have  done 
all  in  my  power  to  avert  war.  Now  that  it  has  been  forced  on  me,  I  trust 
your  country  will  not  fail  to  support  France  and  Russia.  God  bless  and 
protect  you."    (London  Times,  August  5,  1914.) 


256     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

that  the  pourparlers  would  still  have  some  chance  of  suc- 
cess by  facilitating  Austria's  acquiescence  in  a  necessary 
compromise.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  31,  R.  O.  P.  no. 
69;  cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  56.) 

We  have  seen  how  the  German  Government,  yielding 
to  the  representations  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  had  asked 
Vienna,  on  July  30,  what  would  satisfy  them.1  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  107.) 

In  reply  Count  Berchtold  sent  next  day  (July  31),  the 
following  dispatch  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin : 

"  I  request  Your  Excellency  to  thank  the  Secretary  of 
State  most  deeply  for  the  information  transmitted  to  us 
through  Herr  von  Tchirsky  and  to  tell  him  that  we,  in 
spite  of  the  change  in  the  situation  occasioned  by  Russia's 
mobilization,  would  be  willing  to  cooperate  with  Sir  E. 
Grey  in  his  proposal  to  mediate  between  ourselves  and 
Servia. 

"Our  acceptance  would  naturally  be  upon  the  condi- 
tions that  our  military  operations  against  Servia  shall 
meanwhile  take  their  course,  and  that  the  English  Cabinet 
prevail  upon  the  Russian  Government  to  arrest  the  Rus- 
sian mobilization  against  us,  in  which  case  we  would  natu- 
rally at  once  countermand  in  Galicia  the  defensive  military 
measures  forced  upon  us  by  Russia's  mobilization."  2 
(Extract,  July  31,  A.  R.  B.  no.  51.) 

On  July  31,  Sir  Edward  Grey  learned  from  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London  that,  'as  a  result  of  suggestions 
by  the  German  Government,  a  conversation  had  taken 
place  at  Vienna  between  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and  the  Russian  Ambassador.  The  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  had  also  been  instructed  that 
he  might  converse  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 

1  See  above,  p.  233. 

2  The  French  Ambassador  questions  the  sincerity  of  Austria's  acceptance 
of  mediation.  (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  121.  See  above,  p.  260.)  This  same  view 
is  suggested  as  probable  by  Durkheim  and  Denis,  Who  Wanted  War? 
Colin,  Paris,  1915,  p.  55,  note  1. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  257 

Affairs,  and  that  he  should  give  explanations  about  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  and  discuss  suggestions 
and  any  questions  directly  affecting  Austro-Russian  rela- 
tions.' (Modified  quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  110. 
Cf.  A.  R.  B.  nos.  49,  50.) 

On  this  same  date  (July  31),  Sir  Edward  received  a  tele- 
gram, dispatched  that  day  from  the  British  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  stating:  — 

"It  has  been  decided  to  issue  orders  for  general  mobil- 
ization. 

"This  decision  was  taken  in  consequence  of  report 
received  from  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  ef- 
fect that  Austria  is  determined  not  to  yield  to  interven- 
tion of  powers,  and  that  she  is  moving  troops  against 
Russia  as  well  as  against  Servia. 

"Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is 
making  active  military  preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford 
to  let  her  get  a  start."   (July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  113.) 

On  August  1,  the  following  telegram  from  M.  Sazonof, 
dated  July  31,  was  communicated  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  the  Governments  of  the  other  powers:  — 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  declared  the  readi- 
ness of  his  Government  to  discuss  the  substance  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia.  M.  Sazonof  replied  by  ex- 
pressing his  satisfaction,  and  said  it  was  desirable  that  the 
discussions  should  take  place  in  London  with  the  partici- 
pation of  the  great  powers. 

"M.  Sazonof  hoped  that  the  British  Government  would 
assume  the  direction  of  these  discussions.  The  whole  of 
Europe  would  be  thankful  to  them.  It  would  be  very  im- 
portant that  Austria  should  meanwhile  put  a  stop  provi- 
sionally to  her  military  action  on  Servian  territory." 
(August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  133.) 

On  August  1,  the  same  day  that  M.  Sazonof  s  telegram 
of  July  31  was  communicated  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  he  tele- 
graphed to  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg:  — 


258     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

"  Information  reaches  me  from  a  most  reliable  source 
that  Austrian  Government  have  informed  German  Gov- 
ernment that,  though  the  situation  has  been  changed  by 
the  mobilization  of  Russia,  they  would  in  full  appreciation 
of  the  efforts  of  England  for  the  preservation  of  peace  be 
ready  to  consider  favorably  my  proposal  for  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Servia.  The  understanding  of  this 
acceptance  would  naturally  be  that  the  Austrian  military 
action  against  Servia  would  continue  for  the  present,  and 
that  the  British  Government  would  urge  upon  Russian 
Government  to  stop  the  mobilization  of  troops  directed 
against  Austria,  in  which  case  Austria  would  naturally 
cancel  those  defensive  military  counter-measures  in  Gali- 
cia,  which  have  been  forced  upon  Austria  by  Russian 
mobilization. 

"You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
say  that  if,  in  the  consideration  of  the  acceptance  of  medi- 
ation by  Austria,  Russia  can  agree  to  stop  mobilization, 
it  appears  still  to  be  possible  to  preserve  peace.  Pre- 
sumably the  matter  should  be  discussed  with  German 
Government,  also  by  Russian  Government."  (August  1, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  135.) 

The  following  dispatch,  dated  August  1,  sent  by  M. 
Viviani,  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  respon- 
sible head  of  the  Government,  to  the  French  representa- 
tives abroad,  gives  an  account  of  the  Austrian  action:  — 

"Two  steps  were  taken  yesterday  evening  by  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassadors  :  one  rather  vague  at  Paris,  and  the 
other  at  St.  Petersburg  definite  and  conciliatory. 

"Count  Szecsen  called  upon  me  and  declared  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  officially  informed 
Russia  that  it  entertained  no  territorial  ambition  and 
would  not  touch  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  of  Servia; 
that  it  also  repudiated  all  intention  of  occupying  the 
Sandjak;  but  that  these  declarations  of  disinterestedness 
would  only  preserve  their  value  if  the  war  remained  local- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  259 

ized  to  Austria  and  to  Servia,  a  European  war  opening  up 
eventualities  which  it  was  impossible  to  foresee.  The 
Austrian  Ambassador,  in  commenting  on  these  declara- 
tions, let  it  be  understood  that  although  his  Government 
could  not  reply  to  the  questions  of  the  powers  speaking 
in  their  own  names,  it  could  doubtless  reply  to  Servia 
or  to  a  power  which  asked  its  conditions  on  behalf  of  Ser- 
via. He  added  that  here  there  might  perhaps  still  be  a 
possibility. 

"In  St.  Petersburg  the  Austrian  Ambassador  called  on 
M.  Sazonof  and  communicated  to  him  the  consent  of  his 
Government  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  as  to  the  basis  of 
the  ultimatum  addressed  to  Servia.  The  Russian  Minister 
declared  himself  satisfied  with  this  declaration,  and  pro- 
posed that  the  conversations  should  take  place  in  London 
with  the  participation  of  the  powers.  M.  Sazonof  had 
doubtless  asked  the  British  Government  to  take  over  the 
direction  of  the  negotiations.  He  pointed  out  that  it 
would  be  very  important  that  Austria  should  cease  her 
operations  in  Servia. 

"These  facts  show  that  Austria  at  last  says  that  she 
is  inclined  to  an  arrangement,  just  as  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment is  also  ready  to  enter  into  negotiations  on  the 
basis  of  the  English  proposal.1 

"Unfortunately  these  dispositions,  which  might  justify 
hope  in  a  pacific  solution,  appear  in  fact  bound  to  be  an- 
nulled by  Germany's  attitude.  This  power  has,  indeed, 
delivered  an  ultimatum  giving  the  Russian  Government 
twelve  hours  in  which  to  agree  to  demobilization  not  only 
on  the  German  frontier,  but  also  on  the  Austrian  frontier. 
This  period  expires  at  noon.  The  ultimatum  is  not  justi- 
fied, since  Russia  has  accepted  the  English  proposal,  which 
implies  a  suspension  of  military  preparations  by  all  the 
powers."  2  (Extract,  August  1,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  120.) 

1  The  Cambon  suggestion.  See  §  9,  ante. 

*  It  is  not  clear  to  what  acceptance  M.  Viviani  refers;  Russia  had  given 


260     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  in  his 
dispatch  of  August  1,  says:  — 

"My  Russian  colleague  yesterday  evening  received  two 
telegrams  from  M.  Sazonof  advising  him  that  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  stated  that  the  Austrian 
Government  was  ready  to  discuss  with  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment the  basis  even  of  the  note  to  Servia.  M.  Sazonof 
replied  that  in  his  opinion  these  conversations  should  take 
place  in  London. 

"The  ultimatum  to  Russia  can  but  lessen  the  last 
chances  of  peace  which  seem  to  be  held  out  by  these  con- 
versations. It  may  be  asked  if  in  such  circumstances 
Austria's  acceptance  was  serious,  and  if  its  aim  were  not 
to  make  the  responsibility  for  the  struggle  fall  upon 
Russia. 

"To-night  my  British  colleague  has  made  a  pressing 
appeal  to  Herr  von  Jagow's  sentiments  of  humanity. 
The  latter  replied  that  the  question  was  too  involved, 
and  that  the  Russian  reply  to  the  German  ultimatum  must 
be  awaited.  Moreover,  he  said  to  Sir  E.  Goschen  that 
the  ultimatum  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  Russian 
mobilization  not  only  against  Germany,  but  also  against 
Austria.  My  British  colleague  showed  himself  more  than 
surprised,  and  told  him  that  this  last  point  appeared  to  be 
unacceptable  to  Russia. 

"The  ultimatum  of  Germany,  intervening  just  at  the 
exact  time  at  which  agreement  appeared  on  the  point  of 
being  established  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  is 
significant  of  her  bellicose  policy. 

a  qualified  acceptance  of  "anything  arranged  by  the  four  powers,  provided 
it  was  acceptable  to  Servia"  (B.W.  P.  no.  78) ;  but  Russia  had  not  agreed  to 
arrest  her  mobilization.  Furthermore  this  assertion  that  Russia  had 
accepted  the  English  proposal  does  not  correspond  with  the  statement  a  few 
lines  above  that  the  Russian  Government  was  ready  to  negotiate  on  the 
basis  of  the  English  proposal.  (Cf.  also  the  German  Chancellor's  note  of 
December  24,  1914,  to  the  German  representatives,  New  York  Times, 
January  15,  1915;  and  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich's  article  in  the  New  York  Times, 
March  14,  1915.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  261 

"The  dispute  existed  only  between  Russia  and  Austria, 
Germany  having  to  intervene  only  as  the  ally  of  Austria. 
In  these  conditions  the  two  powers  chiefly  interested 
being  ready  to  talk,  if  Germany  did  not  want  war  on  her 
own  account,  it  would  be  incomprehensible  that  she  should 
send  an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  instead  of  continuing  to 
work  like  all  the  other  powers  for  a  peaceful  solution." 
(August  1,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  121.) 

According  to  the  report  of  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  at  Vienna,  after  July  30,  when  Count 
Berchtold  'gave  his  consent  to  the  continuation  of  the 
conversations  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  tension  between 
Russia  and  Germany  was  much  greater  than  between 
Russia  and  Austria.  As  between  the  latter,  the  Ambassa- 
dor stated,  an  arrangement  seemed  almost  in  sight,  and 
on  the  1st  of  August,  he  was  informed  by  the  Russian 
Ambassador  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg had  at  last  conceded  the  main  point  at  issue,  by 
announcing  to  M.  Sazonof  that  Austria  would  consent  to 
submit  to  mediation  the  points  in  the  note  to  Servia  which 
seemed  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  Servian 
independence.  The  Russian  Ambassador  stated  that  M. 
Sazonof  had  accepted  this  proposal  on  condition  that  Aus- 
tria would  refrain  from  actual  invasion  of  Servia.  Austria, 
in  fact,  had  finally  yielded,  and  that  she  herself  had  at 
this  point  good  hopes  of  a  peaceful  issue  is  shown  by  the 
communication  made  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the  1st  of 
August  by  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London,  to  the 
effect  that  Austria  had  neither  " banged  the  door"  on 
compromise  nor  cut  off  the  conversations.  The  Russian 
Ambassador  to  the  end  worked  hard  for  peace.  He  em- 
ployed the  most  conciliatory  language  to  Count  Berchtold, 
and  he  informed  Sir  Maurice  that  Count  Berchtold  as  well 
as  Count  Forgach,  the  Austrian  Under-Secretary,  had 
responded  in  the  same  spirit.  Certainly  it  was  too  much 
for  Russia  to  expect  that  Austria  would  hold  back  her 


262     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

armies;  but  this  matter  could  probably  have  been  settled 
by  negotiation,  and  the  Russian  Ambassador  repeatedly 
told  Sir  Maurice  that  he  was  prepared  to  accept  any  rea- 
sonable compromise. 

'Unfortunately  these  conversations  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  Vienna  were  cut  short  by  the  transfer  of  the  dispute 
to  the  more  dangerous  ground  of  a  direct  conflict  between 
Germany  and  Russia.  Germany  intervened  on  the  31st  of 
July  by  means  of  her  double  ultimatums  to  St.  Petersburg 
and  Paris.  The  ultimatums  were  of  a  kind  to  which  only 
one  answer  is  possible,  and  Germany  declared  war  on 
Russia  on  the  1st,  and  on  France  on  the  3d  of  August. 
A  few  days'  delay  might  in  all  probability  have  saved 
Europe  from  one  of  the  greatest  calamities  in  history.' 
(Modified  quotation,  September  1,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellane- 
ous, no.  10,  p.  3.) 

It  is  important  to  compare  these  statements  with  the 
reports  which  the  Austrian  Ambassador  sent  from  St. 
Petersburg.  On  July  31,  Count  Szapary  telegraphed  Count 
Berchtold:  "Your  Excellency  will  have  learned  from  my 
telegram  of  the  29th  that  I,  without  awaiting  instructions, 
had  resumed  conversations  with  Sazonof  practically  on 
the  basis  now  suggested  by  you,  without  coming  notice- 
ably closer  to  an  understanding."  (Extract,  July  31, 
A.  R.  B.  no.  55.)  The  next  day,  August  1,  he  sent  the 
following  report :  — 

"On  my  visit  to  M.  Sazonof  to-day,  I  declared  that  I 
had  received  certain  instructions,  but  that  I  was  not  aware 
of  the  situation  created  in  Vienna  by  the  Russian  general 
mobilization. 

"  Therefore,  in  carrying  out  the  instructions  which  had 
been  dispatched  to  me  before  that  event,  I  could  not  take 
into  account  the  newly  created  situation.  I  said  that  the 
two  points  of  your  instructions  dealt  with  the  misun- 
derstanding arising  out  of  our  refusal  to  discuss  mat- 
ters any  further  with  Russia.    As  I  had  said,  even  before 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  263 

I  was  authorized  to  do  so,  this  conception  was  erroneous. 
I  pointed  out  that  you  were  not  only  willing  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  Russia  on  a  most  comprehensive  basis, 
but  even  to  discuss  the  wording  of  our  note,  inasmuch  as  it 
was  only  a  question  of  interpretation. 

"I  emphasized  the  point  that  your  instructions  once 
more  bore  out  your  good  intentions;  that  I  was  still  ignor- 
ant of  the  effect  produced  in  Vienna  by  the  Russian  general 
mobilization,  and  that  I  could  but  hope  that  events  might 
not  yet  have  carried  us  too  far.  In  any  case  I  considered 
it  my  duty  at  the  present  momentous  juncture  to  furnish 
another  proof  of  the  good-will  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government. 

"M.  Sazonof,  in  reply,  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  this 
evidence  of  our  good  intentions,  but  observed  that  for 
obvious  reasons  the  neutral  ground  of  London  would 
promise  better  success  for  the  proposed  negotiations  than 
St.  Petersburg.  I  replied  that  you  desired  to  be  in  direct 
touch  with  St.  Petersburg,  and  that  I  was  consequently 
unable  to  give  an  opinion  on  the  suggestion,  but  would  not 
fail  to  convey  it  to  you."   (August  1,  A.  R.  B.,  no.  56.) 

These  dispatches  do  not  bear  out  the  statements  of  MM. 
Viviani,  Cambon,  and  de  Bunsen,  that  Austria  and  Russia 
were  on  the  point  of  a  settlement  when  the  German  ulti- 
matum to  Russia  intervened.  Austria  was  willing  to  give 
assurances  to  Russia  that  she  would  not  impinge  upon 
either  the  territorial  integrity  or  the  sovereignty  of  Servia. 
She  would  not,  however,  agree  to  any  modification  of  the 
terms  of  the  ultimatum,  and  insisted  upon  pursuing  her 
military  operations  until  the  ultimatum  had  been  accepted 
without  condition  by  Servia.  Austria  had  announced  that 
it  would  not  be  enough  for  Servia  to  accept  the  terms  of  the 
original  ultimatum  after  war  had  been  declared,  but  that 
she  would  have  to  give,  beside,  security  to  indemnify 
Austria  for  the  expense  incurred  in  mobilizing.  (Cf. 
A.  R.  B.  no.  17.) 


264     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

At  the  last  moment,  July  31  (see  A.  R.  B.  no.  51), 
Austria  agreed  to  consider  the  Servian  answer  as  a  basis 
for  negotiation,  on  condition  (1)  that  she  continue  her 
military  operations  against  Servia,  and  (2)  that  Russia 
demobilize.  On  her  side  Austria  would  then  arrest  her 
preparations  in  Galicia.  It  does  not  appear  whether 
Austria  also  would  have  agreed  to  arrest  her  advance  after 
she  had  taken  Belgrade.  If  Russia  had  demobilized, 
Austria  might  have  found  some  new  excuse  for  continuing 
her  conquest,  and  Russia  would  then  have  been  in  no 
position  to  make  her  protest  heard. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  Russian  Government  could 
not  have  demobilized  against  Austria,  and  it  would  have 
been  very  difficult  for  it  to  remain  passive  while  Austria 
invaded  Servia.  It  is  possible  that  the  fear  which  Russia 
may  have  had  that  the  other  powers  would  ask  her  to  make 
that  sacrifice  for  the  cause  of  peace  hastened  the  issuance 
of  the  general  mobilization  order  after  the  German  Am- 
bassador had  threatened  a  counter-mobilization.  At  that 
point  both  Austria  and  Russia  were  playing  for  the  support 
of  the  other  powers.  When  Germany,  instigated  by  Aus- 
tria, threatened  Russia,  July  29,  Russia  replied  by  draw- 
ing the  attention  of  England  and  France  to  the  undiplo- 
matic course  pursued  by  the  German  Ambassador  and, 
on  the  31st,  issued  the  order  for  a  general  mobilization.1 

13.   The  failure  to  reach  a  compromise 

The  principal  efforts  of  the  diplomatists  had  been  di- 
rected towards  securing  some  solution  in  regard  to  the 
Servian  question  which  would  satisfy  both  Austria  and 
Russia.  The  powers  were  able  neither  to  find  an  acceptable 
compromise  nor  to  reach  any  agreement  as  to  the  method 
of  procedure  for  continuing  the  search  further.  Media- 
tion had  been  suggested  and  refused.  Direct  conversations 

1  French  authorities  argue  that  Austria  mobilized  before  Russia.  See 
Durkheim  and  Denis,  Who  Wanted  Wart  p.  40,  note  2. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  265 

had  been  accepted  by  Austria  and  Russia  and  then  termi- 
nated because  Austria  was  unwilling  to  discuss  any  modi- 
fication of  her  terms  as  laid  down  to  Servia.  Meanwhile 
the  various  military  preparations  had  increased  the  ten- 
sion and  diminished  the  chance  of  reaching  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion, while  at  the  same  time  stimulating  the  diplomats 
in  their  final  efforts  to  find  some  acceptable  compromise. 
Various  formulas  were  suggested,  but  in  the  confusion  of 
the  last  two  or  three  days  it  is  not  possible  to  decide  with 
any  definiteness  how  far  they  might  have  been  acceptable 
if  further  time  for  peaceful  discussion  could  have  been 
found.1  On  July  30,  Austria,  at  the  solicitation  of  Ger- 
many, explained  to  Russia  that  she  was  ready  to  elucidate 
the  terms  of  her  note  to  Servia  and  to  continue  direct  nego- 
tiations with  Russia,  and  Russia  on  this  same  day  modified 
the  conditions  she  had  laid  down  in  her  first  formula,  but 
no  longer  agreed  to  arrest  her  military  preparations.  This 
Sazonof  formula,  as  we  have  seen,  required  Austria  to 
accept  the  mediation  of  the  powers  and  eliminate  from 
her  ultimatum  those  conditions  which  were  incompatible 
with  the  maintenance  of  Servian  independence  and  in- 
tegrity. The  next  day  (July  31),  just  after  Germany  had 
launched  her  ultimatum  requiring  Russia  to  demobilize,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  brought  forward  his  final  proposal,  which 
was  that  Austria  and  Russia  should  arrest  their  military 
preparations,  on  the  understanding  that  the  powers  would 

1  The  situation  was  characterized  by  the  Paris  Journal  des  Debats  as 
follows:  "All  these  formula?  of  the  old  Chancelleries  have  had  their  day. 
Let  us  consider  facts  only.  The  Triple  Alliance  has  challenged  the  Triple 
Entente.  The  German  Ambassadors  at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburg 
have  just  supported  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  declaring  that  the 
Governments  to  which  they  were  accredited  must,  under  penalty  of  incal- 
culable consequences,  allow  Austria  to  enslave  Servia.  The  Cabinets  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Paris,  and  London  have  replied  in  courteous  terms  that  they 
would  not  allow  this  crime  to  be  consummated.  It  has  gone  as  far  as  that. 
All  the  formula?  in  the  world  will  not  change  the  situation.  Austria-Ger- 
many must  effectively  renounce  the  execution  of  her  plan  or  the  two  forces 
will  come  face  to  face."  (Extract,  July  31, 1914,  Journal  des  Debats,  Paris, 
"Le  Dessein  Austro-Allemand.") 


266     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

work  to  find  some  solution  satisfactory  alike  to  Austria 
and  Russia.  According  to  these  terms  Austria  would 
receive  adequate  guaranty  against  the  continuance  of 
the  hostile  Servian  propaganda  and  unfriendly  action  of 
Servia,  of  which  she  justly  complained.  With  due  regard 
to  the  rights  of  Servia  and  the  prestige  of  her  mighty  pro- 
tector, nothing  would  be  accepted  which  should  infringe 
upon  Servia's  rights  as  a  sovereign  state.  It  was  Sir  Ed- 
ward's thought  that  Germany  might  support  this  pro- 
posal at  Vienna  while  the  other  powers  entered  into  a 
friendly  discussion  at  London,  but  although  the  German 
Government  expressed  a  favorable  opinion  of  this  proposal, 
the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Von  Jagow,  refused  to 
cooperate  at  Vienna  until  an  answer  to  the  German  ulti- 
matum should  be  received  from  Russia.  This  dashed  all 
hopes,  since  it  was  hardly  likely  that  Russia  would  make 
a  conciliatory  reply  to  an  ultimatum  couched  in  such 
terms. 

It  is  hard  to  overestimate  the  place  which  compromise 
plays  in  the  affairs  of  nations.  But  for  the  system  of 
mutual  "give  and  take,"  all  international  intercourse  were 
well-nigh  impossible,  and  except  where  there  is  an  inten- 
tion to  force  an  issue,  in  all  disputes  the  governments  con- 
cerned are  ready  to  concede  something  of  their  extreme 
claims  for  the  sake  of  reaching  a  half-way  and  peaceful 
result.1  It  is  the  work  of  the  diplomatist  to  trace  this  line, 

1  Cf.  R.  O.  P.  no.  51,  where  Von  Jagow  told  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  that  he  learned  that  M.  Sazonof  was  "more  inclined  than  previously 
to  find  a  compromise  acceptable  to  all  parties."  M.  Sazonof  had  said  to 
the  German  Ambassador  that,  "after  the  concessions  which  had  been  made 
by  Servia,  it  should  not  be  very  difficult  to  find  a  compromise  to  settle  the 
other  questions  which  remained  outstanding,  provided  that  Austria  showed 
some  good-will  and  that  all  the  powers  used  their  entire  influence  in  the 
direction  of  conciliation."    (Extract,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  92  (2).) 

Such  evidently  was  not  the  frame  of  mind  of  Baron  von  Giesl,  the  Aus- 
trian Minister  at  Belgrade,  when  two  days  before  the  presentation  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  he  wrote  to  Vienna:  "Half  measures,  demands,  end- 
less debating,  and  finally  a  foul  compromise,  would  be  the  hardest  blow  to 
Austria-Hungary's  prestige  in  Servia  and  her  standing  as  a  great  power 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  267 

and  for  such  negotiations  a  certain  length  of  time  is  neces- 
sary. The  more  complex  and  delicate  the  situation,  the 
longer  must  be  the  period  allowed.  In  the  present  in- 
stance the  diplomats  realized  from  the  very  first  that  in 
place  of  weeks,  a  few  days  would  have  to  suffice  to  effect 
the  work  of  peace.  The  task  would  have  been  difficult 
enough  in  an  atmosphere  of  general  confidence  and  good 
will,  but  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  mutual  rivalries 
and  distrust  of  the  powers.  In  his  speech  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  August  3,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said:  — 

"In  the  present  crisis,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  secure 
the  peace  of  Europe;  because  there  has  been  little  time, 
and  there  has  been  a  disposition  —  at  any  rate  in  some 
quarters  on  which  I  will  not  dwell  —  to  force  things  rapidly 
to  an  issue,  at  any  rate  to  the  great  risk  of  peace,  and  as 
we  now  know,  the  result  of  that  is  that  the  policy  of  peace 
as  far  as  the  great  powers  (generally)  are  concerned,  is  in 
danger.  ..." 

in  Europe."  (Extract,  July  21,  A.  R.  B.  no.  6.)  The  Austrian  Government 
seem  to  have  taken  these  words  to  heart.  government 


CHAPTER  VIII 

SIR  EDWARD  GREY  AND  THE  ENGLISH  DIPLOMACY 

The  important  r61e  of  England  —  Efforts  to  prevent  war  —  Efforts  to 
organize  mediation  —  England  refuses  to  take  sides  — The  Anglo- French 
Entente  —  England  declares  that  she  is  not  interested  in  a  Balkan  ques- 
tion —  England  warns  Germany  that  she  will  not  hold  aloof  if  France  is 
involved  —  Germany's  bid  for  English  neutrality  —  Divergence  of  opinion 
in  England  —  England's  vital  interests  —  England's  inquiry  relative  to 
Belgium's  neutrality  —  England  asked  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France 
—  Germany's  detention  of  English  vessels  —  Germany  invades  Luxemburg 
> —  England  agrees  to  protect  the  French  coasts  —  The  British  ultimatum. 

1 .  The  important  rdle  of  England 

In  the  midst  of  all  these  preparations,  mobilizations  and 
counter-mobilizations,  England  with  her  First  Fleet  assem- 
bled at  Portsmouth  was  the  key  to  the  whole  European 
situation.  The  fears  of  Austria  and  Germany  and  the 
hopes  of  France  and  Russia  centered  about  the  probable 
course  of  England.  No  other  state  was  so  free  from  entan- 
gling alliances,  none  was  so  secure  from  invasion,  and  in 
case  of  war,  no  state  as  a  neutral  would  have  had  such  an 
opportunity  for  commercial  expansion.  But  England,  hav- 
ing built  up  an  immense  empire,  required  security  above 
everything ;  so  her  first  desire  was  to  prevent  the  outbreak 
of  any  war  between  the  powers,  and  if  this  should  not  be 
possible,  she  still  hoped  to  keep  out  of  it  herself. 

At  this  critical  juncture  the  control  of  England's  foreign 
affairs  was  in  the  experienced  hands  of  the  broad-minded 
and  large-framed  statesman  —  Sir  Edward  Grey.1  In  the 
short  period  between  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  note 
at  Belgrade  and  the  British  ultimatum  at  Berlin,  Sir 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey,  third  baronet,  was  born  April  25,  1862.  He  was  edu- 
cated at  Balliol  College,  Oxford,  and  has  been  a  member  of  the  Liberal  party 
in  Parliament  since  1885.  In  1892  he  became  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  holding  office  three  years.  Since  1905  he  has  held  the  office  of  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  269 

Edward  is  shown  by  the  British  White  Paper  to  have  had 
a  constant  succession  of  interviews,  and  to  have  sent  nearly 
sixty  dispatches  to  the  British  representatives  at  the  cap- 
itals of  the  great  powers.  Together  with  this  great  tax  on 
his  time  and  energy  went  the  heaviest  responsibility  which 
has  ever  fallen  to  any  single  man.  Under  ordinary  circum- 
stances the  responsibility  of  the  British  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs  is  heavy  enough,  when  he  can  refer  to 
his  colleagues  and  gauge  the  trend  of  opinion  in  his  party 
or  throughout  the  country  as  a  whole;  but  when  events 
move  with  such  rapidity  as  they  did  just  preceding  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war,  he  has  to  make  almost  instan- 
taneous decisions  on  very  important  questions,  where  any 
misstep  may  destroy  confidence  in  his  party  or  even  in- 
volve his  country  in  war.  He  has  to  decide  what  the  coun- 
try wishes  and  what  the  country  needs,  and  act  upon  it 
forthwith.  It  is  easily  understood  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
first  object  must  have  been  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  war, 
but  he  had  at  the  same  time  to  be  working  to  keep  Eng- 
land out  of  the  war  should  it  prove  inevitable.  His  great 
responsibility  lay  in  deciding  which  plans  or  methods  to 
follow.  He  had  to  be  sure  that  he  took  no  step  without  the 
support  of  a  Cabinet  which  was  torn  by  conflicting  views; 
he  had  further  to  feel  certain  that  the  policy  adopted  would 
secure  a  large  non-partisan  majority  in  Parliament  and  be 
enthusiastically  acclaimed  by  the  press  and  the  whole 
country.  Not  a  very  easy  problem  in  statecraft,  as  we 
shall  see  when  we  come  to  examine  the  intricacies  of  the 
political  situation  and  the  sudden  transformations  during 
the  fortnight  preceding  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany. 

In  the  critical  week  following  the  presentation  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  the  diplomats  tried  one  plan  after 
another,  and  one  plan  in  conjunction  with  another,  and 
always  it  was  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  whom  they  turned  from 
all  sides. 


270     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

2.  Efforts  to  prevent  war 

Sir  Edward  turned  his  attention  from  the  very  first  to 
preventing  war  between  any  of  the  principal  powers.  As 
he  observed  to  the  German  Ambassador  at  London, 
"When  there  was  danger  of  a  European  conflict,  it  was 
impossible  to  say  who  would  not  be  drawn  into  it."  (B. 
W.  P.  no.  90.)  He  made  suggestions,  he  fathered  the  pro- 
posals of  others,  he  was  ceaseless  in  his  efforts  for  peace. 
He  first  advised  Austria  against  an  ultimatum,  explaining 
how  it  would  be  likely  to  inflame  public  opinion  in  Russia, 
and  could,  he  said,  be  introduced  later  if  Servian  pro- 
crastination made  it  necessary.  Wnen  he  learned  that  the 
time  limit  of  the  ultimatum  was  only  forty-eight  hours,  he 
had  recourse  to  the  telegraph,  and  worked  with  France, 
Russia,  and  Italy  in  an  attempt  to  prevail  upon  Austria, 
either  directly  or  through  the  mediation  of  her  ally,  Ger- 
many, to  extend  the  delay  long  enough  to  permit  of  find- 
ing some  way  out  of  the  threatening  complications.  When 
Germany  refused  to  join  in  making  the  representations 
at  Vienna,  and  Austria  refused  the  requested  extension, 
Sir  Edward  instructed  the  British  representative  at  Bel- 
grade to  bend  his  efforts  toward  securing  a  conciliatory 
reply  from  Servia.  So  successful  was  the  combined  influ- 
ence of  Russia,  England,  and  France  that  for  a  moment 
it  seemed  as  if  Austria  must  accept  Servia's  reply,  and 
forego  the  war  for  which  her  people  were  clamoring;  but 
in  spite  of  all  the  persuasion  lavished  upon  her,  Austria 
pronounced  the  reply  unacceptable.1 

3.  Efforts  to  organize  mediation 
While  all  this  was  taking  place,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
been  striving  to  set  up  a  mediatory  conference  at  London, 

1  Some  of  the  indications  of  England's  disposition  to  exercise  a  pacific 
and  restraining  influence  at  Vienna,  Belgrade,  and  St.  Petersburg  will  be 
found  in  the  following  dispatches:  B.  W.  P.  nos.  5,  6,  11,  17,  18,  30,  44,  46, 
65,  72,  104,  110,  111;  A.  R.  B.  no.  38. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  271 

and  as  soon  as  he  found  that  several  of  the  powers  ap- 
proved the  project,  he  issued  the  formal  invitation  and 
asked  the  accepting  Governments  to  urge  upon  Belgrade, 
Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg  to  refrain  from  all  aggressive 
action  until  the  conference  should  be  able  to  arrive  at 
some  solution.  Germany  agreed  to  mediation  in  principle, 
and  declared  that  she  was  ready  to  cooperate  in  media- 
tion if  necessary  to  keep  the  peace  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  but  said  emphatically  that  Austria  and  Servia  must 
be  allowed  to  settle  their  difference  without  interference 
from  other  powers.   In  place  of  the  British  proposal,  the 
German  Government  suggested  to  Russia  that  the  Austro- 
Russian  disagreement  over  the  Servian  question  be  made 
the  object  of  direct  conversations.   Russia  accepted  with 
alacrity,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  held  his  mediation  proposal 
in  abeyance  in  the  hope  that  the  direct  negotiation  might 
succeed.   These  conversations  were  suddenly  interrupted 
when  Austria,  as  if  fearing  that  the  negotiations  might  be 
successful  in  robbing  her  of  an  excuse  for  war  against  Ser- 
via, declared  that  she  could  not  discuss  any  modification  of 
the  terms  of  the  Servian  reply,  and  put  Europe  face  to  face 
with  a,  fait  accompli  by  declaring  war  against  Servia.  Rus- 
sia refused  to  be  satisfied  by  Austria's  assurances  that  she 
would  not  impair  Servia's  independence,  and  now  again 
Russia,  France,  and  Italy  turned  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
imploring  him  to  renew  his  proposal  for  conferences  at 
London  as  the  only  hope  of  averting  war.   But  Germany 
again  raised  objections  —  she  felt  that  she  could  not  drag 
her  ally  before  a  European  tribunal,  which  would  sit  in 
judgment  on  matters  interesting  only  Austria  and  Servia. 
The  British  Foreign  Minister  hastened  to  explain  that  the 
conference  would  not  be  of  so  formal  a  nature,  and  that 
nothing  would  be  proposed  which  had  not  first  been  sub- 
mitted to  both  Austria  and  Russia  for  their  approval.  In 
the  vain  effort  to  find  some  basis  of  mediation  acceptable 
to  Austria,  it  was  even  suggested  that  Austria  might  save 


272     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

her  face  by  occupying  Belgrade,  and  that  she  might  there 
agree  to  a  discussion  of  the  terms  of  settlement. 

The  natural  consequence  of  Germany's  objections  and 
Austria's  aggression  on  Servia  had  been  to  call  forth  a 
partial  mobilization  from  Russia.  When  the  German 
Chancellor  had  previously  appealed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
to  put  pressure  upon  Russia,  he  had  replied  in  no  uncertain 
terms,  warning  Germany  of  her  responsibility  for  backing 
Austria  in  her  uncompromising  attitude,  and  pointing  out 
that  Vienna  was  the  place  where  a  restraining  influence 
was  needed.  (Cf.  R.  0.  P.  no.  42.)  Germany  seems  to 
have  felt  the  justice  or  at  least  the  seriousness  of  these 
remarks,  and  to  have  spoken  at  Vienna.  Whether  as  a 
consequence  of  this  influence  from  Berlin,  or  because  she 
perceived  too  late  that  England  was  likely  to  be  drawn 
into  the  war,  the  Austrian  Government  assumed  a  much 
more  conciliatory  attitude,  and  renewed  direct  negotia- 
tions with  Russia.  The  powers  had  now  faint  hope  of  suc- 
cess from  these  conversations,  and  made  every  effort  to 
bring  Germany  into  a  conference  at  London. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  asked  Germany  herself,  since  she  had 
agreed  to  mediation  "in  principle,"  to  suggest  the  form  it 
should  take,  to  "press  the  button,"  as  the  British  Minister 
expressed  it.  When  this  offer  evoked  no  response  from 
Berlin,  except  that  the  Chancellor  to  save  time  had  passed 
it  on  directly  to  Austria,  Sir  Edward  came  forward  with 
the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano's  plan  that  Servia  should 
accept  Austria's  demands  in  their  entirety,  Austria  giving 
to  the  powers  certain  explanations  as  to  their  meaning  and 
effects.1  When  this  fell  flat,  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  ready 
to  ask  that  Austria  should  herself  suggest  an  acceptable 
formula,  which  would  have  given  the  conference  more  the 
appearance  of  an  Austrian  commission,  working  to  help 
Austria  solve  her  difficulties,  than  an  Areopagus  sitting 

1  See  above,  chap,  vii,  §  10,  pp.  240-242,  where  Sir  Edward  Grey's  offer 
and  the  Chancellor's  reply  are  given. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  273 

in  judgment  over  the  prostrate  Dual  Monarchy.  Sir  Ed- 
ward went  so  far  as  to  say  to  the  German  Ambassador  at 
London  that  'if  Germany  could  get  any  reasonable  pro- 
posal put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace,  and 
that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable  if  they  re- 
jected it,  he  would  support  it  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris, 
and  go  the  length  of  saying  .that  if  Russia  and  France 
would  not  accept  it,  the  British  Government  would  have 
nothing  more  to  do  with  the  consequences. '  (Modified 
quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  111.) 

4-  England  refuses  to  take  sides 
From  the  very  beginning,  France  and  Russia  had  been 
urging  England  to  stand  with  them,  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  deter  Germany  from  entering  upon  a  war.  The  day 
that  he  learned  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
M.  Sazonof  joined  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg 'in  pressing  the  British  representative  for  a  declara- 
tion of  complete  solidarity  of  his  Government  with  the 
French  and  Russian  Governments.  The  Ambassador 
replied  that  it  seemed  to  him  possible  that  Sir  Edward 
Grey  might  perhaps  be  willing  to  make  strong  representa- 
tions to  both  the  German  and  Austrian  Governments,  and 
to  impress  upon  them  that  an  attack  upon  Servia  by 
Austria  would  endanger  the  whole  peace  of  Europe.  Per- 
haps he  might  see  his  way  to  saying  to  them  that  such 
action  on  the  part  of  Austria  would  probably  mean  Russian 
intervention,  which  would  involve  France  and  Germany, 
and  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  keep  out 
if  the  war  were  to  become  general.  M.  Sazonof  answered 
that  England  would  sooner  or  later  be  dragged  into  war 
if  it  did  break  out;  and  that  England  would  have  rendered 
war  more  likely  if  she  did  not  from  the  outset  make  com- 
mon cause  with  his  country  and  with  France;  at  any  rate, 
he  hoped  the  British  Government  would  express  strong 


274     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

reprobation  of  the  action  taken  by  Austria.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  6;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  24.) 

The  next  day  (July  25),  M.  Sazonof  further  said  to  the 
British  Ambassador  that '  he  did  not  believe  that  Germany 
really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was  decided  by  Eng- 
land's. If  she  took  her  stand  firmly  with  France  and 
Russia,  there  would  be  no  war.  If  she  failed  them  now, 
rivers  of  blood  would  flow  and  England  would  in  the  end 
be  dragged  into  war.  The  Ambassador  replied  that  Eng- 
land could  play  the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and  Vienna 
to  better  purpose  as  a  friend,  who,  if  her  counsels  of  mod- 
eration were  disregarded,  might  one  day  be  converted  into 
an  ally,  than  if  she  were  to  declare  herself  Russia's  ally  at 
once.  M.  Sazonof  said  that,  unfortunately,  Germany  was 
convinced  that  she  could  count  upon  England's  neutrality.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no.  17;  cf.  F.  Y.  B. 
nos.  31,  47,  92.) 

A  couple  of  days  later  (July  27)  the  Russian  Ambassador 
at  London  told  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  'in  German  and 
Austrian  circles  the  impression  prevailed  that  in  any  event 
England  would  stand  aside.  He  deplored  the  effect  that 
such  an  impression  must  produce.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  47.) 

The  President  of  France  also  was  '  convinced  that  peace 
between  the  powers  was  in  the  hands  of  England.  He 
thought  that  if  the  British  Government  announced  that 
England  would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of  a 
conflict  between  France  and  Germany  as  a  result  of  the 
present  difference  between  Austria  and  Servia,  there  would 
be  no  war,  for  Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude.1 

1  George  Bernard  Shaw,  in  various  articles  appearing  in  the  press,  has 
presented  this  view  to  the  public  with  all  his  literary  skill.  We  have,  how- 
ever, to  remember  that,  though  such  may  have  been  the  sincere  conviction 
of  France,  Russia,  and  Italy,  it  was  also  the  dearest  hope  of  France  and 
Russia.  Under  the  circumstances  the  most  effective  way  for  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance to  bring  England  to  stand  with  them  was  to  express  this  view  with  as 
much  force  as  possible.   Then,  in  case  war  did  result,  France  and  Russia 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  275 

When  the  British  Ambassador  explained  how  difficult  it 
would  be  for  the  British  Government  to  make  such  an 
announcement,  M.  Poincare"  still  said  that  he  must  main- 
tain that  it  would  be  in  the  interests  of  peace.  If  there  were 
a  general  war  on  the  Continent,  it  would  inevitably  draw 
England  into  it  for  the  protection  of  her  vital  interests. 
A  declaration  at  that  time  of  England's  intention  to  sup- 
port France  would  almost  certainly  prevent  Germany  from 
going  to  war.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
99.) 

In  a  final  effort  to  obtain  a  declaration  of  support  of 
France,  President  Poincare"  sent  the  King  of  England  an 
autograph  letter  x  dated  July  31.    M.   Paul   Cambon, 

could  maintain  with  all  appearance  of  reason  that  the  war  could  have  been 
avoided  if  England  had  followed  their  advice;  as  a  consequence  their  moral 
claim  on  England's  assistance  would  have  been  very  strong.  From  the  Ger- 
man side  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  been  made  responsible  for  the  war,  on  the 
ground  that  by  standing  back  of  France  he  encouraged  France  to  promise 
Russia  support,  with  the  result  that  the  latter  by  ordering  a  general  mobili- 
zation precipitated  the  war.  (See  Bernhard  Dernburg,  Search-Lights  on  the 
War,  pp.  28-29;  cf.  the  German  Chancellor's  speech  of  December  2,  1915, 
in  the  Reichstag.) 

Whatever  the  truth  of  these  conflicting  assertions,  it  is  open  to  doubt 
whether  Germany  showed  as  conciliatory  a  disposition  after  Julv  29  as  be- 
fore.  (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  92.) 

Professor  Hans  Delbriick  writes:  "...  Grey's  fault  is  not  that  he  gave 
them  a  promise  of  help,  but  that  he  failed  to  declare  that  England  would 
not  be  on  their  side.  That,  and  that  alone,  would  have  conserved  the  peace." 
("Germany's  Answer,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1915,  p.  240.) 

1  President  Poincare"s  letter  of  July  31,  and  King  George's  reply,  dated 
August  1,  were  published  in  the  London  Times,  February  20,  1915:  — 

Paris,  July  31,  1914. 
Dear  and  great  Friend,  — 

In  the  grave  events  through  which  Europe  is  passing,  I  feel  bound 
to  convey  to  Your  Majesty  the  information  which  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  have  received  from  Germany.  The  military  prepara- 
tions which  are  being  undertaken  by  the  Imperial  Government,  espe- 
cially in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  French  frontier,  are  being 
pushed  forward  every  day  with  fresh  vigor  and  speed.  France,  re- 
solved to  continue  to  the  very  end  to  do  all  that  lies  within  her  power 
to  maintain  peace,  has,  up  to  the  present,  confined  herself  solely  to  the 
most  indispensable  precautionary  measures.  But  it  does  not  appear 
that  her  prudence  and  moderation  serve  to  check  Germany's  action; 
indeed,  quite  the  reverse.  We  are,  perhaps,  then,  in  spite  of  the  modera- 


276     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

French  Ambassador  at  London,  in  a  telegram  dispatched 
on  that  same  date  (July  31)  informs  his  Government: 

tion  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  and  the  calm  of  public  opinion, 
on  the  eve  of  the  most  terrible  events. 

From  all  the  information  which  reaches  us  it  would  seem  that  war 
would  be  inevitable  if  Germany  were  convinced  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment would  not  intervene  in  a  conflict  in  which  France  might  be 
engaged;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  convinced  that  the  en- 
tente cordiale  would  be  affirmed,  in  case  of  need,  even  to  the  extent  of 
taking  the  field  side  by  side,  there  would  be  the  greatest  chance  that 
peace  would  remain  unbroken. 

It  is  true  that  our  military  and  naval  arrangements  leave  complete 
liberty  to  Your  Majesty's  Government,  and  that,  in  the  letters  ex- 
changed in  1912  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
Great  Britain  and  France  entered  into  nothing  more  than  a  mutual 
agreement  to  consult  one  another  in  the  event  of  European  tension,  and 
to  examine  in  concert  whether  common  action  were  advisable. 

But  the  character  of  close  friendship  which  public  feeling  has  given 
in  both  countries  to  the  entente  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  the 
confidence  with  which  our  two  Governments  have  never  ceased  to  work 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  the  signs  of  sympathy  which  Your 
Majesty  has  ever  shown  to  France,  justify  me  in  informing  you  quite 
frankly  of  my  impressions,  which  are  those  of  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  and  of  all  France. 

It  is,  I  consider,  on  the  language  and  the  action  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment that  henceforward  the  last  chances  of  a  peaceful  settlement 
depend. 

We,  ourselves,  from  the  initial  stages  of  the  crisis,  have  enjoined 
upon  our  Ally  an  attitude  of  moderation  from  which  they  have  not 
swerved.  In  concert  with  Your  Majesty's  Government,  and  in  con- 
formity with  Sir  E.  Grey's  latest  suggestions,  we  will  continue  to  act 
on  the  same  lines. 

But  if  all  efforts  at  conciliation  emanate  from  one  side,  and  if  Ger- 
many and  Austria  can  speculate  on  the  abstention  of  Great  Britain, 
Austria's  demands  will  remain  inflexible,  and  an  agreement  between 
her  and  Russia  will  become  impossible.  I  am  profoundly  convinced  that 
at  the  present  moment  the  more  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  can 
give  a  deep  impression  that  they  are  united  in  their  diplomatic  action, 
the  more  possible  will  it  be  to  count  upon  the  preservation  of  peace. 

I  beg  that  Your  Majesty  will  excuse  a  step  which  is  only  inspired  by 
the  hope  of  seeing  the  European  balance  of  power  definitely  reaffirmed. 

Pray  accept  the  expression  of  my  most  cordial  sentiments. 

R.    PoiNCARE. 

Buckingham  Palace,  August  1,  1914. 
Dear  and  great  Friend,  — 

I  most  highly  appreciate  the  sentiments  which  moved  you  to  write 
to  me  in  so  cordial  and  friendly  a  spirit,  and  I  am  grateful  to  you  for 
having  stated  your  views  so  fully  and  frankly. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  277 

"According  to  your  instructions,  I  have  taken  the  neces- 
sary steps  to  secure  that  the  autograph  letter  which  the 
President  of  the  Republic  has  addressed  to  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  England  should  be  given  to  the  King  this  even- 
ing. This  step,  which  will  certainly  be  communicated  to 
the  Prime  Minister  to-morrow  morning,  will,  I  am  sure,  be 
taken  into  serious  consideration  by  the  British  Cabinet."  l 
(Extract,  July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  110.) 

Even  Italy  joined  in  urging  England  to  declare  herself 
on  the  side  of  France  and  Russia.  The  Marquis  di  San 
Giuliano  said  that  'as  Germany  was  really  anxious  for 
good  relations  with  England,  if  she  believed  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  would  act  with  Russia  and  France,  he 
thought  it  would  have  a  great  effect.'  (Modified  quota- 
tion, July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  80;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  72,  96.) 
The  following  evening,  July  30,  the  Italian  Foreign  Minis- 

You  may  be  assured  that  the  present  situation  in  Europe  has  been 
the  cause  of  much  anxiety  and  preoccupation  to  me,  and  I  am  glad  to 
think  that  our  two  Governments  have  worked  so  amicably  together 
in  endeavoring  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  questions  at  issue. 

It  would  be  a  source  of  real  satisfaction  to  me  if  our  united  efforts 
were  to  meet  with  success,  and  I  am  still  not  without  hope  that  the  ter- 
rible events  which  seem  so  near  may  be  averted. 
_  I  admire  the  restraint  which  you  and  your  Government  are  exercis- 
ing in  refraining  from  taking  undue  military  measures  on  the  frontier 
and  not  adopting  an  attitude  which  could  in  any  wise  be  interpreted 
as  a  provocative  one. 

_  I  am  personally  using  my  best  endeavors  with  the  Emperors  of  Rus- 
sia and  of  Germany  towards  finding  some  solution  by  which  actual 
military  operations  may  at  any  rate  be  postponed,  and  time  be  thus 
given  for  calm  discussion  between  the  Powers.  I  intend  to  prosecute 
these  efforts  without  intermission  so  long  as  any  hope  remains  of  an 
amicable  settlement. 

_  As  to  the  attitude  of  my  country,  events  are  changing  so  rapidly  that 
it  is  difficult  to  forecast  future  developments;  but  you  may  "be  assured 
that  my  Government  will  continue  to  discuss  freely  and  frankly  any 
point  which  might  arise  of  interest  to  our  two  nations  with  M.  Cambon. 
Believe  me, 

M.  le  President, 

(Signed)  George  R.  I. 

1  From  the  London  Times  of  August  3,  we  learn  that  Mr.  Asquith  was 
received  on  August  1 ,  at  1 .30  a.m.,  by  the  King,  who  had  been  visited  shortly 
before  midnight  by  M.  Paul  Cambon. 


278     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ter  told  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  that  'he  had 
reason  to  believe  that  Germany  was  now  disposed  to  give 
more  conciliatory  advice  to  Austria,  as  she  seemed  con- 
vinced that  England  would  act  with  France  and  Russia, 
and  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  an  issue  with  her.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  106.) 

When,  on  the  other  side,  Germany  and  Austria  ap- 
pealed to  England  to  prevent  a  European  war  by  declar- 
ing that  the  English  Government  would  not  permit  the 
peace  of  Europe  to  be  disturbed  by  a  Balkan  question  and 
that  Austria  should  be  allowed  to  settle  her  difference  with 
Servia  undisturbed,  Sir  Edward  Grey  refused.1  Before  the 

1  Cf.  above,  p.  274,  note.  An  editorial  in  the  London  Times  (December 
5,  1914),  entitled  "The  German  Premise,"  makes  answer:  "There  was  one 
minor  point  in  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  speech  in  the  Reichstag 
which  deserves  noting,  not  because  it  needs  to  be  denied,  but  because  it 
throws  light  on  the  German  state  of  mind.  The  responsibility  for  the  war, 
he  said,  falls  on  the  British  Government,  because  it  could  have  made  war 
impossible  if  it  had,  without  ambiguity,  declared  at  Petrograd  that  Great 
Britain  would  not  allow  a  Continental  war  to  develop  from  the  Austro- 
Serbian  conflict.  That,  unlike  some  other  statements  in  the  speech,  is  prob- 
ably quite  true.  But  if  the  British  Government  had  made  this  declaration 
to  the  Russians,  it  would  have  meant  simply  that  England  declared  for 
Germany  and  Austria  against  Russia.  But,  according  to  that  argument, 
all  of  the  great  powers  at  war  are  equally  responsible  because  they  did  not 
do  something  different  from  what  they  did  do.  France,  for  instance,  could 
have  prevented  the  war  if  she  had  declined  to  support  Russia;  Russia  could 
have  prevented  it  if  she  had  taken  no  interest  in  the  fate  of  Serbia;  and, 
finally,  Germany  could  have  prevented  it  if  she  had  refused  to  support  Aus- 
tria; while  as  for  Austria,  she  could  have  prevented  it  if  she  had  never  pre- 
sented her  ultimatum.  But  the  Chancellor's  argument,  poor  as  it  may  seem 
to  the  rest  of  the  world,  will  satisfy  the  Germans,  because  for  them  the 
Austro-German  resolve  was  something  as  fixed  and  unalterable  as  a  force 
of  nature.  According  to  their  notion,  the  problem  for  France,  Russia,  and 
England  was  not  to  achieve  some  compromise,  but  to  adapt  themselves  to 
that  resolve  as  best  they  could.  If  Russia  would  not  submit  to  it,  it  was  the 
duty  of  France  to  desert  her;  and  if  France  preferred  to  be  faithful  to  her 
alliance,  it  was  our  duty  to  prevent  war  by  threatening  to  throw  all  our 
power  in  on  the  6ide  of  Germany  and  Austria.  And  since  we  failed  to  do 
that,  we  are  responsible  for  the  war  that  followed.  Given  the  German  prem- 
ises, we  are;  but  on  that  condition  any  power  that  went  to  war  with  Ger- 
many in  any  possible  circumstances  would  be  responsible.  Even  Belgium  is 
responsible  because  she  did  not  allow  her  neutrality  to  be  violated.  In  fact, 
if  another  nation  exists  and  Germany  prefers  that  it  should  not  exist,  that 
nation  is  responsible  for  any  efforts  which  Germany  may  make  to  bring  its 
existence  to  an  end."   (Extract.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  279 

presentation  of  the  ultimatum  he  had  made  it  clear  to 
Austria  that  the  amount  of  influence  he  could  use  with 
Russia  would  depend  upon  the  reasonableness  of  the  de- 
mands which  Austria  made  upon  Servia.  As  soon  as  he  was 
cognizant  of  the  terms  of  the  note,  he  foresaw  — what 
was,  indeed,  plain  to  every  one  —  that  Servia  could  not 
accept  it  unconditionally,  and  that,  in  consequence  of 
Austria  s  probable  intention  of  having  recourse  to  mili- 
tary measures  against  Servia,   Russia  would  mobilize 
When  all  this  came  to  pass  and  Germany  persistently 
urged  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  influence  Russia  to  arrest  her 
military  operations,  he  replied  by  renewing  his  suggestions 
tor  quadruple  mediation  or  intervention,  but  did  not  con- 
sider that  he  could  bring  pressure  to  bear  at  St.  Peters- 
burg alone,  since  that  would  not  be  mediation  but  inter- 
vention in  favor  of  Austria. 

At  first  sight,  as  one  reads  the  documents,  it  seems  most 
probable  that  had  Sir  Edward  Grey  announced  that  Eng- 
land would  support  France  and  Russia,  he  might  have 
prevented  the  war.  I  admit  frankly  that  such  was  my  own 
opinion  until  I  had  made  a  thorough  and  critical  study  of 
the  documents  and  the  situation  of  the  respective  powers. 
As  a  result  of  this  examination  I  am  convinced  that  Sir 
Edward  would  not  have  been  justified  in  taking  any  other 
course  than  that  which  he  actually  pursued.  For  if  he  had 
let  it  be  known  that  England  would  stand  with  France  and 
Russia,  his  course  would  have  been  attended  with  two 
dangers.  In  the  first  place,  if  Germany  was  in  her  heart  of 
hearts  determined  to  have  war  unless  she  could  impose  on 
Europe  her  own  solution  of  the  Servian  and  Balkan  ques- 
tion, England's  declaration  would  have  made  it  evident 
that  Germany  must  strike  at  once  to  secure  the  whole 
benefit  of  her  speed  in  mobilization,  and  this  would  have 
been  the  easier  to  accomplish,  since  the  popular  imagina- 
tion in  Germany  would  have  been  instantly  fired  with 
hatred  of  England  for  her  interference.  Whereas,  by  hold- 


280     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ing  off,  Sir  Edward  forced  Germany,  even  if  it  were  ad- 
mitted that  she  was  set  on  war,  to  weigh  the  relative 
advantages  of  striking  at  once,  thereby  drawing  Eng- 
land in,  or  of  making  a  show  of  negotiation  to  furnish 
England  with  some  good  excuse  for  remaining  neutral. 
By  holding  aloof  and  prevailing  upon  the  other  powers  to 
show  a  conciliatory  spirit,  Sir  Edward  would  force  even 
a  power  bent  upon  war  to  lose  time *  and  to  fence  for  a 
position  justifying  it  in  the  eyes  of  its  own  people  in 
commencing  the  war. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  had  been  sincerely  and 
out  and  out  for  peace,  England  by  joining  France  and 
Russia  might  have  put  Germany  in  the  position  where  she 
could  only  yield  with  loss  of  prestige,  a  situation  to  which 
there  would  be  no  alternative  but  war.  Nor  is  it  certain 
that  France  and  Russia  would  not  have  thought  it  too 
good  an  opportunity  to  lose  and  have  found  some  means  of 
bringing  on  the  conflict.  I  admit  that  this  seems  a  wild 
hypothesis  in  view  of  all  the  efforts  made  by  France  and 
Russia  to  keep  the  peace,  but  we  do  not  know  what  at- 
tempts might  not  have  been  made  to  stampede  a  war  if 
English  support  was  certain.  In  any  event,  France  and 
Russia  must  have  been  still  more  anxious  for  peace,  when 
they  were  uncertain  as  to  England's  stand,  than  they 
would  have  been  had  they  counted  upon  her  support. 

There  is  still  another  aspect  of  the  affair  which  we  are 
likely  now  to  forget.  It  is  that  England  and  Germany  had 
been  making  sincere,  if  unfruitful,  efforts  to  reach  some 
agreement  to  eliminate  their  rivalry,  to  their  own  great 
benefit  and  for  the  good  of  the  world's  peace.2  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  having,  I  believe,  a  right  to  expect  that  peace 
could  be  maintained,  and  that  the  reasonable  prospects  of 
maintaining  peace  outweighed  the  probability  of  war  up  to 

1  Belgium  took  advantage  of  this  delay  to  mobilize,  July  31 ;  see  Charles 
Sarolea,  How  Belgium  Saved  Europe,  pp.  73-74,  1915. 

2  See  Documents:  "Anglo-German  Relations,"  post,  chap.  xm. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  281 

the  time  of  Germany's  presentation  of  her  ultimatum  to 
Russia,  would  not  have  been  justified  in  destroying  the 
growing  confidence  between  England  and  Germany.  A 
reciprocal  desire  upon  the  part  of  Germany  is  indicated  by 
Von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  remark  that  'ever  since  he  had 
been  Chancellor,  his  policy  had  been,  as  Sir  Edward  was 
aware,  to  bring  about  an  understanding  with  England.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  85.)  We  can 
sympathize  with  Sir  Edward  in  trying  to  emphasize  and 
appeal  to  this  common  desire  for  cooperation  when  he 
instructed  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  when  refusing  Germany's 
offer  to  secure  England's  neutrality,  to  say  most  earnestly 
to  the  Chancellor,  as  from  him,  that '  the  one  way  of  main- 
taining good  relations  between  England  and  Germany  was 
that  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve 
the  peace  of  Europe;  if  they  succeeded  in  this  object, 
the  mutual  relations  of  Germany  and  England  would, 
he  believed,  be  ipso  facto  improved  and  strengthened. 
For  that  object,  adds  Sir  Edward,  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  work  in  that  way  with  all  sincerity  and  good- 
will.' 

Sir  Edward  added  further : l  If  the  peace  of  Europe  could 
be  preserved,  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  his  own 
endeavor  would  be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to  which 
Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured 
that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued 
against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  England, 
jointly  or  separately.  He  had  desired  this  and  worked  for 
it,  as  far  as  he  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and, 
Germany  having  a  corresponding  object,  their  relations 
sensibly  improved.  The  idea  had  hitherto  been  too  Uto- 
pian to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this 
present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe 
had  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  he  was 
hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  would  follow 
might  make  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement 


282     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

between  the  powers  than  had  been  possible  hitherto.'1 
(Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  101.) 

As  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  expressed  it, 
'the  English  Government  was  sincerely  disposed  to  col- 
laborate with  the  German  Government  in  an  effort  to 
preserve  the  peace.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27,  R.  O. 
P.  no.  42.) 

By  taking  the  stand  he  did,  Sir  Edward  Grey  encour- 
aged, even  forced,  Germany  along  the  road  of  peaceful 
concession,  and  when  she  balked  herself  or  blocked  the 
route  for  others,  all  the  world  could  judge  of  the  real  re- 
sponsibility for  the  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

5.  The  Anglo-French  Entente 

England's  refusal  to  take  sides  involved  the  delicate 
question  of  what  were  her  obligations  toward  France  and 
Russia  by  reason  of  the  intangible  Entente.  With  what 
admirable  aplomb  the  French  Ambassador  handled  this 
most  difficult  discussion!  He  tactfully  pressed  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  to  stand  with  France,  and  asked  for  informa- 
tion as  to  what  England's  course  would  be,  without  ever 
attempting  to  tell  the  British  Government  what  its  duty 

1  Following  is  an  extract  from  some  observations  upon  the  report  of  an 
interview  with  the  German  Chancellor  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The 
publication  of  the  observations  was  authorized  by  the  British  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs:  "The  German  Chancellor  spoke  to  the  American 
correspondent  of  his  'efforts  for  years  to  bring  about  an  understanding  be- 
tween England  and  Germany,'  an  understanding,  he  added,  which  would 
have  'absolutely  guaranteed  the  peace  of  Europe.'  He  omitted  to  mention, 
what  Mr.  Asquith  made  public  in  his  speech  at  Cardiff,  that  Germany  re- 
quired, as  the  price  of  an  understanding,  an  unconditional  pledge  of  Eng- 
land's neutrality.  The  British  Government  were  ready  to  bind  themselves 
not  to  be  parties  to  any  aggression  against  Germany;  they  were  not  pre- 
pared to  pledge  their  neutrality  in  case  of  aggression  by  Germany.  An 
Anglo-German  understanding  on  the  latter  terms  would  not  have  meant  an 
absolute  guaranty  for  the  peace  of  Europe;  but  it  would  have  meant  an 
absolutely  free  hand  for  Germany,  so  far  as  England  was  concerned,  for 
Germany  to  break  the  peace  of  Europe."  (London  Times,  January  27, 
1915.  Cf.  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  speech  of  December  2.) 

What  Mr.  Asquith  said  in  his  Cardiff  Speech  of  October  2  is  given  in  the 
Documents,  post,  chap.  xiii. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  283 

was.  In  an  interview,  on  July  30,  M.  Paul  Cambon  re- 
minded Sir  Edward  of  a  letter  written  him  two  years  pre- 
viously which  read  as  follows :  — 

Foreign  Office,  November  22,  1912. 
My  dear  Ambassador:  — 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years,  the  French  and 
British  naval  and  military  experts  have  consulted  to- 
gether. It  has  always  been  understood  that  such  con- 
sultation does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Gov- 
ernment to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not 
to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed 
that  consultation  between  experts  is  not,  and  ought 
not  to  be,  regarded  as  an  engagement  that  commits 
either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency  that 
has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition, 
for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respec- 
tively at  the  present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an 
engagement  to  cooperate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either 
Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unpro- 
voked attack  by  a  third  power,  it  might  become  es- 
sential to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend 
upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  rea- 
son to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  power, 
or  something  that  threatened  the  general  peace,  it 
should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether 
both  Governments  should  act  together  to  prevent 
aggression  and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what 
measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common. 
If  these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the 
General  Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion, and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what 
effect  should  be  given  to  them.     Yours,  etc. 

E.  Grey.1 

1  B.  W.  P.  no.  105;  end.  1. 


284     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

M.  Cambon's  translated  reply  was:  — 

French  Embassy,  London,  November  23,  1912. 
Dear  Sir  Edward  :  — 

You  reminded  me  in  your  letter  of  yesterday,  22d 
November,  that  during  the  last  few  years  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  authorities  of  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain had  consulted  with  each  other  from  time  to 
time;  that  it  had  always  been  understood  that  these 
consultations  should  not  restrict  the  liberty  of  either 
Government  to  decide  in  the  future  whether  they 
should  lend  each  other  the  support  of  their  armed 
forces;  that,  on  either  side,  these  consultations  be- 
tween experts  were  not  and  should  not  be  considered 
as  engagements  binding  our  Governments  to  take 
action  in  certain  eventualities;  that,  however,  I  had 
remarked  to  you  that,  if  one  or  other  of  the  two  Gov- 
ernments had  grave  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked 
attack  on  the  part  of  a  third  power,  it  would  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it  could  count  on  the 
armed  support  of  the  other. 

Your  letter  answers  that  point,  and  I  am  authorized 
to  state  that,  in  the  event  of  one  of  our  two  Govern- 
ments having  grave  reasons  to  fear  either  an  attack 
from  a  third  power,  or  some  event  threatening  the 
general  peace,  that  Government  would  immediately 
examine  with  the  other  the  question  whether  both 
Governments  should  act  together  in  order  to  prevent 
aggression  or  preserve  peace.  If  so,  the  two  Govern- 
ments would  deliberate  as  to  the  measures  which  they 
would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common.  If  those  meas- 
ures involved  action,  the  two  Governments  would 
take  into  immediate  consideration  the  plans  of  their 
General  Staffs  and  would  then  decide  as  to  the  effect 
to  be  given  to  those  plans.     Yours,  &c, 

Paul  Cambon.1 

1  B.  W.  P.  no.  105,  end.  2. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  285 

Having  thus  recalled  to  Sir  Edward's  mind  the  exact 
nature  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente,  M.  Cambon  went  on 
to  say  that '  the  peace  of  Europe  was  never  more  seriously 
threatened  than  it  was  then.  He  did  not  wish  to  ask  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  say  directly  that  Great  Britain  would 
intervene,  but  he  was  desirous  of  having  him  say  what 
Great  Britain  would  do  if  certain  circumstances  arose. 
The  particular  hypothesis  he  had  in  mind  was  an  aggres- 
sion by  Germany  on  France.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  105.)  The  Ambassador  handed  Sir  Ed- 
ward a  paper  indicating  the  extent  to  which  Germany  had 
pushed  her  preparations  for  an  attack  upon  France  and 
the  efforts  the  latter  was  making  to  preserve  peace.1  Sir 

1  The  War  Chronicle,  December,  1914,  pp.  20-24,  gives  an  English  trans- 
lation of  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  N orddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung 
(no.  321,  December  23,  1914,)  attacking  the  veracity  of  the  documents  in 
the  British  White  Paper  on  the  ground  of  the  inconsistencies  contained  in 
no.  105.  This  criticism,  however,  was  made  without  reference  to  the  docu- 
ments in  the  French  Yellow  Book. 

In  making  a  comparison  of  the  original  in  no.  106  of  the  French  Yellow 
Book  with  the  French  original  of  enclosure  3  in  no.  105  of  the  British  White 
Paper,  we  find  that  they  are  almost  identical.  With  the  exception  of  one  or 
two  sentences  they  can  be  pieced  out  word  for  word.  This  shows  beyond 
question  that  they  are  the  same  dispatch.  But  the  French  Yellow  Book  no. 
106  is  dated  July  30,  whereas  the  first  edition  of  the  British  White  Paper 
gave  the  date  of  its  enclosed  document  as  July  31.  Directly  after  the 
"hier"  of  the  French  Yellow  Book,  no.  106,  the  British  WThite  Paper  has 
"vendredi"  in  parentheses.  This  does  not  occur  in  the  original  French 
Yellow  Book,  no.  106,  since  hier  —  that  is,  July  29  —  would  have  been 
Wednesday.  Apparently  noticing  this  mistake,  the  later  editions  drop  out 
the  "vendredi." 

Another  mistake  of  a  similar  nature  was  made  in  an  attempt  to  explain 
the  "Saturday"  mentioned  in  the  second  paragraph  of  enclosure  3  by  the 
addition  of  "lejourmeme  de  la  remise  de  la  note  aidrichienne."  If  Saturday 
the  25th  was  referred  to,  it  was  the  day  that  the  Servian  reply  was  handed 
in,  and  not  the  Austrian  note.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106  has  simply  "  Saturday,  the 
25th."  This  discrepancy  is  explained  in  the  Blue  Book  edition  of  the  docu- 
ment by  the  addition  of  a  note:  "Sic  in  original." 

In  the  later  editions  of  the  British  White  Paper  the  date  of  enclosure  3  in 
B.  W.  P.  no.  105  is  omitted. 

If  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106  and  B.  W.  P.  no.  105  are  both  correctly  dated  July  30, 
it  must  mean  that  the  French  dispatch  left  Paris  and  reached  the  French 
Ambassador  at  London  in  time  for  him  to  present  it  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  have  him  include  it  in  his  dispatch  of  that  same  date  to  the  British  Am- 


286     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Edward  replied  that  'there  would  be  a  meeting  of  the 
Cabinet  next  day,  in  the  morning,  and  that  he  would  see 
M.  Cambon  in  the  afternoon.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  105.) 

When  M.  Cambon,  in  the  interview  after  the  Cabinet 
meeting,  referred  to  a  remark  of  the  French  Ambassador 
at  Berlin  that  'it  was  the  uncertainty  with  regard  to 
whether  England  would  intervene  which  was  the  encour- 
aging element  in  Berlin,  and  that,  if  England  would  declare 
definitely  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France,  it  would  de- 
cide the  German  attitude  in  favor  of  peace,  Sir  Edward 
said  that  it  was  quite  wrong  to  suppose  that  they  had  left 
Germany  under  the  impression  that  they  would  not  inter- 

bassador  at  Paris.  Furthermore,  it  does  not  seem  that  the  dispatch  (F.  Y. 
B.  no.  106)  could  have  been  sent  by  cipher,  otherwise  the  words,  when  re- 
translated, would  not  have  been  identical. 

If  we  examine  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106  closely,  we  shall  notice  the  statement  in  the 
next  to  the  last  paragraph:  "  Par  deuxfois,  hier,  des  palrouilles  allemandes 
ont  penetre  sur  notre  territoire."  Enclosure  3  of  B.  W.  P.  no.  105  has  identi- 
cally the  same  words,  except  that  the  "hier"  is  thrown  into  the  previous 
sentence.  We  do  not  find  that  the  French  Government  made  any  protest 
against  this  violation  of  the  frontier,  but  when  we  come  to  August  2,  we 
find  the  telegram  from  M.  Viviani  to  M.  Jules  Cambon  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  139), 
directing  him  to  protest  against  various  violations  of  the  frontier.  In  this 
M .  Viviani  says : ' '  Aunord  de  Delle,  deux patrouilles  allemandes  du  5e  chasseurs 
d  cheval  ontfranchi  lafrontiere  dans  la  matinee  d'aujourd'hui.  .  .  ."  (F.  Y.  B. 
no.  155  recounts  the  interview  in  which  M.  Jules  Cambon  presented  the 
protest  as  instructed.)  The  next  day  the  French  Prime  Minister  indig- 
nantly challenged  the  accuracy  of  the  German  Ambassador's  statement  in 
regard  to  French  violations  of  the  frontier,  and  reminded  him  that  he  had 
yesterday  sent  him  a  note  protesting  against  the  violations  of  the  French 
frontier  committed  during  the  last  two  days  by  detachments  of  German 
troops.  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  148.)  In  the  German  Chancellor's  speech  of  August  2, 
he  quotes  a  report  of  the  General  Staff  as  follows:  "Against  express  orders 
a  patrol  of  the  14th  Army  Corps,  apparently  led  by  an  officer,  crossed  the 
frontier  on  August  2." 

That  there  should  have  been  some  isolated  violations  of  the  frontier  is 
easily  understood  when  we  read  in  the  telegram  that  Emperor  William  sent 
to  King  George  V,  on  August  1 :  "The  troops  on  my  frontier  at  this  moment 
have  received  orders  by  telegraph  and  by  telephone  to  arrest  their  advance 
across  the  French  frontier."   (F.  Y.  B.,  p.  188.) 

It  is  hard  to  explain  these  discrepancies,  which  are  patently  the  result  of 
carelessness  and  hasty  editing,  since  no  falsification  would  have  been  ut- 
tered with  such  obvious  inconsistencies. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  287 

vene,  and  that  he  had  refused  overtures  to  promise  that 
they  should  remain  neutral.  He  had  not  only  definitely 
declined  to  say  that  they  would  remain  neutral;  he  had 
even  gone  so  far  that  morning  as  to  say  to  the  German 
Ambassador  that  if  France  and  Germany  became  involved 
in  war,  England  would  be  drawn  into  it.  That,  of  course, 
was  not  the  same  thing  as  entering  into  an  engagement  to 
France,  and  he  told  M.  Cambon  of  it  only  to  show  that 
they  had  not  left  Germany  under  the  impression  that  they 
would  stand  aside. 

'M.  Cambon  then  asked  Sir  Edward  for  his  reply  to 
what  he  had  said  the  day  before.  Sir  Edward  said  that 
they  had  come  to  the  conclusion  in  the  Cabinet  that  day 
that  they  could  not  give  any  pledge  at  the  present  time; 
that  though  they  should  have  to  put  their  policy  before 
Parliament,  they  could  not  pledge  Parliament  in  advance. 
Up  to  that  moment  they  did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion 
did  not  feel,  that  any  treaties  or  obligations  of  England 
were  involved.1  Further  developments  might  alter  this 
situation  and  cause  the  Government  and  Parliament  to 
take  the  view  that  intervention  was  justified.  The  preser- 
vation of  Belgian  neutrality  might  be,  Sir  Edward  would 
not  say  a  decisive,  but  an  important  factor  in  determining 
their  attitude.  Whether  they  proposed  to  Parliament  to 
intervene  or  not  to  intervene  in  a  war,  Parliament  would 
wish  to  know  how  they  stood  with  regard  to  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  and  it  might  be  that  Sir  Edward  would  ask 
both  France  and  Germany  whether  each  was  prepared  to 
undertake  an  engagement  that  she  would  not  be  the  first 
to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

'M.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether  England 
would  help  France  if  Germany  made  an  attack  on  her. 

'Sir  Edward  replied  that  he  could  only  adhere  to  the 
answer  that,  as  far  as  things  had  gone  then,  they  could  not 
enter  into  any  engagement. 

1  Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  87;  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  32,  110. 


288     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

'  M.  Cambon  urged  that  Germany  had  from  the  begin- 
ning rejected  proposals  that  might  have  made  for  peace; 
that  it  could  not  be  to  England's  interest  that  France 
should  be  crushed  by  Germany;  that  they  would  then  be 
in  a  very  diminished  position  with  regard  to  Germany; 
that  in  1870,  the  English  had  made  a  great  mistake  in 
allowing  an  enormous  increase  of  German  strength,  and 
that  they  would  now  be  repeating  the  mistake.  M.  Cam- 
bon asked  Sir  Edward  whether  he  could  not  submit  his 
question  to  the  Cabinet  again. 

'Sir  Edward  said  that  the  Cabinet  would  certainly  be 
summoned  as  soon  as  there  was  some  new  development, 
but  at  that  moment,  the  only  answer  he  could  give  was 
that  they  could  not  undertake  any  definite  engagement.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  119;  cf.  B.  W.  P. 
no.  116.) 

On  August  3,  at  the  end  of  three  days  crowded  with 
momentous  happenings,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  as  a  prelimin- 
ary to  consulting  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  course  the 
Government  should  take,  gave  an  authoritative  account  of 
the  formation  of  the  entente  with  France :  — 

"I  come  first,  now,  to  the  question  of  British  obligations. 
I  have  assured  the  House  —  and  the  Prime  Minister  has 
assured  the  House  more  than  once  —  that  if  any  crisis 
such  as  this  arose,  we  should  come  before  the  House  of 
Commons  and  be  able  to  say  to  the  House  that  it  was  free 
to  decide  what  the  British  attitude  should  be,  that  we 
would  have  no  secret  engagement  which  we  should  spring 
upon  the  House,  and  tell  the  House  that  because  we  had 
entered  into  that  engagement  there  was  an  obligation  of 
honor  upon  the  country.  I  will  deal  with  that  point  to 
clear  the  ground  first. 

"There  have  been  in  Europe  two  diplomatic  groups,  the 
Triple  Alliance  and  what  came  to  be  called  the  Triple 
Entente,  for  some  years  past.  The  Triple  Entente  was  not 
an  alliance  —  it  was  a  diplomatic  group.  The  House  will 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  289 

remember  that  in  1908  there  was  a  crisis,  also  a  Balkan 
crisis,  originating  in  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. The  Russian  Minister,  M.  Isvolsky,  came  to 
London,  or  happened  to  come  to  London,  because  his  visit 
was  planned  before  the  crisis  broke  out,  I  told  him  defi- 
nitely then,  this  being  a  Balkan  crisis,  a  Balkan  affair,  I 
did  not  consider  that  public  opinion  in  this  country  would 
justify  us  in  promising  to  give  anything  more  than  diplo- 
matic support.  More  was  never  asked  from  us,  more  was 
never  given,  and  more  was  never  promised. 

"In  this  present  crisis,  up  till  yesterday,  we  have  also 
given  no  promise  of  anything  more  than  diplomatic  sup- 
port.  Now  I  must  make  this  question  of  obligation  clear 
to  the  House.  I  must  go  back  to  the  first  Moroccan  crisis  of 
1906.  That  was  the  time  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  and 
it  came  at  a  time  of  very  great  difficulty  to  His  Majesty's 
Government,  when  a  general  election  was  in  progress, 
and  Ministers  were  scattered  over  the  country,  and  I  — 
spending  three  days  a  week  in  my  constituency  and  three 
days  at  the  Foreign  Office  —  was  asked  the  question 
whether,  if  that  crisis  developed  into  war  between  France 
and  Germany,  we  would  give  armed  support.   I  said  then 
that  I  could  promise  nothing  to  any  foreign  power  unless 
it  was  subsequently  to  receive  the  whole-hearted  support 
of  public  opinion  here  if  the  occasion  arose.  I  said,  in  my 
opinion,  if  war  was  forced  upon  France  then  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Morocco  —  a  question  which  had  just  been  the 
subject  of  agreement  between  this  country  and  France, 
an  agreement  exceedingly  popular  on  both  sides  —  that  if 
out  of  that  agreement  war  was  forced  on  France  at  that 
time,  in  my  view  public  opinion  in  this  country  would  have 
rallied  to  the  material  support  of  France. 

"I  gave  no  promise,  but  I  expressed  that  opinion  during 
the  crisis,  as  far  as  I  remember,  almost  in  the  same  words, 
to  the  French  Ambassador  and  the  German  Ambassador 
at  the  time.  I  made  no  promise,  and  I  used  no  threats; 


290     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

but  I  expressed  that  opinion.  That  position  was  accepted 
by  the  French  Government,  but  they  said  to  me  at  the 
time  —  and  I  think  very  reasonably  —  '  If  you  think  it 
possible  that  the  public  opinion  of  Great  Britain  might, 
should  a  sudden  crisis  arise,  justify  you  in  giving  to  France 
the  armed  support  which  you  cannot  promise  in  advance, 
you  will  not  be  able  to  give  that  support,  even  if  you  wish 
to  give  it,  when  the  time  comes,  unless  some  ''conversa- 
tions have  already  taken  place  between  naval  and  military 
experts."'  There  was  force  in  that.  I  agreed  to  it,  and 
authorized  those  conversations  to  take  place,  but  on  the 
distinct  understanding  that  nothing  which  passed  between 
military  or  naval  experts  should  bind  either  Government 
or  restrict  in  any  way  their  freedom  to  make  a  decision  as 
to  whether  or  not  they  would  give  that  support  when  the 
time  arose. 

"As  I  have  told  the  House,  upon  that  occasion  a  general 
election  was  in  prospect.  I  had  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  doing  that  without  the  Cabinet.  It  could  not  be  sum- 
moned. An  answer  had  to  be  given.  I  consulted  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman,  the  Prime  Minister;  I  consulted,  I 
remember,  Lord  Haldane,  who  was  then  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  and  the  present  Prime  Minister,  who  was 
then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  That  was  the  most  I 
could  do,  and  they  authorized  that  on  the  distinct  under- 
standing that  it  left  the  hands  of  the  Government  free 
whenever  the  crisis  arose.  The  fact  that  conversations  be- 
tween military  and  naval  experts  took  place  was  later  on 
—  I  think  much  later  on,  because  that  crisis  passed,  and 
the  thing  ceased  to  be  of  importance  —  but  later  on  it  was 
brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Cabinet. 

"The  Agadir  crisis  came  —  another  Morocco  crisis  — 
and  throughout  that  I  took  precisely  the  same  line  that 
had  been  taken  in  1906.  But  subsequently,  in  1912,  after 
discussion  and  consideration  in  the  Cabinet  it  was  decided 
that  we  ought  to  have  a  definite  understanding  in  writing, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  291 

which  was  to  be  only  in  the  form  of  an  unofficial  letter, 
that  these  conversations  which  took  place  were  not  bind- 
ing upon  the  freedom  of  either  Government;  and  on  the 
22nd  of  November,  1912, 1  wrote  to  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor the  letter  which  I  will  now  read  to  the  House,  and  I 
received  from  him  a  letter  in  similar  terms  in  reply.  The 
letter  which  I  have  to  read  to  the  House  is  this,  and  it  will 
be  known  to  the  public  now  as  the  record  that,  whatever 
took  place  between  military  and  naval  experts,  they  were 
not  binding  engagements  upon  the  Government.  [Sir 
Edward  then  read  his  letter  to  M.  Cambon  of  November 
22,  1912.  See  above  pp.  283-84.] 

".  .  .  That  is  the  starting-point  for  the  Government  with 
regard  to  the  present  crisis.  I  think  it  makes  it  clear  that 
what  the  Prime  Minister  and  I  said  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons was  perfectly  justified,  and  that,  as  regards  our  free- 
dom to  decide  in  a  crisis  what  our  line  should  be,  whether 
we  should  intervene  or  whether  we  should  abstain,  the 
Government  remained  perfectly  free  and,  a  fortiori,  the 
House  of  Commons  remains  perfectly  free.  That  I  say  to 
clear  the  ground  from  the  point  of  view  of  obligation.  I 
think  it  was  due  to  prove  our  good  faith  to  the  House  of 
Commons  that  I  should  give  that  full  information  to  the 
House  now,  and  say  what  I  think  is  obvious  from  the 
letter  I  have  just  read,  that  we  do  not  construe  anything 
which  has  previously  taken  place  in  our  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  other  powers  in  this  matter  as  restricting  the 
freedom  of  the  Government  to  decide  what  attitude  they 
should  take  now,  or  restrict  the  freedom  of  the  House  of 
Commons  to  decide  what  their  attitude  should  be. 

''Well,  Sir,  I  will  go  further,  and  I  will  say  this:  The 
situation  in  the  present  crisis  is  not  precisely  the  same  as 
it  was  in  the  Morocco  question.  In  the  Morocco  question 
it  was  primarily  a  dispute  which  concerned  France  —  a 
dispute  which  concerned  France  and  France  primarily  — 
a  dispute,  as  it  seemed  to  us,  affecting  France,  out  of  an 


292     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

agreement  subsisting  between  us  and  France,  and  pub- 
lished to  the  whole  world,  in  which  we  engaged  to  give 
France  diplomatic  support.  No  doubt  we  were  pledged 
to  give  nothing  but  diplomatic  support;  we  were,  at  any 
rate,  pledged  by  a  definite  public  agreement  to  stand  with 
France  diplomatically  in  that  question. 

"The  present  crisis  has  originated  differently.  It  has 
not  originated  with  regard  to  Morocco.  It  has  not  origin- 
ated as  regards  anything  with  which  we  had  a  special  agree- 
ment with  France;  it  has  not  originated  with  anything 
which  primarily  concerned  France.  It  has  originated  in  a 
dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia.  I  can  say  this  with 
the  most  absolute  confidence  —  no  Government  and  no 
country  has  less  desire  to  be  involved  in  war  over  a  dispute 
with  Austria  and  Servia  than  the  Government  and  the 
country  of  France.  They  are  involved  in  it  because  of  their 
obligation  of  honor  under  a  definite  alliance  with  Russia. 
Well,  it  is  only  fair  to  say  to  the  House  that  that  obligation 
of  honor  cannot  apply  in  the  same  way  to  us.  We  are  not 
parties  to  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  We  do  not  even 
know  the  terms  of  that  Alliance.  So  far  I  have,  I  think, 
faithfully  and  completely  cleared  the  ground  with  regard 
to  the  question  of  obligation."  1 

1  At  the  same  time  that  the  relations  of  France  and  England  are  under 
discussion,  it  will  be  of  interest  to  consider  what  was  the  situation  between 
England  and  Russia.  Some  very  interesting  documents  bearing  upon  the 
negotiations  of  England  with  France  and  Russia  have  been  published  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung.  These  appeared  in  Germany,  October  16, 
and  were  republished  by  the  New  York  Times,  November  8,  and  on  account 
of  their  length  have  been  placed  among  the  documents  at  the  end  of  this 
volume.  (Post,  chap,  xm.)  It  is  necessary  to  read  them  carefully  to  reach 
an  understanding  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  hazy  entente,  which  "  with 
subtle  ingenuity  is  worded  in  such  a  manner  that  it  suits  the  peculiar  Eng- 
lish mentality."  To  the  German  editorial  writer  it  looks  like  an  attempt  to 
play  a  double  game,  but  it  is  in  reality  something  deeper  than  an  ordinary 
treaty  between  two  bureaucratic  governments;  just  as  between  individuals 
the  ties  of  a  sincere  friendship  are  deeper  and  sometimes  better  observed 
than  a  more  formal  and  legally  binding  partnership  agreement. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  293 

6.  England  declares  that  she  is  not  interested  in  a  Balkan 
question 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  paralleling  his  efforts  to  pre- 
vent a  war  by  a  second  series  of  efforts  to  prevent  his 
country  from  being  engulfed,  should  war  prove  inevitable 
From  the  very  start  he  had  made  the  same  declaration 
contained  in  his  speech  of  August  3,  that  England  was  not 
concerned  in  a  Balkan  question  (R.  O.  P.  no.  20;  B.  W.  P. 
no.  5),  and  that  as  long  as  Austria  could  settle  her' affairs 
with  Servia  so  as  not  to  involve  Russia,  he  had  nothing  to 
say.   The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  told  M. 
Sazonof,  that  'direct  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  and 
a  war  on  behalf  of  that  country  would  never  be  sanctioned 
by  British  public  opinion.'   (Modified  quotation,  Julv  24 
B.  W.  P.  no.  6;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  24.)  ' 

In  conformity  with  this  stand,  Sir  Edward  Grey  refused 
to  go  into  the  merits  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  (B.  W. 
P.  no.  91),  but  said  that  he  'should  concern  himself  with 
the  matter  solely  and  simply  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
peace  of  Europe.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  5.)  British  opinion  sympathized  with  Austria's  be- 
reavement, and  could  easily  believe  that  a  government 
founded  upon  regicide  and  favoring  regicides  merited  the 
natural  suspicions  which  attached  to  its  evil  reputation 

Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the  German  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don that  'of  course,  if  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  did  not  lead  to  trouble  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  they  need  not  concern  themselves  about  it.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  July  24,  B.  W.  P.  no.  10.) 

Sir  Edward,  well  knowing  that  France  had  announced 
Irom  the  start  that  she  would  stand  back  of  Russia  and 
that  Germany  would  not  allow  Russia  to  crush  Austria 
realized  that  an  Austro-Russian  conflict  was  almost  cer- 
tain to  widen  out  to  include  Germany  and  France,  and 
that  when  this  occurred  it  would  be  difficult  for  England 


294     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

to  keep  out  of  the  struggle.  (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  6,  24,  25.) 
As  Sir  Edward  remarked,  'when  there  was  a  danger  of  a 
European  conflict,  it  was  impossible  to  say  who  would  not 
be  drawn  into  it;  even  the  Netherlands  apparently  were 
taking  precautions.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W. 
P.  no.  90.) 

Intending  to  reserve  his  independence  of  action  up  to 
the  last,  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  M.  Paul  Cambon  (July 
29)  that  he  meant  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  that 
day  that  he  'must  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of 
their  conversations  into  any  sense  of  false  security  that 
they  should  stand  aside  if  all  the  efforts  to  preserve  the 
peace,  which  they  were  then  making  in  common  with  Ger- 
many, failed.  But  he  went  on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon  that 
he  thought  it  necessary  to  tell  him  also  that  public  opin- 
ion in  England  approached  the  present  difficulty  from  a 
quite  different  point  of  view  from  that  taken  during  the 
difficulty  as  to  Morocco  a  few  years  before.  In  the  case  of 
Morocco  the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was  prima- 
rily interested,  and  in  which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in 
an  attempt  to  crush  France,  was  fastening  a  quarrel  on 
France  on  a  question  that  was  the  subject  of  a  special 
agreement  between  France  and  England.  In  the  present 
case  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  was  not  one  in 
which  she  felt  called  to  take  a  hand.  Even  if  the  question 
became  one  between  Austria  and  Russia,  England  would 
not  feel  called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then  be 
a  question  of  the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav  —  a  strug- 
gle for  supremacy  in  the  Balkans;  and  their  idea  had  al- 
ways been  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a  war  over  a  Balkan 
question.  If  Germany  became  involved  and  France  be- 
came involved,  they  had  not  made  up  their  minds  what 
they  should  do;  it  was  a  case  that  they  would  have  to  con- 
sider. France  would  then  have  been  drawn  into  a  quarrel 
which  was  not  hers,  but  in  which,  owing  to  her  alliance, 
her  honor  and  interest  obliged  her  to  engage.    England 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  295 

was  free  from  engagements,  and  would  have  to  decide 
what  British  interests  required  her  to  do.  Sir  Edward 
thought  it  necessary  to  say  this,  because,  as  M.  Cambon 
knew,  they  were  taking  all  precautions  with  regard  to  their 
fleet,  and  he  was  about  to  warn  Prince  Lichnowsky  not  to 
count  on  their  standing  aside,  but  it  would  not  be  fair 
that  he  should  let  M.  Cambon  be  misled  into  supposing 
that  this  meant  that  they  had  decided  what  to  do  in  a 
contingency  that  he  still  hoped  might  not  arise.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  87.) 

7.  England  warns  Germany  that  she  will  not  hold  aloof  if 
France  is  involved 

As  early  as  July  27,  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  English  Under- 
Secretary  of  State,  told  the  French  Charge  at  London,  in 
reference  to  '  the  German  and  Austrian  Ambassadors  giv- 
ing it  to  be  understood  that  England  would  remain  neutral, 
that  Prince  Lichnowsky  could  not,  after  the  conversation 
he  had  had  with  him  that  day,  preserve  any  doubt  as  to  the 
liberty  of  intervention  which  the  British  Government  in- 
tended to  keep,  should  it  deem  intervention  necessary.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  63.) 

In  Sir  Edward  Grey's  dispatch  of  July  29,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Goschen  at  Berlin,  we  learn  that  he  told  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London  that  '  after  speaking  to  him  about 
the  European  situation,  he  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite 
private  and  friendly  way,  something  that  was  on  his  mind. 
The  situation  was  very  grave.  While  it  was  restricted  to 
the  issues  at  present  actually  involved,  England  had  no 
thought  of  interfering  in  it.  But  if  Germany  became  in- 
volved in  it,  and  then  France,  the  issue  might  be  so  great 
that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests;  and  he  did 
not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  their  con- 
versation —  which  he  hoped  would  continue  —  into  think- 
ing that  they  would  stand  aside. 

'  Prince  Lichnowsky  said  that  he  quite  understood  this, 


296     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

but  he  asked  whether  Sir  Edward  meant  that  England 
would  under  certain  circumstances  intervene.  Sir  Edward 
replied  that  he  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  anything 
that  was  like  a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pressure  by 
saying  that,  if  things  became  worse,  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  intervene.  There  would  be  no  question  of 
their  intervening  if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if 
France  was  not  involved.  But  the  British  Government 
knew  very  well  that  if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  they 
thought  British  interests  required  them  to  intervene,  they 
must  intervene  at  once,  and  the  decision  would  have  to  be 
very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of  other  powers  had  to  be. 
He  hoped  that  the  friendly  tone  of  their  conversations 
would  continue  as  at  present,  and  that  he  would  be  able  to 
keep  as  closely  in  touch  with  the  German  Government  in 
working  for  peace.  But  if  they  failed  in  their  efforts  to 
keep  the  peace,  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  involved 
practically  every  European  interest,  he  did  not  wish  to  be 
open  to  any  reproach  from  him  that  the  friendly  tone  of  all 
their  conversations  had  misled  him  or  his  Government 
into  supposing  that  they  would  not  take  action,  and  to  the 
reproach  that,  if  they  had  not  been  so  misled,  the  course 
of  things  might  have  been  different.1 

'The  German  Ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what 
Sir  Edward  said;  indeed,  he  told  him  that  it  accorded  with 
what  he  had  already  given  in  Berlin  as  his  own  view  of  the 
situation.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
89;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  98.) 

1  We  have  seen  above  (p.  294)  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  already  told 
the  French  Ambassador  of  his  intention  to  give  the  German  Ambassador 
this  warning  (cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  87).  German  partisans  have  criticized  Sir 
Edward  Grey  severely  for  thus  taking  M.  Cambon  into  his  confidence.  Dr. 
Karl  Helfferich  cites  various  documents  (R.  O.  P.  no.  58;  B.  W.  P.  no.  17) 
in  support  of  his  contention  that  this  act,  by  assuring  France  of  England's 
support,  decided  the  French  Government  to  promise  its  support  to  Russia, 
(New  York  Times,  March  14,  1915;  Bee  also  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg, 
Search-Lights  on  the  War,  The  Fatherland  Corporation,  New  York,  1915.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  297 

8.  Germany's  bid  for  English  neutrality 

At  the  very  time  (July  29)  when  the  British  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  explaining  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London  that  England  would  not  neces- 
sarily come  in  or  stay  out,  but  must,  in  case  of  a  general 
European  war,  decide  —  and  that  very  rapidly  —  what  her 
interests  dictated,  the  German  Chancellor,  just  returned  to 
Berlin  from  Potsdam,  was  making  an  offer  to  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  secure  England's  neutrality.  He 
said  that  '  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia,  a  Euro- 
pean conflagration  might,  he  feared,  become  inevitable, 
owing  to  Germany's  obligations  as  Austria's  ally,  in  spite 
of  his  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded, as  Sir  Edward  Goschen  said,  to  make  the  following 
strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He  said  that  it  was  clear, 
so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the  main  principle  which 
governed  British  policy,  that  Great  Britain  would  never 
stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict 
there  might  be.  That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at 
which  Germany  aimed.  Provided  that  the  neutrality  of 
Great  Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be 
given  to  the  British  Government  that  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  at 
the  expense  of  France,  should  they  prove  victorious  in  any 
war  that  might  ensue. 

'When  questioned  about  the  French  colonies,  the  Chan- 
cellor said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking 
in  that  respect.  As  regards  Holland,  however,  he  said  that, 
so  long  as  Germany's  adversaries  respected  the  integrity 
and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready 
to  give  the  British  Government  an  assurance  that  she 
would  do  likewise.  It  depended  upon  the  action  of  France 
what  operations  Germany  might  be  forced  to  enter  upon 
in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war  was  over,  Belgian  integrity 
would  be  respected,  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 


298     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

1  He  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had  been  Chan- 
cellor, the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  Sir  Edward 
Grey  was  aware,  to  bring  about  an  understanding  with 
England ;  he  trusted  that  these  assurances  might  form  the 
basis  of  that  understanding  which  he  so  much  desired. 
He  had  in  mind  a  general  neutrality  agreement  between 
England  and  Germany,  though  it  was  of  course  at  the 
present  moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and  an  as- 
surance of  British  neutrality,  in  the  conflict  which  the 
present  crisis  might  possibly  produce,  would  enable  him 
to  look  forward  to  the  realization  of  his  desire.  In  reply  to 
an  inquiry  how  he  thought  this  request  would  appeal  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  Sir  Edward  Goschen  said  that  he  did 
not  think  it  probable  that  at  this  stage  of  events  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  would  care  to  bind  himself  to  any  course  of 
action  and  that  he  was  of  opinion  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
would  desire  to  retain  full  liberty.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  85.) 

To  this,  Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  (July  30)  in  a  telegram 
to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin :  — 

"His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  en- 
tertain the  Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should  bind 
themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

"What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while 
French  colonies  are  taken  and  France  is  beaten,  so  long 
as  Germany  does  not  take  French  territory  as  distinct 
from  the  colonies. 

"From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is 
unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further  territory  in 
Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to  lose 
her  position  as  a  great  power,  and  become  subordinate  to 
German  policy. 

"Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for 
us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of 
France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good  name  of  this  coun- 
try would  never  recover. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  299 

"The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away- 
whatever  obligations  or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not  entertain  that  bargain 
either. 

"Having  said  so  much,  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine 
whether  the  prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality  agree- 
ment between  England  and  Germany  offered  positive  ad- 
vantages sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  tying  our  hands 
now.  We  must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to  act  as  circum- 
stances may  seem  to  us  to  require  in  any  such  unfavorable 
and  regrettable  development  of  the  present  crisis  as  the 
Chancellor  contemplates."  (Extract,  July  30,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  101;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  126.) 

Then  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  the  words  referred  to  above 
(see  above,  pp.  281,  282),  directed  the  Ambassador  to  speak 
of  the  need  of  cooperation  between  England  and  Germany 
and  of  Sir  Edward's  hopes  that,  if  they  succeeded  in  pre- 
serving the  peace,  their  relations  would  be  improved,  and 
to  say  that  he  would  work  for  some  arrangement  to  assure 
Germany  against  aggression  from  any  European  power. 

When  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  read  to  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  Sir  Edward  Grey's  'answer  to  his 
appeal  for  British  neutrality  in  the  event  of  war,  the  Chan- 
cellor was  so  taken  up  with  the  news  of  the  Russian  meas- 
ures along  the  frontier  that  he  received  the  communica- 
tion without  comment.  He  asked  the  Ambassador  to  let 
him  have  the  message  just  read  to  him  as  a  memorandum, 
as  he  would  like  to  reflect  upon  it  before  giving  an  answer, 
and  his  mind  was  so  full  of  grave  matters  that  he  could 
not  be  certain  of  remembering  all  its  points.  Sir  Edward 
Goschen,  therefore,  handed  to  him  the  text  of  the  message 
on  the  understanding  that  it  should  be  regarded  merely  as 
a  record  of  conversation,  and  not  as  an  official  document. 
To  this  the  Chancellor  agreed.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  109.) 

Before  Sir  Edward  Goschen  had  communicated  this 


300     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

message  from  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  German  Secretary  of 
State  learned  of  England's  attitude  in  a  telegram  from 
Prince  Lichnowsky  a  propos  of  which  Herr  Von  Jagow 
said  that  it  'contained  matter  which  he  had  heard  with 
regret,  but  not  exactly  with  surprise,  and  at  all  events  he 
thoroughly  appreciated  the  frankness  and  loyalty  with 
which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  spoken.  He  also  told  the 
British  Ambassador  that  this  telegram  had  only  reached 
Berlin  very  late  the  night  before;  had  it  been  received 
earlier  the  Chancellor  would,  of  course,  not  have  spoken 
to  him  in  the  way  he  had  done.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  98.) 

While  this  exchange  was  going  on,  the  situation  had  been 
growing  rapidly  worse  between  Russia  and  Germany,  and 
on  July  31,  the  German  Chancellor  informed  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  that  'if,  as  he  learned  was  the  case,  military 
measures  were  then  being  taken  by  Russia  against  Ger- 
many also,  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  remain  quiet. 
He  wished  to  tell  the  Ambassador,  he  said,  that  it  was 
quite  possible  that  in  a  very  short  time,  that  day,  perhaps, 
the  German  Government  would  have  to  take  some  very 
serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of  going  to 
have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  108.) 

On  August  1,  the  day  Germany  declared  war  against 
Russia,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  an  important  interview 
with  the  German  Ambassador  at  London,  in  which  he  told 
Prince  Lichnowsky  that '  the  reply  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  mat- 
ter of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
affected  feeling  in  the  country.  If  Germany  could  see  her 
way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as  that  which  had  been 
given  by  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve 
anxiety  and  tension.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant 
while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  301 

to  restrain  public  feeling  in  England.  Sir  Edward  said 
that  they  had  been  discussing  this  question  at  a  Cabinet 
meeting,  and  as  he  was  authorized  to  tell  this  to  Prince 
Lichnowsky,  he  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

'  Prince  Lichnowsky  asked  Sir  Edward  whether,  if  Ger- 
many gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality, 
England  would  engage  to  remain  neutral. 

'Sir  Edward  replied  that  he  could  not  say  that;  their 
hands  were  still  free,  and  they  were  considering  what  their 
attitude  should  be.  All  he  could  say  was  that  their  attitude 
would  be  determined  largely  by  public  opinion  in  Eng- 
land, and  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  appeal 
very  strongly  to  public  opinion.  He  did  not  think  that 
they  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition 
alone. 

'  The  Ambassador  pressed  Sir  Edward  as  to  whether  he 
could  not  formulate  conditions  on  which  he  would  remain 
neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France 
and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 

'  Sir  Edward  said  that  he  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely 
any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on  similar  terms,  and  he 
could  only  say  that  they  must  keep  their  hands  free.' 
(Modified  quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  123.) 

This  second  "bid"  for  England's  neutrality  shows  how 
far  Germany  was  ready  to  go  to  obtain  a  pledge  from  Eng- 
land that  she  would  stand  aside.  It  seems  likely  that  Ger- 
many would  have  agreed  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium and  to  guarantee  the  restoration  of  French  territory, 
colonial  as  well  as  European,  and  also  that  Germany  might 
have  agreed  not  to  attack  the  northern  and  western  coasts 
of  France.  But  England  could  not  agree  to  stay  out  of  the 
war,  much  as  she  hoped  to  be  able  to,  unless  she  could  be 
certain  that  her  vital  interests  would  not  suffer.1 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  stated  that  this  offer  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  was 
his  personal  offer  and  not  that  of  the  German  Government.  If  Sir  Edward 
had  wished  to  consider  it,  the  German  Ambassador  could  have  learned  in  a 


302     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Again,  on  August  3,  'just  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  leav- 
ing for  the  Cabinet  meeting,  Prince  Lichnowsky  called  to 

few  hours  whether  his  Government  would  confirm  it  or  not.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  has  been  attacked  by  J.  Ramsay  MacDonald  (New  York  Evening 
Post,  September  8,  1914)  and  others  because  he  did  not  communicate  this 
offer  to  Parliament  and  because  he  did  not  make  any  effort  to  formulate 
conditions  upon  which  England  could  remain  neutral.  According  to  the 
report  in  the  London  Times,  Sir  Edward  Grey  answered  Mr.  Hardie  as  fol- 
lows in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  27 :  — 

"Mr.  Keir  Hardie  (Merthyr  Tydvil,  Lab.)  asked  the  Secretary  for  For- 
eign Affairs  whether  the  suggestions  for  a  peace  settlement  made  by  the 
German  Ambassador  (White  Paper,  p.  66,  no.  123),  together  with  his  invi- 
tation to  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  put  forward  proposals  of  his  own  which 
would  be  acceptable  as  a  basis  for  neutrality,  were  submitted  to  and  con- 
sidered by  the  Cabinet,  and,  if  not,  why  proposals  involving  such  far-reach- 
ing possibilities  were  thus  rejected. 

"Sir  E.  Gret  (Northumberland,  Berwick)  — These  were  personal  sug- 
gestions made  by  the  Ambassador  on  August  1,  and  without  authority  to 
alter  the  conditions  of  neutrality  proposed  to  us  by  the  German  Chancellor 
in  no.  85  in  the  White  Paper  —  Miscellaneous,  no.  6,  [1914]. 

"The  Cabinet  did,  however,  consider  most  carefully  the  next  morning  — 
that  is,  Sunday,  August  2  —  the  conditions  on  which  we  could  remain  neu- 
tral, and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  respect  for  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
must  be  one  of  these  conditions.  [Hear,  hear!]  The  German  Chancellor  had 
already  been  told  on  July  30  that  we  could  not  bargain  that  way. 

"On  Monday,  August  3,  I  made  a  statement  in  the  House  accordingly. 
I  had  seen  the  German  Ambassador  again  at  his  own  request  on  Monday, 
and  he  urged  me  most  strongly,  though  he  said  that  he  did  not  know  the 
plans  of  the  German  military  authorities,  not  to  make  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  one  of  our  conditions  when  I  spoke  in  the  House.  It  was  a  day  of 
great  pressure,  for  we  had  another  Cabinet  in  the  morning,  and  I  had  no 
time  to  record  the  conversation,  and  therefore  it  does  not  appear  in  the 
White  Paper;  but  it  was  impossible  to  withdraw  that  condition  [loud  cheers] 
without  becoming  a  consenting  party  to  the  violation  of  the  treaty,  and 
subsequently  to  a  German  attack  on  Belgium. 

"After  I  spoke  in  the  House  we  made  to  the  German  Government  the 
communication  described  in  no.  153  in  the  White  Paper  about  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium.  Sir  Edward  Goschen's  report  of  the  reply  to  that  commu- 
nication had  not  been  received  when  the  White  Paper  was  printed  and  laid. 
It  will  be  laid  before  Parliament  to  complete  the  White  Paper. 

"  I  have  been  asked  why  I  did  not  refer  to  no.  123  in  the  White  Paper 
when  I  spoke  in  the  House  on  August  3.  If  I  had  referred  to  suggestions  to 
us  as  to  conditions  of  neutrality  I  must  have  referred  to  no.  85,  the  propo- 
sals made,  not  personally  by  the  Ambassador,  but  officially  by  the  German 
Chancellor,  which  were  so  condemned  by  the  Prime  Minister  subsequently, 
and  this  would  have  made  the  case  against  the  German  Government  much 
6tronger  than  I  did  make  it  in  my  speech.  [Hear,  hear!]  I  deliberately  re- 
frained from  doing  that  then. 
.    "Let  me  add  this  about  personal  suggestions  made  by  the  German  Am- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  303 

urge  him  to  say  that  the  neutrality  of  England  did  not 
depend  upon  respect  for  Belgian  neutrality.  Sir  Edward 
refused  to  discuss  the  matter,  and  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor, according  to  the  report  of  M.  Cambon,  gave  out  to 
the  press  a  communique l  stating  that  if  England  remained 
neutral,  Germany  would  forego  all  naval  operation  and 
would  not  use  the  Belgian  coasts  as  a  supporting  base. 
The  French  Ambassador  informed  his  Government  that 
he  was  replying  that  respect  for  coasts  was  not  respect  for 
the  neutrality  of  territory,  and  that  the  German  ultima- 
tum was  in  itself  a  violation  of  neutrality.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, August  3,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  144;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  126.) 

9.  Divergence  of  opinion  in  England 
Up  to  this  point  we  have  been  examining  certain  aspects 
of  the  attitude  assumed  by  England  when  first  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  European  crisis.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
could  be  sure  of  the  unanimous  support  of  the  country  in 
pursuing  a  policy  which  offered  some  chance  of  averting 
a  war  at  the  same  time  that  it  left  open  the  question  of  the 
conditions  which  might  necessitate  armed  intervention  on 

bassador,  as  distinct  from  communications  made  on  behalf  of  his  Govern- 
ment. He  worked  for  peace;  but  real  authority  at  Berlin  did  not  rest  with 
him  and  others  like  him,  and  that  is  one  reason  why  our  efforts  for  peace 
failed.   [Loud  cheers.] 

"Mr.  Keir  Hardie  —  May  I  ask  whether  any  attempt  was  made  to 
open  up  negotiations  with  Germany  on  the  basis  of  suggestions  here  set 
forth  by  the  German  Ambassador  ? 

"Sir  E.  Grey  —  The  German  Ambassador  did  not  make  any  basis  of 
suggestions.  It  was  the  German  Chancellor  who  made  the  basis  of  sugges- 
tions. The  German  Ambassador,  speaking  on  his  own  personal  initiative 
and  without  authority,  asked  whether  we  would  formulate  conditions  on 
which  we  would  be  neutral.  We  did  go  into  that  question,  and  those  condi- 
tions were  stated  to  the  House  and  made  known  to  the  German  Ambas- 
sador. 

"Mr.  Keir  Hardie  [who  was  received  with  cries  of  'Oh!'  from  all  parts 
of  the  House]  — May  I  ask  whether  the  German  authorities  at  Berlin 
repudiated  the  suggestions  of  their  Ambassador  in  London,  and  whether 
any  effort  at  all  [renewed  cries  of  'Oh!'  and  'Order! ']  was  made  to  find  out 
how  far  the  German  Government  would  have  agreed  to  the  suggestions  put 
before  them  by  their  own  Ambassador?  "  (London  Times,  August  28, 1914.) 

1  See  post,  p.  360. 


304     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  part  of  Great  Britain.  From  the  very  start  it  was 
evident  that  the  Austro-German  and  the  Franco-Russian 
groups  were  each  acting  in  the  closest  accord,  and  that 
neither  Germany  nor  France  was  inclined  to  exert  any 
pressure  upon  its  ally.  In  this  situation  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  to  use  the  whole  strength  of  his  position  to  influence 
and  stimulate  the  peaceful  efforts  of  each  group ;  he  was  the 
better  able  to  do  this  because  of  England's  long-estab- 
lished cordial  understanding  with  France  and  her  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  which  had  gradually  been  becoming 
more  friendly  as  a  result  of  the  collaboration  of  the  two 
Governments  at  the  recent  conference  in  London,  when 
they  had  succeeded  in  avoiding  a  Balkan  war.1 

Even  before  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  in  discussion  with  the  German 
Ambassador,  pointing  out  to  him  that  the  influence  the 
English  Government  could  exert  in  Russia  would  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  the  Austrian  demands  on  Servia.  No 
sooner  had  the  Austrian  note  been  presented  than  the 
principal  diplomatic  effort  of  all  the  great  powers  was 
directed  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  win  his  support  for  one 
side  or  the  other.  He  held  his  ground  steadfastly,  en- 
couraging now  one,  now  the  other.  In  view  of  Russia's  as- 
suming a  most  correct  and  conciliatory  attitude  and  in- 
ducing Servia  to  astonish  the  world  by  the  extent  of  her 
concessions  to  the  intentionally  insulting  Austrian  de- 
mands, he  refused  to  acquiesce  in  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor's attempt  to  put  off  on  Russia  the  responsibility  for 
the  outcome.  In  no  uncertain  terms  he  imparted  to 
Prince  Lichnowsky  his  characterization  of  Austria's  action 
in  case  she  should  put  the  Servian  reply  aside  as  worthless 
and  march  into  Servia,  reckless  of  the  consequences.  In 
this  same  interview  Sir  Edward  Grey  promised,  as  long  as 

1  This  close  sympathy  and  cooperation  was  clearly  indicated  by  the 
Anglo-German  discussions  relative  to  an  eventual  partition  of  the  Portu- 
guese colonial  possessions.  (See  Documents:  Anglo-German  Relations,  post, 
chap,  xiii.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  305 

Germany  would  work  for  peace,  to  keep  in  close  touch. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  46.)  Lest,  however,  Austria  and  Germany 
might  believe  —  as  the  Russian  Ambassador  asserted  they 
did — that  England  would  stand  aside  in  any  event,  Sir 
Edward  rewarded  Russia  and  Servia  for  their  conciliatory 
action  by  publishing  the  news  that  the  First  Fleet  had 
not  been  dispersed.  (July  27,  B.  W.  P.  no.  47;  July  27,  F. 
Y.  B.  no.  66.) 

Yet  Sir  Edward  did  not  encourage  Russia  to  relax  her 
efforts  to  reach  a  peaceful  solution  through  a  feeling  that 
she  was  certain  of  England's  support;  at  the  same  time 
that  he  showed  his  appreciation  of  Russia's  action  by  in- 
forming the  Russian  Ambassador  of  the  retention  of  the 
fleet,  he  added  significantly  that  his  reference  to  the  fleet 
must  not  be  understood  as  promising  anything  more  than 
diplomatic  action.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  47.) 

While  Sir  Edward  continued  to  declare  that  England 
was  not  concerned  in  a  Balkan  question,  he  proposed  vari- 
ous bases  for  the  mediation  of  the  four  less  interested 
powers  to  avoid  an  Austro-Russian  conflict.  When  Ger- 
many refused  to  participate  in  a  mediation  conference,  he 
emphatically  declared  that  if  Germany  intervened  in  an 
Austro-Russian  conflict,  brought  on  by  the  unjustifiable 
aggression  of  Austria  against  Servia,  it  would  be  because 
Germany,  without  any  reference  to  the  merits  of  the  dis- 
pute, could  not  afford  to  see  Austria  crushed.1  Just  so  he 
hinted  that  other  issues  might  be  raised  which  would 
supersede  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  and 
would  bring  other  powers  in.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  46.)  This  was 
equivalent  to  an  intimation  that,  when  France  came  to  the 
support  of  Russia  by  reason  of  her  obligation  under  the 
Dual  Alliance,  England  might  consider  that  she  was  under 
a  certain  moral  obligation  to  support  her  partner  in  the 
Entente  against  Germany,  whose  aggressive  action  would 

1  That  is  to  say,  Germany's  action  would  not  be  based  upon  the  casus 
foederis  of  a  defensive  alliance,  but  would  be  a  matter  of  policy. 


306     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

have  dragged  her  unwillingly  into  a  conflict.  Besides,  it 
was  clear  that  England's  vital  interests  might  be  affected 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  very  difficult  for  her  to  keep  out. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  informed  the 
French  Ambassador  of  his  intention  to  warn  x  the  German 
Ambassador  of  the  consequences  which  might  result  in 
case  Germany  supported  Austria  in  her  unjustifiably  ag- 
gressive action,  he  distinctly  told  M.  Paul  Cambon  that  it 
would  not  be  fair  to  let  him  be  "misled  into  supposing  that 
this  meant  that  they  had  decided  what  to  do  in  a  contin- 
gency that  he  still  hoped  might  not  arise."  2  (July  29,  B. 
W.  P.  no.  87.)  Against  this  statement  M.  Cambon  could 
urge  nothing  except  his  understanding  of  English  inter- 
ests which,  he  said,  required  her  intervention.  England 
was,  indeed,  absolutely  free  to  remain  out  or  not  as  she 

1  The  difference  between  a  warning  and  a  threat  is,  that  in  a  warning, 
the  actual  condition  of  affairs  is  set  forth  in  an  objective  manner  by  one 
speaking  with  expert  knowledge.  Such  an  exposition  makes  plain  the  inev- 
itable consequences  of  a  certain  course  of  action.  A  threat  implies  an  inten- 
tionally retaliatory  action,  and  is  a  conditional  declaration  of  hostility  which 
often  has  an  injurious  effect  upon  relations  hitherto  friendly. 

2  It  has  been  ably  argued  by  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich  (New  York  Times, 
March  14,  1915)  that  this  declaration  decided  France  to  promise  her  sup- 
port to  Russia  (see  above  chap,  v),  and  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  attempt  to 
play  the  role  of  an  independent  mediator  was  doomed  to  failure  because 
England  was  bound  by  the  Entente  to  help  France.  Yet  elsewhere  in  the 
same  article  Dr.  Helfferich  points  out  how  anxious  France  was  about  Eng- 
land's attitude  up  to  August  2,  and  he  concurs  with  the  German  Chancellor's 
opinion  that  England  should  have  informed  Russia  that  she  would  not  al- 
low a  European  war  to  result  from  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  (See  Chan- 
cellor's speech  in  the  Reichstag,  December  2,  1914,  post,  chap,  xin.)  This 
would  hardly  be  consistent  with  England's  recognition  of  an  obligation  to 
support  France.  By  notifying  France  that  she  might  not  support  her  (B. 
W.  P.  no.  87),  Sir  Edward  Grey  plainly  intimated  that  England  was  not 
bound.  Before  reaching  any  conclusion  about  this  question,  one  has  to  con- 
sider the  effect  of  Germany's  attitude  in  regard  to  Belgium.  The  whole 
situation  is  made  clear  by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  offers  of  July  31  to  desert 
France  and  Russia  if  they  refused  to  cooperate  in  any  reasonable  peace  pro- 
posal put  forward  by  Germany.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  111.)  To  admit  that  Eng- 
land was  bound  to  support  France  would  have  meant  that  she  was  pledged 
to  protect  Russia  from  aggression  to  the  same  extent  as  France.  It  is  hard 
to  believe  that  England  would  have  obligated  herself  to  such  an  extent  with- 
out some  quid  pro  quo. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  307 

should  deem  best  for  the  protection  of  her  interests.1  To 
deny  this  is  to  assert  that  England  was  obligated  to  defend 
Russia  from  attack  whenever  the  Franco-Russian  Alli- 
ance forced  France  to  intervene  in  favor  of  her  ally. 

That  same  day,  July  29,  arrived  the  German  Chancel- 
lor's "strong  bid  for  British  neutrality" — another  at- 
tempt to  induce  the  English  Government  to  depart  from 
its  role  of  neutral  mediation,  and  to  support  Germany  by 
a  binding  agreement  not  to  intervene  in  favor  of  the  Dual 
Alliance  in  the  event  of  war.  Sir  Edward  Grey  refused  this 
offer  the  following  day  and  declared  that  '  the  one  way  of 
maintaining  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany 
was  that  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  pre- 
serve the  peace  of  Europe.'  (Modified  quotation,  July 
30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  101.) 

By  Thursday,  July  30,  the  European  situation  had 
grown  most  serious.  We  have  seen  how  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
up  to  this  date,  had  avoided  taking  sides,  but  when  M. 
Paul  Cambon  reminded  him  of  their  understanding  that  if 
the  peace  of  Europe  was  threatened,  they  would  discuss 
what  they  were  prepared  to  do,  the  English  Secretary  rec- 
ognized that  his  Government  must  give  the  French  as 
frank  a  statement  as  possible,  and  so  Sir  Edward  told  M. 
Cambon  that  he  would  bring  the  question  up  in  the  Cabi- 
net meeting  next  day,  and  tell  him  of  the  result  in  the 
afternoon. 

Hitherto  we  have  considered  the  foreign  relations  side  of 
the  negotiations,  without  reference  to  the  internal  situa- 
tion, which  was,  notwithstanding,  a  factor  of  the  utmost 
importance.  It  is  impossible  to  understand  what  hap- 
pened in  the  three  days,  July  31  to  August  2,  apart  from 
a  consideration  of  the  political  situation  in  England. 

The  morning  of  Friday,  July  31,  1914,  will,  I  believe,  be 

1  The  obligation  to  protect  the  French  coast,  which  resulted  from  the 
concentration  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  is  considered,  post, 
§15. 


308     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

considered  the  most  fateful  day  of  the  century,  and  Sir 
Edward  Grey  the  principal  actor.  That  day  was  the  cul- 
mination of  several  important  movements.  Only  a  few 
hours  before  (July  30),  Mr.  Asquith,  in  the  interest  of 
national  harmony,  had  announced  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons the  decision  of  the  Government  to  adjourn  the  sec- 
ond reading  of  the  Amending  Bill.1  This  action  made  pos- 
sible the  union  of  all  parties  to  support  the  Government 
in  the  adoption  of  a  firm  national  foreign  policy. 

A  few  days  before,  July  21,  the  King  had  summoned  the 
leaders  of  both  parties  to  a  conference  at  Buckingham 
Palace,  in  an  effort  to  reach  some  compromise  to  avoid 
civil  war.2  The  royal  intervention  was  ineffectual,  and  on 
the  Sunday  following  these  unusual  conferences,  just  when 
the  country  was  learning  of  Austria's  peremptory  rejec- 
tion of  the  Servian  note,  the  whole  nation  was  stirred  by 
the  news  of  the  fighting  at  Dublin,  where  three  men  were 
killed  and  thirty-two  wounded. 

The  agitation  of  the  public  during  this  period  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that,  since  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian 
note  on  the  23d  of  July,  consols  had  begun  to  fall,  until 
the  extraordinarily  low  price  of  69  was  reached  on  the  31st 
—  the  last  day  before  the  Stock  Exchange  closed.  As  was 
to  be  expected,  the  Bank  of  England  tried  to  inspire  confi- 
dence by  retaining  its  rate  at  3  per  cent,  but  on  the  30th  it 
was  raised  to  4  per  cent,  and  on  the  31st  this  was  doubled. 

During  the  preceding  week,  while  the  powers  had  been 
engaged  in  their  great  diplomatic  struggle,  the  necessity 
of  quickly  coming  to  a  decision  in  regard  to  the  foreign 
policy  had  subjected  the  governmental  political  machinery 
of  the  different  states  to  a  severe  test.3 

1  Amending  the  Home  Rule  Bill. 

2  This  action  on  the  part  of  the  King  gave  rise  to  bitter  discussion,  in 
which  George  V  was  openly  accused  of  being  a  Conservative  partisan. 

3  On  the  30th,  in  Russia,  the  war  party  seems  to  have  gained  control, 
and  on  the  31st,  in  France,  the  agitation  is  shown  by  the  assassination  of 
Jaures,  July  31. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  309 

In  England  the  political  situation  was  most  complex 
and  difficult,  not  only  because  the  country  was  on  the 
verge  of  war,  but  also  because  the  Government  was  in 
control  of  the  Liberal  Party,  whose  ultra-pacifist  proclivi- 
ties made  it  willing  to  try  almost  any  expedient  which 
might  be  considered  as  offering  a  chance  of  maintaining  an 
honorable  peace.  They  had  been  working  to  reach  some 
agreement  with  Germany  and  were  not  ready  to  believe 
that  war  with  her  was  unavoidable.1  It  was  the  Conserva- 
tives who  were  most  strongly  inclined  toward  taking  a 
firm  stand  in  support  of  the  Entente.  Under  the  English 
system,  the  Foreign  Office  has  never  been  given  over  to 
partisan  conception.  Whatever  the  changes  in  internal 
politics,  in  foreign  affairs  the  country  has  continued  to 
pursue  the  same  general  course. 

1  Up  to  the  very  day  of  the  presentation  of  the  English  ultimatum  to 
Germany  the  Manchester  Guardian  inveighed  against  intervention. 

The  New  York  Evening  Post,  August  14,  1914,  printed  the  following 
editorial:  "  Why  England  went  to  War": 

"  What  chiefly  surprises  one  who  reads  the  English  newspapers,  now  at 
hand,  published  during  the  week  ending  August  5,  is  the  extent  and  inten- 
sity of  the  feeling  against  going  to  war  with  Germany.  There  was,  of  course, 
an  active  war  party.  In  the  press  it  was  led  by  the  London  Times  and  Daily 
Mail.  And  naval  men,  it  is  evident,  were  hot  for  striking  now  that  the  hour 
for  which  they  had  been  watching  had  come.  But  there  was  a  powerful  anti- 
war party.  Its  moderate  exponent  was  the  Westminster  Gazette,  a  newspaper 
which  has  long  shown  that  it  stands  closer  to  the  Liberal  Government  than 
any  other.  It  was  all  for  caution  and  restraint,  and,  till  the  last  moment, 
anxious  to  keep  England  out  of  the  war  and  to  find  some  means  of  coming  to 
terms  with  Germany.  But  the  impassioned  champion  of  peace,  through  all 
the  time  when  the  issues  hung  in  the  balance,  was  the  Manchester  Guardian. 
This  able  newspaper  —  thought  by  many  to  be  the  most  influential  in  Eng- 
land ;  outside  London  it  certainly  is  —  made  a  most  gallant  fight  against  the 
war.  Day  after  day  it  made  powerful  appeals,  arguing  that  neither  Eng- 
lish interest  nor  English  honor  required  the  nation  to  fling  itself  into  the 
gulf  of  a  European  war. 

"  And  this  opinion  found  very  wide  support  throughout  the  country.  A 
Neutrality  League  was  formed.  It  at  once  gained  numerous  adherents.  It 
spread  its  protests  broadside.  And  a  host  of  enlightened  Englishmen  has- 
tened to  array  themselves  against  the  war  party.  Among  them  was  the 
editor  of  the  Economist,  still  the  chief  financial  guide  of  England,  with 
clergymen,  professors,  philanthropists,  and  honorable  women  not  a  few." 
(Extract.) 


310     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

On  July  31,  the  Cabinet  met,  and,  in  spite  of  the  urgent 
appeals  from  France,  decided  that  England  could  not 
agree  to  support  her.1  Sir  Edward  Grey  imparted  this 
decision  to  M.  Cambon  and  refused  to  commit  himself 
further,  except  to  intimate  that  the  Government  were 
considering  asking  France  and  Germany  whether  they 
were  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium so  long  as  no  other  power  violated  it.  (B.  W.  P.  no. 
114;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  110.)  Sir  Edward  further  promised  to 
bring  up  the  question  of  their  cooperation  with  France  as 

1  The  situation,  on  that  morning,  July  31,  when  the  Cabinet  met  and 
considered  what  course  to  adopt,  is  well  summarized  in  a  Times  editorial 
which  appeared  the  following  day:  — 

"Europe  was  rapidly  arming  last  night,  as  was  foreshadowed  by  the  ex- 
ceedingly grave  disclosures  made  yesterday  by  the  Prime  Minister.  He  said 
that  the  Government  had  just  heard  —  not  from  St.  Petersburg,  but  from 
Germany  —  that  Russia  had  proclaimed  a  general  mobilization  of  her  army 
and  fleet,  and  that  in  consequence  martial  law  was  to  be  proclaimed  in 
Germany.  It  was  understood,  he  added,  that  mobilization  would  follow  in 
Germany  if  the  Russian  mobilization  continued.  We  may  amplify  the 
Prime  Minister's  statement  by  saying  that  even  yesterday  morning  there 
6till  seemed  to  be  a  ray  of  hope.  It  was  announced  in  London,  in  authorita- 
tive quarters,  that  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  were  discussing  the  possibility  of  settling  the 
Servian  question.  Even  last  night  'conversations'  were  reported  to  be 
continuing  at  Vienna. 

"Then  came  the  disquieting  news  of  the  Russian  general  mobilization, 
which  meant  that  four  million  Russians  were  being  placed  upon  a  war  foot- 
ing. Germany,  who  had  already  proclaimed  martial  law,  declared  that  un- 
less the  Russian  movement  was  suspended  within  twelve  hours  the  German 
forces  would  be  mobilized  also.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  believe  that  large 
bodies  of  German  troops  are  already  massed  on  the  French  frontier.  Sub- 
stantial rumors  from  Paris  indicate  that  there  will  probably  be  a  general 
mobilization  in  France  to-day.  The  Queen  of  Holland  has  already  signed 
an  urgent  decree  ordering  the  general  mobilization  of  the  Dutch  forces. 
Belgium  has  also  decided  to  mobilize.  The  trend  of  German  thoughts  is 
illustrated  by  the  retention  at  Hamburg  of  the  great  Atlantic  liner,  the 
Imperator,  which  was  to  have  sailed  yesterday  morning  for  Southampton 
on  her  way  to  New  York.  Simultaneously  the  sister  ship,  the  Vaterland, 
was  ordered  to  stay  in  shelter  at  New  York,  where  she  now  is.  These  and 
many  other  indications  unfortunately  point  to  the  extreme  probability  that, 
within  a  time  which  may  now  be  measured  by  hours  rather  than  by  days, 
we  may  see  the  beginning  of  that  unprecedented  struggle  of  which  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  has  said  that  'it  can  but  end  in  the  greatest  catastrophe  that  has 
ever  befallen  the  Continent  of  Europe  at  one  blow.'"  (Extract,  London 
Times,  editorial,  "Europe  in  Arms,"  August  1,  1914.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  311 

soon  as  any  modification  of  the  situation  should  occur.  To 
the  German  Ambassador  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  that  morn- 
ing made  the  promise  that,  '  if  France  and  Russia  should 
refuse  to  cooperate  in  any  reasonable  peace  proposal  sug- 
gested by  Germany,  England  would  have  nothing  more  to 
do  with  the  consequences;  but  otherwise,  Sir  Edward  told 
Prince  Lichnowsky  that,  if  France  became  involved,  Eng- 
land would  be  drawn  in.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  31, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  111.) 

In  spite  of  the  divergence  of  opinion  among  the  members 
of  the  Cabinet,  which  threatened  to  split  them  into  two 
factions,  the  dire  need  of  the  nation  kept  them  together. 
During  this  crisis  Sir  Edward  Grey  continued  to  work  to 
present  the  British  foreign  policy  in  such  a  way  as  to  unite 
the  Cabinet  and  the  country  in  the  furtherance  of  Eng- 
land's vital  interests.1 

10.  England's  vital  interests. 

Although  the  Cabinet  at  its  meeting  on  Friday  morning, 
July  31,  had  decided  not  to  guarantee  England's  inter- 
vention in  favor  of  France,  the  probability  of  war  made  it 
necessary  for  the  Government  to  consider  what  policy  they 
must  adopt  to  protect  England's  vital  interests.  The  dif- 
ficulty in  this  situation  was  to  find  the  method  of  action 
which  was,  under  the  circumstances,  best  suited  to  this 
end.  The  first  desideratum  was  the  preservation  of  peace 
without  such  a  loss  of  prestige  or  honor  as  to  weaken  the 
Triple  Entente  for  the  benefit  of  the  Triple  Alliance.2  Eng- 

1  The  Cabinet  crisis  is  related  in  the  London  Times.  See  post,  p.  340, 
note  1. 

2  It  is  a  mistake  to  consider  that  England  and  France  would  not  have 
been  ready  to  yield  a  matter  of  mere  empty  prestige  to  save  the  peace  of 
Europe,  but  they  reasoned  that  to  yield  at  the  dictation  of  Germany,  when 
Austria's  aggressive  and  unyielding  attitude  was  itself  excused  on  the  ground 
of  the  necessity  of  protecting  her  prestige,  would  only  encourage  Germany 
and  Austria  to  take  a  similarly  uncompromising  stand  on  some  other  ques- 
tion, when  England  would  find  the  Triple  Entente  weakened,  for  Russia 
would  be  likely  to  desert  the  Entente  and  draw  nearer  to  Germany,  in  disgust 
at  finding  that  its  only  purpose  was  to  permit  Austria  to  disregard  Russia's 


312     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

land's  next  most  urgent  desire  was  to  keep  out  of  the  con- 
flict, provided  she  could  do  so  without  too  great  a  sacrifice.1 
When  the  Cabinet  met  on  Friday,  it  seemed  improbable 
that  European  peace  could  be  maintained,  even  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  skillful  putting-up  at  a  peace-auction  the 
determination  whether  England  should  intervene  or  re- 
main neutral.  Up  to  the  actual  outbreak  of  war  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  he  allured  Germany  and  Austria 
with  the  hope  of  English  neutrality,  and  Russia  and  France 
with  that  of  intervention  as  the  reward  to  the  side  which 
should  make  the  sincerest  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace. 

England  might  consider  the  arguments  in  favor  of  inter- 
vention as  coming  under  three  heads :  First,  on  the  ground 

vital  interests  in  the  Balkans.  Germany  offered  England  the  choice  of  pre- 
serving the  peace  or  the  Entente,  and  England  was  not  willing  to  sacrifice  the 
Entente  without  some  security  that  she  would  not,  next  time,  find  herself  in 
the  dilemma  of  having  to  choose  between  peace  with  the  sacrifice  of  import- 
ant interests,  or  war  without  any  allies  against  Germany  and  Austria,  and 
possibly  with  Italy,  too,  —  nay,  she  might  have  had  to  encounter  a  coalition 
similar  to  that  which  the  German  Emperor  has  stated  that  he  prevented 
during  the  Anglo-Boer  War.  (See  Documents:  Interview  of  October  28, 
1908.) 

Dr.  Karl  Helfferich  admits:  "  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  true  that, 
had  France  and  England  stood  aloof,  no  matter  how  such  a  step  may  have 
been  formally  authorized  by  treaties  and  agreements,  the  triple  understand- 
ing would  have  been  destroyed,  and  a  new  direction  given  to  the  policy  of  all 
Europe,  which  necessarily  would  have  led,  not  to  the  hegemony  of  a  single 
nation,  but  far  more  to  a  state  of  affairs  in  which  every  power  could  have 
had  its  due.  Confronted  with  the  choice  of  preserving  the  Entente  or  pre- 
serving the  peace  of  the  world,  the  statesmen  at  the  helm  in  Great  Britain 
and  France,  who  had  by  their  own  acts  and  words  in  reality  lost  their  free- 
dom and  become  entangled,  sacrificed  the  peace  of  the  world  to  the  Entente, 
under  pressure  from  the  cliques  desiring  war,  and  swept  in  their  wake  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  public  in  their  countries  by  appealing  to  the  sanctity 
of  written  and  unwritten  treaties."  (New  York  Times,  March  14,  1915.) 

1  No  doubt  France  and  Russia  would  have  resented  England's  remaining 
neutral,  however  good  an  excuse  she  had,  but  at  the  end  of  a  desperate  war 
with  Germany,  their  incapacity  to  retaliate  would  have  made  their  hostility 
less  formidable;  in  any  event,  it  would  have  been  counterbalanced  by  a 
better  understanding  with  Germany.  What  England  had  most  to  fear  was 
the  disruption  of  the  Entente,  as  the  result  of  a  diplomatic  triumph  on  the 
part  of  the  Imperial  Allies,  which  would  have  left  France  and  Russia  un- 
shorn of  their  strength  and  smarting  with  resentment  against  England  as 
the  "perfidious"  cause  of  their  humiliation. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  313 

of  obligation  to  France  resulting  from  the  Entente.  It  has 
been  shown  most  clearly  from  Sir  Edward  Grey's  own 
arguments  that  England  was  not  bound  to  make  common 
cause  with  France  when  involved  in  a  war  through  the 
Russian  alliance.  In  consequence  of  the  Anglo-French 
cooperative  division  of  naval  forces,  England  was  bound  to 
protect  the  coasts  of  France,  —  perhaps  even  French  com- 
merce in  the  Atlantic,  —  but  Germany  would  almost  cer- 
tainly have  raised  no  objection  to  this  qualified  partici- 
pation in  the  war  if  she  had  felt  that  it  would  extend 
no  further.  The  second  consideration  was  the  balance  of 
power  for  which  England  had  been  employing  her  diplo- 
macy and  her  arms  since  the  time  of  Wolsey.  The  develop- 
ment of  larger  views  of  world  interests  and  the  unity  of 
aim  of  civilized  nations  had  weakened  the  support  of  this 
principle.  Some  of  the  most  powerful  organs l  of  the  press 
openly  raised  their  voices  against  the  idea  of  continuing 
longer  to  bow  down  before  this  fetish  which  had  been  re- 
sponsible for  the  long  duel  with  France.  On  this  question 
the  country  was  divided,  without  any  prospect  of  being 
able  to  agree.2  There  remained  the  question  of  Belgian 
neutrality  —  a  diplomatic  jewel  for  the  Foreign  Office 
which  sparkled  light  from  its  many  facettes.  There  was  the 
obligation  to  make  good  the  guaranty,  which  was  of  a  na- 
ture to  rally  the  support  of  that  very  group  of  advanced 
Liberals  who  refused  to  be  drawn  into  a  war  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  balance  of  power.  The  need  of  defending  a 
small  state  against  aggression  would  also  influence  them. 
The  partisans  of  a  vigorous  foreign  policy,  the  supporters 
of  the  Entente,  and  the  Germanophobes  all  realized  that 
insistence  upon  the  respect  of  Belgian  territory  would  lend 
material  strength  to  the  support  of  their  cherished  policies 
or  convictions.  If  Germany  agreed  to  respect  Belgian  neu- 

1  Notably  the  Manchester  Guardian;  see  editorial  of  August  3,  1915. 

2  See  "Changes  in  the  Cabinet,"  London  Times,  August  5,  1914,  post, 
p.  340,  note.  Cf.  also  above,  p.  311. 


314     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

trality,  a  great  step  toward  the  maintenance  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power  would  have  been  assured,  and  it  would  have 
been  easier  for  England  to  intervene  later  on  if  German 
success  should  endanger  the  balance  of  power;  and  France, 
secured  from  attack  through  Belgium,  would  be  much  bet- 
ter able  to  resist  attack.  The  respecting  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  might  thus  have  left  Germany  and  Austria  to 
fight  on  fairly  even  terms  against  Russia  and  France.  Had 
Germany  agreed  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality,  the  bal- 
ance of  power  and  the  integrity  of  France  might  have  been 
maintained  by  this  diplomatic  intervention  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain.  Germany's  refusal  would  tend  to  unite 
all  parties  in  support  of  British  intervention.  The  only 
danger  —  and  that  a  slight  one  —  was  that  France  and 
Russia  might  suddenly  give  in  to  Germany,  through  fear 
that  they  could  not  resist,  and  then  nurse  their  resentment 
against  England.1   It  was,  therefore,  most  important  to 

1  The  effect  of  placing  the  whole  question  of  England's  intervention  on 
the  broad  basis  of  respect  for  Belgian  neutrality  is  strikingly  shown  by  the 
following  remark  of  Henry  James,  who  has  lived  so  long  in  England  as  to  be 
classed  as  an  Englishman:  "Personally  I  feel  so  strongly  on  everything  that 
the  war  has  brought  into  question  for  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  that  humor- 
ous detachment  or  any  other  thinness  or  tepidity  of  mind  on  the  subject 
affects  me  as  vulgar  impiety,  not  to  say  as  rank  blasphemy;  our  whole  race 
tension  became  for  me  a  sublimely  conscious  thing  from  the  moment  Ger- 
many flung  at  us  all  her  explanation  of  her  pounce  upon  Belgium  for  mas- 
sacre and  ravage  in  the  form  of  the  most  insolent  'Because  I  choose  to, 
damn  you  all!'  recorded  in  history."  (New  York  Times,  Magazine  Sec- 
tion, p.  4,  March  21,  1915.) 

Mr.  Clifford  Allen,  a  well-known  leader  of  the  Labor  Party,  bears  un- 
intentional testimony  to  the  efficacy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  diplomacy  in 
placing  England's  intervention  on  the  Belgian  basis:  — 

"What  happened,  then,  when  the  danger  of  war  loomed  ahead?  The 
Prime  Minister  had  told  us,  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  confirmed  his 
statement,  that  we  were  under  no  secret  alliance  with  any  nation,  yet,  when 
it  came  to  the  point,  it  became  perfectly  clear  that  we  considered  ourselves 
under  an  honorable  obligation  to  France  far  more  binding  than  Italy's  share 
in  the  Triple  Alliance.  Over  and  over  again  this  has  been  emphasized  since 
the  outbreak  of  war.  We  could  not  leave  our  neighbor,  France,  in  the  lurch, 
having  put  her  fleet  in  the  lurch  long  before  Belgium  was  violated.  We 
eventually  give  her  an  undertaking  to  protect  her  coasts. 

"Now,  let  us  be  perfectly  definite  about  this  business.  The  question  of 
Belgian  neutrality  has  been  raised,  with  all  the  ingenuity  of  the  capitalist, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  315 

know  at  once  what  would  be  Germany's  attitude.  Ac- 
cordingly, Sir  Edward  Grey  decided  to  ask  France  and 
Germany  to  declare  their  intentions  in  respect  to  Bel- 
gium.1 The  making  of  this  inquiry  at  that  time  had  the 
further  advantage,  in  case  Germany  should  refuse,  of 
showing  plainly  to  the  English  people  the  true  nature  of 
German  designs.  Public  opinion  would  have  time  to  form 
and  unite  in  support  of  intervention,  so  that  when  war 
was  declared,  the  whole  country,  to  a  man,  would  respond. 
It  now  appears  clearly  how  perfect  was  the  British  diplo- 
macy in  taking  advantage  of  the  Belgian  question  on  that 
critical  Friday  morning,  July  31.  At  one  stroke  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  showed  up  Germany's  designs,  secured  an 
opportunity  to  urge  upon  Belgium  a  timely  resistance, 
united  the  Cabinet  and  the  country  against  Germany,  in- 
tervened in  good  season  for  the  defense  of  the  balance  of 
power,  and  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Entente  soon  enough 
to  be  sure  of  the  gratitude  of  Russia  and  France ;  yet  he 
had  also  succeeded  in  holding  off  both  sides  long  enough 
to  try  the  effect  of  every  inducement  for  peace  he  could 
bring  forward.  It  is  also  probable  that  the  delay  robbed 
Germany  of  a  great  part  of  the  advantage  she  would  have 
had  if  she  could  have  struck  several  days  earlier. 

With  a  full  realization  of  the  importance  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  Belgian  policy,  we  can  return  to  an  examination  of 
the  manner  in  which  it  was  carried  out  and  the  futile 
efforts  of  Germany  to  prevent  Sir  Edward  Grey  from  tak- 

as  the  great  and  honorable  pretext  for  our  participation  in  this  war.  Had 
that  been  the  only  reason,  it  could  have  been  discussed  upon  its  merits,  and 
upon  those  merits  it  could  certainly  claim  a  far  higher  place  than  any  other 
pretext.  But  let  us  make  no  mistake  about  it.  Belgian  neutrality  or  no 
Belgian  neutrality,  Britain  would  have  been  involved  in  this  war.  Why? 
Accepting  our  foreign  policy  and  our  view  of  the  balance  of  power,  it  was  to 
our  interest  to  join  in."  (Extracts  from  Clifford  Allen,  Is  Germany  Right 
and  Britain  Wrong?  Second  edition,  1914.) 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  M.  Paul  Cambon  that  "Germany's  reply  to  this 
communication  and  to  that  of  Russia  concerning  the  mobilization  of  four 
army  corps  on  the  Austrian  frontier  would  allow  us  [them]  to  realize  the 
intentions  of  the  German  Government."  (Extract,  July  29,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  98.) 


316     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

ing  the  steps  which  brought  about  the  mental  and  moral 
mobilization  of  the  country  to  present  against  Germany 
the  united  strength  of  the  whole  people.1 

11.  England's  inquiry  relative  to  Belgium's  neutrality 

The  vital  importance  to  England  of  maintaining  Bel- 
gium free  from  all  control  of  a  Continental  power  is  recog- 
nized as  the  principal  reason  why  the  regime  of  neutrali- 
zation was  imposed  upon  Belgium  when  she  broke  away 
from  Holland.  Because  of  the  very  great  importance  of 
Belgian  independence  to  England,2  it  is  natural  that  Sir 
Edward  Grey  should  have  told  the  German  Ambassador 
at  London  that,  though  England  could  not  agree  to  stay 
out  of  the  conflict  in  any  event,  even  if  Belgium's  neutral- 
ity was  respected,  they  would  nevertheless  consider  it  a 
very  important  factor.  It  was  because  of  this  attitude  on 
the  part  of  the  British  Government  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  on  July  31  telegraphed  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin :  — 

"I  still  trust  the  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in 
view  of  the  prospect  of  mobilization  in  Germany,  it  be- 
comes essential  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  in  view  of 
existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  the  German  Government 
is  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium,  so 

1  For  a  fuller  consideration  of  the  question  of  Belgian  Neutrality,  see 
chapter  ix. 

2  See  "The  Barrier  Treaty  Vindicated,"  Documents,  post,  chap.  xiii. 
Grotius  wrote  in  1632:  "The  King  of  England  will  give  up  everything 
before  he  allows  France  to  receive  the  ports  of  Flanders."  (Dollot,  Les 
Origines  de  la  Neutrality  de  la  Belgique,  p.  58.)  Cf.  also  post,  chap,  ix,  §§1, 
10.  "...  With  characteristic  naivete  and  insular  selfishness  some  jingoes 
imagine  that  if  only  the  naval  armaments  of  Germany  could  be  stopped,  all 
danger  to  England  would  be  averted.  But  surely  the  greatest  danger  to 
England  is  not  the  invasion  of  England;  it  is  the  invasion  of  France  and  Bel- 
gium. For  in  the  case  of  an  invasion  of  England,  even  the  Germans  admit 
that  the  probabilities  of  success  would  all  be  against  Germany;  whilst  in  the 
case  of  an  invasion  of  France,  the  Germans  claim  that  the  probabilities  are 
all  in  their  favor.  It  is  therefore  in  France  and  Belgium  that  the  vulnerable 
point  lies,  the  Achilles  heel  of  the  British  Empire."  (Charles  Sarolea,  The 
Anglo-German  Problem,  p.  43.  London  and  New  York,  1912.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  317 

long  as  no  other  power  violates  it.  A  similar  request  is 
being  addressed  to  the  French  Government.  It  is  impor- 
tant to  have  an  early  answer."  (July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  114.) 

To  this  Sir  Edward  Goschen  replied :  — 

"I  have  seen  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  informs  me 
that  he  must  consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor 
before  he  could  possibly  answer.  I  gathered  from  what 
he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they  might  give  could 
not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of  their  plan  of  cam- 
paign in  the  event  of  war  ensuing,  and  he  was  therefore 
very  doubtful  whether  they  would  return  any  answer  at 
all.  His  Excellency,  nevertheless,  took  note  of  your  re- 
quest. 

"  It  appears  from  what  he  said  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment consider  that  certain  hostile  acts  have  already  been 
committed  by  Belgium.  As  an  instance  of  this,  he  alleged 
that  a  consignment  of  corn  for  Germany  had  been  placed 
under  an  embargo  *  already. 

"I  hope  to  see  His  Excellency  to-morrow  again  to  dis- 
cuss the  matter  further,  but  the  prospect  of  obtaining  a 
definite  answer  seems  to  me  remote. 

"In  speaking  to  me  to-day  the  Chancellor  made  it  clear 
that  Germany  would  in  any  case  desire  to  know  the  reply 
returned  to  you  by  the  French  Government."  (Extract, 
July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  122.) 

The  desire  of  the  German  Chancellor  to  know  what  reply 
was  returned  by  France,  before  giving  Germany's  answer, 
may  have  been  explained  on  the  ground  that  there  was 
some  sincere  belief  in  Germany  that  France  intended  to 
violate  Belgium's  neutrality.  In  the  latter  case  it  does  not 
do  much  credit  to  German  political  acumen  or  to  her  se- 
cret service,  which  has  been  credited  with  such  a  high  de- 

1  As  regards  the  embargo  to  which  Von  Jagow  refers,  documents  in  the 
Belgian  Gray  Paper  explain  that  a  provisional  prohibition  was  placed  by  the 
Government  on  certain  articles,  but  this  was  not  intended  to  apply  to  arti- 
cles in  transit,  and  the  German  Legation  was  informed,  August  3,  that  the 
exportation  of  the  grain  had  been  authorized  on  August  1.  (B.  G.  P.  no.  79.) 


318     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

gree  of  efficiency.  It  may,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been  a 
mere  play  to  hold  off  British  action  or  to  avoid  an  abrupt 
refusal. 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  reported  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  regard  to  Belgian  neutrality:  "  On  the  receipt 
at  8.30  to-night  of  your  telegram  of  this  afternoon,  I  sent 
a  message  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  requesting 
to  see  him.  He  received  me  at  10.30  to-night  at  the  Elysee, 
where  a  Cabinet  council  was  being  held.  He  took  a  note 
of  the  inquiry  as  to  the  respecting  by  France  of  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  which  you  instructed  me  to  make." 
(July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  124.) 

In  a  telegram  immediately  following  he  added:  "Politi- 
cal Director  has  brought  me  the  reply  of  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  your  inquiry  respecting  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  It  is  as  follows:  The  French  Government  are 
resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  would 
only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  power  violating  that 
neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  neces- 
sity, in  order  to  assure  defense  of  her  own  security,  to  act 
otherwise.  This  assurance  has  been  given  several  times. 
The  President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of 
the  Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels  has 
spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance  to  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day."  (July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
125;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  119.) 

On  July  31,  Sir  Edward  Grey  instructed  the  British 
representative  at  Brussels:  — 

"  In  view  of  existing  treaties  you  should  inform  the  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  that,  in  consideration  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a  European  war,  I  have  asked  the  French  and 
German  Governments  whether  each  is  prepared  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  provided  it  is  violated  by  no 
other  power. 

"You  should  say  that  I  assume  that  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment will  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power  her  neu- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  319 

trality,  which  I  desire  and  expect  other  powers  to  uphold 
and  observe. 

"You  should  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  an 
early  reply  is  desired."   (July  31,  B.  W.  P.  no.  115.) 

He  received  the  following  reply  (August  1):  — 

"The  instructions  conveyed  in  your  telegram  of  yes- 
terday (see  B.  W.  P.  no.  115)  have  been  acted  upon. 

"Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  powers  will 
observe  and  uphold  her  neutrality,  which  she  intends  to 
maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power.  In  so  informing  me, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  said  that,  in  the  event  of 
the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  their  territory,  they  be- 
lieved that  they  were  in  a  position  to  defend  themselves 
against  intrusion.  The  relations  between  Belgium  and  her 
neighbors  were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  sus- 
pect their  intentions;  but  he  thought  it  well,  nevertheless, 
to  be  prepared  against  emergencies."  (August  1,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  128.) 

When  Sir  Edward  Grey  said,  "I  assume  that  the  Bel- 
gian Government  will  maintain  to  the  utmost  her  neutral- 
ity, which  I  desire  and  expect  other  powers  to  uphold  and 
observe,"  he  gave  Belgium  official  notice  that  England 
would  support  her  in  her  defense  of  her  neutrality.  The 
evident  intention  was  to  stiffen  her  resistance  to  Grerman 
aggression  by  promise  of  support.  The  language  used 
might  possibly  cover  a  threat  as  well.  Yet  this  is  hard  to 
reconcile  with  the  attitude  of  the  British  Minister  at  Brus- 
sels (July  31),  who,  after  informing  the  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  that  France  and  Germany  had  been 
asked  whether  they  would  respect  Belgian  neutrality, 
evinced  in  the  course  of  the  conversation  which  followed 
'some  surprise  at  the  rapidity  with  which  the  Belgian 
Government  had  resolved  upon  the  mobilization  of  their 
army.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out  that 
the  Netherlands  had  taken  an  identical  resolution  before 
they  had,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  recent  date  of 


320     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

the  putting  into  effect  of  their  new  military  regime  and  the 
measures  made  necessary  by  this  transformation  imposed 
urgent  and  comprehensive  measures  upon  them.  Their 
neighbors,  the  guarantor  powers,  ought  to  view  this  action 
as  an  evidence  of  their  wish  to  manifest  their  profound  de- 
sire to  maintain  of  themselves  their  own  neutrality.  The 
British  Minister  appeared  satisfied  with  his  reply,  and 
said  the  British  Government  awaited  this  reply  and  assur- 
ance of  Belgium's  intention  to  defend  her  neutrality  in 
order  to  continue  negotiations  with  France  and  Germany, 
the  conclusion  of  which  negotiations  would,  he  said,  be 
communicated  to  the  Belgian  Government.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  31,  B.  G.  P.  no.  11;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  115, 
128.) 

'On  the  morning  of  July  31,  in  the  course  of  a  conversa- 
tion which  Baron  van  der  Elst,  Secretary-General  of  the 
Belgian  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  had  with  Herr  von 
Below,  he  explained  to  the  German  Minister  the  trend  of 
the  military  measures  which  Belgium  had  taken  and  told 
him  they  were  a  consequence  of  Belgium's  decision  to 
carry  out  her  international  obligations,  and  that  they  in  no 
way  implied  an  attitude  of  defiance  toward  her  neighbors. 

'  The  Secretary-General  subsequently  asked  Von  Below 
whether  he  had  knowledge  of  the  conversation  which  he 
had  had  with  the  German  Minister,  his  predecessor,  Herr 
von  Flotow,  and  of  the  reply  which  the  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor had  instructed  the  latter  to  make  to  him. 

'In  the  course  of  the  discussion  aroused  in  1911  by  the 
consideration  of  the  Dutch  scheme  regarding  the  Flush- 
ing fortifications,  certain  newspapers  asserted  that  in  the 
event  of  a  Franco-German  war,  Belgium's  neutrality 
would  be  violated  by  Germany. 

'The  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  suggested  that  a 
declaration  made  in  the  German  Parliament  on  the  occa- 
sion of  a  discussion  of  foreign  policy  would  be  calculated 
to  appease  public  opinion  and  to  calm  the  suspicions, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  321 

which  are  so  much  to  be  regretted  because  of  their  influ- 
ence on  the  relations  of  the  two  countries. 

'Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  made  the  reply  that  he 
was  most  appreciative  of  the  motives  which  had  caused 
Belgium  to  make  this  request.  He  declared  that  Germany 
had  no  intention  of  violating  Belgium's  neutrality,  but 
said  he  considered  that  by  making  a  declaration  publicly, 
Germany  would  weaken  her  military  position  in  respect 
to  France,  who,  being  reassured  as  to  her  northern  fron- 
tier, would  direct  all  her  efforts  to  the  east. 

'Baron  van  der  Elst,  continuing  the  discussion  with 
Von  Below,  went  on  to  say  that  he  perfectly  understood 
the  objections  which  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  raised 
to  the  suggested  public  declaration,  and  he  pointed  out 
that  subsequently  in  1913  Herr  von  Jagow  had  given  to 
the  Budget  Committee  of  the  Reichstag  reassuring  declara- 
tions with  reference  to  the  respect  of  Belgian  neutrality.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  31,  B.  G.  P.  no.  12.) 

As  an  enclosure  in  the  same  dispatch  is  given  a  letter  of 
May  2,  1913,  from  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  which 
gives  an  account  of  Von  Jagow's  assurance  in  the  following 
words :  — 

"I  have  the  honor  of  informing  you,  according  to  the 
semi-official  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  of  the  de- 
clarations made  in  the  course  of  the  sitting  of  the  29th  of 
April  of  the  Budget  Committee  of  the  Reichstag  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Minister  of 
War  with  reference  to  Belgian  neutrality. 

"A  member  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  said:  'In 
Belgium  the  approach  of  a  Franco-German  war  is  viewed 
with  apprehension,  because  it  is  feared  that  Germany  will 
not  respect  Belgian  neutrality.' 

"Herr  von  Jagow,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
replied : '  The  neutrality  of  Belgium  is  determined  by  inter- 
national conventions,  and  Germany  is  resolved  to  respect 
these  conventions.' 


322     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

"This  declaration  did  not  satisfy  another  member  of  the 
Social  Democratic  Party.  Herr  von  Jagow  observed  that 
he  had  nothing  to  add  to  the  clear  statement  which  he  had 
uttered  with  reference  to  the  relations  between  Germany 
and  Belgium. 

"In  reply  to  further  interrogations  from  a  member  of 
the  Social  Democratic  Party,  Herr  von  Heeringen,  Minis- 
ter of  War,  stated :  '  Belgium  does  not  play  any  part  in  the 
justification  of  the  German  scheme  of  military  reorgan- 
ization; the  scheme  is  justified  by  the  position  of  matters  in 
the  East.  Germany  will  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Bel- 
gian neutrality  is  guaranteed  by  international  treaties.' 

"A  member  of  the  Progressive  Party  having  again  re- 
ferred to  Belgium,  Herr  von  Jagow  again  pointed  out  that 
his  declaration  regarding  Belgium  was  sufficiently  clear." 
(Extract,  May  2,  1913;  enclosure  in  B.  G.  P.  no.  12.) 

It  is  hard  to  understand  just  what  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  Belgian  Foreign  Office  meant  when  he  said  that  he 
understood  the  objections  to  making  a  public  declaration. 
On  its  face  it  would  look  as  though  Belgium  recognized 
that  Germany  was  justified  in  trading  upon  the  possibility 
that  she  might  violate  her  agreement  to  respect  Belgian 
neutrality  so  as  to  hamper  France.  Such  an  attitude,  if 
really  entertained  by  Belgium,  would  be  contrary  to  the 
principles  of  neutrality,  and  would  constitute  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  departure  from  a  neutral  attitude  on  Bel- 
gium's part  which  has  been  adduced.  The  departure  from 
this  attitude  of  neutrality  is  probably  more  apparent  than 
real,  and  merely  intended  not  to  offend  a  powerful  neigh- 
bor. In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  Belgium's 
attitude  at  the  Second  Hague  Conference,  when  her  dele- 
gation was  generally  to  be  found  supporting  Germany. 
Belgium's  support  of  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  would 
have  been  very  valuable  then,  but  she  preferred  to  follow 
the  lead  of  German  opposition.  Again  it  is  to  be  remarked 
that  Belgium  showed  no  disposition  to  facilitate  France's 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  323 

policy  in  Morocco,  but  held  back  her  approval  of  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  of  her  consuls. 
Such  an  attitude  savors  of  political  support  of  Germany, 
and  as  such  does  not  indicate  subserviency  to  French  or 
English  dictation.  The  determining  factor  in  this  action 
was  undoubtedly  the  fear  that  France  might  seize  the  Bel- 
gian Congo,  and  did  not  indicate  the  slightest  intention  of 
failing  to  observe  the  duties  of  her  position  as  a  perpetually 
neutral  state. 

On  August  1,  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels  made  the 
following  verbal  communication  to  the  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs:  "I  am  authorized  to  declare  that  in 
the  event  of  an  international  conflict  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  will,  as  it  has  always  declared,  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  In  the  event  of  this  neutrality  not 
being  respected  by  another  power,  the  French  Government, 
in  order  to  insure  its  own  defense,  might  be  led  to  modify 
its  attitude."   (August  1,  B.  G.  P.  no.  15.) 

The  next  day,  August  2,  at  7  p.m.,  Von  Below,  notwith- 
standing his  assurances  given  two  days  before,  handed  the 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  Germany's  ultima- 
tum: — 

"The  German  Government  has  received  reliable  infor- 
mation according  to  which  the  French  forces  intend  to 
march  on  the  Meuse,  by  way  of  Givet  and  Namur.  This 
information  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France 
marching  on  Germany  through  Belgian  territory.  The 
Imperial  German  Government  cannot  avoid  the  fear  that 
Belgium,  in  spite  of  its  best  will,  will  be  in  no  position  to 
repulse  such  a  largely  developed  French  march  without 
aid.  In  this  fact  there  is  sufficient  certainty  of  a  threat 
directed  against  Germany. 

"It  is  an  imperative  duty  for  the  preservation  of  Ger- 
many to  forestall  this  attack  of  the  enemy. 

"The  German  Government  would  feel  keen  regret  if 
Belgium  should  regard  as  an  act  of  hostility  against  her- 


324     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

self  the  fact  that  the  measures  of  the  enemies  of  Germany- 
oblige  her  on  her  part  to  violate  Belgian  territory. 

"In  order  to  dissipate  any  misunderstanding,  the  Ger- 
man Government  declares  as  follows :  — 

"1.  Germany  does  not  contemplate  any  act  of  hostil- 
ity against  Belgium.  If  Belgium  consents  in  the  war  about 
to  commence  to  take  up  an  attitude  of  friendly  neutrality 
toward  Germany,  the  German  Government  on  its  part 
undertakes,  on  the  declaration  of  peace,  to  guarantee  the 
kingdom  and  its  possessions  in  their  whole  extent. 

"2.  Germany  undertakes  under  the  condition  laid  down 
to  evacuate  Belgian  territory  as  soon  as  peace  is  con- 
cluded. 

"3.  If  Belgium  preserves  a  friendly  attitude,  Germany 
is  prepared,  in  agreement  with  the  authorities  of  the  Bel- 
gian Government,  to  buy  against  cash  all  that  is  required 
by  her  troops,  and  to  give  indemnity  for  the  damages 
caused  in  Belgium. 

"4.  If  Belgium  behaves  in  a  hostile  manner  toward  the 
German  troops,  and  in  particular  raises  difficulties  against 
their  advance  by  the  opposition  of  the  fortifications  of  the 
Meuse,  or  by  destroying  roads,  railways,  tunnels,  or  other 
engineering  works,  Germany  will  be  compelled  to  consider 
Belgium  as  an  enemy. 

"In  this  case  Germany  will  take  no  engagements  toward 
Belgium,  but  she  will  leave  the  later  settlement  of  relations 
of  the  two  States  toward  one  another  to  the  decision  of 
arms.  The  German  Government  has  a  justified  hope  that 
this  contingency  will  not  arise,  and  that  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment will  know  how  to  take  suitable  measures  to  hinder 
its  taking  place.  In  this  case  the  friendly  relations  which 
unite  the  two  neighboring  states  will  become  closer  and 
more  lasting."  (August  2,  B.  G.  P.  no.  20;  see  also  B.  W. 
P.  no.  153.) 

A  few  hours  later,  August  3,  at  half-past  one  in  the  morn- 
ing, the  German  Minister  asked  for  an  interview  with  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  325 

Belgian  Foreign  Minister,  and  made  the  extraordinary 
statement  that  'he  was  instructed  by  his  Government  to 
inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  French  dirigibles 
had  thrown  bombs,  and  that  a  patrol  of  French  cavalry, 
violating  international  law,  seeing  that  war  was  not  de- 
clared, had  crossed  the  frontier.1 

'When  asked  where  these  events  had  taken  place,  Herr 
von  Below  answered,  in  Germany.  The  Secretary-Gen- 
eral observed  that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand 
the  object  of  his  communication.  Herr  von  Below  replied 
that  these  acts,  contrary  to  international  law,  were  of  a 
nature  to  make  one  expect  that  other  acts  contrary  to 
international  law  would  be  perpetrated  by  France.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  August  3,  B.  G.  P.  no.  21.) 

1  In  reference  to  these  alleged  violations  of  German  territory,  seeF.  Y.  B. 
nos.  146,  147,  148,  149,  155.  A  pamphlet  by  two  distinguished  French  pro- 
fessors has  the  following  note :  — 

"  As  we  wished  to  ascertain  whether  the  German  newspapers  had  given  a 
more  detailed  account  of  these  occurrences,  we  consulted  five  of  the  principal 
newspapers  (Vorwaerts,  Arbeiter  Zeitung,  of  Vienna,  Frankfurter  Zeitung, 
Koelnische  Zeitung,  Munchner  Neueste  Nachrichten)  from  the  end  of  July  to 
the  5th  of  August.  First  of  all  we  noticed  that  the  aviator  who  is  said  to  have 
flown  over  Karlsruhe  is  not  mentioned.  As  for  the  others,  the  account  of 
them  is  as  vague  as  it  is  in  the  official  note.  These  incidents,  given  as  the 
cause  determining  war,  take  up  one  line,  two  or  three  at  the  most.  The 
bombs  never  left  any  trace.  One  of  these  aeroplanes,  that  at  Wesel,  is  said  to 
have  been  brought  down;  nothing  is  said  of  the  aviator  and  what  became  of 
him,  nor  is  there  anything  about  the  aeroplane  itself.  In  a  word,  the  Ger- 
mans took  care  to  draw  attention  to  their  arrival  in  Germany  and  then  never 
spoke  of  them  again.  They  were  never  seen  to  return  to  their  starting-point. 

"But  we  have  still  more  convincing  evidence.  We  have  been  able  to  pro- 
cure a  Nuremberg  newspaper,  the  Frankischer  Kurrier.  On  the  2d  of  August, 
the  day  the  bombs  are  supposed  to  have  been  thrown,  not  a  word  is  said 
about  the  incident.  Nuremberg  received  the  news  on  the  3d  by  a  telegram 
from  Berlin  identical  to  that  published  by  the  other  newspapers.  Again,  the 
Koelnische  Zeitung  of  the  3d,  in  its  morning  edition,  published  a  telegram 
from  Munich  which  read  as  follows : '  The  Bavarian  Minister  of  War  is  doubt- 
ful as  to  the  exactness  of  the  news  announcing  that  aviators  had  been  seen 
above  the  lines  Nuremberg-Kitzingen  and  Nuremberg-Ansbach  and  that 
they  had  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway.' 

"We  have  been  greatly  helped  in  these  researches  by  our  colleague  J. 
Hadamard  and  M.  Edg.  Milhaud,  professor  at  the  University  of  Geneva,  to 
whom  we  tender  our  sincere  thanks."  (E\  Durkheim  and  E.  Denis,  Who 
Wanted  War  f  p.  50,  note  1.   Paris,  1915.) 


326     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Apparently  the  German  Government  wished  to  put  their 
action  in  Belgium  in  the  light  of  a  reprisal  or  violation  of 
international  law  in  answer  to  that  of  France. 

At  the  hour  of  the  expiration  of  the  German  ultimatum, 
Monday  morning,  August  3,  the  Belgian  Government 
handed  Von  Below  its  answer :  — 

'By  their  note  of  the  2d  of  August,  1914,  the  German 
Government  has  made  known  that  according  to  certain 
intelligence  the  French  forces  intend  to  march  on  the 
Meuse  via  Givet  and  Namur,  and  that  Belgium,  in  spite 
of  her  good  intentions,  would  not  be  able  without  help  to 
beat  off  an  advance  of  the  French  troops. 

'  The  German  Government  felt  it  to  be  its  duty  to  fore- 
stall this  attack,  and  to  violate  Belgian  territory.  Under 
these  conditions  Germany  proposes  to  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment to  take  up  a  friendly  attitude,  and  undertakes 
when  peace  is  established  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the 
Belgian  Kingdom  and  of  its  possessions  in  their  entirety. 
The  note  adds  that  if  Belgium  raises  difficulties  about  the 
advance  of  the  German  troops,  Germany  will  be  compelled 
to  consider  her  as  an  enemy  and  to  leave  to  the  decision  of 
arms  settlement  of  the  later  relations  of  the  two  states 
toward  one  another. 

'This  note  caused  profound  and  painful  surprise  to  the 
Belgian  Government. 

'The  intentions  which  it  attributed  to  France  are  in 
contradiction  with  the  express  declarations  which  were 
made  to  us  on  the  1st  of  August,  in  the  name  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic. 

'Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  a  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  were  to  be  committed  by  France, 
Belgium  would  fulfill  all  her  international  duties,  and  her 
army  would  offer  the  most  vigorous  opposition  to  the  in- 
vader. 

'The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the  treaties  of  1870, 
establish  the  independence  and  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  327 

under  the  guaranty  of  the  powers,  and  particularly  of  the 
Government  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

'Belgium  has  always  been  faithful  to  her  international 
obligations;  she  has  fulfilled  her  duties  in  a  spirit  of  loyal 
impartiality;  she  has  neglected  no  effort  to  maintain  her 
neutrality  or  to  make  it  respected. 

'The  attempt  against  her  independence  with  which  the 
German  Government  threatens  her  would  constitute  a 
flagrant  violation  of  international  law.  No  strategic  in- 
terest justifies  the  violation  of  that  law. 

'The  Belgian  Government  would,  by  accepting  the 
propositions  which  are  notified  to  her,  sacrifice  the  honor 
of  the  nation  while  at  the  same  time  betraying  her  duties 
toward  Europe. 

'Conscious  of  the  part  Belgium  has  played  for  more 
than  eighty  years  in  the  civilization  of  the  world,  she  re- 
fuses to  believe  that  the  independence  of  Belgium  can  be 
preserved  only  at  the  expense  of  the  violation  of  her  neu- 
trality. 

'If  this  hope  were  disappointed  the  Belgian  Government 
has  firmly  resolved  to  repulse  by  every  means  in  her  power 
any  attack  upon  her  rights.'  (Modified  quotation,  August 
3,  B.  G.  P.  no.  22.) 

The  Council  of  Ministers  having  decided  that '  there  was 
not  for  the  moment  reason  to  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing 
powers,'  (B.  G.  P.  no.  24),  the  French  Minister  to  Belgium 
said:  'Without  being  instructed  to  make  a  declaration 
by  his  Government,  he  believed,  however,  judging  by  its 
known  intentions,  that  he  could  say  that  if  the  Royal 
Government  should  appeal  to  the  French  Government,  as 
a  power  guaranteeing  her  neutrality,  the  French  Govern- 
ment would  immediately  respond  to  her  appeal;  if  this 
appeal  was  not  made,  it  is  probable,  unless  of  course  the 
anxiety  about  their  own  defense  should  lead  them  to  take 
exceptional  measures,  that  the  French  Government  would 
wait  before  intervening  until  Belgium  had  performed  an 


328     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

act  of  effective  resistance.'    (Modified  quotation,  August 
3,  B.  G.  P.  no.  24.) 

Probably  the  heroic  little  people  wished  first  to  make  a 
stand  for  their  rights.  By  this  action,  in  not  calling  imme- 
diately upon  the  guaranteeing  powers,  they  made  it  im- 
possible for  Germany  to  claim  that  Belgium  had  violated 
her  obligations  as  a  neutral;  for  if  French  troops  had  been 
rushed  to  the  frontier,  it  would  have  been  hard  to  tell  just 
when  they  had  entered  Belgian  territory. 

12.  England  asked  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France 
It  will  be  remembered  how  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  a  con- 
versation with  Prince  Lichnowsky  on  July  29  had  said 
that  there  would  be  no  question  of  England's  intervening 
if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France  was  not 
involved.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  89.)  Three  days  after  this  declara- 
tion an  important  exchange  of  telegrams  took  place  re- 
garding the  neutrality  of  France.  August  1  is  the  date  of 
Lichnowsky' s  dispatch  informing  his  Government  that 
'Sir  Edward  had  just  asked  him  by  telephone  whether  he 
believed  he  could  declare  the  German  Government  would 
not  attack  France  in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and 
Russia,  provided  France  remained  neutral.  To  which  the 
Ambassador  replied  that  he  believed  he  could  enter  into 
such  an  agreement.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1,  G.  W. 
B.  exhibit  33.) 

This  brought  in  response  that  same  day  two  telegrams, 
one  from  the  Kaiser :  — 

"I  have  just  received  the  communication  from  your 
Government  offering  French  neutrality  under  guarantee  of 
Great  Britain.  Added  to  this  offer  was  the  inquiry  whether 
under  these  conditions  Germany  would  refrain  from  at- 
tacking France.  On  technical  grounds  my  mobilization, 
which  had  already  been  proclaimed  this  afternoon,  must 
proceed  against  two  fronts  east  and  west  as  prepared;  this 
cannot  be  countermanded  because,  I  am  sorry,  your  tele- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  329 

gram  came  so  late.  But  if  France  offers  me  neutrality 
which  must  be  guaranteed  by  the  British  fleet  and  army, 
I  shall  of  course  refrain  from  attacking  France  and  employ 
my  troops  elsewhere.  I  hope  that  France  will  not  become 
nervous.  The  troops  on  my  frontier  are  in  the  act  of  being 
stopped  by  telegraph  and  telephone  from  crossing  into 
France."    (August  1,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  32.) 

Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  telegraphed :  — 

''Germany  is  ready  to  accept  British  proposal  in  case 
England  guarantees  with  all  her  forces  absolute  neutrality 
of  France  in  Russo-German  conflict.  German  mobilization 
has  been  ordered  to-day  on  account  of  Russian  challenge 
before  English  proposal  was  known  here.  It  is,  therefore, 
now  impossible  to  make  any  change  in  strategical  distribu- 
tion of  troops  ordered  to  the  French  frontier.  But  we  guar- 
antee that  our  troops  will  not  cross  the  French  frontier  be- 
fore 7  p.m.  on  Monday  the  3rd  inst.  in  case  England  will 
pledge  herself  meanwhile."  (August  1,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  34.) 

In  reply  to  this  response,  King  George  telegraphed  the 
same  day :  — 

"In  answer  to  your  telegram  just  received,  I  think  there 
must  be  some  misunderstanding  as  to  a  suggestion  that 
passed  in  friendly  conversation  between  Prince  Lichnow- 
sky  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  afternoon  when  they  were 
discussing  how  actual  fighting  between  German  and 
French  armies  might  be  avoided  while  there  is  still  a  chance 
of  some  agreement  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  will  arrange  to  see  Prince  Lichnowsky  early 
to-morrow  morning  to  ascertain  whether  there  is  a  misun- 
derstanding on  his  part."  (August  1,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  35.) 

This  direct  exchange  of  telegrams  between  the  heads  of 
the  states  was  brought  about  by  Prince  Henry's  telegram 
of  July  30  to  King  George,  informing  him  of  the  efforts  the 
Kaiser  was  making  to  'fulfill  Nicky's  l  appeal  to  him  to 

1  The  authorized  English  version  of  the  German  White  Book  puts 
"Nicky"  for  Nicholas,  but  the  German  edition  has  "Nikolaus." 


330     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

work  for  the  maintenance  of  peace ' ;  and  urging  the  King, 
'if  he  really  and  earnestly  wished  to  prevent  the  terrible 
disaster,  to  use  his  influence  on  France  and  Russia  to  keep 
them  neutral.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  29.)  King  George  in  his  reply  of  the  same  date 
'expressed  pleasure  at  learning  of  the  Kaiser's  efforts, 
and  explained  the  exertions  the  British  Government  were 
making,  by  suggesting  to  Russia  and  France  to  suspend 
further  military  preparations,  if  Austria  would  agree  to 
content  herself  with  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  sur- 
rounding territory  as  a  hostage  for  the  satisfactory  settle- 
ment of  her  demands,  the  other  countries  agreeing  mean- 
while to  suspend  their  preparations  for  war.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  30,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  30.) 

The  foregoing  telegrams  were  published  in  the  North- 
German  Gazette,  August  20,  1914.  A  few  days  later,  when 
Lord  Robert  Cecil,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  asked  the 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether  his  attention  had 
been  called  to  the  publication  by  the  German  Government 
of  certain  proposals  which  were  alleged  to  have  been  made 
to  secure  French  and  English  neutrality  during  the  war, 
and  whether  the  publication  was  complete  and  accurate, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  replied :  — 

"I  have  seen  an  incomplete  publication.  The  circum- 
stances were  as  follows:  It  was  reported  to  me  one  day 
that  the  German  Ambassador  had  suggested  that  Ger- 
many might  remain  neutral  in  a  war  between  Russia  and 
Austria  and  also  engage  not  to  attack  France  if  we  would 
remain  neutral  and  secure  the  neutrality  of  France.  I  said 
at  once  that  if  the  German  Government  thought  such  an 
arrangement  possible  I  was  sure  we  could  secure  it. 

"It  appeared,  however,  that  what  the  Ambassador 
meant  was  that  we  should  secure  the  neutrality  of  France 
if  Germany  went  to  war  with  Russia.  This  was  quite 
a  different  proposal,  and  as  I  supposed  it  in  all  proba- 
bility to  be  incompatible  with  the  terms  of  the  Franco- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  331 

Russian  Alliance,  it  was  not  in  my  power  to  promise  to 
secure  it. 

"Subsequently,  the  Ambassador  sent  for  my  private  sec- 
retary and  told  him  that  as  soon  as  the  misunderstanding 
was  cleared  up  he  had  sent  a  second  telegram  to  Berlin  to 
cancel  the  impression  produced  by  the  first  telegram  he  had 
sent  on  the  subject.  The  first  telegram  has  been  published. 
This  second  telegram  does  not  seem  to  have  been  pub- 
lished." » 

1  From  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  debates  in  the  London  Times  of 
August  29.  An  article  in  the  London  Times  commenting  on  the  publication 
of  the  letters  in  the  North-German  Gazette  gave  the  text  of  the  omitted  letter, 
which  would  indicate  that  Lichnowsky  communicated  a  copy  of  his  ex- 
planation to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  Perhaps  he  felt  he  was  to  blame  for  the  mis- 
understanding, and  took  this  straightforward  means  of  setting  his  blunder 
right  with  Sir  Edward. 

Shortly  after  this,  the  German  Government  issued  from  the  Government 
Printing  Office  in  Berlin  an  official  English  translation  of  these  letters, 
among  which  was  included  Lichnowsky's  telegram  of  August  2.  (See  New 
York  Times,  September  11,  1914.) 

The  Appendix  of  the  Authorized  American  Edition  of  the  German  White 
Book  (pp.  31-32)  contains  the  following  official  communique  in  reference  to 
this  disputed  question :  — 

"The  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  September  5,  1914,  contains  the 
following  official  statement :  — 

"According  to  news  received  in  Berlin,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  had  made  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  exchange  of  tele- 
grams between  Germany  and  England,  prior  to  the  war,  as  published  by  the 
German  Government,  was  incomplete. 

"The  Secretary  alleged  that  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  cancelled  his  report 
anent  the  well-known  telephonic  conversation,  immediately  afterwards,  by 
telegraph,  after  he  had  been  enlightened  that  there  was  a  misunderstanding. 
This  telegram,  however,  had  not  been  published. 

"Moreover,  the  Times,  apparently  on  information  from  official  quarters, 
had  made  an  identical  statement,  with  the  comment  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment had  suppressed  the  telegram  in  question,  in  order  to  be  able  to  ac- 
cuse England  of  perfidy,  and  to  prove  Germany's  pacific  intentions. 

"In  contradiction  to  these  statements,  we  hereby  affirm  that  a  telegram 
of  the  alleged  contents  does  not  exist ! 

"Besides  the  telegram  already  published,  which  was  dispatched  from 
London  on  August  1,  11  a.m.,  Prince  Lichnowsky  sent  on  the  same  day,  the 
following  telegrams  to  Berlin :  — 

"(1)  At  1.15  p.m. 

'"The  Private  Secretary  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  just  called  to  inform  me: 
The  Minister  wished  to  make  propositions  to  me  for  the  neutrality  of  Eng- 
land, even  in  the  event  of  our  going  to  war  with  Russia,  as  well  as  with 


332     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

The  explanatory  telegram  of  the  German  Ambassador, 
dated  August  2,  was:  — 

"Sir  E,  Grey's  suggestions  were  prompted  by  a  desire 
to  make  it  possible  for  England  to  keep  permanent  neu- 
trality, but  as  they  were  not  based  on  a  previous  under- 


France.    I  shall  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  afternoon  and  will  at  once  re- 
port.' 

"(2)  At  5.30  p.m. 

"  '  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  read  to  me  the  following  declaration  which 
had  been  unanimously  applied  (sic)  by  the  Cabinet :  — 

"  '  "The  reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  is  a  matter  of  very  great  regret  because  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  does  affect  feeling  in  this  country.    If  Germany  could 
see  her  way  to  give  the  same  positive  reply,  as  that  which  has  been 
given  by  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and 
tension  here,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it, 
it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  opinion  in  this  coun- 
try." 
"'To  my  question,  whether  he  could  give  me  a  definite  guaranty  as  to  the 
neutrality  of  England  in  case  we  respected  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  the 
Minister  responded  that  he  was  unable  to  do  so.    However,  this  question 
would  have  an  important  bearing  upon  English  public  opinion.  If,  in  a  war 
against  France,  we  should  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  would  surely 
cause  a  change  in  public  opinion  which  would  make  it  very  difficult  for  the 
British  Government  to  maintain  an  amicable  neutrality.  So  far,  there  was 
not  the  slightest  intention  to  take  hostile  measures  against  us.  The  desire 
prevailed  of  refraining  from  such  measures,  as  far  as  possible.  Yet  one  could 
hardly  draw  a  line  up  to  which  we  might  safely  proceed,  without  calling 
forth  British  intervention.  He  repeatedly  recurred  to  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, and  said  that  this  question  would,  at  all  events,  play  a  great  r61e.  He 
said  that  he  had  already  thought  it  over  whether  it  would  be  possible  that 
we  and  France  would,  in  the  event  of  a  Russian  war,  remain  in  a  state  of 
armed  opposition,  without  attacking  each  other.   I  asked  him  whether  he 
was  in  a  position  to  declare  that  France  would  be  prepared  to  enter  such  a 
pact.  Since  we  had  no  intention  of  either  annihilating  France,  nor  of  an- 
nexing parts  of  her  territory,  I  was  inclined  to  think  that  we  might  be  open 
for  such  an  agreement  which  would  secure  for  us  the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain.   The  Minister  said  that  he  would  make  inquiries,  adding  that  he 
did  not  under-rate  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  military  inactivity  on 
both  sides.' 

"  (3)  At  8.30  p.m. 

"  '  My  report  of  this  morning  is  cancelled  by  my  report  of  to-night.  Since 
positive  English  proposals  are  not  forthcoming,  further  steps  in  the  direction 
indicated  in  (Your  Excellency's)  instructions  are  useless.' 

"  Obviously  the  above  telegrams  contain  no  hint  whatsoever  that  there 


THE  BEGINNINGS   OF  THE  WAR  333 

standing  with  France  and  made  without  knowledge  of  our 
mobilization,  they  have  been  abandoned  as  absolutely 
hopeless."   (August  2,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  36.) 

At  first  view  one  might  be  inclined  to  think  that  the 
German  Ambassador,  whose  sincerity  seems  never  to  have 
been  questioned,  could  not  have  made  such  a  mistake 
unless  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  some  such  proposal, 
perhaps  only  tentative.  Entirely  aside  from  the  reliance 
which  I  think  may  be  placed  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
word,  it  is  most  improbable  that  England  would  have 
agreed  to  stand  aside  and  let  Germany  and  Austria  unite 
in  an  attempt  to  crush  Russia,  while  England  restrained 
France.  France  had  let  it  appear  clearly  that  she  wanted 
peace,  but  that  she  would,  nevertheless,  support  her  ally  if 
attacked  by  Germany,  and  England,  if  she  had  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  France,  would  have  placed  the  latter  in  a 
dependent  and  humiliated  position.  The  result  of  a  policy 
so  fatuous  might  have  been  to  allow  Germany  to  crush 
Russia,  perhaps,  and  then  turn  later  against  England. 
Again,  if  we  were  to  question  the  sincerity  of  Germany's 
Ambassador,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  we  might  discover  a  plot 
to  pretend  a  conversation  which  had  not  occurred,  and  by 
answering  it  to  put  on  record  material  apt  to  create  in 
Russia  suspicions  of  France  and  England,  and  in  France 
distrust  of  England,  so  as  to  break  up  the  cordial  coopera- 
tion of  the  members  of  the  Entente.  But  in  that  case,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  would  not  have  known  anything  of  Prince 

had  been  a  misunderstanding,  nor  anything  about  the  removal  of  the  al- 
leged misunderstanding,  as  affirmed  by  the  English  statesman." 

The  same  publication  contains  the  following  remarks  about  this  ex- 
change of  correspondence :  — 

"...  It  will  be  perceived  from  these  documents  that  Germany  was  pre- 
pared to  spare  France  in  case  England  should  remain  neutral  and  would 
guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France. 

"The  essence  of  Germany's  declarations  is  contained  in  Emperor  Wil- 
liam's telegram  to  the  King  of  England  of  August  1st,  1914.  Even  if  there 
existed  a  misunderstanding  as  to  an  English  proposal,  the  Kaiser's  offer 
furnished  England  the  opportunity  to  prove  her  pacific  disposition  and  to 
prevent  the  Franco-German  War." 


332     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

The  explanatory  telegram  of  the  German  Ambassador, 
dated  August  2,  was :  — 

"Sir  E,  Grey's  suggestions  were  prompted  by  a  desire 
to  make  it  possible  for  England  to  keep  permanent  neu- 
trality, but  as  they  were  not  based  on  a  previous  under- 


France.    I  shall  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  afternoon  and  will  at  once  re- 
port.' 

"(2)  At  5.30  p.m. 

"  '  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  read  to  me  the  following  declaration  which 
had  been  unanimously  applied  (sic)  by  the  Cabinet :  — 

"  '  "The  reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  is  a  matter  of  very  great  regret  because  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  does  affect  feeling  in  this  country.    If  Germany  could 
see  her  way  to  give  the  same  positive  reply,  as  that  which  has  been 
given  by  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and 
tension  here,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it, 
it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  opinion  in  this  coun- 
try." 
"'To  my  question,  whether  he  could  give  me  a  definite  guaranty  as  to  the 
neutrality  of  England  in  case  we  respected  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  the 
Minister  responded  that  he  was  unable  to  do  so.    However,  this  question 
would  have  an  important  bearing  upon  English  public  opinion.  If,  in  a  war 
against  France,  we  should  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  would  surely 
cause  a  change  in  public  opinion  which  would  make  it  very  difficult  for  the 
British  Government  to  maintain  an  amicable  neutrality.  So  far,  there  was 
not  the  slightest  intention  to  take  hostile  measures  against  us.  The  desire 
prevailed  of  refraining  from  such  measures,  as  far  as  possible.  Yet  one  could 
hardly  draw  a  line  up  to  which  we  might  safely  proceed,  without  calling 
forth  British  intervention.  He  repeatedly  recurred  to  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, and  said  that  this  question  would,  at  all  events,  play  a  great  r61e.  He 
said  that  he  had  already  thought  it  over  whether  it  would  be  possible  that 
we  and  France  would,  in  the  event  of  a  Russian  war,  remain  in  a  state  of 
armed  opposition,  without  attacking  each  other.   I  asked  him  whether  he 
was  in  a  position  to  declare  that  France  would  be  prepared  to  enter  such  a 
pact.  Since  we  had  no  intention  of  either  annihilating  France,  nor  of  an- 
nexing parts  of  her  territory,  I  was  inclined  to  think  that  we  might  be  open 
for  such  an  agreement  which  would  secure  for  us  the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain.   The  Minister  said  that  he  would  make  inquiries,  adding  that  he 
did  not  under-rate  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  military  inactivity  on 
both  sides.' 

"  (3)  At  8.30  p.m. 

"  '  My  report  of  this  morning  is  cancelled  by  my  report  of  to-night.  Since 
positive  English  proposals  are  not  forthcoming,  further  steps  in  the  direction 
indicated  in  (Your  Excellency's)  instructions  are  useless.' 

"  Obviously  the  above  telegrams  contain  no  hint  whatsoever  that  there 


bi 


MM  ■  • 


THE  BEGINNINGS   OF  THE  WAR 


333 


i*4 


item 
i  '■.'  \m 

.■  -.-: 

■lifcHe 

,«ilitkl 

utfed 

-  aihrbe 

of  an- 

>  «tefc 

-  ■■tirifej CD 


standing  with  France  and  made  without  knowledge  of  our 
mobilization,  they  have  been  abandoned  as  absolutely 
hopeless."   (August  2,  G.  W.  B.  exhibit  36.) 

At  first  view  one  might  be  inclined  to  think  that  the 
German  Ambassador,  whose  sincerity  seems  never  to  have 
been  questioned,  could  not  have  made  such  a  mistake 
unless  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  some  such  proposal, 
perhaps  only  tentative.  Entirely  aside  from  the  reliance 
which  I  think  may  be  placed  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
word,  it  is  most  improbable  that  England  would  have 
agreed  to  stand  aside  and  let  Germany  and  Austria  unite 
in  an  attempt  to  crush  Russia,  while  England  restrained 
France.  France  had  let  it  appear  clearly  that  she  wanted 
peace,  but  that  she  would,  nevertheless,  support  her  ally  if 
attacked  by  Germany,  and  England,  if  she  had  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  France,  would  have  placed  the  latter  in  a 
dependent  and  humiliated  position.  The  result  of  a  policy 
so  fatuous  might  have  been  to  allow  Germany  to  crush 
Russia,  perhaps,  and  then  turn  later  against  England. 
Again,  if  we  were  to  question  the  sincerity  of  Germany's 
Ambassador,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  we  might  discover  a  plot 
to  pretend  a  conversation  which  had  not  occurred,  and  by 
answering  it  to  put  on  record  material  apt  to  create  in 
Russia  suspicions  of  France  and  England,  and  in  France 
distrust  of  England,  so  as  to  break  up  the  cordial  coopera- 
tion of  the  members  of  the  Entente.  But  in  that  case,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  would  not  have  known  anything  of  Prince 

had  been  a  misunderstanding,  nor  anything  about  the  removal  of  the  al- 
leged misunderstanding,  as  affirmed  by  the  English  statesman." 

The  same  publication  contains  the  following  remarks  about  this  ex- 
change of  correspondence :  — 

"...  It  will  be  perceived  from  these  documents  that  Germany  was  pre- 
pared to  spare  France  in  case  England  should  remain  neutral  and  would 
guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France. 

"The  essence  of  Germany's  declarations  is  contained  in  Emperor  Wil- 
liam's telegram  to  the  King  of  England  of  August  1st,  1914.  Even  if  there 
existed  a  misunderstanding  as  to  an  English  proposal,  the  Kaiser's  offer 
furnished  England  the  opportunity  to  prove  her  pacific  disposition  and  to 
prevent  the  Franco-German  War." 


334     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE   WAR  OF   1914 

Lichnowsky's  letter  to  his  Government,  explaining  his 
mistake.  In  reality,  it  seems  then  that  Prince  Lichnow- 
sky  must  have  misunderstood.  Sir  Edward  Grey  may  per- 
haps have  asked  whether,  if  he  prevailed  upon  France  to 
remain  neutral,  Germany  would  hold  aloof.  Some  such 
remark  Lichnowsky  may  possibly  have  understood  as  an 
offer  to  secure  the  neutrality  of  France ;  but  to  believe  this 
makes  it  impossible  to  place  a  very  high  estimate  on  the 
German  Ambassador's  intelligence.  With  the  best  inten- 
tions, he  was  unable  to  handle  the  situation  as  his  predeces- 
sor Von  Bieberstein  would  have  done.1 

1  The  London  Times  of  August  27  (p.  5),  giving  the  important  parts  of 
the  letters  published  in  the  Gazette,  and  Lichnowsky's  supposed  telegram 
of  explanation,  comments:  — 

"PRINCE   LICHNOWSKY'S   BLUNDER 

"Prince  Lichnowsky's  telegram  of  August  1  was  based  upon  a  com- 
plete misunderstanding  of  the  subject  of  a  conversation.  It  was  in  fact 
a  serious  professional  blunder  of  which  the  only  explanation  can  be 
that  Prince  Lichnowsky,  who  was  himself  working  sincerely  and 
seriously  for  an  Austro-Russian  settlement,  was  not  equal  to  the  strain 
imposed  upon  him.  There  was  no  question  of  French  neutrality  in  the 
event  of '  a  Russo-German  war.'  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  merely  making 
one  last  desperate  effort  to  see  whether  Germany  could  be  induced  to 
remain  neutral  if  England  secured  the  neutrality  of  France. 

"We  understand  that  immediately  after  the  telephone  conversa- 
tion, which  took  place  at  11.30  in  the  morning  of  August  1,  there  was 
an  official  conversation  with  Prince  Lichnowsky  in  which  it  was  plainly 
pointed  out  that  what  would  be  a  casus  foederis  for  Germany  must 
imply  a  casus  foederis  for  France  —  that  if  Germany  fought,  France 
must  fight  also.  Prince  Lichnowsky  at  once  said  that  he  had  been 
under  a  misapprehension,  and  telegraphed  to  Berlin  a  correction  of  his 
previous  telegram.  His  second  telegram  has  simply  been  suppressed, 
and  the  German  Government  actually  publishes  the  German  Ambas- 
sador's inaccurate  dispatch  in  order  to  give  a  fresh  proof  of  British 
perfidy  and  of  Germany's  eagerness  to  accept  any  proposal  making  for 
peace. 

"Meanwhile  we  may  at  any  rate  be  grateful  for  the  publication  of 
the  extraordinary  telegram  sent  by  the  Emperor  William  when  he  was 
given  to  believe  that  England  was  offering  to  look  after  France  while 
Germany  attacked  Russia.  So  far  from  remaining  quiet  herself,  Ger- 
many was  to  move  her  troops  from  the  French  frontier  in  order  to 
employ  them  'elsewhere.'  There  was,  moreover,  to  be  no  shadow  of 
doubt  about  France  keeping  quiet,  for  England  was  not  merely  to 
procure  a  declaration  of  French  neutrality  —  in  fact,  the  destruction 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  335 

The  English  Government  must  have  felt  justly  incensed 
to  learn,  on  July  31,  "not  from  St.  Petersburg,  but  from 
Germany,  that  Russia  had  proclaimed  a  general  mobiliza- 
tion of  her  army  and  fleet."1   And  it  is  very  possible  that 

of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  —  but  was  to  guarantee  French  neu- 
trality with  the  whole  strength  of  the  British  Army  and  Navy." 
Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg,  in  an  article  in  the  New  York  Sun  of  Sunday, 
October  11,  implies  that  the  British  Government  left  out  of  the  White 
Paper  the  so-called  "Willy,"  "Georgie,"  and  "Nicky"  correspondence  for 
fear  it  might  prejudice  their  case.  The  following  Sunday  the  well-known 
historian,  George  Louis  Beer,  in  a  vigorous  defense  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment publication,  says  of  this  omission:  — 

"The  explanation  is  quite  simple  to  one  \ersed  in  British  constitu- 
tional practice,  but  is  naturally  not  so  plain  to  the  citizen  of  a  country 
whose  monarch  claims  to  be  the  direct  agent  of  God.  As  a  result  of 
prolonged  struggles  the  House  of  Commons  ultimately  established  its 
predominance  in  the  British  Commonwealth,  and  while  leaving  most 
of  the  powers  of  the  Crown  intact,  it  successfully  insisted  upon  the 
exercise  of  those  functions  by  Ministers  responsible  to  it.  Hence  the 
essential  negotiations  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war  were  conducted 
by  the  Foreign  Secretary.  This  does  not,  however,  imply  that  the 
King's  personal  influence  is  not  at  times  used  by  the  Ministry  in  a 
delicate  diplomatic  situation. 

"But  unquestionably  all  letters  and  telegrams  from  the  King  to  the 
Kaiser  and  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  were  either  drafted  by  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  or  submitted  to  him  for  approval.    This  is  a  necessary  con- 
sequence of  the  system  of  a  responsible  government.  Thus  Queen  Vic- 
toria under  similar  circumstances  was  at  times  obliged  in  her  own 
handwriting  to  express  opinions  far  other  than  those  she  really  held. 
But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  was  this  ancillary  correspondence  not 
published?   Here  again  one  runs  across  some  peculiar  features  of  the 
British  Constitution  resulting  from  the  adaptation  of  mediaeval  formB 
to  democratic  conditions.   According  to  British  practice  a  Minister  is 
responsible  for  every  executive  act,  and  the  King's  name  must  not  be 
brought  into  the  political  discussions  either  within  or  without  Parlia- 
ment.  It  is  obvious  that  if  this  personal  correspondence  of  the  King 
were  laid  before  Parliament  there  would  be  a  violation  of  this  funda- 
mental principle,  without  which  the  system  of  responsible  government 
cannot  work  smoothly.   Moreover,  these  documents  were  naturally  in 
complete  accord  with  those  submitted,  and  were  in  no  way  essential  to 
the  formation  of  a  correct  judgment  by  Parliament.  Had  there  been 
any  divergence  Dr.  Dernburg's  query  would  have  some  point." 
1  Statement  of  Mr.  Asquith,  July  31;  see  London  Times,  August  1,  1914. 
The  date  of  the  Austrian  general  mobilization  is  in  dispute.   (Cf .  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  115.)   M.  Viviani  stated:  "But  while  these  negotiations  were  going  on, 
and  while  Russia  in  the  negotiations  showed  a  good-will  which  cannot  be 
disputed,   Austria  was  the  first  to  proceed  to  a  general  mobilization." 
(Extract,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  127.)  Nevertheless,  the  weight  of  the  evidence  indi- 


336     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  negotiating  with  Prince  Lichnowsky 
in  an  attempt  to  find  some  way  of  allowing  France  and  Eng- 
land to  keep  out  of  the  fray,  so  that  Russia  might  be  left  to 
pay  the  penalty  of  her  ill-timed  and  precipitate  mobiliza- 
tion.1 In  any  event,  the  attitude  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment in  regard  to  Belgium  and  the  determination  of 
France  to  support  Russia  under  all  circumstances  would 
have  rendered  such  efforts  of  no  avail. 

13.  Germany's  detention  of  English  vessels 

On  August  1,  Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  in  reference  to  the  detention  of  British  vessels:  — 

"We  are  informed  that  authorities  at  Hamburg  have 
forcibly  detained  steamers  belonging  to  the  Great  Central 
Company  and  other  British  merchant  ships. 

"I  cannot  ascertain  on  what  grounds  the  detention  of 
British  ships  has  been  ordered. 

cates  that  Russia  was  the  first  to  order  a  general  mobilization.  M.  Auguste 
Gauvin,  in  his  article,  on  Les  origines  de  la  guerre  Europeenne,  states:  "The 
posting  up  of  orders  completing  the  bulletins  which  announced  partial  mo- 
bilization took  place  only  the  1st  of  August  in  part  of  the  monarchy." 
(Translated  from  La  Revue  de  Paris,  December  15,  1914,  p.  414,  note  1.) 

Professors  Durkheim  and  Denis  take  a  different  view.  (Durkheim  and 
Denis:  Who  Wanted  War  ?  p.  40,  note  2.    Paris,  1915.) 

1  In  this  connection  the  remark  in  the  London  Times  of  August  27  (see 
above,  p.  334),  that  Prince  Lichnowsky  was  guilty  of  a  "serious  professional 
blunder,"  seems  to  convey  the  idea  that  some  very  confidential  matters  were 
under  discussion.  The  Oxford  professors  make  the  following  statement: 
"One  more  effort  to  preserve  peace  in  western  Europe  seems  to  have  been 
made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  On  the  telephone  he  asked  Prince  Lichnowsky 
whether,  if  France  remained  neutral,  Germany  would  promise  not  to  attack 
her.  The  impression  seems  to  have  prevailed  in  Berlin  that  this  was  an  offer 
to  guarantee  French  neutrality  by  the  force  of  British  arms,  and  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  in  his  telegram  to  the  King  gave  evidence  of  the  relief  His 
Imperial  Majesty  felt  at  the  prospect  that  the  good  relations  between  the 
two  countries  would  be  maintained.  Unfortunately  for  such  hopes,  France 
had  never  been  consulted  in  the  matter,  nor  was  there  ever  any  idea  of 
coercing  France  into  neutrality,  and  even  the  original  proposal  had  to  be 
abandoned  on  consideration  as  unpractical."  (Extract  from  Why  We  are 
at  War,  by  Members  of  the  Oxford  Faculty  of  Modern  History,  p.  87.  Clar- 
endon Press,  1914.) 

The  authors  of  these  remarks  must  have  had  exceptional  facilities  for 
ascertaining  what  actually  took  place. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  337 

"You  should  request  German  Government  to  send  im- 
mediate orders  that  they  should  be  allowed  to  proceed 
without  delay.  The  effect  on  public  opinion  here  will  be 
deplorable  unless  this  is  done.  His  Majesty's  Government, 
on  their  side,  are  most  anxious  to  avoid  any  incident  of  an 
aggressive  nature,  and  the  German  Government  will,  I 
hope,  be  equally  careful  not  to  take  any  step  which  would 
make  the  situation  between  us  impossible."  (August  1, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  130.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  'expressed  the  greatest 
surprise  and  annoyance  and  promised  to  send  orders  at 
once  to  allow  steamers  to  proceed  without  delay.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  143.)  The  Secretary 
said  that  '  this  must  be  regarded  as  a  special  favor  to  His 
Majesty's  Government,  as  no  other  foreign  ships  have 
been  allowed  to  leave.  Reason  of  detention  was  that  mines 
were  being  laid  and  other  precautions  being  taken.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  August  2,  B.  W.  P.  no.  145.) 

The  next  day,  August  2,  Sir  Edward  Grey  lodged  pro- 
test against  unloading  and  holding  of  British  cargoes  of 
sugar  (B.  W.  P.  no.  150) ;  but  the  British  Ambassador  re- 
ported "no  information  available."  (Extract,  August  3, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  150.) 

14-  Germany  invades  Luxemburg 

On  August  2,  Sir  Edward  Grey  received  the  following 
dispatch  from  the  Minister  of  State  of  Luxemburg :  — 

"I  have  the  honor  to  bring  to  Your  Excellency's  notice 
the  following  facts :  — 

"On  Sunday,  the  2d  of  August,  very  early,  the  German 
troops,  according  to  the  information  which  has  up  to  now 
reached  the  Grand  Ducal  Government,  penetrated  into 
Luxemburg  territory  by  the  bridges  of  Wasserbillig  and 
Remich,  and  proceeded  particularly  toward  the  south  and 
in  the  direction  of  Luxemburg,  the  capital  of  the  Grand 
Duchy.  A  certain  number  of  armored  trains  with  troops 


338     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

and  ammunition  have  been  sent  along  the  railway  line 
from  Wasserbillig  to  Luxemburg,  where  their  arrival  is  ex- 
pected. These  occurrences  constitute  acts  which  are  mani- 
festly contrary  to  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  as 
guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  of  London  of  1867.  The  Luxem- 
burg Government  have  not  failed  to  address  an  energetic 
protest  against  this  aggression  to  the  representatives  of 
His  Majesty,  the  German  Emperor,  at  Luxemburg.  An 
identical  protest  will  be  sent  by  telegraph  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Berlin."  (August  2,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  147.) 

Sir  Edward  received  a  second  dispatch  the  same  day:  — 

"The  Luxemburg  Minister  of  State  has  just  received 
through  the  German  Minister  in  Luxemburg,  M.  de  Buch, 
a  telegram  from  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire, 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  to  the  effect  that  the  military  meas- 
ures taken  in  Luxemburg  do  not  constitute  a  hostile  act 
against  Luxemburg,  but  are  only  intended  to  insure  against 
a  possible  attack  of  a  French  Army.  Full  compensation 
will  be  paid  to  Luxemburg  for  any  damage  caused  by 
using  the  railways,  which  are  leased  to  the  Empire." 
(August  2,  B.  W.  P.  no.  129.) 

When  M.  Paul  Cambon  'asked  Sir  Edward  about  the 
violation  of  Luxemburg,  he  stated  to  him  the  doctrine  on 
that  point  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon 
in  1867,  but  when  the  Ambassador  asked  what  the  British 
Government  would  say  about  the  violation  of  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium,  the  British  Minister  replied  that  that  was  a 
much  more  important  matter  and  that  they  were  consider- 
ing what  statement  they  should  make  in  Parliament  next 
day  —  in  effect,  whether  they  should  declare  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  a  casus  belli.'  (Modified  quotation, 
August  2,  B.  W.  P.  no.  148.) 

In  reporting  this  interview,  M.  Cambon  says  that  'the 
Secretary  of  State  reminded  me  that  the  convention  of 
1867  relative  to  Luxemburg  differed  from  the  treaty  rela- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  339 

tive  to  Belgium  in  this  sense,  that  England  was  bound  to 
uphold  this  latter  agreement  without  the  support  of  the 
other  guaranteeing  powers,  while,  for  Luxemburg,  all  the 
guaranteeing  powers  must  act  in  concert.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, August  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  137.) 

It  seems  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  that  this  violation  by 
Germany  of  the  perpetual  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  was 
contrary  to  her  solemn  treaty  obligations,  and  hence  a  con- 
spicuous violation  of  international  law;  for  the  German 
Empire  had  inherited  the  obligation  of  Prussia  to  respect 
and  guarantee  the  perpetual  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 
undertaken  by  the  Treaty  of  London.  The  principle  of  the 
perpetual  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  was  "placed  under  the 
sanction  of  the  collective  guarantee  of  the  powers,"1  and 
England  has  expressly  stated  that  she  did  not  understand 
the  treaty  of  guaranty  to  compel  her  to  make  war  against  a 
guarantor  to  secure  its  respect.  This  is  a  weakness  in  the 
logic  of  England's  stand,  for  why  should  she  from  a  legal 
point  of  view  be  any  more  bound  in  the  case  of  Belgium? 
Only  because  in  the  latter  case  her  political  interests  and 
her  obligations  under  international  law  coincide.  It  is  to  be 
remarked,  however,  that  it  is  one  thing  for  a  nation  to  re- 
fuse to  make  war  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg, 
and  another  to  be  guilty  itself  of  violating  it.   The  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  will  be  more  fully  dis- 
cussed in  the  following  chapter.2 

15.  England  agrees  to  protect  the  French  coast 
On  August  1,  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  M.  Paul  Cambon 
that,  when  informing  the  Cabinet  that  Germany  had  de- 
clared "herself  not  in  a  position  to  reply, "  regarding  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  he  would  'ask  for  authority  to  tell  the 
House  of  Commons  on  Monday  [August  3]  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  would  not  permit  a  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality.  In  the  second  place,  Sir  Edward  said  that  he 

1  Wicker,  Neutralization,  p.  30.  1911.  2  Chap,  rs,  §  8. 


340     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

would  propose  to  his  colleagues  that  they  should  declare 
that  the  fleet,  the  squadrons  of  which  were  mobilized,  would 
oppose  the  passage  of  the  German  squadrons  through  the 
Straits;  or,  if  they  passed  the  Straits,  that  they  would  op- 
pose any  attack  upon  the  French  coasts.  M.  Cambon 
pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  that  if  between  then  and 
Monday,  when  the  Cabinet  would  discuss  these  questions, 
any  serious  incident  should  occur,  it  would  not  do  to  be 
taken  by  surprise  and  that  it  would  be  well  to  consider 
intervening  in  time.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  1, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  126.) 

The  morning  of  August  2,  after  the  meeting  of  the  Cabi- 
net, Sir  Edward  Grey  gave  M.  Cambon  the  following 
memoranda :  — 

"I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  Ger- 
man fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North 
Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against  French  coasts 
or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in 
its  power. 

"  This  assurance  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the  policy  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  receiving  the  support  of  Parlia- 
ment, and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding  His  Majesty's 
Government  to  take  any  action  until  the  above  contin- 
gency of  action  by  the  German  fleet  takes  place."  *  (August 
2,  B.  W.  P.  no.  148.) 

1  An  editorial  in  the  London  Times,  August  3,  gives  a  rSsume'  of  the  situa- 
tion and  sets  forth  its  understanding  of  England's  vital  interests:  "The 
whole  situation  has  been  revolutionized  by  the  events  of  yesterday.  The 
doubts  which  many  of  us  tried  hard  to  cherish  as  to  Germany's  real  inten- 
tions have  been  dispelled  by  her  high-handed  contempt  for  public  law.  The 
Government  and  the  nation  now  realize  that  she  has  been  bent  on  a  Euro- 
pean war  — a  European  war  to  be  waged  in  the  first  instance  against  France, 
and  through  at  least  one  of  those  neutral  States  whose  safety  we  have  bound 
ourselves  to  defend  because  it  is  indispensable  to  our  own.  The  Cabinet, 
which  has  been  sitting  almost  uninterruptedly  since  Saturday  morning, 
reached  a  decision  at  an  early  hour  yesterday,  which  shows  that  they  know 
what  is  before  us.  They  have  called  up  the  Naval  Reserves.  They  would 
not  have  taken  this  step  had  they  not  felt  that  in  this  quarrel  our  interests 
are  now  directly  at  stake.  .  .  .  Here  at  home  and  in  the  far-off  dominions 
the  sure  instinct  of  our  peoples  teaches  them  that  the  ruin  of  France  or  of 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  341 

'Sir  Edward  Grey  pointed  out  that  Great  Britain  had 
very  large  questions  and  most  difficult  issues  to  consider, 
and  that  the  Government  felt  that  they  could  not  neces- 
sarily bind  themselves  to  declare  war  upon  Germany  if  war 
broke  out  between  France  and  Germany  the  next  day,  but 
it  was  essential  to  the  French  Government,  whose  fleet  had 
long  been  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  know  how 
to  make  their  dispositions  with  their  north  coast  entirely 
undefended.  Great  Britain,  therefore,  thought  it  necessary 
to  give  them  this  assurance.  It  did  not  bind  her  to  go  to 
war  with  Germany,  unless  the  German  fleet  took  the  ac- 
tion indicated,  but  it  did  give  a  security  to  France  that 
would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of  her  own  Med- 
iterranean fleet.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  2,  B.  W  P 
no.  148.) 

The  British  Cabinet,  in  spite  of  the  dissension  among  its 
members,1  could  on  August  2  feel  more  secure  in  giving  the 

the  Low  Countries  would  be  the  prelude  to  our  own.  We  can  no  more  toler- 
ate a  German  hegemony  in  Europe  than  we  can  tolerate  the  hegemony  of 
any  other  power.  As  our  fathers  fought  Spain  and  France  in  the  days  of 
then- greatest  strength  to  defeat  their  pretense  to  Continental  supremacy, 
and  their  menace  to  the  narrow  seas,  which  are  the  bulwark  of  our  independ- 
ence, so  shall  we  be  ready,  with  the  same  unanimity  and  the  same  stubborn 
tenacity  of  purpose,  to  fight  any  other  nation  which  shows  by  her  acts  that 
she  is  advancing  a  like  claim  and  confronting  us  with  a  like  threat.  If  any 
individual  member  of  the  Cabinet  dissents  from  this  view,  the  sooner  he 
quits  the  Government  the  better.  Mr.  Asquith  may  find  it  no  disadvantage 
to  take  fresh  blood  into  his  Administration,  as  M.  Viviani  has  undoubtedly 
strengthened  the  French  Government  by  the  admission  of  M.  Delcasse  and 
M  Clemenceau.  The  controversy  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia, 
and  that  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  have  passed  away  from  the 
eyes  of  the  nation.  These  are  fixed  on  the  German  attack  upon  the  French 
Republic  and  upon  Luxemburg.  In  that  conflict  the  nation  know  their  duty. 
With  the  blessing  of  Heaven  they  will  do  it  to  the  uttermost."   (Extract.) 

1  The  acute  Cabinet  crisis  which  paralleled  the  European  crisis  is  dis- 
closed in  the  London  Times:  — 

"CHANGES  IN  THE  CABINET 

"We  understand  that  Lord  Morley,  Lord  President  of  the  Council,  and 
Mr.  Burns,  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  have  resigned  office.  At  a  late 
hour  last  night  efforts  were  still  being  made  to  induce  Mr.  Burns  to  with- 
draw his  resignation,  but  Lord  Morley 's  is  final. 

"The  resignation  of  these  Ministers  is  the  result,  of  course,  of  a  fundamen- 


344     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

to  the  French  Chambers,  he  purposed  to  indicate  that  the 
assistance  which  Great  Britain  had  the  intention  of  giving 
France,  with  the  view  of  protecting  the  French  coasts  or 
the  French  mercantile  marine,  would  be  so  exerted  as  to 
afford  equal  support  to  the  French  navy  by  the  English 
fleet,  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  conflict,  in  the  Atlantic 
as  well  as  in  the  North  Sea  and  in  the  English  Channel. 
He  said,  moreover,  that  he  would  mention  that  English 
ports  could  not  be  used  as  points  for  the  revictualing  of 
the  German  fleet.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  2,  F.  W.  B. 
no.  138.) 

M.  Cambon  replied:  — 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  has  authorized  me  to  tell  you  that 
you  may  inform  Parliament  that  to-day  he  made  declara- 
tions in  the  Commons  as  to  the  present  attitude  of  the 
British  Government,  and  that  the  chief  of  these  declara- 
tions was  as  follows : '  If  the  German  fleet  cross  the  Straits, 
or  go  north  in  the  North  Sea  in  order  to  double  the  British 
Isles,  with  a  view  to  attacking  the  French  coasts  or  the 
French  Navy,  or  to  disturbing  the  French  mercantile 
marine,  the  British  fleet  will  intervene  in  order  to  give  the 
French  marine  entire  protection,  so  that  from  that  moment 
on  England  and  Germany  would  be  in  a  state  of  war.' 

"Sir  E.  Grey  pointed  out  that  the  mention  of  operations 
through  the  North  Sea  implied  protection  against  a  dem- 
onstration in  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

"The  declaration  with  regard  to  the  intervention  of  the 
British  fleet,  of  which  I  gave  you  the  text  in  my  telegram 
of  August  2,  is  to  be  regarded  as  binding  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. Sir  Edward  Grey  assured  me  of  this,  and  added, 
that  the  French  Government  was  therefore  in  a  position  to 
bring  it  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Chambers. 

"On  my  return  to  the  Embassy,  I  learned  from  your 
telephonic  communication  of  the  German  ultimatum  ad- 
dressed to  Belgium.  I  immediately  informed  Sir  E.  Grey 
of  it."   (Extract,  August  3,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  143.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  345 

In  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  (August  3),  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  after  tracing  the  history  and  explaining  the 
nature  of  the  Entente 1  with  France,  said :  — 

"I  now  come  to  what  we  think  the  situation  requires  of 
us.  For  many  years  we  have  had  a  long-standing  friend- 
ship with  France.  I  remember  well  the  feeling  in  the  House 
—  and  my  own  feeling — for  I  spoke  on  the  subject,  I  think, 
when  the  late  Government  made  their  agreement  with 
France  —  the  warm  and  cordial  feeling  resulting  from  the 
fact  that  these  two  nations,  who  had  had  perpetual  differ- 
ences in  the  past,  had  cleared  these  differences  away.  I  re- 
member saying,  I  think,  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  some 
benign  influence  had  been  at  work  to  produce  the  cordial 
atmosphere  that  had  made  that  possible.  But  how  far  that 
friendship  entails  obligation  —  it  has  been  a  friendship 
between  the  nations  and  ratified  by  the  nations  —  how 
far  that  entails  an  obligation,  let  every  man  look  into  his 
own  heart,  and  his  own  feelings,  and  construe  the  extent 
of  the  obligation  for  himself.  I  construe  it  myself  as  I  feel 
it,  but  I  do  not  wish  to  urge  upon  any  one  else  more  than 
their  feelings  dictate  as  to  what  they  should  feel  about  the 
obligation.  The  House,  individually  and  collectively,  may 
judge  for  itself.  I  speak  my  personal  view,  and  I  have 
given  the  House  my  own  feeling  in  the  matter. 

"The  French  fleet  is  now  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 
northern  and  western  coasts  of  France  are  absolutely  un- 
defended. The  French  fleet  being  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterranean,  the  situation  is  very  different  from  what 
it  used  to  be,  because  the  friendship  which  has  grown  up 
between  the  two  countries  has  given  them  a  sense  of  se- 
curity that  there  was  nothing  to  be  feared  from  us.  'The 
French  coasts  are  absolutely  undefended.  The  French 
fleet  is  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  has  for  some  years  been 
concentrated  there  because  of  the  feeling  of  confidence  and 
friendship  which  has  existed  between  the  two  countries. 

1  See  above,  pp.  288-292. 


346     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

My  own  feeling  is  that  if  a  foreign  fleet,  engaged  in  a  war 
which  France  had  not  sought,  and  in  which  she  had  not 
been  the  aggressor,  came  down  the  English  Channel  and 
bombarded  and  battered  the  undefended  coasts  of  France, 
we  could  not  stand  aside  and  see  this  going  on  practically 
within  sight  of  our  eyes,  with  our  arms  folded,  looking  on 
dispassionately,  doing  nothing! *  I  believe  that  would  be 
the  feeling  of  this  country.  There  are  times  when  one  feels 
that  if  these  circumstances  actually  did  arise,  it  would  be  a 
feeling  which  would  spread  with  irresistible  force  through- 
out the  land. 

"But  I  also  want  to  look  at  the  matter  without  senti- 
ment, and  from  the  point  of  view  of  British  interests,  and 
it  is  on  that  that  I  am  going  to  base  and  justify  what  I  am 
presently  going  to  say  to  the  House.  If  we  say  nothing  at 
this  moment,  what  is  France  to  do  with  her  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean?  If  she  leaves  it  there,  with  no  statement 
from  us  as  to  what  we  will  do,  she  leaves  her  northern  and 
western  coasts  absolutely  undefended,  at  the  mercy  of  a 
German  fleet  coming  down  the  Channel,  to  do  as  it  pleases 
in  a  war  which  is  a  war  of  life  and  death  between  them.  If 
we  say  nothing,  it  may  be  that  the  French  fleet  is  with- 
drawn from  the  Mediterranean.  We  are  in  the  presence  of 
a  European  conflagration;  can  anybody  set  limits  to  the 
consequences  that  may  arise  out  of  it?  Let  us  assume  that 
to-day  we  stand  aside  in  an  attitude  of  neutrality,  saying 
'  No,  we  cannot  undertake  and  engage  to  help  either  party 
in  this  conflict.'  Let  us  suppose  the  French  fleet  is  with- 
drawn from  the  Mediterranean;  and  let  us  assume  that  the 
consequences  —  which  are  already  tremendous  in  what 
has  happened  in  Europe  even  to  countries  which  are  at 
peace  —  in  fact,  equally  whether  countries  are  at  peace  or 
at  war  —  let  us  assume  that  out  of  that  come  consequences 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  here  acknowledges  England's  moral  obligation  to 
support  France  against  a  German  attack  upon  her  coasts,  but  this  was  only 
because  France  "had  not  been  the  aggressor." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  347 

unforeseen,  which  make  it  necessary  at  a  sudden  moment 
that,  in  defense  of  vital  British  interests,  we  should  go  to 
war :  and  let  us  assume  —  which  is  quite  possible  —  that 
Italy,  who  is  now  neutral,  because,  as  I  understand,  she 
considers  that  this  war  is  an  aggressive  war,  and  the  Triple 
Alliance  being  a  defensive  alliance  her  obligation  did  not 
arise  —  let  us  assume  that  consequences  which  are  not 
yet  foreseen  —  and  which  perfectly  legitimately  consult- 
ing her  own  interests  —  make  Italy  depart  from  her  atti- 
tude of  neutrality  at  a  time  when  we  are  forced  in  defense 
of  vital  British  interests  ourselves  to  fight,  what  then  will 
be  the  position  in  the  Mediterranean?  It  might  be  that  at 
some  critical  moment  those  consequences  would  be  forced 
upon  us  because  our  trade  routes  in  the  Mediterranean 
might  be  vital  to  this  country. 

"  Nobody  can  say  that  in  the  course  of  the  next  few 
weeks  there  is  any  particular  trade  route  the  keeping  open 
of  which  may  not  be  vital  to  this  country.  What  will  be 
our  position  then?  We  have  not  kept  a  fleet  in  the  Medi- 
terranean which  is  equal  to  dealing  alone  with  a  combina- 
tion of  other  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean.  It  would  be  the 
very  moment  when  we  could  not  detach  more  ships  to  the 
Mediterranean,  and  we  might  have  exposed  this  country 
from  our  negative. attitude  at  the  present  moment  to  the 
most  appalling  risk.  I  say  that  from  the  point  of  view  of 
British  interests.  We  feel  strongly  that  France  was  en- 
titled to  know  —  and  to  know  at  once!  —  whether  or  not 
in  the  event  of  attack  upon  her  unprotected  northern  and 
western  coasts  she  could  depend  upon  British  support.  In 
that  emergency,  and  in  these  compelling  circumstances, 
yesterday  afternoon  I  gave  to  the  French  Ambassador  the 
following  statement :  — 

"'I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that  if  the 
German  fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the 
North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against  the 
French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give 


348     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 


all  the  protection  in  its  power.  This  assurance  is,  of 
course,  subject  to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must 
not  be  taken  as  binding  His  Majesty's  Government  to 
take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of  action 
by  the  German  fleet  takes  place.' 
"I  read  that  to  the  House,  not  as  a  declaration  of  war 
on  our  part,  not  as  entailing  immediate  aggressive  action 
on  our  part,  but  as  binding  us  to  take  aggressive  action 
should  that  contingency  arise.    Things  move  very  hur- 
riedly from  hour  to  hour.  Fresh  news  comes  in,  and  I  can- 
not give  this  in  any  very  formal  way;  but  I  understand 
that  the  German  Government  would  be  prepared,  if  we 
would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality,  to  agree  that  its 
fleet  would  not  attack  the  nothern  coast  of  France.  I  have 
only  heard  that  shortly  before  I  came  to  the  House,  but  it 
is  far  too  narrow  an  engagement  for  us. 

"There  is  but  one  way  in  which  the  Government  could 
make  certain  at  the  present  moment  of  keeping  outside 
this  war,  and  that  would  be  that  it  should  immediately 
issue  a  proclamation  of  unconditional  neutrality.  We  can- 
not do  that.  We  have  made  the  commitment  to  France, 
that  I  have  read  to  the  House,  which  prevents  us  from 
doing  that.  We  have  got  the  consideration  of  Belgium 
which  prevents  us  also  from  any  unconditional  neutrality, 
and,  without  those  conditions  absolutely  satisfied  and  sat- 
isfactory, we  are  bound  not  to  shrink  from  proceeding  to 
the  use  of  all  the  forces  in  our  power.  If  we  did  take  that 
line  by  saying,  '  We  will  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
this  matter '  under  no  conditions  —  the  Belgian  Treaty 
obligations,  the  possible  position  in  the  Mediterranean, 
with  damage  to  British  interests,  and  what  may  happen 
to  France  from  our  failure  to  support  France  —  if  we  were 
to  say  that  all  those  things  mattered  nothing,  were  as 
nothing,  and  to  say  we  would  stand  aside,  we  should,  I  be- 


bum 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


349 


lieve,  sacrifice  our  respect  and  good  name  and  reputation 
before  the  world  and  should  not  escape  the  most  serious 
and  grave  economic  consequences. 

"My  object  has  been  to  explain  the  view  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  to  place  before  the  House  the  issue  and  the 
choice.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  conceal,  after  what  I  have 
said,  and  after  the  information,  incomplete  as  it  is,  that  I 
have  given  to  the  House  with  regard  to  Belgium, x  that  we 
must  be  prepared,  and  we  are  prepared,  for  the  conse- 
quences of  having  to  use  all  the  strength  we  have  at  any 
moment  —  we  know  not  how  soon  —  to  defend  ourselves 
and  to  take  our  part.  We  know,  if  the  facts  all  be  as  I  have 
stated  them,  though  I  have  announced  no  intending  ag- 
gressive action  on  our  part,  no  final  decision  to  resort  to 
force  at  a  moment's  notice,  until  we  know  the  whole  of  the 
case,  that  the  use  of  it  may  be  forced  upon  us.  As  far  as 
the  forces  of  the  Crown  are  concerned,  we  are  ready.  I 
believe  the  Prime  Minister  and  my  right  hon.  friend  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  have  no  doubt  whatever  that 
the  readiness  and  the  efficiency  of  those  forces  were  never 
at  a  higher  mark  than  they  are  to-day,  and  never  was  there 
a  time  when  confidence  was  more  justified  in  the  power  of 
the  navy  to  protect  our  commerce  and  to  protect  our 
shores.  The  thought  is  with  us  always  of  the  suffering  and 
misery  entailed  from  which  no  country  in  Europe  will 
escape  and  from  which  no  abdication  or  neutrality  will 
save  us.  The  amount  of  harm  that  can  be  done  by  an 
enemy  ship  to  our  trade  is  infinitesimal,  compared  with  the 
amount  of  harm  that  must  be  done  by  the  economic  con- 
dition that  is  caused  on  the  Continent. 

"The  most  awful  responsibility  is  resting  upon  the 
Government  in  deciding  what  to  advise  the  House  of  Com- 
mons to  do.  We  have  disclosed  our  mind  to  the  House  of 
Commons.  We  have  disclosed  the  issue,  the  information 
which  we  have,  and  made  clear  to  the  House,  I  trust,  that 

1  See  post,  Documents,  chap,  xm;  also  p.  353. 


348     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

all  the  protection  in  its  power.   This  assurance  is,  of 
course,  subject  to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must 
not  be  taken  as  binding  His  Majesty's  Government  to 
take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of  action 
by  the  German  fleet  takes  place.' 
"I  read  that  to  the  House,  not  as  a  declaration  of  war 
on  our  part,  not  as  entailing  immediate  aggressive  action 
on  our  part,  but  as  binding  us  to  take  aggressive  action 
should  that  contingency  arise.    Things  move  very  hur- 
riedly from  hour  to  hour.  Fresh  news  comes  in,  and  I  can- 
not give  this  in  any  very  formal  way;  but  I  understand 
that  the  German  Government  would  be  prepared,  if  we 
would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality,  to  agree  that  its 
fleet  would  not  attack  the  nothern  coast  of  France.  I  have 
only  heard  that  shortly  before  I  came  to  the  House,  but  it 
is  far  too  narrow  an  engagement  for  us. 

"There  is  but  one  way  in  which  the  Government  could 
make  certain  at  the  present  moment  of  keeping  outside 
this  war,  and  that  would  be  that  it  should  immediately 
issue  a  proclamation  of  unconditional  neutrality.  We  can- 
not do  that.  We  have  made  the  commitment  to  France, 
that  I  have  read  to  the  House,  which  prevents  us  from 
doing  that.  We  have  got  the  consideration  of  Belgium 
which  prevents  us  also  from  any  unconditional  neutrality, 
and,  without  those  conditions  absolutely  satisfied  and  sat- 
isfactory, we  are  bound  not  to  shrink  from  proceeding  to 
the  use  of  all  the  forces  in  our  power.  If  we  did  take  that 
line  by  saying,  '  We  will  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
this  matter '  under  no  conditions  —  the  Belgian  Treaty 
obligations,  the  possible  position  in  the  Mediterranean, 
with  damage  to  British  interests,  and  what  may  happen 
to  France  from  our  failure  to  support  France  —  if  we  were 
to  say  that  all  those  things  mattered  nothing,  were  as 
nothing,  and  to  say  we  would  stand  aside,  we  should,  I  be- 


THE  BEGINNINGS^  OF  THE  WAR  349 

lieve,  sacrifice  our  respect  and  good  name  and  reputation 
before  the  world  and  should  not  escape  the  most  serious 
and  grave  economic  consequences. 

"My  object  has  been  to  explain  the  view  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  to  place  before  the  House  the  issue  and  the 
choice.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  conceal,  after  what  I  have 
said,  and  after  the  information,  incomplete  as  it  is,  that  I 
have  given  to  the  House  with  regard  to  Belgium,1  that  we 
must  be  prepared,  and  we  are  prepared,  for  the  conse- 
quences of  having  to  use  all  the  strength  we  have  at  any 
moment  —  we  know  not  how  soon  —  to  defend  ourselves 
and  to  take  our  part.  We  know,  if  the  facts  all  be  as  I  have 
stated  them,  though  I  have  announced  no  intending  ag- 
gressive action  on  our  part,  no  final  decision  to  resort  to 
force  at  a  moment's  notice,  until  we  know  the  whole  of  the 
case,  that  the  use  of  it  may  be  forced  upon  us.  As  far  as 
the  forces  of  the  Crown  are  concerned,  we  are  ready.  I 
believe  the  Prime  Minister  and  my  right  hon.  friend  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  have  no  doubt  whatever  that 
the  readiness  and  the  efficiency  of  those  forces  were  never 
at  a  higher  mark  than  they  are  to-day,  and  never  was  there 
a  time  when  confidence  was  more  justified  in  the  power  of 
the  navy  to  protect  our  commerce  and  to  protect  our 
shores.  The  thought  is  with  us  always  of  the  suffering  and 
misery  entailed  from  which  no  country  in  Europe  will 
escape  and  from  which  no  abdication  or  neutrality  will 
save  us.  The  amount  of  harm  that  can  be  done  by  an 
enemy  ship  to  our  trade  is  infinitesimal,  compared  with  the 
amount  of  harm  that  must  be  done  by  the  economic  con- 
dition that  is  caused  on  the  Continent. 

"The  most  awful  responsibility  is  resting  upon  the 
Government  in  deciding  what  to  advise  the  House  of  Com- 
mons to  do.  We  have  disclosed  our  mind  to  the  House  of 
Commons.  We  have  disclosed  the  issue,  the  information 
which  we  have,  and  made  clear  to  the  House,  I  trust,  that 

1  See  post,  Documents,  chap,  xiii;  also  p.  353. 


352     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

else  have  continued  to  hold  the  British  fleet  constantly- 
prepared  for  a  sudden  attack,  which  could  not  have  been 
designated  as  treacherous.1 

16.  The  British  ultimatum 

In  the  dispatch  which  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Am- 
bassador at  London,  sent  to  his  Government  on  Sunday, 

1  At  the  time  when  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  his  speech  before  the  House  of 
Commons  (August  3),  made  public  the  assurance  given  to  France,  he  did 
not  know  whether  Germany  had  yet  declared  war  on  France.  The  effect  of 
the  promise  made  to  France  was  that  when  war  broke  out,  England  would 
remain  on  the  watch  to  prevent  the  German  fleet  from  making  an  attack  on 
the  French  coasts  or  French  shipping.  That  is  to  say,  upon  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  between  France  and  Germany,  England  was  actively  involved  to 
the  extent  of  a  conditional  intervention  in  case  a  certain  contingency  should 
arise.  France,  Germany,  and  England  were  obligated  by  their  ratification 
of  the  Hague  Convention  "Relative  to  the  Opening  of  Hostilities"  to  give  a 
formal  notice  before  attacking,  but  Germany,  when  engaged  in  war  with 
France,  was  under  no  obligation  to  notify  England  of  her  intentions  in  re- 
gard to  sending  her  fleet  through  the  Channel  or  the  North  Sea  to  attack 
France;  yet  when  she  attempted  to  do  so,  it  was  certain  that  she  would  be 
attacked  by  the  British  fleet.  It  follows  that  Germany  was  free  to  take  any 
hostile  action  she  thought  advisable  against  England  to  prevent  this  inter- 
ference. In  other  words,  England  had  made  a  conditional  declaration  of  war 
which  absolved  Germany  from  the  obligation  of  giving  any  further  notice 
of  an  intention  to  attack  England. 

Sir  Edward  Cook  says:  "This  was  not  a  declaration  of  war,  but  a  contin- 
gent obligation  to  make  war."  (Why  Britain  is  at  War,  p.  18.  Macmillan, 
&  Co.,  London,  1914.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich,  has  recently 
stated:  — 

"  Therefore,  if  during  the  time  between  August  2  and  4  German  warships 
had  passed  through  the  Strait  of  Calais  or  the  North  Sea,  a  state  of  war 
would  immediately  have  arisen  between  Germany  and  England,  since  such 
an  operation  would  have  been  immediately  taken  by  the  English  to  mean 
that  the  French  coast  or  fleet  was  to  be  attacked  or,  at  least,  the  French 
merchant  marine  to  be  alarmed ;  and  this  would  have  occurred  solely  because 
of  the  obligations  which  the  English  Cabinet  felt  to  be  imposed  upon  it  by 
the  entente  with  France,  which,  on  its  face,  bound  England  to  nothing:  all 
this,  moreover,  quite  irrespective  of  Germany's  attitude  toward  Belgian 
neutrality. 

"  One  must  now  deplore  that  in  those  days  the  German  fleet  did  not  come 
out  and  cause  hostile  action  on  the  part  of  the  English  fleet.  Then  the  fairy 
tale  that  England  was  forced  to  enter  the  war  solely  by  the  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality  at  the  hands  of  Germany  could  never  have  come  up."  (New 
York  Times,  March  14,  1915.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  353 

August  2,  to  announce  the  important  decision  of  the  Eng- 
lish Government  to  give  France  the  assurance  that  the 
English  fleet  would  protect  the  French  coasts  from  a  Ger- 
man attack,  he  sagaciously  added  that  '  the  preservation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  was  considered  so  important  there 
that  England  would  look  upon  its  violation  by  Germany  as 
a  casus  belli.  This  was,  he  said,  a  peculiarly  English  in- 
terest, and  one  could  not  doubt  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment, faithful  to  the  traditions  of  its  policy,  would  make 
it  prevail,  even  if  the  business  world,  where  German  in- 
fluence makes  tenacious  efforts,  tried  to  exert  pressure  to 
hinder  the  Government  from  engaging  itself  against  Ger- 
many.'  (Modified  quotation,  August  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  137.) 

In  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  next  day  (that 
is,  Monday,  August  3),  Sir  Edward  Grey,  after  consider- 
ing the  nature  of  England's  obligation  to  assist  France, 
turned  to  the  question  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Be- 
ginning with  the  Treaty  of  1839,  he  outlined  the  history 
of  the  question,  including  a  review  of  the  negotiations  in 
course  (see  post,  Documents,  chap,  xm),  and  concluded: — 

"It  now  appears,  from  the  news  I  have  received  to-day, 
—  which  has  come  quite  recently,  and  I  am  not  yet  quite 
sure  how  far  it  has  reached  me  in  an  accurate  form,1  — 
that  an  ultimatum  has  been  given  to  Belgium  by  Germany, 
the  object  of  which  was  to  offer  Belgium  friendly  relations 
with  Germany  on  condition  that  she  would  facilitate  the 
passage  of  German  troops  through  Belgium.  Well,  Sir, 
until  one  has  these  things  absolutely  definitely,  up  to  the 
last  moment,  I  do  not  wish  to  say  all  that  one  would  say 
if  one  were  in  a  position  to  give  the  House  full,  complete, 
and  absolute  information  upon  the  point.  We  were  sounded 
in  the  course  of  last  week  as  to  whether,  if  a  guaranty  were 
given  that,  after  the  war,  Belgian  integrity  would  be  pre- 

1  August  3,  M.  Paul  Cambon  reported  to  his  Government:  "  On  my 
return  to  the  Embassy  I  learned  from  your  telephonic  communication  of 
the  German  ultimatum  addressed  to  Belgium.  I  immediately  informed 
Sir  E.  Grey  of  it."   (Extract,  August  3,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  143.) 


354     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

served,  that  would  content  us.  We  replied  that  we  could 
not  bargain  away  whatever  interests  or  obligations  we  had 
in  Belgian  neutrality.1 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  been  accused  of  being  responsible  for  the  war:  — 

(1)  Because  he  did  not  inform  Russia  and  France  that  England  would  not 
allow  a  European  war  to  develop  out  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  could  not  have  done  this  without  disrupting  the  Entente.  He 
could  not  have  guaranteed  that  his  country  would  intervene  to  make  good 
his  threat,  and  it  is  very  possible  that  France  and  Russia  would  have  made 
war  together  against  Austria  and  Germany  rather  than  permit  Austria  to 
overthrow  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans.  The  disastrous  results  to  Eng- 
land might  have  been  still  greater  if  the  war  had  been  thus  avoided  as  a  re- 
sult of  England's  veto,  for  Russia  and  France  would  have  resented  Eng- 
land's desertion  of  them  and  awaited  an  opportunity  to  join  Germany  in 
accomplishing  her  ruin. 

(2)  Because  he  did  not  tell  Germany  that  England  would  stand  by  France 
and  Russia.  An  influential  friend  and  intimate  of  the  Kaiser,  Herr  Ballin, 
has  recently  joined  the  ranks  of  those  who  criticize  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  this 
ground.  He  has  said:  — 

"  We  all  feel  that  this  war  has  been  brought  about  by  England.  We  hon- 
estly believe  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  have  stopped  it. 

"  If,  on  the  first  day,  he  had  declared,  'England  refuses  to  go  to  war  be- 
cause of  the  internal  questions  between  Servia  and  Austria,'  then  Russia  and 
France  would  have  found  a  way  to  compromise  with  Austria. 

"If,  on  the  other  hand,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  said  England  was  ready  to 
go  to  war,  then,  for  the  sake  of  Germany,  probably  Austria  might  have  been 
more  ready  to  compromise. 

"  But,  by  leaving  his  attitude  uncertain  and  letting  us  understand  that  he 
was  not  bound  to  go  to  war,  Sir  Edward  Grey  certainly  brought  about  the 
war.  If  he  had  decided  at  once,  one  way  or  the  other,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
could  have  avoided  this  terrible  thing."  (London  Times,  April  15,  1915, 
extract  from  New  York  World,  April  16,  1915.) 

The  London  Spectator  (August  8,  1914,  p.  193)  adopts  this  view  in  an 
article  on  "  The  Revelations  of  the  Blue  Book."  "  But  we  do  say  that  if  we 
had  stated  firmly  and  boldly  to  Germany  from  the  first  that  we  should  un- 
doubtedly stand  by  our  friends,  —  it  was  always  obvious  to  people  of  the 
least  penetration  that  we  must  do  so  in  the  end,  —  we  should  have  been 
saved  this  appalling  war." 

The  French  and  Russian  diplomatists  began  to  harp  on  this  theme  from 
the  moment  they  learned  of  the  presentation  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum.  I 
believe  it  has  been  shown  that  the  course  Sir  Edward  Grey  pursued  was 
much  wiser,  since  he  stimulated  both  sides  to  make  concessions  for  a  peace- 
ful settlement.  As  soon  as  it  was  believed  in  Russia  that  England  would  be 
upon  her  side,  those  in  favor  of  war  seem  to  have  acquired  a  greater  influ- 
ence. (See  Reuter  dispatch;  Price,  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  p.  338.) 
There  are  certain  indications  that  at  about  this  period,  July  29,  when 
France  and  Russia  felt  confident  that  England  might  be  upon  their  side, 
Germany  and  Austria  hesitated  to  force  the  issue.  Nevertheless,  we  do  not 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  355 

"Shortly  before  I  reached  the  House  I  was  informed  that 
the  following  telegram  had  been  received  from  the  King 

find  that  either  Austria  or  Germany  put  forward  a  single  suggestion  which 
might  have  served  as  a  possible  compromise.  In  addition  to  the  reasons  just 
given,  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  not  have  made  such  a  declaration,  because  he 
could  not  have  been  sure  that  the  Government  and  the  country  would  back 
him  up.  Even  after  several  days  had  elapsed,  in  which  the  British  public 
might  have  convinced  itself  that  Austria  and  Germany  were  forcing  the 
issue,  and  that  France  and  Russia  were  giving  every  indication  of  a  concilia- 
tory spirit,  there  was,  nevertheless,  a  strong  British  sentiment  in  favor  of 
remaining  neutral.  There  was  a  serious  split  in  the  Cabinet,  and  it  is  ru- 
mored that  Sir  Edward  Grey  himself  considered  resigning.  Not  until  Ger- 
many refused  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality  was  it  possible  to  unite  the  Gov- 
ernment and  the  country  in  the  firm  support  of  Russia  and  France  against 
German  aggression.  Sir  Edward  Grey  must  have  felt  that  England  would  be 
dishonored  if  she  did  not  support  France  against  German  aggression.  He 
must  have  known  that  bis  country  would  come  to  a  realization  of  her  mis- 
take as  soon  as  Germany  had  crushed  France,  but  that  it  might  then  be  too 
late  to  succor  France  or  wash  away  England's  dishonor. 

(3)  Because  he  worked  to  involve  England  in  a  war  against  Germany. 
The  main  argument  in  support  of  this  contention  is  that  he  would  not 
respond  to  Prince  Lichnowsky's  request  to  state  the  conditions  upon  which 
England  would  remain  neutral.  In  point  of  fact,  he  did  lay  down  the  condi- 
tions upon  which  England  would  remain  neutral,  when,  on  July  31,  he  said 
that  if  Germany  brought  forward  any  reasonable  proposal  which  France  and 
Russia  would  not  agree  to,  he  would  have  nothing  further  to  do  with  the 
consequences.  The  failure  to  meet  this  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  showed 
that  Germany  was  making  no  efforts  at  cooperation  and  made  plainer  than 
ever  her  aggressive  purpose.  In  the  face  of  German  aggression  upon  France, 
England  was  bound  to  come  to  her  support  both  on  the  ground  of  the 
Entente  and  on  the  ground  of  her  general  interests  to  resist  the  attempt  of 
any  nation  to  acquire  dominion  on  the  Continent  by  conquest  of  arms. 
The  vast  majority  of  those  who  were  won  over  by  Sir  Edward's  maneuvers 
of  springing  the  Belgian  question  at  an  opportune  moment  must  have  been 
very  thankful  to  him  for  making  clear  Germany's  real  designs  and  saving 
them  from  making  a  colossal  blunder.  I  doubt  if  the  British  people  will  ever 
consider  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  deceived  them.  By  focusing  attention  upon 
the  Belgian  question  he  united  the  whole  country  for  immediate  action.  As 
soon  as  there  was  time  for  reflection,  it  was  seen  that  Belgium  was  only  one 
of  several  reasons  for  joining  France  and  Russia  against  Germany. 

In  any  event,  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  tell  Prince  Lichnowsky,  July  29,  that 
he  must  not  be  misled  into  thinking  that  England  would  stand  aside  (B.  W. 
P.  nos.  87,  89).  Prince  Lichnowsky  replied  that  he  had  already  reported  to 
his  Government  that  such  was  his  estimate  of  the  situation  (B.  W.  P.  no.  89), 
and  Herr  von  Jagow  told  Sir  Edward  Goschen  that  he  heard  the  answer  of 
the  British  Government  to  the  German  proposal  (B.  W.  P.  no.  85)  not  ex- 
actly with  surprise  (B.  W.  P.  no.  98).  Neither  Sir  Edward  Grey  nor  any  one 
else  could  tell  with  certainty  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  the  British  Gov- 


356     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

of  the  Belgians  by  our  King  — King  George  :  '  Remem- 
bering the  numerous  proofs  of  Your  Majesty's  friendship 

eminent.    George  Bernard  Shaw  has  given  the  following  picturesque  de- 
scription of  the  situation :  — 

"  The  Lion  broods  and  broods,  and  deep  in  his  subconsciousness  there 
stirs  the  knowledge  that  Germany  will  never  fight  unless  —  unless  —  unless 
—  the  Lion  does  not  quite  know  what,  does  not  want  to  know  what,  but  dis- 
interested observers  complete  the  sentence  thus:  Unless  Germany  can  be 
persuaded  that  the  Lion  is  taking  a  fancy  to  Germany  and  is  becoming  a  bit 
of  a  pacifist  and  will  not  fight.  Then  the  luck  that  has  so  seldom  failed  the 
Lion  sent  Prince  Lichnowsky  as  German  Ambassador  to  London.  There 
was  nothing  wrong  in  being  very  friendly  to  the  Prince,  a  charming  man 
with  a  very  charming  wife;  there  was  our  Sir  Edward  Grey,  also  a  charming 
man,  always  ready  to  talk  peace  quite  sincerely  at  tea  parties  with  all 
Europe  if  necessary. 

"  The  Lion  knew  in  his  heart  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  knew  nothing  of  the 
ways  of  lions,  and  would  not  approve  of  them  if  he  did,  for  Sir  Edward  had 
ideas  instead  of  the  one  idea,  and  Prince  Lichnowsky  knew  so  much  less  of 
the  ways  of  lions  than  Sir  Edward  that  he  actually  thought  Sir  Edward  was 
the  Lion.  The  Lion  said:  'This  is  not  my  doing.  England's  destiny  has 
provided  Grey,  and  provided  Lichnowsky;  England's  star  is  still  in  the  ze- 
nith.' Lichnowsky  thought  Grey  every  day  a  greater  statesman  and  a  more 
charming  man,  and  became  every  day  more  persuaded  that  the  lion's  heart 
had  changed  and  that  he  was  becoming  friendly,  and  Grey  thought  Lichnow- 
sky, perhaps,  rather  a  fool,  but  was  none  the  less  nice  to  him. 

"Then  there  was  Mr.  Asquith,  the  lucid  lawyer,  the  man  who  could 
neither  remember  the  past  nor  foresee  the  future,  yet  was  always  a  Yorkshire- 
man  with  [an]  ancient  English  depths  behind  his  mirrorlike  lucidity,  in  which 
something  of  the  lioncraft  could  lodge  without  troubling  the  surface  of  the 
mirror.  Mr.  Asquith  suddenly  found  in  himself  an  unaccountable  but 
wholly  irresistible  impulse  to  hide  and  deny  those  arrangements  with  the 
French  commanders  which  had  frightened  Germany.  He  said  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey:  'You  must  go  to  the  French  and  say  that  we  are  not  bound  to  any- 
thing.' Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  amiable  lover  of  peace,  was  delighted.  He 
went,  and  the  French,  with  imperturbable  politeness,  made  note  of  it,  and 
then  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward,  with  good  conscience,  found  themselves 
busily  persuading  the  world  that  the  Lion  was  not  bound  to  help  France  and 
Russia  when  the  great  day  of  Armageddon  came.  They  persuaded  the  na- 
tion, they  persuaded  the  House  of  Commons,  they  persuaded  their  own 
Cabinet,  and  at  last  —  at  last,  they  persuaded  Germany.  And  the  Lion 
crouched. 

"Almost  before  he  was  ready  the  devil's  own  luck  struck  down  the  Arch- 
duke by  the  hand  of  the  assassin,  and  Austria  saw  Servia  in  her  grasp.  At 
last  she  flew  at  Servia,  Russia  flew  at  Austria,  Germany  flew  at  France,  and 
the  Lion,  with  a  mighty  roar,  sprang  at  last,  and  in  a  flash  had  his  teeth  and 
claws  in  the  rival  of  England  and  will  now  not  let  her  go  for  all  the  pacifists 
or  Socialists  in  the  world  until  he  is  either  killed  or  back  on  his  Waterloo 
pedestal  again."    (New  York  Times,  December  13,  1914.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  accomplished  his  task  of  uniting  the  Cabinet  and  secur- 


THE   BEGINNINGS   OF   THE   WAR  357 

and  that  of  your  predecessors,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of 
England  in  1870,  and  the  proof  of  friendship  she  has  just 

ing  the  united  support  of  Parliament  and  the  country  for  his  policy  at  the 
same  time  that  he  retained  the  respect  of  France  and  Russia.  Furthermore, 
his  unofficial  mediatory  action  for  peace  delayed  the  recourse  to  hostilities 
long  enough  to  give  time  for  Belgium  to  mobilize  and  save  France,  while  he 
showed  up,  beyond  all  question  of  doubt,  Germany's  aggressive  action,  so 
that  Italy  was  amply  justified  in  her  own  eyes  and  before  the  neutral  world 
in  refusing  to  support  her  allies  in  their  aggressive  campaign.  Had  Sir 
Edward  Grey  declared  that  England  would  be  on  the  side  of  France  and 
Russia,  it  is  very  possible  that  Italy  might  have  become  involved  on  the  side 
of  Austria  and  Germany. 

Recently  a  distinguished  British  scholar,  Dr.  F.  C.  Conybeare,  has  en- 
tered the  lists  and  declared  Russia  responsible  for  the  war,  placing  upon  Sir 
Edward  Grey  the  responsibility  for  not  taking  action  which  would  have 
given  Russia  pause.  He  says  in  part :  — 

"Meanwhile  Grey  had  great  difficulty  with  the  Cabinet,  a  majority  of 
whom  flatly  refused  to  go  to  war  with  Germany  over  Servia  and  preferred 
to  throw  over  Grey's  naval  and  other  agreements  with  France  (which  on 
July  30  Cambon  urged  Grey  to  execute  without  delay;  see  White  Paper, 
no.  105).  Grey  threatened  to  resign,  but  on  July  31  agreed  to  stay  on  until 
it  was  known  if  Germany  would  respect  or  not  Belgian  neutrality,  as  to 
which,  on  July  29  (White  Paper,  no.  85),  the  German  Chancellor  had 
spoken  ambiguously.  If  he  really  feared  that  France  would  violate  it  he 
should  have  demanded  of  us  an  assurance  that  we  would  defend  it  vi  et  armis 
against  France.  We  could  not  have  refused  such  an  assurance.  But  Belgian 
neutrality  was  the  only  thing  the  majority  in  our  Cabinet  really  cared  about, 
and  unless  it  —  a  small  country  —  was  violated  by  Germany  —  a  big  one  — 
the  English  people  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  join  in  any  war.  Nothing  else 
appealed  to  them  in  the  least,  and  not  a  soul  had  any  idea  that  Germany 
had  already  offered  to  respect  Belgium.  Accordingly  on  the  afternoon  of 
July  31  Goschen  sounded  Von  Jagow  about  Belgium,  and  he  could  not 
answer  without  consulting  the  Kaiser  and  the  Chancellor.  The  Kaiser,  ever 
anxious  to  keep  us  out  (and  probably  aware  also  that  Russia  would  retire 
across  the  golden  bridge  he  had  built  as  soon  as  ever  she  learned  that  we 
were  going  to  be  neutral  and  not  help  her  in  her  designs),  ordered  Lichnow- 
eky  to  offer  to  respect  Belgium  and  also  to  guarantee  integrity  of  France  and 
of  French  colonies,  to  offer,  in  short,  any  conditions  in  order  to  keep  us  out. 
Our  Cabinet,  in  its  turn  anxious  only  to  get  from  Germany  a  favorable 
answer  about  Belgium  and  to  be  able  to  keep  the  peace  with  Germany,  met 
early  on  August  1  and  drew  up  a  memorandum  about  it,  which  Grey  was  to 
submit  to  Lichnowsky. 

"There  was  perhaps  some  one  in  the  Cabinet  who  pointed  out  that  to 
challenge  Germany  to  respect  Belgium,  after  signifying  our  intention  of 
supporting  France  anyhow,  was  a  work  of  supererogation.  It  was  in  effect 
to  say:  'I  am  going  to  war  anyhow  with  you,'  and  at  the  same  time,  'I  will 
go  to  war  with  you  if  you  touch  Belgium.'  The  Germans  would  probably 
answer: '  We  may  as  well  be  hanged  for  a  sheep  as  for  a  lamb,  and  if  we  are, 
anyhow,  to  fight  you,  why  should  we  forego  the  military  advantages  of 
going  through  Belgium? ' 


358     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic 
intervention  of  Your  Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard 
the  integrity  of  Belgium.' 

"  In  our  White  Paper,  no.  123,  may  be  read  Grey's  own  abstract  of  his 
conversation  with  Lichnowsky.  At  about  1.30,  on  August  1,  Lichnowsky 
freely  offered  to  respect  Belgium  and  also  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of 
France  and  of  her  colonies,  although  France  (who  really  needed  a  strait- 
waistcoat  to  keep  her  out  of  a  quarrel  which  was  not  hers)  could  not  com- 
plain, if  she  was  beaten,  of  Germany  helping  herself  to  some  of  her  colonies. 
Grey  might  have  said  to  Lichnowsky  that  he  could  not  barter  our  neutrality 
against  an  undertaking  by  Germany  to  respect  Belgium,  seeing  that  it  was 
anyhow  Germany's  duty  to  respect  Belgium.  However,  our  Cabinet  was  in 
a  bartering  mood,  and  they  only  wanted  an  excuse  for  not  going  to  war  with 
Germany.  Lichnowsky  therefore  adopted  the  bartering  tone,  and  so  did 
Grey.  Grey  evidently  expected  Lichnowsky  to  offer  no  sort  of  terms,  and 
when  Lichnowsky  made  the  proposals  as  he  did,  and  furthermore  besought 
him  to  formulate  any  conditions  on  which  England  would  consent  to  be 
neutral,  Grey  refused  all  on  the  pretext  of  keeping  his  hands  free  (see  no. 
123).  Lichnowsky  must  have  gone  away  with  the  conviction  that  Grey 
anyhow  wanted  war. 

"  Now,  our  Cabinet  plainly  expected  Grey  to  report  to  them  at  once  any 
disposition  to  yield,  if  Germany  showed  signs  of  it.  He  knew  that  if  he  re- 
ported Lichnowsky's  proposals,  the  Cabinet  would  jump  at  them,  and  then 
he  would  be  unable  to  execute  his  secret  bond  to  France  and  Russia.  What 
did  he  do?  He  told  none  of  his  colleagues  of  them  on  August  1,  and  when  the 
Cabinet  met  next  morning,  August  2,  he  concealed  them  from  the  entire 
Cabinet,  as  he  did  from  the  House  of  Commons  next  day,  August  3.  By  do- 
ing so  he  precipitated  us  into  this  war.  I  say  he  tricked  us  into  war;  us,  a 
generous  people  (who  —  except  for  a  few  rabid  chauvinists  on  the  Tory  side 
—  were  averse  to  war  with  Germany  with  whom  we  were  for  the  first  time 
since  Agadir  on  cordial  terms)  into  war  with  you.  Take  my  word  for  it, 
Grey  will,  in  good  time,  be  running  for  his  life  over  this  sinister  business. 
Bismarck  in  1870  modified  a  telegram  in  order  to  provoke  that  owl,  Louis 
Napoleon,  into  a  declaration  of  war;  Grey  deliberately  concealed  from  his 
colleagues  and  from  Parliament  overtures  made  by  Lichnowsky,  which 
would  have  been  accepted  at  once;  but  for  Grey's  action  Belgium  would  not 
have  been  turned  into  a  shambles,  and  in  all  probability  Russia  would  have 
professed  her  satisfaction  that  Austria  had  accepted  her  terms  (dictated  by 
Sazonof  to  Pourtales  at  2  a.m.  on  July  30)  and  have  shut  up.  I  consider  that 
Grey  acted  more  criminally  than  Bismarck  ever  did. 

"  Mark  the  sequel.  War  ensued  over  Belgium,  and  weeks  of  it  ensued 
before  any  one  knew  of  the  interview  given  in  White  Paper,  no.  123.  As 
soon,  however,  as  Parliament  met  on  August  27,  Keir  Hardie,  who  spotted 
it,  asked  Grey  whether  he  had  submitted  Lichnowsky's  proposals  to  the 
Cabinet  and  why  they  had  not  been  made  the  basis  of  peace  with  Germany. 
Grey  in  his  answer  acknowledged  that  he  had  disclosed  it  to  no  one  at  the 
time  and  excused  himself  on  the  ground  that  Lichnowsky  in  no.  123  was 
speaking  de  suo  and  without  authority  from  Berlin.    He  acknowledged  that 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  359 

"Diplomatic  intervention  took  place  last  week  on  our 
part.  What  can  diplomatic  intervention  do  now?  We  have 
great  and  vital  interests  in  the  independence  —  and  in- 
tegrity is  the  least  part  —  of  Belgium.  If  Belgium  is  com- 
pelled to  submit  to  allow  her  neutrality  to  be  violated,  of 

Liohnowsky  was  actuated  in  making  these  proposals  by  a  sincere  desire  for 
peace  with  us,  but  declared  that  Berlin  in  the  background  was  as  sincerely 
working  for  war.  And  yet  he  must  have  been  well  aware  that  Lichnowsky 
was  acting  on  instructions  from  Berlin,  as  Lichnowsky's  three  dispatches 
sent  to  Berlin  about  that  interview  at  1.15  p.m.,  5.30  p.m.,  and  8.30  p.m.  on 
August  1  sufficiently  prove.  Moreover,  had  Grey  not  known  that  Lichnow- 
sky's proposals  were  authoritative  and  bound  the  German  Government, 
he  would  never  have  wired  them  at  once  to  Goschen  lest  the  latter  should 
get  at  cross-purposes  with  our  Foreign  Office  in  the  matter.  All  Grey's 
answers  to  Keir  Hardie  on  August  27  are  thus  a  model  of  hard  lying,  sup- 
press™ veri  and  suggestio  falsi.  Naturally  the  House  of  Commons,  having 
been  utterly  hoodwinked  by  him,  applauded.  Presently  they  will  send  him 
to  the  gallows.  I  doubt  if  even  Asquith  knew  of  this  crime,  for  on  August 
6  he  based  his  whole  argument  on  White  Paper,  no.  85,  but  if  he  really  was 
Grey's  accomplice,  he  will  swing  too.  I  fancy  Lloyd  George  —  a  plastic 
tool  in  Grey's  hands  —  begins  to  smell  a  rat,  for  he  is  going  about  the 
country  now  protesting  loudly  that  he  and  the  English  democracy  could 
and  would  never  have  been  induced  to  go  to  war  except  by  the  aggres- 
sion on  Belgium."    (The  Vital  Issue,  April  17,  1915,  vol.  n,  no.  16.) 

If  the  facts  are  as  stated,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  "deliberately  concealed 
from  his  colleagues  and  from  Parliament  overtures  made  by  Lichnowsky, 
which  would  have  been  accepted  at  once,"  he  certainly  took  a  very  heavy 
responsibility,  —  probably  greater  than  any  man  should  be  allowed  to 
accept  under  a  free  government.  In  point  of  fact,  however,  the  very  men 
from  whom  he  is  alleged  to  have  concealed  the  offer  probably  now  realize 
the  reasons  for  his  action.  Some  of  those  reasons  might  have  been  that:  (1) 
Until  Germany  met  his  offer  of  July  31  and  proposed  some  practical  method 
of  procedure  to  reach  a  compromise,  there  was  no  use  in  offering  terms  which 
would  have  temporarily  tied  Great  Britain's  hands.  (2)  If  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  offered  his  conditions  and  Germany  had  chosen  to  let  them  be  known, 
Russia  might  possibly  have  retreated  (as  Mr.  Conybeare  suggests),  but  the 
Entente  would  have  been  sacrificed  at  German  dictation  to  buy  peace  for 
Europe,  —  not  a  permanent,  but  probably  only  a  temporary,  peace.  (3) 
British  public  opinion  would  have  been  so  confused  with  the  complicated 
issues  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  take  united  action  until  it  was  too  late  to 
come  to  the  effective  support  of  Belgium  and  France,  and  to  preserve  the 
good  name  of  England.  It  is  my  opinion  that,  instead  of  heaping  blame  upon 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  we  should  accord  him  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  for  his  active 
and  intelligent  work  to  preserve  peace.  He  performed  the  Herculean  task  of 
putting  off  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities  for  several  days  at  least.  It  was 
not  his  fault  if  his  great  plans  could  not  be  carried  to  a  successful  culmina- 
tion. He  preserved  his  country's  vital  interests,  he  saved  her  good  name, 
and  he  did  everything  that  was  possible  to  preserve  peace. 


360     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

course  the  situation  is  clear.  Even  if  by  agreement  she 
admitted  the  violation  of  her  neutrality,  it  is  clear  she 
could  only  do  so  under  duress.  The  smaller  states  in  that 
region  of  Europe  ask  but  one  thing.  Their  one  desire  is 
that  they  should  be  left  alone  and  independent.  The  one 
thing  they  fear  is,  I  think,  not  so  much  that  their  integrity 
but  that  their  independence  should  be  interfered  with.  If 
in  this  war  which  is  before  Europe  the  neutrality  of  one  of 
those  countries  is  violated,  if  the  troops  of  one  of  the  com- 
batants violate  its  neutrality  and  no  action  be  taken  to 
resent  it,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  whatever  the  integrity  may 
be,  the  independence  will  be  gone." 

M.  Paul  Cambon  informed  his  Government:  'In  view  of 
events,  Sir  Edward  Grey  rendered  more  precise  the  de- 
clarations he  intended  to  make  on  the  subject  of  Belgian 
neutrality.  The  reading  of  a  letter  from  King  Albert  ask- 
ing for  the  support  of  England  made  a  deep  impression  on 
the  House.  The  House  would  that  evening  vote  credits 
asked  for;  from  then  on  its  support  was  acquired  to  the 
policy  of  the  Government,  which,  following  public  opinion, 
was  growing  more  and  more  in  their  favor.'  (Modified 
quotation,  August  3,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  145.) 

That  same  day  (August  3)  Baron  Kuhlmann,  Councillor 
of  the  German  Embassy  in  London,  gave  to  the  press  the 
communique  previously  referred  to :  — 

"The  maintenance  of  British  neutrality  would  in  no 
way  injure  France.  On  the  contrary,  it  might  be  argued 
that  by  remaining  neutral  Great  Britain  could  give  France 
exactly  as  much  strategic  assistance  and  a  good  deal  more 
effective  diplomatic  help. 

"As,  according  to  all  reliable  information,  there  is  no 
intention  of  sending  British  troops  to  the  Continent,  and 
as  a  few  British  divisions,  considering  the  enormous  num- 
bers engaged,  could  hardly  alter  the  balance  of  power,  all 
England  can  do  for  France  is  to  protect  her  North  Sea 
coast  from  invasion  and  to  prevent  the  neutral  ports  of 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  361 

Belgium  and  Holland  being  used  as  bases  of  armed  aggres- 
sion against  France. 

"Germany  would  be  disposed  to  give  an  undertaking 
that  she  will  not  attack  France  by  sea  in  the  north,  or 
make  any  warlike  use  of  the  seacoast  of  Belgium  or  Hol- 
land, if  it  appeared  that  Great  Britain  would  make  this 
undertaking  a  condition  of  her  neutrality  for  the  time 
being. 

"Thus,  England,  without  going  to  war  herself,  could 
render  to  France  the  maximum  of  assistance  she  could 
give  by  going  to  war.  That  England,  as  a  neutral  power, 
maintaining  an  armed  neutrality,  would  diplomatically 
be  a  greater  asset  for  France  for  the  termination  of  hostil- 
ities at  an  early  moment  than  if  herself  involved  in  war, 
is  self-evident."  1 

The  next  day,  August  4,  Sir  Edward  Grey  transmitted 
to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  the  text  of  the  Belgian 
appeal  to  England  for  diplomatic  intervention,  and  further 
stated  that  the  British  Government  were  also  informed 
that  'the  German  Government  had  delivered  to  the  Bel- 
gian Government  a  note  proposing  friendly  neutrality  en- 
tailing free  passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and  promis- 
ing to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
kingdom  and  its  possessions  at  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
threatening  in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an 
enemy.  An  answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 
They  also  understood  that  Belgium  had  categorically  re- 
fused this  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.  The 
British  Government  were  bound  to  protest  against  this 
violation  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  a  party  in  com- 
mon with  themselves,  and  requested  an  assurance  that  the 
demand  made  upon  Belgium  would  not  be  proceeded  with, 
and  that  her  neutrality  would  be  respected  by  Germany. 
Sir  Edward  instructed  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Tuesday,  August  4,  1914.  Statement  first 
printed  in  evening  papers,  August  3,  1914. 


362     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ask  for  an  immediate  reply.'  (Modified  quotations,  Au- 
gust 4,  B.  W.  P.  no.  153;  cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  25.) 

On  August  4,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  telegraphed 
Prince  Lichnowsky :  — 

"Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part 
of  the  British  Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions, 
by  repeating  most  positively  formal  assurance  that,  even 
in  the  case  of  armed  conflict  with  Belgium,  Germany  will, 
under  no  pretense  whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory.  The 
sincerity  of  this  declaration  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that 
we  solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to  re- 
spect her  neutrality.  It  is  obvious  that  we  could  not  pro- 
fitably annex  Belgian  territory  without  making  at  the 
same  time  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  Hol- 
land. Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.  Grey  that  the  German 
army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Bel- 
gium, which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unim- 
peachable information.  Germany  had  consequently  to  dis- 
regard Belgian  neutrality,  it  being  for  her  a  question  of 
life  or  death  to  prevent  the  French  advance."  (August 
4,  B.  W.  P.  no.  157.) 

On  August  4,  the  British  Government  learned  that '  Ger- 
man troops  had  entered  Belgian  territory,  and  that  Liege 
had  been  summoned  to  surrender  by  a  small  party  of  Ger- 
mans, who,  however,  were  repulsed.'  (Modified  quotation, 
August  4,  B.  W.  P.  no.  158.) 

That  same  day  Sir  Edward  Grey  instructed  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin :  — 

"We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  a  note  to  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that  the  German 
Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary, 
by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispensable. 

"We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has  been 
violated  at  Gemmenich. 

"In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Germany  declined  to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  363 

Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in  reply  to  our  request 
made  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  we  must  repeat 
that  request,  and  ask  that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and 
to  my  telegram  of  this  morning  (see  B.  W.  P.  no.  153)  be 
received  here  by  12  o'clock  to-night.  If  not,  you  are  in- 
structed to  ask  for  your  passports,  and  to  say  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  feel  bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their 
power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  obser- 
vance of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as 
ourselves."   (August  4,  B.  W.  P.  no.  159.) 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  relates  in  the  following  words  how 
he  called  upon  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  on  the  afternoon  of  August  4,  and  inquired  in  the 
name  of  the  British  Government  whether  the  German 
Government  would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian  neu- 
trality : l  — 

"Herr  von  Jagow  at  once  replied  that  he  was  sorry  to 
say  that  his  answer  must  be  'No,'  as,  in  consequence  of  the 
German  troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning, 
Belgian  neutrality  had  been  already  violated.  Herr  von 
Jagow  again  went  into  the  reasons  why  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step,  namely,  that 
they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest  and 
easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their 
operations  and  endeavor  to  strike  some  decisive  blow  as 
early  as  possible.  It  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  them, 
as  if  they  had  gone  by  the  more  southern  route  they  could 
not  have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the 
strength  of  the  fortresses,  to  have  got  through  without 
formidable  opposition  entailing  great  loss  of  time.  This 
loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the  Russians 
for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  German  frontier.  Rap- 
idity of  action  was  the  great  German  asset,  while  that  of 
Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  troops.   I  pointed 

1  This  dispatch,  drawn  up  on  August  8,  after  Sir  Edward  Goschen  re- 
turned to  London,  supplements  the  record  of  the  British  White  Paper. 


364     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli  of  the  viola- 
tion of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he  would  readily 
understand,  the  situation  exceedingly  grave,  and  I  asked 
him  whether  there  was  not  still  time  to  draw  back  and 
avoid  possible  consequences,  which  both  he  and  I  would 
deplore.  He  replied  that,  for  the  reasons  he  had  given  me, 
it  was  now  impossible  for  them  to  draw  back. 

"During  the  afternoon  I  received  your  further  telegram 
of  the  same  date,  and,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions 
therein  contained,  I  again  proceeded  to  the  Imperial  For- 
eign Office  and  informed  the  Secretary  of  State  that  unless 
the  Imperial  Government  could  give  the  assurance  by  12 
o'clock  that  night  that  they  would  proceed  no  further 
with  their  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  stop  their 
advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  demand  my  passports 
and  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  have  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to 
uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a 
treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as  much  a  party  as  them- 
selves. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he 
could  give  no  other  answer  than  that  which  he  had  given 
me  earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that  the  safety  of  the  Em- 
pire rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Imperial 
troops  should  advance  through  Belgium.  I  gave  His  Ex- 
cellency a  written  summary  of  your  telegram  and,  point- 
ing out  that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the  time  when 
His  Majesty's  Government  would  expect  an  answer, 
asked  him  whether,  in  view  of  the  terrible  consequences 
which  would  necessarily  ensue,  it  were  not  possible  even 
at  the  last  moment  that  their  answer  should  be  reconsid- 
ered. He  replied  that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty- 
four  hours  or  more,  his  answer  must  be  the  same.  I  said 
that  in  that  case  I  should  have  to  demand  my  passports. 
This  interview  took  place  at  about  7  o'clock.  In  a  short 
conversation  which  ensued,  Herr  von  Jagow  expressed  his 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  365 

poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire  policy  and 
that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to  make  friends 
with  Great  Britain  and  then,  through  Great  Britain,  to  get 
closer  to  France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work 
in  Berlin  was  to  me  also  a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  dis- 
appointment, but  that  he  must  understand  that  under  the 
circumstances  and  in  view  of  our  engagements,  His  Majes- 
ty's Government  could  not  possibly  have  acted  otherwise 
than  they  had  done. 

"I  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the  Chan- 
cellor, as  it  might  be,  perhaps,  the  last  time  I  should  have 
an  opportunity  of  seeing  him.  He  begged  me  to  do  so.  I 
found  the  Chancellor  very  agitated.  His  Excellency  at  once 
began  a  harangue,  which  lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes. 
He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  His  Majesty's  Government 
was  terrible  to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word  —  'neutrality,'  a 
word  which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been  disregarded  — 
just  for  a  scrap  of  paper,1  Great  Britain  was  going  to  make 
war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired  nothing  better  than 
to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts  in  that  direction  had 
been  rendered  useless  by  this  last  terrible  step,  and  the 
policy  to  which,  as  I  knew,  he  had  devoted  himself  since 
his  accession  to  office  had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of 
cards.  What  we  had  done  was  unthinkable;  it  was  like 
striking  a  man  from  behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his 
life  against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain  respon- 
sible for  all  the  terrible  events  that  might  happen.  I  pro-  / 
tested  strongly  against  that  statement,  and  said  that,  in  the 
same  way  as  he  and  Herr  von  Jagow  wished  me  to  under- 
stand that  for  strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  to  Germany  to  advance  through  Belgium  and 
violate  the  latter 's  neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to 
understand  that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  'life  and 

1  The  Chancellor,  in  an  interview  with  the  correspondent  of  the  Associ- 
ated Press,  has  explained  what  he  meant  by  the  phrase  "a  scrap  of  paper." 
His  explanation  and  Sir  Edward  Grey's  rejoinder  are  considered  in  the 
following  chapter. 


366     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

death '  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep 
her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgi- 
um's neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn  compact  simply- 
had  to  be  kept,  or  what  confidence  could  any  one  have  in 
engagements  given  by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?  The 
Chancellor  said, '  But  at  what  price  will  that  compact  have 
been  kept?  Has  the  British  Government  thought  of  that? ' 
I  hinted  to  His  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of 
consequences  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for 
breaking  solemn  engagements,  but  His  Excellency  was  so 
excited,  so  evidently  overcome  by  the  news  of  our  action, 
and  so  little  disposed  to  hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from 
adding  fuel  to  the  flame  by  further  argument.  As  I  was 
leaving  he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Britain  joining 
Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost  up  to 
the  last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working 
with  us  and  supporting  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia.  I  said  that  this  was  part  of  the 
tragedy  which  saw  the  two  nations  fall  apart  just  at  the 
moment  when  the  relations  between  them  had  been  more 
friendly  and  cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years.  Unfor- 
tunately, notwithstanding  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace 
between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had  spread  and  had 
brought  us  face  to  face  with  a  situation  which,  if  we  held  to 
our  engagements,  we  could  not  possibly  avoid,  and  which 
unfortunately  entailed  our  separation  from  our  late  fellow- 
workers.  He  would  readily  understand  that  no  one  re- 
gretted this  more  than  I. 

''After  this  somewhat  painful  interview  I  returned  to 
the  embassy  and  drew  up  a  telegraphic  report  of  what  had 
passed.  This  telegram  was  handed  in  at  the  Central  Tele- 
graph Office  a  little  before  9  p.m.  It  was  accepted  by  that 
office,  but  apparently  never  dispatched.1 

"At  about  9.30  p.m.  Herr  von  Zimmermann,  the  Under- 
Secretary  of  State,  came  to  see  me.   After  expressing  his 

1  This  telegram  never  reached  the  Foreign  Office. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  367 

deep  regret  that  the  very  friendly  official  and  personal 
relations  between  us  were  about  to  cease,  he  asked  me 
casually  whether  a  demand  for  passports  was  equivalent 
to  a  declaration  of  war.  I  said  that  such  an  authority  on 
international  law  as  he  was  known  to  be  must  know  as  well 
or  better  than  I  what  was  usual  in  such  cases.  I  added 
that  there  were  many  cases  where  diplomatic  relations  had 
been  broken  off  and,  nevertheless,  war  had  not  ensued; 
but  that  in  this  case  he  would  have  seen  from  my  instruc- 
tions, of  which  I  had  given  Herr  von  Jagow  a  written  sum- 
mary, that  His  Majesty's  Government  expected  an  answer 
to  a  definite  question  by  12  o'clock  that  night  and  that  in 
default  of  a  satisfactory  answer  they  would  be  forced  to 
take  such  steps  as  their  engagements  required.  Herr  Zim- 
mermann  said  that  that  was,  in  fact,  a  declaration  of  war, 
as  the  Imperial  Government  could  not  possibly  give  the 
assurance  required  either  that  night  or  any  other  night. 

"In  the  mean  time,  after  Herr  Zimmermann  left  me,  a 
flying  sheet,  issued  by  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  was  circu- 
lated stating  that  Great  Britain  had  declared  war  against 
Germany.  The  immediate  result  of  this  news  was  the  as- 
semblage of  an  exceedingly  excited  and  unruly  mob  before 
His  Majesty's  Embassy.  The  small  force  of  police  which 
had  been  sent  to  guard  the  embassy  was  soon  overpowered, 
and  the  attitude  of  the  mob  became  more  threatening.  We 
took  no  notice  of  this  demonstration  as  long  as  it  was  con- 
fined to  noise,  but  when  the  crash  of  glass  and  the  landing 
of  cobble  stones  into  the  drawing-room,  where  we  were  all 
sitting,  warned  us  that  the  situation  was  getting  unpleas- 
ant, I  telephoned  to  the  Foreign  Office  an  account  of  what 
was  happening.  Herr  von  Jagow  at  once  informed  the 
Chief  of  Police,  and  an  adequate  force  of  mounted  police, 
sent  with  great  promptness,  very  soon  cleared  the  street. 
From  that  moment  on  we  were  well  guarded,  and  no  more 
direct  unpleasantness  occurred. 

"After  order  had  been  restored,  Herr  von  Jagow  came 


368     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

to  see  me  and  expressed  his  most  heartfelt  regrets  at  what 
had  occurred.  He  said  that  the  behavior  of  his  country- 
men had  made  him  feel  more  ashamed  than  he  had  words 
to  express.  It  was  an  indelible  stain  on  the  reputation  of 
Berlin.  He  said  that  the  flying  sheet  circulated  in  the 
streets  had  not  been  authorized  by  the  Government;  in 
fact  the  Chancellor  had  asked  him  by  telephone  whether 
he  thought  that  such  a  statement  should  be  issued,  and  he 
had  replied,  'Certainly  not,  until  the  morning.'  It  was  in 
consequence  of  his  decision  to  that  effect  that  only  a  small 
force  of  police  had  been  sent  to  the  neighborhood  of  the 
embassy,  as  he  had  thought  that  the  presence  of  a  large 
force  would  inevitably  attract  attention  and  perhaps  lead 
to  disturbances.  It  was  the  'pestilential  Tageblatt'  which 
had  somehow  got  hold  of  the  news,  that  had  upset  his 
calculations.  He  had  heard  rumors  that  the  mob  had  been 
excited  to  violence  by  gestures  made  and  missiles  thrown 
from  the  embassy,  but  he  felt  sure  that  that  was  not  true 
(I  was  able  soon  to  assure  him  that  the  report  had  no 
foundation  whatever) ,  and  even  if  it  was,  it  was  no  excuse 
for  the  disgraceful  scenes  which  had  taken  place.  He  feared 
that  I  would  take  home  with  me  a  sorry  impression  of 
Berlin  manners  in  moments  of  excitement.  In  fact,  no 
apology  could  have  been  more  full  and  complete. 

"On  the  following  morning,  the  5th  August,  the  Em- 
peror sent  one  of  His  Majesty's  aides-de-camp  to  me  with 
the  following  message :  — 

"'The  Emperor  has  charged  me  to  express  to  Your 
Excellency  his  regret  for  the  occurrences  of  last  night, 
but  to  tell  you  at  the  same  time  that  you  will  gather 
from  these  occurrences  an  idea  of  the  feelings  of  his 
people  respecting  the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  join- 
ing with  other  nations  against  her  old  allies  of  Water- 
loo. His  Majesty  also  begs  that  you  will  tell  the  King 
that  he  has  been  proud  of  the  titles  of  British  Field- 
Marshal  and  British  Admiral,  but  that  in  consequence 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  369 

of  what  has  occurred  he  must  now  at  once  divest  him- 
self of  those  titles.' 

"I  would  add  that  the  above  message  lost  none  of  its 
acerbity  by  the  manner  of  its  delivery. 

"On  the  other  hand,  I  should  like  to  state  that  I  re- 
ceived all  through  this  trying  time  nothing  but  courtesy 
at  the  hands  of  Herr  von  Jagow  and  the  officials  of  the 
Imperial  Foreign  Office.  At  about  11  o'clock  on  the  same 
morning  Count  Wedel  handed  me  my  passports  —  which 
I  had  earlier  in  the  day  demanded  in  writing  —  and  told 
me  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  confer  with  me  as  to 
the  route  which  I  should  follow  for  my  return  to  England. 
He  said  that  he  had  understood  that  I  preferred  the  route 
via  the  Hook  of  Holland  to  that  via  Copenhagen;  they  had 
therefore  arranged  that  I  should  go  by  the  former  route, 
only  I  should  have  to  wait  till  the  following  morning.  I 
agreed  to  this,  and  he  said  that  I  might  be  quite  assured 
that  there  would  be  no  repetition  of  the  disgraceful  scenes 
of  the  preceding  night  as  full  precautions  would  be  taken. 
He  added  that  they  were  doing  all  in  their  power  to  have  a 
restaurant  car  attached  to  the  train,  but  it  was  rather  a 
difficult  matter.  He  also  brought  me  a  charming  letter 
from  Herr  von  Jagow  couched  in  the  most  friendly  terms. 
The  day  was  passed  in  packing  up  such  articles  as  time 
allowed. 

"  The  night  passed  quietly  without  any  incident.  In  the 
morning  a  strong  force  of  police  was  posted  along  the 
usual  route  to  the  Lehrter  Station,  while  the  embassy  was 
smuggled  away  in  taxi-cabs  to  the  station  by  side  streets. 
We  there  suffered  no  molestation  whatever,  and  avoided 
the  treatment  meted  out  by  the  crowd  to  my  Russian  and 
French  colleagues.  Count  Wedel  met  us  at  the  station  to 
say  good-bye  on  behalf  of  Herr  von  Jagow  and  to  see  that 
all  the  arrangements  ordered  for  our  comfort  had  been 
properly  carried  out.  A  retired  colonel  of  the  Guards  ac- 
companied the  train  to  the  Dutch  frontier,  and  was  ex- 


370      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF   1914 

ceedingly  kind  in  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  great  crowds 
which  thronged  the  platforms  at  every  station  where  we 
stopped  from  insulting  us;  but  beyond  the  yelling  of  pa- 
triotic songs  and  a  few  jeers  and  insulting  gestures  we  had 
really  nothing  to  complain  of  during  our  tedious  journey 
to  the  Dutch  frontier. 

"Before  closing  this  long  account  of  our  last  days  in 
Berlin  I  should  like  to  place  on  record  and  bring  to  your 
notice  the  quite  admirable  behavior  of  my  staff  under  the 
most  trying  circumstances  possible.  One  and  all,  they 
worked  night  and  day  with  scarcely  any  rest,  and  I  cannot 
praise  too  highly  the  cheerful  zeal  with  which  counsellor, 
naval  and  military  attaches,  secretaries,  and  the  two 
young  attaches  buckled  to  their  work  and  kept  their  nerve 
with  often  a  yelling  mob  outside  and  inside  hundreds  of 
British  subjects  clamoring  for  advice  and  assistance.  I 
was  proud  to  have  such  a  staff  to  work  with,  and  feel  most 
grateful  to  them  all  for  the  invaluable  assistance  and  sup- 
port, often  exposing  them  to  considerable  personal  risk, 
which  they  so  readily  and  cheerfully  gave  to  me. 

"I  should  also  like  to  mention  the  great  assistance  ren- 
dered to  us  all  by  my  American  colleague,  Mr.  Gerard,  and 
his  staff.  Undeterred  by  the  hooting  and  hisses  with  which 
he  was  often  greeted  by  the  mob  on  entering  and  leaving 
the  embassy,  His  Excellency  came  repeatedly  to  see  me  to 
ask  how  he  could  help  us  and  to  make  arrangements  for  the 
safety  of  stranded  British  subjects.  He  extricated  many  of 
these  from  extremely  difficult  situations  at  some  personal 
risk  to  himself,  and  his  calmness  and  savoir-faire  and  his 
firmness  in  dealing  with  the  Imperial  authorities  gave  full 
assurance  that  the  protection  of  British  subjects  and  in- 
terests could  not  have  been  left  in  more  efficient  and  able 
hands."   (B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  8  [1914].) 


CHAPTER  IX 

BELGIAN   NEUTRALITY 

The  history  of  Belgian  neutrality  —  The  obligation  to  respect  the  treaty 
of  April  19, 1839  —  The  obligation  to  make  good  the  guaranty  of  neutrality 
—  The  right  to  make  war  and  the  equality  of  states  —  Anglo-Belgian  con- 
versations —  Effect  of  Belgium's  preparations  against  Germany  —  Alleged 
violations  of  Belgian  neutrality  —  The  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Lux- 
emburg—  Some  considerations  concerning  Belgium's  right  to  resist  — 
Germany  accuses  England  of  misrepresentation  in  regard  to  Belgium —  Ger- 
many's plea  of  necessity. 

1 .  The  history  of  Belgian  neutrality 

The  origins  of  Belgian  neutrality  may  be  traced  back 
for  centuries.  The  subject  is  a  most  important  one,  and 
round  it  have  centered  the  intense  rivalries  of  the  European 
states.  Ever  since  the  Treaty  of  Verdun,  when  the  grand- 
sons of  Charlemagne  divided  his  inheritance  into  three 
strips,  there  has  been  an  incessant  conflict  between  the 
western  division  which  fell  to  Charles  the  Bold,  and 
the  eastern  which  Louis  the  German  received,  to  divide 
the  intermediate  inheritance  of  Lothair,  whose  name  in 
the  form  of  Lorraine  is  still  applied  to  part  of  the  terri- 
tory which  is  now  the  scene  of  an  armed  conflict. 

France  early  gained  the  advantage  through  her  achieve- 
ment of  a  strong  national  state,  while  Germany  remained 
split  up  into  a  lot  of  independent  and  semi-independent 
states  under  the  nominal  suzerainty  of  emperors  chosen,  as 
a  rule,  from  the  Austrian  reigning  house.  Spain  and  Eng- 
land played  an  important  part  in  checking  the  ambitions 
of  France,  and  when  Spain  fell  into  decadence,  the  Eng- 
lish and  the  Dutch  strove  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power 
on  the  Continent.  France,  by  playing  upon  the  fears  and 
jealousies  of  the  minor  German  states,  was  able  to  para- 
lyze the  political  and  military  action  of  the  German  Em- 
pire. England  alone  was  able  to  persist  in  her  resistance, 


372     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

and  prevented  the  French  from  advancing  to  their  goal  of 
occupying  the  Netherlands. 

In  the  course  of  generations  France  had  acquired  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  middle  strip  of  the  inheritance  of 
Lothair,  but  until  the  French  Revolution  she  was  never 
able  to  acquire  those  provinces  on  her  northeastern  frontier 
which  were  successively  known  as  Burgundy,  the  Spanish 
Netherlands,  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  the  Belgic  Prov- 
inces, and  Belgium. 

As  early  as  1609  the  great  Cardinal  Richelieu  perceived 
the  futility  of  any  immediate  efforts  of  conquest,  and  pro- 
posed that  France  and  the  United  Provinces  of  Holland 
should  enter  into  a  treaty  with  these  provinces,  according 
to  the  terms  of  which  this  middle  state,  made  into  an  in- 
dependent Catholic  republic,  should  join  in  a  perpetual 
alliance  with  its  two  neighbors  to  maintain  its  independ- 
ence.1 The  great  statesman  considered  such  a  solution 
superior  to  any  attempt  at  partition  of  these  provinces  by 
France  and  Holland,  for  the  following  reasons:  (1)  It 
would  prevent  the  maintenance  of  an  expensive  system  of 
fortifications  between  France  and  the  growing  Dutch  Re- 
public, which  Richelieu  foresaw  would  soon  acquire  a 
position  of  great  strength.  (2)  It  would  do  much  to  re- 
move the  causes  of  war,  so  difficult  to  avoid  between  two 
powerful  coterminous  states.  (3)  It  would  prevent  a  coali- 
tion of  England  and  Spain  to  check  France.  This  danger 
the  Cardinal  appreciated  fully,  because  he  realized  the 
fundamental  motives  which  governed  England's  policy 
better  than  did  the  English  statesmen  of  the  period. 
(4)  An  independent  republic  placed  between  France  and 
the  Dutch  Republic  would  be  a  factor  in  preserving  peace, 
because  this  medial  state  would  understand  that  the  great- 
est menace  to  its  existence  would  arise  from  a  conflict 
between  its  neighbors. 

By  insisting  that  the  state  so  established  should  be 
1  See  Documents,  chap.  xin. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  373 

Catholic,  the  Cardinal  would  have  made  it  extremely  dif- 
ficult for  the  Dutch  to  incorporate  it  in  their  own  terri- 
tory. But  the  advantages  of  this  plan  of  the  far-seeing 
Cardinal  were  not  sufficiently  appreciated  by  his  con- 
temporaries, and  it  had  to  be  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  less 
perfect  scheme.1 

The  purpose  of  the  Dutch  was  to  acquire  a  sufficient 
strip  of  this  territory  bordering  on  France  to  serve  as  a 
barrier  for  the  protection  of  their  own  province.  In  pur- 
suit of  this  policy,  they  acquired  a  strip  called  the  Gen- 
erality or  Common  Lands,  and  succeeded  in  closing  the 
Scheldt,  so  that  Amsterdam  and  the  Dutch  cities  might  be 
favored  over  Antwerp.  Unable  to  secure  the  establish- 
ment of  a  neutralized  state,  they  decided  to  adopt  the 
system  of  a  "buffer"  state,  which  was  then  called  a  bar- 
Here.2  But  in  the  course  of  time  this  plan  was  modified, 
and  took  the  form  of  a  system  of  barrier  fortresses,  located 
in  these  provinces  and  garrisoned  by  the  Dutch  and  Eng- 
lish. At  the  conclusion  of  the  Wars  of  the  Spanish  Suc- 
cession these  provinces  passed  to  Austria.  Even  before 
this  the  Dutch  had  attempted  to  establish  a  similar  sys- 
tem of  outposts  along  the  Rhine,  by  holding  Ravestein 
and  Rhineburg  in  defiance  of  the  rights  of  their  lawful 
possessors,  with  the  object  of  protecting  their  frontier  on 
the  German  side.  The  negotiations  in  regard  to  these  bar- 
rier posts  may  be  considered  as  the  very  crux  of  the  diplo- 
macy between  France,  England,  and  Holland.  England 
was  generally  to  be  found  helping  the  adversaries  of 
France,  so  as  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power  on  the 
Continent. 

1  Dollot,  Neutrality  de  la  Belgique,  pp.  56-57.  Paris,  1902. 

2  "In  order  to  prevent  France  from  encroaching  upon  Flanders,  since 
otherwise  she  would  be  more  to  be  dreaded  than  Spain,  and  to  this  effect 
just  as  the  Princes  of  Christendom  secured  the  equality  of  the  balance  on 
the  side  of  Spain  by  assisting  us,  let  the  same  procedure  be  undertaken 
against'.France,  and  Flanders  always  kept  as  a  dividing  wall."  (Extract  from 
the  minutes  of  the  Session  of  the  States  General  of  April  19,  1647.  See 
Dollot,  op.  tit.,  p.  99.) 


374     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

The  system  of  barrier  treaties,  as  organized  in  1709  and 
continued  by  the  treaties  of  1713  and  1715,  provided  for 
the  Dutch  control  of  the  Scheldt  and  the  shutting-off ,  in 
favor  of  Amsterdam,  of  the  competition  of  the  more  favor- 
ably located  Antwerp;  the  right  to  garrison  certain  of  the 
strong  places  along  the  frontier;  and  the  placing  upon  the 
Austrian  Netherlands  of  the  maintenance  of  this  heavy 
military  burden. 

The  essential  idea  of  this  barrier  system  was  to  place 
upon  Belgium  the  cost  of  maintaining  a  foreign  garrison 
intended  principally  for  the  protection  of  the  Dutch, 
though  incidentally  for  Belgium's  own  security  against  an 
invasion  from  France.  The  adoption  of  this  system  was 
made  possible  only  through  the  agreement  between  Eng- 
land and  Holland.  It  amounted  to  the  imposition  of  a 
military  servitude  on  these  territories  in  favor  of  Holland 
and  England. 

England  had  insisted  upon  treaty  recognition  of  the  ap- 
plication of  a  similar  military  servitude  applied  directly 
to  French  territory,  and  had  succeeded  in  securing  it;  the 
Treaty  of  Utrecht,  Article  9,  required  that  the  fortifica- 
tions at  Dunkirk  should  be  destroyed  and  not  rebuilt. 

As  the  power  of  Austria  and  Holland  waned,  they  were 
quick  to  recognize  that  they  could  place  upon  England 
the  principal  burden  of  preserving  the  independence  of 
the  Austrian  Netherlands.  When  England  became  in- 
volved in  difficulties,  she  could  no  longer  sustain  the  bur- 
den of  this  military  establishment,  and  on  April  18,  1782, 
the  last  of  the  Scotch  regiments  left  Namur.  The  system 
of  the  barrier  had  come  to  an  end,  as  was  tacitly  admitted 
by  the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau  of  November  19,  1785, 
which  omits  all  mention  of  it.1 

When  in  1789  Belgium  revolted  because  of  the  attempt 
of  Emperor  Joseph  II  to  introduce  certain  religious  and 
administrative  reforms,  Prussia  feared  that  the  modifica- 

1  Dollot,  op.  cit.,  p.  440. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  375 

tion  introduced  might  strengthen  Austria's  position  and 
affect  her  political  influence.  Accordingly,  Frederick  Wil- 
liam favored  the  project  of  establishing  Belgium  as  an 
independent  republic;  but  England,  although  the  scheme 
was  in  general  harmony  with  her  policy,  was  not  willing 
to  give  Prussia  her  support,  not  wishing  to  antagonize 
Austria.1  The  Belgian  revolt  was  quickly  suppressed,  only 
to  be  succeeded  shortly  after  by  another  uprising.  The 
efforts  of  the  Provinces  to  break  away  from  Austria  found 
enthusiastic  support  in  France,  and  in  1792  the  French 
invaded  Belgium  to  free  her,  as  they  considered,  from  the 
Austrian  yoke.  Maurier,  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  realized,  however,  that  England  would  not  place 
much  confidence  in  the  French  protestations  of  disin- 
terestedness. England  was  aroused,  but  offered  no  resist- 
ance to  the  French,  who  acquired  control  of  the  country. 
The  French  Convention  was  so  lacking  in  all  appreciation 
of  the  political  situation  as  to  remove  the  restrictions  on 
the  navigation  of  the  Scheldt  and  thus  to  goad  England  on 
to  declare  war.  This  French  occupation  of  Belgium  and 
Holland  undoubtedly  was  a  vigorous  spur  toward  urging 
England  on  to  accomplish  the  fall  of  Napoleon.  Even  dur- 
ing the  great  conflict  which  ensued,  we  trace  the  formation 
of  the  idea  of  the  regime  to  be  applied  to  Belgium.  On 
January  9,  1805,  Pitt  remarked  to  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador to  England:  "Belgium  can  never  exist  as  a  separate 
and  independent  state."  2  This  thought  of  Pitt's  was  put 
into  effect  when  Holland  and  Belgium  were  united  for  the 
purpose  of  forming  a  " stopper"  state  against  French  ad- 
vance. Certain  of  the  old  Dutch  barrier  forts,  which  had 
been  destroyed  by  Napoleon  in  1803,  were  rebuilt,  and  the 
old  system  of  the  barriere  was  thereby  reestablished  against 

1  Dollot,  op.  cit.,  pp.  452-53. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  515.  In  an  article  on  "  The  Neutrality  of  Belgium,"  by  Th. 
Baty,  The  Quarterly  Review,  January,  1915,  p.  216,  is  the  following  note: 
"  Pitt's  original  plan  was  to  give  Belgium  to  Prussia.  Castlereagh  preferred 
to  strengthen  Holland  (Hansard,  Nov.  2,  1830,  col.  40)." 


376     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

France,  though  in  a  more  perfected  form,  and  placed 
under  the  general  guaranty  of  the  powers.  This  arrange- 
ment was  intended  to  be  not  merely  for  the  advantage  of 
the  English  and  the  Dutch,  but  to  serve  as  a  rampart  for 
all  Europe  against  another  revolutionary  outbreak  on  the 
part  of  France. 

Without  repeating  what  has  been  said  already  x  about 
the  separation  of  Belgium  from  Holland  in  1830,  we  need 
only  recall  how  the  Treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  guar- 
anteeing the  neutrality  and  independence  of  Belgium,  was 
replaced  eight  years  later  by  the  treaties  signed  April  19, 
1839,  after  Holland  had  agreed  at  last  to  recognize  Belgian 
independence. 

2.  The  obligation  to  respect  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839 

The  obligation  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  may 
be  considered  to  rest  upon  the  obligation  to  respect  the 
Treaty  of  April  19,  1839,  which  sets  forth  this  obligation 
in  express  terms.  To  understand  the  question  of  observ- 
ance we  must,  however,  examine  the  nature  of  this  treaty 
and  of  treaties  in  general.  Although  there  is  no  good  classi- 
fication of  treaties,  some  of  the  divisions  into  which  they 
fall  are:  (1)  political  treaties;  (2)  commercial  treaties;  (3) 
treaties  of  settlement;  (4)  treaties  to  take  effect  in  the 
event  of  war;  and  (5)  law-making  treaties.  We  cannot  here 
enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  different  kinds 
of  treaties  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  germane  to  the  question 
of  Belgium. 

The  treaty  of  neutralization  of  Belgium  is  certainly 
either  a  political  treaty  or  a  treaty  made  for  the  event  of 
war.  It  may,  in  fact,  belong  to  both  categories.2  This  dual 
characteristic  of  the  neutralization  treaty  is  one  of  the 

1  See  chap.  i. 

2  Many  authorities  regard  the  stipulations  establishing  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  as  a  lawmaking  treaty.  See  Oppenheim,  International  Law,  vol. 
i,  §§  555,  558,  18,  492  (2d  edition,  New  York,  1912);  and  Westlake,  Inter- 
national Law,  part  i,  pp.  29-30,  Cambridge,  1910. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  377 

reasons  why  there  is  so  much  discussion  as  to  the  require- 
ments in  regard  to  its  observance.  Let  us  examine  the 
treaty  first  from  the  political  aspect  in  an  attempt  to  de- 
termine the  conditions  under  which  it  may  come  to  an 
end. 

Undoubtedly,  this  result  may  be  reached  by  an  agree- 
ment of  all  the  parties.  Any  signatory  of  a  political  treaty 
of  indefinite  extent  may  by  its  simple  declaration  put  an 
end,  as  far  as  it  is  concerned,  to  the  continuance  of  the 
treaty.  If  by  so  doing  it  arouse  the  anger  of  the  other 
party  or  parties,  the  settlement  of  the  question  is  one  of 
politics  like  the  treaty  to  which  it  relates.  Let  us  take,  as 
an  example  of  a  political  treaty,  the  alliance  existing  be- 
tween Italy  and  her  partners  in  the  Triplice.  It  is  for 
Italy  to  interpret  her  obligation,  and  if  Austria  and  Ger- 
many should  be  dissatisfied,  they  could  only  apply  such 
measures  of  persuasion  or  of  force  as  they  might  judge 
expedient. 

The  termination  of  a  treaty  may  be  brought  about 
tacitly  by  its  gradually  falling  into  desuetude.  Whether 
a  treaty  be  terminated  by  an  express  declaration  or 
whether  it  gradually  wastes  away  until  it  is  generally  rec- 
ognized to  have  lost  all  binding  force,  every  state  is  re- 
quired by  the  fundamental  principles  of  international  law 
to  observe  good  faith  in  regard  to  its  conventional  agree- 
ments, as  well  as  in  regard  to  all  other  relations  with  its 
sister  states.  Treaties  would  be  of  no  value  unless  it  were 
generally  recognized  that  every  self-respecting  state  might 
be  counted  upon  to  obs^ua  its  obligations  in  those  cases 
in  which  it  had  solemrS  mven  its  most  sacred  word  of 
honor.  ^r 

Governments  are  not  sufficiently  wise  to  foresee  all 
events,  and  may  with  the  best  of  faith  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment, the  observance  of  which  would  mean  the  jeopardiz- 
ing of  the  existence  of  the  nation.  Whatever  we  might  like 
to  urge  in  theory,  the  practice  of  all  those  states  which 


378     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

now  survive  and  make  up  the  family  of  nations  has  then 
been  to  prefer  their  national  existence  to  the  scrupulous 
observance  of  their  plighted  troth.1  It  might  well  be  ques- 
tioned whether  the  present  crude  machinery  of  govern- 
ment is  a  sufficiently  authorized  agent  of  the  whole  people 
of  the  state  to  engage  the  responsibility  of  all  the  state  to 
the  observance  of  such  a  treaty.  If  the  Government  did 
not  hasten  to  repudiate  its  obligation,  the  nation  would 
cast  it  out  and  place  the  control  of  its  public  affairs  in  other 
hands. 

The  determination  of  the  dividing  line,  where  the  obliga- 
tion to  observe  a  treaty  ends  and  the  necessity  of  guarding 
the  national  existence  begins,  cannot  be  decided  with  any 
degree  of  certainty.  The  evolutionary  process  of  the  ages, 
working  to  select  the  states  best  fitted  to  survive  in  the 
family  of  nations,  will  favor  those  which  have  had  a  gov- 
ernment sufficiently  intelligent  or  fortunate  to  have  been 
caught  most  rarely  by  this  dilemma.  For  every  time  that 
a  state  finds  it  necessary  to  modify  or  avoid  the  obliga- 
tions to  which  it  has  subscribed,  its  credit  will  be  adversely 
affected,  and  the  burden  of  its  ill-repute  will  weigh  it 
down,  as  compared  with  the  states  which  have  found  it 
possible  to  survive  and  adhere  more  faithfully  to  their 
agreements.  A  certain  latitude  must  be  allowed  for  every 
state  to  reconcile  the  scrupulous  observance  of  its  obliga- 
tions with  a  necessary  regard  for  its  own  vital  interests. 

In  another  respect  treaties  are  sometimes  considered  to 
lapse,  when  conditions  have  so  essentially  altered  as  to 
render  their  stipulations  no  lonoM:  applicable.  Any  politi- 
cal agreement  entered  into  bj  Ko  governments  must  be 
tacitly  understood  as  intend^pPo  apply  to  conditions 
similar  to  those  which  existed  at  the  time  the  treaty  was 
entered  into.  Where  there  is  a  gradual  modification  of 
conditions,  and  a  continued  indication  on  the  part  of  both 

1  Cf.  the  remarks  of  Bismarck  in  reference  to  the  observance  of  treaties; 
speech  of  February  6,  1888;  post,  chap.  xin. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  379 

the  parties  to  the  treaty  of  an  intention  to  observe  its 
terms,  it  may  be  said  that  the  original  obligation  is  con- 
tinued by  a  tacit  prolongation.  In  the  absence  of  such  con- 
tinuation, an  essential  modification  of  the  conditions  to 
which  the  treaty  was  expected  to  apply  would  give  rise  to 
a  doubt,  at  least,  as  to  whether  it  continued  to  apply.  At 
the  present  time,  for  the  most  part,  political  agreements 
are  entered  into  for  a  short  term  of  years,  which  in  itself 
may  be  looked  upon  as  a  tacit  waiving  in  great  measure 
of  the  condition  just  stated,  often  spoken  of  as  the  rule  of 
rebus  sic  stantibus. 

With  these  exceptions,  a  treaty  entered  into  must  be 
faithfully  observed  by  all  the  parties  as  long  as  it  continues 
in  existence.  The  exceptions  pointed  out  presuppose  that 
the  states  will  endeavor  under  all  circumstances  to  avoid 
any  action  which  may  take  their  co-signatory  by  surprise. 
This  implies  that  a  state  which  considers  a  treaty  defunct 
and  no  longer  binding  must  refrain  from  any  action  which 
might  be  misinterpreted  by  the  other  party  as  an  expres- 
sion of  an  intention  to  continue  to  observe  the  obligation. 
It  would  be  contrary  to  a  due  regard  for  the  proper  con- 
duct of  international  relations  to  allow  such  a  misunder- 
standing to  arise  or  persist. 

In  deciding  to  what  class  any  particular  treaty  applies, 
the  safest  method  will  be  to  inquire  what  purpose  it  was 
intended  to  serve.  Applying  this  test  to  the  Neutraliza- 
tion Treaty  of  June  26,  1831,  and  to  its  successor  of  April 
19,  1839,  we  may  consider  the  purpose  as  twofold:  (1)  To 
find,  in  place  of  Holland,  the  large  state  with  which  the 
powers  of  Europe  had  hop"ed  in  1815  to  block  any  further 
danger  of  French  expansion  into  the  rich  Belgian  terri- 
tory, another  check  in  the  form  of  a  neutralized  Belgium 
whose  independence  should  be  guaranteed  by  all  the 
powers.1  This  purpose  is  evidently  political  in  its  nature. 

1  Perhaps  England  was  the  only  power  really  desirous  to  secure  the  adop- 
tion of  this  plan  in  1831.   With  all  the  others  it  was  probably  a  choice  of 


380     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

(2)  The  second  purpose  of  the  treaty  resulting  from  the 
neutralization  of  Belgian  territory  was  intended  to  pro- 
tect Belgium  from  invasion,  and  make  it  impossible  for 
France  or  any  other  country  to  use  its  plains  as  a  highway 
for  military  operations.  England  was,  of  course,  partic- 
ularly interested,  not  wishing,  as  a  result  of  the  invasion 
of  Belgium,  to  have  military  forces  massed  so  near  her  own 
shores.  The  neutralization  of  Belgium  amounted  to  the 
placing  upon  her  territory  of  a  military  servitude.  As  this 
provision  was  intended  to  have  its  full  effect  only  in  the 
event  of  war,  the  treaty  must  upon  this  ground  be  classed 
as  one  made  in  the  anticipation  of  war.1 

Now,  treaties  made  for  the  event  of  war  are  peculiar 
in  their  nature,  for,  just  when  all  normal  relations  be- 
tween nations  cease,  a  treaty  made  in  anticipation  of  war 
would  come  into  full  vigor.2  War  automatically  puts 
an  end  to  all  political  treaties,  and  brings  into  full  effect 
those  made  in  anticipation  of  war.  What,  then,  will  be 
the  effect  of  war  upon  this  treaty  which  seems  to  be 
partly  political  and  partly  contingent  upon  the  event  of 
war? 

Before  we  answer  this,  let  us  examine  further  the  na- 

evils.  France  preferred  an  independent  Belgium  to  the  former  arrangement; 
besides,  she  did  not  wish  to  have  the  powers  undertake  joint  intervention  to 
regulate  Belgian  affairs,  for  fear  Nicholas  I  and  Metternich  might  attempt 
to  interfere  with  what  they  considered  the  revolutionary  government  of 
France. 

1  Baron  Kuhlmann  in  his  communique  to  the  press  was  careful  to  explain 
that  Germany  would  not  make  any  warlike  use  of  the  seacoast  of  Belgium 
or  Holland.  (See  above,  p.  361.)  This  view  of  the  nature  of  the  treaty  of 
1839  is  maintained  by  Dr.  Th.  Niemeyer,  "International  Law  in  War": 
Michigan  Law  Review,  Jan.  1915,  p.  178. 

2  Crandall  quotes  with  approval  Vattel's  remark  in  reference  to  the  an- 
nulling of  treaties:  "  '  Yet  here  we  must  except  those  treaties  by  which  cer- 
tain things  are  stipulated  in  case  of  a  rupture  —  as,  for  instance,  the  length 
of  time  to  be  allowed  on  each  side  for  the  subjects  of  the  other  nation  to  quit 
the  country  —  the  neutrality  of  a  town  or  province  insured  by  mutual  con- 
sent, etc.  Since,  by  treaties  of  this  nature,  we  mean  to  provide  for  what  shall 
be  observed  in  case  of  a  rupture,  we  renounce  the  right  of  cancelling  them 
by  a  declaration  of  war.'  "  (S.  B.  Crandall,  Treaties,  Their  Making  and  En- 
forcement, New  York,  1904,  p.  244.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  381 

ture  of  treaties  made  in  anticipation  of  war.  It  would  be 
futile,  of  course,  to  attempt  to  incorporate  political  pro- 
visions in  a  treaty  of  this  kind,  since  the  very  object  of  a 
war  would  generally  be  to  modify  the  political  relations  of 
the  signatories.  What  stipulations,  then,  may  we  rea- 
sonably expect  to  find  in  such  a  treaty?  Clearly,  only  such 
provisions  as  both  the  parties  consider  it  to  their  common 
advantage  to  secure  in  the  event  of  military  operations. 
For  example,  both  parties  might  agree  not  to  employ  aero- 
planes or  submarines,  or  might  stipulate  that  each  would 
permit  the  citizens  of  the  other  to  continue  their  uninter- 
rupted residence  in  its  territories  upon  the  outbreak  of 
war.  Any  provision  made  in  anticipation  of  war  must  be 
entirely  voluntary  on  the  part  of  both  the  signatories,  and 
free  from  any  taint  of  duress.1  This  is  a  point  of  capital 
importance,  for  in  the  case  of  all  other  treaties,  the  pres- 
sure which  compels  the  signatory  government  to  agree  in 
no  wise  affects  the  validity  of  the  agreement.2 

The  truth  of  what  was  said  above,  that  any  treaty  made 
to  take  effect  in  the  event  of  war  must  be  free  from  all 
taint  of  compulsion,  is  made  evident  when  we  consider 
that  otherwise,  by  menace  or  force,  one  state  could  make 
another  sign  agreements  restricting  its  liberty  of  action  in 
the  event  of  war.  If  such  a  principle  were  to  be  admitted, 
the  oppressed  state,  having  recourse  to  war  to  rid  itself  of 

1  Westlake  says:  "Conspicuous  among  treaties  doomed  by  their  nature 
to  obsolescence  are  those  by  which  a  state  defeated  in  war  is  obliged  to  ab- 
stain from  fortifying  or  otherwise  making  free  use  of  some  part  of  its  terri- 
tory, when  the  restriction  is  not  imposed  as  forming  part  of  a  system  of 
permanent  neutrality."  (John  Westlake,  International  Law,  part  i,  p.  296. 
Cambridge,  1910.) 

2  Much  confusion  results  from  the  drawing  of  false  comparisons  between 
international  treaties  and  ordinary  contracts  between  individuals.  In  the 
case  of  the  former,  the  fact  that  one  of  the  parties  has  been  more  or  less 
under  the  dominance  of  force  and  compelled  to  subscribe  to  the  stipulations 
is  not  necessarily  a  ground  for  denying  its  validity.  In  a  treaty  of  peace,  for 
instance,  the  vanquished  is  under  the  necessity  of  accepting  the  terms  which 
the  victor  imposes.  If  he  is  not  willing  loyally  to  accept  the  conditions,  he 
must  prolong  the  contest  as  best  he  may. 


382     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

the  obnoxious  pressure,  might  find  its  liberty  to  wage  war 
restricted  by  these  previous  agreements  imposed  upon  it 
with  this  very  purpose  in  view.  Had  it  happened,  in  the 
year  1913,  that  the  states  as  now  existing  in  Europe  had 
never  signed  an  agreement  relating  to  the  neutralization 
of  Belgium,  and  the  Entente  Powers,  feeling  their  strength 
sufficient  to  attack,  should  have  imposed  upon  the  Triple 
Alliance  the  acceptance  of  the  neutralization  of  Belgium 
and  Switzerland,  Germany  might  have  found  herself  in  a 
situation  entirely  unprepared  for  war  and  have  had  to 
subscribe  to  these  conditions.  When  war  broke  out,  how- 
ever, she  would  have  been  perfectly  justified  in  reasserting 
her  full  liberty  of  action.  But  such  is  not  the  actual  situa- 
tion of  Belgium.  The  neutralization  of  Belgium  was  de- 
sired by  Prussia  in  1839.  She  has  never  since  given  any 
official  indication  that  she  would  not  consider  herself 
bound  by  the  terms  of  the  neutralization  treaty  in  the 
event  of  war,  although  she  might  easily  have  done  so. 
During  the  eighty-four  years  which  have  intervened  since 
Belgium  was  first  neutralized,  she  has  been  universally 
recognized  as  enjoying  this  peculiar  status  of  neutraliza- 
tion, and  up  to  the  outbreak  of  this  war  had  fulfilled 
her  obligations  to  the  apparent  satisfaction  of  the  other 
states. 

The  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839,  had  come  to  be  looked 
upon  as  such  a  fundamental  part  of  the  public  law  of 
Europe  that  it  no  longer  bore  the  political  imprint  of  its 
origin.  As  Dr.  David  Jayne  Hill  declared,  in  a  book  pub- 
lished shortly  after  his  return  from  Berlin  where  he  had 
represented  the  United  States:  "While  this  arrangement 
prevents  making  their  territories  the  scene  of  hostilities, 
it  does  not  deprive  these  States  of  the  right  of  self-defense. 
On  the  contrary,  it  imposes  upon  them  the  duty  of  defend- 
ing their  neutrality  to  the  best  of  their  ability;  but,  as 
they  enjoy  the  guaranty  of  the  powers  that  they  will  aid 
them  in  this  respect,  it  is  improbable  that  their  neutrality 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  383 

will  ever  be  violated."  1  From  such  a  source  these  re- 
marks are  most  significant,  for  no  doubt  former  Ambassa- 
dor Hill  had  an  opportunity  to  fraternize  with  the  mem- 
bers of  the  diplomatic  corps  at  Berlin  and  to  study  at  first 
hand  the  various  political  views  of  the  powers  in  regard 
to  the  situation  of  Belgium.  In  his  previous  post  at  The 
Hague,  Dr.  Hill  had  another  excellent  opportunity  to 
study  the  question  of  neutralization. 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839,  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  which  the  principal  powers  were 
obligated  to  defend  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  was  no 
longer  in  effect :  — 

(1)  Because  it  had  been  superseded  by  the  Treaties  of 
1870,  which  had  also  lapsed. 

(2)  Because  the  present  German  Empire  was  not  a 
party  to  the  Treaty  of  1839. 

(3)  Because  Gladstone  had  admitted  that  England,  and 
hence  the  other  powers,  could  not  be  expected  to 
carry  out  its  provisions. 

(4)  Because  the  conditions  in  Belgium  had  so  altered  as 
to  make  the  treaty  of  neutrality  no  longer  applic- 
able. 

(1)  As  far  as  regards  the  effect  of  the  Treaties  of  1870 
on  the  Treaty  of  1839,  one  has  only  to  read  the  Parlia- 
mentary debates  to  perceive  that  the  British  Government 
had  no  thought  of  superseding  the  Treaty  of  1839  as  a 
result  of  entering  into  treaties  with  France  and  Germany 
in  1870. 2  The  fact  that  England  found  it  necessary  to 
enter  into  separate  treaties  with  France  and  Germany  at 
that  time  did  not  affect  the  Treaty  of  1839,  but  only  made 
clear,  whatever  care  the  British  Ministers  took  to  disguise 
it,  that  the  guaranty,  being  every  power's  duty,  might  fail 

1  See  Documents,  post,  chap,  xm,  where  an  extensive  extract  from  David 
Jayne  Hill's  World  Organization  as  affected  by  the  Nature  of  the  Modern  State 
is  given. 

2  Consult  Extracts  from  the  Parliamentary  Debates,  post,  chap.  xxn. 


384     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

of  execution  by  any.1  Austria  and  Russia  had  probably 
never  expected  to  take  a  very  active  part  in  making  good 
the  guaranty,  so  that  England  must  have  realized  that  she 
alone  would  have  to  watch  over  Belgium's  neutrality  dur- 
ing the  war  between  Prussia  and  France.  The  situation 
was  particularly  difficult  because  one  of  the  belligerents 
might  discover  that  it  might  be  to  his  advantage  to  vio- 
late Belgian  neutrality,  and  by  doing  so  he  might  secure  a 
strong  position  from  which  it  might  be  difficult  to  dislodge 
him  before  England  could  gather  her  forces  together  to 
offer  any  resistance.  The  effect  of  the  separate  Treaties 
of  1870  was,  that  in  the  event  of  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  one  of  the  belligerents,  the  other  could  rely 
upon  England  as  an  ally  in  defense  of  the  Treaty  of  1839. 
By  their  own  express  terms  (Article  III)  the  Treaties  of 
1870  expired  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  conclusion  of 
peace.2  Their  introduction  shows  that  the  treaties  were  in 
no  wise  at  variance  with  the  Treaty  of  1839,  but  supple- 
mentary to  it,  hence  the  obligations  to  respect  and  guar- 
antee the  neutrality  of  Belgium  remained  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  Treaties  of  1870,  and  even  during  their 

1  In  1855  Palmerston  in  the  course  of  a  discussion  about  the  Danubian 
Principalities  expressed  some  doubt  as  to  the  efficacy  of  neutralization: 
"  The  right  honorable  Gentleman  has  thrown  out  certain  suggestions,  some 
of  which,  no  doubt,  are  deserving  of  consideration,  with  respect  to  the  ar- 
rangements for  the  future  protection  of  Turkey,  and  one  of  those  sugges- 
tions was  that  the  Principalities  should  be  declared  neutral.  There  cer- 
tainly are  instances  in  Europe  of  such  propositions,  and  it  has  been  agreed 
by  treaty  that  Belgium  and  Switzerland  should  be  declared  neutral;  but  I 
am  not  disposed  to  attach  very  much  importance  to  such  engagements,  for 
the  history  of  the  world  shows  that  when  a  quarrel  arises,  and  a  nation 
makes  war,  and  thinks  it  advantageous  to  traverse  with  its  army  such  neu- 
tral territory,  the  declarations  of  neutrality  are  not  apt  to  be  very  reli- 
giously respected.  But  if  these  Principalities  continue  to  form  a  part  of  the 
Turkish  Empire,  as  I  think  it  is  essential  they  should  —  for,  if  separated, 
they  might  follow  the  fate  of  Poland,  and  be  partitioned  to  some  neighbor- 
ing State  —  for  their  neutrality  would  be  disregarded  the  moment  Russia 
went  to  war,  that,  I  think,  would  be  the  best  guaranty  for  the  safety  of  the 
whole."  (Extract,  June  8,  1855,  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol. 
cxxxvm,  pp.  1747-48.) 

2  For  the  terms  of  the  treaties,  see  post,  chap.  xin. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  385 

existence,  upon  the  same  footing  as  before  their  signature. 
Furthermore,  Austria  and  Russia  were  not  parties  to  these 
other  treaties.  Strictly  speaking,  any  action  on  the  part 
of  England,  France,  and  Prussia,  could  not  without  the 
consent  of  the  other  signatories  terminate  the  perpetual 
Treaty  of  1839. 

(2)  It  is  true  that  the  present  German  Empire  was  not 
a  signatory  to  the  Treaty  of  1839.  Prussia,  however, 
signed  it,  and  the  German  Empire  has  in  general  suc- 
ceeded to  the  obligations  of  its  component  states.  In 
many  instances  the  German  Government  has  claimed  the 
benefit  of  treaty  rights  previously  enjoyed  by  the  sepa- 
rate states  of  the  Empire.1 

The  difficult  question  as  to  what  treaties  survive,  when 
one  state  is  succeeded  by  another,  cannot  be  answered  off- 
hand. As  a  general  rule,  it  may  be  said  that  the  continu- 
ance of  those  treaties  which  might  be  denounced,  depends 
upon  the  intentions  of  the  parties,  and  that  each  case  is 
decided  more  or  less  upon  its  merits.  As  soon  as  either  of 
the  parties  avails  itself  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty,  it 

1  "  Where  no  new  treaty  has  been  negotiated  with  the  Empire,  the  trea- 
ties with  the  various  States  which  have  preserved  a  separate  existence  have 
been  resorted  to. 

"The  question  of  the  existence  of  the  extradition  treaty  with  Bavaria 
was  presented  to  the  United  States  District  Court,  on  the  application  of  a 
person,  accused  of  forgery  committed  in  Bavaria,  to  be  discharged  on  ha- 
beas corpus,  who  was  in  custody  after  the  issue  of  a  mandate,  at  the  request 
of  the  Minister  of  Germany.  The  court  held  that  the  treaty  was  admitted 
by  both  Governments  to  be  in  existence. 

"Such  a  question  is,  after  all,  purely  a  political  one."  (Opinion  of  Chief 
Justice  Fuller,  in  Terlinden  v.  Ames  [1901],  U.S.  Reports,  vol.  184,  p.  287, 
quoting  with  approval  the  remarks  of  Mr.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis  contained 
in  his  notes  to  the  State  Department's  compilation  of  Treaties  and  Con- 
ventions between  the  United  States  and  other  Powers,  published  in  1889.) 

Crandall  says:  "The  Italian  government  considered  the  treaties  between 
foreign  countries  and  the  two  Sicilies  terminated,  at  least  for  most  pur- 
poses, on  the  consolidation  of  the  latter  with  the  Kingdom  of  Sardinia  in 
1860,  but  treaties  existing  with  Sardinia,  the  nucleus  of  the  Kingdom,  it 
regarded  as  still  binding  and  applicable  to  the  whole  kingdom."  (Samuel 
B.  Crandall,  Treaties,  their  Making  and  Enforcement,  p.  234.  New  York, 
1904.) 


386     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

would  be  considered  as  evidence  of  the  survival  of  the 
treaty.  The  party  availing  itself  of  the  treaty  or  recog- 
nizing its  efficacy,  might  be  considered  as  estopped  from 
denying  its  validity  until  the  other  signatories  had  re- 
fused to  recognize  it.1  In  the  case  of  Belgian  neutrality, 
all  the  signatories  and  their  successors  continued  to  treat 
Belgium  as  a  neutralized  state,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  continuance  of  the  treaty  in  force. 

(3)  What  Gladstone  said  in  1870  in  no  wise  admitted 
that  the  Treaty  of  1839  was  not  binding  upon  all  the  sig- 
natories. His  language  is  somewhat  obscure,  with  the 
haziness  so  dear  to  the  practical  English  statesmen,  con- 
scious of  their  great  responsibility  and  the  danger  of  def- 
inition. In  this  particular  instance  it  seems  clear  enough 
that  Gladstone  was  considering  the  possibility  that  Eng- 
land alone  might  be  called  upon  to  make  good  her  obliga- 
tions to  guarantee  Belgium's  neutrality.  No  one  would 
take  so  extreme  a  view  as  to  consider  that  England  was 
obliged  to  risk  her  existence  in  a  combat  with  all  the  other 
powers,  should  they  insist  upon  a  concerted  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality.  Gladstone  admitted  the  obligations  of 
England  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  would 
undoubtedly  have  recognized  the  duty  of  taking  reason- 
able action  to  maintain  her  inviolability.  To  that  extent 
he  would  have  been  ready  to  make  good  England's  obliga- 
tion to  guarantee  the  neutrality. 

(4)  It  has  been  said  that  Belgium  has  so  developed  in 
population  and  influence,  through  the  organization  of  her 

1  "None  of  the  arguments  advanced  by  Germany's  apologists  to  show 
that  the  treaties  of  1839,  neutralizing  Belgium,  were  no  longer  binding  on 
Prussia  (either  because  Prussia  has  become  a  part  of  the  German  Empire, 
or  because  provisional  agreements,  reinforcing  these  treaties,  were  made  in 
1870),  has  any  basis  in  international  theory  or  practice.  Moreover,  the  in- 
tention of  Germany  to  respect  these  treaties  was  asserted  by  the  present 
Imperial  Chancellor  in  1911  and  by  the  present  Imperial  Secretary  of  State 
in  1913.  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Paper,  no.  12,  and  enclosures."  (Munroe  Smith, 
"Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol. 
xxx,  March,  1915,  no.  1,  p.  57.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  387 

army  and  the  acquisition  of  the  Belgian  Congo,  that  the 
system  of  neutralization  could  no  longer  be  applied  to  her 
territory.  Far  from  being  a  reason  for  a  discontinuance  of 
the  former  neutralization  applied  to  Belgium,  any  in- 
crease in  strength  should  be  regarded  as  a  justification  of 
the  stipulation  allowing  Belgium  to  take  part  in  defending 
her  own  neutrality.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  the  relative 
military  strength  of  Belgium  as  compared  with  that  of  her 
neighbors  has  been  greatly  changed  through  the  course  of 
years.  The  acquisition  of  colonies  could  in  no  wise  affect 
her  neutrality,  provided,  of  course,  her  colonies  were  not 
obtained  at  the  expense  of  any  of  the  powers. 

After  due  consideration  of  all  these  arguments,  I  have 
no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839, 
in  spite  of  its  violation  by  two  of  the  signatories,  is  to-day 
legally  binding.  It  remains  to  be  seen  what  modification, 
if  any,  may  be  made  by  the  treaty  of  peace  which  will 
terminate  the  present  conflict. 

8.  The  obligation  to  make  good  the  guaranty  of  neutrality 
When  the  great  powers  signed  the  treaty  by  which  they 
agreed  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality  and  to  guarantee  its 
observance,  they  took  an  engagement  in  express  terms  to 
exert  what  strength  they  could  to  protect  Belgian  territory 
from  invasion.  If,  as  practical  students  of  politics,  we  try 
to  examine  the  situation  at  the  time  the  Treaty  of  Nov- 
ember 15,  1831,  was  signed,  we  should  recognize  that  the 
interests  of  the  signatory  powers  were  varied.  To  a  cer- 
tain degree  the  old  fear  of  France  still  prevailed,  and  it  was 
the  general  intention  to  maintain  a  "stopper"  state  to 
prevent  her  expansion.  The  need  of  this  policy  became 
apparent  later  on  when  Napoleon  III  became  the  most 
powerful  and  most  feared  monarch  of  Europe. 

The  main  reason  why  France  was  led  to  agree  to  the 
neutralization  of  Belgium  was  that  she  preferred  a  small 
independent  Belgium  to  the  larger  border  state  which  it 


388     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

replaced.  France  was  glad  also  to  avoid  complications  with 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia.  The  French  Monarchy, 
brought  in  by  the  revolution  of  July  (1830),  was  regarded 
with  considerable  distrust  and  apprehension  by  the  reac- 
tionary courts  of  Europe.  Louis  Philippe  was  in  a  difficult 
situation  because  French  public  opinion  would  not  have 
permitted  the  Government  to  acquiesce,  much  less  take 
part  in  any  collective  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  great 
powers  to  compel  Belgium  to  continue  in  the  union  with 
Holland.  Prussia  in  1831  was  doubtless  glad  to  have  an 
obstacle  to  French  advance  or  possible  aggression  against 
her.  Austria  and  Russia,  obliged  to  concur  in  the  ar- 
rangement, had  probably  no  intention  of  wasting  any 
strength  in  maintaining  Belgian  neutrality,  except  in  so 
far  as  should  be  necessary  to  prevent  a  too  great  aggran- 
dizement on  the  part  of  France  or  England,  or  any  other 
rival  who  happened  at  the  moment  to  arouse  their  fears. 

The  views  of  each  of  the  signatories  of  the  Treaty  of 
November  15,  1831,  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  Eng- 
land intended  to  keep  Belgium  really  neutral  and  out  of 
the  control  of  any  great  Continental  power.  France 
agreed  to  the  neutralization  because  she  knew  she  would 
not  be  permitted  to  absorb  Belgium.  Prussia  looked  upon 
the  neutralization  as  a  measure  to  check  France  and  by 
means  of  a  buffer  state  prevent  an  inconvenient  attack 
upon  herself.  Austria  and  Russia  considered  the  regime 
as  a  check  upon  French  expansion,  even  though  they  re- 
gretted the  necessity  of  legalizing  a  government  which  had 
made  a  revolutionary  break  in  the  work  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna.1 

The  only  power  that  may  be  considered  to  have  en- 
tertained the  intention  to  make  good  the  guaranty  was 
Great  Britain.  The  guaranteeing  action  of  the  other  states 
could  be  counted  upon  only  in  special  circumstances. 

1  See  Th.  Baty,  "  The  Neutrality  of  Belgium,"  The  Quarterly  Review, 
January,  1915,  p.  214. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  389 

France  and  Prussia  could  each  be  relied  upon  to  oppose  an 
invasion  of  Belgium  by  the  other,  though  they  might  not 
have  been  averse  to  partition  at  an  appropriate  oppor- 
tunity. Austria  and  Russia  might  reasonably  expect  the 
whole  burden  of  the  obligation  to  fall  on  the  three  nearest 
powers.  As  for  Holland,  she  was  naturally  chagrined  at 
losing  half  of  her  territory,  and  refused  to  sign  the  treaty ; 
but  long  before  her  stubborn  king  could  be  made  to  accept 
the  inevitable  and  agree  to  the  separation,  the  Dutch  peo- 
ple were  ready  to  acquiesce.  They  only  awaited  the  as- 
sent of  their  king  to  agree  to  the  neutralization  of  Bel- 
gium in  accordance  with  the  policy  pursued  since  the  time 
when  they  secured  their  independence  from  Spain.1  Eng- 
land, then,  was  the  only  power  which,  in  1831,  might  be 
considered  to  have  accepted  in  its  full  significance  the  ob- 
ligation to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  against  any 
violator.  By  April  19,  1839,  the  powers  had  come  to  look 
upon  the  neutralization  of  Belgium  with  much  greater 
favor.  The  treaty  signed  that  day,  reproducing  the  articles 
and  stipulations  relating  to  the  neutralization  of  Belgium, 
may  be  considered  as  purged  of  any  insincerity  that  may 
have  attended  the  acceptance  of  its  predecessor. 

In  reference  to  the  guaranty  of  the  Treaty  of  1839  it  is 
most  important  to  note  what  Gladstone  said  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  August  10,  1870:  "But  I  am  not  able  to 
subscribe  to  the  doctrine  of  those  who  have  held  in  this 
House,  what  plainly  amounts  to  an  assertion,  that  the 
simple  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  guaranty  is  binding  on 
every  party  to  it  irrespectively  altogether  of  the  particular 
position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when  the 
occasion  for  acting  on  the  guaranty  arises.  The  great 
authorities  upon  foreign  policy  to  whom  I  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  listen  —  such  as  Lord  Aberdeen  and  Lord  Palm- 
erston  —  never,  to  my  knowledge,  took  that  rigid  and, 

1  The  Dutch  did  not  join  in  the  guaranty  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in 
1839. 


390     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

if  I  may  venture  to  say  so,  that  impracticable  view  of  a 
guaranty."  1 

What  Gladstone  undoubtedly  meant  by  this  was  that 
the  English  statesmen  perceived  that  the  whole  brunt  of 
maintaining  the  Belgian  neutrality  rested  upon  their 
shoulders,  and  that  though  they  intended  to  take  every 
means  to  make  good  the  engagement  into  which  they  had 
entered,  they  did  not  feel  that  England  was  in  honor  bound, 
where  the  odds  were  too  great  against  her,  to  stake  her 
national  existence  in  the  defense  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

Gladstone  has  been  criticized  for  this  frank  expression, 
and  in  truth  his  speech  seems  to  present  a  confusion  of 
ideas  which  lays  him  open  to  criticism.  In  reality,  how- 
ever, his  stand  was  perfectly  justified,  for  otherwise,  in 
agreeing  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  England  would  have 
been  digging  a  pit  into  which  she  herself  might  later  have 
fallen.  Gladstone  could  not  have  meant  that  England 
would  ever  shirk  her  obligation  to  participate  in  any  rea- 
sonable measures  to  make  good  the  guaranty.  England's 
vital  interests  would  surely  recommend  such  a  course; 
but  it  would  have  been  an  impracticable  view  of  the  obli- 
gation which  would  have  sent  England  to  her  doom  in  the 
face  of  a  great  Continental  combination  intent  upon  vio- 
lating the  obligation  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of  1839. 

At  the  present  time,  then,  I  believe  it  to  be  beyond  all 
reasonable  doubt  that  all  the  signatory  states  of  the  Treaty 
of  1839  were  bound  not  only  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  but  to  collaborate  in  the  undertaking  of  rea- 
sonable measures  to  guarantee  this  neutrality.  It  was  a 
duty  which  all  the  states  of  the  world  owed  to  international 
law  to  take  every  reasonable  and  practical  means  to  pre- 
vent Germany  from  effecting  such  a  gross  violation  of  the 
rights  of  a  weak  state  as  has  resulted  from  her  invasion. 

As  this  latter  duty  is  part  of  the  general  obligation  on 

1  See  post,  chap,  xm,  where  the  rest  of  Gladstone's  remarks  and  other 
extensive  extracts  are  quoted  from  the  Parliamentary  Debates. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  391 

all  nations  to  cooperate  toward  securing  a  proper  respect 
for  the  principles  of  international  law,  it  may  be  said  to 
enjoin  similar  action  on  the  United  States.1  The  obliga- 
tion, though  equally  binding  upon  us,  cannot  require  us  to 
act  with  the  same  energy  and  promptness  as  the  powers 
nearer  at  hand  and  more  vitally  interested.  International 
law,  as  now  in  operation,  lays  upon  the  states  most  di- 
rectly concerned  the  burden  of  taking  the  requisite  action 
to  secure  respect  for  its  rules. 

4.  The  right  to  make  war  and  the  equality  of  states 
International  law,  as  at  present  applied  to  the  relations 
between  states,  is  based  on  the  fundamental  principle  of 
equality  of  the  separate  states  before  this  law  of  nations. 
As  Pascal  said  of  custom,  this  principle  owes  its  greatest 
force,  perhaps,  to  the  fact  that  it  is  accepted.  For  ac- 
cepted it  is,  with  a  concurrence  of  opinion  almost  reaching 
unanimity.  If  an  objection  to  the  validity  of  the  principle 
be  raised,  we  must  refer  to  the  authorities  and  marshal  the 
arguments  in  its  favor. 

If,  for  the  purpose  of  this  argument,  we  accept  the  prin- 
ciple, it  follows  necessarily  that  this  equality  between  the 
states  would  have  no  meaning  if  the  stronger  could  refuse 

1  The  United  States  is  required  only  to  make  every  reasonable  effort  to 
secure  respect  for  Belgium's  rights,  which  are  the  rights  of  all  humanity: 
necessarily  the  rights  of  Germany,  too,  if  she  could  but  perceive  it.  It  has 
been  argued  that  we  should  intervene  as  signatories  of  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion of  October  18,  1907,  respecting  the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral  powers 
and  persons  in  case  of  war  on  land.  Article  I  of  this  convention  reads:  "  The 
territory  of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable."  This  article  would  apply  to  a  neu- 
tralized state  like  Belgium  as  well  as  to  a  state  neutral  in  the  ordinary  sense 
like  Holland  or  Italy  in  the  present  war.  In  the  case  of  Belgium  the  invio- 
lability is  sufficiently  covered  by  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839.  Germany's 
ratification  of  this  Hague  Convention  might,  however,  be  taken  as  another 
indication  that  she  expected  to  recognize  the  inviolability  of  Belgian  terri- 
tory. For  that  matter  the  convention  is  for  the  most  part  a  restating  of  the 
recognized  rules  of  international  law,  but  since  this  treaty  was  not  ratified 
by  all  the  belligerents,  it  would  not  under  its  terms  be  applicable.  The 
concern  of  the  United  States  in  the  protection  of  Belgium's  rights  must 
therefore  rest  upon  the  general  principles  of  international  law. 


392     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

to  respect  the  recognized  right  of  the  weaker,  or  if  the 
stronger  could  use  his  might  to  work  his  will  in  violation 
of  the  right  of  the  weaker.  It  follows  that  no  state  is  justi- 
fied in  making  war  except  in  the  vindication  of  its  rights. 
Such  is,  in  truth,  the  principle  recognized  and  observed  by 
civilized  states.  What  if  the  strong  does,  notwithstanding, 
appeal  to  arms  and  disregard  the  right  of  a  weaker  state? 
Has  international  law  any  means  to  check  the  violator? 
Yes;  a  means  less  direct  and  less  immediate  than  in  the 
case  of  violations  of  national  law,  though  none  the  less 
sure  in  its  effect.  Public  opinion  throughout  the  world  will 
work  against  the  culprit,  and  in  favor  of  the  oppressed, 
until  perhaps  some  combination  of  states  is  found  to  in- 
tervene and  check  the  aggression.  At  times  it  is  not  easy 
to  discover  which  side  is  right,  so  that  other  states  are 
cautious  lest  they  make  a  mistake  and  lest  their  interven- 
tion be  considered  a  cloak  to  hide  political  designs.  Un- 
fortunately, in  the  past  the  political  element  in  interven- 
tion has  often  been  predominant.  Each  state  is  eager  to 
protect  the  policies  which  lie  closest  to  the  hearts  of  the 
people,  as  being  the  expression  of  views  peculiarly  their 
own;  that  is,  the  views  which  they  think  right  and  wish  to 
have  adopted.  To  maintain  the  law  pertaining  to  all  the 
states  and  accepted  by  them  does  not  require  the  same 
effort. 

When  a  state  has  recourse  to  force,  it  is  not  possible  to 
know  at  once  the  real  motive,  and  to  judge  how  far  the 
action  is  justified.  It  results  from  this  situation  that 
when  a  state  takes  the  law  into  its  own  hands  and  at- 
tacks another,  there  is  no  effective  way  of  determining  on 
the  instant  whether  the  action  is  a  proper  vindication  of 
its  rights  or  a  more  or  less  disguised  violation  of  interna- 
tional law.  This  inability  to  discern  the  rights  of  the 
question  and  the  consequences  which  will  result  from 
the  prevalence  of  either  of  the  opposing  views  led  to  the 
development  of  the  condition  of  neutrality.  Where  two 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  393 

political  views  are  opposed  to  each  other,  it  is  natural  that 
superior  force  should  have  its  effect.  It  is  only  in  the 
realm  of  law  that  the  equality  of  weak  and  strong  is 
reasonable.1 

In  the  presence  of  a  conflict  between  two  opposing 
political  views,  interest  and  expediency  alone  determine 
whether  a  given  state  will  throw  its  support  to  one  side  or 
the  other.  When  in  doubt,  neutrality  would  be  by  far  the 
safest  course.  Since  the  greater  number  of  international 
disputes  have  related  to  political  questions,  neutrality  has 
proved  a  useful  institution,  and  has  developed  into  a  sys- 
tem recognized  as  part  of  the  law  of  nations.  This  system 
of  neutrality  could  never  be  meant  to  justify  the  nations  in 
standing  aside  and  in  letting  the  strong  crush  the  weak  by 
violating  clearly  recognized  principles  of  international  law. 
If  that  were  true,  neutrality  might  serve  in  practice  to 
authorize  or  make  possible  any  violation  of  the  law  of  na- 
tions. In  the  face  of  such  a  contradiction  the  whole  system 
of  the  law  of  nations  would  fall  to  pieces. 

The  old  conception  of  international  law  recognized  this 
obligation  of  the  nations,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  take  up 
arms  against  the  unjust.  In  the  case  of  political  disputes, 
which  were  most  frequently  the  cause  of  conflict,  this 
principle  could  not  be  satisfactorily  applied,  and  the  idea 
of  neutrality  gradually  ceased  to  be  held  in  disrepute,  un- 
til to-day  it  has  become  the  rule  for  third  states  to  adopt 
this  status  upon  the  outbreak  of  a  war.  By  a  natural  con- 
fusion of  ideas,  the  general  practice  of  neutrality  has  been 
mistaken  as  a  license  for  any  state  to  have  recourse  to  war 
at  will.   This  would  constitute  a  right  to  make  war  irre- 

1  The  great  jurist  Westlake  remarks  d  propos  of  the  action  of  States  in 
adopting  new  rules  of  international  law:  "Therefore,  from  time  to  time  new 
rules  have  to  be  proposed  on  reasonable  grounds,  acted  on  provisionally, 
and  ultimately  adopted  or  rejected  as  may  be  determined  by  experience, 
including  the  effect,  not  less  important  in  international  than  in  national 
affairs,  of  interest  coupled  with  preponderating  power."  (John  Westlake, 
International  Law,  part  i,  p.  15.  Cambridge,  1910.) 


394     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

spective  of  the  cause.  There  could  be  no  graver  error,  since 
the  recognition  of  such  a  right  would  vitiate  the  highest 
law  of  humanity.  It  would  make  impossible  the  con- 
tinued survival  of  small  states,  to  the  great  detriment  of 
mankind. 

When  we  come  to  the  question  of  settling  conflicting 
views  of  rights,  we  find  at  once  a  difficulty  in  that  the 
stronger  state  always  finds  some  advantage  in  its  strength 
to  secure  a  better  recognition  of  what  it  calls  its  right, 
sometimes  to  the  total  disregard  of  the  superior  right  of  a 
weaker  state.  The  defect  is  not  in  the  substantive  law  of 
nations,  which  is  sufficiently  well  defined  and  discernible 
to  indicate  the  right.  It  is  due  to  the  fact  that  when  the 
interests,  prejudices,  and  passions  of  a  strong  country 
cause  it  to  take  a  view  at  variance  with  that  held  by  an- 
other state,  if  this  other  be  weaker,  there  is  no  direct  means 
by  which  it  can  make  good  its  rights.  Its  only  champion  is 
the  opinion  of  other  governments  and  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world,  which  may  directly  or  indirectly  compel  some 
action  in  support  of  the  weaker's  right.  At  the  present 
time,  when  the  stronger  comes  into  conflict  with  the 
weaker,  if  its  view  be  not  accepted,  it  often  finds  it  possi- 
ble to  have  recourse  to  war  to  enforce  its  views. 

As  we  have  seen,  international  law  does  not  authorize 
the  strong  state  thus  to  make  use  of  its  force  to  the  dis- 
paragement of  the  right  of  the  weaker.  With  no  means  of 
control  for  enforcing  its  rules,  except  the  general  public 
opinion  which  we  have  considered,  international  law  has 
often  to  leave  the  conflict  to  run  its  course.  This  situation 
is  to  blame  for  that  serious  error  of  those  who  believe  that 
international  law  allows  the  strong  to  have  recourse  to  war 
to  impose  his  will;  in  other  words,  that  it  constitutes  a 
right  to  make  war.  The  only  rightful  use  of  force  is  to 
establish  right.  Out  of  respect  to  this  underlying  princi- 
ple there  have  slowly  been  developed  certain  methods  of 
procedure.   No  state  may  rightly  have  recourse  to  force 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  395 

until  every  peaceful  means,  reasonably  possible  of  appli- 
cation, has  been  tried  to  settle  the  dispute. 

5.  Anglo-Belgian  conversations 

A  pamphlet  called  "The  Case  of  Belgium,"  containing 
facsimiles  of  documents  found  in  the  Belgian  archives  after 
the  occupation  of  Brussels,  has  been  widely  circulated,  with 
an  introduction  by  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg,  and  a  transla- 
tion of  an  article  in  the  North-German  Gazette  commenting 
upon  them.  A  similar  translation  has  been  given  out  to  the 
press,  and  may  be  considered  as  the  inspired  or  semi-official 
defense  of  the  German  Government. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience  I  reproduce  here  the  trans- 
lation, given  in  the  pamphlet  referred  to  above,  of  docu- 
ment 2  containing  the  minutes  of  a  conference  between 
the  Belgian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General  Jungbluth, 
and  the  British  Military  Attache,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bridges : 1  — 

1  The  other  document  (1)  and  the  extract  of  another  (3)  are  given  among 
the  Documents  (see  post,  chap,  xiii).  Document  2  is  reproduced  here  be- 
cause it  seems  to  be  the  briefest  and  most  important  of  the  three  and  con- 
tains the  evidence  upon  which  the  charge  against  Belgium  and  England  is 
rested.  In  the  following  summary  adjoined  to  the  documents,  the  most 
disputed  assertions  are  contained  in  the  italicized  portion  and  one  other 
sentence  which  I  have  underlined :  — 

"SUMMARY   OF   THE   SECRET   DOCUMENTS 

"I.  The  first  document  is  a  report  of  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General 
Staff,  Major-General  Ducarme,  to  the  Minister  of  War,  reporting  a  series 
of  conversations  which  he  had  had  with  the  Military  Attache"  of  the  British 
Legation,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  in  Brussels.  It  discloses  that, 
as  early  as  January,  1906,  the  Belgian  Government  was  in  consultation  with 
the  British  Government  over  steps  to  be  taken  by  Belgium,  Great  Britain 
and  France  against  Germany.  A  plan  had  been  fully  elaborated  for  the 
landing  of  two  British  army  corps  in  French  ports  to  be  transferred  to  the 
point  in  Belgium  necessary  for  operations  against  the  Germans.  Through- 
out the  conversation  the  British  and  Belgian  forces  were  spoken  of  as  "  al- 
lied armies";  the  British  Military  Attache"  insisted  on  discussing  the  ques- 
tion of  the  chief  command;  and  he  urged  the  establishment,  in  the  mean 
time,  of  a  Belgian  spy  system  in  Germany. 

"II.  When  in  the  year  1912  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  had  been 
succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges  as  British  Military  Attache"  in 


396     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"Confidential 

"The  British  Military  Attache"  asked  to  see  Gen- 
eral Jungbluth.  The  two  gentlemen  met  on  April  23d. 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges  told  the  General  that 
England  had  at  her  disposal  an  army  which  could  be 
sent  to  the  Continent,  composed  of  six  divisions  of 
infantry  and  eight  brigades  of  cavalry  —  together 
160,000  troops.  She  has  also  everything  which  is 
necessary  for  her  to  defend  her  insular  territory. 
Everything  is  ready. 

"At  the  time  of  the  recent  events,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment would  have  immediately  effected  a  disem- 
barkment  in  Belgium  (chez  nous),  even  if  we  had  not 
asked  for  assistance. 

"The  General  objected  that  for  that  our  consent 
was  necessary. 

Brussels,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  Major-General  Du- 
carme,  had  been  succeeded  by  General  Jungbluth  as  Chief  of  the  Belgian 
General  Staff,  the  conversations  proceeded  between  the  two  latter  officials. 
That  is  to  say,  these  were  not  casual  conversations  between  individuals,  but 
a  series  of  official  conversations  between  representatives  of  their  respective 
governments,  in  pursuance  of  a  well-considered  policy  on  the  part  of  both 
governments. 

"III.  The  above  documents  are  given  additional  significance  by  a  report 
made  in  1911  by  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  from  which  it  appears  that  this  representative 
of  the  Belgian  Government  in  Berlin  was  familiar  with  the  plans  above  set 
forth  and  protested  against  them,  asking  why  like  preparations  had  not 
been  made  with  Germany  to  repel  invasion  by  the  French  and  English. 

"Taken  together,  these  documents  show  that  the  British  Government  had 
the  intention,  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  war,  of  sending  troops  into  Belgium 
immediately,  that  is,  of  doing  the  very  thing  which,  done  by  Germany,  was 
used  by  England  as  a  pretext  for  declaring  war  on  Germany. 

"They  show  also  that  the  Belgian  Government  took,  in  agreement  with 
the  English  General  Staff,  military  precautions  against  a  hypothetical  Ger- 
man invasion  of  Belgium.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Belgian  Government 
never  made  the  slightest  attempt  to  take,  in  agreement  with  the  German 
Government,  military  precautions  against  an  Anglo-French  invasion  of 
Belgium,  though  fully  informed  that  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  land  and  dispatch,  across  French  territory  into  Belgium,  160,000 
troops,  without  asking  Belgium's  permission,  on  the  first  outbreak  of  the 
European  war.  This  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  Belgian  Government  was 
determined  from  the  outset  to  join  Germany's  enemies." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  397 

"  The  Military  Attache  answered  that  he  knew  this, 
but  that  —  since  we  were  not  able  to  prevent  the 
Germans  from  passing  through  our  country  —  Eng- 
land would  have  landed  her  troops  in  Belgium  under 
all  circumstances  (en  tout  etat  de  cause). 

"As  for  the  place  of  landing,  the  Military  Attache" 
did  not  make  a  precise  statement;  he  said  that  the 
coast  was  rather  long,  but  the  General  knows  that 
Mr.  Bridges,  during  Easter,  has  paid  daily  visits  to 
Zeebrugge  from  Ostende. 

"The  General  added  that  we  were,  besides,  per- 
fectly able  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  passing 
through."  * 
A  confidential  report  dated  December  23,  1911,  and 
probably  therefore  anterior  to  document  2,  was  received  at 
Brussels  from  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin. 
The  Minister  warns  his  Government  of  the  danger  which 
threatened  Belgium  from  the  French  side,  not  only  in  the 
south  of  Luxemburg,  but  along  the  entire  length  of  the 
Belgian  frontier,  remarking  that  this  assertion  was  not 
based  upon  conjectures,  but  that  the  Belgian  Government 
had  positive  evidence  of  it.   Baron  Greindl  then  proceeds 
to  the  reasons  for  his  anxiety  in  the  following  terms :  — 

"Evidently  the  project  of  an  outflanking  movement 
from  the  north  forms  part  of  the  scheme  of  the  Entente 
Cordiale.  If  that  were  not  the  case,  then  the  plan  of  forti- 
fying Flushing  would  not  have  called  forth  such  an  out- 
burst in  Paris  and  London.  The  reason  why  they  wished 
that  the  Scheldt  should  remain  unfortified  was  hardly  con- 

1  Document  2  was  published  with  the  following  explanatory  note: 
"Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  British  Military  Attache  in  Brussels, 
was  succeeded  in  his  office  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges.  Likewise, 
General  Ducarme  was  succeeded,  as  Chief  of  the  Belgian  Staff,  by  General 
Jungbluth.  A  conversation  between  Colonel  Bridges  and  General  Jung- 
bluth  was  committed  to  writing,  and  that  writing  was  also  found  at  the 
Belgian  Foreign  Office.  The  document,  which  is  dated  April  23d  and  is 
presumed  to  belong  to  the  year  1912,  is  marked  '  conftdentielle'  in  the 
handwriting  of  Graf.  v.  d.  Straaten,  the  Belgian  Foreign  Secretary." 


398     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

cealed  by  them.  Their  aim  was  to  be  able  to  transport  an 
English  garrison,  unhindered,  to  Antwerp,  which  means  to 
establish  in  our  country  a  basis  of  operation  [sic]  for  an 
offensive  in  the  direction  of  the  Lower  Rhine  and  West- 
phalia, and  then  to  make  us  throw  our  lot  in  with  them, 
which  would  not  be  difficult,  for,  after  the  surrender  of  our 
national  center  of  refuge,  we  would,  through  our  own  fault, 
renounce  every  possibility  of  opposing  the  demands  of  our 
doubtful  protectors  after  having  been  so  unwise  as  to  per- 
mit then  entrance  into  our  country.  Colonel  Barnardiston's 
announcements  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  En- 
tente Cordiale,  which  were  just  as  perfidious  as  they  were 
naive,  have  shown  us  plainly  the  true  meaning  of  things. 
Wrien  it  became  evident  that  we  would  not  allow  ourselves 
to  be  frightened  by  the  pretended  danger  of  the  closing  of 
the  Scheldt,  the  plan  was  not  entirely  abandoned,  but 
modified  in  so  far  as  the  British  army  was  not  to  land  on 
the  Belgian  coast,  but  at  the  nearest  French  harbors. 

"The  revelations  of  Captain  Faber,  which  were  denied 
as  little  as  the  newspaper  reports  by  which  they  were  con- 
firmed or  completed  in  several  respects,  also  testify  to 
this.  This  British  army,  at  Calais  and  Dunkirk,  would  by 
no  means  march  along  our  frontier  to  Longwy  in  order  to 
reach  Germany.  It  would  directly  invade  Belgium  from 
the  northwest.  That  would  give  it  the  advantage  of  being 
able  to  begin  operations  immediately,  to  encounter  the 
Belgian  army  in  a  region  where  we  could  not  depend  on 
any  fortress,  in  case  we  wanted  to  risk  a  battle.  Moreover, 
that  would  make  it  possible  for  it  to  occupy  provinces  rich 
in  all  kinds  of  resources,  and,  at  any  rate,  to  prevent  our 
mobilization  or  only  to  permit  it  after  we  had  formally 
pledged  ourselves  to  carry  on  our  mobilization  to  the  ex- 
clusive advantage  of  England  and  her  allies. 

"It  is  therefore  of  necessity  to  prepare  a  plan  of  battle 
for  the  Belgian  army  also  for  that  possibility.  This  is 
necessary  in  the  interest  of  our  military  defense,  as  well 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  399 

as  for  the  sake  of  the  direction  of  our  foreign  policy,  in 
case  of  war  between  Germany  and  France."  1 

This  extract  from  this  remarkable  report  of  Baron 
Greindl  is  clear  and  easy  to  comprehend,  and  leaves  the 
impression  that  England  and  France  were  in  fact  prepar- 
ing to  invade  Belgium  immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war 
for  the  purpose  of  attacking  Germany.  The  Belgian  Min- 
ister was  undoubtedly  of  the  opinion  that  the  powers  of  the 
Entente  intended  to  frustrate  any  attempt  on  the  part  of 
Belgium  to  live  up  to  her  obligations  and  defend  her  neu- 
trality, by  preventing  her  mobilization  unless  she  agreed 
to  violate  her  sacred  obligations  by  joining  in  an  attack 
on  Germany. 

The  Baron's  report  contradicts  by  implication  any  idea 
of  an  agreement  between  Belgium  and  the  Entente  Powers. 
The  Belgian  Minister  does  not,  in  any  event,  seem  to  have 
the  slightest  suspicion  of  such  an  agreement,  though  the 
extract  of  his  report  refers  to  Colonel  Barnardiston's  plans 
in  regard  to  the  landing  of  English  troops  at  French  ports. 

The  Belgian  Government  made  answer  to  the  publica- 
tion of  this  report  through  the  columns  of  the  London 
Times.2 

1  This  document,  in  so  far  as  made  public,  is  given  in  the  Documents. 
(See  post,  chap,  xrn.) 

2  The  London  Times  of  Friday,  October  23,  1914,  in  answer  to  the  pub- 
lication of  these  documents  in  the  North-German  Gazette,  published  a  reply 
from  the  Belgian  Government  of  which  this  is  an  extract :  — 

"We  have  only  one  regret  to  express  on  the  subject  of  the  disclosure  of 
these  documents,  and  that  is  that  the  publication  of  our  military  documents 
should  be  mangled  and  arranged  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  the  reader  the 
impression  of  duplicity  on  the  part  of  England  and  adhesion  by  Belgium, 
in  violation  of  her  duties  as  a  neutral  State,  to  the  policy  of  the  Triple 
Entente.  We  ask  the  North-German  Gazette  to  publish  in  full  the  result  of 
its  search  among  our  secret  documents.  Therein  will  be  found  fresh  and 
striking  proof  of  the  loyalty,  correctness,  and  impartiality  with  which  Bel- 
gium for  eighty-four  years  has  discharged  her  international  obligations. 

"It  was  stated  that  Colonel  Barnardiston,  the  military  representative  at 
Brussels  of  a  power  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  at  the  time  of 
the  Algeciras  crisis  questioned  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  as  to 
the  measures  which  he  had  taken  to  prevent  any  violation  of  that  neutrality. 
The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  at  that  time  Lieut  enant-General  Ducarme, 


400     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

When  the  Greindl  report  and  the  minutes  of  the  two 
Anglo-Belgian  military  conversations  were  distributed  in 
this  country,  with  a  prefatory  explanation  by  Dr.  Bern- 
hard  Dernburg,  the  Belgian  Minister  to  the  United  States 
gave  out  a  statement  in  which  he  said:  "The  Belgian 
Minister  does  not  know  whether  or  not  these  published 
documents  are  authentic;  but,  far  from  discussing  their 
authenticity,  he  declares  that  if  he  had  them  in  his  pos- 
session he  would  have  published  them  long  ago,  as  they 
constitute  the  strongest  proof  of  the  innocence  of  the  Bel- 
gian Government."  x 

replied  that  Belgium  was  ready  to  repel  any  invader.  Did  the  conversation 
extend  beyond  these  limits,  and  did  Colonel  Barnardiston,  in  an  interview 
of  a  private  and  confidential  nature,  disclose  to  General  Ducarme  the  plan 
of  campaign  which  the  British  General  Staff  would  have  desired  to  follow  if 
that  neutrality  were  violated?  We  doubt  it,  but  in  any  case  we  can  solemnly 
assert,  and  it  will  be  impossible  to  prove  the  contrary,  that  never  has  the 
Bang  or  his  Government  been  invited,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  join 
the  Triple  Entente  in  the  event  of  a  Franco-German  war.  By  their  words 
and  by  their  acts  they  have  always  shown  such  a  firm  attitude  that  any 
supposition  that  they  could  have  departed  from  the  strictest  neutrality  is 
eliminated  a  priori. 

"As  for  Baron  Greindl's  dispatch  of  December  23,  1911,  it  dealt  with  a 
plan  for  the  defense  of  Luxemburg,  due  to  the  personal  initiative  of  the 
Chief  of  the  First  Section  of  the  War  Ministry.  This  plan  was  of  an  abso- 
lutely private  character  and  had  not  been  approved  by  the  Minister  of 
War.  If  this  plan  contemplated  above  all  an  attack  by  Germany,  there  is 
no  cause  for  surprise,  since  the  great  German  military  writers,  in  particular 
T.  Bernhardi,  V.  Schlivfeboch,  and  Von  der  Goltz,  spoke  openly  in  their 
treatises  on  the  coming  war  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory  by  the  Ger- 
man armies. 

"At  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the  Imperial  Government,  through  the 
mouth  of  the  Chancellor  and  of  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  did  not 
search  for  vain  pretexts  for  the  aggression  of  which  Belgium  has  been  the 
victim.  They  justified  it  on  the  plea  of  military  interests.  Since  then,  in 
face  of  the  universal  reprobation  which  this  odious  action  has  excited,  they 
have  attempted  to  deceive  public  opinion  by  representing  Belgium  as 
bound  already  before  the  war  to  the  Triple  Entente.  These  intrigues  will 
deceive  nobody.  They  will  recoil  on  the  head  of  Germany.  History  will 
record  that  this  power,  after  binding  itself  by  treaty  to  defend  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  took  the  initiative  in  violating  it,  without  even  finding  a  pretext 
with  which  to  justify  itself." 

1  The  full  statement  of  the  Minister,  as  it  appeared  in  the  New  York 
Times  of  December  22,  1914,  is  given  in  chapter  xin,  together  with  the 
Dernburg  charges  and  explanations  to  which  it  refers.  See  also  Emile 
Waxweiler,  La  Belgique  neutre  et  loyale,  Part  iv.  Lausanne,  1915. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  401 

The  British  Foreign  Office  gave  out  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
report  of  his  conversation  with  the  Belgian  Minister  con- 
tained in  his  dispatch  of  April  7,  1913,  to  Sir  F.  Villiers, 
British  Minister  at  Brussels,  which  was  as  follows : l  — 

Foreign  Office, 

April  7,  1913. 

Sir: 

In  speaking  to  the  Belgian  Minister  to-day  I  said, 
speaking  unofficially,  that  it  had  been  brought  to  my 
knowledge  that  there  was  apprehension  in  Belgium 
lest  we  should  be  the  first  to  violate  Belgian  neutral- 
ity. I  did  not  think  that  this  apprehension  could  have 
come  from  a  British  source. 

The  Belgian  Minister  informed  me  that  there  had 
been  talk,  in  a  British  source  which  he  could  not 
name,  of  the  landing  of  troops  in  Belgium  by  Great 
Britain,  in  order  to  anticipate  a  possible  dispatch  of 
German  troops  through  Belgium  to  France. 

I  said  I  was  sure  that  this  Government  would  not 
be  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  I 
did  not  believe  that  any  British  Government  would 
be  the  first  to  do  so,  nor  would  public  opinion  here 
ever  approve  of  it.2  What  we  had  to  consider,  and  it 
was  a  somewhat  embarrassing  question,  was  what  it 
would  be  desirable  and  necessary  for  us,  as  one  of  the 
guarantors  of  Belgian  neutrality,  to  do  if  Belgian 
neutrality  was  violated  by  any  power.  For  us  to  be 
the  first  to  violate  it  and  to  send  troops  in  to  Belgium 
would  be  to  give  Germany,  for  instance,  justification 
for  sending  troops  into  Belgium  also.  WTaat  we  desired 
in  the  case  of  Belgium,  as  in  that  of  other  neutral 
countries,  was  that  their  neutrality  should  be  re- 

1  Printed  in  part  in  the  New  York  Times  of  December  7,  1914. 

2  Dr.  Edmund  von  Mach  puts  a  peculiar  interpretation  on  this  statement. 
(See  post,  p.  403,  note  1.  Cf.  Bethmann-Hollweg's  statement,  post,  p.  455, 
note.) 


402     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

spected,  and  as  long  as  it  was  not  violated  by  any- 
other  power  we  should  certainly  not  send  troops  our- 
selves into  their  territory. 

I  am,  etc., 

E.  Grey. 

As  nearly  as  I  can  sum  up  the  assertions  made  by  the 
defenders  of  Germany's  action  in  regard  to  Belgium,  they 
may  be  set  down  as  follows :  — 

1.  That  England  intended  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality 
by  landing  troops  in  Belgium  for  the  purpose  of  at- 
tacking Germany. 

2.  That  there  was  an  Anglo-Belgian  agreement  in  con- 
travention of  Belgian  neutrality  to  make  common 
cause  against  Germany. 

3.  That  there  was  a  similar  agreement  between  France 
and  Belgium. 

4.  That  England  also  intended  to  violate  the  neutrality 
of  Holland. 

5.  That  the  documents  discovered  at  Brussels  show  that 
Belgium  had  violated  her  neutral  obligations,  so  that 
Germany  could  not  be  expected  to  observe  them,  and 
hence  was  not  at  fault  in  invading  Belgian  territory. 

Beginning  with  the  first  of  these  assertions:  In  docu- 
ment 1,  it  is  clearly  stated  that  "the  entry  of  the  English 
into  Belgium  would  take  place  only  after  the  violation  of 
our  [Belgian]  neutrality  by  Germany."  This  is  admitted, 
but  in  document  2,  supposed  to  be  of  the  year  1912,  the 
British  Military  Attache  at  Brussels  declares  that  "at  the 
time  of  the  recent  events,  the  British  Government  would 
have  immediately  effected  a  disembarkment  in  Belgium, 
even  if  we  [the  Belgians]  had  not  asked  for  assistance"  ; 
and  when  "the  General  [Jungbluth]  objected  that  for  that 
our  consent  was  necessary,  the  military  attach^  answered 
that  he  knew  this,  but  that  —  since  we  were  not  able  to 
prevent  the  Germans  from  passing  through  our  country  — 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  403 

England  would  have  landed  her  troops  in  Belgium  under 
all  circumstances  (en  tout  etat  de  cause)." 

An  examination  of  the  previously  quoted  extract  from 
document  3  shows  plainly  that  the  Belgian  Minister  at 
Berlin  could  not  conceal  his  fear  that  it  might  be  the  insidi- 
ous design  of  France  and  England  to  make  use  of  Belgian 
territory  in  the  furtherance  of  their  attack  upon  Germany, 
without  regard  to  Belgium's  wishes  in  the  matter.1 

A  mere  superficial  perusal  of  the  documents  might 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  England  did  contemplate  an 
attack  upon  Germany  without  regard  to  whether  Belgium 
called  for  her  assistance  or  not.  Such  a  conclusion  seems 
reasonable  after  examining  the  documents,  especially  the 
contents  of  General  Jungbluth's  report  in  document  2; 
and  this  opinion  is  strengthened  by  the  evident  appre- 
hension of  Belgium  as  to  England's  intention.  If  the  Bel- 
gian Government  did  not  have  real  cause  for  anxiety,  why, 
it  will  be  asked,  should  it  have  been  necessary  for  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  to  assure  the  Belgian  Minister,  in  an  interview 
which  took  place  in  1913,  that  England  would  not  be  the 
first  to  send  troops  into  Belgium? 

To  this,  doubtless,  England  will  reply  that  the  Belgian 
Government  really  could  have  had  no  serious  grounds  for 
apprehension,  but  wished  to  be  in  a  position  to  demon- 
strate to  Germany  how  careful  and  how  impartial  it  had 
been  in  providing  against  the  violation  of  its  territory.  In 
the  same  way  that  the  British  Government  had  been  asked 

1  Dr.  Edmund  von  Mach,  writing  in  the  Boston  Evening  Transcript  of 
January  6,  1915,  declares:  "It  was  exactly  the  same  with  the  Treaty  of 
1839.  She  [Englandl  had  been  unwilling  to  declare  it  either  valid  or  invalid. 
For  years  military  experts  in  Europe,  both  French  and  German,  have  talked 
of  the  necessity  of  striking  a  blow  through  Belgium,  and  England  never 
raised  her  voice  in  protest  nor  pointed  to  an  existing  treaty.  When  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  was  charged  by  the  Belgian  Government  in  1913  that  England 
intended  to  be  the  first  to  invade  Belgium,  Sir  Edward  in  his  reply,  pub- 
lished by  himself,  made  no  reference  to  an  existing  treaty,  but  contented 
himself  with  pointing  out  that  such  an  action  would  be  unwise."  (Cf.  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  statement  above,  p.  401.) 


404     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

to  give  this  formal  expression  of  its  intention  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality  in  1913,  the  German  Chancellor  had 
been  approached  in  1911  with  a  request  that  he  make  a 
formal  statement  of  the  German  attitude  toward  Belgian 
neutrality.  He  replied  that  Germany  had  no  intention  of 
violating  Belgian  neutrality,  but  that  it  might  weaken 
Germany's  military  position  if  he  were  to  make  a  public 
declaration  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  he  wished  to 
imply  that  the  Belgians  would  have  to  rely  as  best  they 
might  on  Germany's  observance  of  their  neutrality,  with- 
out any  public  declaration  on  his  part,  because  he  wished 
the  situation  to  remain  uncertain,  so  that  the  French 
would  have  to  expend  part  of  their  resources  in  fortifying 
the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  against  a  possible  German 
invasion.1  The  only  other  reasonable  explanation  of  his 
reply  that  I  can  perceive  is  that  Germany  wished  to  keep 
open  the  possibility  of  making  a  successful  attack  through 
Belgium. 

The  British  military  authorities  may  have  felt  so  sure 
that  Germany  would  disregard  Belgian  neutrality  as  to 
be  themselves  impatient  of  any  further  thought  of  re- 
specting it.  This  is  not  by  any  means  to  say  that  the  Brit- 
ish Foreign  Office  or  British  Cabinet  would  have  been  will- 
ing to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  before  Germany  had  done 
so.  If,  however,  for  any  reason,  Belgium  should  have  de- 
cided to  cast  her  lot  with  Germany,  and  allowed  Germany 
free  transit  through  her  territory,  England  would  then, 
of  course,  have  been  perfectly  justified  in  landing  troops 
in  Belgium  and  forcing  Belgium  to  assist  her  in  resisting 
the  German  aggression. 

In  case  Belgium  was  defending  her  own  neutrality 
against  Germany,  and  had  not  made  appeal  to  England  or 
France,  the  question  as  to  whether  England  and  France 
would  have  a  right,  uninvited,  to  come  to  the  assistance 
of  Belgium  is  more  open  to  question;  since  England  and 
1  Cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  12;  see  above  p.  317,  321. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  405 

France  were  guarantors  of  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839, 
it  would  seem  that  they  might  be  expected  to  take  what- 
ever measures  were  necessary  to  ward  off  an  attack  upon 
Belgium's  neutrality.1 

The  next  assertion  relates  to  an  Anglo-Belgian  agree- 
ment to  make  common  cause  against  Germany.2  This 
assertion  seems  to  be  entirely  without  foundation.  The 
alleged  agreement  between  the  British  Military  Attache* 
and  General  Jungbluth  could  not  have  been  binding  upon 
either  Government  without  the  concurrence  of  the  re- 
sponsible authorities.3  Furthermore,  there  does  not  seem 
actually  to  have  been  any  agreement;  otherwise  why 
should  it  have  been  necessary  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  have 
assured  the  Belgian  Government  that  England  would  not 

1  After  such  an  ultimatum  as  that  delivered  by  Germany,  the  other 
guarantors  had  a  right  to  take  all  necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  con- 
summation of  the  announced  or  threatened  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  They  would  have  been  justified  even  in  invading  Belgium,  pro- 
vided Belgium  was  unable  to  make  an  effective  resistance. 

2  "For  this  reason,  Belgium,  in  1906,  as  has  now  become  known,  closed 
with  France  and  England  an  eventual  convention  concerning  military  aid. 
Belgium  did  not  close  such  a  convention  with  Germany.  This  might  be 
explained  if  Belgium  —  in  spite  of  the  memory  of  the  French  plans  in  1870 
—  had  been  absolutely  sure  that  this  neighbor  (on  the  south)  at  no  time  and 
under  no  circumstances  would  violate  her  neutrality.  If  this  had  been  the 
reason,  Sir  Edward  Grey  would  have  told  the  German  Ambassador,  and 
would  have  been  obliged  to  tell  him,  that  France  would  not  violate  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  and  that  England  was  ready  to  guarantee  that 
France  would  keep  this  obligation.  Sir  Edward  did  not  give  such  a  pledge 
to  the  German  Ambassador."  (Professor  Hans  Delbriick:  "Germany's 
Answer."  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1915,  p.  239.) 

3  "When  in  1912  (or  1911:  the  date  seems  to  be  uncertain),  the  British 
Military  Attache  in  Brussels  told  the  Belgian  general  with  whom  he  was 
conferring  that,  in  case  of  necessity,  the  British  Government  would  land 
troops  in  Belgium  without  waiting  for  any  invitation  from  that  country,  he 
neither  committed  the  Belgian  Government  to  any  such  arrangement, 
since  the  Belgian  general  protested  that  Belgian  consent  was  necessary,  nor 
did  he  commit  his  own  Government,  because,  fortunately,  he  had  no  power 
to  do  so.  He  gave,  however,  a  typical  illustration  of  the  incapacity  of  the 
military  man  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  keeping  one's  country  in  a 
correct  attitude  on  the  face  of  the  record."  [The  Case  of  Belgium,  p.  12.] 
(Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  p.  80.)  See  also  Sir  Edward  Grey's  remark 
about  the  Anglo-French  military  conversations  (above,  p.  290). 


404     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

to  give  this  formal  expression  of  its  intention  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality  in  1913,  the  German  Chancellor  had 
been  approached  in  1911  with  a  request  that  he  make  a 
formal  statement  of  the  German  attitude  toward  Belgian 
neutrality.  He  replied  that  Germany  had  no  intention  of 
violating  Belgian  neutrality,  but  that  it  might  weaken 
Germany's  military  position  if  he  were  to  make  a  public 
declaration  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  he  wished  to 
imply  that  the  Belgians  would  have  to  rely  as  best  they 
might  on  Germany's  observance  of  their  neutrality,  with- 
out any  public  declaration  on  his  part,  because  he  wished 
the  situation  to  remain  uncertain,  so  that  the  French 
would  have  to  expend  part  of  their  resources  in  fortifying 
the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  against  a  possible  German 
invasion.1  The  only  other  reasonable  explanation  of  his 
reply  that  I  can  perceive  is  that  Germany  wished  to  keep 
open  the  possibility  of  making  a  successful  attack  through 
Belgium. 

The  British  military  authorities  may  have  felt  so  sure 
that  Germany  would  disregard  Belgian  neutrality  as  to 
be  themselves  impatient  of  any  further  thought  of  re- 
specting it.  This  is  not  by  any  means  to  say  that  the  Brit- 
ish Foreign  Office  or  British  Cabinet  would  have  been  will- 
ing to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  before  Germany  had  done 
so.  If,  however,  for  any  reason,  Belgium  should  have  de- 
cided to  cast  her  lot  with  Germany,  and  allowed  Germany 
free  transit  through  her  territory,  England  would  then, 
of  course,  have  been  perfectly  justified  in  landing  troops 
in  Belgium  and  forcing  Belgium  to  assist  her  in  resisting 
the  German  aggression. 

In  case  Belgium  was  defending  her  own  neutrality 
against  Germany,  and  had  not  made  appeal  to  England  or 
France,  the  question  as  to  whether  England  and  France 
would  have  a  right,  uninvited,  to  come  to  the  assistance 
of  Belgium  is  more  open  to  question;  since  England  and 
1  Cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  12;  see  above  p.  317,  321. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  405 

France  were  guarantors  of  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839, 
it  would  seem  that  they  might  be  expected  to  take  what- 
ever measures  were  necessary  to  ward  off  an  attack  upon 
Belgium's  neutrality.1 

The  next  assertion  relates  to  an  Anglo-Belgian  agree- 
ment to  make  common  cause  against  Germany.2  This 
assertion  seems  to  be  entirely  without  foundation.  The 
alleged  agreement  between  the  British  Military  Attache* 
and  General  Jungbluth  could  not  have  been  binding  upon 
either  Government  without  the  concurrence  of  the  re- 
sponsible authorities.3  Furthermore,  there  does  not  seem 
actually  to  have  been  any  agreement;  otherwise  why 
should  it  have  been  necessary  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  have 
assured  the  Belgian  Government  that  England  would  not 

1  After  such  an  ultimatum  as  that  delivered  by  Germany,  the  other 
guarantors  had  a  right  to  take  all  necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  con- 
summation of  the  announced  or  threatened  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  They  would  have  been  justified  even  in  invading  Belgium,  pro- 
vided Belgium  was  unable  to  make  an  effective  resistance. 

2  "For  this  reason,  Belgium,  in  1906,  as  has  now  become  known,  closed 
with  France  and  England  an  eventual  convention  concerning  military  aid. 
Belgium  did  not  close  such  a  convention  with  Germany.  This  might  be 
explained  if  Belgium  —  in  spite  of  the  memory  of  the  French  plans  in  1870 
—  had  been  absolutely  sure  that  this  neighbor  (on  the  south)  at  no  time  and 
under  no  circumstances  would  violate  her  neutrality.  If  this  had  been  the 
reason,  Sir  Edward  Grey  would  have  told  the  German  Ambassador,  and 
would  have  been  obliged  to  tell  him,  that  France  would  not  violate  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  and  that  England  was  ready  to  guarantee  that 
France  would  keep  this  obligation.  Sir  Edward  did  not  give  such  a  pledge 
to  the  German  Ambassador."  (Professor  Hans  Delbriick:  "Germany's 
Answer."  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1915,  p.  239.) 

3  "When  in  1912  (or  1911:  the  date  seems  to  be  uncertain),  the  British 
Military  Attache  in  Brussels  told  the  Belgian  general  with  whom  he  was 
conferring  that,  in  case  of  necessity,  the  British  Government  would  land 
troops  in  Belgium  without  waiting  for  any  invitation  from  that  country,  he 
neither  committed  the  Belgian  Government  to  any  such  arrangement, 
since  the  Belgian  general  protested  that  Belgian  consent  was  necessary,  nor 
did  he  commit  his  own  Government,  because,  fortunately,  he  had  no  power 
to  do  so.  He  gave,  however,  a  typical  illustration  of  the  incapacity  of  the 
military  man  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  keeping  one 's  country  in  a 
correct  attitude  on  the  face  of  the  record."  [The  Case  of  Belgium,  p.  12.] 
(Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  p.  80.)  See  also  Sir  Edward  Grey's  remark 
about  the  Anglo-French  military  conversations  (above,  p.  290). 


406     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

violate  Belgian  neutrality?  1  Baron  Greindl's  report  of 
December  23,  1911,  complaining  of  the  danger  of  an  at- 
tack from  England  and  France,  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
his  Government  had  not  entered  into  any  agreement  with 
the  Entente  Powers.  At  least  it  must  have  been  kept  so 
secret  as  not  to  have  been  known  by  the  most  important 
diplomatic  officers  of  the  Belgian  Government.  Although 
the  report  of  General  Jungbluth  would  seem  to  be  sub- 
sequent to  Baron  Greindl's  statement,  it  does  not  refer 
to  any  change  of  situation  between  Belgium  and  England 
from  that  disclosed  by  document  1,  containing  the  report 
of  a  conversation  between  Colonel  Barnardiston  and  Gen- 
eral Ducarme.  Even  if  we  were  to  make  the  very  most  of 
the  German  arguments  and  accept  the  documents  brought 
forward  by  Germany  as  genuine,  exhaustive,  complete, 
and  uncontroverted  by  other  documents  which  might  have 
been  suppressed  or  withheld,  and  if  we  accept  for  true  — 
what  I  must  consider  as  a  forced  interpretation  —  that 
they  indicate  a  firm  engagement  according  to  the  terms 
of  which  England  and  Belgium  are  to  make  common  cause 
against  Germany,  there  would  still  be  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  this  agreement  was  conditional  in  nature,  and 
would  only  come  into  effect  after  Germany  had  violated 
Belgium's  neutrality.2 

1  Cf.  Statement  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  Belgian  Minister  April  7, 
1913.    (See  ante,  p.  401.) 

2  A  statement  in  answer  to  a  published  interview  with  the  German 
Chancellor  given  out  with  Sir  Edward  Grey's  authorization,  contains  the 
following:  — 

"If  the  Chancellor  wishes  to  know  why  there  were  conversations  on  mili- 
tary subjects  between  British  and  Belgian  officers,  he  may  find  one  reason 
in  a  fact  well  known  to  him:  namely,  that  Germany  was  establishing  an 
elaborate  network  of  strategical  railways  leading  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Belgian  frontier  through  a  barren,  thinly  populated  tract.  The  railways 
were  deliberately  constructed  to  permit  of  a  sudden  attack  upon  Belgium 
such  as  was  carried  out  in  August  last. 

"This  fact  alone  was  enough  to  justify  any  communications  between  Bel- 
gium and  the  other  powers  on  the  footing  that  there  would  be  no  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality,  unless  it  was  previously  violated  by  another  power. 
On  no  other  footing  did  Belgium  ever  have  any  such  communications. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  407 

The  New  York  World  recently  published  an  interview 
the  King  of  Belgium  fgave  its  correspondent  in  which  he 
declared  that  he  had  the  German  Military  Attache1  at 
Brussels  informed  that  these  conversations  were  taking 
place.1  I  sought  a  confirmation  of  this  important  state- 
ment from  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Washington,  who  re- 
plied :  — 

"Concerning  the  matter  referred  to  in  your  letter  of 
March  25,  I  wish  to  let  you  know  that  I  am  just  now  in 
receipt  of  instructions  from  my  Government  to  the  effect 
that  I  am  authorized,  in  reply  to  your  letter,  to  make  the 
statement  herewith  enclosed." 

[The  following  is  the  authorized  statement  of  the  Belgian 
Government  enclosed  in  Minister  Havenith's  letter.] 

"In  spite  of  these  facts  the  German  Chancellor  speaks  of  Belgium  as  hav- 
ing thereby  'abandoned  and  forfeited'  her  neutrality,  and  he  implies  that  he 
would  not  have  spoken  of  the  German  invasion  as  a  'wrong'  had  he  then 
known  of  the  conversations  of  1906  and  1911. 

"It  would  seem  to  follow  that  according  to  Herr  von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg's  code  wrong  becomes  right  if  the  party  which  is  to  be  the  subject  of  the 
wrong  foresees  the  possibility  and  makes  preparations  to  resist  it."  (New 
York  Times,  January  27,  1915.) 

1  King  Albert  of  Belgium,  according  to  the  interview  in  the  New  York 
World,  printed  on  March  22,  1915,  made  the  following  statement  regarding 
the  Anglo-Belgian  conversations:  — 

"No  honest  man  could  have  acted  otherwise  than  I  did.  Belgium  never 
departed  for  an  instant  nor  in  the  slightest  degree  from  the  strictest  neu- 
trality, and  Belgium  was  always  the  loyal  friend  of  each  and  every  one  of  the 
powers  that  guaranteed  her  neutrality.  At  first,  Germany  openly  admitted 
that  in  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  she  was  doing  a  wrong,  but  now, 
for  the  purposes  of  a  campaign  of  propaganda  in  neutral  countries,  an  at- 
tempt is  being  made  to  cast  a  slur  upon  Belgium  and  hold  her  up  to  scorn 
as  having  perfidiously  departed  from  her  neutrality  in  connection  with  the 
so-called  Anglo-Belgian  convention  of  which  so  much  is  being  made. 

"I  can  say  this:  No  one  in  Belgium  ever  gave  the  name  of  Anglo-Belgian 
conventions  to  the  letter  of  General  Ducarme  to  the  Minister  of  War  detail- 
ing the  entirely  informal  conversations  with  the  British  Military  Attache, 
but  I  was  so  desirous  of  avoiding  even  the  semblance  of  anything  that  might 
be  construed  as  un-neutral  that  I  had  the  matters  of  which  it  is  now  sought 
to  make  so  much  communicated  to  the  German  Military  Attache'  in  Brus- 
sels. When  the  Germans  went  through  our  archives,  they  knew  exactly 
what  they  would  find,  and  all  their  present  surprise  and  indignation  is 
assumed."   (Extract.) 


408     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"With  the  King's  assent,  and  in  several  conversa- 
tions, the  German  Minister  in  Brussels  was  placed  on 
his  guard  against  the  attitude  of  military  attaches  who 
were  holding  conversations  of  which  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment had  never  been  apprised  by  the  only  author- 
ized representative  of  their  country. 

"A  more  official  communication  was  impossible,  as 
it  would  have  infringed  the  rules  of  diplomacy  and 
lent  to  these  conversations  an  importance  which  the 
Belgian  Government  could  not  attribute  and  never 
did  attribute  to  them. 

"The  fact  that  the  military  attache  of  a  power 
guaranteeing  the  integrity  of  Belgium  should  converse 
with  other  military  men  about  military  matters,  in 
case  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  was  in  no 
way  abnormal.  All  the  representatives  of  the  guaran- 
teeing powers  have  at  all  times  render [ed]  justice  to 
the  absolute  correctness  of  Belgium  in  its  interna- 
tional relations.    By  placing  Germany  on  its  guard, 
Belgium  was  carrying  her  loyalty  to  the  most  scrupu- 
lous extreme." 
It  has  been  asserted  that  a  neutral  state  has  no  right  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  for  its  defense.  This  is  true  in  so 
far  as  it  means  that  such  a  state  has  no  right  to  join  forces 
with  any  other  state  for  the  purpose  of  providing  against 
the  contingency  of  a  violation  of  its  neutrality.   If,  how- 
ever, the  preparations  to  defend  its  neutrality  should  be 
put  off  until  its  neutrality  had  been  actually  violated,  it 
might  then  be  too  late  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with 
any  of  the  guarantors  for  combined  action  against  the 
violator.   There  is  no  good  reason  why,  when  Belgium  or 
any  other  neutralized  state,  obligated  to  provide  for  the 
maintenance  of  its  own  neutrality,  has  reason  to  antici- 
pate an  attack,  it  should  not  enter  into  a  conditional 
agreement  by  the  terms  of  which  it  would,  in  case  of  an 
attack,  receive  immediate  assistance,  according  to  pre- 


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THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


409 


viously  specified  and  elaborated  plans.1  This  would  be 
nothing  more  than  common-sense  provision  for  the  main- 
tenance of  its  neutrality.  It  would  be  a  very  different 
matter,  should  the  neutralized  state  hand  over  to  its  pros- 
pective ally  complete  information  in  regard  to  its  system 
of  national  defense.2 

Objection  has  been  made  that  Germany,  knowing  that 
such  a  plan  for  concerted  action  against  her  existed,  could 
not  be  expected  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  Belgium,  had 
England  invaded  her  territory  uninvited.  If  Germany's 
action  made  such  preparations  for  joining  forces  against 
her  necessary,  she  would  not  be  relieved  from  her  obliga- 
tions, though  doubtless  she  would  be  less  disposed  to  ful- 
fill them.  At  most,  this  argument  might  justify  Germany 
in  not  going  to  the  assistance  of  Belgium  against  England, 
in  case  of  the  latter' s  invasion  of  Belgian  territory,  but 
would  by  no  means  justify  her  in  attacking  Belgium  unless 
it  was  made  certain  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  that 
Belgium  was  planning  to  engage  with  some  other  power  for 
a  concerted  and  unprovoked  attack  upon  Germany. 

The  various  official  documents  published  seem  to  indi- 
cate that,  though  Belgium  realized  that  her  principal 
danger  of  attack  lay  with  Germany,  she  did  not  wish  to 
become  so  dependent  on  England's  protection  in  case  of 
this  attack  as  to  lose  her  independent  position.  This  atti- 
tude is  reflected  in  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment. At  the  Second  Hague  Conference  of  1907  it  was 
very  striking  to  remark  how  the  Belgian  delegates  sup- 
ported Germany  in  preventing  the  adoption  of  a  general 
treaty  of  obligatory  arbitration  which  England,  France, 

1  Cyrus  French  Wicker,  Neutralization,  p.  59.  Oxford,  1911.  Wicker 
also  cites  Rivier  and  Arendt. 

2  Some  other  alleged  proofs  of  Belgium's  secret  and  unneutral  agreement 
with  England  have  been  adduced;  see  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
December  2,  1914,  and  December  15,  1914;  printed  in  Der  Kriegsverlauf, 
November,  1914,  pp.  323-31;  December,  1914,  pp.  427-28;  E.  Waxweiler, 
La  Belgique  neutre  et  loyale,  p.  186;  "British  Aviator's  Secret  Data,"  New 
York  Times,  February  28,  1915. 


408     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"With  the  King's  assent,  and  in  several  conversa- 
tions, the  German  Minister  in  Brussels  was  placed  on 
his  guard  against  the  attitude  of  military  attaches  who 
were  holding  conversations  of  which  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment had  never  been  apprised  by  the  only  author- 
ized representative  of  their  country. 

"A  more  official  communication  was  impossible,  as 
it  would  have  infringed  the  rules  of  diplomacy  and 
lent  to  these  conversations  an  importance  which  the 
Belgian  Government  could  not  attribute  and  never 
did  attribute  to  them. 

"The  fact  that  the  military  attache  of  a  power 
guaranteeing  the  integrity  of  Belgium  should  converse 
with  other  military  men  about  military  matters,  in 
case  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  was  in  no 
way  abnormal.  All  the  representatives  of  the  guaran- 
teeing powers  have  at  all  times  render[ed]  justice  to 
the  absolute  correctness  of  Belgium  in  its  interna- 
tional relations.    By  placing  Germany  on  its  guard, 
Belgium  was  carrying  her  loyalty  to  the  most  scrupu- 
lous extreme." 
It  has  been  asserted  that  a  neutral  state  has  no  right  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  for  its  defense.  This  is  true  in  so 
far  as  it  means  that  such  a  state  has  no  right  to  join  forces 
with  any  other  state  for  the  purpose  of  providing  against 
the  contingency  of  a  violation  of  its  neutrality.   If,  how- 
ever, the  preparations  to  defend  its  neutrality  should  be 
put  off  until  its  neutrality  had  been  actually  violated,  it 
might  then  be  too  late  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with 
any  of  the  guarantors  for  combined  action  against  the 
violator.   There  is  no  good  reason  why,  when  Belgium  or 
any  other  neutralized  state,  obligated  to  provide  for  the 
maintenance  of  its  own  neutrality,  has  reason  to  antici- 
pate an  attack,  it  should  not  enter  into  a  conditional 
agreement  by  the  terms  of  which  it  would,  in  case  of  an 
attack,  receive  immediate  assistance,  according  to  pre- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


409 


■toe 

- 
m  ■■■'  '- 


viously  specified  and  elaborated  plans.1  This  would  be 
nothing  more  than  common-sense  provision  for  the  main- 
tenance of  its  neutrality.  It  would  be  a  very  different 
matter,  should  the  neutralized  state  hand  over  to  its  pros- 
pective ally  complete  information  in  regard  to  its  system 
of  national  defense.2 

Objection  has  been  made  that  Germany,  knowing  that 
such  a  plan  for  concerted  action  against  her  existed,  could 
not  be  expected  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  Belgium,  had 
England  invaded  her  territory  uninvited.  If  Germany's 
action  made  such  preparations  for  joining  forces  against 
her  necessary,  she  would  not  be  relieved  from  her  obliga- 
tions, though  doubtless  she  would  be  less  disposed  to  ful- 
fill them.  At  most,  this  argument  might  justify  Germany 
in  not  going  to  the  assistance  of  Belgium  against  England, 
in  case  of  the  latter's  invasion  of  Belgian  territory,  but 
would  by  no  means  justify  her  in  attacking  Belgium  unless 
it  was  made  certain  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  that 
Belgium  was  planning  to  engage  with  some  other  power  for 
a  concerted  and  unprovoked  attack  upon  Germany. 

The  various  official  documents  published  seem  to  indi- 
cate that,  though  Belgium  realized  that  her  principal 
danger  of  attack  lay  with  Germany,  she  did  not  wish  to 
become  so  dependent  on  England's  protection  in  case  of 
this  attack  as  to  lose  her  independent  position.  This  atti- 
tude is  reflected  in  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment. At  the  Second  Hague  Conference  of  1907  it  was 
very  striking  to  remark  how  the  Belgian  delegates  sup- 
ported Germany  in  preventing  the  adoption  of  a  general 
treaty  of  obligatory  arbitration  which  England,  France, 

1  Cyrus  French  Wicker,  Neutralization,  p.  59.  Oxford,  1911.  Wicker 
also  cites  Rivier  and  Arendt. 

2  Some  other  alleged  proofs  of  Belgium's  secret  and  unneutral  agreement 
with  England  have  been  adduced;  see  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
December  2,  1914,  and  December  15,  1914;  printed  in  Der  Kriegsverlauf, 
November,  1914,  pp.  323-31;  December,  1914,  pp.  427-28;  E.  Waxweiler, 
La  Belgique  neutre  et  loyale,  p.  186;  "British  Aviator's  Secret  Data,"  New 
York  Times,  February  28,  1915. 


414     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tion.  Nevertheless  it  is  patent  that  Belgium  has  directed 
her  attention  principally  to  fortifying  her  territory  against 
Germany.  In  this  practical  world  we  can  hardly  blame 
Belgium  if  she  spent  what  money  she  could  afford  in 
strengthening  the  points  at  which  she  was  most  immedi- 
ately threatened.  Even  if  we  were  to  consider  the  Eng- 
lish as  ready  to  violate  any  and  every  principle  of  interna- 
tional law,  unrestrained  by  any  considerations  for  the 
rights  of  others,  we  certainly  must  believe  that  out  of  con- 
sideration for  their  own  interests  they  would  not  be  the  first 
to  violate  the  neutrality  which  they  made  such  efforts  to 
incorporate  into  the  public  law  of  Europe  and  to  place 
upon  a  juridical  foundation.  It  seems  hardly  reasonable 
to  expect  that  they  would  have  contemplated  operations 
through  Belgium  unless  they  were  convinced  that  Ger- 
many would  in  all  probability  violate  Belgian  neutrality. 
In  any  event,  the  onesidedness  of  Belgian  defense  could  at 
most  have  constituted  but  a  ground  of  complaint  on  the 
part  of  Germany. 

A  study  of  the  events  at  the  commencement  of  the  pre- 
sent war  leads  me  to  conclude  that  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  theoretical  working  of  the  institution  of  neutrality, 
Belgium's  action  was  unjustifiable,  and  yet,  as  a  practi- 
cal matter,  the  need  of  devoting  all  her  resources  to  pre- 
paration against  a  German  invasion  has  been  clearly  dem- 
onstrated. Germany,  it  seems  to  me,  after  giving  grounds 
for  legitimate  apprehension  that  she  might  violate  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  has  declared  that  the  inevitable  Belgian 
counter-preparations,  to  which  Germany's  action  gave 
rise,  constituted  a  perfect  justification  for  the  German 
Government's  disregarding  Belgian  neutrality.  In  other 
words,  they  take  as  an  excuse  for  the  carrying  into  effect 
of  the  unjustifiable  German  acts  which  they  had  previ- 
ously planned,  the  perfectly  practical  and  legitimate  at- 
tempts on  the  part  of  the  Belgians  to  defend  themselves 
against  this  anticipated  German  violation.  It  was  evident 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  415 

that  Germany  was  planning  such  a  violation  —  at  least, 
her  expectation  of  undertaking  military  operations  in  Bel- 
gium was  made  perfectly  evident.  Germany  may  reply 
that  these  preparations  were  to  anticipate  a  French  vio- 
lation of  Belgian  territory.  The  impartial  critic  will  have 
to  form  his  opinion  in  part  from  antecedent  probability, 
and  in  part  from  the  consideration  of  the  evidence  such 
as  that  which  has  been  given  in  the  preceding  pages.1 

7.  Alleged  violations  of  Belgian  neutrality 

Germany  has  declared  that  her  invasion  of  Belgium  was 
undertaken  only  in  response  to  violations  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality on  the  part  of  France.  The  German  Government  has 
asserted  that  the  evidences  of  French  preparations  to  march 
through  Belgium  constituted  such  proof  of  their  intention 
as  to  justify  an  invasion  of  Belgium  on  Germany's  part.2 

1  "The  German  Government  asserts  that  Belgium  had  ceased  to  be 
neutral  and  was  virtually  in  alliance  with  France  and  Great  Britain.  [The 
Case  of  Belgium,  in  the  Light  of  Official  Reports  found  in  the  Archives  of  the 
Belgian  Government,  with  an  introduction  by  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg. 
n.  d.]  If  this  assertion  could  be  proved,  the  strongest  prejudice  which  Ger- 
many's conduct  of  the  war  has  aroused  in  neutral  countries  would  tend  to 
disappear.  In  America,  at  least,  few  people  care  whether  the  Treaties  of 
1839  were  or  were  not  in  force  and  binding  upon  Prussia.  Even  if  Belgium 
was  no  longer  a  neutralized  country,  it  was  apparently  a  neutral  country, 
and  it  has  been  ravaged  with  fire  and  steel  because  so  the  German  armies 
could  reach  France  most  quickly.  What,  however,  has  Germany  been  able 
to  prove?  Only  that  British  military  attaches  had  concerted  with  Belgian 
military  authorities  plans  of  joint  action  against  a  German  invasion.  If,  as 
is  insisted,  no  consultations  were  held  with  German  military  attaches  to 
provide  for  the  defense  of  Belgian  neutrality  against  a  French  or  British 
invasion,  what  does  that  prove?  Only  that  the  Belgians  knew  well  or 
guessed  rightly  on  which  side  their  neutrality  was  menaced."  (Munroe 
Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
vol.  xxx  [1915],  p.  59.) 

2  "If  we  had  waited  longer  before  taking  the  offensive,  we  should  not 
have  needed  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  nor  should  we  have  been 
able  to  do  it,  for  by  that  time  the  French  and  English  would  have  been  on 
the  way  through  Belgium;  they  would  have  invaded  the  Rhine  country, 
occupied  Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Treves,  and  then,  with  the  strong  Belgian 
strongholds  of  Liege  and  Namur  as  bases,  would  have  been  able  to  push  their 
offensive  operations  further  into  the  Rhine  provinces."  (Professor  Hana 
Delbriick,  "Germany's  Answer,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1915,  p.  239.) 


416     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

In  his  speech  delivered  in  the  Reichstag  on  August  4, 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
made  the  statement:  "France  has,  it  is  true,  declared  at 
Brussels  that  she  was  prepared  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  so  long  as  it  was  respected  by  her  adversary.1 
But  we  knew  that  France  was  ready  to  invade  Belgium. 
France  could  wait;  we  could  not.  A  French  attack  upon 
our  flank  in  the  region  of  the  Lower  Rhine  might  have  been 
fatal.  We  were,  therefore,  compelled  to  ride  rough-shod 
over  the  legitimate  protests  of  the  Governments  of  Luxem- 
burg and  Belgium."    (Cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  35.) 

We  find  here  no  reference  to  any  overt  act  by  France 
violating  Belgian  neutrality.  The  sole  argument  upon 
which  the  Chancellor  relies  to  justify  Germany's  action  is 
her  necessity  arising  from  this  certitude  of  France's  inten- 
tion. The  head  of  the  German  Government  was  perfectly 
aware  that  French  intentions  could  not  justify  German 
acts.2  Germany's  justification  must  then  depend  upon  the 
validity  of  the  plea  of  necessity,  which  we  shall  discuss 
farther  on.3 

1  The  French  Minister  at  Brussels  made  the  following  declaration  to  the 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  on  July  31:  "I  am  authorized  to  de- 
clare that,  in  the  event  of  an  international  war,  the  French  Government,  in 
accordance  with  the  declarations  they  have  always  made,  will  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  In  the  event  of  this  neutrality  not  being  respected 
by  another  power,  the  French  Government,  to  secure  their  own  defense, 
might  find  it  necessary  to  modify  their  attitude."  (Extract,  B.  G.  P.  no. 
15;  cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  9.) 

2  Proof  sufficient  to  convince  a  government  that  another  intended  to 
have  recourse  to  treachery  would  justify  another  government  in  taking 
any  measures  necessary  to  protect  itself  against  the  commission  of  such 
acts,  but  could  never  justify  it  in  disregarding  the  rights  of  a  third  innocent 
state.  It  cannot  be  presumed  that  a  highly  civilized  state,  with  a  reputation 
for  observing  its  international  obligations  in  good  faith,  will  be  guilty  of 
treachery.  In  the  face  of  the  solemn  declaration  of  the  French  Government 
that  it  would  respect  Belgium's  neutrality,  Germany  must  be  expected  to 
show  the  clearest  proof  of  the  alleged  perfidy  of  France. 

3  In  his  remarks  introductory  to  the  secret  documents  (see  post,  chap. 
xiii)  Dr.  Dernburg  states:  "The  Imperial  Chancellor  has  declared  that 
there  was  irrefutable  proof  that  if  Germany  did  not  march  through  Bel- 
gium her  enemies  would.   This  proof,  as  now  being  produced,  is  of  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  417 

In  any  event,  France  would  hardly  antagonize  England 
by  invading  Belgium  unless  England  gave  her  consent. 
This  consent  might  be  given,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  Eng- 
land, if  neutral,  would  be  willing  to  run  the  risk  that  one  or 
both  of  the  belligerents  might  remain  in  permanent  occu- 
pation of  the  Belgian  ports. 

If  France  and  England  were  united  against  Germany, 
there  is  a  possibility  that  Germany  might  have  been  at- 
tacked by  the  immediate  transit  of  an  Anglo-French  force 
through  Belgium.  If,  however,  France  had  contemplated 
such  a  possibility,  she  would  have  taken  care  to  be  in  a 
better  state  of  preparation  to  send  her  troops  into  Belgium 
than  was  disclosed  at  the  beginning  of  this  war. 

Another  important  consideration  is  the  difference  of 
view  in  regard  to  neutrality  and  the  force  of  treaties  in 
Germany  and  France.  German  authorities  have  gone  the 
farthest  in  permitting  the  freest  action  to  military  force 
when  necessary  to  attain  the  ends  in  view.1 

In  the  present  war  there  were  other  and  stronger  rea- 
sons why  France  was  unlikely  to  be  the  first  to  invade 
Belgium. 

1.  She  had  just  recently  given  her  solemn  word  that  she 
would  not  be  the  first  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  while 
Germany  refused  to  make  a  similar  agreement. 

2.  When  Germany  begged  England  not  to  make  the 
respect  for  Belgian  neutrality  a  condition  of  her  neutrality, 
it  showed  that  Germany  contemplated  a  violation  of  it. 

3.  Germany  admitted  that  France  could  wait  without 
attacking.  In  other  words,  to  make  her  position  clear  and 
secure  as  much  neutral  sympathy  as  possible,  it  was  the 
policy  of  France  to  force  Germany  to  attack.  France,  by 
remaining  within  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier,  could  force 

strongest  character.  So  the  Chancellor  was  right  in  appealing  to  the  law 
of  necessity,  although  he  had  to  regret  that  it  violated  international 
law." 

1  See  Oppenheim,  International  Law,  vol.  n,  War  and  Neutrality,  pp. 
83-85,  §69,  2d  ed. 


418     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Germany  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  or  else  to  undertake 
the  relatively  slow  operations  necessary  to  reduce  the 
French  fortifications  along  the  Franco-German  frontier. 
This  would  have  lost  Germany  so  much  time  that  she 
would  not  have  had  any  great  chance  of  crushing  France 
and  turning  against  Russia  before  Russia  had  completed 
her  mobilization.  If  Germany  was  not  willing  to  lose  this 
advantage,  because  a  treaty  of  neutralization  stood  in  the 
way,  she  had  to  accept  the  onerous  responsibility  of  violat- 
ing Belgian  neutrality.  If  France  believed  Germany  would 
take  this  course,  it  was  to  her  advantage  to  allow  the  Bel- 
gians to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  first  German  onslaught,  while 
she  made  her  preparations  and  hastened  to  the  assistance 
of  the  defenders.  The  success  of  the  German  attack  was 
such  that  Liege  and  Namur  were  taken  before  the  French 
and  English  were  able  to  organize  any  effective  resistance 
to  the  German  advance.  This  fact  itself  is  one  of  the  best 
arguments  that  the  French  were  not,  at  the  time  of  the 
Chancellor's  speech,  in  a  situation  to  take  advantage  of  an 
invasion  of  Belgium  in  violation  of  their  treaty  obligations 
with  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  Rhenish  provinces. 

On  August  3,  at  6.45  p.m.,  Baron  von  Schoen,  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  in  a  farewell  audience  handed  a  letter 
to  M.  Viviani,  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
asking  for  his  passports  on  the  ground  that  French  acts  of 
aggression  forced  the  German  Empire  to  consider  itself  in  a 
state  of  war  with  France.  The  letter  contained  the  follow- 
ing reference  to  a  French  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality: 
"The  German  administrative  and  military  authorities 
have  remarked  a  certain  number  of  definitely  hostile  acts 
committed  on  German  territory  by  French  military  air- 
men. Several  of  these  latter  have  manifestly  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  territory  of  that 
country."     (Extract,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  147.) 

After  receiving  this  communication,  M.  Viviani  sent  a 
dispatch  that  same  day  (August  3)  instructing  M.  Jules 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  419 

Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  ask  for  his 
passports  and  to  protest  against  Germany's  action  in  vio- 
lating the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg,  in  delivering  her 
ultimatum  to  Belgium,  and  in  making  a  '  false  allegation  of 
an  alleged  projected  invasion  of  these  two  countries  by 
French  armies,  by  which  it  had  been  attempted  to  justify 
the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  between  Germany  and 
France.'   (Modified  quotation,  August  3,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  149.) 

Germany  here  makes  the  accusation  that  France  was 
responsible  for  prior  violations  of  Belgian  neutrality.  This, 
if  substantiated,  would  be  a  reasonable  justification  for 
Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium.  Unfortunately  for  Ger- 
many's defense  on  this  ground,  absolutely  no  evidence 
worthy  of  the  name  has  been  forthcoming. 

The  German  Chancellor,  in  his  speech  of  August  4  in  the 
Reichstag,  refers  to  French  violations  of  international  law 
by  the  invasion  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  makes  no  mention 
of  any  acts  contrary  to  Belgian  neutrality.  If  there  had 
been  any  serious  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  and  the 
Belgian  Government  had  been  delinquent  in  its  preven- 
tion, Germany  would  have  been  amply  justified  in  disre- 
garding the  Treaty  of  1839,  as  well  as  Belgium's  rights  as  a 
neutral  state.  Under  such  circumstances  the  Chancellor 
need  not  have  confessed:  "This  [Germany's  invasion  of 
Belgium]  is  contrary  to  international  law." 

In  its  ultimatum  delivered  at  Brussels,  August  2,  the 
German  Government  made  no  reference  to  the  previous 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  France,  and  declared:  — 

"Reliable  information  has  been  received  by  the  German 
Government  to  the  effect  that  French  forces  intend  to 
march  on  the  line  of  the  Meuse  by  Givet  and  Namur.  This 
information  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France 
to  march  through  Belgian  territory  against  Germany. 

"The  German  Government  cannot  but  fear  that  Bel- 
gium, in  spite  of  the  utmost  good-will,  will  be  unable,  with- 
out assistance,  to  repel  so  considerable  a  French  invasion 


420     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

with  sufficient  prospect  of  success  to  afford  an  adequate 
guaranty  against  danger  to  Germany.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment would,  however,  feel  the  deepest  regret  if  Belgium 
regarded  as  an  act  of  hostility  against  herself  the  fact  that 
the  measures  of  Germany's  opponents  force  Germany,  for 
her  own  protection,  to  enter  Belgian  territory."  (Extract, 
August  2,  B.  G.  P.  no.  20.) 

This  ultimatum  was  presented  at  the  Belgian  Foreign 
Office  on  the  afternoon  of  August  2.  A  few  hours  later  — 
that  is,  in  the  early  morning  hours  of  August  3,  before  a 
reply  to  the  ultimatum  had  been  received  —  the  German 
Minister  returned  to  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that 
'  he  had  been  instructed  by  his  Government  to  inform  the 
Belgian  Government  that  French  dirigibles  had  thrown 
bombs,  and  that  a  French  cavalry  patrol  had  crossed  the 
frontier  in  violation  of  international  law,  since  war  had  not 
been  declared.  The  Belgian  Secretary-General  asked  the 
German  Minister  where  these  incidents  had  occurred,  and 
was  told  that  it  was  in  Germany.  The  Secretary-General 
then  observed  that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand 
the  object  of  this  communication.  The  German  Minister 
stated  that  these  acts,  which  were  contrary  to  international 
law,  were  calculated  to  lead  to  the  supposition  that  France 
would  commit  other  acts  contrary  to  international  law.' 
(Modified  quotation,  August  2,  B.  G.  P.  no.  21.) 

On  August  9,  at  Montjoie,  Von  Billow,  General  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  German  Second  Army,  issued  a 
proclamation  which  said  in  part:  "To  the  Belgian  Nation 
—  We  have  been  obliged  to  enter  into  Belgian  territory  in 
order  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  our  national  defense. 
We  are  fighting  the  Belgian  army  solely  in  order  to  force  a 
passage  into  France,  which  your  Government  wrongly  re- 
fused us,  although  it  tolerated  a  French  military  recon- 
naissance, a  fact  of  which  your  newspapers  have  kept  you 
in  ignorance."  * 

1  Boston  Evening  Transcript,  December  26,  1915. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  421 

Dr.  Dernburg  asks:  !  "  ...  What  would  American  read- 
ers say  if  they  knew  that  as  early  as  July  30  French  guns 
were  in  Liege  where  they  have  been  captured  alongside  of 
French  officers  and  soldiers?  Such  is  stated  in  a  letter  writ- 
ten to  Mr.  Lehman,  house  superintendent  of  the  Beecher 
Memorial  Building,  from  his  brother  in  Germany,  who  has 
been  on  the  ground.  What  would  they  think  if  it  was 
proved,  as  it  is  recited  in  the  semi-official  Government 
journal,  that  two  wounded  Frenchmen  had  been  found  in 
Namur,  who  said  that  their  regiment,  the  Forty-fifth,  was 
brought  to  Namur  as  early  as  July  30?  In  the  Evening 
Post  of  to-day  a  lady  from  Boston  relates  on  good  author- 
ity the  landing  of  British  marines  in  Ostend  on  the  30th 
of  July." 

Professor  Harnack  and  other  well-known  Germans  have 
stated  that  Great  Britain  stored  great  quantities  of  am- 
munition at  the  French  fortress  of  Maubeuge  before  the  out- 
break of  the  war.  This  they  consider  as  evidence  that  Eng- 
land intended  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  The 
official  Press  Bureau  at  London  denies  that  there  is  any 
authority  for  these  statements.2  Even  if  the  Harnack 
statement  had  been  true,  it  might  well  be  considered  evi- 
dence of  justifiable  preparations  in  the  event  of  Germany's 
disregard  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  discussed  the  charge  made 
by  the  German  Government  that  Belgium  had  departed 
from  a  neutral  attitude  by  holding  up  shipments  of  grain 
for  Germany.3 

We  must  leave  this  discussion  for  the  present,  I  think, 

1  The  New  York  Sim  of  October  11,  1914. 

*  The  New  York  Times  of  October  7,  1914,  gives  an  extract  from  this 
statement:  "No  decision  to  send  British  forces  abroad  was  taken  till  after 
Germany  had  violated  Belgian  neutrality  and  Belgium  had  appealed  for 
assistance.  No  British  ammunition  or  stores  had  been  placed  at  Maubeuge 
before  these  events.  Any  British  ammunition  or  stores  found  at  Maubeuge 
was  sent  there  after,  and  not  before,  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany." 

*  See  ante,  chap,  vni,  §  11. 


422     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

until  Germany  has  brought  forward  some  evidence  sub- 
stantiating some  of  these  various  alleged  violations  of 
Belgian  neutrality  previous  to  Germany's  attack.  We 
must  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  from  the  moment  Ger- 
many invaded  Luxemburg  and  disregarded  her  solemn 
treaty  obligations  to  respect  the  latter' s  neutrality,  France 
would  have  been  perfectly  justified,  as  far  as  her  obliga- 
tion toward  Germany  went,  in  disregarding  Belgian  neu- 
trality. Nevertheless,  as  between  France  and  Belgium  and 
as  between  France  and  the  other  guaranteeing  powers,  a 
retaliatory  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  would  not  have 
been  justified;  nor  is  there  any  indication  that  France 
proposed  to  violate  Belgian  territory  in  return  for  Ger- 
many's violation  of  Luxemburg's  neutralization  on  August 
2.  In  any  event,  the  German  Government  has  as  yet  pro- 
duced no  evidence  of  this. 

8.  The  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 

At  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815,  Luxemburg  had  been 
given  to  the  King  of  the  Netherlands,1  and  it  continued  to 
form  a  part  of  the  German  Confederation  until  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Confederation  in  1866.  At  that  date  it  was  ap- 
parent that,  upon  the  death  of  the  King  of  Holland,  the 
effect  of  the  Luxemburg  law  governing  the  succession  to 
the  Grand  Duchy  would  bring  to  an  end  the  personal 
union  of  Holland  and  Luxemburg  under  one  ruler.  The 
London  Conference  which  met  in  1867  was  successful  in 
reaching  an  agreement  in  regard  to  the  settlement  of  the 
Luxemburg  question.  By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Lon- 

1  ".  .  .  This  [Luxemburg]  had  been  granted  in  1815  to  the  King  of  the 
Netherlands  in  compensation  for  his  hereditary  territories  of  Orange- 
Nassau  ceded  to  Prussia.  It  formed  part  of  the  German  Confederation,  and, 
as  its  duke,  King  William  had  a  vote  in  the  Diet  of  Frankfort.  The  city  of 
Luxemburg  itself  was,  moreover,  a  strong  fortress,  and  commanded  the 
approaches  to  Lower  Germany.  The  Belgians,  however,  while  consenting 
to  reserve  the  rights  of  the  German  Confederation,  claimed  Luxemburg  as 
an  integral  part  of  their  country,  and  deputies  from  it  took  their  seats  in  the 
Congress  at  Brussels."   (Phillips,  Modern  Europe,  p.  192.  London,  1902.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  423 

don  of  May  11,  1867,  Luxemburg  was  constituted  into  an 
independent  neutral  state  placed  under  the  "collective 
guaranty"  of  the  powers.1 

Since  Luxemburg  was  too  weak  to  provide  for  her  own 
defense,  and  since  neither  France  nor  Prussia  would  allow 
the  other  to  garrison  her  fortresses,  it  only  remained  to  de- 
molish them.  Had  they  been  left  standing,  in  times  of  ten- 
sion either  France  or  Prussia,  mistrusting  the  other's  in- 
tentions, might  have  been  tempted  to  seize  them.2 

The  question  of  the  guaranty  of  the  perpetual  neutrality 
of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  is  one  of  the  most  in- 
teresting that  has  arisen  in  international  law.  According 
to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  May  11,  1867,  Luxemburg, 
as  I  have  said,  was  placed  under  the  " collective  guaranty" 
of  the  powers.  This  treaty  was  signed  by  the  five  great 
powers  signatory  to  the  treaties  guaranteeing  the  neutrali- 
zation of  Belgium,  with  the  addition  of  Italy,  who  there- 
upon took  her  place  as  the  sixth  great  power  in  the  Euro- 
pean Concert.  Belgium  also  signed  this  treaty,  with  an  ex- 
press reservation  in  regard  to  the  neutralization  guaranty, 
the  subscription  to  which  was  very  properly  considered 
as  incompatible  with  her  own  situation  as  a  neutralized 
state. 

The  interest  which  the  British  public  took  in  the  work 
of  the  London  Conference  was  evidenced  by  the  questions 
which  the  members  of  Parliament  addressed  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, as  to  the  nature  of  the  obligations  incurred  by 
Great  Britain's  agreeing  to  the  collective  guaranty  of  the 
neutralization  of  Luxemburg.  In  Chapter  XIII  we  have 
given  full  extracts  of  the  most  important  portions  of  this 
most  interesting  debate,  from  which  it  appears  that  the 
responsible  ministers  of  the  British  Government  took  the 
ground  that  Great  Britain  was  not  obligated  to  make  good 
her  guaranty  unless  all  the  other  signatories  should  also 

1  See  for  terms  of  the  treaty,  Documents,  post,  chap.  xin. 

1  See  Article  III  of  the  Treaty  of  May  11,  1867,  post,  chap.  xin. 


424     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

join  in  collective  action  for  this  purpose.  As  it  would  be 
hard  to  conceive  of  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxem- 
burg on  the  part  of  any  power  other  than  the  signatories 
of  the  treaty  of  guaranty,  this  interpretation  of  the  British 
Government  of  the  obligation  would  make  the  treaty  the 
most  veritable  scrap  of  paper  and  the  greatest  trumpery  of 
diplomacy. 

This  peculiar  quirk  in  British  policy,  this  twisting  of  the 
clear  intention  of  the  treaty  stipulation  as  generally  inter- 
preted by  impartial  observers,1  is  only  comprehensible  in 
the  light  of  the  diplomatic  situation  which  led  to  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Treaty  of  May  11,  1867.  Napoleon  III, 
making  Prussia's  increase  in  territory  after  the  defeat  of 
Austria  an  excuse,  sought  compensation  in  order  to  main- 
tain the  relative  position  of  France.  The  dissolution  of  the 
Germanic  Confederation  caused  uncertainty  in  regard  to 
the  situation  of  Luxemburg,  which  was  further  increased 
by  the  fact  that  in  the  death  of  the  King  of  Holland  the 
personal  union  with  that  country  would  disappear,  because 
the  Luxemburg  law  of  inheritance  did  not  recognize  the 
succession  of  females  except  in  default  of  male  heirs.  Na- 
poleon III  found  the  King  of  Holland  ready  to  acquiesce 

1  See  Milovanovitch,  Les  TrailGs  de  Garantie  au  XI Xe  Sihcle,  pp.  287-88. 
(Translation.)  "We  have  seen  how,  taking  their  stand  on  this  difference  in 
terms,  consisting  only  in  the  qualification  '  collective '  given  to  the  guaranty 
applying  to  Luxemburg,  the  English  Ministers,  Lord  Stanley  and  Lord 
Derby,  built  up  a  theory  on  the  distinction  between  a  collective  guaranty 
and  a  number  of  individual  guaranties.  We  shall  not  repeat  here  our  reasons 
for  finding  this  distinction  without  foundation.  We  will  only  point  out  that 
the  terms  establishing  the  guaranty  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  were 
retained  exactly  as  the  Prussian  plenipotentiary  had  proposed  them.  Now, 
this  plenipotentiary  formally  declared,  while  making  his  amendment,  that 
he  desired  to  have  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  placed  under  the  same 
guaranty  as  that  given  to  Belgian  neutrality.  It  would  be  strange,  there- 
fore, to  give  to  the  terms  in  which  he  formulated  his  proposal  a  real 
difference  as  regards  the  efficacy  of  the  two  kinds  of  guaranties.  Assuredly, 
neither  the  Prussian  plenipotentiary  in  making  his  proposal,  nor  any  of  the 
plenipotentiaries  who  adopted  it,  suspected  that  it  was  possible  to  attribute 
to  the  term  'Collective  Guaranty'  the  meaning  given  to  it  in  the  English 
Parliament.*' 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  425 

in  his  project  to  secure  Luxemburg,  but  unwilling  to  keep 
the  negotiations  secret  from  Prussia.  Bismarck,  however, 
showed  a  complaisant  disposition  and  seemed  willing  to 
allow  France  to  secure  Luxemburg  in  return  for  her  neu- 
trality during  Prussia's  war  with  Austria.  At  an  opportune 
moment  Bismarck  proceeded  to  make  public  the  negotia- 
tions in  regard  to  the  cession  of  Luxemburg  and  to  take 
advantage  of  the  popular  outburst  of  indignation  against 
France  to  form  defensive  alliances  with  the  several  German 
states  against  the  eventuality  of  a  French  attack.  Sup- 
ported by  a  strong  public  sentiment,  Bismarck  refused  to 
withdraw  the  Prussian  garrison  from  Luxemburg,1  and  a 
Franco-Prussian  war  seemed  on  the  point  of  breaking  out. 
The  other  powers  did  what  they  could  to  prevent  the  con- 
flict, and  at  Russia's  suggestion  a  conference  was  called  at 
London  to  settle  the  Luxemburg  question  on  the  basis  of 
the  neutralization  of  the  territory  and  the  destruction  of 
its  fortresses. 

Prussia  made  her  participation  in  this  conference  con- 
ditional upon  the  adoption  of  a  provision  establishing  the 
perpetual  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  under  a  collective  guar- 
anty of  the  powers.  The  British  Government  were  not  at 
all  disposed  to  shoulder  the  responsibility  of  this  guaranty. 
The  fate  of  Luxemburg  did  not  present  a  vital  question 
like  that  of  Belgium,  and  it  was  reasonable  for  England  to 
strive  to  keep  her  treaty  obligations  and  her  vital  interests 
coextensive.  For  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  war  which 
threatened,  Great  Britain  accepted  Bismarck's  terms.  As 
soon  as  the  conference  began  its  work,  however,  Lord 
Stanley  introduced  a  draft  of  a  treaty  which  omitted  the 
provision  of  the  collective  guaranty.  The  British  Govern- 
ment perhaps  hoped  that  in  the  interval  the  acute  feeling 
in  regard  to  Luxemburg  might  have  sufficiently  cooled  to 
make  it  possible  to  find  some  adjustment  without  accept- 

1  Prussia  had  been  authorized  by  the  Treaty  of  February  17,  1856,  to 
garrison  the  forts  of  Luxemburg. 


426     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

ing  the  objectionable  clause.  The  Prussian  delegate  was 
not  to  be  put  off  in  this  manner,  and  his  objections  were 
sustained  by  the  other  delegates  to  the  conference.  Great 
Britain  thus  had  to  accept  in  express  terms  the  provision 
for  a  collective  guaranty  to  prevent  France  and  Prussia 
from  deciding  their  dispute  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  Con- 
strained to  take  this  attitude,  the  British  Government  lost 
no  time  in  attempting  to  minimize  the  extent  of  their  obli- 
gations. This  explains  the  peculiar  language  used  in  the 
Parliamentary  debates  on  Luxemburg  neutrality.  Well 
might  Lord  Russell  say,  ".  .  .  We  know  that  the  explana- 
tions given  by  the  noble  Lord,  reported  as  they  have  been 
in  the  newspapers  and  otherwise,  have  created  a  very  un- 
pleasant feeling  in  Prussia,  and  that  it  is  commonly  said 
there  that  it  is  no  use  to  sign  a  treaty  with  England,  be- 
cause England  will  find  a  means  of  escaping  from  the 
obligations  imposed  on  her  by  it."  *  Whatever  the  official 
utterances  of  the  British  Government,  the  truth  of  the 
situation  was,  as  Lord  Derby  said,  "Whatever  the  inter- 
pretation which  I  may  put  on  particular  words  of  the 
treaty,  or  whatever  the  interpretation  which  Her  Ma- 
jesty's Government  may  put  on  it,  such  interpretation 
cannot  affect  the  International  Law  by  which  the  terms 
of  all  treaties  are  construed."  2  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  Prussian  Government  might  very  naturally  have  ac- 
cepted the  official  utterances  of  the  British  Ministers  as 
indicating  the  probable  interpretation  which  England 
would  put  upon  its  obligations  when  called  upon  to  make 
them  good.  The  official  British  utterances  might  have 
served  as  an  excuse  to  Prussia  for  violating  the  treaty, 
since  she  could  claim  that  the  quid  pro  quo  for  which  she 
agreed  to  refer  the  whole  question  to  the  London  Con- 
ference had  been  rendered  illusory  by  the  interpretation 

1  Extract  from  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol.  clxxxviii,  House 
of  Lords,  July  4,  on  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.    (See  post,  chap,  xni.) 
a  Ibid.    (See  post,  chap,  xm.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  427 

that  the  British  Government  had  put  upon  it,  in  clear  con- 
tradiction to  the  express  terms  of  the  treaty.1 

The  British  Government  does  not  seem  to  have  receded 
from  this  view  that  it  was  not  bound  to  make  good  its 
guaranty  to  Luxemburg  unless  all  the  powers  joining  in 

1  The  London  Times,  in  its  editorial  of  December  3,  1914,  seems  to  over- 
look this  when  it  says:  — 

"LUXEMBURG  — ANOTHER  BROKEN  TREATY 

"The  new  attempt  of  the  Germans  to  explain  away  their  acts  of  aggres- 
sion to  neutral  peoples  comes  as  a  reminder  that  the  whole  case  against 
them  has  still  to  be  stated.  In  particular,  the  brutal  treatment  of  Belgium, 
the  greatest  international  crime  of  modern  times,  has  somewhat  distracted 
attention  from  the  perfidy  of  Germany  toward  Luxemburg.  Yet  there  are 
circumstances  connected  with  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  the  latter 
which  are  scarcely  to  be  surpassed  in  cynical  bad  faith.  Let  us  recall  the 
facts.  The  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  was,  by  the  Treaty  of  1839,  joined  by  a 
personal  tie  to  the  Sovereign  of  Holland.  In  1866  and  1867  the  political 
position  of  Luxemburg  was  the  subject  of  diplomatic  correspondence  which 
threatened  to  precipitate  war  between  France  and  Prussia,  a  war  which 
Bismarck  at  that  time  desired  to  postpone.  The  former  wished  to  purchase 
the  rights  of  the  King  of  Holland,  and  he  at  one  time  consented  to  part  with 
them.  But,  Prussia  strongly  objecting  to  the  transaction,  he  withdrew  his 
consent.  France  pressed  Prussia  to  withdraw  her  garrison  from  Luxemburg, 
which  Bismarck  met  with  a  refusal.  At  the  instance  of  Lord  Stanley,  then 
Foreign  Secretary,  a  conference  was  held  in  London  in  1867,  and  was  at- 
tended by  representatives  of  all  the  great  powers.  Count  von  Bernstorff , 
the  representative  of  Prussia,  announced  at  the  outset  that  the  invitation 
had  been  accepted  by  her  only  upon  the  assumption  that  a  European  guar- 
anty of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  would  be  given.  Lord  Stanley  at  first 
demurred:  the  guaranty  given  by  the  Treaty  of  1839  was,  in  his  view, 
sufficient,  and  he  was  reluctant,  as  he  explained  to  the  House  of  Commons, 
to  extend  the  liability  of  this  country.  But  Count  von  Bernstorff  did  not 
agree  with  him,  and  insisted  upon  the  insertion  of  the  words  to  be  found  in 
Article  II  of  the  treaty  —  viz.,  that  Luxemburg  was  to  form  henceforth  a 
state  perpetually  neutral  'under  the  sanction  of  the  collective  guaranty 
of  the  signatories  to  the  present  treaty.'  It  matters  not  whether  these 
words  substantially  differed  from  those  in  the  Treaty  of  1839;  Bismarck 
thought  that  they  did,  and  insisted  upon  their  insertion  as  giving  an  ampler 
guaranty.  What  is  to  be  said  of  diplomacy  which  deliberately  breaks  a 
promise  expressed  in  words  of  its  own  choosing  in  preference  to  other  words 
conceived  to  be  less  binding?  The  contention  of  Prussia  in  1867  was,  '  We 
are  so  anxious  about  the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Duchy  that 
we  must  have  it  secured  by  the  strongest  possible  obligation.'  Could  her 
most  diligent  historians  discover  an  example  of  bad  faith  comparable  with 
her  violation  in  1914  of  the  promise  which  in  1867  she  gave,  and  which  she 
insisted  upon  the  other  powers  also  giving?" 


428     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  collective  guaranty  should  take  part  in  the  collective 
action  to  this  effect.  This  would  have  limited  her  obliga- 
tion to  one  of  mere  respect  for  the  treaty,  not  much  of  a 
burden,  since  it  was  hardly  likely  that  she  would  ever  con- 
template the  acquisition  of  Luxemburg  territory  or  its  vio- 
lation. On  the  other  hand,  she  has  interpreted  the  Belgian 
guaranty  as  requiring  her  to  make  every  reasonable  sacri- 
fice in  enforcing  upon  other  powers  its  respect. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  a  conversation  with  the  French  Am- 
bassador just  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  re- 
ferred to  the  distinction  between  the  guaranty  of  Luxem- 
burg and  that  of  Belgium  as  explained  in  the  speeches  of 
Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon  in  the  Parliamentary  de- 
bates in  1867,  thus  reaffirming  the  untenable  view  of 
Great  Britain's  obligation.1  (Cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  148.)  The 
truth  of  the  situation  would  seem  to  be  that  a  collective 
guaranty  was  intended  to  be  much  stronger  than  an  ordin- 
ary guaranty,  in  that  all  the  powers  would  be  obligated  to 
take  action  against  the  violator,  whereas  in  the  case  of  an 
ordinary  guaranty  like  that  of  Belgium,  the  less  interested 
powers  might  expect  to  place  upon  the  shoulders  of  those 
more  directly  interested  the  particular  charge  of  maintain- 
ing the  inviolability  of  the  neutrality.  The  English  inter- 
pretation is  the  exact  reverse  of  this.  If  my  interpretation 
be  correct,  Germany's  invasion  of  Luxemburg  was  as  great 
a  violation  of  formal  international  law  as  was  her  action 
in  the  case  of  Belgium.  The  maxim,  de  minimis  non  curat 
lex  (the  law  does  not  take  account  of  trifles),  is  equally  ap- 
plicable in  international  law,  so  that  it  is  reasonable  that  a 
question  of  the  violation  of  Luxemburg  should  not  be  con- 
sidered of  the  same  concern  as  would  be  the  more  serious 
interference  with  the  neutralization  of  Belgium.  Never- 
theless, the  views  of  the  British  Government  in  interpret- 
ing its  obligations  under  the  Treaty  of  May  11, 1867,  form 
a  curious  commentary  on  the  provisions  of  the  protocol, 

1  See  above,  p.  338. 


THE    BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  429 

which,  as  the  result  of  the  efforts  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, was  signed  at  London  by  the  representatives  of  the 
powers  on  January  17,  1871.  It  reads:  "The  plenipoten- 
tiaries of  North  Germany,  of  Austria-Hungary,  of  Great 
Britain,  of  Italy,  of  Russia,  and  of  Turkey,  assembled  to- 
day in  conference,  recognize  that  it  is  an  essential  principle 
of  the  law  of  nations  that  no  power  can  liberate  itself  from 
the  engagements  of  a  treaty,  nor  modify  the  stipulations 
thereof,  unless  with  the  consent  of  the  contracting  powers 
by  means  of  an  amicable  arrangement."  ! 

When  the  situation  became  tense,  after  the  presentation 
of  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia,  M.  Eyschen,  Minister  of 
State  of  Luxemburg,  asked  the  French  Minister  on  July  31, 
'  for  an  official  declaration  to  the  effect  that  France,  in  case 
of  war,  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  When 
the  French  Minister  asked  him  if  he  had  received  a  similar 
declaration  from  the  German  Government,  M.  Eyschen 
answered  that  he  was  going  to  the  German  Minister  to 
ask  for  it.  Upon  his  return,  M.  Eyschen  informed  the 
French  Minister  that  the  German  Minister  had  replied, 
"That  is  a  matter  of  course,  but  the  French  Government 
must  make  the  same  promise."'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  31,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  111.) 

The  next  day  M.  Eyschen  asked  both  Governments  to 
give  Luxemburg  an  assurance  of  neutrality.  (Cf.  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  128.)  To  this,  M.  Viviani,  responsible  head  of  the 
French  Government,  replied :  — 

"Be  good  enough  to  state  to  the  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil that  in  conformity  with  the  Treaty  of  London,  1867, 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  intends  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  as  they 
have  shown  by  their  attitude. 

"The  violation  of  this  attitude  by  Germany  would,  how- 
ever, compel  France  from  that  time  to  be  guided  in  her  ac- 

1  Translation  as  laid  before  Parliament.  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by 
Treaty,  vol.  m,  p.  1904.   London,  1875. 


430     THE  DIPLOMACY   OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tion  by  the  necessity  of  caring  for  her  defense  and  her  in- 
terests."  (August  1,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  129.) 

The  next  day,  August  2,  M.  Eyschen  telegraphed  the 
French  Government  of  the  German  invasion  of  Luxemburg 
as  follows:  "I  have  the  honor  to  bring  to  Your  Excellency's 
notice  the  following  facts:  On  Sunday,  the  2d  August, 
very  early,  German  troops,  according  to  the  information 
which  has  up  to  now  reached  the  Grand  Ducal  Govern- 
ment, penetrated  into  Luxemburg  territory  especially  to- 
ward the  south  and  in  the  direction  of  Luxemburg,  the 
capital  of  the  Grand  Duchy.  A  certain  number  of  armored 
trains  with  troops  and  ammunition  have  been  sent  along 
the  railway  line  from  Wasserbillig  to  Luxemburg,  where 
their  arrival  is  immediately  expected.  These  occurrences 
constitute  acts  which  are  manifestly  contrary  to  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Grand  Duchy  as  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty 
of  London  of  1867.  The  Luxemburg  Government  have  not 
failed  to  address  an  energetic  protest  against  this  aggres- 
sion to  the  representatives  of  His  Majesty  the  German 
Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identical  protest  will  be  sent 
by  telegraph  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
at  Berlin."  (August  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  131.) 

Likewise,  on  August  2,  Baron  von  Schoen,  German  Am- 
bassador at  Paris,  delivered  the  following  note  from  his 
Government:  "The  German  Ambassador  has  just  been 
instructed,  and  hastens  to  inform  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  the  military  measures  taken  by  Germany  in 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  do  not  constitute  an  act 
of  hostility.  They  must  be  considered  as  purely  preventive 
measures  taken  for  the  protection  of  the  railways,  which, 
under  the  treaties  between  Germany  and  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  are  under  German  administra- 
tion."   (August  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  133.) 

That  same  day,  August  2,  the  French  Ambassador  at 
London  informed  his  Government  that '  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
in  speaking  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  431 

had  reminded  him  that  the  Convention  of  1867,  relative  to 
the  Grand  Duchy  [Luxemburg],  differed  from  the  treaty- 
concerning  Belgium,  in  that  England  was  bound  to  re- 
quire the  observance  of  this  latter  convention  without 
necessarily  having  the  concurrence  [concours]  of  the  other 
guaranteeing  powers,  whereas  in  the  case  of  Luxemburg 
all  the  guaranteeing  powers  were  to  act  in  concert.'  (Modi- 
fied quotation,  August  2,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  137;  cf.  B.  W.  P. 
no.  148.) 

9.  Some  considerations  concerning  Belgium's  right  to  resist 

According  to  the  Treaties  of  April  19,  1839,  between 
Belgium  and  the  six  other  powers,  Belgium  is  obligated  to 
preserve  a  strictly  neutral  attitude  toward  all  the  powers, 
and  to  take  no  action  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  this  neutral- 
ity. She  was  not  expressly  required  to  defend  her  own 
neutrality.  Belgium's  own  interests  would,  however,  im- 
pel her  to  take  as  active  a  part  as  possible  in  resisting  any 
attempt  to  violate  her  territory.1 

Belgium  is  thus  in  the  situation  in  which  the  great  Car- 
dinal Richelieu  desired  to  see  her,  when  he  thought  that 
a  friendly  medial  state  between  France  and  Holland  would 
be  ever  ready  to  resist  any  encroachment  upon  her  inde- 
pendence by  either  neighbor,  and  to  throw  her  support 
wherever  it  would  best  help  her  to  maintain  her  independ- 
ent position.  Besides,  this  buffer  state  would  exert  all  its 
influence  to  keep  the  countries  which  it  separated  on  good 
terms,  since  at  the  outbreak  of  any  conflict  between  them 
its  own  territory  would  be  in  great  danger  of  invasion.  The 
great  powers,  on  the  other  hand,  by  guaranteeing  Belgium's 

1  The  treaty  signed  at  London  December  14,  1831,  by  Belgium  and  the 
great  powers  excepting  France,  placed  upon  Belgium  the  obligation  to  main- 
tain constantly  in  good  order  the  fortresses  which  were  not  demolished. 
(Article  IV;  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  n,  p.  883.)  Bel- 
gium was  furthermore  recognized  as  an  independent  state,  except  for  the 
obligation  to  respect  her  neutralization.  (Treaty  of  November  15,  1831, 
Article  VII;  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  n,  p.  863.) 


432     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

neutrality,  agreed  to  render  assistance  in  maintaining  her 
independence  and  the  inviolability  of  her  territory. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  the  difficulties  which  have  arisen 
in  regard  to  Belgium  are  primarily  due  to  this  freedom  left 
to  her  to  provide  for  her  own  defense.  Such  a  situation  is 
open  to  criticism  from  two  points  of  view.    In  the  first 
place,  as  Wicker  in  his  extremely  enlightening  monograph 
on  neutralization  has  so  well  pointed  out,  the  greatest 
danger  that  the  regime  of  neutralization  may  fail  is  to  be 
found  in  the  provision  which  makes  the  continuance  of  the 
neutralized  condition  dependent  upon  the  conduct  of  the 
Government  of  the  territory  neutralized.1  The  example  of 
Cracow  well  illustrates  how  the  powers  are  quick  to  seize 
upon  the  action  of  the  Government  of  the  neutralized  ter- 
ritory to  make  it  an  excuse  for  disregarding  the  obligations 
to  respect  its  neutrality.   Another  example  of  this  is  af- 
forded by  the  German  arguments  against  the  manner  in 
which  Belgium  has  lived  up  to  her  obligations.   The  sys- 
tem of  neutralization,  as  applied  to  Belgium,  instead  of 
proving  an  advantage  has  proved  a  great  calamity  to  the 
people.  If  Belgium  had  been  relieved  from  all  responsibil- 
ity of  providing  for  the  defense  of  her  own  neutrality, 
in  case  of  French  or  German  aggression,  Belgium  would 
simply  have  allowed  the  occupation  of  her  territory  until 
the  conclusion  of  the  conflict  between  the  great  powers; 
and  we  should  not  have  had  to  endure  the  heartrending 
spectacle  of  Belgium's  suffering  which  has  resulted  from 
her  heroic  but  unavailing  efforts  to  live  up  to  her  obliga- 
tions to  prevent  the  violation  of  her  territory. 

Doubtless,  if  Germany  had  realized  what  this  resistance 
would  have  amounted  to,  and  had  appreciated  the  terrible 
consequences  of  her  act,  she  might  have  hesitated  to  allow 
her  generals  to  "hack  their  way  through."2  Perhaps  Ger- 

1  Cyrus  French  Wicker,  Neutralization,  p.  23.    Oxford,  1911. 

2  "It  is  obvious  that  Belgian  resistance  has  enabled  the  invaders  to  use 
not  only  the  territory,  but  all  the  resources  of  this  country  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war,  and  has  opened  the  way  for  its  annexation  in  case  of  final 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  433 

many's  adversaries  hoped  that  this  consideration  might 
check  German  action  and  help  to  win  for  them  the  support 
of  the  world  in  case  Germany  should,  nevertheless,  disre- 
gard it.  Whatever  the  reasons  for  the  adoption  and  con- 
tinuation of  such  a  system  as  that  applied  to  Belgium,  it 
was  hardly  fair  to  expect  a  small  state  to  support  such  a 
burden. 

The  acclamations  of  admiration  for  Belgian  conduct 
which  have  gone  up  throughout  the  whole  world  may  cheer 
the  hearts  of  the  refugees,  but  who  can  be  sure  that  Bel- 
gium will  ever  recover  from  the  effects  of  the  struggle  to 
which  she  has  so  nobly  sacrificed  everything  in  the  vain  de- 
fense of  her  home,  though  in  the  successful  protection  of 
her  honor?  Even  in  the  midst  of  our  enthusiastic  admira- 
tion we  may  be  permitted  to  pause  and  ask  ourselves 
whether  this  little  nation  was  called  upon  to  make  such  a 
sacrifice  for  the  maintenance  of  a  regime  which  had  the 
effect  of  putting  upon  her  a  burden  so  disproportionate  to 
her  strength.  I  believe  that  if  those  responsible  for  Bel- 
gium's welfare  could  have  known  with  certainty  what 
would  have  been  the  result  of  Belgium's  resistance,  the 
Government  at  Brussels  might  have  considered  that  the 
burden  of  maintaining  the  inviolability  of  Belgian  terri- 
tory should  fall  to  the  guaranteeing  powers. 

There  were  reasons,  however,  which  militated  in  the  past 
against  the  adoption  of  such  a  policy  on  the  part  of  Bel- 
gium. The  first  and  foremost  was  that  England  would 
certainly  have  considered  it  a  violation  of  Belgium's  obli- 
gations in  favor  of  Germany.  The  consequence  would 
have  been  to  force  England  to  increase  her  army  for  the 
purpose  of  being  able  to  resist,  from  the  very  beginning,  a 

German  victory;  but  to  infer  that,  in  view  of  these  immediate  and  prospec- 
tive advantages,  the  German  Government  not  only  reckoned  with  but 
hoped  for  resistance  would  be  to  attribute  to  that  Government  intentions 
which  it  has  not  avowed  and  with  which  it  should  not  be  charged  without 
direct  evidence."  (Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy," 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915],  no.  1,  pp.  77-78.) 


434     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

German  invasion  of  Belgium.  England  in  all  probability 
would  have  tried  to  find  some  means  of  reaching  an  agree- 
ment to  avoid  this  difficulty  and  the  burdens  it  would  have 
imposed.  In  doing  so  she  might  not  have  had  any  tender- 
ness for  Belgium,  whose  action  would  have  placed  her  in 
that  quandary.  There  is  still  another  aspect  of  the  ques- 
tion, perhaps  of  more  importance,  and  that  is  the  aspiration 
of  the  Belgian  people  to  play  as  virile  a  role  in  the  affairs  of 
the  nations  as  their  numbers  and  situation  could  reason- 
ably entitle  them  to.  This  ambition  of  theirs  prevented 
them  from  taking  advantage  of  their  neutralized  position. 
The  Belgian  Government,  without  in  any  way  violating 
its  obligations,  continued  to  assert  that  it  possessed  the 
entire  freedom  of  an  independent  state,  except  in  so  far  as 
limited  by  the  obligations  immediately  resulting  from  its 
neutralized  position.  Had  Belgium,  instead  of  attempting 
to  acquire  a  prominent  position  as  a  political  power, 
thrown  her  whole  efforts  into  making  the  most  of  her  neu- 
tralized position,  she  would  then  have  limited  her  political 
activity  to  the  minimum.  Such  a  policy  would  have  done 
much  to  save  her  the  dangers  consequent  upon  her  geo- 
graphical position. 

A  factor  in  the  situation  which  has  not  been  sufficiently 
appreciated  is  the  belief  that  Belgian  fortifications  when 
manfully  defended  could  successfully  resist  the  German 
onslaught,  long  enough,  at  least,  to  permit  reinforcements 
from  England  and  France  to  arrive.  Belgium  must  have 
quickly  discovered  her  mistake,  but  once  having  decided 
to  resist,  it  was  not  in  her  nature  to  stop  to  weigh  the  con- 
sequences. If  the  Belgians  had  foreseen  how  futile  would 
have  been  their  resistance,  I  believe  that  they  would  have 
left  the  responsibility  of  defending  their  territory  to  the 
powers  to  settle  as  best  they  might,  and  have  limited  their 
action  to  a  negative  observance  of  a  strictly  neutral  atti- 
tude. The  world  is  certainly  richer  by  their  action,  for  if 
they  had  foreseen  these  consequences  and  been  influenced 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  435 

by  them,  as  I  think  any  reasonable  people  would,  we 
should  not  have  witnessed  the  noblest  example  of  resist- 
ance in  recorded  history. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  Au- 
gust 4,  telegraphed  to  the  British  Minister  at  Brussels: 
"You  should  inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure 
is  applied  to  them  by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart 
from  neutrality,  His  Majesty's  Government  expect  that 
they  will  resist  by  any  means  in  their  power,  and  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  support  them  in  offering  such 
resistance,  and  that  His  Majesty's  Government  in  this 
event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France,  if  desired,  in 
offering  to  the  Belgian  Government  at  once  common  ac- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  resisting  use  of  force  by  Germany 
against  them,  and  a  guaranty  to  maintain  their  independ- 
ence and  integrity  in  future  years."  (August  4,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
155;  cf.  B.  G.  P.  no.  28.)  The  Belgian  Government  must 
have  noticed  the  "expect "  and  the  mentioning  of  the  main- 
tenance of  Belgian  "independence  and  integrity  in  future 
years."  Any  one  familiar  with  diplomatic  language  might 
consider  this  significant.  It  cannot  be  called  a  threat,  but 
it  might  be  taken  as  a  spur  to  resistance,  lest  the  great 
power  lose  interest  in  maintaining  Belgium's  independ- 
ence.1 

1  The  following  extract  from  the  New  York  Times  of  October  1,  1914, 
gives  a  semi-official  defense  from  England:  "In  an  interview  granted  to 
the  correspondent  of  a  Copenhagen  paper,  Francis  Dyke  Acland,  Parlia- 
mentary Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  contradicts  certain  statements 
made  by  the  German  Secretary  of  State,  Heir  von  Jagow,  in  an  interview 
recently  issued  at  Berlin.  One  assertion  was  that  'England  has  provoked 
poor  Belgium  to  make  resistance.'  'This  leaves  it  to  be  inferred,'  said  Mr. 
Acland,  'that  Belgium,  if  not  provoked,  would  have  allowed  herself  to  be 
trampled  upon.  It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  nature  of  the  resist- 
ance offered  by  Belgium  would  be  enough  to  prevent  such  a  libel  on  a  gallant 
foe.  An  official  statement  issued  this  week  by  the  Belgian  Government  con- 
clusively proves  that  no  provocation  from  England  or  anybody  else  was 
needed  to  make  Belgium  maintain  her  rights.  The  Belgian  Government  at 
the  time  of  the  Agadir  crisis  did  not  hesitate  to  warn  the  foreign  ambassa- 
dors in  terms  which  could  not  be  misunderstood  of  its  intention  to  compel 
respect  for  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  every  means  at  its  disposal.' " 


436     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

To  be  just,  we  must  confess  that  England  and  France 
were  in  a  desperate  situation ;  and  they  probably  believed 
that  they  would  be  able  to  come  to  Belgium's  assistance 
before  Liege  could  be  taken.  They  perhaps  considered  that 
the  risk  of  a  devastating  invasion  that  Belgium  was  made 
to  run  was  only  a  fair  return  for  the  guaranty  of  the  powers. 

Belgium  gave  every  indication  that  she  would  have  de- 
fended her  neutrality  irrespective  of  any  prodding  from 
abroad.  The  Belgian  Government  even  delayed  calling 
upon  the  assistance  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  (see  Au- 
gust 3,  B.  G.  P.  no.  24).  This  may  have  been  for  the  pur- 
pose of  demonstrating  to  the  world  that  Germany  alone 
had  been  guilty  of  violating  her  neutrality. 

The  attitude  of  Belgium  was  clearly  indicated  in  Emile 
Waxweiler's  account  of  the  interview  which  the  Belgian 
Minister  at  Berlin  had  with  Herr  von  Jagow :  — 

"This  indeed  was  just  what  the  German  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr  von  Jagow,  declared  to 
Baron  Beyens,  the  Belgian  minister  at  Berlin,  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning  (Monday,  August  3),  at  the  beginning 
of  a  conversation  in  which  things  were  said  which  deter- 
mined the  whole  subsequent  course  of  events.  It  is  at 
Baron  Beyens's  wish  that  I  record  this  conversation,  the 
spirited  march  of  which  I  shall  do  my  best  to  render. 

"Early  that  Monday  morning,  the  Belgian  Minister 
asked  by  telephone  to  be  received  by  the  Secretary  of 
State;  the  interview  was  immediately  granted. 

"The  Belgian  Minister  had  scarcely  pronounced  his 
greetings  when  Herr  von  Jagow  exclaimed:  'Believe  me, 
it  is  with  anguish  in  her  heart  that  Germany  has  resolved 
to  violate  Belgian  neutrality;  and  personally  I  feel  the 
most  poignant  regret.  But  what  else  is  possible?  It  is  a 
question  of  life  or  death  for  the  Empire.  If  the  German 
armies  would  avoid  being  caught  between  hammer  and 
anvil,  they  must  strike  a  vigorous  blow  upon  the  side  of 
France  so  as  to  be  able  to  turn  then  upon  Russia,' 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  437 

"'But,'  said  Baron  Beyens,  'the  French  frontier  is  of 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  passage  through  Belgium  avoid- 
able.' 

"'But  that  frontier  is  too  well  fortified.  Besides,  what 
is  it  we  ask  of  you?  Simply  to  permit  us  a  free  passage  and 
not  to  destroy  your  railways  or  your  tunnels,  and  to  allow 
us  to  occupy  the  fortified  places  which  we  need.' 

"'There  is,'  immediately  rejoined  the  Belgian  Minister, 
'  a  very  easy  way  of  formulating  the  only  reply  admissible 
to  such  a  demand.  It  is  this:  suppose  France  had  pre- 
ferred the  selfsame  request  and  we  had  yielded.  Would 
not  Germany  have  said  that  we  had  basely  betrayed 
her?' 

"The  Secretary  of  State  allowing  this  clear-cut  inter- 
rogation to  pass  without  answer,  Baron  Beyens  completed 
his  thought. 

"'Have  you,'  he  asked,  'the  least  thing  with  which  to 
reproach  us?  Have  we  not  always,  for  three  quarters  of 
a  century,  fulfilled  toward  Germany,  as  well  as  to  all  the 
great  powers  guarantors  [of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium],  all 
our  duties  of  neutrality?  Have  we  not  given  Germany 
proof  of  our  loyal  friendship?  With  what  coin  does  Ger- 
many repay  all  this?  With  making  Belgium  the  battle- 
field of  Europe,  and  we  know  what  devastation,  what 
calamity  modern  warfare  brings  in  its  train.' 

"'Germany  has  nothing  with  which  she  can  reproach 
Belgium;  the  attitude  of  Belgium  has  always  been  beyond 
reproach  (d'une  correction  parfaite.) ' 

"'You  will  admit,'  replied  Baron  Beyens,  'that  Belgium 
can  make  no  other  reply  than  that  which  she  has  already 
given,  without  the  loss  of  honor.  It  is  with  nations  as  it 
is  with  individuals;  there  is  not  a  different  kind  of  honor 
for  a  people  than  for  one's  self.  You  must  admit,'  urged 
Baron  Beyens,  'our  reply  had  to  be  what  it  is.' 

" '  I  grant  you  that  as  a  private  individual,  but  as  Secre- 
tary of  State  I  have  no  opinion  to  express.' 


438     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"The  interview  was  at  an  end.  Nevertheless,  the  Bel- 
gian Minister  added  that  in  his  opinion  Germany  was 
deceiving  herself :  she  was  going  into  a  war  with  England, 
and  besides,  German  troops  would  not  pass  Liege  as  easily, 
perhaps,  as  they  imagined.  And,  when  the  Minister  made 
him  understand  that  there  was  no  doubt  of  his  asking  for 
his  passports,  Herr  von  Jagow  protested,  'Do  not  leave; 
perhaps  we  shall  still  have  occasion  to  converse.'  'What 
is  about  to  take  place,'  replied  Baron  Beyens,  'is  not  a 
matter  within  our  control;  from  now  on  it  is  for  the  Bel- 
gian Government  to  decide  upon  the  action  it  will  take.' "  x 

The  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  dispatch 
of  August  4  to  the  Belgian  representatives  abroad,  re- 
lates: 

"The  ultimatum  expired  at  7  a.m.  on  August  3.  As  at 
10  o'clock  no  act  of  war  had  been  committed,  the  Belgian 
Cabinet  decided  that  there  was  no  reason  for  the  moment 
to  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing  powers. 

"Toward  midday  the  French  Minister  questioned  me 
upon  this  point,  and  said:  'Although  in  view  of  the  rapid 
march  of  events  I  have  as  yet  received  no  instructions  to 
make  a  declaration  from  my  Government,  I  feel  justified, 
in  view  of  their  well-known  intentions,  in  saying  that  if  the 
Belgian  Government  were  to  appeal  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment as  one  of  the  powers  guaranteeing  their  neutrality, 
the  French  Government  would  at  once  respond  to  Bel- 
gium's appeal;  if  such  an  appeal  were  not  made  it  is  prob- 
able that  —  unless,  of  course,  exceptional  measures  were 
rendered  necessary  in  self-defense  —  the  French  Govern- 
ment would  not  intervene  until  Belgium  had  taken  some 
effective  measure  of  resistance.' 

"I  thanked  Monsieur  Klobukowski  for  the  support 
which  the  French  Government  had  been  good  enough  to 
offer  us  in  case  of  need,  and  I  informed  him  that  the  Bel- 

1  Emile  Waxweiler,  La  Belgique  neulre  et  loyale,  pp.  65-67.  Lausanne, 
1915. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  439 

gian  Government  were  making  no  appeal  at  present  to  the 
guaranty  of  the  powers,  and  that  they  would  decide  later 
what  ought  to  be  done. 

"Finally,  at  6  a.m.  on  August  4,  the  German  Minister 
made  the  following  communication  to  me :  '  In  accordance 
with  my  instructions,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your 
Excellency  that  in  consequence  of  the  refusal  of  the  Bel- 
gian Government  to  entertain  the  well-intentioned  pro- 
posals made  to  them  by  the  German  Government,  the  lat- 
ter, to  their  deep  regret,  find  themselves  compelled  to 
take  —  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms  —  those  measures  of 
defense  already  foreshadowed  as  indispensable,  in  view  of 
the  menace  of  France.' 

"The  Cabinet  is  at  the  present  moment  deliberating  on 
the  question  of  an  appeal  to  the  powers  guaranteeing  our 
neutrality."     (August  4,  B.  G.  P.  no.  38.) 

The  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  delivered  that 
same  day  to  the  representatives  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia,  the  following  note :  — 

"The  Belgian  Government  regret  to  have  to  announce 
to  Your  Excellency  that  this  morning  the  armed  forces  of 
Germany  entered  Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  treaty 
engagements. 

"The  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  determined  to  re- 
sist by  all  the  means  in  their  power. 

"Belgium  appeals  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia 
to  cooperate  as  guaranteeing  powers  in  the  defense  of  her 
territory. 

"There  should  be  concerted  and  joint  action,  to  oppose 
the  forcible  measures  taken  by  Germany  against  Belgium, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  guarantee  the  future  mainten- 
ance of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Belgium. 

"Belgium  is  happy  to  be  able  to  declare  that  she  will 
undertake  the  defense  of  her  fortified  places."  (August  4, 
B.  G.  P.  no.  40.) 

On  August  5,  the  Belgian  Government  communicated 


440     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

its  views  to  the  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  in  the 
following  note :  — 

"By  the  Treaty  of  April  18th  [sic],  1839,  Prussia,  France, 
Great  Britain,  Austria,  and  Russia  declared  themselves 
guarantors  of  the  treaty  concluded  on  the  same  day  be- 
tween His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  His  Ma- 
jesty the  King  of  the  Netherlands.  The  treaty  runs: 
'Belgium  shall  form  a  state  independent  and  perpetually 
neutral.'  Belgium  has  fulfilled  all  her  international  obli- 
gations, she  has  accomplished  her  duty  in  a  spirit  of  loyal 
impartiality,  she  has  neglected  no  effort  to  maintain  her 
neutrality  and  to  cause  that  neutrality  to  be  respected. 

"In  these  circumstances  the  Belgian  Government  have 
learnt  with  deep  pain  that  the  armed  forces  of  Germany, 
a  power  guaranteeing  Belgian  neutrality,  have  entered 
Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  the  obligations  undertaken 
by  treaty. 

"It  is  our  duty  to  protest  with  indignation  against  an 
outrage  against  international  law  provoked  by  no  act  of 
ours. 

"The  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  determined  to  re- 
pel by  all  the  means  in  their  power  the  attack  thus  made 
upon  their  neutrality,  and  they  recall  the  fact  that,  in  vir- 
tue of  Article  10  of  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  respect- 
ing the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral  powers  and  persons  in 
the  case  of  war  by  land,  if  a  neutral  power  repels,  even  by 
force,  attacks  on  her  neutrality,  such  action  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  a  hostile  act. 

"I  have  to  request  that  you  will  ask  at  once  for  an  audi- 
ence with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  read  this 
dispatch  to  his  Excellency,  handing  him  a  copy.  If  the 
interview  cannot  be  granted  at  once  you  should  make  the 
communication  in  question  in  writing."  (August  5, 
B.  G.  P.  no.  44.) 

The  strong  are  apt  to  consider  as  unjustifiable  all  resist- 
ance to  their  advance,  and  the  Germans  have  gone  so  far 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  441 

as  to  blame  the  Belgians  for  their  resistance.  We  find  in 
Germany  many  indications  of  a  widely  prevailing  idea  that 
the  Belgians  merit  the  severity  of  their  suffering  because  of 
the  futility  of  their  resistance.  They  make  somewhat  the 
same  distinction  that  we  should  make  between  one  who 
should  unfortunately,  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  meet 
with  a  mishap,  and  another  who  deliberately  sets  himself  in 
front  of  an  advancing,  irresistible  force.  Here  again  they 
leave  out  of  account  the  obligations  which  Belgium  had 
assumed  to  maintain  her  inviolability.  Once  we  admit  the 
validity  of  these  obligations,  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
ground  for  declaring  that  the  Belgians  were  at  fault  be- 
cause they  did  not  weigh  the  consequences.  Quite  the  con- 
trary: their  preeminent  glory  depends  upon  this  very  fact, 
and  makes  every  sincere  admirer  and  lover  of  Germany 
hang  his  head  for  shame  at  this  sad  page  of  her  history. 

10.  Germany  accuses  England  of  misrepresentations  in  regard 
to  Belgium 

In  Germany  and  in  England  also  the  British  Govern- 
ment have  been  attacked  because  they  gave  as  the  reason 
for  England's  intervention  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium. 

The  British  Government  have  never,  so  far  as  I  have 
noted,  made  the  statement  that  England  entered  the  war 
solely  to  defend  Belgium  and  to  make  good  the  guaranty 
under  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839.  In  many  instances, 
however,  this  reason  has  been  emphasized  while  the  others 
have  been  slighted.  This  is  nothing  more  than  the  ordinary 
procedure  of  every  government  in  time  of  war.  An  attempt 
is  made  to  present  its  action  in  such  a  way  as  to  move  the 
country  to  come  to  its  support.1  The  mass  of  men  cannot 

1  "That  Great  Britain  had  other  grounds  for  declaring  war  is  not  dis- 
puted. They  are  indicated  in  the  correspondence  published  by  the  British 
Government  (c/.  British  Blue  Book,  especially  nos.  89,  101,  111),  and  they 
were  frankly  stated  —  and  put  first  —  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  his  speech  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  August  3.  (Ibid.,  pp.  89-96.)  If  among  its  various 
grounds  for  declaring  war,  the  British  Government  finally  selected  that 
which  was  formally  the  best  and  which  would  appeal  most  strongly  to  pub- 


442     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

grasp  complicated  details;  consequently,  every  govern- 
ment presents  for  popular  consumption  only  one  or  two 
main  ideas.  No  doubt  England's  chief  reasons  for  going 
into  the  war  were,  first,  to  protect  her  vital  interests,  and, 
second,  her  good  name  in  observing  her  treaty  obligations. 
Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium  would,  however,  have 
stirred  all  England  irrespective  of  vital  interests  and  treaty 
obligations,  as  it  has  stirred,  the  world  over,  every  lover 
of  justice  who  was  not  already  a  German  partisan. 

It  is  much  to  the  credit  of  the  British  people  that  they 
are  moved  by  the  disregard  of  Belgium's  rights  rather  than 
by  their  more  immediate  selfish  interests.  Any  one  who 
will  read  the  British  White  Paper  will  find  that  England 
does  not  conceal  the  fact  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  for 
her  a  vital  question.  One  vital  question  may  be  enough  to 
justify  a  war  of  defense.1  That  England  has  other  reasons 

lie  sentiment  in  Great  Britain  and  in  other  countries,  it  is  not  chargeable 
with  insincerity  or  with  hypocrisy.  Any  other  course  would  have  been  unin- 
telligent. As  far  as  the  appeal  to  public  sentiment  is  concerned,  Austria  and 
Germany  acted  in  the  same  way;  the  former  in  the  stress  it  laid  upon  the 
crime  of  Serajevo,  the  latter  in  charging  the  Russian  Emperor  with  'per- 
fidy', because  his  armies  were  mobilizing  while  the  German  Emperor  was 
conducting  direct  personal  negotiations  with  him.  (This  was  the  casus  belli 
emphasized  in  all  the  German  newspapers  in  the  early  days  of  August.)" 
(Munroe  Smith,  "Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  vol.  xxx,  [1915],  no.  1,  p.  58.) 

1  "When  we  read  the  official  and  unofficial  explanations  of  Great  Brit- 
ain's intervention  which  have  been  advanced  on  the  part  of  Germany  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  which  aim  to  show  that  Great  Britain  had 
quite  other  reasons  for  intervening  than  Germany's  breach  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality, our  perplexity  increases.  When,  for  example,  we  are  reminded  that 
for  centuries  it  has  been  Great  Britain's  policy  to  promote  and  support  Con- 
tinental coalitions  against  any  Continental  state  which  threatened  to  ob- 
tain a  dominating  position,  especially  if  such  a  state  was  developing  sea 
power,  we  wonder  why  this  fact  was  not  taken  into  account  by  the  German 
Government  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war.  And  when  we  are  told 
that  to  Great  Britain  itself  —  to  take  the  German  Chancellor's  most  recent 
explanation  of  his  famous  phrase  —  the  Treaty  of  1839  was  only  'a  scrap  of 
paper,'  we  wonder  why,  in  a  country  justly  renowned  for  the  promotion  of 
historical  research,  it  should  be  forgotten  that  the  neutralizing  of  Belgium 
in  1839,  like  the  creation  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  in  1815,  was 
chiefly  promoted  by  Great  Britain,  for  the  quite  intelligible  purpose  of  pre- 
venting this  part  of  the  European  coast  line  from  being  used  as  a  base  for 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  443 

is  no  ground  for  accusing  her  of  hypocrisy  in  proclaiming 
loudest  the  one  that  stirs  her  deepest,  or  the  one  that  she 
thinks  best  calculated  to  awaken  neutral  sympathy. 
Many  of  the  German  defenders  make  the  mistake  of  con- 
fusing the  question  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
and  the  guilt  attaching  to  it  with  the  cause  for  England's 
joining  in  the  war.  They  are  two  entirely  distinct  ques- 
tions.1 

In  his  speech  before  the  Reichstag  on  December  2,  the 
German  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  said: 
"The  Belgian  neutrality,  which  England  pretended  she 
was  bound  to  shield,  is  but  a  mask.  On  the  2d  of  August, 
7  p.m.,  we  informed  Brussels  that  France's  plan  of  cam- 
paign was  known  to  us  and  that  it  compelled  us,  for  rea- 

military  operations  against  its  own  territory."  (Munroe  Smith,  "Military 
Strategy  versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xxx  [1915], 
pp.  74-75.) 

1  Mr.  Jacob  H.  Schiff  in  a  published  interview  makes  the  distinction:  — 

"I  am  not  defending  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.  This,  undeni- 
ably was  a  most  unjustifiable  action,  in  spite  of  German  claims  that  she  was 
forced  into  it  by  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  But  I  am  explaining  that, 
even  had  it  not  occurred,  still  England  would  have  gone  to  war. 

"That  was  the  situation. 

"Germany  is  now  fighting  for  her  very  existence  and  I,  who  am  not  with- 
out knowledge  of  German  conditions,  am  convinced  that  never  has  there 
been  a  war  more  wholly  that  of  a  whole  people  than  is  this  present  conflict, 
as  far  as  Germany  is  concerned."  (New  York  Times,  November  22,  1914. 
Interview  with  Jacob  H.  Schiff.) 

The  former  Ambassador  of  Austria  to  the  United  States,  Baron  L. 
Hengelmuller,  writes  in  a  letter  to  Colonel  Roosevelt,  published  in  the  New 
York  Times  of  November  8,  1914:  — 

"But  why  has  England  plunged  into  this  war?  Officially  and  to  the  world 
at  large  she  has  explained  her  resolution  by  Germany's  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  and  in  the  royal  message  to  Parliament  it  was  solemnly  declared 
that  England  could  not  stand  by  and  passively  tolerate  such  a  breach  of 
international  obligations. 

"No  Austrian  can  read  this  declaration  otherwise  than  with  a  mournful 
smile.  Its  futility  has  been  exposed  by  the  question  which  Englishmen  of 
standing  and  renown  have  put  to  their  Government,  viz.,  whether  they 
would  equally  have  declared  war  on  France  if  that  violation  of  neutrality 
had  first  come  from  her  side.  In  face  of  this  question  having  remained  un- 
answered, and  in  face  of  what  has  come  to  light  since  about  French  prepara- 
tions in  Belgium,  there  is  no  need  to  expatiate  on  this  subject." 

This  extract  illustrates  the  confusion  referred  to  above. 


444     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

sons  of  self-preservation,  to  march  through  Belgium;  but 
as  early  as  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  August  2,  that  is 
to  say,  before  anything  was  known  and  could  be  known 
of  this  step,  the  British  Government  promised  uncondi- 
tional aid  to  France  in  case  the  German  navy  attacked  the 
French  coast  line.  Not  a  word  was  said  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality. This  fact  is  established  by  the  declaration  made  by 
Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  3d  of 
August.  The  declaration  was  communicated  to  me  on 
August  4,  but  not  in  full,  because  of  the  difficulties  experi- 
enced at  that  time  in  the  transmission  of  telegrams.  Be- 
sides, the  very  Blue  Book  issued  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment confirms  that  fact.  How,  then,  can  England  allege 
that  she  drew  the  sword  because  we  violated  Belgian 
neutrality?  How  could  British  statesmen,  who  accurately 
knew  the  past,  talk  at  all  of  Belgian  neutrality?  When  on 
the  4th  of  August  I  referred  to  the  wrong  which  we  were 
doing  in  marching  through  Belgium,  it  was  not  yet  known 
for  certain  whether  the  Brussels  Government  in  the  hour 
of  need  would  not  decide  after  all  to  spare  the  country  and 
to  retire  to  Antwerp  under  protest.  You  remember  that, 
after  the  occupation  of  Liege,  at  the  request  of  our  army 
leaders,  I  repeated  the  offer  to  the  Belgian  Government. 
For  military  reasons  it  was  absolutely  imperative  that  at 
the  time,  about  the  4th  of  August,  the  possibility  for  such 
a  development  was  being  kept  open.  Even  then  the  guilt 
of  the  Belgian  Government  was  apparent  from  many  a 
sign,  although  I  had  not  yet  any  positive  documentary 
proofs  at  my  disposal.  But  the  English  statesmen  were 
perfectly  familiar  with  these  proofs.  The  documents  which 
in  the  meantime  have  been  found  in  Brussels,  and  which 
have  been  given  publicity  by  me,  prove  and  establish  in 
what  way  and  to  what  degree  Belgium  has  surrendered  her 
neutrality  to  England.  The  whole  world  is  now  acquainted 
with  two  outstanding  facts:  (1)  In  the  night  from  the  3d  to 
the  4th  of  August,  when  our  troops  entered  Belgian  terri- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  445 

tory,  they  were  not  on  neutral  soil,  but  on  the  soil  of  a  state 
that  had  long  abandoned  its  neutrality.  (2)  England  has 
declared  war  on  us,  not  for  the  sake  of  Belgian  neutrality, 
which  she  herself  had  helped  to  undermine,  but  because 
she  believed  that  she  could  overcome  and  master  us  with 
the  help  of  two  great  military  powers  on  the  Continent."  1 

11.  Germany's  plea  of  necessity 

The  German  Chancellor  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag, 
August  4,  said :  — 

"Gentlemen,  we  are  now  acting  in  self-defense.  Neces- 
sity knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg 
and  have  possibly  already  entered  on  Belgian  soil. 

"Gentlemen,  that  is  a  breach  of  international  law. 

"The  French  Government  has  notified  Brussels  that  it 
would  respect  Belgian  neutrality  as  long  as  the  adversary 
respected  it.  But  we  know  that  France  stood  ready  for  an 
invasion.  France  could  wait,  we  could  not.  A  French  in- 
vasion on  our  flank  and  the  lower  Rhine  might  have  been 
disastrous.  Thus  we  were  forced  to  ignore  the  rightful  pro- 
tests of  the  Governments  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  The 
injustice  —  I  speak  openly  —  the  injustice  we  thereby 
commit  we  will  try  to  make  good  as  soon  as  our  military 
aims  have  been  attained.  He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are 
and  is  fighting  for  his  All,  can  only  consider  the  one  and 
best  way  to  strike."  2 

1  [Extract.]  —  Translation  from  Pamphlet  no.  86  of  the  American  Asso- 
ciation for  International  Conciliation. 

2  This  translation  is  taken  from  Pamphlet  no.  84,  p.  7  of  the  American 
Association  for  International  Conciliation.  The  London  Times  of  August 
11, 1914,  gave  the  following  translation :  "Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state 
of  necessity,  and  necessity  knows  no  law !  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxem- 
burg, and  perhaps  [as  a  matter  of  fact  the  speaker  knew  that  Belgium  had 
been  invaded  that  morning]  are  already  on  Belgian  soil.  Gentlemen,  that 
is  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  international  law.  It  is  true  that  the  French 
Government  has  declared  at  Brussels  that  France  is  willing  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  as  long  as  her  opponent  respects  it.  We  knew,  how- 
ever, that  France  stood  ready  for  the  invasion.  France  could  wait,  but  we 
could  not  wait.  A  French  movement  upon  our  flank  upon  the  lower  Rhine 


446     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Various  other  pleas  in  justification  of  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium were  later  brought  forward.  The  arguments  in  their 
support  have  not  appealed  to  impartial  minds  with  the 
same  force  as  the  Chancellor's  original  pleas  of  necessity, 
either  because  the  evidence  to  substantiate  the  assertions 
upon  which  they  rested  was  trivial  and  far  from  the  point, 
or  else  because  the  plea  of  necessity  has  really  struck  a 
responsive  chord.1 

might  have  been  disastrous.  So  we  were  compelled  to  override  the  just  pro- 
test of  the  Luxemburg  and  Belgian  Governments.  The  wrong  —  I  speak 
openly  —  that  we  are  committing  we  will  endeavor  to  make  good  as  soon  as 
our  military  goal  has  been  reached.  Anybody  who  is  threatened,  as  we  are 
threatened,  and  is  fighting  for  his  highest  possessions,  can  have  only  one 
thought  —  how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through  {wie  er  sich  durchhaut)\" 
The  version  of  this  part  of  the  Chancellor's  speech  in  the  New  York  Times 
Current  History  of  the  War,  vol.  i,  no.  2,  pp.  219-22,  follows  closely  that  of 
the  London  Times,  but  the  last  sentence  reads:  "Who,  like  we,  are  fighting 
for  the  highest,  must  only  consider  how  victory  can  be  gained." 

1  The  following  extracts  may  serve  as  an  illustration  of  this  as  well  as  of  the 
confusion  above  referred  to  regarding  the  motive  of  England's  intervention. 

A  Dutch  professor  wrote  to  the  Koelnische  Zeitung:  — 

"When  Germany  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  I  was  very  indig- 
nant. But  I  was  partially  conciliated  when  the  Imperial  Chancellor  said 
frankly : '  We  are  doing  the  wrong  thing,  but  for  military  reasons  we  cannot 
help  but  do  it.'   Necessity  is,  at  any  rate,  a  strong  excuse. 

"But  that's  where  the  thing  should  have  stopped.  Distinct  antipathy 
is  provoked  when  afterward  all  kinds  of  little  things  are  dug  up  to  show 
that  Germany  had  the  right  to  act  as  she  did."   (New  York  Sun,  December 

27,  1914.) 

Professor  George  W.  Kirchwey,  of  Columbia  University,  in  a  letter  to 
the  New  York  Times,  Thursday,  December  24,  1914,  says:  — 

"The  pity  of  it  is  that  Germany  really  has  a  case  which  is  obscured  and 
betrayed  by  arguments  such  as  this.  The  argument  from  military  necessity 
urged  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  in  his  address  to  the  Reichstag  (immoral 
though  it  be)  has  at  least  the  merit  of  a  certain  nobility,  and  there  are  not 
wanting  those  in  this  country  to  whom  it  makes  its  appeal.  We,  too,  have 
our  admirers  of  the  strong  man  or  nation  that  takes  what  he  or  she  needs, 
that  hews  his  or  her  way  through  every  obstacle  to  success,  that  lets  no 
trumpery  considerations  of  public  morality  or  humanity  stand  in  the  way 
of  the  pursuit  of  his  or  her  ends.  But  even  our  Bernhardis  can  have  only 
contempt  for  a  cause  which  seeks  to  justify  its  grandiose  violation  of  inter- 
national law  and  public  right  by  seeking,  through  the  distortion  and  mis- 
representation of  facts,  to  shift  the  responsibility  upon  the  victim  of  its 
high-handed  proceedings." 

Professor  John  W.  Burgess  in  a  letter  to  the  New  York  Times  (October 

28,  1914)  says:  — 

"I  find  in  the  British  'White  Paper,'  itself,  no.  123,  not  only  ample  justi- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  447 

In  his  speech  of  December  2, x  before  the  Reichstag  the 
Chancellor  no  longer  relies  on  the  necessity  plea  pure  and 
simple,  but  adds  as  a  justification  of  Germany's  course  the 
charge  that  Belgium  herself  was  guilty  of  violating  her 
obligations.  We  have  seen  what  foundation  there  was  for 
this  serious  charge.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Professor  Hans 
Delbriick,  in  a  recent  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  ("Ger- 
many's Answer,"  February,  1915,  p.  233),  ignores,  except 
for  a  passing  allusion,  these  efforts  to  excuse  Germany's  in- 
vasion on  the  ground  of  Belgium's  guilt,  and  reverts  to  the 
Chancellor's  first  position,  when  he  says:  — 

fication,  but  absolute  necessity,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  for  a  German 
army  advancing  against  France,  not  only  to  pass  through  Belgium  but  to 
occupy  Belgium.  This  number  of  the  'White  Paper'  is  a  communication 
dated  August  1  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  British  Am- 
bassador in  Berlin.  In  it  Sir  Edward  Grey  informed  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
that  the  German  Ambassador  in  London  asked  him  'whether,  if  Germany 
gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  we,  Great  Britain,  would 
remain  neutral,'  and  that  he  [Grey]  replied  that  he  'could  not  say  that,'  that 
he  did  not  think  Great  Britain  'could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that 
condition  alone';  further,  Sir  Edward  Grey  says:  ' The  Ambassador  pressed 
me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formulate  conditions  on  which  we  would  re- 
main neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France  and  her  col- 
onies might  be  guaranteed.  I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any 
promise  to  remain  neutral  on  similar  terms,  and  I  could  only  say  that  we 
must  keep  our  hands  free.'" 

Count  Apponyi,  the  distinguished  Hungarian  statesman,  in  an  article 
in  the  New  York  Times  (January  17,  1915),  writes:  — 

"I  should  like  to  say  one  word  concerning  Belgium.  Many  are  hypno- 
tized by  the  case  of  Belgium,  and  I  certainly  agree  with  them  so  far  as  to  de- 
plore the  ruin  inflicted  on  a  highly  civilized,  prosperous  country,  and  the 
setting  aside  of  international  treaties.  But  if  the  question  of  right  and  wrong 
is  to  be  decided,  you  cannot  isolate  this  peculiar  fact  from  the  situation  in 
which  it  originates,  and  you  cannot  speak  in  fairness  of  Germany  as  having 
invaded  Belgium  in  a  spirit  of  wanton  aggression  and  premeditated  disre- 
gard of  international  obligations." 

Professor  Morris  Jastrow,  Jr.,  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  in  an 
article  published  in  The  Fatherland  allows  by  implication  some  force  to  the 
necessity  plea :  — 

"Germany's  breach  of  neutrality  with  Belgium,  which  I  do  not  justify 
and  which  Germany  herself  acknowledges  was  wrong,  but  prompted  by  ab- 
solute necessity,  could  not  have  been  the  real,  or  let  us  say  the  only,  motive 
inducing  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  range  England  on  the  side  of  France  and 
Russia." 

1  See  above  §  10,  pp.  443-45. 


448     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

"From  Sir  Edward  Grey's  refusal  to  answer  the  neu- 
trality question,  Germany  saw  clearly  that  just  as  soon  as 
the  Russians  were  near  enough,  the  French,  perhaps  aided 
by  the  English  and  Belgians,  would  attack  Germany  on 
that  flank.  Germany,  therefore,  had  to  consider  which 
was  the  lesser  of  the  two  evils. 

"If  she  proceeded  against  Belgium,  there  was  the  pros- 
pect of  gaining  large  advantages  before  the  Russians  en- 
tered the  conflict  —  a  hope  that  has  only  in  small  measure 
been  realized.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  the  disadvan- 
tage in  this  move,  that  abroad,  particularly  in  neutral  coun- 
tries, Germany  would  appear  in  the  light  of  peace-breaker. 

"  If,  on  the  contrary,  Germany  had  waited  until  the  en- 
emy had  violated  Belgium's  neutrality,  she  would  have 
had  the  moral  advantage  of  appearing  in  the  light  of  the 
defender  of  the  right,  but  at  the  same  time  would  have  lost 
almost  all  hope  of  victory  against  the  stupendous  odds. 
Under  these  conditions  Germany  chose  the  odium  of  ap- 
pearing to  the  world  as  the  treaty-breaker,  sure  that  she 
was  so  only  in  appearance,  because  the  treaty  had  already 
been  broken  in  fact  from  the  other  side." 

Delbriick  and  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  both  allege  that 
Germany's  necessity  arose  from  the  fact  that  France  in- 
tended, by  waiting,  to  take  advantage  of  Germany  when 
she  was  obliged  to  divide  her  forces  to  repel  the  Russian 
advance,  and  then  to  invade  Belgian  territory  to  strike 
Germany  on  the  flank.  If  France  had  actually  attempted 
to  do  this,  Germany  would  have  been  justified  in  advanc- 
ing across  Belgian  soil  to  meet  her  treacherous  attack,  but 
the  clearest  and  most  absolute  proof  of  the  mere  intention 
of  France  to  do  so  would  not  serve  as  a  justification,  though 
it  might  afford  some  excuse.  I  have  examined  this  question 
without  finding  any  evidence  that  France  intended  any 
such  perfidy  —  nay,  I  find  every  indication  that  France 
would  have  refrained  from  any  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality.   She  had  made  an  express  declaration  to  the  Bel- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  449 

gian  Government  that  she  would  observe  the  latter's  neu- 
trality provided  Germany  followed  a  like  course,  and  I 
know  of  no  case  where  a  formal  engagement  of  this  kind 
has  been  violated  by  a  civilized  state.  In  the  last  analysis, 
then,  we  must  fall  back  on  the  only  German  argument 
which  has  any  strength  —  that  of  necessity  pure  and 
simple. 

Before  we  take  up  the  main  argument,  it  may  be  ob- 
served that  the  excuse  of  necessity  can  serve  as  a  justifi- 
cation only  when  there  actually  is  a  necessity.  It  will  not 
suffice  that  the  one  who  disregards  the  ordinary  rules  sup- 
posed such  a  necessity  to  exist.  In  this  present  war  there 
was  really  no  necessity  for  violating  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, since  Germany  had  another  perfectly  feasible  plan  of 
campaign.  She  might  have  confined  her  offensive  opera- 
tions to  the  eastern  frontier  and  remained  on  the  defensive 
on  the  West,  forcing  France  to  adopt  the  role  of  the  aggres- 
sor. 

For  the  sake  of  argument,  however,  we  will  admit  that 
Germany  could  discover  no  other  way  to  preserve  her 
national  independence  and  integrity  except  by  forcing  her 
way  through  Belgium  to  crush  France.  On  this  assumption 
we  must  examine  whether  Germany  can  make  out  a  case 
to  justify  her  action  before  the  really  impartial  public  opin- 
ion of  the  world.  Speaking  generally,  is  there  any  restric- 
tion upon  the  liberty  of  one  individual  to  injure  another 
for  his  own  preservation? 

By  restriction  of  the  liberty  to  injure  another  for  self- 
preservation,  we  mean,  of  course,  a  self-imposed  restric- 
tion — that  is,  one  which  will  affect  the  will  in  such  a  way 
as  to  deter  an  individual  from  using  strength  to  the  de- 
triment of  another  person,  even  though  it  be  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preserving  existence.  The  only  limit  which  can  be 
self-imposed  on  this  liberty  to  injure  another  must  result 
from  respect  for  principles  which  are  intended  either  for 
the  direct  benefit  of  the  individual  himself,  or  for  the  pro- 


450     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tection  of  what  he  considers  still  more  important.  For  ex- 
ample, except  when  acting  instinctively,  an  individual 
would  hardly  take  any  action,  whether  involving  injury  to 
another  or  not,  when  he  felt  absolutely  convinced  that  his 
own  existence  after  the  commission  of  the  act  would  be  an 
intolerable  burden  for  him.  We  are  all  brought  up  with  the 
idea  that  it  is  better  to  die  than  to  live  on  as  a  miserable 
creature  despised  by  all.  Pushing  this  idea  still  further,  we 
reach  the  stage  when  life  seems  intolerable  unless  we  can 
preserve  and  remain  true  to  certain  ideals.  Suicide  is  the 
ordinary  outlet  when  an  individual  finds  this  impossible. 
Consequently,  individuals  will  sacrifice  life  and  property 
to  defend  a  person  or  an  ideal  when  a  failure  to  do  so  would 
result  in  making  life  unbearable.  The  refusal  to  injure  an- 
other, in  order  to  preserve  life,  would  not  differ  essentially 
from  the  case  just  considered. 

So  by  a  projection  of  his  personality  into  the  future,  an 
individual  is  ready  to  sacrifice  himself  rather  than  retain 
life  upon  conditions  that  he  is  not  willing  to  accept.  This 
attitude  toward  the  maintenance  of  certain  ideals,  becom- 
ing widespread  and  generalized,  brings  it  about  that  the 
protection  of  certain  principles  or  ideals  is  considered  by 
the  better  individuals  as  more  important  than  life  itself. 
In  any  community  those  unwilling  to  put  this  ideal  into 
practice  may,  when  those  who  believe  in  the  ideal  and  ad- 
here to  it  are  sufficiently  strong,  be  punished  so  severely  in 
one  way  or  another  as  to  act  on  the  public  imagination  or 
conscience  and  to  enforce  upon  individuals  the  sacrifice 
of  certain  primary  or  brute  instincts  for  the  good  of  all  as 
expressed  in  the  ideal.  In  other  words  the  community 
will  find  a  way  to  make  life  unbearable  to  those  who  do  not 
observe  the  ideal. 

Deeper  down  than  this  superstructure  of  social  and 
ethical  ideals,  however,  is  the  primary,  fundamental  love 
of  life,  which  like  any  other  passion  may  be  so  strong  in 
many  individuals  as  to  defy  the  ideals  of  the  enveloping 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  451 

society.  This  primary  instinct  to  live  and  the  socially 
evolved  ideal,  will  be  in  constant  conflict,  and  if  the  organ- 
ized society  is  once  well  in  the  control  of  those  who  believe 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  ideal,  the  individual  who  gives 
any  indications  of  breaking  away  will  be  eliminated  from 
the  society,  with  the  result  that  the  ideal  becomes  better 
and  better  observed.  We  have  a  good  example  of  this 
willingness  to  sacrifice  life  for  an  ideal  in  the  patriotic 
spirit  which  makes  a  whole  people  rush  to  the  defense  of 
the  nation  without  regard  to  self-preservation. 

Now,  individuals,  in  addition  to  being  members  of  inde- 
pendent states,  are  also  part  of  humanity,  and  the  inde- 
pendent governments  to  which  they  belong  merely  carry 
on  the  principal  relations  of  humanity,  each  acting  as  trus- 
tees for  that  part  of  humanity  embraced  within  the  terri- 
tories it  controls.  Each  government  must,  in  the  long  run, 
give  expression  to  the  views  which  prevail  and  control  the 
action  of  the  individuals  composing  it.  Just  as  in  each 
such  state  certain  principles  will  be  found  to  be  more  ap- 
preciated than  life,  so  in  the  realm  of  world  society,  or 
humanity,  individuals  may  look  upon  certain  ideals  as 
more  important  than  their  national  life.  When  this  stage 
is  reached,  the  individuals  composing  the  state  will  prevent 
their  government  from  overriding  the  international  or  hu- 
manitarian ideal  even  for  the  preservation  of  the  nation's 
life.  Should  the  individuals  composing  a  state  allow  their 
government  to  trample  upon  such  humanitarian  ideals, 
the  people  of  other  states,  acting  unitedly  and  individually 
through  the  agency  of  their  governments,  will  be  found 
discriminating  against  that  people  and  punishing  it  so  se- 
verely as  to  deter  any  other  state  from  a  similar  violation 
in  future.  Should  mistaken  ideals  prevail,  and  attempts  be 
made  to  exact  respect  for  principles  the  maintenance  of 
which  would  not  be  for  the  general  good,  governments  at- 
tempting to  disregard  these  principles  for  immediately 
selfish  ends  will  be  successful,  andin  consequence  the  un- 


450     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

tection  of  what  he  considers  still  more  important.  For  ex- 
ample, except  when  acting  instinctively,  an  individual 
would  hardly  take  any  action,  whether  involving  injury  to 
another  or  not,  when  he  felt  absolutely  convinced  that  his 
own  existence  after  the  commission  of  the  act  would  be  an 
intolerable  burden  for  him.  We  are  all  brought  up  with  the 
idea  that  it  is  better  to  die  than  to  live  on  as  a  miserable 
creature  despised  by  all.  Pushing  this  idea  still  further,  we 
reach  the  stage  when  life  seems  intolerable  unless  we  can 
preserve  and  remain  true  to  certain  ideals.  Suicide  is  the 
ordinary  outlet  when  an  individual  finds  this  impossible. 
Consequently,  individuals  will  sacrifice  life  and  property 
to  defend  a  person  or  an  ideal  when  a  failure  to  do  so  would 
result  in  making  life  unbearable.  The  refusal  to  injure  an- 
other, in  order  to  preserve  life,  would  not  differ  essentially 
from  the  case  just  considered. 

So  by  a  projection  of  his  personality  into  the  future,  an 
individual  is  ready  to  sacrifice  himself  rather  than  retain 
life  upon  conditions  that  he  is  not  willing  to  accept.  This 
attitude  toward  the  maintenance  of  certain  ideals,  becom- 
ing widespread  and  generalized,  brings  it  about  that  the 
protection  of  certain  principles  or  ideals  is  considered  by 
the  better  individuals  as  more  important  than  life  itself. 
In  any  community  those  unwilling  to  put  this  ideal  into 
practice  may,  when  those  who  believe  in  the  ideal  and  ad- 
here to  it  are  sufficiently  strong,  be  punished  so  severely  in 
one  way  or  another  as  to  act  on  the  public  imagination  or 
conscience  and  to  enforce  upon  individuals  the  sacrifice 
of  certain  primary  or  brute  instincts  for  the  good  of  all  as 
expressed  in  the  ideal.  In  other  words  the  community 
will  find  a  way  to  make  life  unbearable  to  those  who  do  not 
observe  the  ideal. 

Deeper  down  than  this  superstructure  of  social  and 
ethical  ideals,  however,  is  the  primary,  fundamental  love 
of  life,  which  like  any  other  passion  may  be  so  strong  in 
many  individuals  as  to  defy  the  ideals  of  the  enveloping 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


451 


society.  This  primary  instinct  to  live  and  the  socially 
evolved  ideal,  will  be  in  constant  conflict,  and  if  the  organ- 
ized society  is  once  well  in  the  control  of  those  who  believe 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  ideal,  the  individual  who  gives 
any  indications  of  breaking  away  will  be  eliminated  from 
the  society,  with  the  result  that  the  ideal  becomes  better 
and  better  observed.  We  have  a  good  example  of  this 
willingness  to  sacrifice  life  for  an  ideal  in  the  patriotic 
spirit  which  makes  a  whole  people  rush  to  the  defense  of 
the  nation  without  regard  to  self-preservation. 

Now,  individuals,  in  addition  to  being  members  of  inde- 
pendent states,  are  also  part  of  humanity,  and  the  inde- 
pendent governments  to  which  they  belong  merely  carry 
on  the  principal  relations  of  humanity,  each  acting  as  trus- 
tees for  that  part  of  humanity  embraced  within  the  terri- 
tories it  controls.  Each  government  must,  in  the  long  run, 
give  expression  to  the  views  which  prevail  and  control  the 
action  of  the  individuals  composing  it.  Just  as  in  each 
such  state  certain  principles  will  be  found  to  be  more  ap- 
preciated than  life,  so  in  the  realm  of  world  society,  or 
humanity,  individuals  may  look  upon  certain  ideals  as 
more  important  than  their  national  life.  When  this  stage 
is  reached,  the  individuals  composing  the  state  will  prevent 
their  government  from  overriding  the  international  or  hu- 
manitarian ideal  even  for  the  preservation  of  the  nation's 
life.  Should  the  individuals  composing  a  state  allow  their 
government  to  trample  upon  such  humanitarian  ideals, 
the  people  of  other  states,  acting  unitedly  and  individually 
through  the  agency  of  their  governments,  will  be  found 
discriminating  against  that  people  and  punishing  it  so  se- 
verely as  to  deter  any  other  state  from  a  similar  violation 
in  future.  Should  mistaken  ideals  prevail,  and  attempts  be 
made  to  exact  respect  for  principles  the  maintenance  of 
which  would  not  be  for  the  general  good,  governments  at- 
tempting to  disregard  these  principles  for  immediately 
selfish  ends  will  be  successful,  andin  consequence  the  un- 


m\ 


452     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

workable  theory  will  be  discarded.  Ideals  which  have  to 
be  discarded  as  impractical  for  our  present  stage  of  devel- 
opment may  be  resurrected  again  when  a  higher  general 
level  of  civilization  shall  have  been  reached. 

In  our  municipal  law  we  have  long  left  behind  the  brutal 
idea  that  one  individual  may  sacrifice  an  innocent  neighbor 
to  save  himself.1  Our  laws  do  not  permit  any  one  to 
sacrifice  another  innocent  individual  to  save  himself.  In 
the  words  of  the  judge  who  condemned  to  death  for  mur- 
der two  men  who  had  killed  and  eaten  a  boy  to  save 
themselves:  "To  preserve  one's  life  is  generally  speak- 
ing a  duty,  but  it  may  be  the  plainest  and  highest  duty 
to  sacrifice  it."  2 

The  biological  test,  in  my  belief,  will  favor  those  states 
which  observe  most  perfectly  in  their  relations  with  their 
weaker  neighbors  this  same  principle.  An  occasional  in- 
stance may  doubtless  occur,  in  the  course  of  generations, 
where  the  observance  of  this  rule  will  result  in  the  de- 
struction of  the  state  which  is  true  to  the  ideal.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  ill-repute  arising  from  the  sacrifice  of  a 
weaker  neighbor  may  be  too  heavy  a  burden  for  the  trans- 
gressor to  bear. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  has  been  compared  to  the  case 
of  a  man  who  is  guilty  of  a  trespass  in  crossing  his  neigh- 
bor's premises  to  escape  from  a  fire.  The  purpose  of  this 
comparison  is  to  indicate  that  a  lesser  right  should  give 
way  before  a  greater.  This  idea  of  the  relativity  of  rights 
seems  to  me  perfectly  sound,  even  though  the  formal  rules 
of  our  legal  system  do  not  accord  it  the  consideration  it 
merits.  In  the  case  of  Belgium,  however,  the  benefit  of  this 
principle  of  the  relativity  of  rights  might  be  thought  to 

1  The  eminent  jurist,  the  late  Professor  John  Westlake,  of  Cambridge 
University,  has  stated  this  so  clearly  that  I  will  not  confuse  what  he  has  said 
by  the  addition  of  a  single  word,  but  refer  the  reader  to  Westlake's  own 
lucid  remarks.     See  post,  chap.  xin. 

2  Extracts  from  this  remarkable  case,  Queen  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens, 
will  be  found  among  the  Documents,  chap.  xiii. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  453 

incline  more  to  the  support  of  the  action  of  Belgium  than 
to  that  of  Germany ;  for  Belgian  independence  would  have 
been  a  mere  word  if  she  had  accepted  the  terms  of  the 
German  ultimatum.  In  such  a  case,  were  the  Allies  to  win, 
they  would  consider  Belgian  independence  as  a  trap,  which 
they  would  remove  so  that  they  might  not  be  caught  in  it 
again.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  victorious, 
Belgium  would  become  a  German  protectorate. 

It  would  be  fairer  then,  if  instead  of  comparing  Ger- 
many's action  to  that  of  a  man  who  trespasses  to  save  his 
life,  we  should  compare  the  invasion  of  Belgium  to  the  case 
of  a  man  who  does  not  wait  to  meet  his  adversary  in  a  fair 
fight,  but  tries  to  reach  him  by  shooting  through  the  walls 
of  an  intervening  house  without  regard  to  the  lives  of  the 
helpless  inmates. 

It  may  be  asked  whether  the  test  of  time  will  not  favor 
those  little  states  which  hold  the  defense  of  their  honor 
higher  than  the  preservation  of  material  existence,  and 
disparage  those  other  states  which  would  sacrifice  another 
for  their  own  preservation. 

If  the  society  of  nations  is  to  make  any  further  progress, 
it  must  be  recognized  that  the  good  of  all  the  states  is  more 
important  than  the  good  of  any  individual  state.  This 
principle  can  have  no  force  unless  it  means  that  there  are 
certain  fundamental  rights,  the  respect  of  which  all  must 
place  before  every  other  consideration.  Three  of  the  most 
fundamental  principles  of  international  law  I  believe  to  be : 

(1)  Good  faith  in  the  observance  of  treaties.1 

1  It  is  worth  while  to  compare  the  statement  of  the  present  German 
Chancellor  in  reference  to  Belgian  neutrality  (see  above,  chap,  vni,  §  16), 
with  the  words  of  one  of  his  predecessors:  On  May  2,  1871,  Bismarck  de- 
clared before  the  Reichstag:  — 

"  'There  could  be  no  thought,'  said  Bismarck  at  that  time,  'of  our  making 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  into  a  neutral  country,  like  Belgium  and  Switzerland, 
for  that  would  have  constituted  a  barrier  which  would  have  prevented  our 
ever  attacking  France;  we  are  accustomed  to  respect  treaties  and  neu- 
tralities.'" (Emile  Waxweiler,  La  Belgique  neutre  et  loyale,  p.  72.  Lausanne, 
1915.)   Cf.  Les  Discours  de  Bismarck,  vol.  in,  p.  419.   Berlin,  1886. 

In  explanation  of  his  remark  that  England  was  making  war  on  Germany, 


456     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

passions  and  hatred  and  yet  continues  on  its  sublime 
course.  Its  true  and  fundamental  rules  can  no  more  be 
disregarded  without  punishment  than  can  the  laws  of 
hygiene.  If  I  am  wrong  in  my  criticism  of  Germany's 
action,  on  the  ground  that  she  has  violated  international 
law,  time  will  disclose  the  truth  and  indicate  the  right 
path  to  follow. 


CHAPTER  X 

ITALY   REMAINS   NEUTRAL 

Italy  desirous  for  peace  —  San  Giuliano's  helpful  suggestions  —  Italian 
cooperation  with  England  —  Italy  declares  that  she  will  remain  neutral. 

1 .  Italy  desirous  for  peace 

The  position  of  Italy  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  fea- 
tures of  the  present  war.  By  its  very  nature,  the  Triple 
Alliance  contained  within  itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  disso- 
lution. For  the  first  interest  of  Italy,  since  she  obtained 
her  national  unity,  has  been  to  acquire  the  neighboring 
Italian-speaking  provinces  of  Trieste  and  the  Trentino, 
which  she  would  lay  claim  to  on  the  basis  of  the  principle 
of  nationality.  This  aspiration  of  Italy  for  what  is  called 
"Italia  Irredenta"  —  that  is  to  say,  the  remnant  of  Italy 
unredeemed  from  Austrian  sway  —  has  been  a  constant 
source  of  irritation  between  the  two  countries,  and  it  has 
required  all  the  efforts  of  Germany  to  keep  the  peace.  As 
Count  Nigra  said  to  Von  Billow,  "  Austria  and  Italy  can 
only  be  either  allies  or  enemies."  x 

The  first  serious  blow  to  the  Triple  Alliance  was  struck 
when  Italy  threw  her  influence  against  her  ally  at  the  Al- 
geciras  Conference.  A  still  ruder  shock  was  the  Austrian 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  consolidation 
of  Austrian  strength  in  those  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Her- 
zegovina was  most  irritating  to  Italy;  but  she  prepared  a 
subtle  diplomatic  coup,  and  shortly  after,  in  1911,  launched 
a  war  against  Turkey,  a  state  which  had  come  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  component  part  of  the  Triple  Alliance  group. 
It  would  have  taken  the  diplomacy  of  a  Bismarck  to  have 
extricated  Germany  from  this  precarious  and  involved  situ- 
ation; for  any  interference  on  the  part  of  Austria  or  Ger- 

1  Von  Bulow,  Imperial  Germany.  New  York,  1914,  p.  69. 


458     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

many  would  have  thrown  Italy  into  the  arms  of  England 
and  France  and  made  of  her  an  integral  part  of  the  Triple 
Entente.  So  Germany  had  to  stand  by  and  see  her  Otto- 
man protege  stripped  of  her  possessions,  and  her  weakness 
shown  up  to  the  world.  Perhaps  a  later  and  careful  study 
of  the  diplomacy  of  this  epoch  will  show  that  Germany 
made  a  great  mistake  in  not  insisting  upon  arresting  this 
conflict;  but  had  she  been  successful,  she  would  probably 
have  had  to  prepare  in  quick  succession  for  an  attack  from 
France  and  Russia,  assisted  by  Italy  smarting  under  her 
check.  So  Germany  considered  that  she  must  stand  by, 
and  tolerate  Italy's  undermining  of  the  Triple  Alliance  by 
the  dismembering  of  Turkey. 

Still  another  cause  of  discord,  and  consequent  weakening 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  resulted  from  the  settlement  of  the 
Balkan  conflict.  Austria  and  Italy  had  checked  Servia's 
aspiration  for  control  of  Albania  and  had  set  up  an  in- 
dependent state  under  international  supervision,  which 
meant  that  Austria  and  Italy  would  commence  a  diplo- 
matic duel  to  secure  control.  This  ground  of  difference 
with  Austria,  added  to  the  ever-present  popular  aspira- 
tions toward  "  Italia  Irredenta,"  increased  the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  the  peace  of  the  Adriatic.  Even  had  the  War 
of  1914  not  broken  out,  a  conflict  between  Austria  and 
Italy  seemed  imminent,  or  at  most  a  question  of  a  few 
years  —  perhaps  months.  Such  was  the  situation  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.1 

In  the  light  of  conditions  we  have  just  outlined,  Italy 
might  well  consider  that  the  success  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
would  mean  dictation  by  Germany  and  Austria,  an  in- 
crease of  Austrian  and  German  power  in  the  Balkans,  and 
consequently  Austrian  control  of  Albania  and  the  length- 

1  The  recent  disclosures  of  ex-Premier  Giolitti  have  shown  how  Italy 
blocked  Austria's  plans  for  a  war  against  Servia  in  August,  1913,  just  after 
Servia  had  been  so  successful  in  foiling  Austrian  plans  and  had  emerged 
from  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest  with  her  territory  almost  doubled.  (See  post, 
P.  471.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  459 

ening  and  strengthening  of  Austria's  grip  on  the  Adriatic 
coast  line  opposite  Italy.  From  this  point  of  view,  Italy's 
immediate  interest  would  point  to  her  making  common 
cause  with  the  Triple  Entente;  and  she  had  another  reason 
perhaps  of  more  immediate  compelling  force,  in  that  her 
extensive  coast  line  offered  an  easy  target  to  the  fleets  of 
France  in  control  of  the  Mediterranean.  Now  that  Italy 
had  acquired  Tripoli,  she  had  given  a  hostage  to  the  powers 
in  control  of  the  Mediterranean.  Italy  understands  that  it 
is  a  first  consideration  of  self-preservation  for  her  never  to 
be  engaged  in  conflict  with  a  power  in  control  of  the  Med- 
iterranean. 

Italy's  position  was  further  complicated  by  her  inclu- 
sion in  the  Triple  Alliance,  according  to  the  terms  of  which 
Italy  is  in  certain  circumstances  obligated  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  her  two  allies.  It  has  been  much  argued 
whether  the  present  conflict  constitutes  a  casus  foederis 
under  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  To  discuss  this  intelli- 
gently, we  should  have  to  know  what  obligations  Italy  had 
undertaken  toward  Germany  and  Austria.1  We  only  know 
that  Italy  has  considered  that  Austria  and  Germany  were 
the  aggressors  and  that  she  was  not  obligated  to  come  to 
their  assistance.  This  is  the  gist  of  the  whole  question,  and 
has  been  much  obscured  by  the  efforts  of  all  parties  to 
avoid  any  aggressive  action,  for  the  very  high  purpose  of 
influencing  Italy's  action  and  at  the  same  time  bidding  for 
the  support  of  international  opinion. 

The  fact  remains,  after  all  is  said  and  done,  that  it  is 
very  difficult  to  determine  with  any  degree  of  accuracy 
which  party  is  the  aggressor  in  any  conflict.  If  Russia,  for 
example,  should  mobilize,  out  of  a  clear  sky,  along  the 
German  frontier,  Germany  would  certainly  have  to  de- 
clare war  and  put  herself  technically  in  the  position  of  the 

1  The  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  have  not  been  published,  but  Bismarck 
published  in  1888  the  terms  of  the  Dual  Alliance  between  Germany  and 
Austria,  which  is  supposed  to  be  the  basis  of  the  triplice  formed  by  including 
Italy. 


460     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

aggressor,  but  the  causal  act  and  incipient  aggression 
would  have  been  entirely  Russian.  A  political,  defensive 
alliance,  if  it  has  any  real  vigor,  has  always  of  necessity 
a  tendency  to  become  something  more  than  insurance 
against  attack,  and  as  each  member  in  turn  gains  from  the 
diplomatic  support  of  its  co-allies,  the  alliance  comes  in 
time  to  be  looked  upon  as  forming  a  new,  ill-defined  po- 
litical group.  The  impartial  critic  could  not  deny  that, 
even  in  the  absence  of  aggression,  there  would  be  a  certain 
political  obligation  upon  Italy  to  support  her  allies.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  actual  situation  of  a  country,  and  the 
diplomatic  premonitions  which  have  been  given  of  the 
action  it  intends  to  adhere  to,  must  always  be  considered 
when  discussing  any  question  as  to  the  good  faith  of  a 
nation.  The  good  faith  of  the  Italian  Government  in  ob- 
serving her  treaties  has  always  with  reason  stood  very 
high.1  In  our  own  history  we  had  a  similar  crisis,  when  we 
refused  to  live  up  to  the  terms  of  our  alliance  with  France 
and  join  the  French  Revolutionists  against  England. 

Looked  at  superficially,  Italy,  it  might  be  thought, 
would  make  common  cause  with  her  allies  in  the  event  of 
war.  But  if  Italy  supported  Germany  and  Austria,  the  re- 
sults of  a  war,  whether  victory  or  defeat,  might  be  disas- 
trous to  her.  In  case  of  victory,  Austria  would  become 
dangerously  powerful,  and  the  control  of  the  Balkans  — 
and  possibly  of  the  mouth  of  the  Adriatic — would  tighten 
her  grasp  on  the  Italian  portions  of  her  empire.  If  de- 
feated, Italy  would  be  bereft  of  Tripoli.  On  the  other  hand, 
Italy's  political  conscience  would  not  allow  her  to  turn 
against  her  allies;  and  even  if  she  did  so  she  might  suffer 
terribly  from  the  invasion  of  her  northern  provinces.  Italy, 
therefore,  had  more  than  general  objections  to  the  rupture 
of  peace.  The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  made  every  effort 
to  preserve  peace,  and  we  need  only  read  the  telegrams 

1  The  Giolitti  disclosures  reported  in  the  press  indicate  that  Italy  did  not 
leave  Austria  in  doubt  as  to  her  intentions.    See  post,  p.  471. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  461 

from  Italy  to  make  clear  the  quarter  from  which  blew  the 
wind  endangering  it.  (Cf.  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  17,  19,  27,  72;  B.  W. 
P.  no.  80). 

On  July  17,  M.  Michailovitch,  Servian  Minister  at 
Rome,  telegraphed  M.  Pashitch:  "  I  have  reliable  informa- 
tion that  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  has  declared  to  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  that  a  demarche  directed  against 
Servia,  which  did  not  treat  Servia  with  the  respect  due  from 
one  nation  to  another,  would  be  condemned  by  public 
opinion  in  Italy,  and  that  the  Italian  Government  was 
interested  in  the  maintenance  of  the  complete  independ- 
ence of  Servia."  1   (July  17,  S.  B.  B.  no.  28.) 

On  July  25,  '  the  Italian  Ambassador  cordially  approved 
of  what  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  said  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador, and  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  Italy  was 
most  desirous  to  see  war  avoided.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  25,  B.  W.  P.  no  29.) 

Italy  thus  showed  a  general  desire  to  cooperate  with 
Great  Britain  in  her  efforts  to  preserve  peace.  (See  B.  W.  P. 
nos.  57,  86,  90.)  From  the  first  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuli- 
ano supported  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence of  the  four  powers  at  London.   (B.  W.  P.  nos.  35,  63.) 

The  importance  of  Italy's  influence  for  peace  is  also  dis- 
closed by  M.  Sazonof 's  telegram  to  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor in  Italy :  '  Italy  might  play  a  role  of  first  importance  in 
helping  to  maintain  peace,  by  exercising  the  necessary  in- 
fluence upon  Austria  and  by  adopting  an  attitude  clearly 
in  opposition  to  the  conflict,  for  it  cannot  be  localized.  It 
is  desirable  that  you  express  the  conviction  that  it  is  im- 

x  Mr.  Price,  referring  to  Sazonof 's  proposal  to  the  "  effect  that  France  and 
Germany  should  fall  out  of  the  mediation  scheme,  and  that  the  good  offices 
of  two  powers  only,  England  and  Italy,  should  be  used,"  writes:  "This 
seems  to  mean  that  Russia  was  attempting  to  detach  Italy  from  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  then  use  her  as  a  mediator  with  England."  (M.  P.  Price, 
The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  p.  31.)  The  above  dispatch  of  the  Servian 
Minister  shows  that  Servia  and  hence  Russia  also  were  well  aware  of  Italy's 
attitude  and  that  she  had  so  little  sympathy  with  Austria's  projects  as  to 
warn  her  against  the  course  she  was  about  to  take. 


462     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

possible  for  Russia  not  to  come  to  the  aid  of  Servia.'  (Mod- 
ified quotation,  July  26,  R.  0.  P.  no.  23.) 

2.  San  Giuliano' s  helpful  suggestions 
On  July  27,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  returned  to 
Rome,  and  in  a  conversation  which  he  had  immediately 
after  his  arrival,  with  M.  Barrere,  the  French  Ambassador 
to  Italy,  '  he  spoke  to  him  of  the  contents  of  the  Austrian 
note,  and  formally  assured  him  that  he  had  not  had  any 
previous  knowledge  of  it.  He  knew,  indeed,  that  this  note 
was  to  have  a  rigorous  and  forcible  character;  but  he  had 
not  suspected  that  it  could  take  such  a  form.  The  Am- 
bassador asked  him  if  it  was  true  that  he  had  given  at 
Vienna,  as  certain  papers  alleged,  an  approval  of  the  Aus- 
trian action  and  an  assurance  that  Italy  would  fulfill  her 
duties  as  an  ally  toward  Austria.  "In  no  way,"  the  Min- 
ister replied : ' '  we  were  not  consulted ;  we  were  told  nothing ; 
it  was  not  for  us  then  to  make  any  such  communication  to 
Vienna."  The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  thought  that 
Servia  would  have  acted  more  wisely  if  she  had  accepted 
the  note  in  its  entirety;  that  day  he  still  thought  that  that 
would  be  the  only  thing  to  do,  being  convinced  that  Aus- 
tria would  not  withdraw  any  of  her  claims,  and  would 
maintain  them  even  at  the  risk  of  bringing  about  a  general 
conflagration;  he  doubted  whether  Germany  was  disposed 
to  lend  herself  to  any  pressure  on  her  ally.  He  asserted, 
however,  that  Germany  at  that  moment  attached  great 
importance  to  her  relations  with  London,  and  believed 
that  if  any  power  could  determine  Berlin  in  favor  of  peace- 
ful action,  it  was  England.  As  for  Italy,  she  would  con- 
tinue to  make  every  effort  in  favor  of  peace.  It  was  with 
that  end  in  view  that  he  had  adhered  without  hesitation 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  meeting  in  London  of 
the  ambassadors  of  those  powers  which  were  not  directly 
interested  in  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  72.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  463 

On  July  28,  as  a  result  of  his  conversation  with  the  Ser- 
vian Charge"  d' Affaires  at  Rome,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giu- 
liano  told  the  British  Ambassador  that  'he  thought  that 
if  some  explanations  were  given  regarding  the  manner  in 
which  the  Austrian  agents  would  require  to  intervene 
under  Articles  V  and  VI,  Servia  might  still  accept  the 
whole  Austrian  note.  As  it  was  not  to  be  anticipated  that 
Austria  would  give  such  explanations  to  Servia,  they 
might  be  given  to  the  powers  engaged  in  discussions,  who 
might  then  advise  Servia  to  accept  without  conditions.  In 
the  Austrian  official  explanation  of  the  grounds  on  which 
the  Servian  reply  was  considered  inadequate,  the  Marquis 
considered  many  points  besides  explanation  —  such  as 
slight  verbal  difference  in  sentence  regarding  renunciation 
of  propaganda  —  quite  childish,  but  there  was  a  passage 
which  might  prove  useful  in  facilitating  such  a  course  as 
was  considered  practicable  by  the  Servian  Charge  d 'Affaires. 
It  was  stated  that  cooperation  of  Austrian  agents  in  Servia 
was  to  be  only  in  investigation,  not  in  judicial  or  adminis- 
trative measures.  Servia  was  said  to  have  willfully  misin- 
terpreted this.  He  thought,  therefore,  that  the  ground 
might  be  cleared  here.  He  impressed  upon  the  Ambassador, 
above  all,  his  anxiety  for  the  immediate  beginning  of  dis- 
cussion. A  wide  general  latitude  to  accept  at  once  every 
point  or  suggestion  on  which  he  could  be  in  agreement 
with  England  and  Germany  had,  he  said,  been  given  to 
the  Italian  Ambassador.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  28, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  64.) 

On  July  29,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  learned  of 
'information  received  by  the  Italian  Government  that 
Germany  was  really  opposed  to  a  conference,  in  spite  of  the 
statement  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  about  Germany's  accept- 
ance of  it  in  "principle."  The  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  informed  the  ambassadors  that  he  was  telegraph- 
ing to  Berlin  to  urge  adherence  to  the  idea  of  an  exchange 
of  views  in  London,  and  suggested  that  the  German  Secre- 


464     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

tary  of  State  might  propose  a  formula  acceptable  to  his 
Government.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  this  exchange  of 
views  would  keep  the  door  open  if  the  direct  communica- 
tions between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  failed  to  have 
any  result.  He  thought  that  this  exchange  of  views  might 
be  concomitant  with  such  direct  communications.  He  also 
said  that  he  was  informing  the  German  Government  that 
the  Italian  Government  would  not  be  pardoned  by  public 
opinion  in  Italy  unless  they  had  taken  every  possible  step 
to  avoid  war.  He  was  urging  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment must  lend  their  cooperation  in  this.  There  seemed  to 
be  a  difficulty  in  making  Germany  believe  that  Russia  was 
in  earnest.  As  Germany,  however,  was  really  anxious  for 
good  relations  with  Great  Britain,  if  she  believed  that 
Great  Britain  would  act  with  Russia  and  France,  he 
thought  it  would  have  a  great  effect.  Even  should  it  prove 
impossible  to  induce  Germany  to  take  part,  he  would  still 
advocate  that  England  and  Italy,  each  as  representing  one 
group,  should  continue  to  exchange  views.'  (Modified 
quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  80.) 

On  July  29,  'the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano1  suggested 

1  The  London  Times  of  December  5,  1914,  prints  a  Reuter  dispatch, 
an  extract  from  which  sums  up  tersely  San  Giuliano's  direction  of  Italian 
diplomacy  just  preceding  the  war:  — 

"Since  the  beginning  of  July,  when,  after  the  murder  at  Serajevo,  the  re- 
lations between  Austria  and  Serbia  became  most  strained,  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  thought  it  his  duty  to  advise 
Vienna  to  use  moderation  and  to  avoid  the  intervention  of  Russia  in  support 
of  Belgrade.  Austria  answered  that  she  did  not  believe  that  Russia  was  suf- 
ficiently prepared  after  the  Japanese  War  to  undertake  military  action  in 
favour  of  Serbia,  bringing  forward  as  an  example  the  attitude  of  Russia  dur- 
ing the  whole  Conference  of  London  after  the  Balkan  War,  when  she  was 
unable  to  make  her  supremacy  in  the  Balkans  felt. 

"The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  replied  that,  according  to  his  information, 
the  situation  was  changed,  and  Russia  would  not  tolerate  any  attempt  to 
limit  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  Serbia  or  any  diminution  of  her 
territory.  Austria  retorted  that  in  such  a  case  the  intervention  of  Russia 
would  be  answered  by  the  participation  of  Germany  in  the  war.  The  Italian 
Foreign  Minister  pointed  out  the  enormous  gravity  of  this  plan,  as  the  ac- 
tion of  Germany  would  inevitably  mean  the  intervention  of  Great  Britain. 

."Both  Vienna  and  Berlin  replied  that  they  were  convinced  that  at  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  465 

that  the  German  objections  to  the  mediation  of  the  four 
powers,  a  mediation  that  was  strongly  favored  by  Italy, 
might  be  removed  by  some  change  in  the  form  of  procedure.' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  92.)  July  30, 
'when  the  Marquis  learned  that  Austria  had  refused  to 
continue  the  direct  exchange  of  views,  and  believing  that 
Germany  was  then  ready  to  give  Austria  more  concilia- 
tory advice,  he  suggested  that  an  exchange  of  views  be- 
tween the  four  powers  should  be  resumed  in  any  form 
which  Austria  would  consider  acceptable.'  (Modified  quo- 
tation, July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no.  106.) 

3.  Italian  cooperation  with  England 

In  a  conversation,  on  July  26,  with  M.  Barrere,  the 
French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  Signor  Salandra  said  in  re- 
gard to  the  attitude  the  Italian  Government  would  take: 
"  We  shall  make  the  greatest  efforts  to  prevent  the  rupture 
of  peace :  our  situation  is  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  Eng- 
land. It  is  possible  that  we  might  be  able  to  take  some 
action  with  England  toward  maintaining  the  peace."  (Ex- 
tract, July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  51.)  The  advantage  of  such  a 
collaboration  on  the  part  of  the  two  powers  least  directly 
involved  in  the  Austro-Servian  controversy  is  evident,  be- 
cause, even  after  Germany  might  have  become  involved  in 
reply  to  Russian  mobilization  and  have  rallied  to  the  sup- 
port of  her  ally,  these  two  powers,  one  from  each  group, 
Entente  and  Alliance,  could  still  continue  their  united 
efforts  in  the  cause  of  peace. 

At  St.  Petersburg,  on  July  26,  when  M.  Sazonof  pointed 
out  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  why  he  considered  the 
Austrian  note  unacceptable,  he  remarked  that  'it  would  be 

last  moment  Great  Britain  would  not  take  upon  herself  the  risk  of  enter- 
ing a  European  war.  The  Marquis  reiterated  that  such  a  view  was  erron- 
eous, having  sufficient  foundation  for  the  opinion  that  the  exact  opposite 
would  occur,  but  his  warning  was  in  vain.  Events  were  precipitated  by 
the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  which  was  sent  without  Italy's  either  being  con- 
sulted or  notified." 


466     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

useless  for  Russia  to  offer  her  good  offices  at  Belgrade, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  she  was  the  object  of  such  sus- 
picion in  Austria.  In  order,  however,  to  put  an  end  to  the 
present  tension,  he  thought  that  England  and  Italy  might 
be  willing  to  collaborate  with  Austria.  The  Austrian  Am- 
bassador undertook  to  communicate  the  Minister's  re- 
marks to  his  Government.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  27, 
B.  W.  P.  no.  44.)  A  couple  of  days  later,  the  Marquis  di  San 
Giuliano  made  the  various  suggestions  indicated  above; 
more  particularly  he  hinted  that  it  would  have  a  most  salu- 
tary effect  if  England  would  act  with  France  and  Russia; 
but  in  case  that  proved  impossible  he  declared  that  "he 
would  still  advocate  that  England  and  Italy,  each  as  repre- 
senting one  group,  should  continue  to  exchange  views." 
(July  29,  B.  W.  P.  no.  80.)  Again,  on  July  30,  the  resource- 
ful Minister  made  still  other  suggestions  to  the  British  Am- 
bassador, and  concluded  by  repeating  what  he  had  said  the 
day  before  that  'he  in  any  case  was  in  favor  of  continuing 
an  exchange  of  views  with  the  British  Government,  if  the 
idea  of  direct  discussions  between  the  four  powers  was  im- 
possible.' (Modified  quotation,  July  30,  B.  W.  P.  no  106.) 
M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  a 
conversation  with  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, August  1,  said  that  he  had  refused  no  suggestion  held 
out  to  him,  and  enumerated  those  he  had  accepted,  among 
them  the  proposal  for  mediation  by  Great  Britain  and 
Italy.   (Cf.  August  1,  B.  W.  P.  no.  139.) 

Elsewhere  in  the  British  White  Paper  I  find  no  refer- 
ence to  this  proposal  for  the  joint  mediation  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Italy,  and  am  unable  to  discover  whether  Italy 
went  any  further  than  merely  to  make  the  suggestion. 
This  plan  of  Anglo-Italian  mediation  perhaps  offered  the 
method  best  calculated  to  preserve  the  peace,  and  if  it 
could  have  been  possible  for  these  two  less  directly  involved 
states  to  declare  that  they  would  make  common  cause 
against  the  aggressor,  neither  Austria,  Russia,  Germany, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  467 

nor  France  would  have  dared  to  traverse  their  frontiers 
with  hostile  intent.  But  either  the  time  was  too  short,  or 
the  obligations  of  the  alliance  too  encumbering,  to  permit 
of  the  putting  into  effect  of  Anglo-Italian  intervention  in 
favor  of  peace. 

4-  Italy  declares  that  she  will  remain  neutral 

Austria  and  Germany  had  had  occasion  to  sound  Italy 
in  regard  to  her  action  in  the  event  of  a  European  war  re- 
sulting from  an  attack  upon  Servia,  and  although  the  re- 
cent tragedy  had  strengthened  Austria's  position  in  the 
eyes  of  Europe,  the  nature  of  the  Austro-Servian  disagree- 
ment remained  the  same. 

The  Entente  Powers  must,  on  the  other  hand,  have  felt 
considerable  anxiety  as  to  the  course  Italy  would  pursue. 
From  the  very  first  days  of  the  crisis,  this  solicitude  is  in- 
dicated in  the  reports  made  by  the  ambassadors  of  the 
Entente  Powers  to  their  Governments,  especially  as  to 
whether  Italy  had  been  consulted  in  regard  to  the  demarche 
at  Belgrade. 

On  July  24,  —  that  is,  the  day  after  the  presentation  of 
the  Austrian  ultimatum,  —  the  Acting  Foreign  Minister  in 
France,  in  a  telegram  sent  to  Stockholm  to  reach  M.  Vivi- 
ani  and  President  Poincar6,  then  on  their  return  journey 
on  board  the  France,  said:  "It  appears  from  the  informa- 
tion we  obtain  that  not  until  to-day  was  the  Austrian  note 
communicated  to  Italy,  and  that  she  was  neither  con- 
sulted nor  even  informed  about  it."  (Extract,  July  24, 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  26.)  July  25,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
learned  through  the  Belgian  Minister  that  'the  Italian 
Ambassador,  who  had  just  cut  short  his  leave  to  return  to 
his  post,  said  that  Italy  was  surprised,  to  say  the  least,  at 
having  been  kept  in  the  dark  regarding  the  whole  affair  by 
her  two  allies.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  25,  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
35.) 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 


468     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

in  his  report  written  after  his  return  to  London,  says: 
"It  might  have  been  supposed  that  the  Due  Avarna, 
Ambassador  of  the  allied  Italian  Kingdom,  which  was 
bound  to  be  so  closely  affected  by  fresh  complications  in 
the  Balkans,  would  have  been  taken  fully  into  the  confi- 
dence of  Count  Berchtold  during  this  critical  time.  In 
point  of  fact,  His  Excellency  was  left  completely  in  the 
dark."    (Extract,  B.  W.  P.,  Miscellaneous,  no.  10  [1914], 

p.l.) 

In  a  telegram  sent  July  26,  transmitted  to  M.  Viviani 
and  the  French  representatives  abroad,  the  French  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  states  that  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment, ' '  to  whom  the  Austrian  note  had  been  communicated 
on  Friday,1  without  any  request  for  support  or  even  advice, 
could  not,  in  the  absence  of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano, 
who  does  not  return  until  Tuesday  [July  28],  make  any  reply 
to  the  suggestion  of  the  Russian  Government  proposing 
to  press  at  Vienna  for  an  extension  of  time.  It  appears 
from  a  confidential  communication  by  the  Italian  Ambas- 
sador to  M.  Paleologue  [French  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg] that  at  Vienna  people  still  nurse  the  illusion  that 
Russia  'will  not  hold  fast.'  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
Italy  is  only  bound  by  the  engagements  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance if  she  has  been  consulted  beforehand."  (Extract, 
July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  50.) 

A  dispatch,  however,  of  the  same  date  (July  26)  from  M. 
Barrere,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  shows  that  the 
Acting  French  Foreign  Minister  was  mistaken,  for  Signor 
Salandra  stated  to  him  that  '  the  Austrian  note  had  been 
communicated  to  Rome  at  the  last  moment.  M.  Barrere 
carried  away  from  his  conversation  with  the  President  of 
the  Council  the  impression,  gathered  from  the  general 
drift  of  his  remarks,  that  the  Italian  Government  would  be 
willing  in  case  of  war  to  keep  out  of  it  and  maintain  an  at- 

1  That  is  July  24,  the  day  after  the  presentation  of  the  Ultimatum  to 
Servia. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  469 

titude  of  observation.'  (Modified  quotation,  July  26, 
F.  Y.  B.  no  51.) 

Yet,  when,  upon  his  return  to  Rome  on  the  evening  of 
July  27,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  saw  the  French  Am- 
bassador, he  spoke  to  him  of  the  contents  of  the  Austrian 
note  and  formally  assured  him  that  he  had  had  no  previous 
knowledge  of  it.1  'He  knew,  indeed,  that  this  note  was  to 
have  a  rigorous  and  forcible  character;  but  he  had  not 
suspected  that  it  could  take  such  a  form.  The  Ambassador 
asked  him  if  it  was  true  that  he  had  given  at  Vienna,  as 
certain  papers  alleged,  an  approval  of  the  Austrian  action 
and  an  assurance  that  Italy  would  fulfill  her  duties  as  an 
ally  toward  Austria.  "In  no  way,"  the  Minister  replied: 
"we  were  not  consulted;  we  were  told  nothing;  it  was  not 
for  us  then  to  make  any  such  communication  to  Vienna." ' 
(Modified  quotation,  July  27,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  72.) 

We  have  the  statement  of  the  French  Ambassador  at 
Rome  that  'Italian  public  opinion  was  hostile  to  Austria 
in  the  serious  situation  of  affairs.'  (Modified  quotation, 
July  26,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  52.) 

On  August  1,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Rome  sent  the 
following  dispatch  to  his  Government :  — 

"I  went  to  see  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  this  morning 
at  half-past  eight,  in  order  to  get  precise  information  from 
him  as  to  the  attitude  of  Italy  in  view  of  the  provocative 
acts  of  Germany  and  the  results  which  they  may  have. 

"The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  answered  that  he  had 
seen  the  German  Ambassador  yesterday  evening.  Herr 
von  Flotow  had  said  to  him  that  Germany  had  requested 
the  Russian  Government  to  suspend  mobilization,  and  the 
French  Government  to  inform  them  as  to  their  intentions; 
Germany  had  given  France  a  time  limit  of  eighteen  hours 
and  Russia  a  time  limit  of  twelve  hours. 

1  Probably  the  Minister  only  meant  that  he  had  not  known  about  the 
note  before  its  presentation.  It  seems,  however,  from  Signor  Salandra's 
statement,  that  it  was  communicated  to  Rome  shortly  before  it  was  pre- 
sented at  Belgrade. 


470     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

<  "Herr  von  Flotow  as  a  result  of  this  communication 
asked  what  were  the  intentions  of  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment. 

"The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  answered  that  as  the  war 
undertaken  by  Austria  was  aggressive  and  did  not  fall 
within  the  purely  defensive  character  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
particularly  in  view  of  the  consequences  which  might  re- 
sult from  it  according  to  the  declaration  of  the  German 
Ambassador,  Italy  would  not  be  able  to  take  part  in  the 
war."     (August  1,  F.  Y.  B.  no.  124.) 

On  August  1,  the  French  Ambassador  at  London  made 
the  following  communication :  — 

"In  reply  to  the  German  Government's  intimation  of 
the  fact  that  ultimatums  had  been  presented  to  France 
and  Russia,  and  to  the  question  as  to  what  were  the  inten- 
tions of  Italy,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  replied :  '  The 
war  undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences  which 
might  result,  had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Ambassador 
himself,  an  aggressive  object.  Both  were  therefore  in  con- 
flict with  the  purely  defensive  character  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  in  such  circumstances  Italy  would  remain 
neutral.' 

"In  making  this  communication,  M.  Cambon  was  in- 
structed to  lay  stress  upon  the  Italian  declaration  that  the 
present  war  was  not  a  defensive  but  an  aggressive  war, 
and  that,  for  this  reason  the  casus  foederis  under  the  terms 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  arise."  (August  3,  B.  W.  P. 
no.  152.) 

Any  suspicion  that  Italy  had  not  been  frank  with  her 
allies  is  disproved  by  the  declaration  which  Signor  Gio- 
vanni Giolitti,  the  former  Premier,  made  in  the  Italian 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  December  5,  when  announcing  his 
approval  of  the  Government's  policy  of  neutrality:  — 

"I  feel  it  my  duty  to  recall  a  precedent  showing  how  cor- 
rect was  the  interpretation  of  the  alliance  by  the  Govern- 
ment when  the  conflict  began.  During  the  Balkan  War,  on 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  471 

August  9,  1913,  being  absent  from  Rome,  I  received  the 
following  telegram  from  the  late  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano : ! 
'"Austria  has  communicated  to  us  and  Germany  that  it 
has  been  the  intention  to  act  against  Servia,  defining  such 
action  as  defensive  and  hoping  for  an  application  of  a  casus 
foederis  by  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  I  consider  inappli- 
cable. I  am  trying  to  agree  with  Germany  concerning 
efforts  to  prevent  Austrian  action,  but  it  may  be  necessary 
to  say  clearly  that  we  do  not  consider  such  eventual  ac- 
tion as  defensive,  and,  therefore,  do  not  think  that  there 
exists  a  casus  foederis.  Please  send  a  telegram  saying 
whether  you  approve.' 

"I  answered  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  thus:  'If  Austria 
goes  against  Servia,  a  casus  foederis  evidently  does  not  ex- 
ist. It  is  an  action  she  accomplishes  on  her  own  account. 
It  is  not  defensive,  because  nobody  thinks  of  attacking 
her.  It  is  necessary  to  declare  this  to  Austria  in  the  most 
formal  manner,  hoping  that  Germany  will  act  to  dissuade 
Austria  from  a  very  dangerous  adventure.' 

"This  was  done,  and  our  interpretation  of  the  treaty  was 
accepted  by  our  allies,  our  friendly  relations  not  being  in 
the  least  disturbed.  Thus  the  declaration  of  neutrality, 
made  at  the  beginning  of  this  conflict,  is  according  to  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  the  treaties.  I  recall  this  incident,  wish- 
ing to  demonstrate  the  complete  loyalty  of  Italy  before  the 
eyes  of  Europe."  2 

Not  only  have  Germany  and  Austria  refrained  from  crit- 
icizing Italy  for  her  stand,  but  Germany's  ex-Chancellor, 
Prince  von  Bulow,  made  the  following  statement  in  his 
book  published  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war :  ' '  Sup- 
posing Italy  were  not  able  in  every  conceivable  circum- 
stance to  go  to  all  lengths  with  Austria  and  us,  and  if  we 
and  Austria  likewise  were  not  able  to  support  Italy  in  all 

1  The  late  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  was,  at  the  time  referred  to,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Cabinet  of  which  Signor  Giolitti  was  Premier. 

2  From  the  New  York  Times,  December  7,  1914. 


472     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

complications  of  international  politics,  even  then  each  one 
of  the  three  powers  would,  by  virtue  of  the  existing  alli- 
ance, be  prevented  from  assisting  the  enemy.  That  is 
what  Prince  Bismarck  meant  when  he  once  remarked  that 
it  was  sufficient  for  him  that  an  Italian  corporal  with  the 
Italian  flag  and  a  drummer  beside  him  should  array  them- 
selves against  the  West,  i.e.,  France,  and  not  against  the 
East,  i.e.,  Austria."  1 

Let  me  conclude  this  discussion  of  Italy's  attitude  up  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  by  an  extract  from  a  recent  ar- 
ticle by  William  Roscoe  Thayer : 2 

"Too  little  has  been  said  about  Italy's  refusal  to  join 
Germany  and  Austria  in  their  war  for  world  power.  Dur- 
ing the  past  five  months  we  have  heard  German  apologists 
offer  the  most  contradictory  arguments  to  prove,  first,  that 
Russia,  next,  that  France  and  Belgium,  and,  finally,  that 
England  began  the  struggle.  The  Kaiser  himself,  with 
that  disdain  of  fact  which  is  the  privilege  of  autocrats,  de- 
clared that  the  sword  was  forced  into  his  hands.  And  all 
the  while  the  mere  abstention  of  Italy  from  supporting 
Germany  and  Austria  gave  the  lie  to  the  Germanic  pro- 
testations and  excuses. 

"By  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  every  member  of 
it  is  bound  to  communicate  at  once  to  the  other  members 
all  international  diplomatic  transactions  which  concern 
the  alliance.  Germany  and  Austria  failed  to  do  this  during 
the  earlier  stages  in  July,  when  they  were  preparing  for 
war.  Only  after  they  had  laid  their  train  so  surely  that 
an  explosion  was  almost  inevitable  did  they  communicate 
the  documents  to  Italy  and  call  upon  her  to  take  her  place 
in  the  field  with  them.  But  Italy  refused;  because,  after 
examining  the  evidence,  she  concluded  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  the  aggressors.  Now,  the  terms  of  the  Triple 

1  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  72-73.     New  York,  1914. 

2  This  valuable  discussion  of  Italy's  relation  to  the  war  appeared  in  the 
New  York  Times,  Sunday  edition,  January  17,  1915. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  473 

Alliance  bind  its  members  to  stand  by  each  other  only  in 
case  of  attack. 

"Italy's  verdict,  therefore,  threw  the  guilt  of  the  war  on 
Germany  and  Austria.  She  had  testimony  before  her 
which  does  not  appear  even  in  the  'White  Papers'  and 
other  official  diplomatic  correspondence ;  and  all  the  efforts 
of  German  zealots  and  casuists  have  not  subtracted  one 
iota  from  the  meaning  of  her  abstention.  Germany  and 
Austria  were  the  aggressors  —  that  is  the  Italian  verdict, 
which  history  will  confirm. 

"But  a  still  further  consideration  influenced  her.  It  was 
understood  that,  if  the  war  in  which  Germany  and  Austria 
engaged  should  involve  England  as  an  enemy,  Italy's 
obligation  to  support  the  Triple  Alliance  would  cease. 
Since  it  would  be  suicidal  for  Italy  to  accept  the  liability 
of  a  casus  foederis  which  should  expose  her  to  attack  by  the 
English  and  French  navies,  her  participation  in  the  Triple 
Alliance  always  carried  the  proviso  that  it  did  not  bind  her 
to  fight  England." 


CHAPTER  XI 

CONCLUSION 

The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  war  —  Suggested  and  alleged 
causes  of  the  war  —  Displacement  of  the  balance  of  power  —  The  immedi- 
ate causes  of  the  war —  The  determining  causes  of  the  war  —  The  world's 
answer — Formation  of  a  Super-Empire  —  The  "Peace  power"  —  Ger- 
many's nationalistic  conception  —  Nationalism  and  internationalism.  — 
The  results. 

1.  The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  war 
The  United  States  is  more  than  an  interested  spectator 
—  it  is  vitally  affected  by  the  war.  In  the  early  part  of 
July,  1914,  hardly  any  one  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  real- 
ized that  trouble  was  brewing,  and  when,  in  the  last  week 
of  the  month,  we  heard  of  one  threatening  move  after  an- 
other, it  seemed  too  terrible  to  believe.  As  I  look  back,  the 
strongest  impression  I  recall  of  the  days  just  preceding  the 
war  is  that  the  renewal  of  negotiations  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  as  reported  on  July  29  and  30,  seemed  to  point 
to  the  probability  of  a  peaceful  solution,  and  the  continued 
sailing  of  the  great  German  liners  gave  indication  that  all 
hope  was  not  lost.  The  whole  country  was  horrified  at  the 
prospect  of  such  a  war,  and  many,  up  to  the  very  last,  re- 
fused to  believe  it  possible. 

It  was  inevitable  that  war  on  such  a  scale  should  seri- 
ously affect  our  economic  interests.  Not  only  were  our 
markets  and  sources  of  supplies  disorganized  by  the  mili- 
tary operations,  but  almost  all  our  sea-borne  commerce 
was  in  the  hands  of  one  or  the  other  belligerent,  so  that  we 
could  not  depend  upon  adequate  shipping  facilities.  In 
fact,  many  of  the  ships  flying  a  belligerent  flag  were  Am- 
erican-owned, and  their  seizure  would  be  a  loss  to  Ameri- 
can capital.  It  is  not,  however,  the  serious  monetary  losses 
of  this  country  by  reason  of  the  war  which  explain  our  pe- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  475 

culiar  interest.  More  significant  still  is  the  fact  that,  of  the 
population  of  the  United  States,  more  than  ten  millions 
were  born  within  the  territory  of  the  belligerents.1  The  in- 
fluence, direct  and  indirect,  of  these  millions  permeates  this 
whole  country,  and  deepens  our  concern  in  what  is  taking 
place  beyond  the  seas.  The  American  people  is  thoroughly 
imbued  with  the  idea  that  any  avoidable  war  is  a  crime 
against  humanity,  and  before  we  blame  any  of  the  con- 
tending powers,  we  must  make  every  effort  to  ascertain 
what  were  the  causes  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  1914. 

2.  Suggested  and  alleged  causes  of  the  war 

The  interest  of  the  belligerents  in  the  consideration  of 
the  causes  of  the  conflict  is  much  obscured  by  the  all-per- 
vading event  itself.  It  is  desirable  to  consider  the  causes 
of  the  war,  if  only  to  help  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  catas- 
trophe. In  the  United  States  we  are  particularly  well  situ- 
ated to  make  this  the  object  of  our  study.  Among  the  sug- 
gested causes  of  the  war  are  —  the  monarchical  form  of 
government;  exaggerated  armaments;  territorial  ambi- 
tion; England's  repression  of  Germany  and  Germany's 
consequent  jealousy;  capitalistic  organization  of  the  state; 
seizure  of  private  property  at  sea;  tariff  barriers;  nervous 
tension  resulting  from  successive  alarms;  political  ignor- 
ance and  mistrust;  unequal  speed  of  mobilization;  division 
of  Europe  into  two  groups  of  alliances;  displacement  of  the 
balance  of  power;  secret  diplomacy;  Germany's  refusal  to 
join  in  mediation;  Russia's  premature  mobilization  against 
Germany;  national  hatred;  patriotism;  mystic  conception 
of  the  state;  deification  of  force;  England's  hesitation  in 
siding  with  Russia  and  France. 

All  these  reasons  and  many  another  have  been  adduced. 
If  many  English  sympathizers  declare  that  Germany  in  her 

1  This  does  not  include  a  million  and  a  half  of  Italians  and  many  millions 
more  of  our  citizens  who  have  one  or  both  parents  from  a  belligerent  coun- 
try. (United  States  Census  Report,  on  "Foreigners  in  the  United  States  in 
1910.") 


476     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

lust  for  empire  intended  to  wage  a  war  for  the  domination 
of  the  Continent,  the  Germans  answer  that  English  jeal- 
ousy, selfishness,  and  imperialistic  designs  threatened  to 
strangle  her  rival's  development.  The  pacifist  blames  the 
competition  in  armament,  while  the  strategist  gives  an  ex- 
planation diametrically  opposed,  to  the  effect  that  the  un- 
preparedness  of  the  Entente  Powers  invited  attack,  and 
that  the  inability  of  Russia  to  mobilize  with  speed  forced 
the  issue  as  soon  as  she  made  a  move  to  prepare  for  her  de- 
fense. For  others,  the  cause  is  the  inanity  of  the  diploma- 
tists. Many  a  casual  student  of  politics  will  take  upon 
himself  to  give  an  offhand  explanation  of  how  certain  states- 
men or  diplomatists  might  have  acted  so  as  to  save  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

The  really  significant  thing  about  all  these  causes,  main- 
tained with  such  sincerity,  is  their  variety,  their  independ- 
ence one  of  another,  one  might  say  even  their  mutual  ex- 
clusion. It  shows  that  we  are  in  the  presence  of  a  great 
tidal  movement  in  the  affairs  of  men  which  we  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  appreciate  because  of  the  very  fact  that  we  are  in  it 
and  part  of  it.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  very  natural 
for  each  individual  to  fasten  the  blame  upon  the  side  with 
which  he  has  least  sympathy,  and  to  select  his  particular 
phobia  as  the  basic  cause  of  the  conflict. 

S.  Displacement  of  the  balance  of  power 

When  everything  is  considered,  it  may  perhaps  be  said 
that  one  of  the  most  important  contributory  causes  of  the 
outbreak  was  the  disturbance  of  the  balance  of  power  be- 
tween the  two  groups,  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  Triple 
Alliance.  Ever  since  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Europe  has 
been  slowly  working  out  its  political  evolution  from  the 
necessarily  unstable  condition  of  a  number  of  nearly  equal 
powers  toward  a  division  of  these  powers  into  two  great 
groups. 

Great  Britain  at  first  held  aloof  in  "  splendid  isolation." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  477 

Later  she  found  that  even  the  two  opposed  groups  on  the 
Continent  were  gradually  becoming  conscious  of  the  ad- 
vantage which  would  result  from  sinking  their  immediate 
grounds  of  difference  and  forming  a  union  to  oppose  any 
further  extension  of  British  power.  The  danger  of  this  situ- 
ation could  not  fail  to  impress  Great  Britain  and  make  her 
all  the  quicker  to  perceive  the  community  of  interest 
which  she  had  with  France.  Then  came  the  growing  rivalry 
with  Germany  to  hasten  the  formation  of  the  Entente. 
Without  joining  in  a  formal  alliance,  Great  Britain  was 
still  true  to  her  traditional  policy  in  throwing  her  weight 
against  the  more  powerful  continental  group,  which  in- 
cluded her  most  immediate  rival,  Germany.  Great  Bri- 
tain's association  with  France  was  soon  followed  by  an 
understanding  with  Russia  to  form  the  Triple  Entente. 
This  policy,  taken  in  conjunction  with  England's  friendly 
relations  with  the  United  States  and  her  alliance  with 
Japan,  made  it  possible  for  her  to  turn  her  principal  at- 
tention to  the  settlement  of  her  outstanding  differences 
with  Germany.  England  and  France,  both  rich,  conserva- 
tive powers,  wanted  to  keep  what  they  already  had  and  to 
get  rid  of  the  intolerable  burdens  of  increasing  armaments. 
Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  considered  that  disarma- 
ment would  put  an  end  to  her  imperialistic  aspirations 
and  leave  her  industrial  development  at  the  mercy  of  Eng- 
land and  Russia  —  Russia  with  tremendous  advantages 
in  her  millions  of  population,  and  England  enjoying  her 
superb  geographical  situation  and  her  unparalleled  finan- 
cial strength.  If  Germany  had  had  a  Bismarck,  she  would 
have  talked  disarmament  with  the  others,  but  deferred  its 
actual  execution  until  a  satisfactory  political  adjustment 
should  have  been  reached.  As  it  was,  Germany's  refusal, 
in  no  uncertain  tones,  to  entertain  the  thought  of  any  limi- 
tation of  armament,  left  to  Europe  as  her  only  hope  of 
peace  the  continuance  of  her  system  of  balancing  the 
Triple  Entente  against  the  Triple  Alliance. 


478     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

In  spite  of  Germany's  tremendous  efforts  toward  the  co- 
ordination and  organization  of  her  national  strength,  the 
Triple  Entente  was  able  to  exert  throughout  the  world  an 
influence  entirely  overbalancing  that  of  Germany  and 
Austria.  The  strengthening  of  the  bonds  of  union  between 
the  members  of  the  Entente,  the  cooperaton  of  the  French 
and  English  fleets,  and  the  reorganization  of  the  Russian 
navy,  made  it  clear  that  time  was  working  against  the 
Triple  Alliance,  and  that  the  balance  would  incline  more 
and  more  to  the  side  of  the  Triple  Entente.  The  prospect 
of  such  a  dislocation  of  the  balance  of  power  would  have 
been  enough  in  itself  to  threaten  the  peace  of  Europe,  but 
the  equilibrium  was  further  disturbed  by  Italy's  attack 
upon  Turkey  and  her  entering  into  an  agreement  with 
France  and  England  in  regard  to  Mediterranean  waters.1 
One  more  blow  was  dealt  to  the  tottering  edifice  when  the 
Balkan  allies  carved  up  the  Turkish  territory  in  Europe. 
This  was  the  situation  when  the  crime  of  Serajevo  came  as 
the  final  jolt.  Germany  and  Austria  felt  that  they  were 
face  to  face  with  a  dilemma :  either  they  had  to  accept  the 
status  quo  at  what  they  considered  the  dictation  of  the 
Triple  Entente  and  resign  themselves  to  the  increase  of 
Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans,  thus  endangering  the 
existence  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  or  they  had  to  strike  at 
once  before  Russia  became  too  powerful.2    There  were 

1  Italy  held  a  position  of  balance  between  the  different  groups.  Germany 
had  not  been  willing  to  make  the  Triple  Alliance  cover  the  Mediterranean,  so 
that  Italy  had  to  look  for  other  support  in  that  region.  This  necessity  under 
which  she  lay  of  coming  to  an  agreement  with  France  and  England  made  it 
possible  for  her  to  coquet  with  France  without  losing  the  advantage  she  de- 
rived from  her  alliance.  This  difficult  role  of  balancing  between  opposing 
groups  she  has  played  with  great  skill.  At  Algeciras  she  deserted  Germany, 
who  could  hardly  complain  at  Italy's  making  use  of  her  liberty  of  action  in 
Mediterranean  affairs,  since  it  was  Germany  herself  who  had  been  unwilling 
to  extend  the  Triplice  to  include  them. 

2  Prince  von  Billow  says  of  the  Triple  Alliance:  "The  three  mid-Euro- 
pean States  are  bound  to  each  other  by  the  firm  resolve  to  maintain  the 
existing  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  should  a  forcible  change  be  at- 
tempted, to  prevent  it  if  need  be  by  force.  The  united  strength  of  Middle 
Europe  stands  in  the  path  of  any  revolution  —  any  European  policy  which 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  479 

many  reasons  why  the  situation  in  Russia,  France,  and 
England  must  have  made  Germany  feel  it  a  good  time  to 
strike.  So  good  an  excuse  for  war  might  not  soon  again  be 
found,  for  Germany  well  knew  that  a  Balkan  question 
was  not  a  vital  matter  for  either  France  or  England,  and 
that  England  would  not  willingly  be  drawn  into  conflict 
for  such  a  cause.  The  German  Government  seems  to  have 
had  some  hope  that  England  would  really  hold  aloof  from 
the  conflict,  and  that  seems  to  have  been  the  general  pub- 
he  opinion  throughout  Germany.  If  England  had  remained 
neutral,  Germany  might  have  been  able  to  increase  the 
strength  of  the  Triple  Alliance  at  the  expense  of  the  Dual 
Alliance  between  Russia  and  France. 

4.  The  immediate  causes  of  the  war 

It  is  easy  to  recognize  as  a  cause  of  the  war  the  distur- 
bance of  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two  European 
groups.  What  it  really  caused  was  not  the  war,  but  a  con- 
dition of  uneasiness  and  tension  which  made  Germany  ap- 
prehensive lest  she  be  overpowered  by  the  growing  strength 
of  the  Triple  Entente  and  thwarted  in  her  plans  looking  to 
territorial  and  commercial  expansion  throughout  the  world, 
and,  at  the  moment,  through  the  Balkans  into  Asia  Minor. 
This  state  of  mind  is,  then,  more  truly  a  cause  of  the  war  / 
than  is  the  upsetting  of  the  balance  of  power.  Even  so,  we 
must  still  inquire  what  were  the  reasons  why  the  conflict 
broke  out  at  the  particular  time  and  in  the  particular  way 
it  did.  In  other  words,  what  were  the  immediate  causes  of 
the  war. 

WTien  we  speak  of  causes,  we  mean  ordinarily  the  causes 
resulting  from  voluntary  action.  That  is  what  interests  us, 
because  by  discovering  and  demonstrating  wherein  this 
voluntary  action  was  irrational,  we  shall  make  it  impossi- 

might  elect  to  follow  the  courses  pursued  by  Louis  XIV  or  Napoleon  I. 
This  alliance  is  like  a  mighty  fortification  dividing  the  Continent  in  two." 
(Imperial  Germany,  p.  67.     New  York,  1914.) 


480     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

ble  of  repetition  for  rational  beings.  Whatever  lies  beyond 
this  sphere  of  voluntary  action  is  also  beyond  any  possibil- 
ity of  blame  or  responsibility.  It  is  like  the  play  of  natural 
forces. 

We  have  seen  how  the  separate  links  were  forged  in  the 
chain  of  military  preparation  which  involved  the  powers 
in  quick  succession  in  the  coils  of  war.  We  find  that  the 
condition  of  Balkan  affairs  caused  aggressive  action  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  toward  its  weaker  neighbor;  in  the  rivalry 
of  Austria  and  Russia  for  the  maintenance  or  extension  of 
their  influence  in  the  Balkans,  we  discover  the  most  cogent 
immediate  cause  for  the  break  between  these  two  states; 
while  Germany  was  involved  because  she  could  not  allow 
Austria  to  become  engaged  in  an  unequal  struggle  with 
Russia  and  Servia  which  would  have  weakened  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  her  own  influence.  Because  of  the  Dual  Al- 
liance and  the  similar  need  of  maintaining  the  existing 
balance  of  power,  France  could  not  hold  aloof.  And  Ger- 
many ought  to  have  been  sufficiently  well  informed  to 
realize  that  England  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  stand  by 
and  allow  her  partners  in  the  Entente  to  be  crushed,  as 
Germany  knew  they  would  be  if  unsupported  by  England. 
She  should,  therefore,  have  realized  that  England  would 
probably  either  come  in  at  the  start  to  protect  France,  or 
intervene  later  to  prevent  Germany  from  reaping  the  bene- 
fits of  victory.  Germany  seems  indeed  to  have  understood 
that  she  could  not  count  upon  British  neutrality  without  a 
definite  engagement  to  that  effect,  for  she  made  a  "  strong 
bid"  to  secure  it,  and  no  doubt  she  would  have  doubled  or 
trebled  this.  England  was  not  to  be  caught,  however,  and 
Germany  had  to  reckon  upon  English  intervention  as  one 
of  the  factors  of  the  situation.  With  this  great  potential 
coalition  staring  her  in  the  face,  the  necessity  of  getting  in 
a  telling  blow  before  the  Entente  could  collect  its  forces 
was  of  prime  importance;  and  when  we  take  into  account 
the  German  point  of  view,  philosophy  of  life,  and  espe- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF,  THE  WAR  481 

cially  the  large  influence  of  the  military  class,  we  see  that 
it  was  inevitable  that  respect  for  Belgium's  rights  and 
Germany's  own  treaty  obligations  should  be  brushed  aside 
in  order  that  she  lose  no  time  in  crushing  France. 

The  consequence  of  England's  refusal  to  enter  into  a 
binding  agreement  that  she  would  remain  neutral  was  the 
invasion  of  Belgium;  and  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  or  rather 
Germany's  refusal  to  give  her  promise  that  she  would  keep 
out,  was  again  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  England's 
immediate  rally  to  the  support  of  the  Entente.1 

If  the  logic  of  each  of  these  steps  be  true,  so  that  each 
made  the  succeeding  inevitable,  the  first  move  would  be 
the  cause  of  all  the  others.  By  cause  we  mean,  as  has  been 
said,  the  responsible  cause;  that  is,  the  action  which  we 
look  upon  as  having  been  voluntarily  taken.  If,  therefore, 
we  wish  to  get  at  the  cause  or  causes  of  this  conflict,  we 
must,  I  repeat,  examine  in  this  successive  widening  of  the 
area  of  conflict  each  step  to  see  where  there  was  any  op- 
portunity for  a  rational  choice  of  action. 

Looking  at  it  from  this  point  of  view,  we  must  conclude 
that  Servia  and  her  Government  could  do  nothing.  The 
widespread  hatred  of  Austria,  and  the  bitter  disappoint- 
ment in  Servia  at  being  checked  by  her  from  securing  an 
outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  made  it  impossible  for  the  Servian 
Government  to  hold  in  check  the  hostile  propaganda  di- 
rected against  the  integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.  The  Servian  Government  might,  however,  have 
instituted  its  own  court  of  investigation  of  the  Serajevo 
assassination,  and  this  would  have  made  it  more  difficult 
for  Austria  to  present  an  ultimatum  drawn  in  terms  so  ex- 
traordinarily harsh.  I  doubt,  however,  if  this  would  have 

1  Since  England's  action  depended  upon  what  Germany  promised,  and 
Germany's  action  depended  upon  what  England  promised,  it  is  evident  that 
the  real  cause  of  German  aggression  against  Belgium  was  the  belief  that 
England  might  intervene  even  if  Germany  kept  out  of  Belgium,  and  the 
cause  of  the  English  intervention  of  August  2  in  favor  of  France  was  the 
distrust  of  Germany  and  fear  that  she  intended  to  invade  Belgium. 


482     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

had  any  real  effect.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  not  have 
been  possible  to  secure  an  unbiased  and  fair  conduct  of 
such  an  investigation  on  Servian  soil,  and  even  if  the  au- 
thorities at  Belgrade  had  accomplished  this  impossible 
task,  Austrian  hatred  and  ambitions  would  have  caused 
her  to  criticize  the  manner  in  which  it  was  conducted,  and 
would  have  accounted  this  an  additional  ground  of  com- 
plaint. However  little  sympathy  we  may  have  for  the 
Servians,  it  is  unjust  to  lay  at  their  door  the  cause  of  the 
conflict.  So  far  as  it  was  able  to  control  the  action  of  the 
people,  the  course  adopted  by  the  Servian  Government, 
under  the  leadership  of  their  able  Minister  Pashitch,  was 
admirable. 

When,  now,  we  come  to  Austria  and  Russia,  we  may  say 
that  either  or  both  might  by  their  action  have  obviated 
contributing  causes  of  the  conflict.  Russia  and  Austria  had 
each  been  intriguing  by  every  possible  means  to  increase  its 
own  influence  in  the  Balkans  at  the  expense  of  the  other's. 
The  last  moves  had  all  been  in  Russia's  favor,  and  Austria 
was  smarting  at  her  loss  of  prestige  and  fearful  for  the 
preservation  of  the  integrity  of  her  empire.  Even  Russia 
took  into  account  the  difficulty  of  Austria's  position,  and, 
influenced  by  the  Entente  Powers  and  the  broad  vision  of 
her  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  led  to  cooperate  in 
trying  to  find  some  way  to  protect  Austria's  vital  interests 
without  interfering  with  Austria's  integrity  and  sovereign 
rights.  A  difficulty,  perhaps,  was  that  Austria  probably 
considered  that  her  vital  interest  required  that  she  should 
be  free  to  extend  through  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar  toward 
Salonika.  The  death  of  M.  Hartwig,  the  Russian  Minister 
to  Servia,  seemed  to  remove  one  of  the  principal  obstacles 
to  the  improvement  of  relations  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  Doubtless  Austria  was  sincere  when  she  said  she 
would  not  annex  any  Servian  territory,  but  Russia  knew 
that  if  her  rival  were  allowed  to  domineer  over  Servia,  she 
could  find  some  disguised  way  of  continuing  her  advance 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  483 

on  Salonika  without  disturbing  the  nominal  integrity  of 
the  Servian  Kingdom.1  We  are,  therefore,  in  the  presence 
of  a  conflict  in  the  policies  of  expansion.  Servia's  propa- 
ganda directed  against  Austria's  integrity,  if  it  would  not 
have  justified  a  campaign  of  conquest  against  the  Serbs, 
would  have  excused  any  measures  of  force  which  Austria 
found  necessary  to  employ  in  order  to  establish  a  modus 
Vivendi  with  her  neighbor.  If  Russia  chose  to  interfere,  it 
would  have  been  merely  a  case  of  one  ambition  in  conflict 
with  another.  But  the  point  where  Austria  is  to  blame  — 
and  I  would  emphasize  it  most  strongly  —  is  in  the  deliber- 
ate manner  in  which  she  concealed  her  intentions  and  tried 
to  lull  to  rest  the  suspicions  of  the  powers,  while  she  pre- 
pared an  ultimatum  which  she  knew  could  not  possibly  be 
accepted.  In  this  course  of  action  she  disregarded  the  well- 
recognized  forms  of  diplomatic  procedure,  according  to 
which  one  state,  before  it  has  recourse  to  measures  of  force 
against  another,  should  state  its  grievance  and  give  an  op- 
portunity for  explanation  and  the  voluntary  elimination 
of  the  cause  of  complaint.  It  will  be  said  that  this  is  not  a 
requirement  of  international  procedure  specifically  set 
forth,  but  it  will  not  be  denied  that  it  is  the  course  ad- 
hered to  by  civilized  states  in  their  dealings  with  one 
another,  and  that,  wherever  there  has  been  a  departure 
from  this  method  of  procedure,  it  has  met  with  the  general 
condemnation  of  the  society  of  states.  Here,  then,  in  first 
instance,  we  must  place  the  blame  for  the  whole  war  in 
which  Europe  is  engaged. 

Continuing,  let  us  examine  whether  even  after  this 
blameworthy  action,  which  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  con- 
ciliatory efforts  of  the  powers  to  counteract,  there  were  not 
other  acts  open  to  criticism.  As  soon  as  Austria  presented 
her  ultimatum,  it  was  patent  to  all  that  Russia,  unless  re- 
strained by  fear,  would  hasten  to  protect  her  prestige  in  the 

1  For  example,  England  has  been  the  virtual  sovereign  of  Egypt  for  years 
without  disturbing  the  nominal  sovereignty  of  the  Porte. 


484     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Balkans  and  save  her  sister  state  from  annihilation  by  the 
Dual  Monarchy;  and  that  this  would  bring  in  Germany, 
then  France,  and  possibly  England.  Germany  maintained 
that  Russia  by  such  action  would  be  responsible  for  the 
subsequent  widening  of  the  conflict.  But  before  blaming 
Russia  for  coming  to  the  support  of  Servia,  we  have  to 
ascertain  whether  any  other  course  lay  open  to  her.  Again 
I  believe  that  it  will  generally  be  recognized  that  Russia 
could  only  have  kept  out  of  the  conflict  if  some  way  had 
been  found  to  prevent  the  subjugation  of  Servia  by  Austria. 
In  all  Balkan  disputes  the  recognized  method  of  proced- 
ure during  the  last  few  years  has  been  either  to  leave  the 
question  to  be  adjusted  by  mutual  agreement  of  Austria 
and  Russia,  or  else,  in  case  the  problem  proved  too  difficult, 
to  confide  it  to  a  conference  of  the  powers.  In  the  present 
case  Austria  departed  from  this  procedure  and  insisted  on 
settling  this  Balkan  question  directly  with  Servia,  without 
the  interference  of  any  other  powers,  thus  contributing  an- 
other cause  for  the  conflict.  In  this  stand  she  was  abetted 
by  Germany,  who,  up  to  the  time  of  the  presentation  of  her 
ultimatum  to  Russia,  insisted  that  the  settlement  of  the 
Austro-Servian  question  be  left  to  Austria  alone.  Further- 
more, Germany  refused  to  take  part  in  a  conference  to  dis- 
cuss the  question  with  the  hope  of  reaching  some  solution. 
Mr.  Asquith  was  certainly  right  in  saying  that  if  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey's  proposal  for  a  mediatory  conference  of  the 
four  powers  who  were  not  directly  concerned  —  Germany, 
France,  Italy,  and  England  —  "had  been  accepted,  the  ac- 
tual controversy  would  have  been  settled  with  honor  to 
everybody,  and  the  whole  of  this  terrible  welter  would 
have  been  avoided."  *  Germany  did  declare  that  she  was 
willing  to  enter  into  a  conference  to  consider  a  difference 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  but  by  refusing  to  consider 
that  Russia  could  have  any  interest  in  the  Austro-Servian 
dispute,  she  practically  refused  to  enter  into  a  mediatory 

1  Guildhall  speech,  September  4.     (London  Times,  September  5,  1914.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  .485 

conference  in  regard  to  the  only  acute  ground  of  difference 
which  could  be  considered  as  existing  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  In  taking  a  stand  so  opposed  to  what  had  been 
the  practice  in  regard  to  the  settlement  of  Balkan  ques- 
tions, Germany,  it  might  have  been  supposed,  would  make 
every  effort  to  suggest  some  equally  effective  means  of  pre- 
venting actual  recourse  to  arms.  Instead,  she  limited  her 
conciliatory  action  to  urging  her  ally  to  continue  direct 
negotiation  with  Russia,  and  passing  on  to  her  the  various 
suggestions  advanced  in  the  vain  hope  of  preventing  a 
war.  In  adopting  this  course,  she  assumed  a  very  great  re- 
sponsibility, and  because  of  the  superior  development  and 
civilization  of  the  German  Empire  as  compared  with  the 
Austrian  state,  we  must  apportion  to  her  for  this  mistake 
a  still  larger  share  of  the  blame  for  the  terrible  conse- 
quences. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  misunderstood  as  thinking  that  Ger- 
many really  wished  for  war;  but  by  her  conduct  she  gave 
evidence  that  she  intended  to  back  up  her  ally  to  secure  a 
diplomatic  triumph  and  the  subjugation  of  her  neighbor, 
which  would  greatly  have  strengthened  Teutonic  influence 
in  the  Balkans.1  She  risked  the  peace  of  Europe  in  a  cam-  ^ 
paign  after  prestige. 

Germany  accused  Russia  of  making  war  inevitable  by 
her  mobilization  just  at  the  moment  when,  cooperating 

1  Bismarck  said:  "The  Oriental  crisis  is  undoubtedly  the  most  likely  to 
occur,  and  in  this  our  interests  are  only  secondary.  When  it  happens,  we 
are  in  a  position  to  watch  whether  the  powers,  who  are  primarily  interested 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Levant,  will  make  their  decisions  and  come  to 
terms,  if  they  choose,  or  go  to  war  with  Russia  about  them.  We  are  not  im- 
mediately called  upon  to  do  either.  Every  great  power  which  is  trying  to 
influence  or  to  restrain  the  policies  of  other  countries  in  matters  which  are 
beyond  the  sphere  of  its  interests  is  playing  politics  beyond  the  bounds 
which  God  has  assigned  to  it.  Its  policy  is  one  of  force  and  not  of  vital  in-, 
terests.  It  is  working  for  prestige.  We  shall  not  do  this.  If  Oriental  crises 
happen,  we  shall  wait  before  taking  our  position  until  the  powers,  who  have 
greater  interests  at  stake  than  we,  have  declared  themselves."  (Speech  of 
Bismarck,  February  6,  1888,  quoted  from  translation  in  What  Germany 
Wants,  by  Edmund  von  Mach,  pp.  86,  87.    See  ante,  p.  107.) 


.:>- 


486     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Germany  had  prevailed  upon  Aus- 
tria to  renew  direct  negotiations  with  Russia,  and  was  pre- 
pared by  way  of  concession  to  allow  a  conference  of  the 
powers  to  consider  how  a  satisfactory  arrangement  with 
Servia  might  be  effected.  The  German  Government  es- 
pecially blamed  Russia  for  ordering  mobilization  while 
the  Kaiser,  at  the  request  of  the  Tsar,  was  trying  to  use  his 
mediatory  influence  between  Austria  and  Russia.  By  this 
premature  mobilization  Russia  did,  I  believe,  throw  away 
the  last  remaining  chance  of  peace.  The  question  is,  how- 
ever, the  most  difficult  of  all  the  many  knotty  problems  in- 
volved in  the  negotiations  preceding  the  war.  If  Russia 
had  continued  to  the  last  the  extraordinarily  conciliatory 
attitude  which  was  hers  up  to  the  28th  or  29th  of  July, 
there  might  possibly  —  provided,  of  course,  that  Germany 
did  not  really  intend  to  force  a  war  —  have  been  some  way 
of  maintaining  peace.  Since  this  precipitate  military  prep- 
aration on  Russia's  part  could  have  been  avoided,  we  must 
consider  this  also  a  rational  cause  of  the  war,  and  blame 
Russia  accordingly.  Yet  never  did  country  have  greater 
provocation.  After  Russia's  display  of  a  most  unusually 
conciliatory  disposition,  and  after  her  declaration  that 
Austria's  invasion  of  Servia  would  be  considered  a  casus 
belli,  Austria  was  responsible  for  one  high-handed  act  after 
another,  while  she  refused  every  conciliatory  suggestion. 
When  at  last  Russia,  in  response  to  Austria's  aggression 
against  Servia,  partially  mobilized  on  her  Austrian  fron- 
tier, as  she  had  previously  declared  she  would  do,  Ger- 
many took  umbrage.  At  first  Germany  had  said  that  she 
would  not  consider  partial  mobilization  against  Austria  a 
cause  for  war,  but  now  she  performed  a  volte  face  and  in 
menacing  tone  declared  that  mobilization  even  against 
Austria  rendered  the  situation  very  difficult.  This  action 
on  the  part  of  Germany,  taken  with  Austria's  refusal  to 
continue  direct  negotiations  and  with  her  bombardment  of 
Belgrade,  not  to  forget  the  Austrian  threat  of  a  general  mob- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  487 

ilization,1  had  no  doubt  worn  out  the  patience  of  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  and  aroused  feeling  in  Russia.  In  England, 
the  natural  consequence  of  the  attitude  assumed  by  Ger- 
many and  Austria  was  to  awaken  indignation  against  the 
latter  and  sympathy  with  Russia.  After  Austria  declared 
war  against  Servia,  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  emphatically 
to  Germany  of  the  responsibility  which  she  would  incur  by 
supporting  Austria  in  her  course  of  action.  According  to 
the  statements  expressed  by  the  French  and  Italian  diplo- 
mats, the  effect  of  Sir  Edward's  warning  on  Germany  was 
to  influence  her  to  a  more  conciliatory  attitude,  while  in 
Germany  it  is  believed  that  the  result  of  the  British  Secre- 
tary's action  was  to  convince  Russia  that  she  could  count 
upon  England's  support,  with  the  result  that  she  became 
eager  to  enter  upon  the  war.  If  this  should  prove  to  be  the 
case,  which  I  think  is  open  to  question,  it  would  still  have  to 
be  considered  as  the  natural  result  of  Germany's  unjusti- 
fiable action  in  preventing  recourse  to  the  ordinary  diplo- 
matic procedure  for  the  settlement  of  Balkan  difficulties. 

The  last  and  more  difficult  question  —  that  of  England's 
intervention  —  has  already  been  thoroughly  discussed. 
It  is  unthinkable  that  she  should  have  consented  to  tie  her 
hands  and  remain  out  of  the  conflict  no  matter  what  the 
result ;  and,  failing  such  an  agreement,  Germany  was  not 
willing  to  forego  the  advantage  which  she  hoped  to  derive 
by  invading  Belgium.  If  England  had  wished  to  keep  out 
of  the  war,  this  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  was  certain 
to  make  her  come  in,  for  the  reasons  previously  discussed. 
Here  again  Germany  is  rationally  to  blame.  If  she  had 
been  willing  to  agree  to  remain  out  of  Belgium  and  prose- 
cute the  war  upon  that  condition,  it  is  possible  that  Eng- 
land would  have  held  aloof,  except  as  regards  her  condi- 

1  Even  if  Austria  did  not  issue  the  order  for  a  mobilization  until  after 
Russia  had  done  so,  the  Austrian  threat  to  reply  to  Russia's  partial  mobiliza- 
tion by  a  general  mobilization  might  be  expected  to  hasten  Russia's  general 
mobilization.  The  effect  of  Austria's  threat  would  be  all  the  greater  because 
of  the  difficulty  in  learning  what  was  really  taking  place. 


488    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

tional  intervention  in  regard  to  her  protection  of  the  French 
coasts  and  shipping.1 

This  plan  of  the  German  strategists  to  make  France  the 
hostage  for  Russia  was  well  understood  in  France  and  Eng- 
land, and  made  it  possible  for  France  to  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive until  attacked.  Germany  had  to  crush  her  without 
delay,  and  considered  the  route  through  Belgium  the  only 
feasible  way.  The  objection  to  this  plan  was  that  it  forced 
Germany  to  take  upon  herself  the  responsibility  of  aggres- 
sion against  France  and  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.2 

1  It  is  said  on  all  sides  that  a  conflict  between  England  and  Germany  was 
inevitable.  I  doubt  it.  It  used  to  be  said  that  a  conflict  between  England 
and  Russia  was  inevitable.  Now  that  England  is  the  ally  of  France  and 
Russia,  it  is  very  natural  for  all  three  Governments  to  emphasize  whatever 
tends  to  show  that  England  would  have  joined  with  France  and  Russia  in 
any  event.  The  deep  feeling  of  sympathy  for  an  ally  makes  it  difficult  for 
Englishmen  now  to  believe  that  they  would  have  stayed  out  under  any  con- 
ditions. 

2  Professor  Hans  Delbruck  makes  this  clear  in  an  article  in  the  Atlantic 
Monthly,  February,  1915  (p.  238),  in  which  he  writes:  — 

"One  very  important  advantage  for  Germany,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
lay  in  the  fact  that  it  could  hardly  be  expected  that  Russia  and  France 
would  be  able  to  open  hostilities  simultaneously:  the  Russians,  with  their 
cumbersome  mobilization,  the  enormous  extent  of  their  empire,  and  the 
thinly  distributed  network  of  their  railways,  would  not  be  able  to  take  the 
field  until  several  weeks  later  than  their  allies. 

"It  was  to  be  anticipated,  therefore,  that  the  French  would  first  advance 
up  to  the  Franco-German  frontier  (two  hundred  kilometres  in  length,  and 
thickly  invested  by  forts  and  fortresses),  and  would  wait  there,  without  as- 
suming the  offensive,  until  the  Russians,  arriving  from  the  east,  had  obliged 
the  Germans  to  divide  their  forces.  Then,  however,  as  the  Germans  have 
amply  fortified  their  French  frontiers  with  fortresses  at  Strassburg,  Metz, 
and  other  places,  the  attack  would  have  followed  through  Belgium,  on  the 
much  more  exposed  lower  Rhine. 

"Of  course,  the  German  General  Staff  knew  that,  since  they  possessed 
the  great  mortars  which  subdued  Li&ge,  Namur,  Antwerp,  and  the  French 
northern  fortresses,  the  French  fortresses  along  the  Vosges  must  fall  also; 
but  with  these  places  protected  by  the  whole  French  army,  this  would  take 
so  long  that  the  Russians  would  have  time  to  arrive.  The  only  possibility  of 
averting  from  Germany  this  hazardous  double  conflict  was  to  break  into 
France,  across  her  much  longer  and  less  protected  northern  frontier  through 
Belgium,  and  thereby  gain  such  an  advantage  that  a  part  of  the  army  could 
be  dispensed  with  and  sent  against  the  Russians.  Although  finally  Ger- 
many did  declare  war  on  Russia  because  the  latter  was  mobilizing  in  threat- 
ening force  on  the  Austro-German  frontier,  this  danger  was  in  reality  much 
greater  than  Germany  imagined." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  489 

Had  Germany  withdrawn  twenty  kilometres  from  her 
western  frontier,  and  entrenched  herself  behind  her  de- 
fenses, she  could  have  employed  the  greater  part  of  her 
troops  against  Russia.  In  these  conditions  it  is  most  likely 
that  she  could  have  relied  on  dividing  English  sympathy, 
and  could,  perhaps,  have  counted,  with  reasonable  assur- 
ance, on  the  neutrality  of  England.  England  might  have 
exerted  some  influence,  not  to  say  pressure,  upon  France 
to  prevent  her  attacking  Germany.  Had  France,  never- 
theless, gone  to  the  assistance  of  her  ally,  the  sympathy  of 
the  world  would  have  been  divided.  Germany  could  have 
stood  on  the  defensive,  and  could  have  gradually  retreated, 
if  necessary,  until  she  had  dealt  with  Russia. 

The  idea  that  England  should  guarantee  the  neutrality 
of  France  was  fantastic,  but  this  other  plan  would  have 
worked  advantageously  for  Germany.  It  may  be  answered 
that  Germany  could  not  be  sure  of  her  tremendous  military 
superiority  over  other  nations,  and  that  she  did  not  know 
how  effectively  entrenched  troops  could  arrest  the  advance 
of  greatly  superior  forces.  The  consequences  of  Germany's 
attack  upon  Belgium  and  France  show  the  truth  of  what 
Bismarck  said  when  he  opposed  a  policy  of  aggression, 
that  it  was  his  "  conviction  that  even  victorious  wars  can- 
not be  justified  unless  they  are  forced  upon  us,  and  that  we 
cannot  see  the  cards  of  Providence  far  enough  ahead  to 
anticipate  historical  development  according  to  our  own 
calculations." * 

It  is  very  possible  that  the  French  and  English  states- 
men might  have  hit  upon  some  plan  to  prevent  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  but  my  thorough  examination  of  the  doc- 
uments and  my  study  of  European  politics  has  not  made  it 
possible  for'  me  to  discover  wherein  that  possibility  lay. 
We  must  remember  that  the  French  and  English  states- 
men, when  they  were  confronted  by  Austria's  demarche 
and  Germany's  subsequent  stand,  must  have  feared  that 

1  Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  vol.  n,  p.  101.  London,  1898. 


490  .OF  THE  WAB   CF   :9U 

.     ■    ■  •  -■    - 

hare  and 



.'  '    ■    ■ 

........ 

-  -ery 

....  .  . 

i  similar  opinion.    Uncles  -ices. 

•    ._"  :  Englis  -men 

were 

•    •■■-■  Tie 

nab 

....  ...        .  ■  -  -■ 

peace  -       and  very   iroh  oave 

ia~e 

■  ■ 

.    ion. 

...  !  - 

.  .     - 

noost 
7  main  the 

inrer  anctimi  with  FTngfanrf.    A  comirin*- 

-    .       ]  ■       .. 

"     .   .-  ' 
sum     m  .  nigh    i  Iling 

Fngfan  .  did  nor  w  .    ;      .. 

I    .  ::wver.  be 

niMMliirrf  rnntr   -  illiancs. 

wfc»  iiwiMii Timtral unfaa  ..: 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  491 

way  that  the  aftermath  would  mean  a  continuation  of  bit- 
ter relatione  with  Germany.  Everything  considered,  there- 
fore, it  does  not  seem  that  we  are  in  a  position  to  say  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey  might  bo  have  acted  as  to  avoid  the 
war.  It  was  his  duty  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  England 
on  the  safest  basis  and  according  to  what  was  best  on  gen- 
eral principles.  He  could  not  take  some  desperate  chance 
which,  in  the  light  of  after  events,  and  looking  backward, 
we  may  consider  offered  a  possible  means  of  avoiding  the 
conflict. 

5.  The  determining  causes  of  the  war 

Since  our  consideration  of  the  immediate  causes,  in  so 
far  as  they  were  based  on  rational,  as  opposed  to  involun- 
tary, action,  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  countries  re- 
sponsible for  the  outbreak  of  the  war  were  first,  Austria, 
second,  Germany,  and  to  Borne  slight  degree,  Prussia,  it 
becomes  of  interest  to  analyze  what  considerations  or  sen- 
timents were  decisive  in  determining  these  countries  to 
pursue  the  courses  they  did.  In  other  words,  What  was  the 
situation  or  what  were  the  conditions  in  each  country  which 
determined  it  to  take  the  action  upon  which  we  place  the 
responsibility  for  the  war? 

It  will  not  be  unjust,  I  think,  to  lay  at  the  door  of  Ger- 
many the  causes  of  whatever  action  was  taken  on  the  part 
of  Russia  and  Austria  to  bring  on  the  war,  for  Austria,  being 
a  less  civilized  and  less  highly  developed  state  than  Ger- 
many, is  less  responsible  before  the  bar  of  public  opinion 
for  her  unjustifiable  violation  of  international  procedure 
and  disregard  of  the  ordinary  recognized  method  for  the 
settlement  of  Balkan  differences;  and  her  ally,  Germany, 
in  standing  between  her  and  the  diplomatic  intervention 
of  the  other  powers,  assumed  before  civilization  the  full  re- 
sponsibility for  Austria's  action.  By  the  same  token,  Ger- 
many must  shoulder  part  of  the  responsibility  for  Russia's 
response  of  counter-military  preparations  in  answer  to  Aus- 


492     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

tria's  aggression  upon  Servia.  She  incurred  further  respon- 
sibility when  she  changed  her  ground,  and,  instead  of  al- 
lowing Russia  to  effect  a  reasonable  counter-mobilization 
against  Austria,  intimated  in  a  threatening  manner  that  she 
would  consider  such  mobilization  as  endangering  the  rela- 
tions with  herself.1  In  the  third  place,  her  stand  influenced 
England  to  support  France,  against  what  appeared  to  be  un- 
justifiable browbeating  on  Germany's  part.  It  follows,  if  my 
analysis  has  not  been  unfair  to  Germany  on  these  various 
grounds,  that  she  stands  primarily  responsible  for  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  and  it  becomes  of  the  greatest  interest  to 
understand  who  decided  upon  the  various  steps  which  de- 
termined her  action.  This  question  is  much  more  difficult 
to  answer  than  the  preceding,  because  when  we  come  to 
internal  affairs  we  have  a  whole  world  in  itself,  with  the 
resultant  interplay  of  politics  and  intrigue  between  the  dif- 
ferent forces  controlling  the  action  of  the  state;  whereas 
in  international  relations  the  resultant  of  these  different 
forces  finds  expression  through  the  recognized  diplomatic 
organs  of  the  Government,  and  we  hold  the  Government 
responsible  for  the  action  of  these  agents.  To  find  out  who 
is  responsible  for  any  particular  line  of  action  is,  as  has 
been  remarked,  most  difficult.  However,  we  may  discover 
the  influence  of  certain  factors,  such  as  that  of  the  mili- 
tary oligarchy. 

There  may  have  been  certain  men,  like  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  whose  uncompromising  attitude 
helped  to  bring  on  the  crisis  and  did  nothing  to  appease  it, 
but  the  search  for  any  personal  responsibility  for  the  war 
will,  I  believe,  prove  unavailing.  The  causes  are  too  com- 
plex, the  responsibility  too  divided  and  widespread.  In 
answer  to  our  inquiry,  we  shall  learn  that  the  real  cause  of 

1  It  seems  probable  that  Russia  was  to  blame  for  her  hasty  and  excessive 
mobilization,  but  Germany's  manner  of  conducting  her  negotiations  was 
unjustifiably  brusque.  The  recent  publication  of  the  Austrian  Red  Book 
discloses  that  Austria  urged  Germany  to  assume  this  menacing  attitude  to- 
ward Russia.     (July  28,  A.R.B.  no.  42.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  493 

the  action  of  the  German  Government  was  a  result  of  the 
state  of  mind  of  the  nation.   As  a  whole,  the  German  na- 
tion thought  and  still  thinks  in  a  manner  distinct  from  the 
rest  of  Europe.   Because  of  Germany's  geographical  posi- 
tion, she  suffered  for  centuries  before  she  could  constitute 
a  German  state;  finally,  in  the  course  of  European  evolu- 
tion, a  period  was  reached  when  it  was  almost  inevitable 
that  a  strong  German  state  should  be  constituted,  and 
again  the  weakness  of  Germany's  geographical  position 
made  it  necessary,  as  Sarolea  has  said,  for  her  to  have  a 
strong  army  and  a  strong  bureaucracy,  both  of  which  Prus- 
sia gave  her.1  Prussia  herself  was  nothing  but  the  survival 
of  the  state  fittest  to  survive  the  peculiarly  disadvantage- 
ous conditions  of  Central  Germany.   As  leader  of  the  Em- 
pire, she  supplied  the  German  states  with  the  valuable 
results  of  her  own  political  experience,  and  guided  them, 
organized  into  a  confederation,  safely  through  the  maze  of 
European  politics.  Unfortunately  for  Germany,  the  states- 
man who  successfully  accomplished  this  great  achieve- 
ment trampled  upon  the  constitutional  privileges  of  his 
state.   If  he  had  not  succeeded,  he  would  have  paid  with 
exile  or  death;  but  when  by  "  blood  and  iron"  he  had  had 
his  first  great  success  in  vanquishing  Austria,  enthusiastic 
delegates  gave  him  a  vote  of  confidence.    No  voice  was 
longer  raised  to  condemn  his  illegal  acts. 

The  effects  of  these  immoral  acts  upon  the  Staatspolitik 
and  on  the  Weltanschauung  of  Germany  have  been,  in  my 
belief,  very  far  reaching.  It  is  an  open  question  whether 
our  entire  moral  system  is  not  empirical  in  its  nature,  and 
this  does  but  coincide  with  the  doctrines  of  the  pragmatists 
so  widely  accepted  at  the  present  time.  It  is  not,  therefore, 
to  be  wondered  at  that  this  magnificent  success  of  Bis- 
marck should  have  impressed  the  imaginations  of  the  peo- 

1  "Two  things  above  all  were  required  to  make  Germany  into  a  powerful 
state  — a  strong  army  and  a  well-ordered  administration.  Prussia  has 
given  us  both."  (Charles  Sarolea,  The  Anglo-German  Problem,  p.  91.)  These 
words  are  put  into  the  mouth  of  a  German  outside  of  Prussia. 


494    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

pie  of  Germany  —  we  may  say,  of  the  whole  world.  After 
Prussia  under  Bismarck  had  crushed  Austria,  there  fol- 
lowed several  years  during  which  he  guided  the  affairs  of 
the  Kingdom  and  of  the  German  Empire.  He  was  in  the 
main  outspoken,  straightforward,  and  honest,  as  might  be 
expected  of  a  man  of  his  intelligence  and  force  of  character ; 
but  occasionally  he  stooped  to  deceit,  so  subtly  executed 
that  it  was  not  discovered  by  his  victims.  In  the  course  of 
years,  however,  various  bits  of  evidence  were  pieced  to- 
gether, and  his  own  pride  in  achievement  led  him  to  disclose 
the  methods  he  had  pursued  to  confound  his  adversaries. 
We  can  well  understand  the  influence  of  his  example  on 
every  German  youth.  Instead  of  having  held  up  before 
him  the  example  of  a  Lincoln,  or  that  other  hero  who  could 
not  tell  a  lie,  the  German  youth  was  taught  to  admire  the 
man  who  had  trampled  on  the  express  provisions  of  the 
constitution,  and  the  statesman  who  knew  how  to  suppress 
a  part  of  the  truth,1  in  order  to  entrap  an  unprincipled  sov- 
ereign into  an  aggressive  war.  Such  an  example  must  have 
exercised  a  potent  influence  in  building  up  a  Realpolitik  — 
that  is  to  say,  a  policy  of  dealing  with  concrete  conditions 
as  they  are,  as  opposed  to  the  following  of  ideals.  But  in 
the  minds  of  many  it  means  the  justification  of  whatever 
succeeds.  Since  Bismarck  " succeeded"  in  trampling  the 
constitution  under  foot,  the  German  people  have  naturally 
come  to  feel  that  the  same  procedure  might  apply  to  the 
law  binding  the  nations  in  their  relations  to  one  another. 
Any  statesman  might,  they  think,  violate  any  provision, 
however  sacred,  provided  he  could  carry  it  through.  "We 
do  not  need  to  point  out  the  application  to  the  present 
war. 

Still  other  factors  have  entered  into  the  formation  of 
this  point  of  view.   The  necessity  under  which  Germany 

1  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  editing  of  the  Ems  dispatch.  The  unbiased 
sympathy  of  the  world  must  be  with  Prussia  at  that  crisis;  France  deserved 
little  sympathy,  but  this  does  not  change  the  moral  effect  upon  the  nation 
of  Bismarck's  action. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  495 

labors  of  maintaining  a  very  large  army  has  brought  it 
about  that  war  and  the  use  of  armed  force  is  regarded  with 
much  higher  favor  than  in  other  states  of  equal  civiliza- 
tion. Added  to  this,  it  is  generally  conceded  that  since  the 
accession  of  the  present  Kaiser  there  has  been  no  real 
chancellor  like  Bismarck  to  hold  the  strategists  in  check; 
and  although  the  Emperor  has  been  a  sincere  worker  for 
peace,  which  he  preserved  unbroken  up  to  1914,  the  pre- 
dominant role  which  he  plays  as  military  leader  of  the  na- 
tion makes  it  inevitable  that  the  General  Staff  should 
exercise  a  great  influence  in  determining  his  counsels. 

These  are  some  of  the  conditions  which  were  responsible 
for  a  state  of  mind  in  Germany,  in  July,  1914,  such  as  to 
influence  her  Government  to  assume  its  extremely  uncom- 
promising attitude.  This  refusal  to  cooperate  with  her  sis- 
ter states,  among  whom  was  her  ally,  Italy,  must,  I  be- 
lieve, place  upon  Germany  the  first  and  by  far  the  heaviest 
responsibility  for  the  war. 

6.    The  world's  answer 

While  every  one  is  attempting  to  discover  the  causes  of 
the  war,  the  answer  to  the  riddle  is  daily  being  indicated 
by  the  movement  on  all  sides  toward  certain  reforms  de- 
signed to  obviate  the  recurrence  of  a  similar  disaster. 
Everywhere  we  find  in  progress  the  substitution  of  inter- 
national ideas,  that  is,  world  ideas,  in  place  of  the  narrow 
national  policy  which  has  hitherto  prevailed.  Everywhere 
we  hear  talk  of  founding  a  world  organization  capable  of 
eliminating  the  national  differences  responsible  for  this 
conflict.  The  idea  has  gained  the  support  of  statesmen  and 
well-poised  men  of  affairs. 

Up  to  the  present  we  have  been  living  in  an  age  of  na- 
tional states.  The  slow  evolution  of  the  national  state, 
which  began  centuries  ago  in  Europe,  has  reached  its  cul- 
mination in  the  examples  we  have  before  our  eyes;  but  the 
idea  of  a  national  state  is  exclusive,  when  pushed  to  ex- 


496    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tremes,  of  the  broader  ideals  of  humanitarian  cooperation. 
This  idea  of  the  organization  of  a  national  state,  which  was 
a  crutch  to  help  the  development  of  humanity  through  one 
stage,  has  become  a  hindrance  in  the  present  stage  of  de- 
velopment. During  the  last  decades  the  development  of 
internationalism  has  gone  on  at  a  tremendous  pace.  This 
development  has  had  to  be  carried  on,  one  might  almost 
say,  in  spite  of  the  national  states.  The  governments  of 
the  great  national  states  have  been  intensely  jealous  of 
any  interference  with  their  sovereign  rights,  which,  when 
pushed  to  an  extreme,  are  destructive  of  the  rights  of  other 
states.  Of  necessity  they  have  had  to  agree  to  a  certain 
amount  of  combination  for  uniform  action ;  but  they  have 
resisted  all  the  nobler,  broader  tendencies  which  threat- 
ened their  own  lower  ideal  of  national  perfection  as  op- 
posed to  the  general  interests  of  humanity. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  when  the  serf  or  laborer  in  each  com- 
munity had  hardly  any  thought  beyond  the  confines  of  his 
town,  we  find  in  certain  respects  a  broader  internationalism 
than  at  the  present  time.  The  ideal  of  chivalry  was  uni- 
versal. The  conception  of  the  Catholic  Church  was  more 
widespread  than  now  and  more  nearly  universal.  The  legal 
system  of  the  Middle  Ages  transcended  national  or  feudal 
divisions.  It  is  only  in  modern  times  that  the  talents  of 
the  community  have  been  turned  to  strengthening  national 
development  at  the  expense  of  the  general  interests  of  hu- 
manity. 

7.  Formation  of  a  Super-Empire 

Progressing  along  a  course  parallel  with  that  of  the  na- 
tional states,  we  find  great  empire  states  in  which  the  na- 
tional state  has  controlled  the  destinies  of  less  powerful 
or  less  developed  communities.  These  separate,  national 
state  empires  have  become  the  great  politically  independ- 
ent groups  of  our  day.  The  competition  between  national 
states  has  been  transformed  into  a  competition  of  these 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  497 

larger  units  under  the  name  of  what  is  termed  Weltpolitik. 
Among  these  we  have  Great  Britain,  France,  the  United 
States,  Germany,  Russia,  and  Japan ;  all  extending  their 
empires  or  political  control  widely  over  the  habitable  globe. 
The  means  by  which  this  extension  has  been  accom- 
plished are  (1)  seizure  or  acquisition  of  territory;  (2)  the 
throwing  of  a  protectorate  over  a  region,  forming  what  is 
known  as  a  protected  state,  which  becomes  part  of  the  po- 
litical system  of  the  empire;  and  (3)  the  rendering  of  a 
country  dependent  on  the  financial  and  military  support 
of  the  empire  state.  These  different  classes  of  territories 
might  be  designated  as  "owned,"  "protected,"  and  "in- 
fluenced." If  we  trace  the  evolution  of  the  British  Empire 
in  this  way,  we  find  that  Great  Britain  actually  owns  a 
great  part  of  the  globe,  and  protects  another  large  portion, 
while  many  countries  reckoned  as  independent  are  directly 
dependent  upon  her  for  the  support  which  guarantees  their 
political  existence.  A  similar  development  may  be  traced 
with  regard  to  the  expansion  of  the  other  empires. 

At  the  same  time  that  this  great  imperial  development 
has  been  slowly  progressing,  the  great  capitalistic  and  im- 
perialistic states  have  come  to  realize  more  and  more  that, 
since  the  territory  of  the  earth  was  pretty  well  preempted, 
the  great  desiderata  of  widely  extended  and  capitalistic, 
empires  like  those  of  England  and  France  must  be  abso-' 
lute  security}  to  insure  constant  returns  on  their  capital 
and  to  preserve  uninterrupted  the  communications  of  the 
empire  states  with  their  dependencies,  as  well  as  the  in- 
terrelations of  the  political  groups  of  the  empires  among 
themselves.  In  other  words,  they  have  realized  that  their 
aims  were  one  and  the  same,  and  the  desire  to  get  the 
biggest  return  for  their  effort  has  made  them  ready  to  co- 
operate in  supporting  one  another,  rather  than  to  push 
their  competition  to  the  verge  of  a  great  conflict  of  arms. 
Great  Britain  has  in  consequence  decided  frankly  to  ac- 
cept the  Monroe  Doctrine,  —  part  of  our  own  imperial- 


498    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

istic  concept,  —  and  to  leave  the  policing  and  protection 
of  her  own  interests  on  this  continent  mainly  to  the  United 
States.  Her  adoption  of  this  policy  liberated  a  consider- 
able portion  of  her  oversea  fleet  just  when  Germany  began 
to  push  her  naval  construction,  and  allowed  Great  Britain 
to  increase  her  own  fleet  for  immediate  maritime  competi- 
tion in  Europe  without  undertaking  the  tremendous  outlay 
necessary  to  keep  up  the  old  two-power  standard  of  British 
naval  strength. 

The  next  step  for  Great  Britain  was  the  result  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  1902.  Japan  and  England 
found  desirable  a  defensive  alliance  for  mutual  protection 
against  the  possible  designs  of  Russia  on  India  and  the 
Far  East.  In  reality  this  defensive  alliance  went  further 
than  the  mere  terms  of  its  articles  would  indicate.  The 
understanding  upon  which  it  was  based  allowed  Great 
Britain  to  leave  to  Japan  to  a  great  extent  the  policing  of 
her  interests  in  China  and  the  Pacific  in  the  same  way  that 
she  had  previously  decided  to  entrust  the  protection  of  her 
interests  in  the  American  continent  to  the  United  States. 

After  almost  coming  to  war  with  France  at  Fashoda  in 
1898,  Great  Britain  turned  round  in  1904  and  formed  with 
her  the  Entente  Cordiale.  Shortly  after  this  she  withdrew 
a  large  portion  of  her  Mediterranean  fleet,  leaving  to 
France  in  great  part  the  protection  of  her  interests  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  allowing  France  in  return  to  with- 
draw her  fleets  from  the  Channel  and  the  Atlantic. 

The  next  stage,  brought  about  through  France,  was  an 
agreement  of  Great  Britain  with  Russia  to  lay  their  strife 
in  Persia  by  an  apportionment  of  their  spheres  of  influ- 
ence, leaving  to  Persia  a  buffer  strip  in  the  middle. 

We  find,  therefore,  at  the  period  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  that  the  American,  Japanese,  French,  and  Russian 
Empires  had  joined  in  a  cooperative  division  of  spheres 
of  influence  with  the  British  Empire,  so  that  there  is,  in 
fact,  a  super-empire  composed  of  all  this  great  organiza- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  499 

tion.  The  basic  idea  of  this  empire  is  that  the  interests  of 
all  in  every  part  of  the  world  shall  be  cared  for  by  the  rep- 
resentative able  to  act  on  the  spot  in  the  most  effective 
manner  —  all  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  reasonable  ob- 
servance of  the  rules  of  international  intercourse.  This  is 
an  organization  for  cooperation  and  the  enforcement  of 
international  law  in  the  interest  of  the  general  prosperity 
and  the  greater  security  of  these  military  and  financial 
empires.  This  combination  allows  each  empire  to  restrict 
its  armament  to  the  minimum  required  for  the  defense  and 
development  of  the  interests  to  be  protected  in  its  immedi- 
ate sphere,  and  has  made  it  possible  to  avoid  the  increasing 
of  naval  armament  at  the  same  rate  as  the  increase  of  in- 
ternational relations  and  international  commerce. 

While  this  movement  has  been  going  on,  it  has  been  im- 
possible to  lose  sight  of  the  possibility  of  a  great  war  in 
which  one  or  more  of  the  empires  in  this  super-empire 
might  be  involved.  The  danger  of  this  war  was  well  known 
to  lie  in  the  rivalry  between  the  Triple  Entente,  or  the 
European  part  of  the  super-empire,  and  the  Triple  Alliance, 
which  includes  the  only  remaining  great  empire1  and  the 
only  one  which  has  not  seen  her  way  to  join  in  this  co- 
operative action  and  division  of  the  police  work  of  the 
world.  Germany  has  considered  that  she  could  not  be  con- 
tent with  her  position  relatively  to  the  other  empires,  and 
this  discontent  with  her  lot  has  revealed  itself  in  a  pushing 
of  her  armament  to  the  greatest  extent  that  her  economic 
resources  would  bear.  Having  acquired  her  national  unity 
later  than  the  others,  Germany  has  been  inclined  to  over- 

1  We  cannot  call  the  Triple  Alliance  a  second  super-empire  because  Ger- 
many is  the  only  state  in  the  group  which  is  an  empire  in  the  same  sense  as 
are  the  other  empires,  i.e.,  that  has  interests  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  Italy 
is  rapidly  acquiring  such  a  position,  and,  in  so  far  as  she  has  done  so,  she  has 
come  to  an  understanding  with  France  and  England  in  regard  to  her  oversea 
possessions.  As  for  Turkey  and  Austria,  they  may  be  considered  as  coming 
within  the  sphere  of  German  influence  and  constituting  to  this  extent  a  part 
of  the  German  Empire.  The  Chinese  Empire  is  momentarily  in  some  dan- 
ger of  disintegration. . 


500    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

value  this  achievement.  Her  success  in  reaching  results 
through  her  efficiency  in  armament,  and  her  need  of  a 
stout  defense,  owing  to  her  unfavorable  geographic  posi- 
tion, have  led  Germany  to  force  the  pace  of  armaments. 

She  has  preferred  to  turn  the  cold  shoulder  to  the  invita- 
tions to  join  in  the  development  of  this  great  super-empire, 
which  would  thus  have  been  rounded  out  to  the  long- 
dreamt-of  world  state,  —  this  super-empire  composed  of 
six  great  empires:  Britain,  America,  France,  Germany, 
Russia,  and  Japan,  united  in  a  bond  as  loose  and  elastic  as 
that  of  the  Triple  Entente,  yet  strong  through  its  efficiency 
to  perform  the  work  of  humanity  as  a  whole. 

8.  The  "peace  power" 

The  gradual  apportionment  of  the  earth  to  the  spheres 
of  influence  of  certain  empires  requires  as  a  corollary  that 
in  its  sphere  each  empire  should  protect  the  rights  of  all  the 
others  according  to  the  recognized  principles  of  interna- 
tional law.  When,  in  the  face  of  unjustifiable  conduct  upon 
the  part  of  a  wayward  or  less  civilized  government,  the 
overlord  or  responsible  empire  makes  an  appeal  to  force, 
this  action  can  be  no  longer  designated  as  war,  but  should 
be  considered  as  an  act  of  international  police  —  an  exer- 
cise of  what  we  might  call  the  "peace  power." *  For  interna- 
tional peace  must  be  based  upon  respect  for  the  principles 
of  international  law.  A  great  majority  of  the  reasonable 
pacifists  to-day  recognize  this  distinction,  and  approve  the 
use  of  force  where  force  is  applied  to  compel  respect  for 
international  law.2  The  greatest  weakness  in  this  system  of 

1  This  designation  of  "  peace  power "  was  suggested  to  me  as  better 
than  the  term  "police  power"  ordinarily  employed.  I  think  there  are  evi- 
dent reasons  for  the  use  of  "peace  power"  instead  of  "police  power,"  which 
is  also  employed  in  municipal  affairs.  We  might  then  speak  of  recourse  to 
force  for  political  purposes  as  "war  power." 

2  There  is  much  loose  reasoning  in  regard  to  the  use  of  force  in  interna- 
tional relations.  One  party  of  extremists,  headed  by  the  great  Tolstoi,  has 
advocated  the  doctrine  of  non-resistance,  confident  that  through  its  inher- 
ent truth  an  idea  will  persist  and  conquer;  whereas  recourse  to  force  will 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  501 

applying  force  is  the  facility  with  which  a  government  may 
make  use  of  it  as  an  excuse  to  cloak  some  extra-juridical, 
and  hence  purely  political,  design.  This  difficulty  has  led 
governments  of  good  intention  to  call  upon  other  govern- 
ments to  join  with  them  in  substituting  joint  intervention 
in  place  of  their  own  independent  action,  because  joint 
action  is  less  likely  to  be  for  the  purpose  of  abuse. 

In  the  regulation  of  recent  international  difficulties  there 
have  been  numerous  instances  of  this  collective  action,  as 
for  example  the  action  of  the  powers  in  China,  1901. 

In  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  it  was  the  peace  power 
which  Austria  claimed  the  right  to  exercise  in  regard  to  Ser- 
via;  but  as  her  situation  made  it  seem  very  probable  that 

stir  up  opposition  and  confirm  the  ignorant  and  the  transgressors  in  their 
evil  course.  As  a  result  of  the  war  now  in  progress,  the  most  rational  sup- 
porters of  this  policy  have  modified  their  opinion,  without  giving  up  their 
belief  in  the  necessity  of  an  active  propaganda  for  the  peaceful  settlement 
of  international  difficulties  and  the  avoidance  of  all  causes  of  strife.  Many 
of  these  pacifists  now  believe  that  international  peace  can  be  secured  only 
through  the  establishment  of  an  international  court  backed  up  by  an 
armed  force  supplied  by  the  independent  states.  The  advocates  of 'this 
view  fall  into  other  errors  almost  as  serious  as  those  of  the  former  non-re- 
sistance pacifists  whom  they  replace.  The  organization  of  such  an  inter- 
national force  in  the  form  generally  proposed  is  entirely  impracticable. 

In  the  first  place,  it  could  hardly  be  made  sufficiently  powerful  to  impose 
its  will  without  opposition  upon  the  strongest  states.  A  country  like  the 
United  States  would  not,  in  the  case  of  a  fundamental  question  where  its 
conscience  was  thoroughly  aroused,  yield  to  any  organized  force,  though  it 
were  the  combined  armament  of  three  great  European  powers.  The  mere 
anticipation  that  force  will  be  applied  stirs  up  passions  which  will  yield  only 
before  an  irresistible  force,  and  such  an  irresistible  force  as  exists  in  muni- 
cipal affairs  cannot  at  present  be  considered  as  a  practical  basis  for  the  po- 
lice force  of  an  international  organization.  The  states  would  fear  that  it 
might  become  a  veritable  international  Praetorian  guard.  Even  if  we  admit 
that  such  a  force  might  be  constituted,  of  sufficient  strength  to  impose  the 
decisions  of  the  permanent  international  court  upon  all  the  world,  interna- 
tional politics  would  center  round  the  securing  of  the  appointment  of  offi- 
cers who,  in  the  employment  of  the  force  under  their  control,  would  show  a 
partiality  for  the  partisans  of  certain  opinions.  For  the  present,  the  safest 
course  to  pursue  is  to  establish  a  permanent  international  court,  and  leave 
the  enforcing  of  its  decrees  to  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.  In  the  last 
analysis,  public  opinion  is  always  the  force  which  exacts  compliance  with 
the  decrees  of  every  tribunal.  (See  John  Bassett  Moore:  Opening  Address 
at  the  21st  Lake  Mohonk  Arbitration  Conference,  1915.) 


502    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

her  action  would  not  be  strictly  limited  to  this  function, 
but  would  cover  a  political  purpose  as  well,  the  less  inter- 
ested powers  came  forward  with  various  proposals,  hoping 
to  set  in  motion  collective  action  for  the  proper  application 
to  Servia  of  the  peace  power.  Austria  and  Germany,  how- 
ever, denied  the  right  of  the  other  states  to  interest  them- 
selves in  the  dispute.  They  thought  that,  since  the  other 
powers  recognized  that  Servia  was  at  fault,  Austria  should 
be  allowed  a  perfectly  free  hand  to  impose  upon  Servia 
conditions  which  would  guarantee  for  the  future  due 
respect  for  the  rights  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  This  stand 
would  have  been  logical  if  Servia  had  been  within  the 
Austrian  sphere  of  influence,  as  Austria  seemed  to  believe 
should  be  the  case. 

9.  Germany's  nationalistic  conception 

While  the  cooperating  empires  were  elaborating  this  vast 
machine  of  international  control  to  protect  the  interests  of 
civilization  and  maintain  the  peace  of  the  world,  Germany, 
having  lately  achieved  her  national  unity,  looked  to  the 
national  state  as  the  be-all  and  end-all  of  political  achieve- 
ment. This  arrested  conception  of  political  philosophy  has 
had  important  practical  effects.  It  has  made  the  Germans 
feel  very  bitter  because  all  of  the  great  German  emigration 
of  the  past  became  absorbed  in  other  political  units  and 
was  lost  as  a  factor  in  their  national  influence.  Another 
serious  consequence  has  been  that,  while  the  rest  of  the 
world  is  thinking  in  terms  of  international  cooperation,1 
Germany  is  actuated  by  ideals  of  national  aggrandizement. 
The  American  mind  can  hardly  understand  how  a  German 
can  look  upon  it  as  a  benefit  that  heroic  little  Belgium 
should  be  destroyed,  even  though  the  German  Empire 
prosper  thereby.  From  the  international  point  of  view 
they  are  both  useful  administrative  divisions  or  agents  of 

1  Cf .  the  arguments  of  the  Athenians  in  their  discussion  with  the  Melians, 
Documents,  post,  chap.  xiii. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  503 

humanity.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Germany  had  absorbed 
Turkey,  enlightened  opinion  in  England  and  elsewhere 
would  quickly  have  agreed  that  she  was  merely  taking  up 
the  administrative  burden  of  the  world  and  acting  for  the 
general  good. 

The  political  ideals  of  Germany  and  those  which  we  have 
traced  in  the  formation  of  the  super-empire,  being  opposed, 
soon  came  into  conflict.  The  rest  of  the  world  was  not 
willing  to  turn  back  the  hand  of  progress  and  return  to  the 
old  ideas  which  they  had  left  behind.  Were  the  growing 
pains  of  the  Venezuela  Message,  of  the  Fashoda  incident, 
of  the  Dogger  Bank  to  be  so  soon  forgotten?  They  could 
not,  if  they  would,  have  stemmed  the  onward  march  of  a 
more  perfect  political  organization  on  the  basis  of  the 
supremacy  of  international  over  national  laws. 

Germany  was  at  a  parting  of  the  ways,  and  had  to 
choose  between  two  courses.  Either  she  could  bend  her 
policy  toward  the  conservation  of  her  resources,  frankly 
recognizing  the  inevitable  consequences  of  her  geographical 
situation,  which  handicapped  her  in  the  role  of  a  world 
state,  or  she  could  branch  out  into  a  policy  of  search  after 
prestige,  with  the  consequent  modification  of  her  situation. 
If  she  decided  upon  the  first  course,  the  corollaries  would 
have  been  to  attempt  to  reach  some  agreement  with 
France  to  heal  the  still  open  wound  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
and,  instead  of  resisting  their  expansion,  to  support  Eng- 
land and  France  in  all  action  tending  to  affirm  and  solidify 
their  established  control  over  their  extensive  dominions. 
To  this  end  she  would  have  stood  with  England  for  a  most 
rigid  adherence  to  the  binding  force  of  treaties,  and  she 
would  have  cooperated  with  England,  France,  and  the 
United  States  in  the  gradual  and  reasonable  extension  of 
obligatory  arbitration  and  the  rapid  improvement  of  the 
procedure  of  international  relations.  She  would  have 
reverted  to  that  ancient  treaty  negotiated  by  her  King 
Frederick  the  Great  and  the  philosopher  Franklin  to  make 


504    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

inviolate  private  property  at  sea.  The  strengthening  of 
the  ties  between  the  great  empires  would  have  made  it 
possible  for  Germany  to  bring  to  bear  a  strong  influence 
for  the  "open  door"  and  the  lowering  of  tariffs  throughout 
the  world. 

However,  Germany  gave  her  decision  for  the  opposite 
course,  and  determined  to  create  for  herself  a  larger  "place 
in  the  sun."  Especially  she  aspired  to  acquire  part  of  the 
colonies  preempted  by  the  empires  earlier  on  the  field. 
With  such  aims  it  was  natural  that  she  should  oppose 
every  tendency  which  strengthened  the  status  quo.  She 
went  as  far  as  possible  in  denying  the  binding  force  of  inter- 
national law  in  general.1  She  was  unwilling  to  see  inter- 
national obligatory  arbitration  embrace  the  relations  of  all 
the  states,  and  she  did  everything  to  enhance  the  respect 
for  might  as  the  foundation  of  right  to  hold.  She  pushed 
her  armaments,  and  commenced  building  a  great  navy,  to 
protect  her  world-wide  commerce.  By  refusing  to  work 
for  the  adoption  of  a  rule  establishing  the  inviolability  of 
private  property  at  sea,  the  German  Government  accepted 
the  responsibility  for  leaving  the  vast  German  merchant 
fleets  at  the  mercy  of  the  chance  of  war.  The  only  object 
was  to  stimulate  enthusiasm  for  an  extensive  naval  equip- 
ment and  to  make  it  possible  to  strike  England's  weakest 

1  Of  course  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  Germany  have  not  stultified 
themselves  by  proclaiming  such  a  theory,  but  in  Germany  we  find  much  sup- 
port for  the  thoroughly  untenable  and  elsewhere  discredited  theory  of  Kriegs- 
raison,  according  to  which  the  laws  of  war  may  be  set  aside  in  the  case  of 
military  necessity.  A  recent  illustration  of  this  peculiar  nationalistic  myopia 
is  found  in  an  article  by  the  distinguished  German  professor  of  international 
law,  Dr.  Niemeyer,  of  Kiel  University,  whose  article  is  translated  in  the 
Michigan  Law  Review  for  January,  1915.  He  maintains  that  the  1839  treaty 
for  the  neutralization  of  Belgium  must  yield  before  this  Kriegsraison. 

Germany  admits  the  existence  of  rules  of  international  law,  but  has  in 
general  resisted  the  development  of  institutions  for  their  effective  enforce- 
ment. The  result  of  this  policy  would  be  to  leave  the  international  law 
rights  of  the  weak  at  the  mercy  of  the  strong,  and  to  make  the  strong  judge 
in  his  own  case.  We  should  have,  as  a  consequence  of  this  system,  as  many 
different  systems  of  international  law  as  there  were  powerful  states,  which 
shows  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  German  contention. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  505 

spot.  Germany  hoped  to  be  able  in  case  of  war  to  threaten 
England's  communications  and  food  supply. 

In  this  pursuit  of  prestige  and  national  expansion,  Ger- 
many was  anxious  to  acquire  new  territories,  but  as  she 
came  late  into  the  field,  there  was  very  little  left  for  her  to 
glean.  Wherever  she  turned  she  found  some  European 
power  well  established ;  and  since  she  had  no  thought  of 
being  barred  by  this  preemption  of  the  face  of  the  earth,  she 
had  to  consider  where  best  she  could  secure  the  land  she 
coveted.  There  were  several  possibilities.  She  would  have 
preferred,  of  course,  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  England,  and 
at  first  turned  her  thoughts  in  other  directions.  There  was 
the  great  basin  of  the  Congo;  but  England  and  France  pre- 
ferred that  the  King  of  Belgium  should  retain  its  control, 
rather  than  have  Germany  thrust  in  between  them.  To 
have  seized  the  Dutch  possessions  would  again  have  in- 
volved England.  From  all  of  South  America  Germany  was 
shut  out  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  unless  she  would  do 
battle  with  the  United  States.  Accordingly,  she  directed 
her  attention  toward  the  possessions  of  the  Sublime  Porte, 
and  with  the  help  of  her  able  ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople, the  late  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  was  able 
to  acquire  and  maintain  an  ascendancy  over  the  Turk.  It 
is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  opposition  which  the  other 
powers  were  able  to  exercise  at  Constantinople  was  suc- 
cessful in  thwarting  the  development  of  her  plans.  This 
caused  Germany  to  look  toward  Morocco.  Thence  she  had 
to  withdraw  before  the  combined  opposition  of  England 
and  France.  These  various  checks  to  Germany's  diplo- 
matic policy  embittered  her  citizens  and  produced  a  state 
of  mind  largely  instrumental  in  influencing  her  Govern- 
ment to  take  the  uncompromising  attitude  which  was  the 
immediate  cause  of  the  war. 

Germany,  like  the  vigorous  organism  that  she  is,  felt 
the  life  throb  in  her  veins,  a  consciousness  of  strength  to 
do.   Her  superabundant  vitality  was  evident  through  her 


506    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

rapidly  growing  population,  which  was  due  in  part  to  the 
continued  maintenance  of  a  birth-rate  high  as  compared 
with  other  equally  developed  and  civilized  countries,  and 
in  part  to  the  lowering  of  the  death-rate  as  a  result  of  the 
efficient  paternalism  of  the  German  Government. 

This  great  increase  in  population  made  it  necessary  for 
Germany  to  consider  the  policy  she  would  adopt.  Could 
she  continue  her  phenomenal  industrial  development  so 
as  to  find  employment  for  her  increasing  millions,  and  so 
as  to  be  able  to  continue  her  programme  for  the  progres- 
sive uplifting  of  her  masses?  Certain  signs  made  her  doubt 
the  possibility  of  maintaining  the  same  rate  of  increase 
of  industrial  development  which  had  hitherto  made  it 
possible  to  absorb  the  increase  of  population.  In  this  pre- 
dicament, three  courses  of  action  lay  open  to  the  German 
people. 

First,  —  the  simplest  and  most  natural,  —  was  the 
traditional  solution  of  allowing  the  surplus  population  to 
emigrate.  But  the  German  people  have  resented  the  loss 
of  their  good  German  stock  in  the  past  through  emigra- 
tion. They  have  remarked  that  in  all  parts  of  the  world 
the  German  has  become  a  good  citizen  of  his  adopted 
country  and  has  been  lost  to  the  Fatherland.  It  has  become 
a  conscious  part  of  German  policy  to  find  some  means  of 
keeping  the  whole  German  population  within  German 
governmental  control.  If  Germany  had  good  colonies,  the 
solution  would  be  simple. 

The  second  solution  was  that  which  has  been  adopted 
in  other  highly  civilized  communities,  —  commonly  known 
as  race-suicide,  —  which  means,  of  course,  the  restricting 
of  the  number  of  children  so  as  to  maintain  for  the  off- 
spring the  same  or  a  better  standard  of  living  than  that 
enjoyed  by  the  parents.  France  is  the  classical  example 
of  this  system.  The  idea  is  revolting  to  the  German  con- 
sciousness. The  Germans  are  willing  to  restrict  the  num- 
ber of  children  in  the  interest  of  the  best  development  of 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  507 

the  whole  German  people.  They  do  not  advocate  that  the 
family  should  be  so  large  as  to  make  a  drudge  of  the  mother 
with  her  poverty-stricken  horde  of  children;  but  they  do 
believe  that  the  family  should  be  large  enough  to  give  the 
fullest  enjoyment  of  motherhood  and  fatherhood,  and  to 
supply  every  German  child  with  the  beautiful  compan- 
ionship of  brothers  and  sisters.  And  so  Germany  is  not 
willing  to  follow  in  the  path  of  France  and  our  own  New 
England.  If  she  had  accepted  the  status  quo  and  bound 
herself  to  take  no  aggressive  action,  the  increase  of  her 
population  must  have  been  arrested  or  it  would  have 
worked  disaster  in  the  Fatherland  through  the  cut-throat 
competition  it  would  have  engendered. 

In  the  face  of  this  alternative,  Germany  preferred  the 
larger,  fuller  national  life  to  the  quiescent  acceptance  of 
the  status  in  which  she  found  herself.  She  preferred  the 
third  solution,  which  was  to  make  an  appeal  to  her  teem- 
ing millions  to  hack  their  way  to  a  larger  place  in  the 
world.  She  was  not  deterred  by  the  fact  that  she  must 
rend  the  prize  from  the  grasp  of  another  state,  whose 
philosophy  of  race-suicide  she  considered  merited  such  a 
fate. 

Having  decided  for  this  fuller  life,  even  at  the  cost  of 
the  world-condemnation  which  would  follow  her  aggressive 
attempts  to  seize  the  territory  of  others,  she  attempted  to 
secure  the  results  through  threats  of  force  without  its  ac- 
tual employment.  She  played  for  a  diplomatic  victory 
over  Servia  and  so  on  beyond  the  Balkans  into  Asia 
Minor. 

If  England  and  France  could  have  been  sure  that  once 
Germany  had  expanded  over  these  regions  she  would  sub- 
scribe to  their  own  philosophy  of  the  status  quo  and  not 
take  advantage  of  this  increase  in  strength  to  make  it  a 
fulcrum  for  a  further  advance,  they  could,  doubtless,  have 
reached  some  agreement  with  her,  but  each  side  mistrust- 
ing the  other's  purpose,  it  was  most  difficult  to  reach  any 


508    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

compromise.  Germany,  impatient  and  apprehensive  of 
delay,  said,  "I  will  expand,  even  at  the  cost  of  aggression. 
If  need  be  I  will  seek  my  '  place  in  the  sun '  at  the  point  of 
the  sword."  To  this  the  Anglo-French  super-empire,  de- 
fending the  status  quo,  replied,  "Thou  shalt  not  expand 
until  thou  puttest  aggression  behind  thee."  The  issue  is 
being  fought  out. 

10.  Nationalism  and  internationalism 

Under  the  old  conception  of  independent  and  rival 
national  states,  we  had  groups  of  men  swayed  by  antago- 
nisms to  one  another,  traceable  to  opposition  of  interests; 
in  the  course  of  time,  other  conditions  being  equal,  one 
such  group  would  be  eliminated,  which  is  another  way  of 
saying  that  there  is  a  tendency  in  the  long  run  for  the 
action  of  a  group  of  individuals  to  be  based  upon  their 
material  interests.  Where  action  necessary  to  the  protec- 
tion of  such  interests  is  opposed  to  the  action  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  other  interests,  we  may  in  general  predi- 
cate a  conflict  of  the  groups  supporting  the  opposed  inter- 
ests. When  we  consider  what  is  the  direct  motive  of  the 
antagonism,  we  find  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  interest  as 
a  different  way  of  thinking,  though  in  the  long  run  this 
difference  of  thinking  will  arise  from  the  conscious  or  sub- 
conscious appreciation  of  difference  of  interests,  —  which 
restates  our  previous  remark  that  antagonisms  have  a 
tendency  to  be  the  expression  of  differences  of  interests. 
Since,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  section,  Germany's 
interest  was  to  secure  more  territory,  and  since  this  could 
only  be  accomplished  by  aggression,  her  interests  sup- 
ported aggression,  —  which  means  that  she  would  oppose 
all  rules  of  international  law  tending  to  confirm  rights  of 
possession.  This  she  did  through  the  doctrine  of  national 
necessity,  —  that  is  to  say,  whatever  is  necessary  for  na- 
tional salvation  as  interpreted  by  the  state  is  permissible, 
—  and  so  we  find  that  the  German  theory  of  the  superi- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  509 

ority  of  national  needs  over  international  rules  conforms 
with  her  understanding  of  her  interests.1 

We  must  not,  however,  confuse  that  difference  of  interest 
which  may  be  the  fundamental  or  underlying  cause  with 
the  immediate  ground  of  difference,  which  is  psychological. 
Individuals  and  groups  of  individuals  differ  because  they 
have  different  ways  of  thinking,  and  this  it  will  be  found  is 
the  real  reason  for  the  great  human  conflicts.  Religious 
wars  have  been  most  bitter  because  the  difference  of 
opinion  touched  upon  the  most  vital  questions  of  human 
thought.  One  reason  for  the  peculiarly  dreadful  nature  of 
civil  conflicts  is  that  the  disagreement  in  point  of  view 
between  the  two  factions  has  been  more  thoroughly 
brought  out  and  emphasized  by  the  associations  and  inter- 
relations of  the  opposed  factions. 

The  great  states  of  to-day  are  composed  of  individuals 
of  all  degrees  and  kinds  of  opinions,  so  that  an  individual 
will  often  find  closer  relations  between  himself  and  certain 
other  individuals  in  a  neighboring  nation,  in  regard  to  the 
questions  which  he  holds  most  important,  than  he  will 
among  the  generality  of  citizens  of  the  state  to  which  he 
belongs.  This  interrelation  of  ideas  binding  the  world 
together  by  a  philosophical  network  is  the  only  real  foun- 

1  Germany,  being  a  highly  developed,  civilized  state,  had  to  observe  the 
rules  of  international  law  in  her  intercourse  with  her  sister  states.  She  found 
a  workable  system  to  obviate  the  inconveniences  of  her  philosophy  by 
strictly  observing  the  rules  of  international  law,  making  a  reservation  only 
in  those  exceptional  cases  when  it  should  be  necessary  to  consummate  her 
national  aims.  Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  jurists  of  other  countries 
refused  to  believe  that  Germany  meant  her  theory  of  state  necessity  seri- 
ously. They  thought  it  a  half-baked  theory  due  to  a  lack  of  critical  appre- 
ciation and  understanding  of  the  true  meaning  of  international  law.  They 
realize  now  the  sincerity  of  the  views  expressed  by  German  writers  on  inter- 
national law  and  their  general  acceptance  by  German  men  of  affairs.  Had 
the  world  appreciated  sooner  the  true  significance  of  these  views  and  the 
firm  determination  of  the  German  Government  to  apply  them,  it  would 
have  retaliated  against  her.  It  would  not  have  continued  international 
relations  with  her  on  the  same  basis  as  with  the  other  states  which  accept 
a  common  system  based  upon  the  supremacy  of  international  law  over  the 
needs  and  policies  of  any  separate  state. 


510    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

dation  for  considering  humanity  as  a  unit.  But  when  a 
war  intervenes,  we  witness  a  mental  mobilization  analogous 
to  the  wonderful  military  transformation  previously  dis- 
cussed. The  individual  oppositions  and  diversities  of 
opinion  for  the  most  part  disappear,  and  in  the  peculiar 
psychological  condition  which  prevails,  the  individuals  of 
the  highest  mental  endowment  accept  without  question 
the  views  which  are  in  part  the  officially  promulgated  views 
of  their  government.  These  must  of  necessity  in  such 
instances  either  be  in  harmony  with  the  prevailing  senti- 
ments of  the  community,  or  based  upon  them.  To  analyze 
the  causes  of  this  peculiar  mobilization  would  carry  us  too 
far  afield,  but  if  we  apply  the  ever-ready  explanation  of 
the  evolutionist,  we  may  consider  that  the  communities 
which  lack  this  power  of  war-thought  could  not  present 
an  undivided  front  to  the  enemy,  so  that,  in  the  course  of 
countless  generations,  the  surviving  representatives  of 
those  states  possessing  the  fittest  conditions  for  survival 
in  this  world  possess  this  marvelous  faculty  of  united  war- 
thought.  The  rapidity  and  the  thoroughness  with  which 
this  mental  mobilization  can  be  effected  will  depend  upon 
many  conditions,  which  it  would  be  interesting  to  analyze, 
if  space  allowed.  One  of  the  most  important  is  doubtless 
the  degree  of  the  general  realization  of  the  danger  with 
which  the  community  is  threatened. 

In  the  present  war,  Germany  has  given  the  most  wonder- 
ful example  of  this  mental  mobilization,  for  the  whole 
German  people  have  united  themselves  in  support  of  the 
fundamental  ideas  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  Germany's 
political  action  —  that  is,  a  worship  of  the  national  exis- 
tence expressed  in  an  almost  mystical  adoration  for  the 
state.  The  rest  of  the  world,  perhaps  because  it  has  passed 
through  the  national  stage  of  development  and  takes  a 
broader  outlook,  thinks  differently  from  Germany.  Since 
this  difference  of  thought  had  gradually  been  uniting  the 
greater  part  of  the  civilized  world  —  with  the  exception  of 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  511 

Germany  —  into  a  company  for  collaboration  on  the  basis 
of  the  unity  of  mankind,  sometimes  spoken  of  as  inter- 
nationalism or  international  cooperation,  this  great  differ- 
ence of  opinion  has  become  the  fundamental  basis  of  sepa- 
ration between  the  two  great  masses  of  men  now  fighting 
by  land  and  sea.  This  difference  of  point  of  view  explains 
why  Germany's  intense  national  feeling  made  her  oppose 
every  attempt  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  individual  state 
action.  Her  mystical  conception  of  the  divine  position  of 
the  state  prevented  Germany  from  joining  with  the  other 
powers  to  hasten  the  advance  of  international  cooperation. 
With  remarkable  consistency  Germany  remained  true  to 
this  religion  and  opposed  the  various  efforts  of  the  other 
nations  to  strengthen  the  actual  situation,  known  as  the 
status  quo.  The  Germans  saw  no  reason  why  they  should 
voluntarily  limit  the  freedom  of  development  of  the  Ger- 
man state  so  as  to  cooperate  with  England  and  France  in 
reaffirming  this  status  quo.1   Since  they  had  to  recognize 

1  Germany  maintains  that  England's  policy  was  directed  toward  main- 
taining the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent  while  she  remained  supreme 
on  the  seas.  If  Germany  means  that  England's  policy  was  to  protect  the 
weaker  states  on  the  Continent  against  armed  aggression  and  conquest,  no 
doubt  this  was  true.  In  his  speech  of  December  2  before  the  German  Reichs- 
tag, Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  said :  "The  whole  situation  was  as  follows : 
England  was  willing  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  us  in  individual 
questions,  but  the  first  principle  always  was  that  Germany's  free  develop- 
ment of  strength  must  be  checked  by  the  balance  of  power." 

Mr.  Asquith  has  explained  that  in  1912  England  offered  the  German 
Chancellor  an  understanding  neither  to  make  nor  join  in  any  aggression 
upon  Germany;  but  the  Chancellor  asked  for  a  pledge  that  England  would 
remain  neutral  whenever  Germany  went  to  war.  (London  Times,  January 
27,  1915.)  This  shows  that  England  no  longer  wanted  to  maintain  her  old 
traditional  policy  of  aggressive  intervention  to  impose  a  balance  of  power  on 
the  Continent,  but  merely  sought  to  insure  herself  and  France  against  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  take  from  any  state  its  possessions  by 
force.  The  field  of  fair  commercial  competition,  in  which  Germany  was  suc- 
ceeding so  marvelously,  lay  open  to  her. 

In  his  Guildhall  speech  Mr.  Asquith  said:  "Let  me  now  turn  to  the  actual 
situation  in  Europe.  How  do  we  stand?  For  the  last  ten  years,  by  what  I 
believe  to  be  happy  and  well-considered  diplomatic  arrangements,  we  have 
established  friendly  and  increasingly  intimate  relations  with  two  powers  — 
France  and  Russia  —  with  whom  in  days  gone  by  we  have  had  in  various 


512    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

that  in  the  affairs  of  nations  the  international  point  of  view 
was  necessarily  paramount  to  the  national,  it  was  their 
policy  to  minimize,  in  every  way,  the  place  of  international 
law.  Instead  they  would  set  up  a  right  of  the  strong  to 
control,  not,  as  many  think,  with  brutal  excesses,  but 
restrained  by  a  mystic  realization  of  responsibility  for  the 
proper  application  of  this  force;  but  what  the  German 
mind  would  not  admit  was  that  any  control  should  be 
placed  on  the  exercise  of  this  force  by  the  voice  of  any 
majority.  The  strong  individual,  whether  man  or  nation, 
was  to  hold  a  larger  freedom  in  his  action  because  of  his 
superior  qualities.  The  opponent  of  this  point  of  view  con- 
siders that  its  danger  lies  in  the  fact  that  there  exists  no 
guaranty  that  the  physical  force  will  be  combined  with  the 
high  moral  qualities  requisite  for  the  effective  control  of 
its  employment ;  since  the  possessor  of  physical  power  might 
not,  perhaps,  recognize  or  admit  his  own  imperfections,  but 
proceed  to  employ  the  force  at  his  own  will,  society  would 
be  in  imminent  peril.  To  have  met  this  very  need  has  been 
the  culminating  triumph  of  efforts  toward  the  establishing 
and  perfecting  of  constitutional  government.  Germany, 
however,  does  not  appreciate  the  results  of  all  this  human 
experience,  and  has  refused  to  allow  the  society  of  nations 
to  transfer  into  the  domain  of  international  law  those 

parts  of  the  world  occasions  for  friction,  and  now  and  again  for  possible  con- 
flict. These  new  and  better  relations,  based  in  the  first  instance  upon  busi- 
ness principles  of  give  and  take,  matured  into  a  settled  temper  of  confidence 
and  good-will.  They  were  never  in  any  sense  or  at  any  time,  as  I  have 
frequently  said  in  this  hall,  directed  against  other  powers."  (London  Times, 
September  5,  1914.) 

In  spite  of  this  difference  of  aim  the  British  and  German  Governments 
had  made  real  progress  toward  settling  their  differences  and  might  have 
discovered  the  basis  for  a  long  peace  if  they  could  have  passed  this  latest 
and  most  acute  Balkan  crisis.  When  Germany  began  building  her  great 
fleet  in  the  late  nineties,  it  was  evident  that  England  would  strike  very 
quickly  if  she  intended  aggression  for  a  preventative  war.  Similarly,  Ger- 
many had  to  strike  in  1914  before  Russia  and  France  should  become  still 
stronger,  or  resign  herself  to  accept  cooperative  action  on  the  basis  of  the 
status  quo.  That  would  have  meant  the  renunciation  of  all  hopes  of  ex- 
pansion by  force  of  arms  or  threat  of  arms. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  513 

restrictions  upon  the  exercise  of  the  national  will  which,  in 
municipal  affairs,  have  grown  up  within  the  modern  con- 
stitutional states.  And  so,  at  the  Second  Hague  Confer- 
ence, Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein  opposed  the  adop- 
tion of  a  general  convention  of  obligatory  arbitration, 
much  to  the  disappointment  of  the  great  majority  of  the 
delegates  there  assembled.  Furthermore,  Germany  refused 
to  consider  the  possibility  of  limiting  her  armament  by 
land  or  sea.  Regarding  the  obligation  to  respect  treaties, 
Germany  has  compromised ;  she  has  realized  full  well  that 
any  intercourse  with  her  sister  states  was  impossible  on 
any  other  basis  than  the  respect  for  treaties,  so  that,  if  we 
except  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  she  has  stood 
high  in  the  faith  with  which  she  has  observed  her  obliga- 
tions. Nevertheless,  the  general  tendency  of  Germany's 
action  and  the  opinions  expressed  by  German  jurists  has 
been  to  place  the  observance  upon  the  grounds  of  more 
immediate  interest;  that  is,  policy,  rather  than  upon  the 
idea  of  a  sacred  obligation.  The  German  system  is  being 
put  to  its  own  test  of  effectiveness  on  the  high  seas  and  on 
the  plains  of  Europe.  To  me  the  German  view  seems  an 
anachronism,  and,  taking  into  consideration  all  the  aspects 
of  the  subject,  the  greatest  error  of  mankind;  nevertheless, 
I  must  admit  as  a  general  principle  that,  where  great 
masses  of  men  have  been  willing  to  lay  down  their  lives  for 
an  ideal,  the  results  have  demonstrated  that  they  were  not 
wholly  wrong. 

If,  as  I  say,  there  may  be  truth  on  either  side,  this  great 
country  of  ours,  with  its  many  millions  of  German  citizens 
and  sympathizers,  will  not  fail  to  have  it  fully  presented; 
nor,  when  we  remember  the  hold  that  liberal  democratic 
doctrines  have  upon  this  country,  and  the  part  we  have 
taken  in  international  cooperation,  the  great  development 
of  internationalism  among  our  citizens,  and  the  aid  our 
Government  has  given  in  maintenance  of  the  principles  of 
international  law,  will  there  be  any  danger  that  we  shall 


514     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

be  led  to  give  an  undue  place  to  the  narrowing  doctrine  of 
nationalism  as  opposed  to  internationalism. 

11.  The  results 

Germany  has  clearly  violated  international  law,  and,  if 
she  does  not  succeed,  even  for  the  moment,  in  escaping 
punishment,  the  lesson  will  be  as  salutary  as  the  example 
of  Bismarck  was  deleterious.  Meantime,  the  manner  in 
which  she  has  held  the  rest  of  Europe  in  check  compels  the 
admiration  of  all  beholders.  If  Europe  learns  to  realize 
the  necessity  of  finding  some  means  to  organize  an  efficient 
bureaucracy  without  destroying  the  freedom  of  individual 
initiative,  while  Germany  learns  to  take  a  more  cosmopoli- 
tan and  less  nationally  narrow  point  of  view,  the  world 
may  enter  upon  a  new  era  of  efficient  government. 

Should  Germany  be  successful  in  carrying  out  the  theo- 
ries of  her  Government,  and  her  people,  after  the  war 
enthusiasm  is  past,  continue  to  support  the  Government, 
which  has  put  through  its  projects  in  disregard  of  its  treaty 
obligations  and  of  the  peaceful  existence  of  the  individuals 
composing  another  nation,  the  student  of  events,  seeking 
with  impartial  view,  will  have  to  admit  that  we  are  not 
yet  ready  for  any  great  step  forward;  that  it  is  too  early  to 
recognize  the  practical  existence  of  the  society  of  humanity 
as  such,  including  all  peoples.  He  will  perceive  that  the 
high-water  mark  of  achievement  possible  under  present 
conditions  is  the  perfected  national  state  after  the  type  of 
Germany,  where  the  whole  nation  to  a  man  unites  with 
absolute  devotion  and  training  which  indicates  science  and 
character.  He  may  regret  that  the  other  states  which  have 
earlier  achieved  this  national  union  and  passed  on,  looking 
toward  the  next  stage,  have  been  doomed  to  disappoint- 
ment. Just  as  for  centuries  the  Germans  who  dreamed  of 
a  great  national  German  state  had  to  be  content  with  a 
political  grouping  into  smaller  and  less  national  units  and 
endure  all  the  inconveniences  of  such  a  condition,  so  must 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  515 

we  sink  with  despair  to  that  lower  level.  He  will,  perhaps, 
discover,  in  such  an  event,  that  we  rushed  on  with  too 
much  hope  and  idealism,  and  without  a  just  sense  of  pro- 
portion. 

The  world  will  adjust  itself  to  all  the  miseries  of  a  patch- 
work of  jealous  and  independent  states  and  wait  for  the 
next  step,  until  a  broadened  experience  and  a  more  uni- 
form advance  in  civilization  throughout  the  world  have 
made  it  possible  to  build,  on  a  firmer,  saner  foundation,  a 
nobler  edifice  of  human  government. 

But  before  we  yield  up  our  cherished  ideals,  we  will 
strive,  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary,  to  meet  the  force 
which  that  marvelously  perfected  national  state  has 
thrown  against  the  foundation  of  our  international  order. 
We  will  help  to  overthrow  the  projects  of  such  a  govern- 
ment and  recognize  none  that  will  not  live  within  the  same 
community  of  common  international  ideals. 

In  the  mean  time,  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  contest  be- 
tween the  two  great  rival  systems  of  thought  —  national 
and  international  —  which  will  be  settled  in  a  treaty  of 
peace  which  is  a  compromise,  as  every  treaty  of  peace  has 
always  been.  In  any  great  conflict  neither  side  has  all  of 
the  truth,  and  this  new  compromise  may  well  be  a  nearer 
approximation  to  the  facts  of  actual  conditions,  and  con- 
stitute a  better  working  basis  of  agreement,  in  accordance 
with  which  the  nations  of  the  world  may  dwell  in  more  per- 
fect peace. 

Let  us  not  forget  that  every  ounce  of  strength  that  is 
put  forth  to  defend  and  maintain  the  views  we  believe  in 
will  weigh  in  the  balance  when  the  discussion  of  the  terms 
of  peace  shall  come. 


PART  III 
DOCUMENTS  AND  EVIDENCE 


CHAPTER   XII 

QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS 

Question:  —  Did  Austria  intend  to  precipitate  the  war? 

Answer:  —  If  by  intent  to  precipitate  the  war  is  meant  to  bring  on  a  war 
in  any  event,  we  must  answer,  no.  But  if  we  mean,  Did  Austria  take  action 
so  as  to  necessitate  a  war  unless  Servia  consented  to  abase  herself,  as  no  in- 
dependent state  could  do  and  yet  retain  its  claims  to  the  respect  of  the  other 
states?  —  we  must  answer  that  Austria  did  intend  to  precipitate  a  war. 
Austria,  besides  imposing  humiliating  conditions,  demanded  that  Servia 
would  immediately  cease  a  propaganda  which  it  was  practically  impossible 
for  her  Government  to  prevent.  Thus  Austria  made  it  necessary  for  Servia 
to  accept  her  dictation  and  to  become  a  vassal  state  if  she  would  avoid  a  war. 

Question:  —  Was  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Servia  intended  to  be  accepted? 

Answer:  —  The  form  in  which  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  drawn  up, 
the  short  delay  accorded,  and  the  subsequent  action  of  Austria,  make  clear 
that  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  intended  to  be  unacceptable  to  Servia. 

Question:  —  Was  Austria's  action  toward  Servia  reasonable? 

Answer:  —  Austria's  action  was  unreasonable  in  that  she  attempted  to 
deal  with  Servia,  an  independent  sovereign  state,  almost  as  though  she  were 
an  Austrian  province  in  rebellion.  Her  action  was  unreasonable  because 
for  many  years  past  it  had  been  recognized  that  any  change  in  the  Balkan 
affairs  was  the  concern  of  Europe  in  general  and  of  Austria  and  Russia  in 
particular.  The  assassination  of  the  heir  to  the  Dual  Monarchy  gave  Aus- 
tria serious  ground  of  complaint  against  Servia,  but  by  no  means  justified 
her  recourse  to  such  extreme  measures.  Almost  any  other  state  would  have 
departed  from  a  conduct  strictly  reasonable  under  a  similar  provocation, 
and  in  the  face  of  a  similar  danger.  The  manner  of  Austria's  action  was  at 
fault  rather  than  the  nature. 

Question:  —  Did  France  first  cross  the  Franco-German  frontier? 

Answer:  —  The  German  Government,  in  its  official  correspondence, 
claims  that  France  first  crossed  her  frontier  and  was  guilty  of  other  acts 
contrary  to  international  law,  making  her  the  aggressor  in  the  Franco- 
German  conflict.  As  yet  it  has  been  impossible  to  obtain  any  evidence 
substantiating  this  charge,  while  France  has  made  out  by  far  the  best  prima 
facie  case,  because  the  diplomatic  correspondence  contains  the  statement 
of  her  Government  that  she  had  withdrawn  all  her  troops  ten  kilometres 
from  the  frontier  so  as  to  avoid  any  possibility  of  conflict  with  Germany. 

Question:  —  Did  France  do  her  whole  duty  in  restraining  Russia  from 
endangering  the  continuance  of  peace  by  mobilization? 
Answer:  —  The  French  Government  apparently  was  so  convinced  that 


520     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Austria's  action  was  intended  as  an  attack  on  Russia's  position  in  the  Bal- 
kans, and  that  Germany  would  back  up  Austria,  that  from  the  start  she 
made  clear  to  Germany  her  intention  of  supporting  her  ally.  Even  Germany 
herself  recognized  that  France  did  not  wish  for  war.  The  best  evidence  of 
France's  peaceful  intentions  is  derived  from  her  action  in  1909,  when  she 
threw  her  influence  against  war,  although  there  was  a  strong  feeling  on  the 
part  of  the  Entente  Powers  that  Austria,  in  her  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  had  been  guilty  of  unjustifiable  procedure  affecting  the  vital 
interests  of  all  European  powers.  Similarly,  in  1913,  France  used  her  influ- 
ence for  peace  in  the  Balkans.  Nevertheless,  France  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  as  active  in  working  for  peace  during  this  crisis  as  England  and  Italy. 
The  reasons  for  her  attitude  are  made  clear  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  She 
believed  the  only  hope  for  peace  was  for  the  Entente  Powers  to  make  a  firm 
resistance  to  the  Austro-German  demands.  This  attitude  prevented  France 
from  exercising  a  wholesome  restraint  upon  Russia  in  regard  to  a  premature 
mobilization. 

Question:  —  Did  France  violate,  or  intend  to  violate,  Belgium's  neutral- 
ity? 

Answer:  —  Germany  has  declared  that  she  had  proof  that  France  intended 
to  violate  Belgium's  neutrality.  She  alleged  that  French  aviators  flew  over 
Belgian  territory  and  that  France  intended  to  attack  Germany  by  tra- 
versing Belgium.  Germany  has  not,  as  yet,  adduced  any  evidence  worthy 
of  the  name  in  support  of  these  claims.  Even  when  the  German  minister 
aroused  the  Belgium  Foreign  Office  in  the  dead  of  night  during  the  period 
that  the  twelve  hours  of  the  German  ultimatum  to  Belgium  were  running, 
because  he  wished  to  notify  them  of  the  violations  of  international  law  of 
which  France  was  guilty,  he  did  not  assert  that  those  violations  had  occurred 
on  Belgian  territory.  It  is  conceivable  that  France  may  have  prepared 
elaborate  plans  for  traversing  Belgium  to  attack  Germany,  to  be  used  only 
in  case  Germany  should  be  guilty  of  an  unmistakable  and  serious  violation 
of  Belgium's  neutrality.  Germany's  allegations  against  France  have  been 
so  frivolous  as  to  create  a  prejudice  throughout  the  world.  The  world  has 
had  more  respect  for  the  straightforward  declaration  of  the  Chancellor  that 
Germany's  action  was  based  upon  "  necessity,  which  knows  no  law."  The 
best  answer  to  these  claims  of  Germany  is  the  fact  that  even  after  Germany 
had  entered  Belgium's  territory,  it  was  several  weeks  before  the  French 
troops  could  come  up  to  render  assistance. 

Question:  —  Did  the  German  Government  know  the  contents  or  the 
Austrian  note  to  Servia  before  it  was  presented? 

Answer:  —  I  am  convinced  that  the  German  Government  spoke  the 
truth,  and  that  the  note  was  not  previously  communicated.  From  an  ex- 
amination it  would  seem  probable  that  this  ignorance  was  prearranged. 
Cf.  the  Documents,  post,  chap.  xiii. 

Question:  —  Did  Germany  do  everything  reasonably  possible  to  avoid 
war? 

Answer:  —  Germany  certainly  did  make  serious  efforts  to  avoid  war, 
but  they  seem,  though  sincere,  to  have  been  misdirected;  for  example,  her 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  521 

desperate  effort  at  the  last  moment  to  mediate  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
But  Germany  refused  to  employ  the  most  natural  and  effective  means  of 
avoiding  war  by  referring  the  question  in  dispute  to  a  general  conference, 
and,  whatever  her  reasons,  she  backed  her  ally  in  persisting  in  a  course 
contrary  to  the  generally  recognized  canons  of  international  procedure. 
Such  conduct  was  very  likely  to  force  a  war. 

Question:  —  Was  Germany  the  first  to  cross  the  French  frontier? 

Answer:  —  The  evidence  seems  to  indicate  that  Germany  certainly  was 
the  first  to  cross  the  French  frontier,  especially  in  view  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment's declaration  that  it  had  withdrawn  all  its  troops  ten  kilometres  from 
the  international  frontier.  In  any  event,  Germany's  entry  into  Luxemburg, 
on  August  2,  was  an  act  of  aggression  as  dangerous  to  France  as  a  viola- 
tion of  her  territory.  If  France  had  immediately  replied  by  crossing  the  in- 
ternational frontier,  she  could  not  have  been  considered  the  aggressor. 

Question:  —  Was  the  German  Emperor  personally  responsible  for  the 
war? 

Answer:  —  The  German  Emperor  undoubtedly  made  great  efforts  to  pre- 
serve the  peace  of  Europe.  For  forty-four  years,  the  German  Empire  has 
not  known  a  war.  As  a  result  of  this  policy,  the  Emperor  has  been  severely 
criticized  by  the  Pan-Germanist  party  and  has  been  dubbed  "William  the 
Poltroon."  It  is  even  probable  that  the  Emperor  delayed  Germany's  at- 
tack in  the  present  war.  But  if  he  may  not  be  held  directly  responsible  for 
the  war,  indirectly  a  large  share  of  the  blame  falls  to  him,  because  he  has 
been  so  unwise  as  to  wish  to  retain  in  his  own  hands  the  direction  of  Ger- 
many's foreign  affairs.  Since  he  dismissed  Bismarck,  he  has  had  no  real 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  but  only  under-secretaries.  William  I  could  listen 
to  the  arguments  of  the  military  group,  headed  by  Von  Moltke  and  Von 
Roon,  and  balance  against  them  what  Bismarck  had  to  say.  The  present 
Kaiser,  being  his  own  Commander-in-Chief  and  his  own  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  has  lost  the  advantageous  position  of  umpire.  Weak  as  has 
been  German  diplomacy,  it  is  inconceivable  that  those  officially  in  charge  of 
her  foreign  policy  could  have  allowed  her  to  enter  this  war  at  such  a  disad- 
vantage, from  a  diplomatic  point  of  view,  if  they  had  been  able  to  exercise 
any  real  influence  upon  the  German  Government.  For  the  great  aim  of 
diplomacy  is  first  to  avoid  war,  and,  secondly,  when  war  is  inevitable,  to 
prepare  favorable  alliances  or  relations  with  the  other  powers  so  that  war 
may  be  entered  upon  at  an  opportune  moment,  and  incidentally,  to  force 
the  adversary  to  take  the  position  of  the  aggressor  in  appearance  if  not  in 
fact. 

Question:  —  Was  Germany  back  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum? 

Answer:  —  The  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  declared 
that  he  did  not  know  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  before  it  was  presented, 
but  he  probably  had  some  inkling  of  its  general  tenor.  The  British  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna  believed  that  his  German  colleague  was  closely  in  touch  with 
Austria's  preparations  for  taking  drastic  action  against  Servia.  It  may  have 
been  thought  better  that  Germany  should  have  no  official  knowledge  of  the 
contents  of  the  Austrian  note  so  that  she  might  be  in  a  better  position  to 


522    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

support  her  ally.  Another  explanation  may  also  have  been  that  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  Vienna,  who  was  known  to  be  intensely  hostile  to 
Russia  and  to  the  continuance  of  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans,  was 
intriguing,  through  the  help  of  the  military  party,  to  bring  on  a  conflict 
between  Germany  and  Russia.  It  is  hardly  possible  that  Germany  would 
have  allowed  such  a  clumsily  worded  note  to  be  presented  if  she  had  known 
the  terms  in  which  it  was  drawn  up.  If  she  had  not  previously  given  Aus- 
tria carte  blanche,  it  is  not  likely  that  Germany  would  have  approved  the 
note  which  Von  Jagow  said  "left  much  to  be  desired."  So  we  are  led  to 
conclude  that  she  was  so  unwise  as  to  allow  her  ally  a  free  hand. 

Question:  —  Did  Germany  believe  England  would  remain  neutral? 

Answer:  —  No  doubt  a  large  part  of  the  German  and  Austrian  popula- 
tion thought  England  would  keep  out  of  the  war,  as  she  would  almost  cer- 
tainly have  done  if  France  had  not  become  involved.  But  the  German 
statesmen  and  men  of  affairs  must  have  realized  that,  although  England 
would  not  interfere  in  the  Balkans,  she  could  not  allow  Germany  to  become 
paramount  on  the  Continent.  If  there  had  been  any  real  hope  of  England's 
remaining  neutral  throughout  the  war,  Germany  would  not  have  been  so 
insensate  as  to  provoke  her  by  invading  Belgium.  Germany  feared  that 
England  would  step  in  at  a  moment  opportune  for  England  and  inopportune 
for  Germany,  and  preferred  to  secure  what  immediate  advantage  she  could 
by  violating  Belgium's  neutrality. 

Question:  —  Was  it  necessary  for  Germany  to  hack  her  way  through 
Belgium  ? 

Answer:  —  Although  that  was  the  only  way  by  which  she  could  have  any 
hope  of  rapidly  crushing  France  and  vanquishing  her  enemies  in  a  quick 
campaign,  a  better  plan  for  Germany  to  have  pursued  would  have  been  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  against  France  and,  in  cooperation  with  Austria, 
to  direct  her  attack  against  Russia.  If  Germany  had  followed  this  plan,  the 
Belgian  question  would  not  have  arisen,  and  England  might  have  remained 
neutral.  The  invasion  of  Belgium  was  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  the 
preservation  of  the  German  nation. 

Question:  —  Did  Russia  make  every  reasonable  effort  to  avoid  war? 

Answer:  —  In  view  of  conflicting  reports,  it  is  very  difficult  to  arrive  at 
any  conclusion.  There  is,  however,  no  question  but  that  Russia  preserved 
a  perfectly  correct  diplomatic  attitude,  evincing  her  willingness  to  partici- 
pate in  and  give  her  adhesion  to  any  plan  which  seemed  to  present  the 
slightest  possibility  of  a  peaceful  solution.  Furthermore,  she  made  sugges- 
tions herself.  The  only  ground  upon  which  Russia  is  at  all  open  to  criticism 
is  that  she  was  unnecessarily  hasty  in  mobilizing.  Russia's  view  was  that, 
if  she  merely  protested  and  took  no  action,  Austria  would  take  advantage 
of  her  supineness,  thinking  Russia  was  ready  to  submit  to  anything  to 
avoid  war,  and  though  she  was  most  peacefully  inclined,  she  was  not  willing 
to  back  down  again,  as  she  had  done  when  Germany  threatened  war  if  she 
did  not  acquiesce  in  what  she  considered  Austria's  violation  of  Article  25 
of  the  Berlin  Treaty  by  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  So  Russia 
proceeded  to  mobilize  on  her  southern  frontier  bordering  on  Austria. 

In  view  of  the  uncompromising  attitude  of  Germany  and  Austria,  we 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  523 

cannot  blame  Russia  for  thinking  it  necessary  to  show  that  she  was  in  ear- 
nest, but  we  must  regret  that  she  did  not  longer  delay  her  mobilization. 
When,  however,  we  consider  that  Russia  was  by  no  means  assured  of  Eng- 
lish support  in  case  of  a  conflict,  —  in  fact,  England  was  making  heroic 
efforts  to  keep  out  of  any  conflict  arising  from  a  Balkan  question,  —  we 
must  realize  that  Russia  was  in  great  peril  from  a  German  attack.  Russia 
believed  that  Germany  was  intent  upon  war  —  Austrian  and  German  action 
making  such  an  assumption  seem  very  probable  —  and  feared  to  let  Austria 
complete  her  mobilization  while  she  herself  made  no  preparation. 

On  the  other  hand,  Russia  must  have  known  that  Germany  would  con- 
sider it  absolutely  essential  to  strike  before  her  neighbors  had  completed 
their  mobilization  and  would  look  upon  even  Russia's  partial  mobilization 
as  necessitating  war.  Mobilization  once  begun  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
Germany  would  long  delay  a  declaration  of  war.  On  the  whole,  then,  we 
may  say  that  Russia's  mobilization  on  the  Austrian  frontier  made  it  im- 
possible for  the  powers  to  continue  at  greater  length  the  diplomatic  discus- 
sions and  negotiations  which  might  possibly  have  resulted  in  a  solution 
acceptable  to  all.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  say  that  Russia's  action 
was  unreasonable. 

The  last  two  or  three  days  before  the  war,  it  appears  that  the  war  party 
in  St.  Petersburg  may  have  felt  that  England  was  sure  to  support  Russia 
and  so  have  been  anxious  to  precipitate  a  conflict.  It  is  just  possible,  if 
England  had  intimated  to  Russia  from  the  very  start  that  she  would  stand 
with  her  in  case  of  German  aggression,  provided  Russia  did  everything  to 
facilitate  negotiations  toward  peace,  that  Russia  might  have  been  willing 
to  defer  her  mobilization  on  the  southern  frontier;  because  in  case  of  an 
actual  outbreak  of  war,  she  would  then  have  been  linked  with  her  ally, 
France,  and  also  with  England,  against  Austria  and  Germany,  joined 
possibly  by  Italy.  With  such  support  Russia  might  have  felt  more  secure 
of  the  ultimate  result,  and  have  entertained  less  apprehension  of  German 
aggression. 

Germany  reiterates  her  charge  that  the  whole  conflict  was  brought  on  by 
Russia's  mobilization,  when  she  was  in  the  act  of  mediating  in  response  to 
the  appeal  of  the  Tsar.  On  the  other  hand,  to  this  Russia  answers  that  the 
mobilization  which  she  undertook  was  a  result  of  a  decision  made  the  mo- 
ment she  learned  of  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note.  This  mobilization  in 
her  southern  districts  would,  Russia  declared,  be  undertaken  in  case  of 
Austrian  aggression  against  Servia. 

Once  the  order  given  for  this  mobilization,  necessitated  by  Austria's 
action,  it  was,  as  all  military  experts  know,  impossible  to  arrest  it  in  the 
middle.  Russia  assured  Germany  that  the  measures  were  not  directed 
against  her,  but  when  Germany  began  to  assume  a  threatening  attitude  and 
to  insist  that  Russia  should  arrest  her  preparations,  Sazonof  became  con- 
vinced that  Germany  intended  a  war,  and  hastened  his  preparations.  The 
German  Ambassador  requested  Sazonof  to  make  a  suggestion  of  a  formula 
to  Servia  as  a  basis  for  mediation.  This  the  Russian  Ambassador  not  only 
did  in  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case,  which  made  it  amount  almost 
to  an  ultimatum ;  but  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  requested  him  to  change  the 
form  so  as  to  make  it  easier  for  Austria  to  accept,  and  so  as  not  to  seem  in 
any  way  to  force  Austria  and  Germany  to  back  down,  he  did  not  hesitate  to 


524    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

do  so.  Then,  just  as  there  was  some  prospect  of  peace  as  a  result  of  Austria's 
suddenly  assuming  a  conciliatory  attitude,  Russia  dashed  all  hopes  by  order- 
ing a  general  mobilization.  This  gave  Germany  reasonable  ground  to  launch 
her  ultimatum,  after  which,  of  course,  there  could  be  but  one  answer. 

The  impartial  observer  cannot  get  at  the  truth  of  this  difficult  question 
until  he  knows  more  of  the  facts  of  the  military  preparations  undertaken  by 
Germany  and  Russia.  An  examination  of  the  action  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments ia  prejudicial  in  favor  of  Russia,  because  of  the  extremely  concilia- 
tory attitude  of  her  diplomacy  from  the  start.  Russia  did,  nevertheless,  lose 
the  benefit  of  this  favorable  consideration  when  she  became  responsible  for 
precipitating  the  war  by  ordering  a  general  mobilization. 

Question:  —  Was  the  protection  of  Servia  of  vital  interest  to  Russia? 

Answer:  — It  is  hard  to  define  a  vital  interest  with  any  degree  of  accuracy, 
but  from  the  material  side,  it  may  reasonably  be  made  to  include  those 
economic  interests  of  a  country  of  sufficient  importance  to  affect  its  whole 
industrial  and  commercial  development.  From  the  sentimental  or  immate- 
rial side,  it  would  embrace  all  those  ties  of  sympathy  which  are  supported 
by  a  general  consensus  of  opinion  within  the  country  and  which  a  large 
body  of  the  individuals  are  willing  to  help  their  Government  maintain,  even 
to  the  extent  of  sacrificing  their  lives.  From  a  material  point  of  view,  it  is 
essential  for  Russia  to  secure  good  port  facilities  on  ice-free  seas,  and  above 
all  to  protect  her  commerce  through  the  Dardanelles.  Hence  she  must 
consider  Austrian  supremacy  in  the  Balkans  as  a  menace  to  her  vital  inter- 
ests, and  must  be  prepared  to  block,  at  its  inception,  any  move  which  may 
lead  to  such  a  result.  In  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  it  was  evident  that 
Austria,  whatever  her  immediate  design  might  be,  intended  ultimately  to 
secure  control  of  the  Balkans.  Even  though  she  should  leave  Constantinople 
in  Turkish  hands  or  under  the  collective  control  of  the  powers,  by  securing 
Salonika  she  could  at  will  intercept  Russia's  grain  fleets  and  cruisers  as 
they  issued  from  the  Dardanelles. 

But  strong  as  is  Russia's  material  interest  in  the  Balkan  situation,  the 
real  impelling  force  with  the  Russian  people  is  sympathy  for  their  Slav 
brethren.  Whenever  Russia  has  made  war,  the  great  mass  of  the  Russian 
people  has  always  believed  that  it  was  undertaken  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protecting  Christians  and  upholding  Christianity.  Russians  are 
especially  ready  to  assist  the  Orthodox  Slavs  in  the  Balkans.  The  Russo- 
Turkish  War  of  1877  was,  from  the  Russian  point  of  view,  entered  upon  to 
protect  the  Christian  states  in  the  Balkans.  The  war  with  Japan,  it  was  pop- 
ularly believed  in  Russia,  was  merely  a  campaign  against  the  infidel.  Con- 
sequently it  would  be  very  difficult,  almost  impossible,  for  the  Russian 
Government  to  resist  the  popular  pressure  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Servians, 
Bulgarians,  or  Montenegrins  when  threatened  by  Austria.  We  may  con- 
clude that  the  protection  of  Servia  was  a  vital  interest  for  Russia,  though 
this  does  not  mean  that  the  Russian  Government  could  not  have  stemmed 
the  clamor  for  intervention  if  it  had  felt  that  there  were  sufficiently  weighty 
reasons  to  justify  such  action. 

Question:  —  Should  Russia  have  been  satisfied  with  Austria's  assurances 
that  she  would  not  interfere  with  Servian  integrity  or  independence? 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  525 

Answer:  —  Austria,  in  the  assurances  she  gave  to  Russia  and  to  the  other 
powers  concerning  her  intentions  toward  Servia,  especially  emphasized 
that  she  would  under  no  circumstances  seize  Servian  territory,  that  is, 
interfere  with  Servia's  integrity;  but  she  was  much  less  specific  concerning 
Servia's  independence,  though  she  might  perhaps  have  been  willing  to  enter 
into  a  binding  agreement  not  to  interfere  with  Servia's  independence.  But 
the  demands  of  the  ultimatum,  if  complied  with,  would  actually  have  been 
such  an  interference,  for  according  to  their  tenor,  Austria  would  be  permitted 
to  name  the  Servian  officials  who  she  considered  ought  to  be  dismissed,  and 
there  was  no  guaranty  that  this  procedure,  once  agreed  to,  might  not  be 
repeated  on  other  occasions  until  Servia's  officials  would  look  to  Austria's 
favor  for  the  security  of  their  positions.  But  even  if  these  matters  could 
have  been  arranged  satisfactorily  and  Austria  allowed  to  continue  her  cam- 
paign against  Servia,  as  soon  as  she  had  vanquished  her  weaker  neighbor, 
she  might  have  interpreted  her  promises  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  them 
null  and  void.  The  low  standard  of  international  integrity  and  sense  of 
obligation  to  respect  a  solemn  promise  makes  it,  alas,  impossible  to  place 
perfect  reliance  upon  them. 

Question:  —  Did  Russia  mobilize  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  threaten  Ger- 
many and  necessitate  action  by  Germany? 

Answer:  —  The  answer  to  this  question  will  be  found  in  the  discussion  of 
a  previous  question  regarding  Russia's  efforts  to  avoid  war. 

Question:  —  Did  Russia  cross  the  Russo-German  frontier  before  the  dec- 
laration of  war? 

Answer:  —  With  the  present  lack  of  information,  it  seems  impossible  to 
ascertain  whether  this  accusation  of  the  German  Government  is  well 
founded  or  not,  but  in  a  time  of  such  unusual  tension  isolated  instances  of 
violations  of  territory  by  a  few  troops  are  hard  to  prevent.  Even  in  time 
of  peace  they  sometimes  occur,  and  are  of  trivial  importance  when  under- 
taken. They  should  not  be  magnified  and  permitted  to  bring  about  a  gen- 
eral engagement.  Russia  had  every  reason  to  avoid  such  acts,  since  she 
needed  all  the  time  that  she  could  get  to  complete  her  mobilization  before 
Germany  should  strike. 

Question:  —  Did  Great  Britain  enter  the  war  against  Germany  in  order 
to  protect  Belgium's  neutrality? 

Ansiver:  —  Great  Britain  did  not  enter  the  war  solely  to  protect  Bel- 
gium's neutrality,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  been  careful  in  his  official 
utterances  to  say  that  this  was  one  of  the  reasons  why  Great  Britain  en- 
tered the  conflict.  An  approximately  correct  statement  of  Great  Britain's 
position  may  perhaps  be  made  as  follows:  Great  Britain  would  have  found 
it  most  difficult,  under  any  circumstances,  to  have  tied  her  hands  not  to 
intervene  in  the  war.  In  any  event,  when  it  came  to  agreeing  upon  the 
conditions  of  peace,  she  would  have  intervened  diplomatically  to  prevent 
any  terms  that  she  considered  dangerous  to  her  interests.  Even  if  she  had 
agreed  to  remain  absolutely  neutral,  the  understanding  would  always  have 
been  that  Germany  must  not  expect  to  make  any  settlement  of  European 
affairs  violating  too  flagrantly  Great  Britain's  permanent  and  vital  interests. 

The  conditions  under  which  Great  Britain  would  have  tied  her  hands 


526    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

and  remained  out  were  so  difficult  to  define  and  so  little  likely  to  have  been 
acceptable  to  Germany  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  probably  thought  it  was  not 
worth  while  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  them  when  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor asked  him  upon  what  terms  Great  Britain  would  agree  to  remain  neu- 
tral. For  this  action  he  was  severely  criticized  by  a  Labor  Member  of 
Parliament  who  accused  him  of  striving  to  involve  the  country  in  a  con- 
flict with  Germany.  The  only  attitude  that  Great  Britain  could  take  was 
that  she  hoped  to  keep  out  of  the  conflict  and  that  she  would  make  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  an  important  factor.  If  Germany  refused  to  respect 
Belgium's  neutrality,  she  intended  to  enter  the  conflict  at  once,  and  at  the 
same  time  that  she  assisted  Belgium,  she  would  oppose  Germany  in  the 
accomplishment  of  designs  which  must  necessarily  conflict  with  British 
interests. 

It  is,  then,  not  entirely  correct  to  say  that  Great  Britain  entered  the  war 
to  protect  Belgium's  neutrality,  for  she  entered  the  war  to  protect  her  own 
vital  interests.  Though  the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was 
of  the  greatest  importance  to  her  vital  interests,  she  would  have  gone  into 
the  war  likewise  if  it  had  been  a  question  of  Germany's  invading  Holland. 
The  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  not  obligated  by  treaty  to  defend  Holland's 
neutrality  would  not  have  entered  into  consideration,  for  in  the  case  of  an 
invasion  of  Holland,  England's  vital  interests  would  be  endangered.  The 
occupation  of  Belgium,  even  if  it  had  not  involved  the  violation  of  a  solemn 
treaty,  could  not  be  tolerated  by  England.  England  has  never  considered 
that  she  could  permit  any  great  Continental  power  to  hold  any  of  the  Chan- 
nel ports.  It  is  more  correct,  therefore,  to  say  that  England  went  into  the 
war  because  it  was  a  vital  interest  for  her  that  no  great  power  should  con- 
trol Belgium.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  possible  that  she  might  have  gone 
into  the  war  simply  because  of  Germany's  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality. 
The  great  majority  of  the  English  people,  however,  really  believe  that  the 
war  was  undertaken  in  great  measure  to  protect  Belgium.  The  Germans 
consider  such  an  attitude  as  hypocrisy,  but  they  do  not  realize  that  they 
afford  an  example  of  a  still  greater  popular  error  —  that  their  invasion  of 
Belgium  was  undertaken  because  the  German  Government  had  conclusive 
proof  of  the  actual  and  intended  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  France 
or  England. 

Question:  —  Was  Belgium  neutrality  violated  by  France  or  England  or 
by  Belgium  herself  in  such  manner  as  to  justify  Germany's  disregard  of  the 
treaty  guaranteeing  Belgian  neutrality? 

Answer:  —  The  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be  found  in  the  chapter  on 
Belgium  where  an  examination  of  the  evidence  has  been  made.  The  con- 
clusion is  that  not  one  bit  of  evidence  worthy  of  the  name  has  been  brought 
forward  by  Germany  to  justify  any  of  these  serious  charges.  So  many  of 
the  German  allegations  have  been  found,  upon  fuller  investigation,  to  be 
unsubstantiated,  as  to  raise  a  reasonable  presumption  of  doubt  regarding 
all  the  others. 

Question:  —  Was  England  free  to  remain  out  of  the  war  up  to  the  time 
of  her  ultimatum  to  Germany,  and  was  Sir  Edward  Grey  correct  in  saying 
that  Great  Britain  was  in  no  wise  committed? 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  527 

Answer:  —  England  was  committed  to  the  extent  of  a  conditional  partici- 
pation in  the  war  because  of  the  relations  of  the  Entente  and  the  agreement 
with  France.  According  to  the  arrangement  carried  into  effect  by  France 
and  England,  the  English  fleet  was  withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  policing  of  English  interests  left  to  France,  while  the  French  fleets  were 
concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean  for  this  purpose.  This  placed  upon  Great 
Britain  an  obligation  which  she  was  in  honor  bound  to  observe  of  protecting 
the  French  coasts  from  aggression.  Hence  she  was  to  that  extent  a  condi- 
tional ally  of  France.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  remarks  in  Parliament,  and  his 
efforts  as  shown  in  the  diplomatic  documents  to  make  it  clear  that  the  Brit- 
ish Cabinet  could  in  no  wise  agree  to  enter  the  war  even  to  this  extent  unless 
they  should  receive  the  support  of  Parliament,  hardly  alter  the  situation,  for 
the  British  Cabinet  is  the  agent  of  Parliament,  and  it  would  be  almost  un- 
heard of  for  Parliament  to  repudiate  the  action  of  its  Cabinet  in  such  a  crisis. 
The  cooperative  division  of  the  fleets  was  intended  only  for  defensive  pur- 
poses. If  France  had  been  guilty  of  any  aggression  or  even  if  she  had  felt 
that  she  must  support  Russia  when  the  latter  was  responsible  for  any  act 
of  aggression,  England  might  reasonably  have  considered  that  she  was  no 
longer  bound  to  help  France.  Sir  Edward  Grey  first  gave  Germany  what 
almost  amounted  to  an  assurance  that  Russia  and  France  would  join  in  any 
reasonable  plan  to  prevent  a  rupture  of  peace,  and  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  war  he  again  offered  to  leave  Russia  and  France  to  their  fate  if  they  should 
refuse  any  reasonable  suggestion  Germany  put  forward.  Germany  did  not 
avail  herself  of  this  offer.  Under  the  circumstances  Sir  Edward  Grey  was 
justified  in  considering  Russia's  action,  upon  the  whole,  as  defensive.  Hence 
England  was  bound  to  protect  the  French  coasts. 

The  claim  that  England  was  involved  in  any  other  way  seems  to  have  no 
serious  foundation.  No  doubt  she  was  tending  toward  a  closer  entente  with 
Russia,  but  the  whole  course  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  up  to  the 
last  three  or  four  days  does  not  indicate  that  England  was  in  any  way  bound 
to  Russia.  If  Russia  could  have  been  assured  of  British  support,  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  she  would  have  made  such  great  efforts  toward  peace  and  have 
urged  Servia  to  return  an  answer  so  extraordinarily  conciliatory.  When, 
however,  we  come  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  of  August  3  in  Parliament, 
the  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  had  become  clearly  defined  because  of 
Germany's  attitude  respecting  Belgium,  and  the  Government  was  com- 
mitted to  a  conditional  participation  in  the  war,  unless  Parliament  had  been 
ready  to  repudiate  its  Government  on  the  eve  of  the  most  serious  crisis  the 
nation  had  ever  faced.  Hence,  Sir  Edward's  statement  that  the  country  was 
not  committed  to  enter  the  war,  may  be  considered  mere  Parliamentary 
courtesy  or  persiflage.  There  was  no  deception  since  the  actual  facts  of  the 
situation  spoke  for  themselves. 

Question:  —  Was  England  responsible  for  the  result? 

Answer:  —  There  can  be  no  question  that  England  was  most  anxious 
to  avoid  a  war,  and  yet  Germany  would  lay  at  her  door  the  principal  re- 
sponsibility. When  we  read  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  we  find  the 
French  and  Russian  diplomats  predicting  that  war  will  result,  unless  Eng- 
land announces  that  she  will  make  common  cause  with  them.  And  at  the 
end,  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  escape  censure  from  a  member  of  Great 


528      THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

Britain's  own  Parliament,  who  made  the  accusation  that  he  was  to  blame 
for  the  rupture  of  peace  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  No  intelli- 
gent observer,  with  all  the  advantage  of  after-thought  and  after-sight,  has 
been  able  to  point  out  how  Great  Britain  might  surely  have  avoided  the  war. 
If  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  followed  the  suggestions  of  France  and  Russia  and 
had  announced  to  Germany  that  England  would  support  the  Dual  Alliance 
in  resisting  what  was  patently  aggressive  action  on  the  part  of  the  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Triple  Alliance,  she  would  have  played  directly  into  the  hands 
of  Germany,  provided  Germany  wanted  war,  because,  by  refusing  to  agree 
and  by  making  counter-demands,  Germany  could  have  precipitated  an  im- 
mediate conflict,  giving  her  the  advantage  of  striking  quickly  and  without 
delay.  This  would  probably  have  made  war  inevitable.  But  even  if  Ger- 
many, with  her  backing  of  the  arrogant  Austrian  demands,  had  sincerely 
desired  to  maintain  the  peace,  France  and  Russia  might  have  thought  it  was 
too  good  an  opportunity  to  let  slip.  They  might,  by  undercurrents  of  re- 
sistance, have  nettled  Germany  and  have  made  inevitable  the  conflict  which 
Great  Britain  wished  to  avoid.  Sir  Edward's  refusal  to  commit  the  British 
Government  may  have  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  remarkably  concilia- 
tory attitude  of  Russia.  England's  refusal  to  continue  the  discussion  with 
Germany  of  the  conditions  upon  which  she  might  consent  to  remain  neutral 
has  been  considered  under  a  previous  question. 

As  was  previously  noted,  there  is  just  a  possibility  that  Sir  Edward  might 
have  been  successful  if  he  had  attempted  to  play  more  directly  the  media- 
tory role  between  Germany  and  Russia,  and  had  said  to  Germany  that  if 
she  would  agree  to  come  into  a  conference  upon  certain  terms,  he  would 
secure  Russia's  consent  to  demobilize.  If  England  had  taken  this  stand  the 
moment  there  was  danger  of  Russian  mobilization,  there  might  have  been, 
provided  always  that  Germany  was  not  determined  upon  a  war,  a  reason- 
able chance  of  maintaining  peace.  But  such  mediation  would  have  been 
most  hazardous,  and  might  have  involved  England  in  a  war  from  which 
she  could  otherwise  have  held  aloof.  There  is  another  consideration,  which 
is  that  a  great  power  cannot  afford  to  risk  its  prestige  by  having  its  pro- 
posals refused  too  often.  Otherwise,  when  it  made  a  suggestion  it  would  not 
secure  that  consideration  which  is  so  important  a  factor  in  strengthening  a 
state's  political  action.  So  it  was  reasonable  that  Sir  Edward  should  pre- 
fer not  to  commit  England  until  the  last  moment.  We  may  then  answer 
that  England  cannot  be  considered  directly  responsible  for  the  result.  On 
the  whole,  I  believe,  unsuccessful  as  the  event  proved,  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
diplomacy,  as  portrayed  by  the  British  White  Papers,  will  stand  forth  as 
one  of  England's  glories  and  as  a  pattern  for  generations  to  come. 


QUESTIONS  WITHOUT  ANSWERS 

Question:  —  If  Germany  wanted  to  avoid  war,  why  did  she  insist  upon 
disregarding  the  usual  method  of  procedure  for  the  settlement  of  European 

difficulties? 

Question :  —  If  Germany  wanted  war,  why  did  she  lose  valuable  time  in 
prolonging  discussions? 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  529 

Question :  —  Did  Von  Tchirsky,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
telegraph  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  note  to  the  Kaiser  (cf.  B.  W.  P.  no. 
95)  before  it  was  presented  to  Servia? 

Question:  —  If  Germany  considered  that  Russia  was  responsible  for 
bringing  on  the  crisis  by  mobilizing,  why  could  not  the  German  Govern- 
ment have  agreed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  last  proposal  (see  chap.  VII)  on 
condition  that  England  would  guarantee  the  cessation  of  further  military 
preparations? 

Question :  —  What  did  Germany  mean  by  saying  that  her  entry  into 
Luxemburg  was  not  a  hostile  act? 

Question:  —  Why  did  Germany  invade  Belgium? 

Question:  —  As  Russia  was  so  much  slower  to  mobilize,  why  could  Ger- 
many not  have  rested  on  the  defensive  against  France  and  have  appealed 
to  England  to  prevent  war  by  joining  her  against  Russia  unless  Russia  de- 
mobilized? 

Question  :  —  Had  England  been  guilty  of  any  commercial  oppression  of 
Germany  or  interference  with  the  expansion  of  her  international  trade? 

Question :  —  Why  did  Sir  Edward  Grey  not  find  some  means  of  effective 
collaboration  with  Italy,  so  that  the  two  powers  might  have  exercised 
joint  intervention  in  favor  of  the  maintenance  of  peace? 


CHAPTER  XIII 

DOCUMENTS 


POLITICAL  AIMS   OF  THE   POWERS 


WASHINGTON'S  FAREWELL  ADDRESS,  SEPT.  17,  1796. l 

.  .  .  Observe  good  faith  and  justice  toward  all  nations.  Cultivate  peace 
and  harmony  with  all.  Religion  and  morality  enjoin  this  conduct.  And 
can  it  be  that  good  policy  does  not  equally  enjoin  it?  It  will  be  worthy  of 
a  free,  enlightened,  and  at  no  distant  period  a  great  nation  to  give  to  man- 
kind the  magnanimous  and  too  novel  example  of  a  people  always  guided 
by  an  exalted  justice  and  benevolence.  Who  can  doubt  that  in  the  course 
of  time  and  things  the  fruits  of  such  a  plan  would  richly  repay  any  tempo- 
rary advantages  which  might  be  lost  by  a  steady  adherence  to  it?  Can  it- 
be  that  Providence  has  not  connected  the  permanent  felicity  of  a  nation 
with  its  virtue?  The  experiment,  at  least,  is  recommended  by  every  senti- 
ment which  ennobles  human  nature.  Alas!  is  it  rendered  impossible  by  its 
vices? 

In  the  execution  of  such  a  plan  nothing  is  more  essential  than  that  per- 
manent, inveterate  antipathies  against  particular  nations  and  passionate 
attachments  for  others  should  be  excluded,  and  that  in  place  of  them  just 
and  amicable  feelings  toward  all  should  be  cultivated.  The  nation  which 
indulges  toward  another  an  habitual  hatred  or  an  habitual  fondness  is  in 
some  degree  a  slave.  It  is  a  slave  to  its  animosity  or  to  its  affection,  either 
of  which  is  sufficient  to  lead  it  astray  from  its  duty  and  its  interest.  Antipa- 
thy in  one  nation  against  another  disposes  each  more  readily  to  offer  insult 
and  injury,  to  lay  hold  of  slight  causes  of  umbrage,  and  to  be  haughty  and 
intractable  when  accidental  or  trifling  occasions  of  dispute  occur. 

Hence  frequent  collisions,  obstinate,  envenomed,  and  bloody  contests. 
The  nation  prompted  by  ill  will  and  resentment  sometimes  impels  to  war 
the  government  contrary  to  the  best  calculations  of  policy.  The  govern- 
ment sometimes  participates  in  the  national  propensity,  and  adopts  through 
passion  what  reason  would  reject.  At  other  times  it  makes  the  animosity  of 
the  nation  subservient  to  projects  of  hostility,  instigated  by  pride,  ambition, 
and  other  sinister  and  pernicious  motives.  The  peace  often,  sometimes 
perhaps  the  liberty,  of  nations  has  been  the  victim. 

So,  likewise,  a  passionate  attachment  of  one  nation  for  another  produces 
a  variety  of  evils.  Sympathy  for  the  favorite  nation,  facilitating  the  illusion 
of  an  imaginary  common  interest  in  cases  where  no  real  common  interest 
exists,  and  infusing  into  one  the  enmities  of  the  other,  betrays  the  former 
into  a  participation  in  the  quarrels  and  wars  of  the  latter  without  adequate 
inducement  or  justification.  It  leads  also  to  concessions  to  the  favorite  na- 

1  Extract  from  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  I,  pp.  221-24. 
Washington,  1896. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  531 

tion  of  privileges  denied  to  others,  which  is  apt  doubly  to  injure  the  nation 
making  the  concessions  by  unnecessarily  parting  with  what  ought  to  have 
been  retained,  and  by  exciting  jealousy,  ill  will,  and  a  disposition  to  retali- 
ate in  the  parties  from  whom  equal  privileges  are  withheld;  and  it  gives 
to  ambitious,  corrupted,  or  deluded  citizens  (who  devote  themselves  to  the 
favorite  nation)  facility  to  betray  or  sacrifice  the  interests  of  their  own 
country  without  odium,  sometimes  even  with  popularity,  gilding  with  the 
appearances  of  a  virtuous  sense  of  obligation,  a  commendable  deference  for 
public  opinion,  or  a  laudable  zeal  for  public  good  the  base  or  foolish  com- 
pliances of  ambition,  corruption,  or  infatuation. 

As  avenues  to  foreign  influence  in  innumerable  ways,  such  attachments 
are  particularly  alarming  to  the  truly  enlightened  and  independent  patriot. 
How  many  opportunities  do  they  afford  to  tamper  with  domestic  factions, 
to  practice  the  arts  of  seduction,  to  mislead  public  opinion,  to  influence  or 
awe  the  public  councils!  Such  an  attachment  of  a  small  or  weak  toward  a 
great  and  powerful  nation  dooms  the  former  to  be  the  satellite  of  the  latter. 
Against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influence  (I  conjure  you  to  believe  me, 
fellow-citizens)  the  jealousy  of  a  free  people  ought  to  be  constantly  awake, 
since  history  and  experience  prove  that  foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most 
baneful  foes  of  republican  government.  But  that  jealousy,  to  be  useful, 
must  be  impartial,  else  it  becomes  the  instrument  of  the  very  influence  to 
be  avoided,  instead  of  a  defense  against  it.  Excessive  partiality  for  one  for- 
eign nation  and  excessive  dislike  of  another  cause  those  whom  they  actu- 
ate to  see  danger  only  on  one  side,  and  serve  to  veil  and  even  second  the 
arts  of  influence  on  the  other.  Real  patriots  who  may  resist  the  intrigues 
of  the  favorite  are  liable  to  become  suspected  and  odious,  while  its  tools  and 
dupes  usurp  the  applause  and  confidence  of  the  people  to  surrender  their 
interests. 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is,  in  extend- 
ing our  commercial  relations  to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connec- 
tion as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements  let  them  be 
fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith.   Here  let  us  stop. 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none  or  a  very 
remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the 
causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore, 
it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordi- 
nary vicissitudes  of  her  politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions 
of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue 
a  different  course.  If  we  remain  one  people,  under  an  efficient  government, 
the  period  is  not  far  off  when  we  may  defy  material  injury  from  external 
annoyance;  when  we  may  take  such  an  attitude  as  will  cause  the  neutrality 
we  may  at  any  time  resolve  upon  to  be  scrupulously  respected;  when  bel- 
ligerent nations,  under  the  impossibility  of  making  acquisitions  upon  us, 
will  not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  us  provocation;  when  we  may  choose 
peace  or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided  by  justice,  shall  counsel. 

Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation?  Why  quit  our 
own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground?  Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with 
that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of 
European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice? 


532     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion 
of  the  foreign  world,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  we  are  now  at  liberty  to  do  it;  for 
let  me  not  be  understood  as  capable  of  patronizing  infidelity  to  existing  en- 
gagements. I  hold  the  maxim  no  less  applicable  to  public  than  to  private 
affairs  that  honesty  is  always  the  best  policy.  I  repeat,  therefore,  let  those 
engagements  be  observed  in  their  genuine  sense.  But  in  my  opinion  it  is 
unnecessary  and  would  be  unwise  to  extend  them. 

Taking  care  always  to  keep  ourselves  by  suitable  establishments  on  a 
respectable  defensive  posture,  we  may  safely  trust  to  temporary  alliances 
for  extraordinary  emergencies. 

Harmony,  liberal  intercourse  with  all  nations  are  recommended  by  policy, 
humanity,  and  interest.  But  even  our  commercial  policy  should  hold  an 
equal  and  impartial  hand,  neither  seeking  nor  granting  exclusive  favors  or 
preferences;  consulting  the  natural  course  of  things;  diffusing  and  diversify- 
ing by  gentle  means  the  streams  of  commerce,  but  forcing  nothing;  estab- 
lishing with  powers  so  disposed,  in  order  to  give  trade  a  stable  course,  to  de- 
fine the  rights  of  our  merchants,  and  to  enable  the  Government  to  support 
them,  conventional  rules  of  intercourse,  the  best  that  present  circumstances 
and  mutual  opinion  will  permit,  but  temporary  and  liable  to  be  from  time  to 
time  abandoned  or  varied  as  experience  and  circumstances  shall  dictate;  con- 
stantly keeping  in  view  that  it  is  folly  in  one  nation  to  look  for  disinterested 
favors  from  another;  that  it  must  pay  with  a  portion  of  its  independence 
for  whatever  it  may  accept  under  that  character;  that  by  such  acceptance  it 
may  place  itself  in  the  condition  of  having  given  equivalents  for  nominal 
favors,  and  yet  of  being  reproached  with  ingratitude  for  not  giving  more. 
There  can  be  no  greater  error  than  to  expect  or  calculate  upon  real  favors 
from  nation  to  nation.  It  is  an  illusion  which  experience  must  cure,  which 
a  just  pride  ought  to  discard. 

In  offering  to  you,  my  countrymen,  these  counsels  of  an  old  and  affec- 
tionate friend  I  dare  not  hope  they  will  make  the  strong  and  lasting  impres- 
sion I  could  wish  —  that  they  will  control  the  usual  current  of  the  passions 
or  prevent  our  nation  from  running  the  course  which  has  hitherto  marked 
the  destiny  of  nations.  But  if  I  may  even  flatter  myself  that  they  may  be 
productive  of  some  partial  benefit,  some  occasional  good  —  that  they  may 
now  and  then  recur  to  moderate  the  fury  of  party  spirit,  to  warn  against 
the  mischiefs  of  foreign  intrigue,  to  guard  against  the  impostures  of  pre- 
tended patriotism  —  this  hope  will  be  a  full  recompense  for  the  solicitude 
for  your  welfare  by  which  they  have  been  dictated. 

How  far  in  the  discharge  of  my  official  duties  I  have  been  guided  by  the 
principles  which  have  been  delineated  the  public  records  and  other  evi- 
dences of  my  conduct  must  witness  to  you  and  to  the  world.  To  myself, 
the  assurance  of  my  own  conscience  is  that  I  have  at  least  believed  myself 
to  be  guided  by  them. 

In  relation  to  the  still  subsisting  war  in  Europe  my  proclamation  of  the 
22d  of  April,  1793,  is  the  index  to  my  plan.  Sanctioned  by  your  approving 
voice  and  by  that  of  your  representatives  in  both  Houses  of  Congress,  the 
spirit  of  that  measure  has  continually  governed  me,  uninfluenced  by  any 
attempts  to  deter  or  divert  me  from  it. 

After  deliberate  examination,  with  the  aid  of  the  best  lights  I  could  obtain, 
I  was  well  satisfied  that  our  country,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  533 

case,  had  a  right  to  take,  and  was  bound  in  duty  and  interest  to  take, 
a  neutral  position.  Having  taken  it,  I  determined  as  far  as  should  depend 
upon  me  to  maintain  it  with  moderation,  perseverance,  and  firmness. 

The  considerations  which  respect  the  right  to  hold  this  conduct  it  is  not 
necessary  on  this  occasion  to  detail.  I  will  only  observe  that,  according  to 
my  understanding  of  the  matter,  that  right,  so  far  from  being  denied  by 
any  of  the  belligerent  powers,  has  been  virtually  admitted  by  all. 

The  duty  of  holding  a  neutral  conduct  may  be  inferred,  without  anything 
more,  from  the  obligation  which  justice  and  humanity  impose  on  every 
nation,  in  cases  in  which  it  is  free  to  act,  to  maintain  inviolate  the  relations 
of  peace  and  amity  toward  other  nations. 

The  inducements  of  interest  for  observing  that  conduct  will  best  be  re- 
ferred to  your  own  reflections  and  experience.  With  me  a  predominant  mo- 
tive has  been  to  endeavor  to  gain  time  to  our  country  to  settle  and  mature 
its  yet  recent  institutions,  and  to  progress  without  interruption  to  that  degree 
of  strength  and  consistency  which  is  necessary  to  give  it,  humanly  speak- 
ing, the  command  of  its  own  fortunes.  .  .  . 

BISMARCK'S  SPEECH  IN  THE  REICHSTAG,   FEB.   6,   1888  1 

When  I  say  that  it  is  our  duty  to  endeavor  to  be  ready  at  all  times  and 
for  all  emergencies,  I  imply  that  we  must  make  greater  exertions  than  other 
people  for  the  same  purpose,  because  of  our  geographical  position.  We  are 
situated  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  and  have  at  least  three  fronts  open  to  an  at- 
tack. France  has  only  her  eastern,  and  Russia  only  her  western,  frontier 
where  they  may  be  attacked.  We  are  also  more  exposed  to  the  dangers  of  a 
coalition  than  any  other  nation,  as  is  proved  by  the  whole  development  of 
history,  by  our  geographical  position,  and  the  lesser  degree  of  cohesiveness, 
which  until  now  has  characterized  the  German  nation  in  comparison  with 
others.  God  has  placed  us  where  we  are  prevented,  thanks  to  our  neighbors, 
from  growing  lazy  and  dull.  He  has  placed  by  our  side  the  most  warlike  and 
restless  of  all  nations,  the  French,  and  He  has  permitted  warlike  inclina- 
tions to  grow  strong  in  Russia,  where  formerly  they  existed  to  a  lesser  degree. 
Thus  we  are  given  the  spur,  so  to  speak,  from  both  sides,  and  are  compelled 
to  exertions  which  we  should  perhaps  not  be  making  otherwise.  The  pikes 
in  the  European  carp-pond  are  keeping  us  from  being  carps  by  making  us 
feel  their  teeth  on  both  sides.  They  also  are  forcing  us  to  an  exertion  which 
without  them  we  might  not  make,  and  to  a  union  among  us  Germans,  which 
is  abhorrent  to  us  at  heart.  By  nature  we  are  rather  tending  away,  the  one 
from  the  other.  But  the  Franco-Russian  vise  within  which  we  are  squeezed 
compels  us  to  hold  together,  and  by  pressure  our  cohesive  force  is  greatly 
increased.  This  will  bring  us  to  that  state  of  being  inseparable  which  all  other 
nations  possess,  while  we  do  not  yet  enjoy  it.  But  we  must  respond  to  the 
intentions  of  Providence  by  making  ourselves  so  strong  that  the  pikes  can 
do  nothing  but  encourage  us. 

What,  then,  was  my  surprise  and  natural  disappointment,  when  gradu- 
ally a  sort  of  newspaper  campaign  began  in  St.  Petersburg,  attacking  the 

1  These  extracts,  from  an  English  translation,  have  been  taken  from  The  German  Classics, 
vol.  x,  pp.  257-72.  I  have,  however,  made  one  or  two  slight  changes. 


534     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

German  policy,  and  casting  suspicion  on  my  personal  intentions.  These 
attacks  increased  in  the  following  year  to  the  strong  request,  in  1879,  for 
pressure  to  be  exerted  by  us  on  Austria  in  matters  where  we  could  not  attack 
the  Austrian  rights  as  such.  I  could  not  consent,  for,  if  we  should  have  been 
estranged  from  Austria,  we  should  necessarily  have  fallen  into  a  dependence 
on  Russia,  unless  we  were  satisfied  with  standing  entirely  alone  in  Europe. 
Would  such  a  dependence  have  been  bearable?  Formerly  I  had  believed  it 
might  be,  when  I  had  said  to  myself:  "  We  have  no  conflicting  interests  at 
all.  There  is  no  reason  why  Russia  should  ever  cancel  her  friendship." 
At  least  I  had  never  contradicted  my  Russian  colleagues  when  they  ex- 
pounded such  theories  to  me.  The  Russian  behavior  as  regards  the  Con- 
gress disappointed  me  and  showed  me  that  we  could  not  be  sure  of  not  being 
drawn  into  a  conflict  with  Russia  against  our  wishes,  even  if  we  placed  our 
policy  (for  a  time)  completely  at  her  disposal.  The  disagreement  concerning 
instructions  which  we  had  given  or  had  not  given  to  our  representatives  in 
the  south  [Constantinople]  grew,  until  threats  resulted,  threats  of  war  from 
the  most  authoritative  quarters. 

This  is  the  origin  of  our  Austrian  Treaty.  By  these  threats  we  were  com- 
pelled to  choose  between  our  two  former  friends,  a  decision  which  I  had 
avoided  through  several  decades.  At  that  time  I  negotiated  in  Gastein  and 
in  Vienna  the  treaty,  published  the  day  before  yesterday,  which  is  in  force 
between  us  to-day. 

The  publication  has  been  partly  misunderstood,  from  what  I  read  in  the 
newspapers  of  yesterday  and  the  day  before.  It  has  been  variously  inter- 
preted as  an  ultimatum,  a  warning,  and  a  threat.  A  threat  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  contained  in  it,  since  the  text  of  the  treaty  has  been  known  to 
Russia  for  a  long  while,  —  not  since  November  of  last  year  only.  We  con- 
sidered it  due  to  the  sincerity  of  so  loyal  a  monarch  as  the  Emperor  of  Rus- 
sia not  to  leave  a  doubt  concerning  the  actual  state  of  affairs. 

Personally  I  do  not  see  how  we  could  have  done  otherwise  than  conclude 
this  treaty.  If  we  had  not  done  it,  we  should  have  to  do  it  now.  It  possesses 
the  finest  quality  to  be  found  in  an  international  treaty,  in  that  it  is  the 
expression  of  the  lasting  interests  of  both  parties,  of  Austria  as  well  as 
ourselves.  No  great  power  can  for  any  length  of  time  cling  to  the  wording 
of  a  treaty  against  the  interests  of  its  own  people;  it  will  at  last  be  forced 
to  declare  openly:  "Times  have  changed;  we  can  no  longer  do  this";  and 
will  have  to  defend  its  action  as  best  it  can  before  its  own  people  and  the 
other  contracting  party.  For  no  power  will  approve  a  course  which  leads 
its  own  people  to  destruction,  for  the  sake  of  the  letter  of  a  treaty  signed 
under  different  conditions.  Nothing  of  this  kind,  however,  is  contained  in 
these  treaties.  The  treaty  concluded  with  Austria,  as  well  as  similar  treaties 
existing  between  us  and  other  powers,  notably  the  agreements  into  which 
we  have  entered  with  Italy,  is  the  expression  of  common  interests  in  mutual 
aspirations  and  dangers.  Italy,  like  ourselves,  has  been  obliged  to  fight 
against  Austria  for  her  right  to  establish  her  national  union.  At  present 
both  of  us  are  living  in  peace  with  Austria,  sharing  with  her  the  wish  to 
ward  off  the  dangers  which  are  threatening  all  alike.  Together  we  wish  to 
preserve  the  peace,  which  is  as  dear  to  one  as  to  the  other,  and  to  protect 
our  internal  development  to  which  all  of  us  are  determined  to  devote  our- 
selves. These  aims  and  our  mutual  confidence  that  the  treaties  will  be  kept, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  535 

and  that  no  nation  will  be  inconvenienced  by  them  further  than  its  own 
interests  permit,  make  these  treaties  firm,  durable,  and  permanent. 

The  extent  to  which  our  treaty  with  Austria  is  the  expression  of  our 
mutual  interests  was  shown  at  Nikolsburg,  and  in  1870.  Already  during  the 
negotiations  of  Nikolsburg  we  were  of  the  opinion  that  we  could  not  do  for 
any  length  of  time  without  Austria  in  Europe  —  a  strong  and  vigorous  Aus- 
tria. In  1870,  when  the  war  between  ourselves  and  France  broke  out,  many 
sensitive  Austrians  whom  we  had  hurt  were  naturally  tempted  to  make  use 
of  this  opportunity  to  take  revenge  for  1866.  The  thoughtful  and  far- 
seeing  diplomats  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  however,  had  to  ask  themselves: 
"  What  will  be  the  result?  What  will  be  our  position,  if  to-day  we  assist 
the  French,  and  help  them  to  beat  Prussia,  or  even  Germany?"  What 
would  have  been  the  result  if  France  with  the  help  of  Austria  had  been 
victorious  over  us?  If  Austria  had  followed  such  a  policy,  she  could  have 
had  no  other  aim  than  to  resume  her  former  position  in  Germany,  for  this 
was  really  the  only  thing  she  had  given  up  in  1866.  There  had  been  no  other 
important  stipulations,  and  the  pecuniary  conditions  were  insignificant. 
Well,  then,  what  would  have  been  the  position  of  Austria  as  the  presiding 
power  in  the  German  Union,  if  she  had  to  confess  that  in  alliance  with 
France  she  had  taken  from  Germany  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  that  she 
had  reduced  the  South  German  States  to  a  renewed  dependence  on  France 
in  the  shape  of  a  Rhenish  Federation,  and  had  condemned  Prussia  to  an 
irrevocable  dependence  on  Russia,  subject  in  future  to  Russian  policies? 
Such  a  position  was  unacceptable  to  all  Austrian  statesmen  not  completely 
blinded  with  wrath  and  vengeance. 

The  same  is  also  true  with  us  in  Germany.  Imagine  Austria  struck  from 
the  map  of  Europe.  Then  we  and  Italy  would  be  isolated  on  the  continent, 
hemmed  in  between  Russia  and  France,  the  two  strongest  military  powers 
next  to  Germany,  either  continually  one  against  two  —  and  this  would  be 
most  probable  —  or  alternately  dependent  on  one  or  the  other.  But  this 
will  not  be  the  case.  It  is  impossible  to  imagine  Austria  removed,  for  a 
state  like  Austria  does  not  disappear.  She  may  be  estranged  if  jilted,  as 
was  proposed  in  the  Villafranca  negotiations,  and  inclined  to  offer  her  hand 
to  that  nation  which  for  its  own  part  is  the  opponent  of  an  unreliable 
friend. 

In  short,  if  we  wish  to  avoid  being  isolated,  which  is  especially  danger- 
ous for  Germany  in  our  assailable  position,  we  must  have  a  reliable  friend. 
Thanks  to  the  similarities  of  our  interests,  and  this  treaty  before  you,  we 
have  two  such  friends.  It  is  not  love  which  makes  them  reliable,  for  nations 
may  make  war  one  upon  the  other  because  of  hate,  but  it  has  never  yet 
happened  that  one  nation  has  sacrificed  itself  for  another  for  mere  love. 
Nor  do  they  always  fight  when  they  hate  each  other,  for,  if  this  were  the 
case,  France  would  have  to  be  fighting  incessantly,  not  only  with  us,  but  also 
with  England  and  Italy.  She  hates  all  her  neighbors.  I  believe,  however, 
that  the  Russian  hatred  of  us,  which  has  been  artificially  fanned,  will  not 
last.  We  are  united  with  our  allies  in  the  love  of  peace,  not  only  by  inclina- 
tion and  friendship,  but  also  by  the  most  cogent  interests  of  a  European 
equilibrium  and  of  our  own  future. 

Then  there  is  another  advantage  if  this  bill  is  passed.  The  very  strength 


536     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

at  which  we  are  aiming  necessarily  renders  us  pacific.  This  sounds  like  a 
paradox,  but  it  is  not. 

With  the  powerful  engine  into  which  we  are  transforming  the  German 
army  one  does  not  make  an  attack.  If  I  were  to  come  before  you  to-day 
on  the  assumption  that  conditions  were  different  from  what  I  believe  they 
are,  and  should  say,  "We  are  considerably  menaced  by  France  and  Russia; 
we  shall  probably  be  attacked,  and  as  a  diplomat,  believing  my  military 
information  in  these  matters  to  be  correct,  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  better 
for  us  to  have  our  defense  consist  of  a  bold  attack,  and  to  strike  the  first 
blow  now  ";  and  if  I  should  add:  "We  can  more  easily  wage  an  aggressive 
war,  and  I,  therefore,  am  asking  the  Reichstag  for  an  appropriation  of  a 
milliard,  or  half  a  milliard,  marks  to  engage  in  a  war  against  our  two  neigh- 
bors," —  then  I  do  not  know,  gentlemen,  whether  you  would  have  enough 
confidence  in  me  to  grant  my  request,  but  I  hope  you  would  not  have  it. 

But,  if  you  had,  it  would  not  satisfy  me.  If  we  Germans  wish  to  wage 
a  war  with  the  full  effect  of  our  national  strength,  it  must  be  a  war  which 
is  approved  by  all  who  take  part  in  it,  all  who  sacrifice  anything  for  it;  in 
short,  the  whole  nation.  It  must  be  a  national  war,  a  war  carried  on  with  the 
enthusiasm  of  1870,  when  we  were  foully  attacked.  I  still  remember  the  ear- 
splitting,  joyful  shouts  in  the  station  at  Cologne.  It  was  the  same  all  the 
way  from  Berlin  to  Cologne,  in  Berlin  itself.  Waves  of  popular  approval 
bore  us  into  the  war,  whether  we  wished  it  or  not.  That  is  the  way  it  must 
be,  if  popular  force  like  ours  is  to  show  what  it  can  do.  It  will,  however, 
be  very  difficult  to  prove  to  the  provinces  and  states  of  the  Empire  and 
their  inhabitants  that  the  war  is  unavoidable,  and  has  to  be.  People  will 
ask:  "Are  you  so  sure?  Who  can  tell?"  In  short,  when  we  make  an  attack, 
the  whole  weight  of  all  imponderables,  which  weigh  far  heavier  than  material 
weights,  will  be  on  the  side  of  our  opponents  whom  we  have  attacked.  France 
will  be  bristling  with  arms  away  down  to  the  Pyrenees.  The  same  will  take 
place  everywhere.  A  war  into  which  we  are  not  borne  by  the  will  of  the 
people  will  be  waged,  to  be  sure,  if  it  has  been  declared  by  the  constituted 
authorities  who  deemed  it  necessary;  it  will  even  be  waged  pluckily,  and 
possibly  victoriously,  after  we  have  once  smelled  fire  and  tasted  blood,  but 
it  will  lack  from  the  beginning  the  nerve  and  enthusiasm  of  a  war  in  which 
we  are  attacked.  In  such  a  one  the  whole  of  Germany  from  Memel  to  the 
Alpine  Lakes  will  flare  up  like  a  powder  mine;  it  will  be  bristling  with  guns, 
and  no  enemy  will  dare  to  engage  this  furor  teutonicus  which  develops  when 
we  are  attacked.  We  cannot  afford  to  lose  this  factor  of  preeminence  even 
if  many  military  men  —  not  only  ours  but  others  as  well  —  believe  that 
to-day  we  are  superior  to  our  future  opponents.  Our  own  officers  believe 
this  to  a  man,  naturally.  Every  soldier  believes  this.  He  would  almost  cease 
to  be  a  useful  soldier  if  he  did  not  wish  for  war,  and  did  not  believe  that  we 
should  be  victorious  in  it.  If  our  opponents  by  any  chance  are  thinking  that 
we  are  pacific  because  we  are  afraid  of  how  the  war  may  end,  they  are  might- 
ily mistaken.  We  believe  as  firmly  in  our  victory  in  a  just  cause  as  any 
foreign  lieutenant  in  his  garrison,  after  his  third  glass  of  champagne,  can 
believe  in  his,  and  we  probably  do  so  with  greater  certainty.  It  is  not  fear, 
therefore,  which  makes  us  pacific,  but  the  consciousness  of  our  strength. 
We  are  strong  enough  to  protect  ourselves,  even  if  we  should  be  attacked 
at  a  less  favorable  moment,  and  we  are  in  a  position  to  let  divine  Providence 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  537 

determine  whether  a  war  in  the  mean  while  may  not  become  unnecessary 
after  all. 

I  am,  therefore,  not  in  favor  of  any  kind  of  aggressive  war,  and  if  war 
could  result  only  from  an  attack- — somebody  must  kindle  a  fire — we  shall 
not  kindle  it.  Neither  the  consciousness  of  our  strength,  which  I  have 
described,  nor  our  confidence  in  our  treaties,  will  prevent  us  from  continuing 
our  former  endeavors  to  preserve  peace.  In  this  we  do  not  permit  ourselves 
to  be  influenced  by  annoyances  or  dislikes.  The  threats  and  insults  and 
challenges  which  have  been  made  have,  no  doubt,  excited  amongst  us  also 
a  feeling  of  irritation,  which  does  not  easily  occur  in  the  case  of  Germans, 
for  they  are  less  prone  to  national  hatred  than  any  other  nation.  We  are 
trying  to  calm  our  countrymen,  however,  and  we  shall  work  for  peace  with 
our  neighbors,  especially  with  Russia,  in  the  future  as  we  have  in  the  past. 
When  I  say,  'especially  with  Russia,'  I  express  the  opinion  that  France  offers 
us  no  assurances  of  success  in  our  endeavors.  I  will  not,  however,  say  that 
these  endeavors  are  of  no  use.  We  shall  never  pick  a  quarrel,  nor  ever 
attack  France ;  and  in  the  many  little  incidents  which  the  proclivity  of  our 
neighbors  for  spying  and  bribing  has  occasioned,  we  have  always  brought 
about  a  very  courteous  and  amicable  settlement.  I  should  consider  it  crimi- 
nal if  we  were  to  inflame  a  great  national  war  for  such  bagatelles.  These 
are  instances  when  one  should  say:  "The  cleverer  of  the  two  will  yield." 

THE  APOCRYPHAL  WILL  OF  PETER  THE  GREAT 
(THE  SOKOLNICKI  TEXT)  « 

1.  Neglect  nothing  to  give  the  Russian  nation  European  forms  and  cus- 
toms; with  this  purpose  engage  the  different  courts  and  the  learned  of  Eu- 
rope in  particular,  whether  by  interested  motives  or  by  the  philanthropic 
principles  of  philosophy,  or  any  other  motive,  to  contribute  to  this  end. 

2.  Maintain  in  the  state  a  system  of   continuous  warfare  in   order  to 

1  The  ghost  of  Peter  the  Great,  which  has  long  stalked  through  Europe  in  the  shape  of  a 
so-called  "will,"  setting  forth  his  designs  for  Russian  aggrandizement,  can  at  last  be  laid  to 
rest,  at  least  in  its  current  versions.  Whether  Peter  did  or  did  not  leave  behind  him  some  sort 
of  a  political  testament,  we  do  not  attempt  to  decide,  but  the  source  of  the  document  which 
has  masqueraded  under  his  name  has  been  traced  beyond  cavil,  the  original  having  been 
brought  to  light  from  the  Public  Archives  at  Berlin,  with  the  name  of  its  utterer,  one  Sokol- 
nicki.  The  motive  of  its  fabrication  is  not  far  to  seek.  This  Sokolnicki  was  a  Polish  officer, 
a  refugee  in  Paris  in  1797,  at  the  time  of  the  Directory,  and  for  the  purpose  of  inciting  the 
French,  then  posing  as  the  saviors  of  oppressed  peoples,  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  his  native 
land,  he  composed  the  articles  of  this  instrument,  ingeniously  contrived  to  reveal  to  the 
French  Government  the  menace  of  Russian  intrigue. 

In  this  brief  note  it  is  impossible  to  go  into  the  picturesque  details  that  attended  the  birth 
of  the  forgery.  For  them  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  authorities  given  below.  It  may  be 
well  to  add  that  Waliszewski,  in  his  history  of  Peter  the  Great,  arrives  at  the  same  conclusion 
as  to  the  spuriousness  of  the  will,  though  he  does  not  seem  to  be  cognizant  of  the  real  author 
of  the  deception.  Yet  in  a  sense  the  will  is  genuine,  for  it  merely  lends  the  glamour  of  pre- 
tended prophecy  to  historical  events  as  they  have  actually  occurred,  and  in  giving  expres- 
sion to  the  political  aims  of  Russia  it  states  simply  what  was  natural  to  an  empire  situated 
as  hers  has  been,  though  these  aims  were  immeasurably  beyond  any  dreams  of  Peter  and  the 
Muscovy  of  his  day.  I  have,  therefore,  notwithstanding  the  apocryphal  character  of  the 
will,  given  a  translation  of  it  in  its  primitive  form,  the  two  later  versions  (Lesur,  1812,  and 
Gaillardet,  1836)  being  derivatives,  with  such  variations  and  embroideries  as  were  conven- 
ient at  the  date  of  their  appearance.  See  Harry  Bresslau,  Das  Testament  Peter's  des  Grossen, 
in  Sybel's  Historische  Zeitschrift,  vol.  41,  p.  385  et  seg.  (1879),  and  K.  Waliszewski,  Peter  the 
Great,  English  translation  iXew  York,  1900;,  pp.  548-51. 


538     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

harden  the  soldiery  and  to  keep  the  nation  always  in  training  and  ready  to 
march  at  the  first  signal. 

3.  Extend  by  every  possible  means  towards  the  north  along  the  Baltic, 
and  towards  the  south.   And  with  this  end  in  view  — 

4.  Arouse  the  jealousy  of  England,  Denmark,  and  Brandenburg  against 
Sweden ;  as  a  result  of  which  these  powers  will  shut  their  eyes  to  the  encroach- 
ments that  may  be  made  on  that  country,  and  in  the  end  it  will  be  sub- 
jugated. 

5.  Interest  the  House  of  Austria  in  driving  the  Turk  from  Europe,  and 
under  this  pretext  maintain  a  standing  army  and  establish  dockyards  on 
the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  by  continually  advancing  reach  out  to  Con- 
stantinople. 

6.  Keep  Poland  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  influence  its  Diets,  and  especially 
the  elections  of  its  kings;  get  a  morsel  of  it  at  every  opportunity,  and  end 
by  subduing  it  completely. 

7.  Contract  a  close  alliance  with  England,  and  keep  up  direct  relations 
with  her  by  means  of  a  commercial  treaty;  even  permit  her  to  exercise  a 
kind  of  monopoly  in  the  interior;  which  will  lead  imperceptibly  to  an  inter- 
mingling of  our  nationals  with  English  merchants  and  sailors,  who  will  pro- 
vide all  the  means  for  perfecting  and  enlarging  the  Russian  navy,  by  the 
help  of  which  it  should  soon  be  our  aim  to  secure  the  mastery  of  the  Baltic 
and  the  Black  Sea.  .  .  .  This  is  a  point  of  capital  importance  upon  which 
depend  the  rapid  execution  and  success  of  the  plan. 

8.  At  any  cost  mix  in  the  quarrels  of  Europe,  either  by  force  or  by  stealth, 
—  especially  those  relating  to  Germany.  And  to  this  end  — 

9.  Always  appear  to  be  the  ally  of  Austria,  profiting  by  the  smallest 
ascendancy  that  you  can  get  over  her  to  drag  her  into  ruinous  wars  in  order 
to  enfeeble  her  by  degrees;  sometimes  even  succor  her,  and  do  not  cease  to 
make  enemies  for  her  secretly  in  the  interior  of  the  Empire  by  arousing 
against  her  the  jealousy  of  the  princes.  .  .  .  Nota.  This  article  will  be  all 
the  more  easy  to  carry  out  since  the  House  of  Austria  has  not  ceased  up  to 
this  time  to  delude  itself  with  the  project  of  acquiring  universal  dominion, 
or  at  least  of  reestablishing  the  Western  Empire,  and  for  that  purpose  she 
must  before  everything  begin  by  subduing  Germany. 

10.  Always  choose  wives  for  Russian  princes  among  the  princesses  of 
Germany,  and  thus  multiply  alliances  by  the  relations  of  families,  interest 
and  influence  everywhere  in  that  Empire. 

11.  Make  use  of  religious  ascendancy  among  the  Greek  separatists  and 
schismatics  who  are  distributed  through  Hungary,  Turkey,  and  the  south- 
ern parts  of  Poland,  bind  them  to  you  by  every  insidious  method,  get  your- 
selves called  their  protectors  and  acquire  a  title  to  the  sacerdotal  supremacy; 
under  this  pretext  and  with  their  assistance,  with  Turkey  subjugated  and 
Poland  encroached  upon,  the  conquest  of  Hungary  will  be  but  a  trifle;  prom- 
ising to  Austria  in  the  mean  while  indemnifications  in  Germany,  while  the 
rest  of  Poland,  no  longer  able  to  sustain  itself  either  by  its  own  strength,  or 
by  political  connections,  will  of  its  own  accord  come  under  the  yoke. 

12.  From  then  on  every  moment  is  precious.  Make  ready  in  secret  the 
batteries  for  the  decisive  blow  and  have  them  put  into  action  with  an  order, 
foresight,  and  rapidity  that  will  give  Europe  no  time  to  pull  herself  together. 
One  should  begin  by  proposing  separately,  very  secretly,  and  with  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  539 

greatest  circumspection,  first  to  the  Court  of  Versailles  and  then  to  that 
of  Vienna,  a  division  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  universe;  calling  their  atten- 
tion to  this  point:  that  Russia,  being  in  fact  the  sovereign  of  the  entire  East, 
and  having  nothing  further  to  gain  but  the  title,  can  in  no  wise  be  open  to 
their  suspicion  in  advancing  this  proposition.  Without  doubt  this  project, 
on  the  contrary,  cannot  fail  to  flatter  them  and  to  enkindle  between  them 
a  war  to  the  death ;  a  war  which  will  soon  become  general  owing  to  the  con- 
nections and  the  relations  extending  from  these  two  courts  (rivals  and 
natural  enemies),  and  also  because  of  the  interest  which  all  the  other  powers 
will  of  necessity  take  in  this  quarrel. 

13.  In  the  midst  of  this  general  turmoil  Russia  will  arrange  to  be  asked 
for  assistance,  sometimes  by  the  one,  sometimes  by  the  other  of  the  bel- 
ligerent powers,  and  after  having  long  hesitated  in  order  to  give  them  time 
to  exhaust  themselves  and  herself  to  assemble  her  forces,  she  will  seem  finally 
to  decide  for  the  House  of  Austria,  and  while  she  advances  her  regular 
troops  to  the  Rhine,  she  will  have  them  followed  immediately  by  a  swarm 
of  her  Asiatic  hordes;  and  in  proportion  as  these  last  advance  into  Germany, 
two  considerable  fleets  will  set  out,  the  one  from  the  Sea  of  Azof,  the  other 
from  the  harbor  of  Archangel,  laden  with  bands  of  these  same  hordes,  under 
convoy  of  the  armed  fleets  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic;  the  fleets  will 
appear  unexpectedly  in  the  Mediterranean  and  on  the  ocean  and  will  pour 
forth  all  these  nomad  peoples,  fierce  and  greedy  for  booty,  to  inundate  Italy, 
Spain,  and  France,  one  part  of  whose  inhabitants  they  will  plunder,  another 
part  lead  off  into  slavery  to  repeople  with  them  the  deserts  of  abandoned 
Siberia;  and  the  rest  they  will  render  helpless  to  shake  off  the  yoke. 

THE  DECLARATION  OF  THE  AMERICAN  DELEGATION 
AT  THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE 

"On  July  25,  1899,  the  American  delegation  at  the  Peace  Conference  at 
The  Hague,  referring  to  the  convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of 
international  differences,  which  was  then  pending  before  the  conference, 
made  in  full  session  the  following  declaration : 

'"Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  re- 
quire the  United  States  of  America  to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of 
not  intruding  upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political 
questions  or  policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state;  nor  shall 
anything  contained  in  the  said  convention  be  construed  to  imply  a  relin- 
quishment by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its  traditional  attitude 
toward  purely  American  questions.' 

"It  was  under  this  reserve  that  the  American  delegates  signed  the 
convention  on  July  29,  1899."  (Report  of  the  United  States  Commission, 
July  31,  1899,  Holls's  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague,  477,  531.  See  John 
Bassett  Moore:  A  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  VI,  p.  594.) 


540     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 
THE  ALLIANCES 


TREATY  OF  ALLIANCE  OF  OCTOBER  7,  1879,   BETWEEN 
AUSTRIA  AND  GERMANY1 

Considering  that  their  Majesties,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of 
Hungary  and  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  King  of  Prussia,  must  esteem 
it  to  be  their  unavoidable  duty  as  sovereigns  to  watch  under  all  circum- 
stances over  the  safety  of  their  Empires  and  the  tranquillity  of  their 
peoples; 

Considering  that  the  two  Monarchs  will  be  able,  by  a  solid  alliance  of  the 
two  Empires,  in  the  kind  of  that  which  previously  existed,  more  easily  to 
accomplish  this  duty,  as  also  more  efficaciously; 

Considering,  in  fine,  that  an  intimate  agreement  between  Austro-Hun- 
gary  and  Germany  can  threaten  no  one,  but  is  rather  calculated  to  consoli- 
date European  peace  as  created  by  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin; 

Their  Majesties,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of  Hungary  and  the 
Emperor  of  Germany  and  King  of  Prussia,  promising  each  other  solemnly 
never  to  give  any  aggressive  tendency  whatsoever  to  their  purely  defensive 
agreement,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a  reciprocal  alliance  of  peace  and  pro- 
tection; 

In  this  aim,  their  Majesties  have  appointed  as  their  plenipotentiaries:  — 

For  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of  Hungary,  his  real 
Privy  Councillor,  the  Minister  of  the  Imperial  House,  as  also  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Lieutenant  Julius,  Count  Andrassy,  etc.; 

For  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  his  Ambassador  and  pleni- 
potentiary extraordinary,  Lieutenant-General  Prince  Henry  VII  of  Reuss, 
etc.; 

Who  have  both  entered  into  relations  with  each  other  to-day  in  Vienna, 
and,  after  showing  each  other  their  powers  duly  recognized  as  good  and 
sufficient,  have  settled  what  follows:  — 

Article  I.  If,  contrarily  to  what  may  be  hoped  and  contrarily  to  the 
sincere  wishes  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties,  one  of  the  two  Empires 
were  to  be  attacked  by  Russia,  the  two  high  contracting  parties  are  bound 
to  lend  each  other  reciprocal  aid  with  the  whole  of  their  imperial  military 
power,  and,  subsequently,  to  conclude  no  peace  except  conjointly  and  in 
agreement. 

Article  II.  If  one  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties  were  to  be  at- 
tacked by  another  Power,  the  other  high  contracting  party  binds  itself, 
by  the  present  act,  not  only  not  to  uphold  the  aggressor  against  its  high 
Ally,  but  at  the  least,  to  observe  a  benevolent  neutrality  with  regard  to  the 
contracting  party  aforesaid. 

If,  however,  in  the  case  previously  mentioned,  the  Power  attacking  were 
to  be  upheld  by  Russia,  whether  by  way  of  active  cooperation  or  by  military 
measures  that  should  threaten  the  Power  attacked,  then  the  obligation 
of  reciprocal  assistance  with  entire  military  forces  —  obligation  stipulated 
in  Article  I  of  this  treaty  —  would  immediately  become  executory,  and  the 
>  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  pp.  128-29.  New  York,  1908. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  541 

military  operations  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties  would  also,  in  such 
circumstances,  be  conducted  jointly  until  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Article  III.  This  Treaty,  in  conformity  with  its  pacific  character  and 
to  avoid  all  false  interpretation,  will  be  held  secret  by  all  the  high  contract- 
ing parties. 

It  may  only  be  communicated  to  a  Third  Power  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  two  parties  and  after  a  special  agreement  between  them. 

Considering  the  intentions  expressed  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  at  the 
Alexandrowo  interview,  the  two  contracting  parties  nourish  the  hope  that 
Russia's  preparations  will  not,  in  reality,  become  threatening  to  them; 
for  this  reason,  there  is  at  present  no  motive  for  communication. 

But,  if,  against  all  expectation,  this  hope  should  be  rendered  vain,  the 
two  contracting  parties  would  recognize  that  it  was  a  duty  of  loyalty  to 
inform  the  Emperor  Alexander,  at  least  confidentially,  that  they  must 
deem  any  attack  directed  against  one  of  them  as  being  directed  against 
both. 

To  testify  which,  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  this  Treaty  with  their 
own  hand  and  have  affixed  their  seals  thereto. 

Made  at  Vienna,  on  the  7th  of  October,  1879. 
Signed:  Andrasst. 

Prince  Henry  VII  of  Reuss. 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  AND 
JAPAN  i 

Signed  at  London,  July  18,  1911 
Preamble 
The  Goverment  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Government  of  Japan,  having 
in  view  the  important  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  situation  since 
the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  of  the  12th  August, 
1905,  and  believing  that  a  revision  of  that  Agreement  responding  to  such 
changes  would  contribute  to  general  stability  and  repose,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  stipulations  to  replace  the  Agreement  above  mentioned,  such 
stipulations  having  the  same  object  as  the  said  Agreement,  namely:  — 

(a)  The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  the  general  peace  in  the  regions 
of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India; 

(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  Powers  in  China  by 
insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  na- 
tions in  China; 

(c)  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India,  and  the  defence  of  their 
special  interests  in  the  said  regions :  — 

Article  I.  It  is  agreed  that  whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either  Great 
Britain  or  Japan,  any  of  the  rights  and  interests  referred  to  in  the  preamble 

1  British  State  Papers,  vol.  cm.  London,  1911.  The  original  alliance  between  the  two 
states  was  entered  into  January  30, 1902.  See  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1902, 
p.  514;  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  vol.  I,  1907,  Supplement,  p.  14.  A  new  agree- 
ment was  substituted  for  that  of  1902,  August  12,  1905.  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1906,  p.  488;  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  vol.  I,  1907,  Supplement,  p.  15. 


542     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

of  this  Agreement  are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  Governments  will  communicate 
with  one  another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  consider  in  common  the  meas- 
ures which  should  be  taken  to  safeguard  those  menaced  rights  or  interests. 

Article  II.  If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive  action, 
wherever  arising,  on  the  part  of  any  Power  or  Powers,  either  High  Con- 
tracting Party  should  be  involved  in  war  in  defence  of  its  territorial  rights 
or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement,  the  other 
High  Contracting  Party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and 
will  conduct  the  war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

Article  III.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  neither  of  them 
will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  separate  arrangements  with 
another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of 
this  Agreement. 

Article  IV.  Should  either  High  Contracting  Party  conclude  a  treaty 
of  general  arbitration  with  a  third  Power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this 
Agreement  shall  entail  upon  such  Contracting  Party  an  obligation  to  go  to 
war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  treaty  of  arbitration  is  in  force. 

Article  V.  The  conditions  under  which  armed  assistance  shall  be  af- 
forded by  either  Power  to  the  other  in  the  circumstances  mentioned  in  the 
present  Agreement,  and  the  means  by  which  such  assistance  is  to  be  made 
available,  will  be  arranged  by  the  Naval  and  Military  authorities  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties,  who  will  from  time  to  time  consult  one  another 
fully  and  freely  upon  all  questions  of  mutual  interest. 

Article  VI.  The  present  Agreement  shall  come  into  effect  immediately 
after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from  that 
date. 

In  case  neither  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  have  notified 
twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the  said  ten  years  the  intention  of 
terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one  year  from 
the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  have  de- 
nounced it.  But  if,  when  the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally 
is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance  shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace 
is  concluded. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Undersigned,  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Agreement,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their 
Seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  London,  the  13th  day  of  July,  1911. 

ANGLO-AMERICAN  COOPERATION   IN  REGARD  TO 
AMERICAN  AFFAIRS 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  have  expressed  a  wish  to  cooper- 
ate in  terminating  differences  which  have  existed  for  many  years  between 
my  Government  and  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  upon  the  boundary  be- 
tween that  country  and  my  Colony  of  British  Guiana.  I  have  expressed  my 
sympathy  with  the  desire  to  come  to  an  equitable  arrangement,  and  trust 
that  further  negotiation  will  lead  to  a  satisfactory  settlement.1 

1  Extract  from  the  Speech  of  the  Queen,  on  the  Opening  of  the  British  Parliament,  West- 
minster, February  11, 1896.  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1895-96,  vol.  88,  p.  1.  London, 
1900. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  543 

ANGLO-AMERICAN  ARBITRATION 

My  Government  have  discussed  with  the  United  States,  acting  as  the 
friend  of  Venezuela,  the  terms  under  which  the  pending  questions  of  dis- 
puted frontier  between  that  Republic  and  my  Colony  of  British  Guiana 
may  be  equitably  submitted  to  arbitration.  An  arrangement  has  been  ar- 
rived at  witeh  that  Government  which  will,  I  trust,  effect  the  adjustment  of 
existing  controversies  without  exposing  to  risk  the  interests  of  any  colonists 
who  have  established  rights  in  the  disputed  territory. 

It  is  with  much  gratification  that  I  have  concluded  a  Treaty  for  General 
Arbitration  with  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  which  I  trust  that 
all  differences  that  may  arise  between  us  will  be  peacefully  adjusted.  I  hope 
that  this  arrangement  may  have  a  further  value  in  commending  to  other 
Powers  the  consideration  of  a  principle  by  which  the  danger  of  war  may  be 
notably  abated.1 

THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE2 

It  must,  however,  be  conceded  that  the  most  important  political  result  of 
the  Venezuelan  incident  was  not  the  decision  upon  the  territorial  question, 
but  the  official  adoption  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  and  its  explicit  acceptance  by  the  principal  maritime  power 
of  Europe. 

An  official  exposition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  given  by  President 
Roosevelt  in  his  annual  message  of  December  3,  1901,  in  which  he  said:  — 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that  there  must  be  no  territorial 
aggrandizement  by  any  non-American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  Ameri- 
can power  on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any  na- 
tion in  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  This  doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  com- 
mercial relations  of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in  truth  allows  each 
of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires.  .  .  .  We  do  not  guarantee  any  state 
against  punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punishment  does 
not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  non-American 
power." 

An  occasion  for  the  practical  application  of  this  definition  soon  arose.  On 
December  11,  1901,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Washington  left  at  the 
Department  of  State  a  memorandum  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  proposed  to  take  certain  coercive  measures  against  Ven- 
ezuela for  the  satisfaction  of  claims,  based  partly  on  breaches  of  contract 
and  partly  on  violent  wrongs,  which  it  had  been  found  to  be  impracticable 
otherwise  to  bring  to  a  settlement.  At  the  same  time  the  memorandum 
declared  that  "under  no  circumstances"  would  the  German  Government 
consider  in  its  proceedings  "the  acquisition  or  the  permanent  occupation  of 
Venezuelan  territory."  In  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  this  memorandum, 
on  December  16,  Mr.  Hay  adverted  to  the  fact  that  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor, on  his  then  recent  return  from  Berlin,  had  conveyed  personally  to  the 
President,  and  had  afterwards  repeated  to  himself,  the  assurance  of  the  Ger- 

1  Extract  from  Speech  of  the  Queen,  on  the  Opening  of  the  British  Parliament,  West- 
minster, January  19,  1897.  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1896-97,  vol.  89,  p.  1,  London, 
1901.   This  arbitration  treaty  failed  to  receive  the  assent  of  the  Senate. 

1  Extract  from  John  Bassett  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  157-59.  New  York,  1905. 


544    THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF  1914 

man  Emperor  that  the  Imperial  Government  had  no  purpose  or  intention  to 
make  even  the  smallest  acquisition  of  territory  on  the  South  American  con- 
tinent or  the  adjacent  islands;  and  in  view  of  this  circumstance,  and  of  the 
further  assurance  given  in  the  memorandum,  Mr.  Hay  declared  that  the 
President,  while  "appreciating  the  courtesy  of  the  German  Government  in 
making  him  acquainted  with  the  state  of  affairs  referred  to,"  did  not  regard 
himself  "as  called  upon  to  enter  into  the  consideration  of  the  claims  in  ques- 
tion." The  coercive  measures  contemplated  by  the  German  Government 
were  postponed  for  a  year,  and  were  then  taken  in  conjunction  with  the 
British  Government,  which  also  made  to  the  United  States,  on  November 
13,  1902,  a  frank  communication  of  its  purposes.  To  this  communication 
Mr.  Hay  replied  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  although  it 
"regretted  that  European  powers  should  use  force  against  Central  and 
South  American  governments,  could  not  object  to  their  taking  steps  to 
obtain  redress  for  injuries  suffered  by  their  subjects,  provided  that  no 
acquisition  of  territory  was  contemplated."  In  the  hostilities  with  Ven- 
ezuela that  ensued,  the  assurances  of  the  powers  were  honorably  kept,  but 
peaceful  relations  were  eventually  restored  through  the  frank  exercise  of  the 
friendly  offices  of  the  United  States. 

DECLARATION   BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM   AND 
FRANCE   RESPECTING  EGYPT  AND   MOROCCO1 

Dated  April  8,  1904 

Article  I.  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  have 
no  intention  of  altering  the  political  status  of  Egypt. 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  for  their  part,  declare  that 
they  will  not  obstruct  the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  that  country  by  ask- 
ing that  a  limit  of  time  be  fixed  for  the  British  occupation  or  in  any  other 
manner,  and  that  they  give  their  assent  to  the  draft  Khedivial  Decree  an- 
nexed to  the  present  Arrangement,  containing  the  guarantees  considered 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  Egyptian  bondholders, 
on  the  condition  that,  after  its  promulgation,  it  cannot  be  modified  in  any 
way  without  the  consent  of  the  Powers  Signatory  of  the  Convention  of 
London  of  1885. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  post  of  Director-General  of  Antiquities  in  Egypt 
shall  continue,  as  in  the  past,  to  be  entrusted  to  a  French  savant. 

The  French  schools  in  Egypt  shall  continue  to  enjoy  the  same  liberty 
as  in  the  past. 

Article  II.  The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  declare  that  they 
have  no  intention  of  altering  the  political  status  of  Morocco. 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government,  for  their  part,  recognize  that  it 
appertains  to  France,  more  particularly  as  a  Power  whose  dominions  are 
conterminous  for  a  great  distance  with  those  of  Morocco,  to  preserve  order 
in  that  country,  and  to  provide  assistance  for  the  purpose  of  all  adminis- 
trative, economic,  financial  and  military  reforms  which  it  may  require. 

1  See  Great  Britain,  Parliamentary  Papers,  Treaties  Series,  1905,  no.  6;  American  Journal 
of  International  Law,  Supplement,  vol.  i  (1907),  pp.  6-8.  Upon  the  same  day  as  this  treaty, 
another  was  signed  settling  outstanding  differences  between  the  two  powers  in  regard  to  the 
Newfoundland  fisheries  and  the  boundary  lines  between  their  possessions  in  Africa. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  545 

They  declare  that  they  will  not  obstruct  the  action  taken  by  France  for 
this  purpose,  provided  that  such  action  shall  leave  intact  the  rights  which 
Great  Britain,  in  virtue  of  Treaties,  Conventions,  and  usage,  enjoys  in 
Morocco,  including  the  right  of  coasting  trade  between  the  ports  of  Mo- 
rocco, enjoyed  by  British  vessels  since  1901. 

Article  III.  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government,  for  their  part,  will 
respect  the  rights  which  France,  in  virtue  of  Treaties,  Conventions,  and 
usage,  enjoys  in  Egypt,  including  the  right  of  coasting  trade  between 
Egyptian  ports  accorded  to  French  vessels. 

Article  IV.  The  two  Governments,  being  equally  attached  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  commercial  liberty  both  in  Egypt  and  Morocco,  declare  that  they 
will  not,  in  those  countries,  countenance  any  inequality  either  in  the  impo- 
sition of  customs  duties  or  other  taxes,  or  of  railway  transport  charges. 

The  trade  of  both  nations  with  Morocco  and  with  Egypt  shall  enjoy  the 
same  treatment  in  transit  through  the  French  and  British  possessions  in 
Africa.  An  Agreement  between  the  two  Governments  shall  settle  the  con- 
ditions of  such  transit  and  shall  determine  the  points  of  entry. 

This  mutual  engagement  shall  be  binding  for  a  period  of  thirty  years. 
Unless  this  stipulation  is  expressly  denounced  at  least  one  year  in  advance, 
the  period  shall  be  extended  for  five  years  at  a  time. 

Nevertheless,  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic  reserve  to  them- 
selves in  Morocco,  and  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  reserve  to 
themselves  in  Egypt,  the  right  to  see  that  the  concessions  for  roads,  rail- 
ways, ports,  etc.,  are  only  granted  on  such  conditions  as  will  maintain 
intact  the  authority  of  the  State  over  these  great  undertakings  of  public 
interest. 

Article  V.  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  will 
use  their  influence  in  order  that  the  French  officials  now  in  the  Egyptian 
service  may  not  be  placed  under  conditions  less  advantageous  than  those 
applying  to  the  British  officials  in  the  same  service. 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  for  their  part,  would  make  no 
objection  to  the  application  of  analogous  conditions  to  British  officials  now 
in  the  Moorish  service. 

Article  VI.  In  order  to  insure  the  free  passage  of  the  Suez  Canal,  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  adhere  to  the  stipula- 
tions of  the  Treaty  of  the  29th  October,  1888,  and  that  they  agree  to  their 
being  put  in  force.  The  free  passage  of  the  Canal  being  thus  guaranteed, 
the  execution  of  the  last  sentence  of  paragraph  1  as  well  as  of  paragraph  2 
of  Article  VIII  of  that  Treaty  will  remain  in  abeyance. 

Article  VII.  In  order  to  secure  the  free  passage  of  the  Straits  of  Gib- 
raltar, the  two  Governments  agree  not  to  permit  the  erection  of  any  forti- 
fications or  strategic  works  on  that  portion  of  the  coast  of  Morocco  com- 
prised between,  but  not  including,  Melilla  and  the  heights  which  command 
the  right  bank  of  the  River  Sebou. 

This  condition  does  not,  however,  apply  to  the  places  at  present  in  the 
occupation  of  Spain  on  the  Moorish  coast  of  the  Mediterranean. 

Article  VIII.  The  two  Governments,  inspired  by  their  feeling  of  sin- 
cere friendship  for  Spain,  take  into  special  consideration  the  interests  which 
that  country  derives  from  her  geographical  position  and  from  her  territorial 
possessions  on  the  Moorish  coast  of  the  Mediterranean.  In  regard  to  these 


546     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

interests  the  French  Government  will  come  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Spanish  Government. 

The  agreement  which  may  be  come  to  on  the  subject  between  France  and 
Spain  shall  be  communicated  to  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government. 

Article  IX.  The  two  Governments  agree  to  afford  to  one  another 
their  diplomatic  support,  in  order  to  obtain  the  execution  of  the  clauses 
of  the  present  Declaration  regarding  Egypt  and  Morocco. 

In  witness  whereof  His  Excellency  the  Ambassador  of  the  French  Republic 
at  the  Court  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas,  Emperor 
of  India,  and  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
duly  authorized  for  that  purpose,  have  signed  the  present  Declaration  and 
have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  at  London,  in  duplicate,  the  8th  day  of  April,  1904. 

(L.S.)  Lansdowne. 
(L.S.)  Paul  Cambon. 

CONVENTION   BETWEEN   GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  RUSSIA 

CONCERNING  THE  INTERESTS  OF  THEIR  STATES 

ON  THE  CONTINENT  OF  ASIA1 

Signed  August  31,  1907 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland  and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas,  Emperor  of  India, 
and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias,  animated  by  the  sincere  de- 
sire to  settle  by  mutual  agreement  different  questions  concerning  the  inter- 
ests of  their  States  on  the  Continent  of  Asia,  have  determined  to  conclude 
Agreements  destined  to  prevent  all  cause  of  misunderstanding  between 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  in  regard  to  the  questions  referred  to,  and  have 
nominated  for  this  purpose  their  respective  Plenipotentiaries,  to  wit:  — 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas,  Emperor  of  India, 
the  Right  Honorable  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  Ex- 
traordinary and  Plenipotentiary  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the 
Russias; 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias,  the  Master  of  his  Court 
Alexander  Iswolsky,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs; 

Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers,  found  in  good 
and  due  form,  have  agreed  on  the  following:  — 

Arrangement  concerning  Persia 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  having  mutually  engaged 
to  respect  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Persia,  and  sincerely  desiring 
the  preservation  of  order  throughout  that  country  and  its  peaceful  develop- 
ment, as  well  as  the  permanent  establishment  of  equal  advantages  for  the 
trade  and  industry  of  all  other  nations; 

Considering  that  each  of  them  has,  for  geographical  and  economic  reasons, 
a  special  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order  in  certain  provinces 

»  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1907,  part  i,  pp.  54&-53. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  547 

of  Persia  adjoining,  or  in  the  neighborhood  of,  the  Russian  frontier  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  frontiers  of  Afghanistar  and  Baluchistan  on  the  other 
hand;  and  being  desirous  of  avoiding  all  cause  of  conflict  between  their  re- 
spective interests  in  the  above-mentioned  Provinces  of  Persia; 
Have  agreed  on  the  following  terms:  — 


Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek  for  herself,  and  not  to  support  in  favor 
of  British  subjects,  or  in  favor  of  the  subjects  of  third  Powers,  any  Conces- 
sions of  a  political  or  commercial  nature  —  such  as  Concessions  for  railways, 
banks,  telegraphs,  roads,  transport,  insurance,  etc.  —  beyond  a  line  start- 
ing from  Kasr-i-Shirin,  passing  through  Isfahan,  Yezd,  Kakhk,  and  ending 
at  a  point  on  the  Persian  frontier,  at  the  intersection  of  the  Russian  and 
Afghan  frontiers,  and  not  to  oppose,  directly  or  indirectly,  demands  for 
similar  Concessions  in  this  region  which  are  supported  by  the  Russian 
Government.  It  is  understood  that  the  above-mentioned  places  are  in- 
cluded in  the  region  in  which  Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek  the  Conces- 
sions referred  to. 

II 

Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not  to  seek  for  herself  and  not  to  support,  in 
favor  of  Russian  subjects,  or  in  favor  of  subjects  of  third  Powers,  any 
Concessions  of  a  political  or  commercial  nature  —  such  as  Concessions  for 
railways,  banks,  telegraphs,  roads,  transport,  insurance,  etc.  —  beyond  a 
line  going  from  the  Afghan  frontier  by  way  of  Gazik,  Birjand,  Kerman,  and 
ending  at  Bunder  Abbas,  and  not  to  oppose,  directly  or  indirectly,  demands 
for  similar  Concessions  in  this  region  which  are  supported  by  the  British 
Government.  It  is  understood  that  the  above-mentioned  places  are  in- 
cluded in  the  region  in  which  Russia  engages  not  to  seek  the  Concessions 
referred  to. 

Ill 

Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not  to  oppose,  without  previous  arrangement 
with  Great  Britain,  the  grant  of  any  Concessions  whatever  to  British  sub- 
jects in  the  regions  of  Persia  situated  between  the  lines  mentioned  in 
Articles  I  and  II. 

Great  Britain  undertakes  a  similar  engagement  as  regards  the  grant  of 
Concessions  to  Russian  subjects  in  the  same  regions  of  Persia. 

All  Concessions  existing  at  present  in  the  regions  indicated  in  Articles  I 
and  II  are  maintained. 

IV 

It  is  understood  that  the  revenues  of  all  the  Persian  customs,  with  the 
exception  of  those  of  Farsistan  and  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  revenues  guarantee- 
ing the  amortization  and  the  interest  of  the  loans  concluded  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Shah  with  the  "  Banque  d'Escompte  et  des  Prets  de  Perse"  up 
to  the  date  of  the  signature  of  the  present  Arrangement,  shall  be  devoted 
to  the  same  purpose  as  in  the  past. 

It  is  equally  understood  that  the  revenues  of  the  Persian  customs  of 
Farsistan  and  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  as  well  as  those  of  the  fisheries  on  the 
Persian  shore  of  the  Caspian  Sea  and  those  of  the  Posts  and  Telegraphs, 


548     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

shall  be  devoted,  as  in  the  past,  to  the  service  of  the  loans  concluded  by  the 
Government  of  the  Shah  with  the  Imperial  Bank  of  Persia  up  to  the  date 
of  the  signature  of  the  present  Arrangement. 


In  the  event  of  irregularities  occurring  in  the  amortization  or  the  payment 
of  the  interest  of  the  Persian  loans  concluded  with  the  "  Banque  d'Escompte 
et  des  Prets  de  Perse"  and  with  the  Imperial  Bank  of  Persia  up  to  the  date 
of  the  signature  of  the  present  Arrangement,  and  in  the  event  of  the  necessity 
arising  for  Russia  to  establish  control  over  the  sources  of  revenue  guarantee- 
ing the  regular  service  of  the  loans  concluded  with  the  first-named  bank, 
and  situated  in  the  region  mentioned  in  Article  II  of  the  present  Arrange- 
ment, or  for  Great  Britain  to  establish  control  over  the  sources  of  revenue 
guaranteeing  the  regular  service  of  the  loans  concluded  with  the  second- 
named  bank,  and  situated  in  the  region  mentioned  in  Article  I  of  the  present 
Arrangement,  the  British  and  Russian  Governments  undertake  to  enter 
beforehand  into  a  friendly  exchange  of  ideas  with  a  view  to  determine,  in 
agreement  with  each  other,  the  measures  of  control  in  question  and  to  avoid 
all  interference  which  would  not  be  in  conformity  with  the  principles  govern- 
ing the  present  Arrangement. 

Convention  concerning  Afghanistan 

The  High  Contracting  Parties,  in  order  to  ensure  perfect  security  on  their 
respective  frontiers  in  Central  Asia  and  to  maintain  in  these  regions  a  solid 
and  lasting  peace,  have  concluded  the  following  Convention :  — 

Article  I.  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  have 
no  intention  of  changing  the  political  status  of  Afghanistan. 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  further  engage  to  exercise  their 
influence  in  Afghanistan  only  in  a  pacific  sense,  and  they  will  not  themselves 
take,  nor  encourage  Afghanistan  to  take,  any  measures  threatening  Russia. 

The  Russian  Government,  on  their  part,  declare  that  they  recognize 
Afghanistan  as  outside  the  sphere  of  Russian  influence,  and  they  engage 
that  all  their  political  relations  with  Afghanistan  shall  be  conducted  through 
the  intermediary  of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government;  they  further 
engage  not  to  send  any  Agents  into  Afghanistan. 

Article  II.  The  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty  having  declared 
in  the  Treaty  signed  at  Kabul  on  the  21st  March,  1905,  that  they  recognize 
the  Agreement  and  the  engagements  concluded  with  the  late  Ameer  Abdur 
Rahman,  and  that  they  have  no  intention  of  interfering  in  the  internal  gov- 
ernment of  Afghan  territory,  Great  Britain  engages  neither  to  annex  nor  to 
occupy  in  contravention  of  that  Treaty  any  portion  of  Afghanistan  or  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  administration  of  the  country,  provided  that  the 
Ameer  fulfils  the  engagements  already  contracted  by  him  towards  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  under  the  above-mentioned  Treaty. 

Article  III.  The  Russian  and  Afghan  authorities,  specially  designated 
for  the  purpose  on  the  frontier  or  in  the  frontier  provinces,  may  establish 
direct  relations  with  each  other  for  the  settlement  of  local  questions  of  a 
non-political  character. 

Article  IV.  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Russian 
Government  affirm  their  adherence  to  the  principle  of  equality  of  commercial 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  549 

opportunity  in  Afghanistan,  and  they  agree  that  any  facilities  which  may 
have  been,  or  shall  be  hereafter  obtained  for  British  and  British-Indian 
trade  and  traders,  shall  be  equally  enjoyed  by  Russian  trade  and  traders. 
Should  the  progress  of  trade  establish  the  necessity  for  Commercial  Agents, 
the  two  Governments  will  agree  as  to  what  measures  shall  be  taken,  due 
regard,  of  course,  being  had  to  the  Ameer's  sovereign  rights. 

Article  V.  The  present  Arrangements  will  only  come  into  force  when 
His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  shall  have  notified  to  the  Russian 
Government  the  consent  of  the  Ameer  to  the  terms  stipulated  above. 

Arrangement  concerning  Thibet 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  recognizing  the  suzerain 
rights  of  China  in  Thibet,  and  considering  the  fact  that  Great  Britain,  by 
reason  of  her  geographical  position,  has  a  special  interest  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo  in  the  external  relations  of  Thibet,  have  made  the  following 
Arrangement :  — 

Article  I.  The  two  High  Contracting  Parties  engage  to  respect  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  Thibet  and  to  abstain  from  all  interference  in  its  internal 
administration. 

Article  II.  In  conformity  with  the  admitted  principle  of  the  suzerainty 
of  China  over  Thibet,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  engage  not  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  Thibet  except  through  the  intermediary  of  the  Chinese 
Government.  This  engagement  does  not  exclude  the  direct  relations  be- 
tween British  Commercial  Agents  and  the  Thibetan  authorities  provided 
for  in  Article  V  of  the  Convention  between  Great  Britain  and  Thibet  of  the 
7th  September,  1904,  and  confirmed  by  the  Convention  between  Great 
Britain  and  China  of  the  27th  April,  1906;  nor  does  it  modify  the  engage- 
ments entered  into  by  Great  Britain  and  China  in  Article  I  of  the  said 
Convention  of  1906. 

It  is  clearly  understood  that  Buddhists,  subjects  of  Great  Britain  or  of 
Russia,  may  enter  into  direct  relations  on  strictly  religious  matters  with  the 
Dalai  Lama  and  the  other  representatives  of  Buddhism  in  Thibet;  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  engage,  as  far  as  they  are  con- 
cerned, not  to  allow  those  relations  to  infringe  the  stipulations  of  the  present 
arrangement. 

Article  III.  The  British  and  Russian  Governments,  respectively, 
engage  not  to  send  representatives  to  Lhassa. 

Article  IV.  The  two  High  Contracting  Parties  engage  neither  to  seek 
nor  to  obtain,  whether  for  themselves  or  their  subjects,  any  concessions  for 
railways,  roads,  telegraphs,  and  mines,  or  other  rights  in  Thibet. 

Article  V.  The  two  Governments  agree  that  no  part  of  the  revenues  of 
Thibet,  whether  in  kind  or  in  cash,  shall  be  pledged  or  assigned  to  Great 
Britain  or  Russia  or  to  any  of  their  subjects. 

Annex  to  the  arrangement  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia  concerning  Thibet 
Great  Britain  reaffirms  the  Declaration,  signed  by  His  Excellency  the 
Viceroy  and  Governor-General  of  India  and  appended  to  the  ratification  of 
the  Convention  of  the  7th  September,  1904,  to  the  effect  that  the  occupation 
of  the  Chumbi  Valley  by  British  forces  shall  cease  after  the  payment  of 
three  annual  installments  of  the  indemnity  of  25,000,000  rupees,  provided 


550     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

that  the  trade  marts  mentioned  in  Article  II  of  that  Convention  have  been 
effectively  opened  for  three  years,  and  that  in  the  meantime  the  Thibetan 
authorities  have  faithfully  complied  in  all  respects  with  the  terms  of  the  said 
Convention  of  1904.  It  is  clearly  understood  that  if  the  occupation  of  the 
Chumbi  Valley  by  the  British  forces  has,  for  any  reason,  not  been  terminated 
at  the  time  anticipated  in  the  above  Declaration,  the  British  and  Russian 
Governments  will  enter  upon  a  friendly  exchange  of  views  on  this  subject. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications  exchanged 
at  St.  Petersburg  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  the 
present  Convention  and  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  18th  (31st)  August,  1907. 

(L.S.)  A.  Nicolson. 

(L.S.)    ISWOLSKY. 

TREATY  BETWEEN    JAPAN    AND    RUSSIA,   GUARANTEEING 

THE  PRESENT  TERRITORY  OF  EACH,   THE  INTEGRITY 

OF  CHINA,   AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  "OPEN 

DOOR"   IN  THAT  EMPIRE1 

Memorandum  from  the  Japanese  Embassy  2 

Imperial  Japanese  Embassy,  Washington, 
August  14,  1907. 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  His  Majesty  of  all  the  Russias,  being  desirous  to  consolidate  rela- 
tions of  peace  and  good  neighborhood  which  have  happily  been  restored 
between  Japan  and  Russia,  and  wishing  to  remove  for  the  future  all  causes 
of  misunderstanding  in  the  relations  of  the  two  empires,  have  agreed  upon 
following  stipulations:  — 

Article  I.  Each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  engages  to  respect  the 
actual  territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  and  all  rights  due  now  both  parties 
by  virtue  of  treaties,  conventions,  and  contracts  now  in  force  between  them 
and  China,  copies  of  which  have  been  exchanged  between  the  contracting 
parties  (so  far  as  those  rights  are  not  incompatible  with  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity)  as  well  as  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  signed  at  Portsmouth 
on  August  23/  September  5,  1905,  and  the  special  conventions  concluded 
between  Japan  and  Russia. 

Article  II.  The  two  high  contracting  parties  recognize  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  that  Empire  and 
engage  to  uphold  and  support  the  maintenance  of  status  quo  and  the 
respect  for  the  said  principle  by  all  pacific  means  at  their  disposal. 

The  undersigned,  duly  authorized  by  their  respective  Governments,  have 
signed  this  convention  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  at  St.  Petersburg  this  day  July  17/30,  1907. 

(Signed)  I.  Motono. 
(Signed)  A.  Iswolsky. 

1  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1907,  part  II,  p.  765. 

*  Same,  mutatis  mutandis,  handed  to  the  Secretary  of  State  by  the  Russian  Ambassador, 
August  14,  1907. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  551 

CONVENTION   BETWEEN   RUSSIA  AND  JAPAN 
CONCERNING   MANCHURIA  » 
Signed  at  St.  Petersburg,  July  4,  1910 

The  Imperial  Governments  of  Russia  and  Japan,  being  sincerely  attached 
to  the  principles  established  by  the  convention  concluded  between  them  on 
July  30,  1907,  and  being  desirous  of  developing  the  effects  of  this  convention 
with  a  view  to  the  consolidation  of  peace  in  the  Far  East,  have  agreed  to 
complete  the  said  arrangement  in  the  following  manner:  — 

1.  With  the  object  of  facilitating  communications  and  developing  the 
commerce  of  the  nations,  the  two  high  contracting  parties  agree  to  extend 
to  one  another  their  friendly  cooperation  with  a  view  to  the  improvement  of 
their  respective  railway  lines  in  Manchuria  and  the  perfecting  of  the  con- 
necting services  of  the  said  lines,  and  to  abstain  from  all  competition  preju- 
dicial to  the  realization  of  this  object. 

2.  Each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  undertakes  to  maintain  and 
respect  the  status  quo  in  Manchuria  resulting  from  all  the  treaties,  conven- 
tions, and  other  arrangements  concluded  up  to  this  date,  either  between 
Russia  and  Japan  or  between  those  two  powers  and  China.  Copies  of  the 
said  arrangements  have  been  exchanged  between  Russia  and  Japan. 

3.  In  the  event  of  anything  arising  of  a  nature  to  threaten  the  status  quo 
mentioned  above  the  two  high  contracting  parties  shall  enter  each  time  into 
communication  with  each  other  with  a  view  to  coming  to  an  understanding 
as  to  the  measures  they  may  think  it  necessary  to  take  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  said  status  quo. 

THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE2 

The  semi-official  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  October  16  pub- 
lished correspondence  bearing  upon  the  events  leading  up  to  the  war,  with 
particular  reference  to  what  it  regards  as  the  long-meditated  transformation 
of  the  Triple  Entente  into  a  hard-and-fast  alliance. 

In  view  of  the  efforts  of  our  adversaries,  it  says,  to  put  the  blame  for  the 
present  war  on  a  German  "military  party"  and  German  militarism,  we 
publish  herewith  a  number  of  dispatches  of  German  diplomatic  representa- 
tives abroad  which  have  for  their  subject  the  political  and  military  relations 
between  the  powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
For  obvious  reasons  the  exact  dates  of  the  dispatches  and  the  offices  from 
which  they  were  sent  are  not  indicated  here.  The  documents  speak  for 
themselves. 


England  "the  tool  of  France" 
March  — ,  1913.  Tighter  and  tighter  are  growing  the  meshes  of  the  net 
in  which  French  diplomacy  is  succeeding  in  entangling  England.  It  ia 
well  known  that  in  the  early  phases  of  the  Morocco  conflict  England  had 
made  certain  promises  of  a  military  nature  to  France  which  have  since 
grown  into  positive    agreements.     Concerning   their   arrangements  with 

1  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  Supplement,  vol.  4  (1910),  p.  279. 
'  From  the  New  York  Times,  November  8,  1914.   This  is  not  the  title  of  the  article  as  it 
appeared  in  the  Times. 


552     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

regard  to  naval  cooperation,  I  learn  the  following  from  a  generally  well- 
informed  source :  — 

The  British  fleet  undertakes  the  guarding  of  the  North  Sea,  the  Channel, 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  in  order  to  make  it  possible  for  France  to  concen- 
trate her  naval  forces  in  the  western  basin  of  the  Mediterranean,  for  which 
operation  Malta  is  placed  at  her  disposal  for  a  naval  base.  Detailed  ar- 
rangements have  been  made  with  regard  to  the  use  of  French  torpedo  craft 
and  submarines  in  the  Channel,  and  relative  to  the  British  Mediterranean 
squadron,  which  will  be  placed  under  the  command  of  a  French  Admiral  at 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Meanwhile  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government  during  the  Morocco 
crisis  of  1911  —  during  which  it  proved  the  non-reasoning  and  obedient  tool 
of  French  politics  and  by  Mr.  Lloyd-George's  speech  encouraged  French 
chauvinism  and  inspired  it  with  new  hope  —  offered  an  opening  to  the 
French  Government  to  drive  another  nail  into  the  coffin  in  which  Eng- 
land's policy  of  ententes  has  already  put  to  rest  her  freedom  of  deciding  her 
own  course. 

Through  a  trustworthy  source  I  have  obtained  knowledge  of  an  exchange 
of  notes  which  took  place  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Ambassador 
Cambon  last  autumn,  which  I  have  the  honor  of  transmitting  herewith, 
with  the  request  that  it  be  treated  as  strictly  confidential.  In  these  notes, 
the  British  and  the  French  Governments  agree  that,  in  the  event  of  a  threat- 
ening attack  by  a  third  power,  they  will  at  once  enter  into  an  exchange  of 
opinions  about  the  question  whether  common  action  for  preventing  the 
attack  is  advisable,  and,  if  this  should  be  found  to  be  the  case,  whether  and 
to  what  extent  the  existing  military  arrangements  should  be  carried  out. 

With  subtle  ingenuity  the  agreement  is  worded  in  such  a  manner  that  it 
suits  the  peculiar  English  mentality.  Formally,  England  enters  into  no  obli- 
gation whatsoever  to  give  armed  assistance;  according  to  the  letter,  she  re- 
tains full  freedom  to  do  whatever  her  own  interests  may  demand.  However, 
that,  in  point  of  fact,  England  has  by  this  agreement  and  the  existing  mili- 
tary arrangements  already  given  herself  up  beyond  salvation  to  the  French 
revanche  idea,  requires  no  lengthy  explanation. 

The  British  Government  plays  a  dangerous  game.  By  its  attitude  in  the 
Bosnian  and  in  the  Moroccan  questions  it  has  twice  created  a  crisis  which 
each  time  brought  Europe  to  the  verge  of  war.  The  encouragement  which, 
directly  and  indirectly,  it  grants  to  French  chauvinism  may  on  some  future 
day  bring  forth  a  catastrophe  in  which  English  and  French  soldiers  may 
have  to  pay  by  their  blood,  on  French  battlefields,  for  England's  policy 
of  isolation. 

King  Edward's  seed  is  germinating! 

II 

Grey's  Letter  to  Cambon 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  French  Ambassador,  Paul  Cambon :  — 

Foreign  Office,  November  22,  1912. 
My  dear  Ambassador: — 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval  and 
military  experts  have  consulted  together.    It  has  always  been  understood 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  553 

that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government 
to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by  armed 
force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation  between  experts  is  not  and  ought 
not  to  be  regarded  as  an  engagement  that  commits  either  Government  to 
action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  dis- 
position, for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets,  respectively,  at  the 
present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  cooperate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  power,  it  might  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed  as- 
sistance of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unpro- 
voked attack  by  a  third  power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general 
peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace, 
and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common.  If 
these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at 
once  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  Governments  would  then  decide 
what  effect  should  be  given  to  them. 

Ill 

Plan  for  Franco-British  action 
The  French  Ambassador  Cambon  to  Sir  Edward  Grey:  — 

London,  November  23,  1912. 
In  your  letter  of  yesterday  (November  22)  you  remind  me  that  in  recent 
years  the  military  and  naval  authorities  of  France  and  Great  Britain  have 
consulted  together  from  time  to  time;  that  it  has  always  been  understood 
that  these  conversations  did  not  restrict  the  liberty  of  each  Government  to 
decide  in  the  future  whether  they  should  lend  each  other  the  support  of 
their  arms;  that  on  both  sides  these  conversations  between  specialists  were 
not,  and  ought  not  to  be,  considered  as  agreements  obliging  our  Governments 
to  act  in  certain  cases;  that,  moreover,  I  observed  to  you  that  if  either 
Government  had  serious  reasons  for  fearing  an  unprovoked  attack  on  the 
part  of  a  third  power,  it  would  become  necessary  to  know  whether  it  could 
count  on  the  armed  support  of  the  other.  Your  letter  answers  this  obser- 
vation, and  I  am  authorized  to  declare  to  you  that,  in  case  one  of  our  Gov- 
ernments should  have  serious  cause  for  fear,  whether  the  aggression  of  a 
third  power  or  some  event  threatening  the  general  peace,  this  Government 
would  instantly  ascertain  whether  both  Governments  ought  to  act  in  con- 
cert, with  a  view  to  anticipate  the  aggression  or  to  preserve  peace.  In  this 
case,  both  Governments  would  deliberate  on  the  measures  they  would  be 
disposed  to  take  in  common;  if  these  measures  warranted  action,  both  Gov- 
ernments would  immediately  examine  the  plans  of  their  General  Staffs 
and  then  decide  how  these  plans  should  be  executed. 

IV 

King  George's  visit  to  Paris 
May  — ,  1914.    With  regard  to  the  political  results  of  King  George's 
visit  to  Paris  I  learn  that  a  number  of  political  questions  have  been  discussed 


554     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Doumergue.  Moreover,  it  has  been 
suggested  on  the  French  side  to  complete  the  special  military  arrangements 
existing  between  France  and  England  by  an  analogous  arrangement  be- 
tween England  and  Russia.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  received  this  suggestion 
in  a  sympathetic  manner.  He  has,  however,  pointed  out  that  he  is  unable  to 
bind  himself  without  a  previous  consultation  with  the  Cabinet.  It  is  said 
that  the  Minister  has  been  much  impressed  by  the  reception  accorded  to 
the  English  guests  by  the  French  Government  and  the  French  population. 
It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  English  statesman,  who  has  made  an  official  visit 
abroad  for  the  first  time,  and,  as  it  is  affirmed,  even  left  England's  soil  for 
the  first  time  on  this  occasion,  may  in  future  succumb  to  French  influence 
in  an  even  higher  degree  than  he  has  done  heretofore. 


New  Triple  Alliance  predicted 

June  — ,  1914.  The  news  that,  on  the  occasion  of  King  George's  visit 
to  Paris,  the  suggestion  was  made  to  conclude  a  military  arrangement 
between  England  and  Russia,  has  been  confirmed  to  me.  From  a  reliable 
source  I  learn  that  M.  Iswolsky  is  responsible  for  that  suggestion.  His  has 
been  the  idea  of  using  the  expected  high  spirits  of  the  days  of  Paris  for 
transforming  the  Triple  Entente  into  an  alliance  of  the  type  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  If,  in  the  end,  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg  had  to  be  satisfied  with 
a  little  less,  this  has,  evidently,  been  done  out  of  consideration  of  the  fact  that 
in  England  a  large  part  of  public  opinion  is  positively  unfavorable  to  the 
conclusion  of  formal  alliances  with  foreign  powers.  In  view  of  this  fact, 
despite  the  numerous  proofs  of  British  diplomacy's  entire  lack  of  power  to 
resist  the  influence  of  the  Entente,  —  I  refer  to  the  servility  with  which, 
quite  recently,  England  supported  Russia,  in  the  question  of  the  German 
military  mission  to  Turkey,  —  it  has  evidently  not  seemed  advisable  to 
let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  at  once.  It  has  rather  been  decided  to  advance 
gradually,  by  slow  steps.  In  a  meeting  of.  the  Cabinet  Sir  Edward  Grey 
has  warmly  recommended  the  Franco-Russian  suggestion,  and  the  Cabinet 
has  accepted  his  views.  It  has  been  resolved  to  prepare  a  naval  agreement 
the  negotiations  for  which  are  to  be  conducted  in  London  between  the 
Admiralty  and  the  Russian  naval  attache. 

Great  is  the  satisfaction  among  the  Russian  and  French  diplomatists. 
They  consider  the  conclusion  of  a  formal  treaty  of  alliance  only  a  question 
of  time.  To  accelerate  this  result,  St.  Petersburg  would  even  be  ready  to 
make  certain  sham  concessions  to  England  in  Persia.  The  differences  of 
opinion  in  this  regard  which  have  recently  occurred  between  the  two  powers 
have  so  far  not  been  settled.  As  for  England's  apprehensions  with  regard 
to  the  future  of  India  which  have  made  themselves  felt  again  recently,  Russia 
follows  the  policy  of  giving  appeasing  assurances  for  the  time  being. 

VI 

Disclaimers  of  the  new  alliance 
June  — ,  1914.    The  French  indiscretions  with  regard  to  the  Anglo- 
Russian  naval  convention  cause  a  great  deal  of  uneasiness  in  St.   Peters- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  555 

burg  and  London.  Sir  Edward  Grey  is  afraid  that  the  matter  will  cause 
a  question  in  Parliament.  The  naval  attache,  Captain  Wolkov,  who  has 
spent  several  days  in  St.  Petersburg  with  the  obvious  intention  of  getting 
his  instructions  for  the  parliamentary  debate,  has  returned  to  London. 
Parliament  has  already  opened. 

VII 

June  — ,  1914.  In  the  House  of  Commons  the  Ministerial  side  addressed 
an  interpellation  to  the  Government  as  to  whether  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  had  recently  concluded  a  naval  convention,  and  whether  negotia- 
tions with  a  view  of  concluding  such  a  convention  had  recently  taken  place 
between  the  two  countries  or  were  going  on  at  present. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  in  his  answer  referred  to  similar  questions  addressed 
to  the  Government  in  the  preceding  year.  The  Premier  had  at  that  time, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  went  on  to  say,  replied  there  were  no  unpublished  agree- 
ments with  European  powers  apt  to  restrain  or  hem  in  the  free  decision  of 
the  Government  or  Parliament  as  to  whether  Great  Britain  was  to  partici- 
pate in  a  war  or  not.  This  answer  held  good  to-day,  just  as  it  did  a  year 
ago.  No  negotiations  with  any  power  had  since  been  concluded  which 
would  detract  from  the  truth  of  the  declaration  in  question;  no  such  nego- 
tiations were  in  progress,  nor  was  it  likely,  as  far  as  he  could  judge,  that 
such  would  be  entered  upon.  In  case,  however,  that  an  agreement  was  to 
be  concluded  which  might  necessitate  a  retraction  or  alteration  of  the  above- 
mentioned  declaration  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  last  year,  such  an  agree- 
ment, in  his  opinion,  would  have  to  be  and,  he  felt  sure,  consequently  would 
be,  submitted  to  Parliament. 

The  great  majority  of  the  English  press  withholds  all  comment  on  this 
declaration  of  the  Minister. 

Only  the  two  radical  papers,  the  Daily  News  and  the  Manchester  Guardian, 
have  short  editorial  articles.  The  first  mentioned  expresses  satisfaction 
at  Sir  Edward  Grey's  words,  saying  that  they  are  clear  enough  to  dispel 
all  doubts.  England,  it  says,  is  not  in  tow  of  any  other  country.  She  is  not 
a  vassal  of  Russia's,  not  the  ally  of  France,  and  not  the  enemy  of  Germany. 
The  declaration,  it  continues,  is  a  salutary  lecture  to  those  English  jour- 
nalists who  would  give  currency  to  the  belief  that  there  is  a  Triple  Entente 
of  the  same  nature  as  the  Triple  Alliance. 

The  Manchester  Guardian,  on  the  contrary,  is  not  satisfied  with  the 
declaration  of  the  Minister.  The  paper  finds  fault  with  its  tortuous  word- 
ing, and  tries  to  prove  that  it  admits  of  interpretations  which  would  not 
entirely  exclude  the  existence  of  certain,  perhaps  conditional,  agreements  of 
the  rumored  kind. 

The  declarations  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  correspond  with  a  confidential  ut- 
terance to  the  following  effect  of  a  person  of  the  Minister's  immediate 
entourage:  He  was  in  a  position  to  assert  most  emphatically  and  decisively 
that  there  were  no  agreements  of  any  military  or  naval  nature  whatever 
between  England  and  France,  although  the  wish  for  such  had  been  repeat- 
edly expressed  on  the  French  side.  What  the  British  Cabinet  had  refused 
to  France  it  was  not  likely  to  concede  to  Russia.  No  naval  agreement 
had  been  concluded  with  Russia,  nor  was  any  going  to  be  concluded. 


556     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

VIII 

June  — ,  1914.  It  would  seem  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  felt  a  need  at  once 
categorically  to  repudiate  the  remarks  of  the  Manchester  Guardian  in 
response  to  his  answer  to  the  interpellation  made  concerning  the  rumored 
Anglo-Russian  naval  entente.  The  Westminster  Gazette  prints  in  a  prom- 
inent place,  from  the  pen  of  Mr.  Spender,  who  is  well  known  to  be  one  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  most  intimate  political  friends,  a  dementi  which  leaves 
nothing  to  be  desired  as  regards  emphasis.  Therein  it  is  said:  That  no 
naval  agreement  exists,  and  no  negotiations  are  pending  about  a  naval 
agreement  between  England  and  Russia,  and  that  nobody  who  knew  the 
character  and  the  methods  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  think  for  a  moment 
that  the  declaration  which  he  made  was  intended  to  veil  the  truth. 

IX 

The  disclaimers  disbelieved 
June  — ,  1914.  The  fact  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  declaration  in  the  House 
of  Commons  concerning  the  Russo-English  naval  conventions  was  so  read- 
ily accepted  by  public  opinion  in  England  has  caused  great  relief  here  and 
in  St.  Petersburg.  The  wire-pullers  in  this  action  had  feared  that  the  beau- 
tiful dream  of  the  new  Triple  Alliance  had  come  to  an  end.  By  the  way, 
I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  it  should  have  been  reserved  exclusively  for 
the  Manchester  Guardian  to  see  through  the  trick  which  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  playing  in  not  answering  the  questions  whether  negotiations  were 
pending  or  in  progress  about  a  naval  agreement  with  Russia,  and  denying 
the  question  (which  had  not  been  put  at  all)  whether  England  had  entered 
into  binding  obligations  relative  to  her  participation  in  a  European  war. 
I  am,  on  the  contrary,  inclined  to  believe  that  the  English  press  in  this  case 
gave  a  new  proof  of  its  well-known  discipline  in  the  treatment  of  questions 
of  foreign  policy,  and  that  it  kept  silence  either  in  response  to  a  "  mot 
d'ordre,"  or  from  political  instinct.  What  criticising  and  fault-finding  would 
the  Imperial  Government  not  have  been  subjected  to  on  the  part  of  the  Ger- 
man popular  representatives  and  the  German  press;  what  a  clamor  would 
not  be  raised  about  our  foreign  policy  and  our  diplomats,  if  a  similar  declara- 
tion should  be  made  in  the  Reichstag!  In  Parliamentary  England  every- 
body remains  silent  when  a  Minister  tries  in  such  an  evident  manner  to 
mislead  his  own  party,  the  representatives  of  the  people  and  public  opinion. 
What  is  there  that  England  does  not  sacrifice  to  her  Germanophobia? 

X 

Anglo-Russian  agreement 
June  — ,  1914.  From  a  source  which  has  preserved  its  old  sympathies  for 
Germany,  the  accompanying  notes  have  been  sent  to  me  with  a  request  for 
strictest  secrecy,  concerning  a  conference  which  took  place  on  the  26th  of 
May  of  the  present  year,  at  which  the  Chief  of  the  Russian  Naval  Staff  pre- 
sided, and  in  which  the  basic  principles  were  fixed  for  the  negotiations  about 
the  Russo-English  naval  convention.  My  informant  knew  nothing  as  yet 
about  the  result  to  which  the  negotiations  have  led  until  now,  but  he  ex- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  557 

pressed  grave  fears  with  regard  to  the  promotion  which  the  cause  of  Russian 
nationalism  would  experience  if  the  convention  should  really  materialize. 
The  moment  they  were  sure  of  England's  participation,  the  well-known  Pan- 
Slavic  agitators  would  not  hesitate  to  seize  the  first  opportunity  to  bring 
about  a  war.  Also,  M.  Sazonof  was  visibly  drifting  into  the  wake  of  the 
Russian  war  party. 

(Inclosure) 

St.  Petersbtog,  May  13  (26),  1914. 

Led  by  the  considerations  that  an  agreement  was  desirable  between 
Russia  and  England,  with  regard  to  the  cooperation  of  their  naval  forces 
in  the  case  of  military  operations  conducted  by  Russia  and  England  with 
the  participation  of  France,  the  conference  arrived  at  the  following  con- 
clusions: — 

As  the  contemplated  naval  convention  is  to  regulate  the  relations  in 
all  their  details  between  the  Russian  and  English  maritime  forces,  an  agree- 
ment must  be  reached  concerning  signals  and  special  ciphers,  radio-tele- 
grams and  the  mode  of  communication  between  the  Russian  and  English 
Naval  Staffs.  Besides  this,  the  two  Naval  Staffs  are  to  inform  each  other 
regularly  about  the  fleets  of  third  powers  and  about  their  own  navies,  in 
particular  about  technical  data  and  newly  introduced  machines  and 
inventions. 

Following  the  example  of  the  Franco-Russian  naval  convention,  a  cur- 
rent exchange  of  opinion  is  to  take  place  between  the  Russian  and  the  Eng- 
lish Naval  Staff  in  order  to  examine  questions  which  are  of  interest  to  the 
Naval  Minister  of  both  states. 

The  Russian  naval  agreement  with  England,  like  the  Franco-Russian 
agreement,  is  to  make  provision  for  actions  of  the  Russian  and  English 
navies,  which,  previously  agreed  upon,  are  to  be  fought  separately.  In 
respect  of  the  strategic  aims,  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  naval  oper- 
ations in  the  Black  Sea  and  the  North  Sea  on  the  one  side,  and  the  expected 
naval  warfare  in  the  Mediterranean  on  the  other.  In  both  spheres  Russia 
must  endea\-or  to  get  compensation  from  England  for  deflecting  a  part  of 
the  German  navy  upon  the  Russian  fleet. 

In  the  Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles,  temporary  activities  of  Russia 
are  to  be  considered  as  strategic  operations  in  case  of  a  war. 

Russian  interests  in  the  Baltic  Sea  demand  that  England  shall  keep  the 
largest  possible  part  of  the  German  fleet  in  the  North  Sea.  That  would  do 
away  with  the  overpowering  superiority  of  the  German  fleet  as  against  the 
Russian,  and  might  make  it  possible  for  the  Russians  to  land  in  Pome- 
rania.  In  this  the  British  Government  could  be  of  essential  assistance  by 
dispatching  a  great  number  of  merchantmen  to  the  Baltic  ports  before  the 
beginning  of  warlike  operations,  so  as  to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  Russian 
transport  vessels. 

As  regards  the  situation  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  is  of  prime  importance 
to  Russia  to  have  an  unquestionable  superiority  of  the  forces  of  the  Entente 
over  the  Austro-Italian  fleets  established.  For  in  case  the  Austro-Italian 
forces  command  the  Mediterranean,  attacks  of  the  Austrian  fleet  in  the 
Black  Sea  would  be  possible,  a  contingency  which  would  mean  a  dangerous 
blow  to  Russia.    It  must  be  assumed  that  the  Austro-Italian  forces  are 


558     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

superior  to  the  French.  England  would,  therefore,  have  to  secure  the 
preponderance  of  the  fighting  forces  of  the  Entente  Powers  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, at  least  for  so  long  a  time  as  the  development  of  the  Russian  navy 
has  not  made  such  progress  as  to  be  able  to  undertake  this  task  itself.  Rus- 
sian men-of-war  must,  through  England's  consent,  be  allowed  to  use  the 
English  ports  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  as  a  base,  just  as  the  French 
naval  agreement  permits  the  Russian  fleet  to  base  itself  upon  French  ports 
in  the  western  Mediterranean. 

XI 

Poincare's  visit  to  Russia 
July  — ,  1914.  During  the  course  of  my  conversation  to-day  with  M. 
Sazonof,  the  talk  also  turned  to  the  visit  of  M.  Poincare.  The  Minister  laid 
emphasis  upon  the  pacific  tone  of  the  toasts  exchanged.  I  could  not  refrain 
from  drawing  M.  Sazonof 's  attention  to  the  fact  that  not  the  toasts  that 
were  exchanged  at  such  visits  were  wont  to  give  material  for  uneasiness,  but 
the  comments  made  by  the  press  in  connection  with  them.  Such  press  com- 
ments had  been  made  this  time  also,  even  spreading  the  news  of  a  reported 
conclusion  of  an  Anglo-Russian  naval  convention.  M.  Sazonof,  seizing  upon 
this  remark,  said,  in  a  vexed  manner,  that  such  a  naval  convention  existed 
only  "  in  the  mind  of  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  and  in  the  moon." 

XII 

July  — ,  1914.  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  Your  Excellency  herewith 
the  inclosed  copy  of  a  letter,  dated  the  25th  inst.  at  St.  Petersburg,  sent  to  a 
Russian  Grand  Duke,  who  is  sojourning  here  for  the  present,  by  his  adju- 
tant, and  about  the  gist  of  which  I  have  already  made  telegraphic  report. 
The  letter,  which  came  to  my  knowledge  in  a  confidential  way,  is  proof,  to 
my  mind,  that  as  early  as  the  24th  inst.  people  in  Russia  were  determined  to 
go  to  war. 

(Inclosure) 

St.  Petersburg,  July  12  (25),  1914. 

In  St.  Petersburg  we  have  had  great  disorder  among  the  laborers,  which 
strangely  coincided  with  the  presence  here  of  the  French  and  with  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum  to  Servia.  Yesterday  I  heard  from  the  French  military 
agent,  General  de  la  Guiche,  that  he  had  been  told  Austria  was  not  innocent 
of  these  labor  disturbances.  But  now  everything  is  quickly  reverting  to 
normal  conditions,  and  it  seems  that,  encouraged  by  the  French,  our  Gov- 
ernment has  ceased  to  tremble  with  fear  of  the  Germans.  It  was  about  time! 
It  is  better  once  to  speak  one's  mind  clearly  to  the  other  party  than  to  hide 
continually  behind  the  professional  lies  of  the  diplomats.  Austria's  ultima- 
tum is  of  an  unheard-of  insolence,  as  all  papers  here  say  unanimously. 

I  have  just  read  the  evening  papers.  Yesterday  there  was  a  meeting  of  the 
Ministerial  Council.  The  Minister  of  War  spoke  very  strongly;  he  con- 
firmed the  statement  that  Russia  is  ready  for  war,  and  the  other  Ministers 
agreed.  In  accordance  with  this  spirit,  a  report  to  His  Majesty  was  made 
up,  and  this  report  was  acknowledged  the  same  night.  To-day  a  preliminary 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  559 

communique  of  the  Government  was  published  in  the  Russky  Invalid  to  the 
effect  that  "the  Government  is  very  anxious  in  consequence  of  the  events 
that  have  taken  place  and  the  dispatch  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Ser- 
via.  The  Government  is  following  carefully  the  development  of  the  Servo- 
Austrian  conflict,  to  which  Russia  cannot  remain  indifferent."  This  com- 
munique was  printed  by  all  papers  with  very  favorable  comment. 

We  are  all  convinced  that  this  time  there  will  be  no  Rasputins  to  prevent 
Russia  from  doing  her  duty.  Germany,  which  is  pushing  Austria  forward, 
is  determined  to  measure  her  strength  against  ours  before  we  build  up  our 
fleet,  and  the  Balkan  States  have  not  yet  recovered  from  the  war.  We  also 
must  look  danger  bravely  in  the  face,  instead  of  hiding  our  heads  as  during 
the  Balkan  War,  when  Kokovtzoff  had  no  other  thoughts  than  of  the  purse. 
At  that  time  war  would  have  been  easier,  as  the  Balkan  League  was  fully 
armed.  But  in  Russia  the  street  demonstrations  which  were  directed  against 
that  detestable  Austria  were  dispersed  by  the  police.  Now,  however,  such 
demonstrations  would  be  gladly  welcomed. 

Altogether  we  will  hope  that  the  reign  of  the  poltroons  and  of  certain 
bawlers  and  mystics  is  a  thing  of  the  past.  War  is  like  a  thunderstorm. 
Even  though  catastrophes  should  come,  it  would  be  better  than  to  endure 
this  sultriness  longer.  From  experience  I  know  to  a  certainty  that  for  my- 
self the  quietest  place  is  at  the  front,  where  I  can  see  the  danger  in  its  natural 
proportions,  and  that  is  not  so  terrible.  The  worst  is  in  the  realm  where  an 
atmosphere  of  cowardice  prevails,  where  improbable  rumors  are  abroad,  and 
panics  develop.  And  in  the  future  war  the  Russian  interior  will  be  the  rear 
guard. 


560     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 
ANGLO-GERMAN   RELATIONS 


A  GERMAN  HISTORIAN  PREDICTS  WAR  WITH 
ENGLAND  * 

.  .  .  Professor  Delbruck.  begins  his  statement  by  a  candid  avowal  of 
the  "  highly  inflammable  state  of  feeling"  now  rampant  in  Germany  against 
England.  He  asks,  "  Can  an  Anglo-German  war  be  averted?  "  and  replies :  — 

"  I  begin  to  think  it  cannot.  We  know  now  that  England  deliberately 
planned  to  fall  upon  us  without  formal  declaration  of  war  last  summer.  We 
know  now  how  near  we  were  to  the  realization  of  a  British  admiral's  grim 
prophecy  that '  the  Germans  would  wake  up  some  morning  to  find  that  they 
had  once  had  a  fleet.'  The  nation  is  so  outraged  over  that  revelation  that 
the  next  Reichstag  may  be  asked  to  pass  a  law  permitting  us  to  treat  as 
pirates  the  prisoners  of  any  enemy  who  begins  hostilities  under  those  wanton 
circumstances  —  to  shoot  or  hang  them  at  sight!  I  doubt  very  much  if  our 
Government  will  be  able  for  long  to  resist  the  pressure  for  more  powerful 
armaments,  which  are  demanded  in  all  patriotic  German  circles.  Morocco 
proved  to  the  hilt,  if  further  proof  were  necessary,  that  England  is  our 
inveterate  enemy.  In  the  face  of  such  a  peril  there  is  only  one  alternative  — 
more  dreadnoughts!  We  realize  that  a  heavy  or  sudden  increase  of  our  fleet 
might  —  probably  would  —  be  considered  a  casus  belli  by  England.  But 
people  think  we  must  risk  that.  We  cannot  and  will  not  ever  again  tolerate 
such  malicious  interference  with  legitimate  German  aspirations  as  Britain's 
intervention  in  our  negotiations  with  France  over  Morocco. 

"Our  point  is  that  the  British  Government  has  stubbornly  and  con- 
sistently declined  to  negotiate  with  us,  with  a  view  either  to  cooperation  or 
avoidance  of  an  eventual  menace  to  British  interests.  Your  standpoint  is 
simply  blind  unyielding  opposition  —  the  dog-in-the-manger  attitude  in  its 
most  virulent  form.  You  refuse  to  associate  yourselves  with  us  in  financing 
the  project  [of  the  Bagdad  Railway],  as  we  invited  you  to  do  ten  years  ago. 
Then,  not  satisfied  with  blocking  our  progress  in  that  direction,  you  lose  no 
opportunity  to  unite  Russian  and  Frenchman  against  us.  Then  you  seek  to 
undermine  us  with  the  Turk,  whose  only  friend  is  Germany,  because  we  are 
the  only  European  power  which  has  not  despoiled  him  of  territory  in  the 
past  and  has  no  intention  of  doing  so  in  the  future. 

"  Let  me  summarize  what  I  have  said:  The  abandonment  of  unworthy 
suspicions;  the  acknowledgment  of  our  right  to  grow  and  to  participate  in 
shaping  the  world's  destinies;  the  expression  of  an  honest  desire  to  reach  an 
understanding;  formal  diplomatic  steps  in  that  direction;  simultaneous 
withdrawal  of  arbitrary  opposition  to  legitimate  German  political  aspira- 
tions —  those  are  the  things  we  mean  by  an  exhibition  of  British  friendship. 
...  If  you  have  no  inclination  to  meet  us  on  that  ground,  if  your  interests 
rather  point  to  a  perpetuation  of  the  anything-to-beat-Germany  policy,  so 
let  it  be.  The  Armageddon  which  must  then,  some  day,  ensue  will  not  be  of 
our  making." 

»  Extract  from  an  article  in  the  Literary  Digest,  1912,  vol.  xurv,  p.  201. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  561 

THE   PRICE  OF  A  GERMAN-ENGLISH  ENTENTE » 

...  So  soon  as  Germany  perceives  that  the  other  powers  are  no  longer 
making  it  their  object  to  exclude  her  from  the  politics  of  the  world,  she  will 
have  attained  the  purpose  of  her  shipbuilding;  and  she  will  rejoice  to  be  rid 
of  the  necessity  of  increasing  her  burden  (p.  133). 

...  So  soon  as  they  know  that  Germany  is  at  one  with  England,  all  notion 
of  revolt  must  vanish.  In  spite  of  all  differences  among  the  great  nations, 
it  is  never  to  be  forgotten  that  they  also  constitute  a  vast  unity  and  have 
common  interests.  Germany  has  a  large  and  growing  share  in  the  trade  of 
India,  and  especially  of  Egypt.  A  rising  in  India  or  Egypt  that  should  fling 
back  these  lands  into  anarchy  and  barbarism  would,  therefore,  be  also  an 
acute  injury  to  German  interests.  So  soon  as  Germany  stands  in  healthy 
political  relations  with  England,  she  has  the  keenest  interest  in  the  preser- 
vation of  England's  rule,  which  represents  civilization,  in  adjacent  countries. 
President  Roosevelt  was  right  in  saying  that  Germany  on  the  Euphrates 
represented  not  a  weakening,  but  a  strengthening,  of  England's  position  on 
the  Ganges  and  the  Nile  (p.  134). 

...  A  war  between  Germany  and  England  can  only  take  one  course,  viz., 
that  the  English  vessels  blockade  the  German  harbors,  and  the  German 
ships  by  force  or  cunning  break  through  the  blockade  and  endeavor  to  inflict 
widespread  damage  on  English  merchantmen  and  harbors.  If  other  powers 
come  into  play,  Germany  might,  perhaps,  in  combination  with  the  Turks, 
attack  the  English  in  Egypt,  and  the  English  could  strengthen  with  their 
land  forces  an  enemy  of  Germany  —  the  French  or  the  Russians.  The  land- 
ing of  English  troops  in  Denmark  or  Holland  could  scarcely  accomplish 
much,  since  the  German  Empire  has  at  its  disposal  more  than  four  to  five 
million  soldiers,  and  would  therefore  be  speedily  in  a  position  to  attack  and 
annihilate  any  such  English  army  with  overwhelmingly  superior  forces.  We 
could  desire  nothing  better  for  ourselves  than  such  an  isolated  landing  of 
English  troops.  If  the  English  desire  to  support  the  French  against  us,  they 
must  allow  their  army  to  land  in  France  and  unite  directly  with  the  French 
army.  A  landing  elsewhere  would  be  a  division  of  forces  which  would  enable 
the  German  army  to  overcome  each  in  succession  (pp.  135-36). 

The  field,  wherein  the  understanding  between  England  and  Germany  is 
to  be  sought,  is  that  of  colonial  policy  and  the  Turkish  Orient.  Germany 
recognizes  that  the  greatest  part  of  the  world  is  allotted,  and  there  are  no 
longer  important  colonies  to  be  gained  by  her;  but  compensation  for  this 
can  be  obtained  in  the  preservation  of  the  principle  of  the  "open  door," 
where  this  still  exists,  and  close  relations  to  the  rejuvenated  Turkey,  where 
Germany  may  look  for  no  sovereignty,  but  for  influence  and  commercial 
activity.  If  England,  instead  of  placing  obstacle  after  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
the  attainment  of  our  purpose,  in  the  fashion  sufficiently  described  by  Sir 
Harry  Johnston,  will  accord  her  friendly  support,  every  motive  for  hostile 
feeling  on  our  part  will  have  vanished  and  the  rivalry  of  armaments  will 
diminish. 

1  Extracts  from  an  article  by  Hans  Delbruck,  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  1911,  vol. 
xcix,  p.  138. 


562     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

REFERENCES  TO  THE  ANGLO-GERMAN  SECRET  TREATY  OF 

1898  RELATIVE  TO  THE  EVENTUAL  DISMEMBERMENT 

OF  THE  PORTUGUESE  COLONIES 

Even  the  Emperor  William's  telegram  to  Mr.  Kruger  provoked  only  a 
temporary  storm,  and  did  not  hinder  the  conclusion  of  a  secret  treaty  which, 
in  1898,  in  conditions  but  little  known,  disposed  of  the  future  of  the  Portu- 
guese colonies.1 

England  should  afford  Germany  certain  opportunities  for  working  off  her 
surplus  energy,  her  surplus  production  in  Asia,  but  should  avoid  any  ar- 
rangement permitting  her  to  become  a  greater  rival  than  she  already  is 
along  the  Atlantic  trade  routes.  Thus,  instead  of  confirming  the  Treaty  of 
1898  relative  to  the  eventual  dismemberment  of  the  Portuguese  colonies, 
she  should  seek  for  a  fresh  arrangement  undoing  that  dangerous  and  incom- 
prehensible pact.2 

ANGLO-GERMAN   AGREEMENT  IN  REGARD  TO  THE 
AFRICAN  POSSESSIONS  OF  PORTUGAL3 

London,  December  30.  (Special  Cable  to  the  New  York  Times.)  The 
New  York  Times  is  in  a  position  to  state  that  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
have  concluded  an  important  arrangement  with  regard  to  the  African  pos- 
sessions of  Portugal,  that  is,  Angola  and  Portuguese  East  Africa. 

By  this  arrangement  Angola  will  become  a  German  protectorate.  It  is  a 
vast  tract  of  territory,  312,000  square  miles  in  extent,  with  a  native  popula- 
tion of  2,000,000,  lying  north  of  German  Southwest  Africa.  Its  proximity  to 
the  German  colony  is,  of  course,  the  factor  which  made  the  German  claims 
to  it  so  strong. 

With  reference  to  the  Portuguese  possessions  on  the  other  side  of  the  con- 
tinent, Mozambique  in  the  north  and  Gazaland  in  the  south,  territory  ex- 
tending from  the  eleventh  to  the  twenty-sixth  parallels,  the  northern  part 
adjacent  to  German  East  Africa  will  pass  under  German  control,  and  the 
southern  part,  regarded  as  a  natural  seaboard  for  the  Transvaal,  will  become 
British.   The  boundary  will  be  either  the  Zambesi  River  or  in  its  vicinity. 

Advices  have  been  received  in  London  from  Lisbon  to  the  effect  that  not 
only  has  an  agreement  been  completed,  but  that  the  purchase  money  has 
already  been  paid  by  the  two  powers  to  Portugal.  It  is  stated  that  this 
amounts  to  something  over  $100,000,000. 

The  Portuguese  Government  refrains  for  political  reasons  from  making 
public  details  of  the  deal.  It  is  felt  that  any  such  announcement  would 
endanger  the  existence  of  the  present  Government,  which  awaits  a  more 
favorable  time  to  inform  the  public  of  the  bargain. 

The  position  of  Portugal  toward  the  territories  will  be  much  the  same 
under  the  agreement  as  that  of  Turkey  with  regard  to  Egypt  —  suzerainty 
more  in  name  than  anything  else. 

1  Andre1  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  p.  47.    New  York,  1908. 

!  William  Morton  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  p.  264.   New  York,  1913. 

»  From  the  New  York  Times,  December  31,  1913. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  563 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  discussions  which  led  up  to  the  agreement 
had  an  excellent  effect  in  clearing  the  air  between  England  and  Germany. 
They  were,  of  course,  rendered  easier  by  the  fact  that  some  time  before  the 
Boer  War  a  similar  agreement  was  come  to.  It  was  then  not  carried  out,  as 
the  war  increased  the  commercial  competition  between  the  two  countries, 
and  the  German  naval  policy  combined  to  decrease  the  cordiality  of  their 
relations. 

PORTUGAL  WON'T  SELL  YET:    DIVISION  OF  HER  EAST 
AFRICAN  COLONIES  WHEN   SHE  DOES1 

Berlin,  December  31.  The  Foreign  Office  says  of  the  report  of  an  Anglo- 
German  agreement  to  acquire  Angola  and  Mozambique  from  Portugal,  that 
should  such  an  arrangement  be  reached,  it  would  be  contingent  on  Portu- 
gal deciding  to  dispose  of  her  colonies  and  would  concern  only  the  Anglo- 
German  rights  of  preemption. 

Portugal,  however,  it  is  said,  does  not  dream  of  selling  her  colonies. 

London,  December  31.  The  Foreign  Office  says  there  is  no  truth  in  the 
report  that  Germany  and  England  have  agreed  to  the  division  of  the 
Portuguese  colonies  in  Africa.  It  is  pointed  out  that  Portugal  has  not  ex- 
pressed a  desire  to  sell  the  colonies.  Should  the  Portuguese  possessions 
ever  come  into  the  market,  the  two  countries  may  endeavor  to  obtain 
possession  of  them. 

INTERVIEW  OF  OCTOBER  28,   1908,   WITH 
EMPEROR  WILLIAM   II 

[This  interview,  which  the  Kaiser  gave  to  a  "representative  Englishman," 
appeared  in  the  London  Telegraph,  October  28,  1908,  and  is  reprinted  in 
the  New  York  Times  Current  History  of  the  European  War,  vol.  I,  no.  2,  p. 
213.  It  was  corroborated  by  the  German  Foreign  Office,  with  the  comment 
that  it  was  "  intended  as  a  message  to  the  English  people."  In  consequence 
of  the  outcry  in  Germany,  .  .  .  and  the  representations  of  Chancellor  von 
Biilow,  the  Kaiser  had  to  declare  that  his  principal  imperial  task  was  to  "  in- 
sure the  stability  of  the  policies  of  the  Empire,  under  the  guardianship  of 
constitutional  responsibility.  .  .  ."] 

"  You  English  are  as  mad,  mad,  mad  as  March  hares.  What  has  come 
over  you  that  you  are  completely  given  over  to  suspicions  that  are  quite 
unworthy  of  a  great  nation?  What  more  can  I  do  than  I  have  done?  I 
declared  with  all  the  emphasis  at  my  command  in  my  speech  at  the  Guild- 
hall that  my  heart  was  set  upon  pes.ce  and  that  it  was  one  of  my  dearest 
wishes  to  live  on  the  best  terms  with  England.  Have  I  ever  been  false  to 
my  word?  Falsehood  and  prevarication  are  alien  to  my  nature.  My  actions 
ought  to  speak  for  themselves,  but  you  will  not  listen  to  them,  but  to  those 
who  misinterpret  and  distort  them. 

"This  is  a  personal  insult  which  I  resent;  to  be  forever  misjudged,  to 

have  my  repeated  offers  of  friendship  weighed  and  scrutinized  with  jealous, 

mistrustful  eyes  taxes  my  patience  severely.    I  have  said  time  after  time 

that  I  am  a  friend  of  England,  and  your  press,  or  at  least  a  considerable 

1  New  York  Times,  January  1,  1914. 


564     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

section  of  it,  bids  the  people  of  England  to  refuse  my  proffered  hand  and 
insinuates  that  the  other  hand  holds  a  dagger.  How  can  I  convince  a  na- 
tion against  its  will?" 

Complaining  again  of  the  difficulty  imposed  on  him  by  English  distrust, 
His  Majesty  said:  "The  prevailing  sentiment  of  large  sections  of  the  middle 
and  lower  classes  of  my  own  people  is  not  friendly  to  England.  I  am,  there- 
fore, so  to  speak,  in  the  minority  in  my  own  land,  but  it  is  a  minority  of  the 
best  element,  just  as  it  is  in  England  respecting  Germany." 

The  Englishman  reminded  the  Kaiser  that  not  only  England,  but  the 
whole  of  Europe,  viewed  with  disapproval  the  recent  sending  of  the  German 
Consul  at  Algiers  to  Fez  and  forestalling  France  and  Spain  by  suggesting 
the  recognition  of  Sultan  Mulai  Hand.  The  Kaiser  made  an  impatient  ges- 
ture and  exclaimed:  "Yes,  that  is  an  excellent  example  of  the  way  German 
actions  are  misrepresented."  And  with  vivid  directness  he  defended  the 
aforesaid  incident,  as  the  German  Government  has  already  done. 

The  interviewer  reminded  the  Kaiser  that  an  important  and  influential 
section  of  the  German  newspapers  interpreted  these  acts  very  differently, 
and  effusively  approved  of  them  because  they  indicated  that  Germany  was 
bent  upon  shaping  events  in  Morocco. 

"There  are  mischief-makers,"  replied  the  Emperor,  "in  both  countries. 
I  will  not  attempt  to  weigh  their  relative  capacity  for  misrepresentation,  but 
the  facts  are  as  I  have  stated.  There  has  been  nothing  in  Germany's  recent 
action  in  regard  to  Morocco  contrary  to  the  explicit  declaration  of  my  love 
of  peace  made  both  at  the  Guildhall  and  in  my  latest  speech  at  Strassburg." 

Reverting  to  his  efforts  to  show  his  friendship  for  England,  the  Kaiser 
said  they  had  not  been  confined  to  words.  It  was  commonly  believed  that 
Germany  was  hostile  to  England  throughout  the  Boer  War.  Undoubtedly 
the  newspapers  were  hostile  and  public  opinion  was  hostile.  "But  what," 
he  asked,  "of  official  Germany?  What  brought  to  a  sudden  stop,  indeed, 
to  an  absolute  collapse,  the  European  tour  of  the  Boer  delegates,  who  were 
striving  to  obtain  European  intervention? 

"They  were  feted  in  Holland.  France  gave  them  a  rapturous  welcome. 
They  wished  to  come  to  Berlin,  where  the  German  people  would  have 
crowned  them  with  flowers,  but  when  they  asked  me  to  receive  them  I 
refused.  The  agitation  immediately  died  away  and  the  delegates  returned 
empty  handed.  Was  that  the  action  of  a  secret  enemy? 

"Again,  when  the  struggle  was  at  its  height,  the  German  Government  was 
invited  by  France  and  Russia  to  join  them  in  calling  upon  England  to  end 
the  war.  The  moment  had  come,  they  said,  not  only  to  save  the  Boer  re- 
publics, but  also  to  humiliate  England  to  the  dust.  What  was  my  reply?  I 
said  so  far  from  Germany  joining  in  any  concerted  European  action  to 
bring  pressure  against  England  and  bring  about  her  downfall  Germany  would 
always  keep  aloof  from  politics  that  could  bring  her  into  complications 
with  a  sea  power  like  England. 

"Posterity  will  one  day  read  the  exact  terms  of  a  telegram,  now  in  the 
archives  of  Windsor  Castle,  in  which  I  informed  the  sovereign  of  England 
of  the  answer  I  returned  to  the  powers  which  then  sought  to  compass  her 
fall.  Englishmen  who  now  insult  me  by  doubting  my  word  should  know  what 
my  actions  were  in  the  hour  of  their  adversity. 

"Nor  was  that  all.    During  your  black  week  in  December,  1899,  when 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  565 

disasters  followed  one  another  in  rapid  succession,  I  received  a  letter  from 
Queen  Victoria,  my  revered  grandmother,  written  in  sorrow  and  affliction 
and  bearing  manifest  traces  of  the  anxieties  which  were  preying  upon  her 
mind  and  health.  I  at  once  returned  a  sympathetic  reply.  I  did  more.  I 
bade  one  of  my  officers  to  procure  as  exact  an  account  as  he  could  obtain 
of  the  number  of  combatants  on  both  sides  and  the  actual  positions  of  the 
opposing  forces. 

"  With  the  figures  before  me  I  worked  out  what  I  considered  the  best  plan 
of  campaign  in  the  circumstances  and  submitted  it  to  my  General  Staff  for 
criticism.  Then  I  dispatched  it  to  England.  That  document  likewise  is 
among  the  State  papers  at  Windsor  awaiting  the  serenely  impartial  verdict 
of  history. 

"Let  me  add  as  a  curious  coincidence  that  the  plan  which  I  formulated 
ran  very  much  on  the  same  lines  as  that  actually  adopted  by  General 
Roberts  and  carried  by  him  into  successful  operation.  Was  that  the  act  of 
one  who  wished  England  ill?   Let  Englishmen  be  just  and  say." 

Touching  then  upon  the  English  conviction  that  Germany  is  increasing 
her  navy  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  Great  Britain,  the  Kaiser  reiterated 
the  explanation  that  Chancellor  von  Billow  and  other  Ministers  have  made 
familiar,  dwelling  upon  Germany's  worldwide  commerce,  her  manifold 
interests  in  distant  seas,  and  the  necessity  for  being  prepared  to  protect 
them.   He  said:  — 

"  Patriotic  Germans  refuse  to  assign  any  bounds  to  their  legitimate  com- 
mercial ambitions.  They  expect  their  interests  to  go  on  growing.  They 
must  be  able  to  champion  them  manfully  in  any  quarter  of  the  globe.  Ger- 
many looks  ahead.  Her  horizons  stretch  far  away.  She  must  be  prepared  for 
any  eventualities  in  the  Far  East.  Who  can  foresee  what  may  take  place 
in  the  Pacific  in  the  days  to  come,  days  not  so  distant  as  some  believe,  but 
days,  at  any  rate,  for  which  all  European  powers  with  Far  Eastern  inter- 
est sought  to  steadily  prepare? 

"Look  at  the  accomplished  rise  of  Japan.  Think  of  a  possible  national 
awakening  in  China,  and  then  judge  of  the  vast  problems  of  the  Pacific. 
Only  those  powers  which  have  great  navies  will  be  listened  to  with  respect 
when  the  future  of  the  Pacific  comes  to  be  solved,  and  if  for  that  reason  only 
Germany  must  have  a  powerful  fleet.  It  may  even  be  that  England  herself 
will  be  glad  that  Germany  has  a  fleet  when  they  speak  together  in  the  great 
debates  of  the  future." 

The  interviewer  concludes:  — 

"The  Emperor  spoke  with  all  that  earnestness  which  marks  his  man- 
ner when  speaking  on  deeply  pondered  subjects.  I  ask  my  fellow-countrymen 
who  value  the  cause  of  peace,  to  weigh  what  I  have  written  and  revise,  if 
necessary,  their  estimate  of  the  Kaiser  and  his  friendship  for  England  by 
his  Majesty's  own  words.  If  they  had  enjoyed  the  privilege  of  hearing 
them  spoken  they  would  no  longer  doubt  either  his  Majesty's  firm  desire  to 
live  on  the  best  of  terms  with  England  or  his  growing  impatience  at  the  per- 
sistent mistrust  with  which  his  offer  of  friendship  is  too  often  received." 


566     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

COLONIAL  DEVELOPMENT  AND  REMOVAL  OF 
CONFLICTING  INTERESTS1 

By  Sir  Harby  Johnston 

One  thing,  at  any  rate,  that  the  recent  German  colonization  of  England 
has  done,  has  been  to  build  up  a  remarkable  degree  of  commerce  between 
the  British  and  the  German  Empires;  and  a  fact  which  is  too  often  over- 
looked by  British  politicians  is  the  value  of  Anglo-German  commerce  at  the 
present  day.  We  do  a  bigger  trade  with  Germany  than  with  all  the  British 
Empire  over  the  seas,  and  similarly  German  commerce  nourishes  in  all  that 
part  of  the  British  Empire  governed  from  London  more  than  it  does  in  the 
colonial  dominions  of  any  other  power.  An  Anglo-German  war  would  be  the 
most  dreadful  disaster  which  could  possibly  happen  to  either  Germany  or 
Britain.  It  would  bankrupt  both  empires  and  only  profit  the  United  States 
and  Russia. 

.  .  .  We  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  it  is  only  because  hitherto  trade  has 
been  so  splendidly  free  and  fair  to  all  the  world  throughout  all  the  British 
possessions  that  the  rest  of  the  world  has  permitted  without  undue  grum- 
bling a  population  of  some  forty  millions  only  in  northwest  Europe  to  arro- 
gate to  itself  the  control  of  the  best  parts  of  Africa,  Asia,  Australasia,  and 
America.  But  a  reversal  of  this  policy  would,  in  my  opinion,  eventually 
unite  all  the  other  great  commercial  powers  of  the  world  in  league  against 
us. 

Germany  wants,  will  have,  and  must  have  some  day  —  and  is  morally 
entitled  to  —  an  outlet  towards  the  Mediterranean  and  a  port  on  that  sea. 
That  outlet  can  only  be,  if  the  balance  of  power  is  to  remain  undisturbed, 
Trieste.  In  making  such  a  sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  her  ally,  Austria  would 
require  a  territorial  compensation  farther  east,  and  in  the  course  of  events 
must  of  necessity  become  a  great  Slav  empire  rather  than  an  eastern  Ger- 
many. These  are  matters  which  only  concern  Great  Britain  in  so  far  that 
we  might  hinder  their  solution  by  any  stupid,  short-sighted  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Nearest  East.  Far  more  important  to  us,  in  my  hum- 
ble opinion,  than  the  fate  and  future  history  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  is  a 
good  understanding  with  Germany.  It  is  Germany  and  Austria  together 
who  should  be  allowed  by  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  to  determine  the 
settlement  of  southeastern  Europe  north  of  the  Greek  frontier.  Similarly, 
nothing  should  be  done  by  us  to  block  the  way  of  Germany  or  Austria  in 
any  steps  they  may  take  which  are  right  and  fair  and  which  do  not  lead 
to  any  policy  of  protection,  for  the  regeneration  of  Turkey  in  Asia,  providing 
that  due  regard  is  given  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  Syria,  the  neces- 
sity for  a  neutralized  Arabia,  and  British  interests  in  Egypt  and  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

On  the  other  hand,  among  the  British  interests  of  the  greatest  magnitude 
are  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg  and  the 
invulnerability  of  France  within  her  present  limits.  Any  unprovoked  attack 
by  Germany  on  France,  and  any  further  encroachment  of  German  power 
westward  in  that  direction  would  be  a  casus  belli,  even  —  I  should  imagine 
—  with  the  Labor  and  the  Irish  parties  in  Great  Britain. 

i  Extract  from  the  Report  of  Proceedings  of  the  Anglo-German  Understanding  Conference, 
pp.  116-18.   London,  1912. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  567 

COMMERCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  COMPETITION1 
By  Professor  Karl  Rathgen 

As  I  said  before,  with  the  rest  of  the  world  Germany's  foreign  trade  was 
stagnant  for  twenty  years  from  the  middle  of  the  seventies  to  the  middle  of 
the  nineties.  From  that  time  until  now  an  enormous  wave  of  increase  of  the 
volume  and  the  value  of  foreign  trade  has  gone  all  over  the  world.  It  has 
swelled  statistical  numbers  in  England  as  well  as  in  Germany,  but  with  one 
difference.  The  wave  began  to  rise  in  Germany  several  years  earlier  than  in 
England.  In  these  first  years  of  the  great  wave  of  increasing  exports  the 
start  which  England  had  over  Germany  has  been  somewhat  diminished. 
About  18S9-90  British  exports  were  ahead  of  German  exports  by  about 
£100,000,000.  Ten  years  later  the  difference  was  only  £50,000,000  to 
£65,000,000.  But  since  that  time,  during  the  last  fifteen  years,  the  distance 
has  remained  the  same.  Excepting  that  year  of  unusual  prices,  1907,  the 
value  of  English  exports  has  been  ahead  of  German  exports  between 
£45,000,000  and  £65,000,000.  In  other  words,  the  absolute  increase  of  the 
value  of  exports  has  been  the  same  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  in  Germany 
between  the  years  of  prosperity,  1900,  1911,  an  increase  of  £170,000,000  for 
Germany,  £165,000,000  for  the  United  Kingdom,  increases  both  of  them 
much  larger  than  those  of  any  other  country  in  the  world.  Even  in  the 
United  States  it  was  only  £115,000,000.  The  comparison  of  England  and 
Germany  appears  in  less  favorable  light  for  the  latter,  if  we  compute  the 
proportion  of  exports  per  head  of  the  population,  because  the  German  popu- 
lation has  increased  by  larger  numbers  than  that  of  Great  Britain.  From 
1890  to  1911  German  exports  increased  per  head  by  £2, 15s.,  British  exports 
by  £3. 

To  give  an  analysis  of  this  increase  of  exports  would  take  up  too  much 
time.  But  one  point  you  will  allow  me  to  illustrate,  which  is  of  paramount 
importance  for  our  object.  The  direction  of  these  foreign  exports  has  de- 
veloped in  quite  a  different  way  for  both  countries.  I  have  compared  for 
each  commercial  country  of  the  world  the  years  1890  and  1910,  two  years 
of  good  business,  whether  during  this  period  German  or  British  imports 
show  the  greater  increase.  The  result  is  very  curious.  For  no  European 
country  excepting  Rumania  and  Greece  have  imports  from  Great  Britain 
decreased.  But  in  every  European  country  excepting  Portugal,  German 
imports  have  increased  faster  than  British  imports.  Here  you  have  the  in- 
fluence of  the  central  continental  position  of  Germany,  situated  in  the  heart 
of  Europe,  surrounded  by  other  continental  countries.  Germany  has  the 
advantage  of  its  geographical  position  in  Europe.  This  is  confirmed  by  the 
fact  that  about  the  year  1910  British  imports  were  ahead  of  German  im- 
ports in  France,  in  Spain,  in  Portugal,  in  Turkey,  in  Greece;  in  all  the  other 
countries  Germany  is  ahead,  and  that  the  more  so  the  closer  the  continental 
connection  is.  We  get  the  inverse  impression  from  the  statistics  of  imports, 
1890  and  1910,  in  countries  out  of  Europe.  In  each  of  these  countries  the 
imports  from  Great  Britain  have  increased  by  a  larger  sum  than  those  from 
Germany.   An  exception  is  found,  besides  in  the  German  colonies,  only  in 

1  Extract  from  the  Report  of  Proceedings  of  the  Anglo-German  Understanding  Conference, 
pp.  19-21.   London,  1912. 


568     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

some  states  of  Central  America,  Mexico,  Guatemala,  San  Domingo;  in  the 
Argentine  Republic  the  progress  of  both  countries  is  nearly  equal.  Of  the 
increase  in  the  buying  power  of  the  non-European  countries  Britain  has 
profited  more  than  Germany. 

Excepting  certain  parts  of  Central  America  and  tropical  Africa,  British 
exports  are  far  ahead  of  German  exports  everywhere  out  of  Europe. 

Who  would  be  foolish  enough  to  think  that  the  natural  advantage  of 
Germany  in  Europe,  of  Britain  beyond  the  seas,  might  be  changed  by  a  war! 

If  the  economic  conditions  and  necessities  of  England  and  Germany  are 
more  and  more  similar,  does  that  only  mean  increasing  competition?  Does 
it  not  mean  at  the  same  time  similarity  and  community  of  interests?  The 
great  commercial  nations  have  the  same  interest,  that  the  whole  world 
should  be  opened  up  to  civilization  and  to  industrial  and  commercial  enter- 
prises. It  has  been  England  which  has  given  the  example  of  opening  up  new 
areas  to  the  commerce  of  all  comers  in  fair  competition.  It  has  been  the  first 
colonizing  power  which  admitted  merchants  and  goods  from  other  countries, 
and  many  are  the  German  merchants  who  recognize  this  spirit  of  fairness 
and  economic  wisdom.  England  has  been  the  principal  power  to  open  up 
the  Near  and  the  Far  East  to  European  enterprise.  Germany  has,  as  soon 
as  the  Empire  created  the  possibility  of  such  action,  always  worked  in  the 
same  spirit,  as  shown  in  eastern  Asia  and  in  the  opening  up  of  Africa.  It  has 
had  an  essential  share  in  securing  fair  and  equal  treatment  for  all  trading 
nations,  from  the  Congo  Act  down  to  the  recent  Morocco  Treaty,  where 
England  has  left  to  Germany  the  privilege  of  protecting  these  principles. 
It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  make  special  proposals  for  coopera- 
tion; but  how  much  work  is  to  be  done,  how  much  capital  is  required  to 
civilize  the  vast  expanse  of  countries  beyond  the  sea  and  their  hundreds  of 
millions  of  inhabitants!  To  mention  one  point  only:  have  we  not  the  same 
interest  to  increase  the  production  of  other  materials  of  industry  like  cotton? 
In  the  same  way  as  Germany  has  profited  by  the  action  of  England,  Ger- 
many's action  profits  to  England.  Small  as  the  volume  of  commerce  with 
our  new  colonies  is  as  yet,  they  afford  a  market  for  Great  Britain  and  its 
possessions  which  is  bound  to  increase  in  the  future. 


SPEECH  OF  THE   GERMAN   CHANCELLOR,   HERR   VON 

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG,   IN   THE   REICHSTAG, 

DECEMBER  2,   1914 J 

Freer  than  France  and  Russia  was  England.  I  have  already  reminded 
you  how  British  statesmen  in  Parliament,  again  and  again,  proudly  affirmed 
Great  Britain's  absolutely  unrestricted  right  to  steer  her  own  course.  The 
attempt  to  come  to  an  understanding,  which  would  have  safeguarded  the 
peace  of  the  world,  was  easiest  to  make  with  England. 

On  these  lines  I  had  to  act  and  I  did  act.  I  well  knew  that  it  was  a  narrow 
road,  not  easy  to  tread.  In  the  course  of  centuries,  the  English  insular  way 
of  thinking  had  evolved  the  political  maxim  that  England  had  a  right  to  an 
arbitrium  mundi,  which  she  could  only  uphold  by  an  unrivaled  supremacy  on 

1  Extract  from  the  translation  published  in  the  International  Conciliation  Pamphlet, 
no.  86. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  569 

sea  and  by  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent.  I 
never  had  any  hopes  that  my  persuasion  could  break  that  old  English 
maxim.  What  I  did  hope  and  thought  possible  was  that  the  growth  of 
German  power  and  the  increase  of  the  risks  of  a  war  might  open  England's 
eyes  to  the  fact  that  her  old-fashioned  maxim  had  become  untenable  and 
impracticable,  and  that  an  amicable  settlement  with  Germany  was  prefer- 
able. But  that  old  doctrine  of  hers  more  than  once  stood  in  the  way  of  a 
peaceful  understanding.  The  crisis  of  1911  gave  a  new  impetus  to  the  nego- 
tiations. The  English  people  suddenly  realized  that  they  had  stood  at  the 
brink  of  a  European  war.  Popular  sentiment  forced  the  British  Government 
to  a  rapprochement  with  Germany.  After  long  and  arduous  negotiations  we 
finally  arrived  at  an  understanding  on  various  disputed  questions  of  an  eco- 
nomic character,  regarding  Africa  and  Asia  Minor.  This  understanding  was 
to  lessen  every  possible  political  friction.  The  world  is  wide.  There  is  room 
enough  for  both  nations  to  measure  their  strength  in  peaceful  rivalry  as  long 
as  our  national  strength  is  allowed  free  scope  for  development.  German 
policy  always  stood  up  for  that  principle.  But  during  the  negotiations  Eng- 
land was  indefatigable  in  her  endeavors  to  enter  into  ever  closer  relations 
with  France  and  Russia.  The  decisive  point  was  that  beyond  the  political 
sphere  of  action  one  military  agreement  after  the  other  was  made  in  view  of 
a  possible  Continental  war.  England  kept  these  negotiations  as  secret  as 
possible.  When  something  about  them  would  percolate,  it  was  declared, 
both  in  the  press  and  in  Parliament,  to  be  perfectly  harmless.  But  things 
could  not  be  concealed,  as  you  know  from  the  official  papers  that  were  pub- 
lished by  me.  The  general  situation  was  this:  England  was  indeed  ready 
to  come  to  an  understanding  on  single  items,  but  the  first  and  foremost 
principle  of  her  policy  was  the  "  balance  of  power"  as  a  means  of  checking 
German  strength  in  its  free  development. 

CARDIFF  SPEECH  OF  THE   BRITISH   PRIME   MINISTER, 
MR.   ASQUITH,   OCTOBER  2,    1914  » 

I  will  not  repeat,  and  I  certainly  cannot  improve  upon  it,  and  indeed  I 
am  not  here  to-night  to  argue  out  propositions  which  British  citizens  in 
every  part  of  the  world  to-day  regard  as  beyond  the  reach  of  controversy.  I 
do  not  suppose  that  in  the  history  of  mankind  there  has  ever  been,  in  such 
a  vast  and  diverse  community,  agreement  so  unanimous  in  purpose,  so 
concentrated,  a  corporate  conscience  so  clear,  so  convinced,  cooperation  so 
spontaneous,  so  ardent,  and  so  resolute.  Just  consider  what  it  means,  here 
in  this  United  Kingdom  —  England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  and  Wales  —  to 
hear  one  plain,  harmonious,  united  voice,  while  over  the  seas  from  our  great 
Dominions  Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa,  New  Zealand,  our  Crown 
Colonies,  swell  the  chorus. 

In  India,  —  where  whatever  we  won  by  the  sword  we  hold  and  we  retain 
by  the  more  splendid  title  of  just  and  disinterested  rule,  by  the  authority, 
not  of  a  despot,  but  of  a  trustee,  —  the  response  to  our  common  appeal  has 
moved  all  our  feelings  to  their  profoundest  depths,  and  has  been  such  as  to 
shiver  and  to  shatter  the  vain  and  ignorant  imaginings  of  our  enemies.  That 
is  a  remarkable  and  indeed  a  unique  spectacle. 

1  Extract  from  "The  War,"  a  pamphlet  published  by  Methuen  &  Co.,  London,  1914. 


570     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

What  is  it  that  stirred  the  imagination,  aroused  the  conscience,  enlisted 
the  manhood,  welded  into  one  compact  and  irresistible  force  the  energies  and 
the  will  of  the  greatest  Imperial  structure  that  the  world  has  ever  known? 
That  is  a  question  which,  for  a  moment,  it  is  well  worth  asking  and  answer- 
ing. Let  me  say,  then,  first  negatively,  that  we  are  not  impelled,  any  of  us, 
by  some  of  the  motives  which  have  occasioned  the  bloody  struggles  of  the 
past.  In  this  case,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  ambition  and  aggression  play 
no  part.  What  do  we  want?  What  do  we  aim  at?  What  have  we  to  gain? 

We  are  a  great,  world-wide,  peace-loving  partnership.  By  the  wisdom 
and  the  courage  of  our  forefathers,  by  great  deeds  of  heroism  and  adventure 
on  land  and  sea,  by  the  insight  and  corporate  sagacity,  the  tried  and  tested 
experience  of  many  generations,  we  have  built  up  a  dominion  which  is 
buttressed  by  the  two  pillars  of  Liberty  and  Law.  We  are  not  vain  enough  or 
foolish  enough  to  think  that  in  the  course  of  a  long  process  there  have  not 
been  blunders,  or  worse  than  blunders,  and  that  to-day  our  Dominion  does 
not  fall  short  of  what  in  our  ideals  it  might  and  it  ought  and,  we  believe,  it  is 
destined  to  be.  But  such  as  we  have  received  it,  and  such  as  we  hope  to  leave 
it,  with  it  we  are  content. 

We  do  not  covet  any  people's  territory.  We  have  no  desire  to  impose  our 
rule  upon  alien  populations.  The  British  Empire  is  enough  for  us.  All  that 
we  wished  for,  all  that  we  wish  for  now,  is  to  be  allowed  peaceably  to  con- 
solidate our  own  resources,  to  raise  within  the  Empire  the  level  of  common 
opportunity,  to  draw  closer  the  bond  of  affection  and  confidence  between  its 
parts,  and  to  make  it  everywhere  the  worthy  home  of  the  best  traditions  of 
British  liberty.  Does  it  not  follow  from  that,  that  nowhere  in  the  world  is 
there  a  people  who  have  stronger  motives  to  avoid  war  and  to  seek  and  en- 
sue peace?  Why,  then,  are  the  British  people  throughout  the  length  and 
breadth  of  our  Empire  everywhere  turning  their  ploughshares  into  swords? 
Why  are  the  best  of  our  able-bodied  men  leaving  the  fields  and  the  factory 
and  the  counting-house  for  the  recruiting-office  and  the  training-camp? 

If,  as  I  have  said,  we  have  no  desire  to  add  to  our  Imperial  burdens,  either 
in  area  or  in  responsibility,  it  is  equally  true  that  in  entering  this  war  we  had 
no  ill-will  to  gratify,  nor  wrongs  of  our  own  to  avenge.  In  regard  to  Ger- 
many in  particular,  our  policy  —  repeatedly  stated  in  Parliament,  resolutely 
pursued  year  after  year  both  in  London  and  in  Berlin  —  our  policy  has  been 
to  remove  one  by  one  the  outstanding  causes  of  possible  friction,  and  so  to 
establish  a  firm  basis  for  cordial  relations  in  the  days  to  come. 

We  have  said  from  the  first  —  I  have  said  it  over  and  over  again,  and  so 
has  Sir  Edward  Grey  —  we  have  said  from  the  first  that  our  friendships  with 
certain  powers,  with  France,  with  Russia,  and  with  Japan,  were  not  to  be 
construed  as  implying  cold  feelings,  and  still  less  hostile  purposes,  against 
any  other  power.  But  at  the  same  time  we  have  always  made  it  clear,  to 
quote  words  used  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  as  far  back  as  November,  1911,  —  I 
quote  his  exact  words,  —  "One  does  not  make  new  friendships  worth  having 
by  deserting  old  ones.  New  friendships  by  all  means  let  us  have,  but  not  at 
the  expense  of  the  ones  we  have."  That  has  been,  and  I  trust  will  always 
be,  the  attitude  of  those  whom  the  Kaiser  in  bis  now  notorious  proclamation 
describes  as  the  "treacherous  English." 

We  laid  down  —  and  I  wish  to  call  not  only  your  attention,  but  the  atten- 
tion of  the  whole  world  to  this,  when  so  many  false  legends  are  now  being 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  571 

invented  and  circulated  —  in  the  following  year  —  in  the  year  1912  we  laid 
down  in  terms  carefully  approved  by  the  Cabinet,  and  which  I  will  textually 
quote,  what  our  relations  with  Germany  ought  in  our  view  to  be.  We  said, 
and  we  communicated  this  to  the  German  Government,  "Britain  declares 
that  she  will  neither  make,  nor  join  in,  any  unprovoked  attack  upon  Ger- 
many. Aggression  upon  Germany  is  not  the  subject,  and  forms  no  part,  of 
any  treaty,  understanding,  or  combination  to  which  Britain  is  now  a  party, 
nor  will  she  become  a  party  to  anything  that  has  such  an  object."  There  is 
nothing  ambiguous  or  equivocal  about  that. 

But  that  was  not  enough  for  German  statesmanship.  They  wanted  us  to 
go  further.  They  asked  us  to  pledge  ourselves  absolutely  to  neutrality  in 
the  event  of  Germany  being  engaged  in  war,  and  this,  mind  you,  at  a  time 
when  Germany  was  enormously  increasing  both  her  aggressive  and  her  de- 
fensive resources,  especially  upon  the  sea.  They  asked  us,  to  put  it  quite 
plainly,  for  a  free  hand,  so  far  as  we  were  concerned,  when  they  selected  the 
opportunity  to  overbear,  to  dominate  the  European  world. 

To  such  a  demand  but  one  answer  was  possible,  and  that  was  the  answer 
we  gave.  None  the  less  we  have  continued  during  the  whole  of  the  last  two 
years,  and  never  more  energetically  and  more  successfully  than  during  the 
Balkan  crisis  of  last  year,  to  work  not  only  for  the  peace  of  Europe  but  for 
the  creation  of  a  better  international  atmosphere  and  a  more  cordial  coop- 
eration between  all  the  powers.  From  both  points  of  view,  that  of  our  do- 
mestic interests  as  a  kingdom  and  an  empire,  and  that  of  our  settled  attitude 
and  policy  in  the  counsels  of  Europe,  a  war  such  as  this,  which  injures  the 
one  and  frustrates  the  other,  was  and  could  only  be  regarded  as  among  the 
worst  of  catastrophes  —  among  the  worst  of  catastrophes,  but  not  the  worst. 


572     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 
THE  AUSTRO-SERVIAN  DISPUTE 


EXTRACT  FROM   TREATY  OF  BERLIN  > 

Signed  July  13,  1878 

Article  XXV.  The  Provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  shall  be  oc- 
cupied and  administered  by  Austria-Hungary.  The  Government  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, not  desiring  to  undertake  the  administration  of  the  Sandjak 
of  Novi-Bazar,  which  extends  between  Servia  and  Montenegro  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  to  the  other  side  of  Mitrovitza,  the  Ottoman  Adminis- 
tration will  continue  to  exercise  its  functions  there.  Nevertheless,  in  order 
to  assure  the  maintenance  of  the  new  political  state  of  affairs,  as  well  as 
freedom  and  security  of  communications,  Austria-Hungary  reserves  the 
right  of  keeping  garrisons  and  having  military  and  commercial  roads  in 
the  whole  of  this  part  of  the  ancient  Vilayet  of  Bosnia.  To  this  end  the 
Governments  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  reserve  to  themselves  to  come 
to  an  understanding  on  the  details. 

SECRET  APPENDIX  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  FRIENDSHIP  AND 

ALLIANCE  BETWEEN  THE  KINGDOM  OF  BULGARIA 

AND  THE  KINGDOM  OF  SERVIA  2 

Signed  at  Sofia,  February  29,  1912 

Article  I.  In  case  internal  disorders  arise  in  Turkey,  of  such  a  char- 
acter as  to  endanger  the  national  or  state  interests  of  the  contracting  par- 
ties, or  of  one  of  them,  as  for  instance  in  case  Turkey  should  find  itself 
beset  by  internal  or  external  difficulties  which  might  involve  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  first  of  the  contracting 
parties  to  arrive  at  the  conviction  that  military  action  should  be  taken  on 
this  account,  shall  make  a  statement,  giving  the  reasons  therefor,  to  the 
other  party  which  shall  be  bound  to  enter  immediately  upon  an  exchange 
of  views,  and  if  the  latter  party  does  not  agree  with  its  ally,  shall  give  to 
the  ally  an  answer  stating  the  reasons. 

If  an  agreement  is  arrived  at,  this  agreement  shall  be  communicated  to 
Russia,  and  in  case  that  Power  does  not  oppose  it,  the  action  shall  be  under- 
taken in  accordance  with  the  agreement  which  has  been  reached,  and  in 
accordance  with  the  sentiments  of  unity  and  community  of  interests.  In 
the  contrary  case,  —  if  an  agreement  is  not  reached,  —  the  two  states  shall 
appeal  to  the  opinion  of  Russia,  which  opinion  shall,  so  far  as  Russia  shall 
pronounce  the  same,  be  binding  upon  the  two  parties. 

In  case  Russia  does  not  give  its  opinion  and  an  agreement  between  the 
two  contracting  parties  cannot,  even  after  that,  be  reached,  and  in  case  the 
party  which  is  in  favor  of  action  decides  to  pursue  such  action  alone  and 
at  its  own  risk,  the  other  party  shall  be  obliged  to  observe  a  friendly  neu- 
trality towards  its  ally,  to  proceed  at  once  to  mobilize  its  troops  within  the 

1  Foreign  Relations  of  United  Slates,  1878,  p.  901. 

'  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  Supplement,  vol.  8  (1914),  pp.  3-5. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  573 

limits  provided  by  the  military  convention,  and  to  go  to  the  assistance  of 
its  ally  with  all  its  power,  if  a  third  state  takes  the  part  of  Turkey. 

Article  II.  All  territorial  additions  which  may  be  secured  by  common 
action  as  provided  in  articles  one  and  two  of  the  treaty  and  article  one 
of  this  secret  appendix  thereto,  shall  be  under  the  common  dominion 
(condominium)  of  the  allied  states.  The  division  thereof  shall  be  made 
without  delay  within  the  maximum  period  of  three  months  after  the  re- 
establishment  of  peace  and  upon  the  following  bases:  — 

Servia  recognizes  the  right  of  Bulgaria  to  territories  to  the  east  of  the 
Rhodopes  and  the  Struma  River;  Bulgaria  recognizes  the  rights  of  Servia 
to  those  situated  to  the  north  and  west  of  Char-Planina. 

As  regards  territories  situated  between  the  Char,  Rhodopes,  the  Mgian 
Sea,  and  Ochrida  Lake,  if  the  two  parties  reach  the  conclusion  that  it  is 
impossible  because  of  the  common  interests  of  the  Bulgarian  and  Servian 
nations,  or  for  other  reasons  of  domestic  or  foreign  affairs,  to  organize  these 
territories  as  a  separate  autonomous  province,  they  shall  be  disposed  of  ac- 
cording to  the  following  provisions :  — 

Servia  agrees  not  to  lay  any  claim  to  the  territory  situated  beyond  the 
line  traced  upon  the  annexed  map,  starting  from  the  Turkish-Bulgarian 
frontier  at  Mt.  Golem  (to  the  north  of  Kr.  Palanka)  and  following  a  gen- 
erally southwesterly  direction  to  Ochrida  Lake,  passing  Mt.  Kitka,  between 
the  villages  of  Metejeve  and  Podarji-kon,  by  the  summit  to  the  east  of  the 
village  of  Nerav,  and  following  the  watershed  to  the  peak  of  1,000,  north  of 
the  village  of  Baschtevo,  between  the  villages  of  Liubentzi  and  Petarlitza, 
by  the  peak  Ostrich  1,000  (Lissetz-Planina),  the  peak  1,050  between  the 
villages  of  Dratch  and  Opila,  by  the  villages  of  Talichmantzi  and  Jivalevo, 
the  peak  1,050,  the  peak  1,000,  the  village  Kichali,  the  principal  line  of  the 
Gradient 6-Planina  watershed  to  the  peak  Goritchte,  to  the  peak  1,023,  fol- 
lowing then  the  watershed  between  the  villages  of  Ivankovtzi  and  Lo- 
ghintzi,  through  Vetersko  and  Sopot  on  the  Vardar.  Crossing  the  Vardar, 
it  follows  the  ridges  toward  the  peak  2,550  and  as  far  as  Mt.  Petropole, 
along  the  watershed  of  this  mountain  between  the  villages  of  Krapa  and 
Barbaras  to  the  peak  1,200,  between  the  villages  of  Yakryenovo  and  Dre- 
novo,  to  Mt.  Tchesma  (1,254),  along  the  watershed  of  the  mountains  Baba- 
Planina  and  Krouchka-Tepessi,  between  the  villages  of  Salp  and  Tzerske, 
to  the  summit  of  Protoyska-Planina,  to  the  east  of  the  village  of  Belitza, 
through  Brejani  to  the  peak  1,200  (Ilinska-Planina),  along  the  line  of  the 
watershed  passing  the  peak  1,330  to  the  peak  1,217  and  between  the  vil- 
lages of  Livoichta  and  Gorentzi  to  Lake  Ochrida  near  the  monastery  of 
Gabovtzi. 

Bulgaria  agrees  to  accept  this  frontier  if  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  who  shall  be  asked  to  be  the  final  arbitrator  of  this  question,  decides 
in  favor  of  this  line. 

It  is  understood  that  the  two  contracting  parties  agree  to  accept  as  the 
final  frontier  the  line  which  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  within  the 
above  indicated  limits,  may  find  to  correspond  the  closest  to  the  rights  and 
interests  of  the  two  parties. 

Article  III.  A  copy  of  the  treaty  and  of  this  secret  appendix  thereto 
6hall  be  communicated  together  to  the  Imperial  Government  of  Russia, 
which  shall  be  asked  at  the  same  time  to  take  note  thereof,  as  a  proof  of 


574     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

the  good  intentions  of  the  parties  thereto  in  connection  with  the  purposes 
sought  by  them,  and  with  the  request  that  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  deign  to  accept  and  approve  the  powers  attributed  to  himself  and 
his  government  in  the  provisions  of  these  two  documents. 

Article  IV.  Every  difference  which  shall  arise  concerning  the  inter- 
pretation and  execution  of  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty,  of  this  secret 
appendix,  and  of  the  military  convention,  shall  be  submitted  to  Russia  for 
final  decision,  as  soon  as  one  of  the  two  parties  shall  have  declared  that  it 
believes  it  impossible  to  reach  an  agreement  by  direct  negotiations. 

Article  V.  None  of  the  provisions  of  this  secret  appendix  shall  be  pub- 
lished or  communicated  to  another  Power  without  a  prior  agreement 
thereon  by  the  two  parties  hereto  and  the  consent  of  Russia. 

Done  at  Sofia,  February  29,  1912. 

NOTE  ADDRESSED  TO  THE  SERVIAN  GOVERNMENT 

BY  THE  AUSTRO -HUNGARIAN   GOVERNMENT 

ON  JULY  23,   1914 x 

{Translation) 

On  the  31st  March,  1909,  the  Servian  Minister  in  Vienna,  on  the  in- 
structions of  the  Servian  Government,  made  the  following  declaration  to 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government :  — 

"  Servia  recognizes  that  the  fait  accompli  regarding  Bosnia  has  not  affected 
her  rights,  and  consequently  she  will  conform  to  the  decisions  that  the  Pow- 
ers may  take  in  conformity  with  Article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  In 
deference  to  the  advice  of  the  Great  Powers,  Servia  undertakes  to  renounce 
from  now  onwards  the  attitude  of  protest  and  opposition  which  she  has 
adopted  with  regard  to  the  annexation  since  last  autumn.  She  undertakes, 
moreover,  to  modify  the  direction  of  her  policy  with  regard  to  Austria- 
Hungary  and  to  live  in  future  on  good  neighborly  terms  with  the  latter." 

The  history  of  recent  years,  and  in  particular  the  painful  events  of  the 
28th  June  last,  have  shown  the  existence  of  a  subversive  movement  with 
the  object  of  detaching  a  part  of  the  territories  of  Austria-Hungary  from 
the  Monarchy.  The  movement  which  had  its  birth  under  the  eye  of  the 
Servian  Government,  has  gone  so  far  as  to  make  itself  manifest  on  both 
sides  of  the  Servian  frontier  in  the  shape  of  acts  of  terrorism  and  a  series 
of  outrages  and  murders. 

Far  from  carrying  out  the  formal  undertakings  contained  in  the  declara- 
tion of  the  31st  March,  1909,  the  Royal  Servian  Government  has  done 
nothing  to  repress  these  movements.  It  has  permitted  the  criminal  machina- 
tions of  various  societies  and  associations  directed  against  the  Monarchy, 
and  has  tolerated  unrestrained  language  on  the  part  of  the  press,  the  glori- 
fication of  the  perpetrators  of  outrages,  and  the  participation  of  officers  and 
functionaries  in  subversive  agitation.  It  has  permitted  an  unwholesome 
propaganda  in  public  instruction,  in  short,  it  has  permitted  all  manifesta- 
tions of  a  nature  to  incite  the  Servian  population  to  hatred  of  the  Monarchy 
and  contempt  of  its  institutions. 

1  B.  W.  P.  no.  4.  In  the  French  Yellow  Book,  no.  75,  will  be  found  the  memorandum  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  giving  the  reason  for  its  action.  See  also  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Red  Book,  no.  19. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  575 

This  culpable  tolerance  of  the  Royal  Servian  Government  had  not  ceased 
at  the  moment  when  the  events  of  the  28th  June  last  proved  its  fatal  conse- 
quences to  the  whole  world. 

It  results  from  the  depositions  and  confessions  of  the  criminal  perpetra- 
tors of  the  outrage  of  the  28th  June  that  the  Serajevo  assassinations  were 
planned  in  Belgrade;  that  the  arms  and  explosives  with  which  the  murderers 
were  provided  had  been  given  to  them  by  Servian  officers  and  functionaries 
belonging  to  the  Narodna  Odbrana;  and  finally,  that  the  passage  into 
Bosnia  of  the  criminals  and  their  arms  was  organized  and  effected  by  the 
chiefs  of  the  Servian  frontier  service. 

The  above-mentioned  results  of  the  magisterial  investigation  do  not  per- 
mit the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  pursue  any  longer  the  attitude  of 
expectant  forbearance  which  they  have  maintained  for  years  in  face  of  the 
machinations  hatched  in  Belgrade,  and  thence  propagated  in  the  territories 
of  the  Monarchy.  The  results,  on  the  contrary,  impose  on  them  the  duty  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  intrigues  which  form  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  Monarchy. 

i  To  achieve  this  end  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  see  themselves 
compelled  to  demand  from  the  Royal  Servian  Government  a  formal  assur- 
ance that  they  condemn  this  dangerous  propaganda  against  the  Monarchy; 
in  other  words,  the  whole  series  of  tendencies,  the  ultimate  aim  of  which  is 
to  detach  from  the  Monarchy  territories  belonging  to  it,  and  that  they 
undertake  to  suppress  by  every  means  this  criminal  and  terrorist  propa- 
ganda. 

In  order  to  give  a  formal  character  to  this  undertaking  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  shall  publish  on  the  front  page  of  their  Official  Journal  of  the 
13/26  July  the  following  declaration:  — 

"  The  Royal  Government  of  Servia  condemn  the  propaganda  directed 
against  Austria- Hungary  —  i.e.,  the  general  tendency  of  which  the  final  aim 
is  to  detach  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  territories  belonging  to 
it,  and  they  sincerely  deplore  the  fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal 
proceedings. 

"The  Royal  Government  regret  that  Servian  officers  and  functionaries 
participated  in  the  above-mentioned  propaganda  and  thus  compromised 
the  good  neighborly  relations  to  which  the  Royal  Government  were  sol- 
emnly pledged  by  their  declaration  of  the  31st  March,  1909. 

"The  Royal  Government,  who  disapprove  and  repudiate  all  idea  of  inter- 
fering or  attempting  to  interfere  with  the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any 
part  whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary,  consider  it  their  duty  formally  to 
warn  officers  and  functionaries,  and  the  whole  population  of  the  kingdom, 
that  henceforward  they  will  proceed  with  the  utmost  rigor  against  persons 
who  may  be  guilty  of  such  machinations,  which  they  will  use  all  their  efforts 
to  anticipate  and  suppress." 

This  declaration  shall  simultaneously  be  communicated  to  the  Royal 
Army  as  an  order  of  the  day  by  His  Majesty  the  King  and  shall  be  published 
in  the  Official  Bulletin  of  the  Army. 

The  Royal  Servian  Government  further  undertake :  — 

1 .  To  suppress  any  publication  which  incites  to  hatred  and  contempt  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  general  tendency  of  which  is 
directed  against  its  territorial  integrity; 


576     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

2.  To  dissolve  immediately  the  society  styled  "Narodna  Odbrana,"  to 
confiscate  all  its  means  of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed  in  the  same  manner 
against  other  societies  and  their  branches  in  Servia  which  engage  in  propa- 
ganda against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  The  Royal  Government 
shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  societies  dissolved  from 
continuing  their  activity  under  another  name  and  form; 

3.  To  eliminate  without  delay  from  public  instruction  in  Servia,  both  as 
regards  the  teaching  body  and  also  as  regards  the  methods  of  instruction, 
everything  that  serves,  or  might  serve,  to  foment  the  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary ; 

4.  To  remove  from  the  military  service,  and  from  the  administration  in 
general,  all  officers  and  functionaries  guilty  of  propaganda  against  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  whose  names  and  deeds  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  of  communicating  to  the  Royal 
Government; 

5.  To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Servia  of  representatives  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  for  the  suppression  of  the  subversive  movement 
directed  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Monarchy; 

6.  To  take  judicial  proceedings  against  accessories  to  the  plot  of  the  28th 
June  who  are  on  Servian  territory;  delegates  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  will  take  part  in  the  investigation  relating  thereto; 

7.  To  proceed  without  delay  to  the  arrest  of  Major  Voija  Tankositch  and 
of  the  individual  named  Milan  Ciganovitch,  a  Servian  State  employee,  who 
have  been  compromised  by  the  results  of  the  magisterial  inquiry  at  Sera- 
jevo; 

8.  To  prevent  by  effective  measures  the  cooperation  of  the  Servian  author- 
ities in  the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and  explosives  across  the  frontier,  to  dismiss 
and  punish  severely  the  officials  of  the  frontier  service  at  Schabatz  and 
Loznica  guilty  of  having  assisted  the  perpetrators  of  the  Serajevo  crime  by 
facilitating  their  passage  across  the  frontier; 

9.  To  furnish  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  with  explanations 
regarding  the  unjustifiable  utterances  of  high  Servian  officials,  both  in  Servia 
and  abroad,  who,  notwithstanding  their  official  position,  have  not  hesitated 
since  the  crime  of  the  28th  June  to  express  themselves  in  interviews  in  terms 
of  hostility  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government;  and,  finally, 

10.  To  notify  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  without  delay  of  the 
execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the  preceding  heads. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  expect  the  reply  of  the  Royal 
Government  at  the  latest  by  6  o'clock  on  Saturday  evening,  the  25th  July. 

SERVIA'S  REPLY  TO  THE  AUSTRIAN  NOTE,  JULY  25,   1914 « 

(Translation) 
The  Royal  Servian  Government  have  received  the  communication  of  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  of  the  10th  instant,  and  are  convinced  that 
their  reply  will  remove  any  misunderstanding  which  may  threaten  to  im- 
pair the  good  neighborly  relations  between  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  the  Kingdom  of  Servia. 
Conscious  of  the  fact  that  the  protests,  which  were  made  both  from  the 
»  B.  W.  P.  no.  39. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  577 

tribune  of  the  National  Skuptchina  and  in  the  declarations  and  actions  of 
the  responsible  representatives  of  the  State,  —  protests  which  were  cut 
short  by  the  declarations  made  by  the  Servian  Government  on  the  18th 
[31st]  March,  1909,  —  have  not  been  renewed  on  any  occasion  as  regards 
the  great  neighboring  Monarchy,  and  that  no  attempt  has  been  made  since 
that  time,  either  by  the  successive  Royal  Governments  or  by  their  organs, 
to  change  the  political  and  legal  state  of  affairs  created  in  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, the  Royal  Government  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  this  con- 
nection the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  have  made  no  representation 
except  one  concerning  a  school-book,  and  that  on  that  occasion  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  received  an  entirely  satisfactory  explanation.  Ser- 
via  has  several  times  given  proofs  of  her  pacific  and  moderate  policy  during 
the  Balkan  crisis,  and  it  is  thanks  to  Servia  and  to  the  sacrifice  that  she  has 
made  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  European  peace  that  that  peace  has  been 
preserved.  The  Royal  Government  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  mani- 
festations of  a  private  character,  such  as  articles  in  the  press  and  the  peace- 
able work  of  societies  —  manifestations  which  take  place  in  nearly  all  coun- 
tries in  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  and  which,  as  a  general  rule,  escape 
official  control.  The  Royal  Government  are  all  the  less  responsible,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  the  solution  of  a  series  of  questions  which  arose 
between  Servia  and  Austria- Hungary  they  gave  proof  of  a  great  readiness  to 
oblige,  and  thus  succeeded  in  settling  the  majority  of  these  questions  to  the 
advantage  of  the  two  neighboring  countries. 

For  these  reasons  the  Royal  Government  have  been  pained  and  surprised 
at  the  statements,  according  to  which  members  of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia 
are  supposed  to  have  participated  in  the  preparations  for  the  crime  com- 
mitted at  Serajevo;  the  Royal  Government  expected  to  be  invited  to  collab- 
orate in  an  investigation  of  all  that  concerns  this  crime,  and  they  were  ready, 
in  order  to  prove  the  entire  correctness  of  their  attitude,  to  take  measures 
against  any  persons  concerning  whom  representations  were  made  to  them. 
Falling  in,  therefore,  with  the  desire  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government, 
they  are  prepared  to  hand  over  for  trial  any  Servian  subject,  without  regard 
to  his  situation  or  rank,  of  whose  complicity  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo  proofs 
are  forthcoming,  and  more  especially  they  undertake  to  cause  to  be  pub- 
lished on  the  first  page  of  the  Journal  officiel,  on  the  date  of  the  13th  [26th] 
July,  the  following  declaration :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Servia  condemn  all  propaganda  which  may 
be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  that  is  to  say,  all  such  tendencies  as 
aim  at  ultimately  detaching  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  terri- 
tories which  form  part  thereof,  and  they  sincerely  deplore  the  baneful  conse- 
quences of  these  criminal  movements.  The  Royal  Government  regret  that, 
according  to  the  communication  from  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government, 
certain  Servian  officers  and  officials  should  have  taken  part  in  the  above- 
mentioned  propaganda,  and  thus  compromised  the  good  neighborly  rela- 
tions to  which  the  Royal  Servian  Government  was  solemnly  engaged  by  the 
declaration  of  the  31st  March,  1909,  which  declaration  disapproves  and 
repudiates  all  idea  or  attempt  at  interference  with  the  destiny  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  any  part  whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  they  consider  it  their 
duty  formally  to  warn  the  officers,  officials,  and  entire  population  of  the 
kingdom  that  henceforth  they  will  take  the  most  rigorous  steps  against  all 


578     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

such  persons  as  are  guilty  of  such  acts,  to  prevent  and  to  repress  which  they 
will  use  their  utmost  endeavor." 

This  declaration  will  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Royal  Army  in 
an  order  of  the  day,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty  the  King,  by  His  Royal 
Highness  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  and  will  be  published  in  the  next 
official  army  bulletin. 

The  Royal  Government  further  undertake:  — 

1.  To  introduce  at  the  first  regular  convocation  of  the  Skuptchina  a 
provision  into  the  press  law  providing  for  the  most  severe  punishment  of 
incitement  to  hatred  or  contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and 
for  taking  action  against  any  publication  the  general  tendency  of  which  is 
directed  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  Govern- 
ment engage  at' the  approaching  revision  of  the  Constitution  to  cause  an 
amendment  to  be  introduced  into  article  22  of  the  Constitution  of  such  a 
nature  that  such  publication  may  be  confiscated,  a  proceeding  at  present 
impossible  under  the  categorical  terms  of  article  22  of  the  Constitution. 

2.  The  Government  possess  no  proof,  nor  does  the  note  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  with  any,  that  the  "Narodna  Od- 
brana"  and  other  similar  societies  have  committed  up  to  the  present  any 
criminal  act  of  this  nature  through  the  proceedings  of  any  of  their  members. 
Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Government  will  accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  and  will  dissolve  the  "Narodna  Odbrana"  Society 
and  every  other  society  which  may  be  directing  its  efforts  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

3.  The  Royal  Servian  Government  undertake  to  remove  without  delay 
from  their  public  educational  establishments  in  Servia  all  that  serves  or 
could  serve  to  foment  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary,  whenever  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  with  facts  and  proofs  of  this 
propaganda. 

4.  The  Royal  Government  also  agree  to  remove  from  military  service  all 
such  persons  as  the  judicial  inquiry  may  have  proved  to  be  guilty  of  acts 
directed  against  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  they  expect  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  to  com- 
municate to  them  at  a  later  date  the  names  and  the  acts  of  these  officers 
and  officials  for  the  purposes  of  the  proceedings  which  are  to  be  taken 
against  them. 

5.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they  do  not  clearly  grasp 
the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the  demand  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  that  Servia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the  collaboration  of  the 
organs  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  upon  their  territory,  but  they 
declare  that  they  will  admit  such  collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  principle 
of  international  law,  with  criminal  procedure,  and  with  good  neighborly 
relations. 

6.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Royal  Government  consider  it  their 
duty  to  open  an  inquiry  against  all  such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may 
be,  implicated  in  the  plot  of  the  15th  [28th]  June,  and  who  happen  to  be 
within  the  territory  of  the  kingdom.  As  regards  the  participation  in  this 
inquiry  of  Austro-Hungarian  agents  or  authorities  appointed  for  this  pur- 
pose by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  the  Royal  Government  can- 
not accept  such  an  arrangement,  as  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Consti- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  579 

tution  and  of  the  law  of  criminal  procedure ;  nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases 
communications  as  to  the  results  of  the  investigation  in  question  might  be 
given  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  agents. 

7.  The  Royal  Government  proceeded,  on  the  very  evening  of  the  delivery 
of  the  note,  to  arrest  Commandant  Voija  Tankositch.  As  regards  Milan 
Ciganovitch,  who  is  a  subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  who 
up  to  the  15th  [28th]  June  was  employed  (on  probation)  by  the  directorate 
of  railways,  it  has  not  yet  been  possible  to  arrest  him. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  requested  to  be  so  good  as  to 
supply  as  soon  as  possible,  in  the  customary  form,  the  presumptive  evidence 
of  guilt,  as  well  as  the  eventual  proofs  of  guilt  which  have  been  collected  up 
to  the  present,  at  the  inquiry  at  Serajevo  for  the  purposes  of  the  later 
inquiry. 

8.  The  Servian  Government  will  reinforce  and  extend  the  measures 
which  have  been  taken  for  preventing  the  illicit  traffic  of  arms  and  explo- 
sives across  the  frontier.  It  goes  without  saying  that  they  will  immediately 
order  an  inquiry  and  will  severely  punish  the  frontier  officials  on  the  Scha- 
batz-Loznitza  line  who  have  failed  in  their  duty  and  allowed  the  authors  of 
the  crime  of  Serajevo  to  pass. 

9.  The  Royal  Government  will  gladly  give  explanations  of  the  remarks 
made  by  their  officials,  whether  in  Servia  or  abroad,  in  interviews  after  the 
crime,  which,  according  to  the  statement  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment, were  hostile  toward  the  Monarchy,  as  soon  as  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  communicated  to  them  the  passages  in  question  in  these 
remarks,  and  as  soon  as  they  have  shown  that  the  remarks  were  actually 
made  by  the  said  officials,  although  the  Royal  Government  will  itself  take 
steps  to  collect  evidence  and  proofs. 

10.  The  Royal  Government  will  inform  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment of  the  execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the  above  heads,  in 
so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been  done  by  the  present  note,  as  soon  as  each 
measure  has  been  ordered  and  carried  out. 

h  If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not  satisfied  with  this  reply, 
the  Servian  Government,  considering  that  it  is  not  to  the  common  interest 
to  precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question,  are  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a 
pacific  understanding,  either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision  of  the 
International  Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to  the  great  powers  which  took 
part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Servian  Government 
on  the  18th  [31st]  March,  1909. 
Belgrade,  July  12  [25],  1914. 

NEGOTIATIONS    OF    THE    SPANISH    AND    AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENTS  FOLLOWING  THE  DESTRUCTION 
OF  THE  MAINE1 

On  February  15,  1898,  the  United  States  battleship  Maine  was  blown  up 
in  Havana  Harbor. 

February  19,  the  United  States  undertook  an  independent  investigation 

1  This  comparison  between  the  recent  action  of  the  Austrian  Government  and  our  own  in 
1S9S  was  suggested  to  me  last  September  by  Professor  Munroe  Smith,  of  Columbia  Uni- 
versity, who  was  in  Italy  at  the  time  of  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  and 


580     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914' 

conducted  by  American  naval  officers,  and  on  the  same  date  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  informed  Mr.  Lee,  Consul-General  of  the  United  States  at 
Havana,  that  "This  Government  will  afford  every  facility  it  can  to  the 
Spanish  authorities  in  whatever  investigation  they  may  see  fit  to  make  upon 
their  part."  (Senate  Doc.  no.  230,  p.  89,  55th  Congress,  2d  Session,  1897-98, 
vol.  21.) 

February  21,  without  consulting  the  wishes  of  the  Spanish  Government, 
our  Government  instituted  an  independent  court  of  inquiry  on  board  the 
Mangrove  in  Havana  Harbor.  (Senate  Doc.  no.  207,  p.  9,  55th  Congress, 
2d  Session,  1897-98,  vol.  21.) 

February  25,  General  Blanco,  Governor-General  of  Cuba,  suggested  that 
American  divers,  in  making  the  investigation  under  the  authority  of  the 
Spanish  Government,  should  accompany  the  Spanish  divers  in  making  their 
investigation  of  the  cause  of  the  disaster  to  the  Maine.  To  this  Consul- 
General  Lee  replied  to  the  effect  that  the  American  examination  ought  to  be 
made  independently,  but  in  harmony  with  that  conducted  by  the  Spanish 
authorities.  (Senate  Doc.  no.  230,  pp.  90-91,  55th  Congress,  2d  Session, 
1897-98,  vol.  21.) 

February  28,  three  days  later,  Consul-General  Lee  cabled  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  at  Washington:  "Arrangements  made  both  Governments 
conduct  independently  investigation  Maine  disaster."  (Senate  Doc.  no. 
230,  p.  90,  55th  Congress,  2d  Session,  1897-98,  vol.  21.) 

March  19,  Mr.  Woodford,  the  American  Minister  at  Madrid,  cabled  to 
the  President : ' '  Unless  report  on  Maine  requires  immediate  action,  I  suggest 
that  nothing  be  decided  or  done  until  after  the  receipt  of  my  personal  letters 
43,  44,  and  46.  I  also  suggest  that  you  authorize  me  to  tell  .  .  .  that  you 
wish  final  agreement  made  before  April  15th.  If  you  will  acquaint  me  fully 
with'  general  settlement  desired,  I  believe  Spanish  Government  will  offer, 
without  compulsion  and  upon  its  own  motion,  such  terms  of  settlement  as 
may  be  satisfactory  to  both  nations.  Large  liberty  as  to  details  should  be 
conceded  to  Spain,  but  ...  I  now  believe  it  will  be  a  pleasure  to  the  Spanish 
Government  to  propose  what  will  probably  be  satisfactory  to  you."  (Foreign 
Relations  of  the  United  States,  1898,  p.  692.) 

March  20,  the  acting  Secretary  of  State  replied:  "The  President  is  at  a 
loss  to  know  just  what  your  telegram  of  the  19th  covers,  whether  loss  of 
Maine  or  whole  situation.  Confidential  report  shows  naval  board  will  make 
unanimous  report  that  Maine  was  blown  up  by  submarine  mine.  This  report 
must  go  to  Congress  soon.  Feeling  in  the  United  States  very  acute.  .  .  . 
President  has  no  doubt  Congress  will  act  wisely  and  an  immediate  crisis 
may  be  avoided,  particularly  if  there  be  certainty  of  prompt  restoration  of 
peace  in  Cuba.   Maine  loss  may  be  peacefully  settled  if  full  reparation  is 

reached  Austria  early  in  July.  He  had  occasion  to  converse  with  several  men  prominent  in 
the  politics  of  the  Dual  Empire;  and  after  the  Serajevo  assassination  he  was  assured  that  a 
war  between  Austria  and  Germany,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Russia  and  France,  on  the  other, 
was  probably  inevitable,  but  that  it  was  not  expected  that  either  England  or  Italy  would 
become  involved. 

The  material  of  the  comparison  was  prepared  by  Mr.  Henry  F.  Munro  from  Foreign 
Relations  of  the  United  States,  1898,  and  Senate  Documents,  nos.  207,  230,  55th  Congress,  2d 
Session,  1897-98,  vol.  21. 

Striking  as  are  the  points  of  similarity  between  the  Austro-Servian  and  Hispano-Amer- 
ican  controversies,  the  differences  are  equally  well  marked  and  too  apparent  to  require 
notice. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  581 

promptly  made,  such  as  the  most  civilized  nation  would  offer."  (Foreign 
Relations,  1898,  p.  692.) 

March  21,  the  American  inquiry  was  finished.  (Foreign  Relations,  1898, 
p.  1036.) 

March  25,  the  American  Minister  at  Madrid  made  to  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment the  following  statement:  "I  ought,  at  the  beginning  of  our  inter- 
view, to  say  to  you  that  the  report  on  the  Maine  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Presi- 
dent. I  am  not  to-day  authorized  to  disclose  its  character  or  conclusions. 
But  I  am  authorized  to  say  to  you  that,  beyond  and  above  the  destruction 
of  the  Maine,  unless  some  satisfactory  agreement  is  reached  within  a  very 
few  days  which  will  assure  immediate  and  honorable  peace  in  Cuba,  the 
President  must  at  once  submit  the  whole  question  of  the  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain,  including  the  matter  of  the  Maine,  to  the  deci- 
sion of  Congress.  I  will  telegraph  immediately  to  the  President  any  sugges- 
tions that  Spainrmay  make,  and  I  hope  to  receive  within  a  very  few  days 
some  definite  proposition  that  shall  mean  immediate  peace  in  Cuba." 
(Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  698.) 

March  25,  the  Spanish  Memorandum  of  the  same  date  stated:  "It  now 
appears  that  the  captain  of  the  United  States  cruiser  Maine  has  asked  leave 
to  destroy  with  dynamite  the  wreck  of  his  ship,  thus  annihilating  the  only 
proofs  which,  in  case  of  doubt  or  disagreement,  could  be  again  examined  in 
order  to  determine,  if  necessary,  the  cause  and  nature  of  a  catastrophe  in 
the  midst  of  which  Spanish  sailors  and  officials  displayed  the  greatest 
abnegation  and  oblivion  of  all  personal  risks  and  a  generous  wish  to  circum- 
scribe or  diminish  the  dreadful  calamity  which  befell  the  crew  of  the  Ameri- 
can vessel."  The  Memorandum  then  goes  on  to  protest  against  the  proce- 
dure of  the  American  Government  in  submitting  its  report  to  Congress 
before  the  receipt  of  the  report  of  the  Spanish  Commission,  and  ends:  "The 
most  elementary  sense  of  justice  makes  it  in  these  cases  a  duty  previously  to 
examine  and  discuss  in  an  atmosphere  of  absolute  calmness  two  different 
inquiries  tending  to  one  common  end.  Only  in  the  supposition  of  an  irrecon- 
cilable discrepancy  or  complete  opposition  between  one  and  the  other  would 
it  be  proper  to  submit  them  as  equity  demands  to  evidence  less  prone  to 
prejudice,  and  if  necessary,  to  fresh  investigations  and  different  judges." 
(Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  711;  see  also  p.  702.) 

March  26,  the  United  States  report  was  published,  and  declared  that  the 
catastrophe  was  due  to  the  explosion  of  a  submarine  mine,  but  did  not  fix 
the  responsibility  on  any  person.  Secretary  of  State  Sherman  telegraphed 
the  American  Minister  at  Madrid:  "Upon  the  facts  as  disclosed,  a  grave  re- 
sponsibility appears  to  rest  upon  the  Spanish  Government,  .  .  .  which,  as 
the  sovereign  of  the  place,  was  bound  to  render  protection  to  persons  and 
property  there,  and  especially  to  the  public  ship  and  the  sailors  of  a  friendly 
power."  Regret  was  expressed  that  "  circumstances  of  the  case  .  .  .  are  such 
as  to  require  of  the  Spanish  Government  such  action  as  is  due  when  the 
sovereign  rights  of  one  friendly  nation  have  been  assailed  within  the  juris- 
diction of  another.  The  President  does  not  permit  himself  to  doubt  that  the 
sense  of  justice  of  the  Spanish  nation  will  dictate  a  course  of  action  sug- 
gested by  the  friendly  relations  of  the  Governments."  (Foreign  Relations, 
1898,  pp.  1036-37.) 

That  same  day  the  Department  of  State  cabled  the  American  Minister  at 


582     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

Madrid:  "For  your  own  guidance  the  President  suggests  that  if  Spain  will 
revoke  concentration  orders  and  maintain  the  people  until  they  can  support 
themselves  and  offer  to  the  Cubans  full  self-government,  with  reasonable 
indemnity,  the  President  will  gladly  assist  in  its  consummation.  If  Spain 
should  invite  the  United  States  to  mediate  for  peace,  and  the  insurgents 
would  make  like  request,  the  President  might  undertake  such  office  of 
friendship."    (Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  704.) 

March  27,  it  was  explained  to  the  Spanish  Government  that  Captain 
Sigsbee's  request  to  blow  up  the  Maine,  to  which  Spain  took  such  exception, 
was  intended  for  the  purpose  of  getting  "at  the  bodies  and  guns.  But  find- 
ing his  request  misunderstood  and  opposed,  he  withdrew  it  under  instruc- 
tions from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy."   {Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  1040.) 

March  28,  President  McKinley's  message,  transmitting  the  report  on  the 
Maine,  was  read  in  both  houses  of  Congress. 

The  Spanish  "report  states  that  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  procedure  fol- 
lowed and  the  thorough  observance  of  the  principle  of  the  extraterritoriality 
of  the  Maine  have  prevented  the  making  such  investigations  in  the  interior 
of  the  vessel  as  would  furnish  the  means  of  deciding,  at  least  hypothetically, 
the  internal  cause  of  the  disaster;  and  this  inability  was  increased  by  the 
unfortunate  refusal  which  prevented  the  establishment  of  the  necessary  and 
appropriate  cooperation  between  the  Spanish  Commission  on  the  one  side, 
and  the  commander  and  crew  of  the  Maine,  the  American  officials  com- 
missioned to  investigate  the  causes  of  the  event,  and  those  subsequently 
charged  with  the  recovery  (salvamento)  on  the  other  side."  The  report  con- 
cluded that  a  further  examination  would  show  the  explosion  to  have  been 
produced  by  an  internal  cause.  (Foreign  Relations,  1898,  pp.  1040  and 
1044-45.) 

March  31,  Spain  offered  to  submit  the  dispute  regarding  the  Maine  to 
arbitration.    (Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  758.) 

April  10,  the  Spanish  Minister  communicated  to  the  Government  at 
Washington  that  his  Government  had  decreed  an  armistice  in  Cuba, 
though  he  took  care  to  avoid  any  acknowledgment  that  this  was  done  in 
response  to  American  representations.  He  complained  of  the  "manifest 
injustice  with  which  a  portion  of  the  public  opinion  of  this  country  claims 
to  discover  responsibilities  on  the  part  of  Spain  for  the  horrible  catastrophe 
which  took  place  on  the  calamitous  night  of  the  15th  of  February  last." 
And  further  stating  the  attitude  of  his  Government,  declared:  "As  for  the 
question  of  fact  which  springs  from  the  diversity  of  views  between  the 
reports  of  the  Spanish  and  American  boards,  the  Government  of  Her  Maj- 
esty, although  not  yet  possessed  of  the  official  text  of  the  two  reports,  has 
hastened  to  declare  itself  ready  to  submit  to  the  judgment  of  impartial  and 
disinterested  experts,  accepting  in  advance  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
named  by  the  two  parties,  which  is  obvious  proof  of  the  frankness  and  good 
faith  which  marks  the  course  of  Spain  on  this  as  on  all  occasions."  The 
American  Government  did  not  reply  to  this  offer.  (Foreign  Relations,  1898, 
pp.  747-49.) 

April  19,  Congress  passed  a  joint  resolution:  — 

"Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for  more  than 
three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own  borders,  have  shocked  the 
moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace  to  civil- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  583 

ization,  culminating  as  they  have  in  the  destruction  of  a  United  States 
battleship,  with  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on 
a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  cannot  longer  be  endured,  as 
has  been  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to 
Congress  of  April  11th,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  upon  which  the 
action  of  Congress  was  invited :  Therefore, 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

"First,  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to 
be,  free  and  independent. 

"Second,  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand,  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the 
island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and 
Cuban  waters. 

"Third,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  hereby  is, 
directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the 
militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
these  resolutions  into  effect. 

"  Fourth,  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  island, 
except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that 
is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its 
people."  *   (Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  763.) 

April  20,  the  Secretary  of  State  instructed  the  American  Minister  at 
Madrid  to  deliver  an  ultimatum  to  Spain  to  "  at  once  relinquish  its  authority 
and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuban  waters.  ...  If  by  the  hour  of  noon  on  Saturday  next,  the 
23d  day  of  April,  instant,  there  be  not  communicated  to  this  Government 
by  that  of  Spain  a  full  and  satisfactory  response  to  this  demand  and  resolu- 
tion, whereby  the  ends  of  peace  in  Cuba  shall  be  assured,  the  President  will 
proceed  without  further  notice  to  use  the  power  and  authority  enjoined  and 
conferred  upon  him  by  the  said  joint  resolution  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
necessary  to  carry  the  same  into  effect."  (Foreign  Relations,  1898,  pp.  762- 
63.)  But  before  this  ultimatum  could  be  presented,  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment notified  our  Minister  of  the  rupture  of  friendly  relations.  (Foreign 
Relations,  1898,  p.  766.) 

COMPARISON   BETWEEN  THE  ACTION  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  IN   1898  AND  AUSTRIA  IN   1914 

Although  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  bears  little  resemblance  to  our  own 
difference  with  Spain  occasioned  by  the  situation  in  Cuba  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Maine,  the  incidents  of  the  negotiations  present  many  striking 
points  of  similarity.  To  facilitate  the  comparison  an  arrangement  in  parallel 
columns  has  been  employed.2 

»  Approved  April  20,  1898. 

8  There  are  an  equal  number  of  points  of  difference  between  Austro-Servian  and  Spanish- 
American  cases,  so  evident  as  to  need  no  explanation.  For  instance,  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States  was  really  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  weak,  and  in  favor  of  self-govern- 
ment.   _—--- 


584     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 


The  Spanish- Amebic  an 
Disagreement  (1898) 


The  Austro-Servian 
Dispute  (1914) 


Responsibility  for  the  occurrence 


Public  opinion  was  inflamed  as  a 
consequence  of  the  catastrophe  of 
the  Maine,  and  although  the  Spanish 
Government  was  not  held  to  be  di- 
rectly responsible,  it  was  neverthe- 
less considered  criminally  negligent 
in  not  having  taken  adequate  meas- 
ures for  the  protection  of  the  Maine, 
moored  in  her  harbor. 


In  July  preceding  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
public  opinion  was  much  inflamed 
against  Servia,  and  there  was  much 
enthusiasm  for  war.  The  terms  of 
the  Austrian  and  German  corre- 
spondence make  clear  that  the  Ser- 
vian Government  was  held  respon- 
sible on  the  ground  that  it  made  no 
effort  to  prevent  the  assassination, 
but  allowed  the  conspirators  to 
perfect  their  plans  within  the  Ser- 
vian frontiers. 


Disregard  of  territorial  jurisdiction 


The  American  Government  after 
the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  dis- 
regarding the  wishes  of  Spain,  arro- 
gated to  itself  the  right  to  hold,  on 
board  the  U.S.S.  Mangrove  in  Ha- 
vana Harbor,  and  therefore  within 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  Spain, 
an  independent  official  investigation 
of  the  causes  of  the  catastrophe.  Nor 
were  the  Spanish  authorities  in  their 
own  port  allowed  to  examine  the  in- 
terior of  the  wreck,  but  were  com- 
pelled to  base  their  findings  on  a 
superficial  inspection  of  the  exterior 
of  the  hull. 

Offers  to 
The  Spanish  Government,  on 
March  31,  suggested  referring  the 
questions  in  dispute  to  arbitration. 
April  10,  a  further  offer  was  made 
to  submit  the  whole  question  to  an 
impartial  tribunal  of  experts,  the 
Spanish  Government  agreeing  in 
advance  to  accept  its  conclusions. 
To  this  offer  the  United  States  gave 
no  reply. 


Austria's  demand  on  Servia  was 
that  she  should  permit  Austrian 
officials  to  collaborate  on  Servian 
territory  in  the  proceedings  under- 
taken to  suppress  the  subversive 
propaganda  directed  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Austria,  and 
that  Servia  should  likewise  take  ju- 
dicial proceedings  against  the  acces- 
sories to  the  crime  of  June  28,  and 
permit  delegates  of  the  Austrian 
Government  to  participate.  (See  De- 
mands 5  and  6  of  the  Austrian  Note.) 


arbitrate 

At  the  end  of  Servia's  reply  to  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  she  offered, 
should  Austria  not  find  her  accept- 
ance of  the  terms  of  her  note  en- 
tirely satisfactory,  to  submit  to  ar- 
bitration, or  to  the  mediation  of  the 
European  powers,  any  of  the  remain- 
ing questions  in  dispute.  But  Austria 
took  no  official  notice  of  this  offer, 
and  let  it  be  known  to  the  represen- 
tatives of  other  states  that  she  con- 
sidered the  reply  but  a  play  for  time, 
and  that  Servian  promises  could  not 
be  relied  upon. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR 


585 


Presentation  of 
April  20,  the  American  Govern- 
ment instructed  its  Minister  by  tele- 
graph to  present  to  the  Spanish 
Government  an  ultimatum  requiring 
Spain  to  withdraw  from  Cuba  by 
noon  of  April  23.  The  Spanish 
Government,  however,  frustrated 
this  intention  by  breaking  off  friendly 
relations  with  the  United  States. 


an  ultimatum 

The  ultimatum  presented  to  the 
Servian  Government  was,  like  that 
intended  to  be  presented  by  the 
American  Government,  humiliat- 
ing to  the  Government  to  which  it 
was  addressed,  and  obviously  not 
intended  to  be  accepted,  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  admitting  that, 
as  a  diplomatic  document,  it  left 
much  to  be  desired. 


Effect  of  the  explosion  in  Havana  Harbor  and  of  the  assassination  at  Serajevo 
in  hastening  armed  intervention 


The  destruction  of  the  Maine 
exercised  an  important  influence 
upon  our  action  in  Cuba,  and  led  to 
intervention  and  war  with  Spain.  If 
the  destruction  of  the  Maine  had 
not  occurred,  Cuban  autonomy 
might  perhaps  have  been  accom- 
plished without  bringing  the  two 
countries  to  war. 


The  assassination  of  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand led  the  Austrian  Government 
to  force  the  immediate  settlement 
of  their  long-standing  dispute  with 
Servia.  Without  the  Serajevo  as- 
sassination, Austria  might  have  con- 
tinued to  get  along  with  her  trouble- 
some neighbor  until  Austro-Servian 
difficulties  were  obscured  or  swal- 
lowed up  by  some  larger  issue. 

Assurances  by  the  United  States  and  Austria  that  their  intervention  did  not 

cloak  any  designs  of  territorial  aggression,  and  was  not  intended  to  interfere 
.'  with  the  independence  respectively  of  Cuba  and  Servia 


The  joint  resolution  of  Congress 
of  April  20  declares:  "That  the 
United  States  hereby  disclaims  any 
disposition  or  intention  to  exercise 
sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control 
over  said  island,  except  for  the  pacif- 
ication thereof,  and  asserts  its  deter- 
mination, when  that  is  accomplished, 
to  leave  the  government  and  con- 
trol of  the  island  to  its  people." 


Austria  and  Germany  repeatedly 
assured  the  powers  of  the  Entente 
that  Austria  had  no  intention  of 
interfering  with  Servian  independ- 
ence. 


Effect  on  public  opinion 


There  can  be  no  question  that 
American  public  opinion,  aroused 
by  the  Maine  disaster,  considered 
that  our  intervention  in  Cuba  was 
based  upon  humanitarian  considera- 
tions for  the  purpose  of  putting  a 
stop  to  the  continued  horrors  of 
chronic  revolution  and  Weyler's 
repressive  measures,  such  as  recon- 
centrado  camps.     But  at  the  same 


Public  opinion  in  Germany  and 
Austria  considered  the  action  against 
Servia  as  a  just  punishment  upon  a 
Government  of  regicides,  which  had 
been  protecting  bands  of  conspirators 
against  the  safety  of  a  neighboring 
state.  In  one  point  public  opinion 
in  Austria  differed  from  that  in  the 
United  States  regarding  Cuba.  The 
Austrians  realized  the  full  significance 


586     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

time  there  was  behind  this  movement  of  the  political  motives  of  their 
the  support  of  certain  financial  Government,  and  that  it  was  of  vital 
interests,  for  American  capital  had  importance  for  Austria  to  prevent 
invested  deeply  in  the  Cuban  sugar  Servia  from  continuing  her  propa- 
plantations.  Our  action  was  also  ganda  for  the  dismemberment  of 
influenced  in  some  degree  by  politi-  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  But 
cal  considerations  as  to  the  perma-  just  as  there  was  no  general  apprecia- 
nent  interests  of  the  United  States,  tion  in  the  United  States  of  the 
Admiral  Mahan  has  pointed  out  strategic  and  financial  advantages 
very  clearly  the  tremendous  strate-  to  be  derived  from  our  action  in 
gic  importance  to  the  United  States  Cuba,  so  Austrian  and  German  public 
of  the  control  of  Cuba.  opinion  did  not,  perhaps,  fully  real- 

ize the  use  which  the  Austrian  and 
German  Governments  hoped  to 
make  of  this  incident  to  reestablish 
the  prestige  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

THE  CASE  OF  SERVIA1 

But  Belgium  was  not  the  only  little  nation  that  has  been  attacked  in  this 
war,  and  I  make  no  excuse  for  referring  to  the  case  of  the  other  little  nation 
—  the  case  of  Servia.  The  history  of  Servia  is  not  unblotted.  What  history 
in  the  category  of  nations  is  unblotted?  The  first  nation  that  is  without  sin, 
let  her  cast  a  stone  at  Servia  —  a  nation  trained  in  a  horrible  school.  But 
she  won  her  freedom  with  her  tenacious  valor,  and  she  has  maintained  it  by 
the  same  courage.  If  any  Servians  were  mixed  up  in  the  assassination  of  the 
Grand  Duke,  they  ought  to  be  punished.  Servia  admits  that.  The  Servian 
Government  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  Not  even  Austria  claimed  that. 
The  Servian  Prime  Minister  is  one  of  the  most  capable  and  honored  men  in 
Europe.  Servia  was  willing  to  punish  any  one  of  her  subjects  who  had  been 
proved  to  have  any  complicity  in  that  assassination.  What  more  could  you 
expect? 

What  were  the  Austrian  demands?  She  sympathized  with  her  fellow- 
countrymen  in  Bosnia.  That  was  one  of  her  crimes.  She  must  do  so  no 
more.  Her  newspapers  were  saying  nasty  things  about  Austria.  They  must 
do  so  no  longer.  That  is  the  Austrian  spirit.  You  had  it  in  Zabern.  How 
dare  you  criticize  a  Prussian  official?  And  if  you  laugh,  it  is  a  capital  offense. 
The  colonel  threatened  to  shoot  them  if  they  repeated  it.  Servian  news- 
papers must  not  criticize  Austria.  I  wonder  what  would  have  happened  had 
we  taken  up  the  same  line  about  German  newspapers.  Servia  said  :  "Very 
well,  we  will  give  orders  to  the  newspapers  that  they  must  not  criticize 
Austria  in  future,  neither  Austria,  nor  Hungary,  nor  anything  that  is 
theirs."  (Laughter.)  Who  can  doubt  the  valor  of  Servia,  when  she  under- 
took to  tackle  her  newspaper  editors?  (Laughter.)  She  promised  not  to 
sympathize  with  Bosnia,  promised  to  write  no  critical  articles  about  Aus- 
tria. She  would  have  no  public  meetings  at  which  anything  unkind  was 
said  about  Austria.  That  was  not  enough.  She  must  dismiss  from  her  army 
officers  whom  Austria  should  subsequently  name.  But  these  officers  had  just 
emerged  from  a  war  where  they  were  adding  luster  to  the  Servian  arms  — 
l  Extract  from  speech  of  Lloyd  George,  printed  in  the  London  Times,  September  21,  1914. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  587 

gallant,  brave,  efficient.  (Cheers.)  I  wonder  whether  it  was  their  guilt  or 
their  efficiency  that  prompted  Austria's  action.  Scrvia  was  to  undertake  in 
advance  to  dismiss  them  from  the  army  —  the  names  to  be  sent  in  subse- 
quently. Can  you  name  a  country  in  the  world  that  would  have  stood  that? 
Supposing  Austria  or  Germany  had  issued  an  ultimatum  of  that  kind  to  this 
country.  (Laughter.)  "You  must  dismiss  from  your  army  and  from  your 
navy  all  those  officers  whom  we  6hall  subsequently  name."  Well,  I  think  I 
could  name  thorn  now.  Lord  Kitchener  (cheers)  would  go.  Sir  John  French 
(cheers)  would  be  sent  about  his  business.  General  Smith-Dorrien  (cheers) 
would  be  no  more,  and  I  am  sure  that  Sir  John  Jellicoe  (cheers)  would  go. 
(Laughter.)  And  there  is  another  gallant  old  warrior  who  would  go  —  Lord 
Roberts.   (Cheers.) 

It  was  a  difficult  situation  for  a  small  country.  Here  was  a  demand  made 
upon  her  by  a  great  military  power  who  could  put  five  or  six  men  in  the 
field  for  every  one  she  could;  and  that  power  supported  by  the  greatest  mili- 
tary power  in  the  world.  How  did  Servia  behave?  It  is  not  what  happens  to 
you  in  life  that  matters;  it  is  the  way  in  which  you  face  it.  (Cheers.)  And 
Servia  faced  the  situation  with  dignity.   (Loud  cheers.)  She  said  to  Austria: 

—  "If  any  officers  of  mine  have  been  guilty  and  are  proved  to  be  guilty,  I 
will  dismiss  them."  Austria  said,  "  That  is  not  good  enough  for  me."  It 
was  not  guilt  she  was  after,  but  capacity.    (Laughter.) 

Then  came  Russia's  turn.  Russia  has  a  special  regard  for  Servia.  She  has 
a  special  interest  in  Servia.  Russians  have  shed  their  blood  for  Servian 
independence  many  a  time.  Servia  is  a  member  of  her  family  and  she  cannot 
see  Servia  maltreated.  Austria  knew  that.  Germany  knew  that,  and  Ger- 
many turned  round  to  Russia  and  said:  — "I  insist  that  you  shall  stand  by 
with  your  arms  folded  whilst  Austria  is  strangling  your  little  brother  to 
death."  (Laughter.)  What  answer  did  the  Russian  Slav  give?  He  gave  the 
only  answer  that  becomes  a  man.  (Cheers.)  He  turned  to  Austria  and  said : 

—  "  You  lay  hands  on  that  little  fellow  and  I  will  tear  your  ramshackle 
empire  limb  from  limb."  (Prolonged  cheers.)  And  he  is  doing  it.  (Renewed 
cheers.) 

THE  AUSTRO-SERVIAN  CONFLICT2 

.  .  .  The  reply,  although  apparently  conciliatory  was  far  from  satisfactory 
in  several  essential  respects.  The  promise  to  suppress  the  agitation  was 
made  conditional  upon  the  proof  of  its  existence,  when  the  affirmation  of  its 
existence  was  the  basis  of  the  ultimatum.  Then,  again,  the  promise  to 
restrain  the  license  of  the  press  in  its  mendacious  attacks  upon  Austria- 
Hungary  took  the  form  of  a  vague  concession  or  reform  in  the  law  governing 
the  press,  but  did  not  contain  any  pledge  to  put  a  stop  to  the  virulently 
provocative  references  to  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

The  Servian  Government,  on  the  face  of  its  reply,  also  undertook  the 
suppression  of  the  Narodna  Obrana,  with  its  country-wide  network  of 
affiliated  organizations  —  only  on  condition,  however,  of  conclusive  proof 
of  its  subversive  activities.  Inasmuch  as  the  affirmation  of  the  existence  of 
these  subversive  activities  formed  the  sum  and  substance  of  the  ultimatum, 

1  Extract  from  an  article  by  Constantin  Theodor  Dumba,  Ambassador  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary to  the  United  States,  published  in  the  Outlook,  New  York,  August  29,  1914. 


588     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

such  a  reply  to  this  phase  of  its  just  demands  was  regarded  by  Austria  as  the 
flimsiest  sort  of  evasion  on  the  part  of  the  Servian  Government. 

Another  point  that  indicated  the  insincerity  of  Servia's  apparent  compli- 
ance with  the  terms  of  Austria's  ultimatum  was  the  failure  to  accept  the 
Austrian  suggestion  of  cooperation  between  the  Austrian  and  the  Servian 
police  in  a  joint  inquiry  into  the  origin  and  consummation  of  the  crime  of 
Serajevo,  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  the  judicial  proceedings  in  Servia.  As  to 
the  judicial  phase  of  the  inquiry,  Austria  never  made  any  suggestion  of 
participating.  The  cooperation  of  the  Austrian  police  was  essential  to  a 
successful  and  final  solution  of  the  problem.  The  shifty  attitude  of  the 
Servian  police  on  the  entire  issue  raised  by  the  crime  of  Serajevo  can  best  be 
understood  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  principal  instigator  of  that  of- 
fense against  the  laws  of  civilization  could  not  be  brought  to  justice  because 
he  had  been  warned  out  of  Belgrade  by  a  Servian  prefect  of  police. 

The  duplicity  characteristic  of  Servian  diplomacy  came  under  my  per- 
sonal observation  when  I  was  Minister  to  Servia  in  the  last  year  of  the  reign 
of  King  Alexander  and  the  beginning  of  the  rule  of  the  present  Karageorge- 
vitch  dynasty.  At  my  request,  after  a  peculiarly  offensive  outbreak  of  anti- 
Austrian  agitation  carried  on  in  Belgrade,  the  Government  suppressed  the 
society  responsible  for  endangering  the  good  relations  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia  by  a  campaign  of  criminal  mendacity.  Two  weeks 
later,  however,  the  same  organization,  under  another  name  and  with  a  new 
secretary,  but  with  the  same  membership  and  the  same  provocative  aims, 
was  in  full  operation  in  the  same  assault  upon  the  peace  and  security  of  a 
neighboring  friendly  state.  Such  instances  of  evasion  are  so  frequent  in  the 
history  of  Servian  promises  to  Austria-Hungary  that  in  this  case  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  was  determined  to  exact  complete  and  infallible 
guaranties  for  the  performance  of  the  required  pledges.  It  was  all  the  more 
necessary  to  act  with  final  firmness  because  the  Servian  conscience,  after  the 
butchery  of  King  Alexander  and  Queen  Draga,  of  which  all  the  authors,  well 
known  to  every  man  of  any  account  in  Belgrade,  were  promoted  in  army 
rank,  was  not  especially  sensitive  to  the  murder  of  royal  personages. 

Besides,  the  Austrian  Government  had  to  be  determined  to  obtain  a  clear 
and  final  solution  of  the  problem,  because  of  its  knowledge  that  Servia's 
recalcitrant  attitude  was  the  result  of  encouragement  from  the  great  north- 
ern power  whose  shadow  was  darkening  over  the  Austrian  frontier.  Never- 
theless, with  the  certainty  that  Russia  was  the  actual  instigator  of  Servia's 
defiant  policy,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  regarded  the  issue  in- 
volved as  so  vital  that  it  did  not  hesitate  to  submit  it  to  the  final  test  of  war. 

CRITICISM   OF  SERVIA1 

I  consider  it  as  highly  important  that  the  case  for  Austria-Hungary  in  the 
present  conflict  of  nations  should  be  stated  before  American  public  opinion 
with  minute  precision.  We  are  all  agreed  in  abhorring  war  and  in  deploring 
the  outbreak  of  a  catastrophe  the  like  of  which  history  has  never  witnessed. 
Those  who  are  responsible  for  it  will  forever  remain  branded  with  a  stigma 
of  infamy  which  no  amount  of  military  or  political  success  can  wipe  off  their 

1  Article  by  Count  Albert  Apponyi  published  in  the  Continental  Times,  Berlin,  October  9, 
1914,  and  reprinted  in  the  New  York  Times,  January  17,  1915. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  589 

brows.  Feeling  as  strongly  as  I  do  on  that  point,  devoted  as  I  am  to  the 
peace  ideal,  I  consider  myself  qualified  to  proclaim  before  the  whole  world 
that  my  country  is  free  from  guilt  in  the  horrible  contest  which  has  been 
forced  upon  her  and  that  she  can  face  it  with  all  the  moral  power  of  a  pure 
conscience. 

This  is  what  everybody  feels  in  Austria-Hungary  and  in  Germany;  this 
is  why  not  a  single  soul  can  be  found  in  those  countries  who  grumbles  at  the 
horrible  sacrifice  laid  on  his  shoulders;  this  is  why  in  Austria-Hungary  up  to 
1,000,000  and  in  Germany  up  to  1,300,000  men  more  offered  their  services 
at  the  first  call  to  arms  than  are  bidden  by  law  to  do  it;  this  is  why  our  men- 
tality is  one  of  absolute  self-possession  and  quiet  but  unflinching  resolve; 
this  is  why  the  strife  of  races,  on  which  our  enemies  built  such  hopes,  the 
division  of  creeds,  the  conflict  of  party  and  faction,  everything  that  engen- 
ders division,  is  clean  swept  away,  why  millions  feel  of  one  mind  in  absolute 
devotion  to  the  great  aim  of  freeing  themselves  once  for  all  from  the  gang  of 
perfidious  assailants  who  for  the  last  years  have  worked  in  the  dark  for 
our  destruction,  and  whose  infamy  went  so  far  as  to  organize  assassination 
besides  political  conspiracy. 

If  we  can  do  that  work  of  lawful  self-protection  thoroughly,  humanity 
will  enjoy  an  almost  limitless  epoch  of  peace  and  tranquillity;  if  we  cannot, 
the  world  will  remain  under  constant  menace  of  war,  unless  it  submits  to  the 
dictates  of  Muscovite  tyranny  and  to  all  the  misery  therein  implied.  Our 
cause,  so  we  feel,  is  the  cause  of  humanity,  .of  liberty,  of  peace,  of  progress, 
of  everything  that  men  deserving  the  name  of  man  value  more  than  their 
lives. 

Now,  I  am  perfectly  aware  that  foreigners  cannot  be  expected  to  accept 
our  feelings  as  a  base  for  their  judgment,  that  they  want  facts  and  reasons 
to  lean  upon .  That  is  what  I  am  going  to  provide  them  with  presently.  But 
I  may  put  down  the  perfect  unity  of  feeling,  suddenly  arisen  in  countries 
generally  torn  by  dissension,  as  one  of  the  facts  to  be  considered.  There  is  at 
least  a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  a  cause  which  works  so  powerfully  on 
the  psychology  of  the  nations  concerned  and  uplifts  their  minds  above  all 
that  is  petty  and  discordant 

But  the  crucial  question,  the  one  which  decides  the  verdict,  is  the  ques- 
tion how  and  by  whose  fault  the  conflict  originated  and  spread.  This  I  have 
to  elucidate  by  unexceptionable  evidence. 

The  direct  cause  of  the  outbreak  is  Servia's  insane  ambition  to  extend  her 
dominion  over  those  southern  parts  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bosnia,  and  Herze- 
govina to  begin  with,  Croatia  and  the  Slovene  countries  to  follow,  where 
South  Slavs  live  in  great  numbers.  Never  could  a  small  country  like  Servia 
nourish  such  designs  against  a  great  power,  unless  it  felt  sure  of  being  sup- 
ported by  some  other  great  power.  Recent  developments  have  shown  that 
Servia  had  good  reasons  to  expect  such  support.  On  behalf  of  the  mad  am- 
bitions not  warranted  even  by  the  claims  of  racial  kinship  (since  the  Roman 
Catholic  Croatians  generally  abhor  Servia),  a  constant  agitation  was  or- 
ganized in  the  aforementioned  parts  of  Austria  and  Hungary.  The  origin 
of  this  agitation  can  be  traced  as  far  back  as  the  accession  of  the  Karageor- 
gevich  dynasty  to  the  Servian  throne. 

Under  the  Obrenovich  rule  Servia  cultivated  relations  of  good  neighbor- 
hood with  Austria-Hungary,  to  whom  she  was  largely  indebted  for  the  recog- 


590     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

nition  of  her  independence  by  the  Berlin  Treaty  of  1878.  Things  took  differ- 
ent shape  when  the  last  Obrenovich  king  and  his  wife  were  murdered  by 
military  conspirators  and  the  present  king,  Peter  Karageorgevich,  unhesita- 
tingly accepted  the  crown  from  the  blood-stained  hands  of  murderers.  For 
a  short  time  the  conscience  of  Europe  seemed  to  wake,  or  at  least  a  feeling  of 
nausea  prevailed  among  the  civilized  nations.  King  Peter  found  it  difficult 
to  enter  into  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Governments  of  Europe.  Russia 
alone  did  not  scruple  to  take  him  for  granted.  The  other  powers  had  to  fol- 
low; last  of  all  England.   Finally  recognition  became  universal. 

From  that  time  Servia  has  been  the  seat  of  a  permanent  conspiracy  against 
Austria-Hungary.  Associations  were  formed  for  the  "liberation  of  the  South 
Slavonic  brethren"  in  Austria-Hungary;  agents  were  sent  to  undermine 
among  our  fellow-citizens  of  South  Slavonic  race  the  feelings  of  allegiance  to 
their  country;  wherever  a  traitor  could  be  found  among  them,  his  services 
were  enlisted;  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  almost  openly  claimed. 

These  two  Turkish  provinces  had  been  trusted  to  Austria-Hungary's  care 
by  the  Berlin  Treaty  of  1878,  because  only  the  impartial  rule  of  a  western 
power  could  secure  peace  and  liberty  in  a  country  inhabited  by  Moham- 
medans, Greek  Orthodox,  and  Roman  Catholic  Christians.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  they  throve  and  developed  under  the  enlightened  government  of 
Austria-Hungary  to  a  degree  of  welfare  unknown  in  any  other  part  of  the 
Balkanic  Peninsula.  Nevertheless,  Servia  took  hardly  any  pains  to  hide 
covetousness  concerning  these  provinces,  where  under  her  rule  two  thirds 
of  the  population  would  be  submitted  to  the  same  tyranny  of  racial  and 
religious  intolerance  which  the  unhappy  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia  are  expe- 
riencing at  her  hands.  It  was  this  covetousness  which  brought  us  to  the 
verge  of  war  in  1908,  when  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  became  formally  an- 
nexed to  Austria-Hungary.  That  was  done  precisely  to  shut  the  door 
against  intrigues  feeding  on  their  ambiguous  juridical  situation,  a  situation 
which  maintained  the  Sultan's  nominal  sovereignty  over  them,  while  the 
whole  power  and  the  responsibilities  of  sovereignty  belonged  to  Austria- 
Hungary.  From  the  standpoint  of  international  law  the  annexation  was 
certainly  not  unexceptionable.  Turkey,  whose  nominal  rights  were  set 
aside,  had  a  right  to  protest,  and  so  had  the  signatory  powers  of  the  Berlin 
Treaty ;  but  Servia  had  absolutely  no  voice  in  the  matter.  No  right  of  hers 
was  invaded,  no  legitimate  interest  of  hers  damaged;  only  mad  pretensions 
were  thwarted  and  unfair  opportunities  lessened ;  still,  it  was  Servia  whose 
outcries,  echoed  by  Russia,  endangered  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Everybody  knows  how  that  first  outbreak  ended.  Russia,  Servia's  patron 
and  inspirer,  recoiled  at  that  time  from  the  conflict  with  Germany,  which 
aggression  against  Austria-Hungary  would  have  implied ;  so  Servia  had  to 
declare  herself  disinterested  in  the  arrangements  concerning  Bosnia  and 
willing  properly  to  fulfill  toward  Austria-Hungary  the  duties  of  good  neigh- 
bors. It  was  largely  due  to  the  exertions  of  the  Hungarian  Government,  to 
which  I  belonged  at  that  time,  that  Austria-Hungary  accepted  these  verbal 
apologies  and  pledges,  and  that  peace,  or  rather  the  semblance  of  peace, 
was  preserved  for  some  years  more  —  I  almost  regret  this  our  decision. 
Should  Servia's  impudent  behavior  have  been  chastised  then,  as  it  deserved 
to  be,  the  present  general  conflict  might  have  been  averted.  On  the  other 
hand,  Austria-Hungary  would  not  have  shown  that  almost  superhuman  for- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  591 

bearance,  in  which  lies  her  clearest  vindication.  Anyhow  it  is  important  to 
bear  in  mind  that  Servia's  pretensions  and  designs  brought  matters  to  a 
crisis  six  years  ago,  and  that  she  escaped  punishment  only  through  a  sol- 
emn promise  of  correct  behavior. 

How  was  that  promise  kept?  By  doing  worse  from  year  to  year,  by  devel- 
oping with  more  energy  still  the  propaganda  of  high  treason  among  Aus- 
tria's and  Hungary's  South  Slavonic  citizens;  and,  since  the  results  of  such 
merely  political  work  ripened  too  slowly,  the  pace  was  mended  by  setting  up 
an  additional  organization  of  political  assassination,  headed  by  military  and 
non-military  officials  of  the  Servian  kingdom.  The  thing  would  seem  almost 
incredible  but  for  the  fact  that  the  present  Servian  King's  rule  is  based  on 
murder  and  that  murderers  are  or  were  among  his  chief  advisers.  A  Govern- 
ment boasting  of  an  origin  like  this  must  be  expected  to  take  a  lenient  view 
of  political  assassination. 

The  matter  was  brought  to  light  by  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand's  assassi- 
nation. This  dreadful  crime,  as  has  been  established  by  the  judicial  inquiry, 
was  not  the  work  of  a  single  fanatic's  craze;  it  was  the  carefully  prepared 
result  of  a  widespread  conspiracy,  centered  in  a  great  Servian  national 
organization,  the  Narodna  Obrana,  whose  chairman  is  a  general  in  active 
service,  and  whose  rules,  besides  an  almost  open  confession  of  criminal 
propagandism  among  the  neighboring  power's  citizens,  contains  a  para- 
graph of  dark  meaning,  bidding  young  men  to  prepare  for  some  "big  deed 
on  behalf  of  the  national  cause."  Well,  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand's  mur- 
derers, all  of  them  affiliated  with  the  aforesaid  organization,  were  prepared 
for  the  "big  deed,"  and  they  also  achieved  it  successfully.  All  the  imple- 
ments of  their  murderous  deed  came  from  Servian  army  stores;  bombs  of 
the  same  origin  were  found  hidden  in  many  places;  not  a  single  accomplice 
of  the  crime  could  be  laid  hands  upon  on  Servian  ground;  they  found  pro- 
tection there  instead  of  prosecution. 

If  circumstantial  evidence  has  any  meaning,  the  case  against  official 
Servia  seems  to  be  made  out  by  these  facts.  But  what  is  more,  the  lamented 
Archduke's  assassination  was  not  the  first,  but,  within  two  years,  the  fourth 
attempt  organized  by  the  same  gang  of  murderers  against  the  lives  of  faith- 
ful public  servants  in  the  southern  parts  of  Austria  and  Hungary.  Now,  in 
the  name  of  all  that  is  human  and  just  and  fair,  for  how  many  years  more 
should  we  have  submitted  to  this?  How  many  more  assassinations  should 
we  have  left  unprevented,  unpunished?  What  nation,  big  or  small,  can 
tolerate  the  setting  up  in  her  neighborhood  of  a  whole  machinery  of  treason 
and  destruction,  the  organization  of  a  permanent  conspiracy  against  her 
moral  cohesion,  with  murder  lurking  at  every  street's  corner,  threatening 
the  individual  safety  of  her  most  valued  citizens?  Austria-Hungary  has 
tolerated  it  long  enough  to  feel  her  strength  shaken,  to  see  her  power  dis- 
believed, her  destruction  discounted,  and  her  future  ruler  murdered. 

A  little  more  of  this  and  our  fellow-citizens  of  South  Slavonic  race  would 
have  learned  to  doubt  the  Monarchy's  capacity  for  defending  the  loyal  and 
punishing  the  traitors,  for  making  herself  respected,  even  by  small  neigh- 
bors. In  the  face  of  such  weakness  on  one  side  and  such  unscrupulous  dar- 
ing on  the  other,  they  might  have  wavered  in  their  allegiance  to  a  state 
unable  to  protect  them.  It  was  high  time  to  drag  our  treacherous  assail- 
ants from  the  dark  recesses  of  conspiracy  into  the  broad  daylight  of  plain 


592     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

speaking  and  open  doing.  We  had  to  exact  from  official  Servia,  whose  moral 
complicity  was  established  beyond  doubt,  efficient  pledges,  not  words 
which  in  the  case  of  confirmed  liars  are  valueless  —  but  measures,  guar- 
anteeing our  tranquillity  as  a  nation  and  the  individual  safety  of  our 
faithful  public  servants. 

Such  pledges  Servia  would  not  give;  she  evaded  the  summons  in  her  habit- 
ual manner  of  double-dealing,  granting  a  profusion  of  words,  professions, 
and  promises,  the  mendacity  of  which  is  warranted  by  experience,  but  re- 
coiling from  every  measure  really  efficient.  She  was  clearly  resolved  to  go 
on  with  her  work  of  sneaking  aggression  and  to  cultivate  further  on  her  well- 
tried  methods  of  conspiracy.  Austria-Hungary  would  have  been  the  laugh- 
ing-stock not  of  her  enemies  only,  but  of  her  own  citizens,  should  she  have 
feigned  to  believe  where  bad  faith  was  manifest.  There  was  no  help  for  it; 
we  had  to  set  aside  our  extreme  unwillingness  to  adopt  violent  measures. 
We  had  to  strike  or  to  resign  our  right  to  live. 

The  case  was  not  arbitrable,  nor  fit  to  be  submitted  to  an  international 
inquiry.  Before  giving  my  support  in  any  warlike  step  I  examined  with  the 
utmost  care  this  side  of  the  question,  and,  devoted  though  I  am  to  the 
international  peace  institutions  and  to  a  constant  expansion  of  their  activ- 
ity, I  had  to  own  that  they  were  no  use  in  the  present  case.  Their  applica- 
bility supposes  good  faith  and  a  wish  to  do  the  right  thing  on  both  sides; 
failing  this  honesty  plays  the  part  of  a  dupe. 

What  could  have  been  the  result  of  international  proceedings  against 
Servia?  A  verdict  establishing  her  malpractices  and  bidding  her  to  desist 
from  them.  Servia,  of  course,  would  have  professed  to  submit,  just  as  she 
professed  to  be  a  good  neighbor  after  the  crisis  of  1908.  In  fact,  she  would 
have  persisted  in  her  dark  work,  somewhat  cautiously,  perhaps,  at  the  be- 
ginning, more  daringly  afterward.  And  in  a  couple  of  years,  maybe  after 
another  series  of  attempted  and  successful  assassinations,  matters  would 
again  have  ripened  to  a  crisis.  Should  we  then  again  have  begun  that  par- 
ody of  an  international  procedure,  which  settles  nothing,  because  the  ad- 
verse party  hypocritically  accepts  and  bare-facedly  evades  every  decision 
running  against  it?  Should  we  have  gone  on  rotting  all  the  while  and  hast- 
ening toward  dissolution?  Really,  we  could  not  do  that;  international  in- 
stitutions must  not  be  converted  into  traps  where  honesty  is  caught  and  dis- 
honesty enjoys  good  fun;  they  are  meant  to  insure  justice,  not  to  further  the 
designs  of  cheats.  In  the  face  of  God  and  man  do  I  proclaim:  if  ever  there 
was  a  case  of  lawful  self-defense  here  you  have  it. 

But  what  about  the  universal  war  which  grew  out  of  a  local  conflict? 
Who  is  responsible  for  its  horrors,  for  its  calamities?  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  perfectly  clear.  Since  Austria-Hungary  was  in  a  state  of  law- 
ful self-defense  against  Servian  aggression,  those  are  responsible  for  the 
greater  evil  who  espoused  the  cause  of  that  aggression.  And  this  is  what 
Russia  did.  She  is  the  great  culprit.  Her  policy  is  the  main  fountain  whence 
torrents  of  blood  and  of  tears  will  flow.  Her  allies  have  been  drawn  by  her 
into  the  concern. 

Not  that  I  wish  to  attenuate  the  guilt  and  the  disgrace  of  highly  cultured 
nations  like  France  and  England,  who  became  in  some  way  the  patrons  and 
the  associates  of  a  gang  of  murderers.  But  on  Russia  rests  the  chief  respon- 
sibility; on  her  head  falls  the  great  sin  against  humanity  implied  in  this 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  593 

war.  From  her  face  the  mask  has  fallen,  unveiling  the  lust  of  power  and 
expansion  which  inspires  her  policy  and  which  is  the  real  source  of  every 
unrest  in  Europe. 

In  her  war  manifesto  Russia  tries  to  personate  the  chivalrous  defender 
of  a  weak  country  against  a  strong  one.  That  may  appeal  to  the  ignorant; 
in  truth  it  is  bare-faced  humbugging.  When  Austria-Hungary  had  to  coerce 
Servia,  she  solemnly  declared  that  her  only  aim  was  to  win  those  guaranties 
of  her  own  tranquillity  which  Servia  would  not  grant,  but  that  neither  Ser- 
via's  territory,  nor  Servia 's  independence  would  suffer  any  permanent  mu- 
tilation. After  that  solemn  declaration,  made  in  the  most  binding  form  by 
a  power  whose  word  is  as  good  as  any  deed,  there  remained  not  the  smallest 
pretext  for  honest  interference. 

Still  Russia  did  interfere.  On  whose  behalf?  On  Servia's?  After  the  pledges 
freely  given  by  Austria-Hungary  Servia  as  a  nation  needed  no  protection; 
Austria-Hungary's  coercive  action  was  not  directed  against  Servia,  but 
only  against  the  system  of  treacherous  conspiracies  and  murderous  at- 
tempts fostered  by  her  present  rulers.  It  is  these  dark  forces  alone  that  were 
threatened  by  our  action  in  Servia. 

It  is  therefore  on  behalf  of  these,  not  of  the  weaker  nation,  which  was  per- 
fectly safe,  that  Russia  interfered.  Russia  does  not  wish  Servia  to  become 
a  decent  country  and  a  loyal  neighbor;  Russia  draws  her  sword  to  make  it 
possible  that  the  conspiracies  against  Austria-Hungary's  safety  and  the 
plots  of  murder  implied  in  them  should  go  on  undisturbed;  Russia  stands 
behind  that  dark  work  with  all  her  might  and  power ;  it  is  part  of  her  policy. 
Through  it  should  Austria-Hungary  be  kept  in  a  state  of  constant  unrest, 
economic  difficulties  and  moral  decomposition,  till  she  became  ripe  for  re- 
ceiving the  final  blow?  Because  Austria-Hungary  must  disappear,  to  make 
room  for  the  programme  now  openly  proclaimed  by  the  Tsar:  the  union 
of  all  Slavs  under  Russian  rule. 

So  the  mask  has  fallen,  Servia  is  a  simple  outpost;  behind  her  stands  the 
policy  of  Russia,  supporting  those  treacherous  and  abominable  acts  which 
compelled  unwilling  Austria-Hungary  to  make  a  stand  for  her  dignity  and 
safety.  Before  the  tribunal  of  human  conscience  stands  Muscovitism  unveiled 
as  responsible  for  the  horrors  of  universal  war  and  for  the  permanent  unrest 
that  consumes  Europe's  forces.  The  power  of  Muscovitism  must  be  broken 
before  peace  can  be  enjoyed  with  any  amount  of  safety,  before  peace  insti- 
tutions can  work  with  any  degree  of  efficiency. 

Well,  since  Providence  puts  its  burden  on  our  shoulders,  that  work  will 
be  done  with  God's  help  thoroughly.  The  greatness  of  the  task  is  felt  by 
every  soul  throughout  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  absolute  con- 
fidence reigns  everywhere  that  our  joined  forces  are  able  to  fulfill  it.  Even 
in  Germany  there  is  no  peculiar  animosity  against  France.  There  is  more 
of  it  against  England,  whose  intervention  is  considered  as  a  piece  of  revolt- 
ing cynicism;  but  the  object  of  popular  resentment  is  Russia,  which  only 
shows  the  unerring  instinct  of  the  masses.  And  what  I  hear  at  home  from 
simple-minded  but  honest  and  straightforward  people  like  the  day  laborers 
on  my  own  estate,  is  a  passionate  desire  to  have  it  out  once  for  all  with 
Russia. 

It  is  clear  not  from  facts  only,  but  from  the  Tsar's  explicit  confession,  that 
the  policy  of  Russia  pursues  aims  which  can  be  obtained  only  through  uni- 


594     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

versal  war.  The  union  of  all  Slavs  under  Russian  dominion  can  be  effected 
only  after  the  disintegration  of  existing  political  bodies,  Austria-Hungary 
to  begin  with,  and  by  subjecting  the  non-Slav  races  encompassed  between 
Slavs,  such  as  the  Hungarians  and  the  Rumanians.  Does  n't  that  mean  war, 
horrible  war,  universal  war,  since  neither  the  political  bodies  concerned  will 
submit  to  destruction,  without  making  a  desperate  stand,  nor  the  threat- 
ened races  to  subjection,  without  fighting  to  the  last?  And  does  n't  it  imply 
another  confession  of  complicity  with  Servia's  conspiracies  and  crimes, 
which  now  appear  quite  distinctly  for  what  they  are  —  pioneer  work  on 
behalf  of  Russia? 

But  what  would  Russia's  dominion  over  the  whole  mass  of  Slavs,  the 
so-called  Pan-Slavist  ideals,  mean  from  the  standpoint  of  the  great  prin- 
ciples and  ideals  of  progressive  humanity?  What  would  it  mean  to  the  Slavs 
themselves?  It  would  mean,  if  a  bad  pun  is  to  be  allowed  here,  their  trans- 
formation into  slaves;  it  would  mean  to  those  among  them  who  are  now 
enjoying  the  bliss  of  civilized  western  government  and  liberty  a  rolling 
down  into  the  abyss  of  darkest  tyranny,  religious  oppression  to  all  those 
who  do  not  conform  to  the  Orthodox  creed;  a  wiping-out  of  racial  differences 
as  wide  as  the  difference  between  German  and  Dutch,  Italian  and  Spaniard; 
loss  of  every  guaranty  of  individual  and  political  liberty;  arbitrary  police 
rule,  which  makes  every  man  and  woman  liable  to  be  arrested  and  trans- 
ported without  a  trial,  without  a  judicial  verdict. 

These  and  other  similar  blessings  does  Muscovitism  offer  to  those  who 
are  so  happy  as  to  fall  into  its  loving  embrace.  And  to  all  mankind  the 
grouping  of  the  forces  of  Slavism  under  Russia's  despotic  power  would  mean 
the  most  horrible  menace  to  enlightenment,  progress,  liberty,  and  democ- 
racy; a  peril  of  retrogression  of  several  centuries,  a  moral  and  social  catas- 
trophe. 

It  is  to  be  expected  that  Germany's  and  Austria-Hungary's  joint  forces 
will  save  our  kind  from  the  peril  of  falling  so  low,  notwithstanding  the 
damnable  support  which  Muscovitism  gets  from  two  blindfolded  western 
powers,  one  of  whom  does  not  even  scruple  to  draw  the  yellow  race  into  a 
conflict  of  Europeans.  We  have  not  the  smallest  doubt  concerning  the  su- 
perior value  of  our  armies,  even  when  outnumbered.  And  we  feel  able  to 
lay  our  cause  before  God,  the  just,  the  omniscient.  We  are  conscious  of 
having  stood  for  peace  as  long  as  there  was  the  smallest  chance  of  preserv- 
ing it  with  honor.  We  are  fighting  now  the  battle  of  righteous  self-defense 
on  the  strongest  compulsion  ever  undergone  by  any  nation.  We  fight  the 
battle  of  mankind's  highest  ideals  and  we  fight  the  battle  of  peace,  which 
our  victory  will  make  secure  for  generations  to  come. 

So  we  look  forward  to  whatever  is  in  store  for  us,  with  the  serene  forti- 
tude of  men  who  feel  strong  in  the  purity  of  their  conscience. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  595 

BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY 


RICHELIEU   REJECTS   A   PROPOSAL  FOR  THE  PARTITION 
OF  BELGIUM   AND   SUGGESTS  ANOTHER   PLAN  ' 

Cardinal  Richelieu  was  not  at  all  inclined  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
Netherlands;  he  was  deterred  from  it  by  political  considerations  of  a  prac- 
tical nature,  which  have  since  prevented  France' from  taking  or  keeping 
them.  It  was  upon  this  double  difficulty  of  taking  and  holding  the  provinces 
that  in  June,  1634,  the  Cardinal  based  his  objection  to  a  partition  proposed 
by  the  United  Provinces.  "  Even  if,"  said  he,  "  we  should  with  much  time, 
trouble,  and  expense  succeed,  in  it,  the  preservation  of  what  we  had  ac- 
quired could  not  be  effected  except  with  very  large  garrisons  such  as  would 
render  us  intensely  odious  to  the  inhabitants  and  expose  us  for  this  reason 
to  serious  uprisings  and  perpetual  wars.  And,  even  if  France  should  be 
so  fortunate  as  to  keep  the  provinces  which  had  fallen  to  her  share  in  volun- 
tary dependence  upon  her  control,  it  might  soon  happen  that,  having  no 
longer  a  barrier  between  us  and  the  Dutch,  we  should  be  involved  in  the 
same  quarrel  in  which  they  and  the  Spaniards  are  now  engaged,  instead  of 
being  as  at  present  in  good  relations;  [which  is  due]  as  much  to  the  separa- 
tion existing  between  our  states  as  to  the  fact  that  we  have  a  common  enemy 
who  keeps  us  occupied,  —  seeing  that  we  are  equally  interested  in  his  abase- 
ment." 

He  gave  still  other  reasons  drawn  from  the  difficulties  and  uncertainties 
of  war,  the  fickleness  of  the  French  character,  and  the  interests  of  Cathol- 
icism. He  added:  "  Thus  it  is  that  all  these  reasons  lead  Cardinal  Richelieu 
to  say  to  the  King  that  the  proposal  conveyed  by  the  Sieur  de  CharnacS 
could  not  in  his  opinion  be  entertained  in  any  form,  and  that  a  war  for  the 
purpose  of  conquering  Flanders  must  absolutely  not  be  undertaken."  The 
plan  that  he  proposed  was  to  form  an  independent  Catholic  Republic  which 
would  offer  to  the  French  and  to  the  Dutch  the  great  advantage  of  getting 
rid  of  the  Spaniards,  without  exposing  them  [the  French  and  Dutch]  to 
the  risk  of  becoming  enemies  as  a  consequence  of  finding  themselves  out- 
and-out  neighbors.  He  said,  therefore:  "  That  if  it  should  be  necessary  to 
attack  Flanders,  it  must  be  done  under  the  most  plausible  conditions  and 
those  best  adapted  to  facilitate  the  design  which  would  be  entertained,  in 
that  case,  of  expelling  the  Spaniards.  That  France  and  Holland  should  re- 
solve not  to  lay  claim  to  anything  in  all  the  provinces  which  are  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  King  of  Spain  except  two  or  three  places  each  (the 
Dutch,  Breda,  Gueldre,  and  other  neighboring  places  which  could  be  agreed 
upon)  as  pledges,  and  as  a  bond  of  the  union  and  of  the  peace  which  was 
going  to  exist  hereafter  between  the  three  states.  That  they  would  gain 
enough  if  they  should  deliver  the  provinces  from  subjection  to  Spain,  and 
give  to  them  the  means  of  forming  a  free  corporate  body,  powerful,  and 
capable  of  establishing  a  good  alliance  with  them.  That  a  public  declara- 
tion must  be  made  in  the  form  of  a  manifesto,  which  should  assure  the  Cath- 

1  Translated  from  F.  A.  Mignet,  Negotiations  relatives  a  la  Succession  d'Espagne, 
pp.  174-76.   Paris,  1835. 


596     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

olic  religion  and  the  liberty  of  these  peoples  in  the  best  form  that  they 
could  desire,  in  order  to  give  grounds  to  the  nobles,  the  cities,  and  the 
communities  to  rise  up  more  boldly.  .  .  ." 

He  said,  moreover:  "That  if  the  plan  proposed  by  the  Dutch  of  a  com- 
plete conquest  could  succeed  in  twenty  years,  it  was  evident  that  this  other 
could  be  carried  out  in  one  year,  if  God  granted  even  his  slightest  blessing 
to  the  undertaking;  and,  besides,  in  case  of  success,  so  far  from  finding  them- 
selves charged  with  the  garrisoning,  as  in  the  first  project,  and  in  fear  of  a 
war  between  France  and  the  Dutch  (there  being  no  longer  a  barrier  between 
them)  it  would  even  be  the  means  of  arresting  the  perpetual  schemes  of  the 
Spanish  to  regain  what  they  had  lost. 

"  That,  on  the  contrary,  the  garrisons  of  France  could  be  diminished,  be- 
cause we  should  not  have  neighbors  as  powerful  and  as  evil  disposed  as  the 
Spaniards. 

"  That  the  Catholic  provinces,  which  would  then  make  a  body  corporate 
depending  solely  on  itself,  would  have  too  much  interest  in  keeping  France 
and  the  Dutch  in  union  for  a  quarrel  to  arise  between  them. 

"  And  that  the  power  and  the  forces  of  Spain,  being  then  no  longer  next 
to  France,  as  they  are  now,  need  not  be  feared  either. 

"  Moreover,  this  new  body  of  Catholic  states  would  be  watchful  to  guar- 
antee us  from  their  evil  designs,  inasmuch  as  we  should  be  indispensably 
necessary  to  them  for  preserving  their  liberty,  which  was  acquired  by  our 
means." 

He  said  further  that,  "  being  three  bodies  united  together,  it  would  be 
easy  for  us  to  resist  weak  and  distant  enemies,  and  to  live  in  the  future  in 
peace  and  quiet  delivered  from  those  by  whose  mischievous  ambition  we 
have  been  deprived  of  it  hitherto." 

"THE  BARRIER-TREATY"  OF  OCTOBER  29,   1709, 
BETWEEN   GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  HOLLAND1 

V.  And  whereas,  according  to  the  ninth  Article  of  the  said  Alliance,  it 
is  to  be  agreed,  amongst  other  matters,  how  and  in  what  manner  the  States 
shall  be  made  safe  by  means  of  this  Barrier,  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain 
will  use  her  Endeavours  to  procure,  that  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  it  may  be 
agreed,  that  all  the  Spanish  Low-Countries,  and  what  else  may  be  found 
necessary,  whether  conquer'd  or  unconquer'd  Places,  shall  serve  as  a  Bar- 
rier to  the  States. 

VI.  That  to  this  end  their  High  Mightinesses  shall  have  the  Liberty  to 
put  and  keep  Garrison,  to  change,  augment  and  diminish  it  as  they  shall  judge 
proper,  in  the  Places  following :  namely,  Newport,  Furnes,  with  the  Fort  of 
Knocke,  Ipres,  Menin,  the  Town  and  Citadel  of  Lisle,  Tournay  and  its  Cita- 
del, Conde,  Valenciennes ;  and  the  Places  which  shall  from  henceforward  be 
conquer'd  from  France;  Maubeuge,  Charier oy,  Namur  and  its  Citadel, 
Liere,  Hale  to  fortify,  the  Forts  of  Perle,  Philippe,  Damme,  the  Castle  of 
Gand,  and  Dendermonde :  The  Fort  of  St.  Donas  being  join'd  to  the  Forti- 
fications of  the  Sluice,  and  being  entirely  incorporated  with  it,  shall  remain 
and  be  yielded  in  Property  to  the  States.  The  Fort  of  Rodenhuysen,  on  this 
side  Gand,  shall  be  demolish'd. 

i  A  General  Collection  of  Treaties  (English),  vol.  2,  p.  482.   London,  1732. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  597 

VII.  The  said  States-General  may,  in  case  of  an  apparent  Attack,  or 
War,  put  as  many  Troops  as  they  shall  think  necessary  in  all  the  Towns, 
Places  and  Forts  in  the  Spanish  Low-Countries,  where  the  Reason  of  War 
shall  require. 

BELGIUM   AND  THE   BALANCE  OF  POWER1 

The  peculiar  strategical  geography  of  northern  Europe  the  Germans  also 
hold  responsible  for  England's  power.  The  land  on  either  side  of  the  mouth 
of  the  Rhine  is  the  key  to  northern  Europe.  Belgium  controls  the  shortest 
route  to  Paris;  Holland  is  the  only  point  of  departure  from  which  an  inva- 
sion of  England  is  likely  to  be  successful;  both  countries  hold  between  them 
the  door  of  the  Rhine  Valley,  the  gateway  to  the  heart  of  Germany.  Their 
possession  by  any  one  of  the  three  nations  nearest  them  would  give  her  im- 
mediately a  most  deadly  offensive  weapon  against  the  other  two.  To  pos- 
sess them  has  been  the  dream  of  all ;  to  secure  them  half  the  wars  in  Euro- 
pean history  have  been  fought.  Those  two  tiny  states  are  now  independent 
because  England,  France,  and  Germany  cannot  permit  each  other  to  control 
them.  To  the  east  lies  the  gateway  between  France  and  Germany,  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  through  whose  fair  fields  pass  the  roads  to  Cologne  and  Berlin,  to 
Frankfort,  Leipzig,  and  Dresden,  to  Basel,  Switzerland,  and  Italy,  to  the 
Danube  Valley  and  Vienna.  Its  possession  permits  France  to  enter  the 
heart  of  Germany;  its  possession  puts  Germany  at  the  very  doors  of  France; 
it  is  a  potent  weapon  of  offense  or  defense  and  enables  its  holder  to  begin  a 
war  with  tremendous  advantages.  For  its  possession,  France  and  Germany 
have  struggled  for  fifteen  hundred  years.  The  existence  of  these  strategic 
points  has  made  England  important.  If  France  assailed  the  Rhine  from 
Lorraine,  Germany  would  ally  with  England,  who  could  assail  Paris  from 
the  north  through  Belgium.  If  Germany  threatened  France  from  the  east, 
the  English  might  be  induced  to  invade  Germany  from  the  Netherlands. 
Should  either  country  obtain  the  cooperation  of  England  against  the  other, 
the  most  disastrous  results  were  probable.  These  conditions  made  England 
a  factor  in  politics  during  the  Middle  Ages,  out  of  all  proportion  to  her 
actual  strength  as  compared  with  France  or  Germany.  She  was  in  a  position 
to  deliver  a  deadly  flank  attack  on  either;  the  Channel  effectually  prevented 
retaliation;  she  could  have  consummated  the  dynastic  ambitions  of  either; 
she  preferred  to  thwart  the  aims  of  both.  When  the  Netherlands  fell  into 
Spanish  hands  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  the  power  of  the  Hapsburgs 
threatened  to  absorb  all  Europe,  the  cooperation  of  the  islanders,  who  con- 
trolled the  stormy  Channel  and  who  could  so  easily  invade  the  Netherlands, 
was  seen  by  every  one  to  be  the  controlling  factor  in  a  complex  situation. 
Their  assistance  would  almost  certainly  decide  the  war  in  favor  of  France  or 
Spain.  Not  England's  strength,  but  the  fact  that  her  position  made  her 
valuable  to  stronger  nations,  gave  her  a  voice  in  the  days  of  Henry  VIII  and 
Elizabeth.  Not  her  strength,  but  the  evenness  of  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  the  rivalry  of  Bourbon  and  Hapsburg,  their  fear  of  each  other,  gave 
her  the  casting  vote. 

1  Extract  from  Roland  G.  Usher,  Pan-Germanism,  pp.  22-25. 


598     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

THE  BARRIER  TREATY  VINDICATED  » 

1.  As  for  the  first  proposition,  the  former  part  of  it,  that  it  is  in  itself,  and 
apart  from  all  other  considerations,  the  true  interest  of  England,  that  there 
should  be  a  good  and  sufficient  barrier  against  France  on  the  side  of  the 
Netherlands,  is  a  point  so  evident  in  itself,  and  hath  been  so  constantly 
received  as  the  known  and  avowed  sense  of  the  nation ;  that  I  am  ashamed 
to  think  there  should  be  any  number  amongst  us  who  want  to  have  that 
proved  to  them  now,  which  hath  hitherto  been  always  allowed  as  a  standing 
maxim  of  our  Government,  and  is  now  become  our  interest  more  than  ever. 
To  have  a  good  barrier  against  France  in  the  Netherlands  is  as  necessary 
for  us  as  it  is  to  preserve  a  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent,  and  to  pre- 
vent all  Europe's  being  enslaved  by  France.  For  the  situation  of  the  Nether- 
lands is  such,  with  respect  to  Holland  and  the  Empire,  and  even  to  Britain 
itself,  that  if  France  be  once  suffered  to  get  possession  of  them,  it  will  not 
be  in  the  power  of  all  Europe  to  set  any  bounds  to  the  progress  of  her  arms. 
The  United  Provinces  must  in  that  case  unavoidably  fall  a  prey  to  her;  as 
every  one  must  be  fully  convinced,  who  will  but  reflect  upon  the  extremi- 
ties to  which  they  were  reduced  by  the  French  king's  seizing  the  Spanish 
Low-Countries  at  the  death  of  the  late  king  of  Spain.  The  Empire  having 
by  that  means  lost  the  assistance  of  the  States,  and  being  cut  off  from  all 
communication  with  England,  would  soon  follow  the  same  fate;  being,  as 
we  see  by  long  experience,  hardly  able  to  make  head  against  a  handful  of 
French  troops,  while  the  main  strength  of  France  is  diverted  and  employed 
on  the  wars  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  Flanders;  much  less  can  it  be  thought  in 
any  condition  to  defend  itself  when  it  is  without  allies,  and  France  having 
rid  her  hands  of  other  wars  is  at  liberty  to  pour  in  her  whole  force  upon  it. 
So  that  if  France  could  finish  her  long-laid  design  upon  the  Netherlands, 
she  might  without  opposition  carry  her  conquests  as  far  as  she  pleased  into 
Germany.  Let  us  next  consider  the  fatal  consequences  that  will  attend 
the  loss  of  the  Netherlands  with  respect  to  Britain  in  particular.  If  France 
be  once  mistress  of  those  Provinces,  she  will  from  that  moment  have  the 
command  of  the  narrow  seas;  so  that  our  trade  will  neither  be  able  to  go  out 
nor  to  return  with  any  tolerable  safety.  We  see  of  what  consequence  it  is 
thought  to  England  that  Dunkirk  should  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
French,  or  at  least  that  the  harbor  of  it  should  be  ruined;  and  thence  we 
may  judge  how  fatal  it  would  be  to  this  nation  to  let  them  get  possession  of 
the  other  Flemish  ports,  with  such  an  increase  of  naval  strength  as  that 
acquisition  would  give  them.  Our  coasts  and  river  would  then  be  exposed 
to  perpetual  insults,  and  our  trade  would  be  in  so  much  danger  in  the  nar- 
row seas  that  we  should  soon  be  obliged  to  give  it  over.  But  this  is  not  all : 
should  France  be  suffered  to  be  mistress  of  the  Netherlands,  it  is  not  to  be 
thought  the  United  Provinces  could  maintain  their  independency.  They 
must  either  become  directly  the  subjects  of  France,  or  live  in  an  absolute 
dependence  on  that  crown;  and  the  unavoidable  consequence  of  that  would 
be  that  the  great  naval  force  of  the  Dutch,  which  hath  hitherto  acted  in  con- 
junction with  us,  would  then  be  turned  against  us;  and  such  a  vast  accession 

1  Extract  from  The  Barrier  Treaty  Vindicated.  By  Francis  Hare.  London,  1712,  pp.  22-28. 
Halkett  and  Lang's  Dictionary  of  Anonymous  and  Pseudonomous  Literature  of  Great  Britain 
attributes  The  Barrier  Treaty  Vindicated  (second  edition,  London,  1712)  to  Francis  Hare. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  599 

to  the  fleet  of  France  would  give  her  such  a  superiority  at  sea  as  no  one  I  sup- 
pose is  sanguine  enough  to  think  we  could  dispute.  We  should  in  that  case 
not  only  suffer  all  the  inconveniences  that  necessarily  attend  our  being  cut 
off  from  the  Continent,  but  we  should  be  perpetually  unsafe  in  our  own 
ports.  For  our  whole  strength,  when  without  allies,  is  in  the  sea;  and  there- 
fore when  that  security  is  gone,  we  are  in  a  state  perfectly  naked  and  de- 
fenceless. And  as  our  riches  depend  chiefly  upon  our  trade,  they  also  must 
sink  with  it.  Let  therefore  France  but  get  the  Netherlands,  and  our  ruin 
needs  not  wait  for  that  of  other  countries  upon  the  Continent.  If  France 
can  force  the  submission  of  the  States,  and  have  the  use  of  their  ports  and 
fleets,  England  must  truckle  to  France,  if  the  rest  of  Europe  would  be  con- 
tent to  look  on;  and  if  they  should  not,  all  the  efforts  they  could  make 
would  be  of  little  service  to  us.  For  while  we  have  no  maritime  power  on 
our  side,  we  can  have  no  help  at  sea,  where  it  would  be  most  wanted;  nor 
any  support  in  case  of  an  invasion,  tho'  its  suddenness  and  strength  should 
make  it  of  the  last  necessity;  and  as  for  any  efforts  made  in  our  favor  on 
the  Continent,  when  the  States  are  either  slaves  to  or  on  the  side  of  France, 
we  may  be  sure  they  would  be  too  weak  to  make  any  great  impression,  or 
to  cause  any  considerable  diversion  in  our  favor.  So  that  the  ruin  of  Eng- 
land seems  to  be  the  certain  consequence  of  the  loss  of  the  Netherlands. 
We  must  for  want  of  strength  in  ourselves,  or  help  from  abroad,  suffer  the 
fate  of  other  nations;  only  with  so  much  the  greater  misery,  by  how  much 
our  present  condition  is  happier  than  that  of  others. 

If  it  were  sufficient  to  have  reason  on  one's  side,  I  might  think  it  needless 
to  say  any  more  to  prove  that  it  is  the  true  interest  of  England  that  there 
should  be  a  good  barrier  against  France  on  the  side  of  the  Netherlands.  But 
because  I  write  in  a  time  in  which  authority  seems  to  have  much  more  force 
than  reason,  I  shall  in  further  proof  of  this  proposition  appeal  to  authority, 
and  show  that  the  Netherlands  have  in  all  times  past  been  looked  upon  as 
the  barrier  to  England;  and  that  it  was  always  thought  our  interest  to 
hinder  the  growth  of  France  on  that  side.  To  show  this  I  might  go  back  to  the 
time  in  which  those  countries  were  governed  by  the  House  of  Burgundy,  one 
of  the  most  ancient  and  most  useful  allies  to  the  crown  of  England  against 
France.  But  this  may  seem  looking  too  far  backwards  into  the  history  of 
ancient  times ;  and  therefore  I  shall  only  take  notice  of  one  memorable  pas- 
sage in  the  excellent  history  of  Philip  de  Commines  to  this  purpose;  who 
speaking  in  the  beginning  of  his  6th  Book,  of  the  conquest  of  the  Dominions 
of  the  House  of  Burgundy  by  Lewis  11th,  who  laid  the  first  foundation  of 
the  greatness  of  France,  begins  his  second  chapter  with  these  words:  — 

"Those,"  says  he,   "that  hereafter  shall  read  this  History,  will 

wonder  that  the  English  suffered  the  King  to  take  the  towns  bordering 

so  near  upon  them,  namely  Arras,  Bolloin,  Ardes  and  Hedin,  with  divers 

other  castles,  and  to  lie  so  long  with  his  camp  before  St.  Omers." 

And  the  reasons  he  gives  for  this  are  such  as  deserve  to  be  remembered, 

which  are  these;  that 

"the  King  of  France  in  wisdom  and  sense  surmounted  far  Edward 
4th  of  England  then  reigning,  who  was  a  very  corpulent  man,  and 
much  given  to  pleasures;  and  endeavored  by  all  means  possible  to 
content  him  and  entertain  him  by  Ambassadors,  presents,  and  smooth 
words,  to  the  end  he  should  not  intermeddle  with  his  affairs.  That  he 


600     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF  1914 

knew  well  the  English,  as  well  Nobles  and  Commons,  as  the  Clergy, 
to  be  naturally  inclined  to  make  war  upon  his  realm ;  therefore  he  per- 
ceived that  he  must  in  any  wise  keep  the  King  of  England  and  his 
principal  servants  his  friends,  whom  he  saw  altogether  inclin'd  to 
quietness,  and  very  greedy  of  his  money;  for  the  which  cause  he  paid 
duly  at  London  the  pension  of  50,000  crowns,  and  farther  gave  yearly 
16,000  crowns,  besides  many  goodly  presents,  to  the  said  King's  prin- 
cipal servants;  and  their  acquittances  are  yet  to  be  seen  in  the  Chamber 
of  Accounts  at  Paris.  Further,  he  gave  goodly  presents  to  all  the  Am- 
bassadors that  came  to  him,  were  their  messages  never  so  sharp  and 
bitter;  and  sent  them  home  with  goodly  words  and  princely  rewards, 
that  they  returned  well  contented;  and  notwithstanding  that  some 
of  them  understood  that  he  did  all  this  only  to  win  time,  the  better 
to  achieve  his  enterprize  in  the  conquest  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy's 
Dominions,  yet  winked  they  at  it,  because  of  the  great  riches  they 
received  at  his  hands;  and  so  did  the  King  of  England  himself,  though 
some  of  his  Council  told  him  plainly  it  would  be  very  prejudicial  to 
his  realm;  and  in  Parliament  divers  wise  men  that  smelt  the  dissimu- 
lation of  France  afar  off,  and  received  no  pension  as  the  others  did, 
were  very  desirous,  and  yet  the  Commons  of  the  realm  more  desirous, 
that  the  King  should  send  aid  without  delay  to  the  Lady  of  Burgundy, 
daughter  of  Duke  Charles.    And  undoubtedly  if  the  King  had  not 
been  prevailed  upon  by  these  and  some  other  reasons,  he  would  never 
have  suffered  the  King  of  France  to  take  places  bordering  so  near 
upon  the  English  Dominions,  but  have  sought  to  defend  them;  and  if 
at  the  beginning  he  had  declared  himself  for  the  said  Lady,  the  King 
had  never  weakened  this  House  of  Burgundy  as  he  hath." 
The  whole  chapter  is  very  well  worth  reading,  of  which  this  is  but  an 
abstract.  And  upon  it  I  beg  leave  to  make  these  few  remarks:  That  this  His- 
tory was  written  about  230  years  ago,  by  a  person  of  great  credit,  who  was 
not  only  an  eye-witness  of  these  things,  but  had  a  principal  hand  in  the 
transacting  of  them;  which  leaves  no  room  to  doubt  the  truth  of  what  he 
says;  that  it  was  then  looked  on  as  the  known  interest  of  England  to  hinder 
the  growth  of  France  in  the  Low-Countries,  even  in  those  days,  when  the 
French  Dominions  were  bounded  by  the  Soam;  when  the  Dutchy  of  Britain, 
with  the  Port  of  Brest,  was  no  part  of  them;  and  the  strength  they  have  now 
at  sea  was  not  so  much  as  begun;  that  it  was  then  a  maxim  in  our  Govern- 
ment to  cherish  a  strict  alliance  with  the  House  of  Burgundy,  to  prevent  the 
French  from  extending  their  Dominions  on  that  side,  and  making  nearer  ap- 
proaches towards  us;  the  dangers  being  foreseen  at  that  distance,  which  we 
have  since  felt  from  the  neighborhood  of  a  power,  which  through  our  own 
fault  we  have  suffered  to  grow  so  very  formidable. 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  BELGIUM   BY  THE  TREATY  OF 
APRIL  19,  1839:  INTERNATIONAL  TREATIES  REG- 
ULATING THE    NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM 

November  15, 1831,  at  London,  was  signed  a  treaty  between  Great  Brit- 
ain, Austria,  France,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  on  the  one  hand  and  Belgium,  on 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  601 

the  other,  relative  to  the  separation  of  Belgium  from  Holland.  Article  VII 
established  the  independence  and  perpetual  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Article 
XXV  stipulated  that  the  five  powers  would  guarantee  the  execution  of  the 
preceding  articles.1  When  at  last  Holland  was  ready  to  assent  to  the  arrange- 
ments adopted  by  the  powers  in  regard  to  Belgium,  the  five  powers  and 
Holland  signed  at  London  on  April  19,  1839,  a  treaty  of  four  articles,  which 
adopted  in  an  annex  having  the  same  force  as  the  treaty  the  first  twenty- 
four  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  London  of  November  15,  1831.  This  left  out 
Article  XXV  containing  the  guaranty  of  the  first  twenty-four  articles,  but 
Article  II  of  the  new  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839,  declares: 

"Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary 
and  Bohemia,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  French,  His  Majesty  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias, 
declare  that  the  Articles  mentioned  in  the  preceding  Article,  are  con- 
sidered as  having  the  same  force  and  validity  as  if  they  were  textually 
inserted  in  the  present  Act,  and  that  they  are  thus  placed  under  the 
guarantee  of  their  said  Majesties." 
The  effect  of  this  Article  was  to  omit  the  guaranty  contained  in  Article 
XXV  of  the  Treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  and  to  substitute  a  declaration 
of  the  five  powers  guaranteeing  the  annexed  articles.  Hence  Article  VII  is 
guaranteed  by  the  five  powers,  but  not  by  Holland.    Belgium  and  Holland 
also  signed  a  separate  treaty  on  the  same  day,  April  19,  1839.    This  treaty 
refers  to  the  treaty  of  the  same  date  between  Holland  and  the  five  powers 
and  to  the  Treaty  of  November  15, 1831.  The  first  twenty-four  articles  were 
the  same  as  those  in  the  annex  of  the  treaty  between  Belgium  and  the  five 
powers.2 

A  third  treaty  was  signed  at  London  on  this  same  day,  April  19,  1839, 
between  the  five  powers  and  Belgium.  The  preamble  refers  to  the  treaties  of 
November  15,  1831,  and  the  two  other  treaties  of  April  19,  1839.  Article  I 
is  as  follows:  — 

"Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary 
and  Bohemia,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  French,  His  Majesty  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias,  de- 
clare, that  the  Articles  hereunto  annexed,  and  forming  the  tenor  of  the 
Treaty  concluded  this  day  between  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Bel- 
gians and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  Grand  Duke  of 
Luxemburg,  are  considered  as  having  the  same  force  and  validity  as  if 
they  were  textually  inserted  in  the  present  Act,  and  that  they  are  thus 
placed  under  the  Guarantee  of  their  said  Majesties."  3 
Article  II  declares  the  Treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  "not  to  be  obliga- 
tory on  the  High  Contracting  Parties." 

Though  this  maze  of  treaties  is  hard  to  follow,  the  situation  which  results 
may  be  summed  up  as  follows :  — 

(1)  The  treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  has  no  longer  any  force. 

(2)  The  independence  and  perpetual  neutrality  of  Belgium  has  been 
recognized  by  all  the  signatories  of  all  three  treaties  of  April  19,  1839. 

1   British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1830-31,  vol  18,  pp.  645-64. 

J  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  n,  p.  994.    London,  1875. 

*  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  n,  p.  997.   London,  1875. 


602     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

(3)  Holland  and  Belgium  have  not  in  any  of  the  three  treaties  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

(4)  The  five  powers  have  substituted  for  the  original  Article  XXV  of  the 
Treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  containing  the  guaranty  a  new  guaranty  in 
each  of  the  treaties  signed  by  the  five  powers  with  Belgium  and  Holland. 

(5)  The  situation  and  obligations  of  Belgium,  according  to  Article  VII  of 
the  Annex  (same  as  Article  VII  of  the  Treaty  of  1831)  are  as  follows:  — 

"  Belgium,  within  the  limits  specified  in  Articles  I,  II,  and  IV,  shall 
form  an  Independent  and  perpetually  Neutral  State.  It  shall  be  bound 
to  observe  such  Neutrality  towards  all  other  States." 

TREATY  BETWEEN  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  PRUSSIA, 

RELATIVE  TO  THE  INDEPENDENCE  AND 

NEUTRALITY  OF   BELGIUM  2 

Signed  at  London,  9th  August,  1870 
Reference  to  Treaties  of  19th  April,  1839 
Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  being  desirous  at  the  present 
time  of  recording  in  a  solemn  Act  their  fixed  determination  to  maintain  the 
Independence  and  Neutrality  of  Belgium,  as  provided  in  Article  VII  of  the 
Treaty  signed  at  London  on  the  19th  April,  1839,  between  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands,  which  Article  was  declared  by  the  Quintuple  Treaty  of  1839 
to  be  considered  as  having  the  same  force  and  value  as  if  textually  inserted 
in  the  said  Quintuple  Treaty,  their  said  Majesties  have  determined  to  con- 
clude between  themselves  a  separate  Treaty,  which,  without  impairing  or 
invalidating  the  conditions  of  the  said  Quintuple  Treaty,  shall  be  subsidiary 
and  accessory  to  it;  and  they  have  accordingly  named  as  their  Plenipotenti- 
aries for  that  purpose,  that  is  to  say: 

Cooperation  of  Great  Britain  with  Prussia  in  case  of  violation  of  Neutrality  of 
Belgium  by  France 
Article  I.  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  having  declared  that  not- 
withstanding the  Hostilities  in  which  the  North  German  Confederation  is 
engaged  with  France,  it  is  his  fixed  determination  to  respect  the  Neutrality 
of  Belgium,  so  long  as  the  same  shall  be  respected  by  France,  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  on  her  part 
declares  that,  if  during  the  said  Hostilities  the  Armies  of  France  should  vio- 
late that  Neutrality,  she  will  be  prepared  to  cooperate  with  His  Prussian 
Majesty  for  the  defence  of  the  same  in  such  manner  as  may  be  mutually 
agreed  upon,  employing  for  that  purpose  her  Naval  and  Military  Forces  to 
insure  its  observance,  and  to  maintain,  in  conjunction  with  His  Prussian 
Majesty,  then  and  thereafter,  the  Independence  and  Neutrality  of  Belgium. 

Great  Britian  not  engaged  to  take  part  in  War  between  North  German  Confed- 
eration and  France,  except  as  regards  Violation  of  Belgian  Neutrality. 

It  is  clearly  understood  that  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  King- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  does  not  engage  herself  by  this  Treaty  to 

•  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  m,  pp.  1886-88.  London,  1875. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  603 

take  part  in  any  of  the  general  operations  of  the  War  now  carried  on  be- 
tween the  North  German  Confederation  and  France,  beyond  the  Limits  of 
Belgium,  as  defined  in  the  Treaty  between  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands 
of  19th  April,  1839. 

Cooperation  of  Prussia  with  Great  Britain  in  case  of  Violation  of  Neutrality 
of  Belgium  by  France 
Article  II.  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  agrees  on  his  part,  in  the 
event  provided  for  in  the  foregoing  Article,  to  cooperate  with  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  employing 
his  Naval  and  Military  Forces  for  the  purpose  aforesaid;  and,  the  case  aris- 
ing, to  concert  with  Her  Majesty  the  measures  which  shall  be  taken,  sepa- 
rately or  in  common,  to  secure  the  Neutrality  and  Independence  of  Belgium. 

Treaty  to  be  binding  until  conclusion  of  a  Treaty  of  Peace  between  France  and 

Prussia 
Article  III.  This  Treaty  shall  be  binding  on  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  War  between  the  North 
German  Confederation  and  France,  and  for  12  months  after  the  Ratification 
of  any  Treaty  of  Peace  concluded  between  those  Parties ;  and  on  the  expira- 
tion of  that  time  the  Independence  and  Neutrality  of  Belgium  will,  so  far 
as  the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  respectively  concerned,  continue  to 
rest  as  heretofore  on  Article  I  of  the  Quintuple  Treaty  of  the  19th  April, 
1839. 

TREATY   BETWEEN    GREAT   BRITAIN,   AUSTRIA,   BELGIUM, 

FRANCE,   ITALY,   THE  NETHERLANDS,   PRUSSIA,  AND 

RUSSIA    RELATIVE    TO    THE    GRAND     DUCHY    OF 

LUXEMBURG  AND  THE   DUCHY  OF   LIMBURG » 

Signed  at  London,  May  11,  1867 

Maintenance  of  Rights  of  House  of  Orange-Nassau 
Article  I.  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  Grand  Duke  of 

Luxemburg,  maintains  the  ties  which  attach  the  said   Grand  Duchy  to 

the  House  of  Orange-Nassau,  in  virtue  of  the  Treaties  which  placed  that 

State  under  the  Sovereignty  of  the  King  Grand  Duke,  his  descendants 

and  successors. 
The  Rights  which  the  Agnates  of  the  House  of  Nassau  possess  with 

regard  to  the  Succession  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  in  virtue  of  the  same  Treaties, 

are  maintained. 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  accept  the  present  Declaration,  and  place 

it  upon  record. 

Grand  Duchy  to  form  a  Perpetual  Neutral  State  under  Guaranty  of 
Contracting  Parties 
Article  II.  The  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  within  the   Limits  de- 
termined by  the  Act  annexed  to  the  Treaties  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839, 
1  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  in,  pp.  1803-05.  London,  1875. 


604     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF  1914 

under  the  Guarantee  of  the  Courts  of  Great  Britain,  Austria,  France,  Prus- 
sia, and  Russia,  shall  henceforth  form  a  perpetually  Neutral  State. 

It  shall  be  bound  to  observe  the  same  Neutrality  towards  all  other 
States. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage  to  respect  the  principle  of  Neutral- 
ity stipulated  by  the  present  Article. 

That  principle  is  and  remains  placed  under  the  sanction  of  the  collective 
Guarantee  of  the  Powers  signing  Parties  to  the  present  Treaty,  with  the 
exception  of  Belgium,  which  is  itself  a  Neutral  State. 

Luxemburg  to  cease  to  be  a  Fortified  City.  Troops  to  be  maintained  by  the 
King  Grand  Duke 

Article  III.  The  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  being  Neutralized,  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  the  preceding  Article,  the  maintenance  or  establish- 
ment of  Fortresses  upon  its  Territory  becomes  without  necessity  as  well  as 
without  object. 

In  consequence,  it  is  agreed  by  common  consent  that  the  City  of  Luxem- 
burg, considered  in  time  past,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  as  a  Federal  For- 
tress, shall  cease  to  be  a  fortified  city. 

His  Majesty  the  King  Grand  Duke  reserves  to  himself  to  maintain  in  that 
city  the  number  of  troops  necessary  to  provide  in  it  for  the  maintenance  of 
good  order. 

Evacuation  of  Fortress  of  Luxemburg  by  Prussian  Troops 
Article  IV.  In  conformity  with  the  stipulations  contained  in  Articles  II 
and  III,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  declares  that  his  troops  actually  in 
garrison  in  the  Fortress  of  Luxemburg  shall  receive  orders  to  proceed  to  the 
Evacuation  of  that  place  immediately  after  the  exchange  of  the  Ratifica- 
tions of  the  present  Treaty.  The  withdrawal  of  the  artillery,  munitions,  and 
every  object  which  forms  part  of  the  equipment  of  the  said  Fortress  shall 
commence  simultaneously.  During  that  operation  there  shall  remain  in  it  no 
more  than  the  number  of  troops  necessary  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the 
material  of  war,  and  to  effect  the  dispatch  thereof,  which  shall  be  completed 
within  the  shortest  time  possible. 

Demolition  of  Fortress  of  Luxemburg  by  the  Netherlands 
Article  V.  His  Majesty  the  King  Grand  Duke,  in  virtue  of  the  rights  of 
Sovereignty  which  he  exercises  over  the  City  and  Fortress  of  Luxemburg, 
engages,  on  his  part,  to  take  the  necessary  measures  for  converting  the  said 
Fortress  into  an  open  city  by  means  of  a  demolition  which  His  Majesty  shall 
deem  sufficient  to  fulfil  the  intentions  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  ex- 
pressed in  Article  III  of  the  present  Treaty.  The  works  requisite  for  that 
purpose  shall  be  commenced  immediately  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  garri- 
son. They  shall  be  carried  out  with  all  the  attention  required  for  the  interests 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  city. 

Fortifications  not  to  be  restored 
His  Majesty  the  King  Grand  Duke  promises,  moreover,  that  the  Fortifi- 
cations of  the  city  of  Luxemburg  shall  not  be  restored  in  future,  and  that  no 
Military  Establishment  shall  be  there  maintained  or  created. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  605 

Duchy  of  Limburg  to  form  an  integral  part  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands 

Article  VI.  The  Powers  signing  Parties  to  the  present  Treaty  recog- 
nize that  the  Dissolution  of  the  Germanic  Confederation  having  equally 
produced  the  Dissolution  of  the  ties  which  united  the  Duchy  of  Limburg, 
collectively  with  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  to  the  said  Confedera- 
tion, it  results  therefrom  that  the  relations,  of  which  mention  is  made  in 
Articles  III,  IV,  and  V  of  the  Treaty  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839,  between 
the  Grand  Duchy  and  certain  Territories  belonging  to  the  Duchy  of  Lim- 
burg, have  ceased  to  exist,  the  said  Territories  continuing  to  form  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands. 

Ratifications  l 

Article  VII.  The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  Ratifications 
shall  be  exchanged  at  London  within  the  space  of  four  weeks,  or  sooner  if 
possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  the  same, 
and  have  affixed  thereto  the  Seals  of  their  Arms. 

Done  at  London,  the  11th  day  of  May.  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord,  1867. 


(L.S.) 
(L.S. 
(L.S. 
(L.S. 
(L.S.) 
(L.S. 
(L.S.) 
(L.S.) 
(L.S. 
(L.S.) 

[During  the  war  between  France  and  Prussia  in  1870-71,  those  powers 
mutually  engaged  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.] 


Stanley. 

Apponyi. 

Van  de  Weyer. 

La  Tour  d'Auvergne. 

D'Azeglio. 

Bentinck. 

TORNACO. 

E.  Servais. 

Bernstorff. 

Brunnow. 


DECLARATIONS   MADE  BY   FRANCE   AND  PRUSSIA  TO 

RESPECT  THE   NEUTRALITY  OF  LUXEMBURG, 

17TH  JULY,   1870  2 

Lord  A.  Loftus  to  Earl  Granville 

Berlin,  17th  July,  1870. 
My  Lord,  — 

Baron  Thile  informed  me  to-day  that  he  had  received  a  telegram  from 
M.  Fohr,  the  Representative  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  at  this 
Court,  stating  that  the  French  Government  had  officially  notified  their 
intention  to  respect  the  Neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  provided  that  it 
was  likewise  respected  by  Prussia. 

His  Excellency,  by  order  of  Count  Bismarck,  immediately  replied  that 
the  North  German  Government  would  also  respect  the  Neutrality  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  as  long  as  it  was  respected  by  France. 

I  have,  etc., 

Augustus  Loftus. 

1  Ratifications  exchanged  at  London,  31st  May,  1867. 

J  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  in,  p.  1877.   London,  1875. 


606     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

PARLIAMENTARY  DEBATES  ON  THE  NEUTRALITY  OF 
LUXEMBURG  > 

Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  —  Treaty  of  1867  —  The 
Collective  Guarantee  Question 

Lord  Houghton:  I  rise,  my  Lords,  for  the  purpose  of  asking  Her  Maj- 
esty's Government  the  Question  of  which  I  gave  notice  some  days  ago, 
and  which  has  been  inevitably  postponed  in  consequence  of  the  absence, 
through  illness,  of  the  noble  Earl  the  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury,  who  has 
come  down  here  to-day,  I  trust  at  no  inconvenience  to  himself.  I  do  not 
desire  to  challenge  any  convenient  ambiguity  in  diplomatic  instructions; 
but  it  is  because  there  are  certain  words  in  the  second  article  of  the  Treaty 
respecting  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  which  seem  to  me  calculated 
to  raise  a  doubt  to  disturb  the  public  opinion  of  Europe,  to  destroy  the 
pacific  character  of  the  Treaty,  and  to  be  irreconcilable  with  the  declara- 
tion of  the  Foreign  Minister  in  the  House  of  Commons,  that  I  venture  to 
put  this  Question.  When  on  the  7th  of  May  last  my  Lord  Stanley  presided 
at  the  Conference  of  the  Powers  on  this  subject,  he  brought  forward  a  pro- 
posal to  the  effect  that  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  should  be  a  neutral 
State,  and  that  the  contracting  parties  should  engage  to  secure  that  neu- 
trality. Now,  this  was  a  very  solemn  and  honourable  engagement  which  we 
and  the  other  parties  to  the  Treaty  were  asked  to  enter  into.  The  Prussian 
Government,  however,  was  not  content,  but  asked  for  something  more, 
and  the  "something  more"  which  they  proposed  was  the  sanction  of  the 
collective  guarantee  of  the  European  Powers.  That  was  therefore  intended 
to  be  something  different  from,  and  an  increase  of,  the  former  obligation 
which  Lord  Stanley  had  proposed.  At  first  Lord  Stanley  objected  to  the 
new  proposal;  but  after  a  consultation  with  the  Cabinet  he  agreed  to  it. 
Now,  what  is  the  practical  effect  of  that  guarantee  to  be  when  any  necessity 
for  action  arises?  Whether  that  action  is  to  be  of  a  material  or  a  moral 
character  must  from  the  very  nature  of  things  depend  on  the  circumstances 
which  arise.  On  that  point  I  do  not  desire  that  our  obligations  should  be  more 
strictly  defined  than  they  are  now.  But  the  interpretation  placed  upon  the 
Treaty  the  other  day  was  to  the  effect  that  if  any  one  of  the  signataries 
defied  that  Treaty  and  violated  the  neutrality  of  the  State  of  Luxemburg, 
it  would  by  that  very  act  render  the  Treaty  absolutely  null,  and  discharge 
all  the  other  parties  from  their  obligations.  Now,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that 
the  only  parties  against  whom  this  Treaty  was  directed  were  signataries 
to  it.  It  was  not  Spain,  or  Greece,  or  Denmark,  or  Sweden  that  were  the 
objects  of  this  Treaty  as  being  likely  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Luxem- 
burg. The  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  has,  on  account  of  its  peculiar  local  posi- 
tion, acquired  an  importance  which  its  natural  extent  and  character  among 
the  States  of  Europe  would  not  justify.  In  the  eyes  of  Prussia  the  neutrality 
of  Luxemburg  means  the  integrity  of  Belgium;  while  in  the  eyes  of  France 
the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  means  the  integrity  of  Holland.  Thus  grave 
questions  are  involved  in  what  is  apparently  a  small  and  trivial  matter. 
To  use  the  expressive  words  of  the  Professor  of  International  Law  in  the 
University  of  Oxford,  — 

1  Extract  from  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  3d  series,  vol.  clxxxviii,  pp.  966  to 
979.  House  of  Lords,  July  4,  1S67. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  607 

"If  the  default  of  one  of  the  parties  to  this  Treaty  does  discharge 
all  other  parties  from  their  obligations,  then  the  sole  case  in  which 
assistance  can  be  invoked  is  a  case  in  which  that  assistance  is  impos- 
sible." 
It  appears  to  me  that  if  the  object  of  the  Treaty  is  nullified  by  the  very 
act  to  prevent  which  it  was  entered  into,  you  convert  into  a  vague  ceremony 
what  was  intended  to  be  a  solemn  act  and  a  responsible  obligation.  And 
now,  one  word  on  what  passed  in  "another  place"  in  reference  to  this  sub- 
ject. Lord  Stanley  stated  that  in  assenting  to  the  Treaty  he  had  done  so 
with  more  doubt  and  anxiety  than  he  had  ever  felt  on  any  public  question. 
The  weight  of  those  words  is  to  my  mind  very  much  increased  by  the  char- 
acter of  the  noble  Lord,  who  is  not  a  man  to  indulge  in  exaggerated  state- 
ments or  even  in  strong  language  —  these  are  therefore  very  grave  words. 
I  believe  that  by  the  words  of  the  Treaty  the  parties  are  bound  to  resist 
any  aggression  whether  it  proceeds  from  one  of  the  signatories  or  not.  If 
the  aggressor  is  a  signatary,  he  adds  to  the  aggression  a  violation  of  the 
Treaty.  Lord  Stanley  used  the  words  "limited  liability"  in  reference  to 
this  question;  but  I  will  leave  it  to  your  Lordships  to  say  whether  limited 
liability  may  not  involve  a  very  serious  responsibility.  The  Question  which 
I  have  given  notice  to  put  to  the  noble  Earl  is  the  more  important,  because 
I  am  aware  that  there  is  political  agitation  going  on  both  in  France  and 
Prussia  with  respect  to  this  subject.  It  would  be  a  most  dangerous  thing 
for  any  one  in  that  or  the  other  House  of  Parliament  to  give  color  to  that 
agitation,  and  I  hope  that  no  interpretation  will  be  given  to  the  Treaty 
which  would  convert  a  sense  of  security  in  Europe  into  one  of  confusion  and 
alarm.  I  therefore  ask  the  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury,  What  is  the  construc- 
tion which  Her  Majesty's  Government  place  on  the  words  "  Collective 
guarantee"  (garanlie  collective)  in  the  Treaty  of  the  11th  of  May,  1867,  rela- 
tive to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg? 

The  Earl  of  Derby:  My  Lords,  I  regret  that  in  consequence  of  an 
attack  of  illness,  from  which  I  am  still  suffering  slightly,  I  have  been  obliged 
to  put  the  noble  Lord  to  the  inconvenience  of  postponing  more  than  once  a 
question  to  which  he  appears  to  attach  considerable  importance.  In  the  first 
place,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say,  although  I  am  ready  to  repeat  the  explana- 
tion I  have  already  given  of  this  Treaty,  but  which  does  not  appear  to  be 
satisfactory  to  the  noble  Lord,  that,  whatever  the  interpretation  which  I 
may  put  on  particular  words  of  the  Treaty,  or  whatever  the  interpretation 
which  Her  Majesty's  Government  may  put  on  it,  such  interpretation  can- 
not affect  the  International  Law  by  which  the  terms  of  all  treaties  are  con- 
strued. I,  for  one,  am  very  unwilling,  as  I  always  have  been,  to  underrate  or 
do  away  with  any  responsibility  which  this  country  may  have  incurred. 
Still  less  would  it  be  my  desire  that  we  should  shrink  from  carrying  that 
responsibility  out  as  far  as  the  means  of  this  country  would  go,  and  as  far 
as  we  are  bound  by  the  terms  of  any  treaty  into  which  we  may  enter.  In  my 
reference  to  the  Treaty  brought  under  our  notice  by  the  noble  Lord,  I  hope 
he  will  not  understand  me  as  speaking  of  moral  obligations  but  of  the  tech- 
nical obligations  imposed  by  the  Treaty.  To  the  latter  only  the  noble  Lord's 
question  has  reference,  and  to  them  alone  shall  I  apply  myself  in  my  answer. 
I  am  not  much  skilled  in  the  ways  of  diplomatists,  but  I  believe  that  if  there 
be  one  thing  more  clear  than  another  it  is  the  distinction  between  a  collec- 


608     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

tive  guarantee  and  a  separate  and  several  guarantee.  A  several  guarantee 
binds  each  of  the  parties  to  do  its  utmost  individually  to  enforce  the  obser- 
vance of  the  guarantee.  A  collective  guarantee  is  one  which  is  binding  on 
all  the  parties  collectively;  but  which,  if  any  difference  of  opinion  should 
arise,  no  one  of  them  can  be  called  upon  to  take  upon  itself  the  task  of  vin- 
dication by  force  of  arms.  The  guarantee  is  collective,  and  depends  upon 
the  union  of  all  the  parties  signing  it;  and  no  one  of  those  parties  is  bound 
to  take  upon  itself  the  duty  of  enforcing  the  fulfilment  of  the  guarantee. 
The  noble  Lord  expressed  some  surprise  that  with  my  noble  Relative's 
views  of  the  limited  nature  of  the  guarantee  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  the 
11th  of  May  he  should  have  said  in  "  another  place"  that  he  never  had  con- 
sented to  any  measure  with  greater  reluctance  than  that  which  he  had  felt 
in  regard  of  the  guarantee  embodied  in  this  Treaty.  My  Lords,  I  think  it 
is  not  very  difficult  to  see  why  my  noble  Relative  should  have  entertained 
that  reluctance.  It  was  not  till  the  first  day  of  the  meeting  of  the  Conference 
my  noble  Relative  had  an  opportunity  of  knowing  the  extent  of  the  guaran- 
tee expected  by  Prussia;  and  what  has  passed  this  evening  shows  that  he 
was  not  unreasonable  in  his  apprehensions  that,  however  cautious  the  word- 
ing of  the  guarantee  might  be,  in  the  opinion  of  some  we  might  be  supposed 
to  have  entered  into  engagements  more  extensive  than  those  which  we  had 
actually  undertaken,  and  be  by  them  held  guilty  of  a  breach  of  faith  if  we 
did  not  carry  our  responsibility  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  warranted.  I  must  now  call  your  Lordship's  attention  to  the  precise 
circumstances  under  which  this  guarantee  was  asked  for  and  given.  It  is 
quite  true  that,  in  the  first  place,  Prussia  laid  down  as  one  of  the  bases  on 
which  she  would  enter  into  the  Conference  that  she  should  receive  a  Euro- 
pean guarantee  for  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  My  noble  Relative,  in 
the  project  of  a  treaty  which  he  prepared  for  the  Conference,  did  not  use 
the  word  "guarantee";  but  in  reference  to  the  Article  declaring  that  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  should  thenceforth  form  a  perpetually  inde- 
pendent State  proposed  the  words  "  the  high  contracting  parties  engage  to 
respect  the  principle  of  neutrality  stipulated  by  the  present  Article."  Prus- 
sia did  not  think  that  went  far  enough;  for  the  Protocol  states:  — 

"The  Plenipotentiary  of  Prussia  says  that  he  has  in  general  no  ob- 
jection to  make  to  the  project  of  treaty  presented  by  Lord  Stanley,  but 
that  he  remarks  in  it  a  departure  from  the  programme  on  the  basis  of 
which  his  Government  had  accepted  the  invitation  to  the  Conference; 
that  is  to  say,  the  European  guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg;  that,  however,  as  all  the  Powers  represented  in 
the  Conference  have  admitted  and  accepted  that  programme,  he  thinks 
himself  justified  in  hoping  that  this  omission  will  be  supplied  in  the 
discussion  of  Article  II.  The  Plenipotentiaries  of  Austria,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  and  Russia,  confirm  the  statement  of  the  Plenipotentiary 
of  Prussia  that  the  Powers  had  accepted  as  the  basis  of  negotiation  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg  under  a  collective  guarantee.  Lord  Stanley 
points  out  that  in  virtue  of  the  Treaties  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839,  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  is  already  placed  under  a  European  guaran- 
tee. As  to  the  terms  which,  in  the  project  of  treaty  which  he  has  had  the 
honour  of  communicating  to  the  Conference,  refer  to  the  neutrality  to 
be  established  for  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  they  are  identical 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  609 

with  those  which  declare  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in  Article  VII  of 
the  Annex  to  the  treaty  signed  in  London  on  the  19th  of  April,  1839, 
between  Austria,  France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia  and  Russia  on  the 
one  part,  and  the  Netherlands  on  the  other  part.  Count  de  Bernstorff 
points  out  that  the  Treaty  of  1839,  although  it  places  the  territory  of 
Luxemburg  under  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers,  does  not  guarantee  its 
neutrality.  Now,  the  difference  between  this  guarantee  and  that  given 
to  Belgium  is  very  important;  and  he  expresses  the  hope  of  seeing  the 
same  guarantee  given  by  the  Powers  to  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 
as  is  enjoyed  by  that  of  Belgium.  It  is  thereupon  agreed  between  the 
Plenipotentiaries  to  proceed  to  an  examination  of  the  project  of  treaty, 
article  by  article.  To  add  at  the  end  of  the  Article  the  words:  —  'That 
principle  is  and  remains  placed  under  the  sanction  of  the  collective 
(or  common)  guarantee  of  the  Powers  signing,  parties  to  the  present 
treaty,  with  the  exception  of  Belgium,  which  is  itself  a  neutral  State.' 
Baron  de  Brunnow  says  that  he  is  authorized  by  his  Oourt  to  assent 
entirely  to  the  principle  of  placing  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Luxemburg  under  a  collective  guarantee.  He  hopes  that  this  prin- 
ciple will  be  admitted  and  adopted  unanimously  as  the  best  pledge  that 
can  be  offered  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  Europe.  Count  Apponyi 
declares  that  his  Government  has  also  accepted  the  guaranteed  neu- 
trality of  Luxemburg  as  the  basis  of  negotiation." 
And  what  does  the  Plenipotentiary  for  France  say?  — 

"  Prince  de  la  Tour  d'Auvergne  says  that,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned, 
he  has  no  special  instructions  respecting  the  question  of  a  collective 
guarantee;  but  that  he  must  agree  that  this  guarantee  has  hitherto 
been  put  forward  as  the  complement  of  the  neutralization  of  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg;  and,  although,  in  fact,  the  engagement  which 
the  Powers  take  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  has,  in  his 
opinion,  under  the  circumstances  a  value  almost  equal  to  that  of  a  for- 
mal guarantee,  he  cannot  deny  that  the  Prussian  Ambassador  is  justi- 
fied in  his  observations." 
I  wish  the  noble  Lord,  when  in  asking  for  an  interpretation  of  the  Treaty, 
had  been  kind  enough  to  inform  us  what  is  his  interpretation  of  the  guaran- 
tee.  I  think  it  would  be  desirable  to  know  what,  in  the  view  of  the  noble 
Lord,  is  the  true  signification  of  a  collective  guarantee,  signed  by  several 
Powers;  because  if,  as  seems  to  be  the  noble  Lord's  inference,  each  of  the 
parties  to  such  a  guarantee  is  not  only  bound  itself  to  respect  the  treaty, 
but  also  to  enforce  individually  its  maintenance  by  all  the  other  Powers  who 
were  parties  to  the  treaty,  I  think  the  French  Plenipotentiary  would  hardly 
have  said  the  two  terms  were  so  similar  that  one  was  nearly  equal  to  the 
other.  Let  me  give  your  Lordships  one  or  two  instances  of  separate  guaran- 
tees and  of  collective  guarantees.  The  first  I  will  take  is  a  very  remarkable 
case  —  that  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.    In  the  year  1831 
a  Conference  of  the  five  Great  Powers  laid  down  twenty-five  Articles,  which 
were  to  determine  the  relations  between  Belgium  and  Holland,  and  which 
were  to  form  the  basis  of  a  treaty  between  those  two  countries.  The  Powers 
who  were  parties  to  that  Conference  of  1831  bound  themselves  to  uphold, 
not  collectively,  but  severally  and  individually,  the  integrity  of  the  treaty. 
That  was  a  separate  and  individual  guarantee.    But,  notwithstanding,  in 


610     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

1832,  when  Belgium,  who  had  not  been  put  in  possession  of  the  territory 
assigned  to  her  by  that  treaty,  called  on  the  Powers  parties  to  the  Confer- 
ence to  enforce  her  rights,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria  declined  to  inter- 
fere by  force  of  arms  for  that  purpose;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  France  and 
England,  taking  a  stricter  view  of  the  obligations  imposed  upon  them  by  the 
treaty,  proceeded  to  enforce  it  by  combined  naval  and  military  operations. 
In  the  same  treaty  there  was  comprised  a  guarantee  for  the  possession  of 
Luxemburg  by  the  King  of  Holland,  not  in  his  capacity  as  King  of  Hol- 
land, but  as  Grand  Duke  of  Luxemburg.  In  1839,  after  a  treaty  had  been 
made  between  Belgium  and  Holland  embodying  the  main  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  1831,  a  separate  one  was  entered  into  between  the  five  Powers 
and  Belgium,  in  which  the  obligations  of  the  former  Treaty  of  1831  were 
repeated  and  renewed,  and  the  five  Powers  bound  themselves  separately 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Belgium,  its  neutrality  and  independence.  The 
Prussian  Minister  must  have  been  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  terms  of  that 
treaty  by  which  the  five  Powers,  acting  individually,  guaranteed  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium;  yet  if  he  thought  the  one  kind  of  guarantee  equal  to 
the  other,  I  want  to  know  why  he  should  have  studiously  altered  the  words 
and  asked  not  for  a  separate  and  several  guarantee,  but  for  a  collective 
guarantee  by  the  Great  Powers  for  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Lux- 
emburg? With  regard  to  the  difference  between  a  collective  and  a  several 
guarantee,  I  may  refer  to  another  case  in  illustration  of  what  I  have  said. 
In  1856  an  agreement  was  signed  by  seven  great  Powers  —  Great  Britain, 
Austria,  France,  Prussia,  Russia,  Sardinia,  and  Turkey  —  with  regard  to 
the  independence  of  Turkey,  and  these  are  the  terms  in  which  that  guaran- 
tee is  given.  The  several  Potentates  — 

"  declare  the  Sublime  Porte  admitted  to  participate  in  the  advantages 
of  the  public  law  and  system  {concert)  of  Europe.    Their  Majesties 
engage,"  —  and  I  wish  you  particularly  to  observe  this,  —  "  each  on 
his  part,  to  respect  the  independence  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire;  guarantee  in  common  the  strict  observance  of  that 
engagement,  and  will,  in  consequence,  consider  any  act  tending  to  its 
violation  as  a  question  of  general  interest." 
The  engagement  "each  on  his  part"  and  "guarantee  in  common"  are 
precisely  the  terms  introduced  into  the  Treaty  of  May,  1867,  on  the  request 
of  the  Prussian  Minister,  and  the  security  his  Government  desired  to 
obtain.  Are  these  treaties,  then,  to  be  deemed  binding  on  all  the  Powers, 
signataries  of  the  treaty,  not  only  individually  to  respect,  but  collectively, 
individually,  and  separately  to  guarantee  and  enforce  the  neutrality  of 
Luxemburg?  I  think  the  answer  to  that  question  is  given  by  a  treaty  signed 
only  fifteen  days  after  that  from  which  I  have  just  quoted;  I  refer  to  the 
tripartite  treaty  signed  between  Great  Britain,  Austria,  and  France,  having 
for  its  object  the  very  same  purpose  as  the  former  treaty  —  the  integrity 
and  independence  of  the  territories  of  Turkey.  Now,  if  that  was  secured  by 
the  treaty  among  the  seven  Powers,  signed  only  a  fortnight  before,  and  if 
that  engagement  was  binding,  as  I  understood  the  noble  Lord  contends, 
upon  each  of  the  Powers  separately,  I  say  there  was  no  occasion  for  the  sec- 
ond treaty  whatever.   The  very  existence  of  the  second  treaty  admits  the 
insufficiency  of  its  predecessor,  and  is  couched  in  these  terms  — 

"  The  high  contracting  parties  guarantee,  jointly  and  severally,  the 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  611 

independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  recorded  in 
the  treaty  concluded  at  Paris  on  the  30th  of  March,  1856." 
By  this  separate  treaty  the  three  Powers  separately  and  individually 
guarantee  the  same  thing  which  a  fortnight  before  had  been  collectively 
guaranteed  by  the  seven  Powers.  The  three  Powers  found  it  necessary  to 
sign  a  treaty  which  should  express  an  obligation  upon  each,  because  the 
previous  treaty  was  not  binding  separately  and  severally  upon  all  the  signa- 
tary  Powers.   The  treaty  goes  on  to  say  — 

"  Any  infraction  of  the  stipulations  of  the  said  treaty  will  be  consid- 
ered by  the  Powers  signing  the  present  treaty  as  casus  belli.  They  will 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Sublime  Porte  as  to  the  measures 
which  have  become  necessary,  and  will  without  delay  determine  among 
themselves  as  to  the  employment  of  their  military  and  naval  forces." 
It  is  impossible  more  clearly  to  appreciate  the  distinction  between  a  col- 
lective guarantee  and  a  several  guarantee  than  by  considering  the  cause, 
wording,  and  effect  of  these  two  treaties,  signed  within  a  fortnight  of  each 
other.  If  the  noble  Lord  [Lord  Houghton]  is  not  satisfied  with  my  view  of 
this  treaty,  —  namely,  that  the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  rests 
upon  the  collective  voice  and  upon  the  honour  of  all  the  Powers  who  are 
signataries  to  it,  —  I  should  wish  that  he  give  us  his  interpretation  of  its 
effect,  and  to  what  extent  it  is  binding  upon  us.  I  will  put  a  case  to  him. 
Suppose  that  Prussia  with  a  view  of  making  war  on  France,  or  France  with 
a  view  of  making  war  upon  Prussia,  were  to  enter  the  territory  of  Luxem- 
burg, —  thereby,  of  course,  violating  its  neutrality  by  the  mere  passage  of 
an  army,  for  I  am  not  dealing  with  the  question  of  occupation  or  possession, 
but  of  violating  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  by  passing  an  army  through 
it,  —  does  the  noble  Lord  mean  to  say  that  all  the  guaranteeing  Powers  in 
this  Treaty  of  1867,  or  each  singly,  would  be  bound  by  the  obligations 
thrown  on  them  by  this  treaty  to  go  to  war  against  the  Power  —  whichever 
it  might  be  —  which  entered  Luxemburg  with  an  army?  Would  Prussia 
desire  this  interpretation  of  the  treaty?  Suppose,  in  anticipation  of  any  in- 
vasion by  France,  Prussia  thought  it  necessary  to  make  defensive  advances 
into  Luxemburg,  would  Prussia  contend  that  all  the  other  Powers  would  be 
thereby  bound  to  take  part  with  France  in  a  war  against  her  for  the  purpose 
of  vindicating  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg?  And  supposing,  in  a  case,  that 
Russia  and  Austria  held  aloof  from  the  fulfilment  of  their  portion  of  the 
guarantee  in  the  event  of  any  case  for  interference  arising,  does  the  noble 
Lord  for  a  moment  contend  that  England  —  situated  as  she  is,  and  abso- 
lutely unable  to  put  a  sufficient  military  force  on  the  Continent  for  preserv- 
ing this  neutrality  —  has  contracted  the  obligation  of  enforcing  the  guaran- 
tee which  she  gave  in  common  with  all  the  other  Powers  of  Europe?  Such 
a  construction  is  contrary  to  all  the  rules  of  interpretation,  and  far  beyond 
what  this  country  should  undertake  or  carry  through.  Suppose,  again,  that 
France  and  Prussia,  for  the  purpose  of  coming  to  a  contest,  should  simul- 
taneously violate  the  neutrality,  in  what  position  would  the  other  Powers 
be?  Should  the  remaining  guarantors  or  England  alone  immediately  begin 
a  sort  of  triangular  duel,  to  prevent  the  violation  of  the  treaty  by  Powers 
who  had  already  violated  it?  It  is  evident  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  must 
be  construed  with  a  regard  to  what  is  reasonable  and  practicable;  and  I  say 
again  that  by  a  collective  guarantee  it  is  well  understood  that  while  in 


612     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

honor  all  the  Powers  who  are  parties  to  it  severally  engage  to  maintain,  for 
their  own  part,  a  strict  respect  for  the  territory  for  which  neutrality  is 
guaranteed;  and  although,  undoubtedly,  any  one  Power  has  a  perfect  right 
to  declare  a  casus  belli  if  she  think  fit  because  of  the  violation  of  the  guaran- 
tee, yet  a  single  Power  is  not  bound  to  take  up  the  cudgels  for  all  the  other 
Powers  with  whom  she  gave  a  collective  guarantee.  I  can  give  no  further 
interpretation  of  the  treaty  than  this  —  that  as  far  as  the  honor  of  England 
is  concerned  she  will  be  bound  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg;  and 
I  expect  that  all  the  other  Powers  will  equally  respect  it;  but  she  is  not 
bound  to  take  upon  herself  the  Quixotic  duty,  in  the  case  of  a  violation  of 
the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  by  one  of  the  other  Powers,  of  interfering  to 
prevent  its  violation  —  because  we  have  only  undertaken  to  guarantee  it  in 
common  with  all  the  other  great  Powers  of  Europe.  The  integrity  of  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg  must  not  rest  upon  the  force  of  arms  of  any  par- 
ticular one  of  the  guaranteeing  Powers;  but  upon  the  honor  of  all  the  guar- 
anteeing Powers  together,  upon  the  general  obligation  taken  in  the  face  of 
Europe  by  all  the  signatary  Powers;  and  if  the  neutrality  should  be  vio- 
lated by  any  one  of  them,  then  I  say  it  is  not  a  case  of  obligation,  but  a  case 
of  discretion  with  each  of  the  other  signatary  Powers  as  to  how  far  they 
should  singly  or  collectively  take  upon  themselves  to  vindicate  the  neu- 
trality guaranteed. 

Earl  Russell:  My  Lords,  I  think  it  very  unfortunate  that  in  so  short  a 
time  after  a  treaty  has  been  signed  there  should  be  a  discussion  in  Parlia- 
ment as  to  its  precise  meaning,  and  as  to  how  far  England  is  bound  by  it. 
It  is  particularly  unfortunate  in  this  instance,  because  we  know  that  the 
explanations  given  by  the  noble  Lord,  reported  as  they  have  been  in  the 
newspapers  and  otherwise,  have  created  a  very  unpleasant  feeling  in  Prus- 
sia, and  that  it  is  commonly  said  there  that  it  is  no  use  to  sign  a  treaty  with 
England,  because  England  will  find  a  means  of  escaping  from  the  obliga- 
tions imposed  on  her  by  it.  That  is  a  very  unfortunate  state  of  things ;  and 
I  think  it  also  very  unnecessary  to  discuss  with  regard  to  the  treaty,  as  the 
noble  Earl  has  done,  what  this  country  is  bound  to  do  in  a  variety  of  sup- 
posed cases.  It  is  hardly  possible  to  suppose  a  case  which  shall  be  exactly 
what  will  occur,  and  I  would  much  rather  be  contented  with  the  arrange- 
ment made.  I  should  have  thought  that  the  declaration  on  the  part  of  all 
the  Powers  was  sufficient  security  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  I  could  not 
be  surprised  that  the  French  Ambassador  should  say,  on  the  part  of  France, 
"  We  regard  the  engagement  as  very  little  more  than  a  promise  to  respect 
the  principles  of  neutrality  as  stipulated  in  the  present  treaty";  —  because 
supposing  all  the  powers  to  respect  that  principle  of  neutrality,  or  suppos- 
ing France  and  Prussia  to  respect  it,  there  is  very  little  danger  of  interfer- 
ence being  required.  With  regard  to  the  technical  interpretation  of  the 
treaty,  I  am  inclined  not  to  dispute  that  given  by  the  noble  Earl.  There  can 
be  no  better  instance  by  which  to  interpret  the  treaty  than  that  to  which 
the  noble  Earl  has  referred.  The  treaty  with  regard  to  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  was,  I  remember,  the  result  of  discussions  which  took  place 
at  the  time.  The  declaration  of  Russia  always  was  that  she  was  herself 
ready  to  respect  the  integrity  of  Turkey,  and  that  she  had  no  intention  or 
wish  to  violate  it;  but  that  she  was  not  inclined  to  agree  to  a  stipulation  that 
in  case  that  integrity  was  violated  by  Persia  or  any  other  neighboring  Power 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  613 

to  Turkey,  Russia  should  be  bound  at  once  to  interfere  by  force  of  arms  to 
maintain  the  integrity  of  Turkey. 

The  Earl  of  Dekby:  Will  the  noble  Earl  permit  me  to  say  that  Russia's 
declaration  was  that  she  would  not  only  for  herself  respect  the  integrity  of 
Turkey,  but  that  she  should  join  in  a  collective  guarantee  for  that  object, 
and  that  collective  guarantee  was  drawn  up  in  the  precise  terms  introduced 
into  this  Treaty  of  1856? 

Earl  Russell:  It  was  for  that  reason  that  I  said  I  am  not  disposed  to 
deny  the  technical  obligation  as  stated  by  the  noble  Earl.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Russia  declared,  no  doubt,  that  she  agreed  to  a  collective  guarantee 
in  the  form  proposed,  and  that  she  did  not  feel  bound  by  that  guarantee  to 
interfere  by  force  of  arms  if  Turkey  should  be  attacked.  But  I  think  the 
noble  Earl  did  much  in  the  early  part  of  his  statement  to  do  away  with  any 
doubts  or  fears  we  might  before  have  entertained  upon  the  subject.  The 
noble  Earl  seemed  to  imply  that  because  there  was  no  individual  guaran- 
tee, there  was  no  individual  obligation;  but  he  considered  that  a  moral 
obligation  would  rest  upon  this  country  which  might  have  to  be  met.  Now, 
with  regard  to  this  it  strikes  me  that  if  there  is  a  moral  obligation,  that 
moral  obligation  must  entirely  depend  for  its  execution  upon  the  circum- 
stances which  at  any  future  time  may  exist.  If  one  of  those  two  Powers, 
France  or  Prussia,  were  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg,  and  the 
Power  which  objected  and  protested  against  that  violation  were  to  appeal 
to  the  other  Powers,  I  should  myself  consider  that  there  would  be  a  moral 
obligation  upon  those  Powers  to  call  upon  the  Power  so  violating  the  neu- 
trality to  withdraw  from  its  position,  and  to  enforce  that  appeal  if  neces- 
sary by  resorting  to  arms.  That  appears  to  be  the  meaning  of  a  moral 
obligation,  and  that  such  is  the  meaning  is,  I  think,  obvious  from  the  cir- 
cumstances referred  to  by  my  noble  Friend  (Lord  Houghton).  I  understand 
that  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  stated  in  the  other  House  that  it  was 
with  the  greatest  doubt,  hesitation,  and  reluctance  that  he  acceded  to  the 
proposal  of  the  Prussian  Government.  The  Prussian  Government  were 
not  content  with  the  proposal  originally  made,  and  insisted  with  great 
pertinacity  on  the  collective  guarantee,  and  it  was  upon  these  representa- 
tions that  Lord  Stanley,  with  much  hesitation,  agreed  to  this  collective 
guarantee.  Yet  for  some  time  we  have  been  told,  this  House  has  been  told, 
and  Europe  has  been  told,  that  this  article,  which  was  demanded  with  so 
much  pertinacity  by  one  Government,  and  assented  to  with  so  much  reluc- 
tance by  another,  was  no  more  than  waste  paper,  and  that  if  one  of  these 
Powers  violated  this  neutrality  it  was  immediately  at  an  end.  If  this  were 
all,  the  article  would  be  something  less  than  the  engagement  respecting  the 
neutrality  of  the  Duchy  that  already  existed.  I  expect  and  hope,  that  the 
article  may  be  respected,  and  that  the  stipulations  will  be  observed  by  all 
the  parties  to  the  treaty.  I  do  not  myself  believe  that  either  France  or 
Prussia  have  any  intention  of  violating  their  engagements  with  regard  to 
Luxemburg;  but  I  think  it  would  be  a  very  unfortunate  thing  if  this  coun- 
try were  to  be  led  into  a  mistaken  notion  of  the  nature  of  the  obligation 
incurred  under  the  treaty,  and  thus  be  led  so  to  act  as  to  create  the  impres- 
sion that  we  were  willing  to  incur  obligations  without  the  intention  of  ful- 
filling them  when  the  time  arrived  for  our  so  doing.  I  hope  that  no  such 
occasion  may  arise;  but  if  it  does  arise,  I  trust  that  whatever  may  at  the 


614     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

time  be  found  to  be  the  moral  obligation  of  this  country  will  be  punctually 
and  faithfully  performed. 

Lord  Lyveden  said,  that  the  term,  a  "  collective  guarantee,"  appeared 
to  be  a  misnomer  for  the  treaty  to  which  we  had  recently  been  parties. 
From  what  had  been  stated  it  did  not  seem  to  be  anything  more  than  an 
honourable  arrangement  by  which  each  Power  was  bound  by  its  own  hon- 
our to  respect  its  stipulations,  but  was  bound  in  no  other  way.  He  trusted 
that  the  construction  put  upon  the  treaty  by  his  noble  Friend  (Earl  Russell) 
was  not  the  one  put  upon  it  by  the  Prime  Minister,  and  that  we  had  not 
really  incurred  any  such  moral  obligation  as  that  to  which  his  noble  Friend 
had  alluded. 

Viscount  Stratford  de  Redcliffe  addressed  a  few  observations  to  the 
House  which  were  inaudible. 

The  Duke  of  Argyll  said,  that  the  answer  which  the  noble  Earl  (the 
Earl  of  Derby)  had  given  some  few  weeks  since  to  a  Question  which  he  had 
put  upon  the  Paper  referring  to  this  subject  had  created  some  sensation. 
The  noble  Earl,  in  answering  his  Question,  had  not  referred  to  what  would 
have  to  be  done  supposing  the  treaty  were  violated  by  one  of  the  contract- 
ing Powers,  and  the  remainder  called  conjointly  upon  England  to  fulfil  the 
stipulations  entered  into.  In  that  case  he  (the  Duke  of  Argyll)  believed 
that  the  natural  interpretation  of  the  treaty  would  be  that  we  were  not  only 
morally,  but  also  legally  bound  to  act  with  the  other  Powers.  That  was  not 
the  interpretation  put  upon  it  by  the  Government,  and  that  was  so  far 
satisfactory,  because  they  hoped  that  the  present  Government  might  never 
be  called  upon  to  take  action  in  any  way  in  consequence  of  the  treaty;  but 
we  had  no  security  that  any  future  Administration  would  put  the  same 
interpretation  upon  it  —  they  would,  of  course,  put  their  own  interpreta- 
tion upon  it,  and  act  as  circumstances  required. 

Earl  Grey  thought  that  these  discussions  were  very  greatly  to  be  re- 
gretted. He  could  only  express  a  hope  that  after  the  explanation  which 
had  been  given  by  the  noble  Earl  at  the  head  of  the  Government  the  sub- 
ject would  not  be  pressed  any  further,  because  he  felt  persuaded  that  these 
constant  discussions  were  calculated  to  do  harm,  and  could  only  lead  to 
difficulty  and  misunderstanding. 

Lord  Denman  said,  that  guarantees  seldom  led  to  serious  consequences 
where  there  was  perfect  good  faith  and  good-will  on  all  sides;  but  he  pro- 
tested against  the  House  discussing  a  question  of  the  breach  of  a  guarantee 
until  a  breach  appeared  likely  to  take  place.  He  was  quite  certain  that  in 
case  of  the  treaty  being  in  danger,  there  would  be  a  Conference  of  all  the 
parties  to  the  treaty,  and  as  the  consequences  of  Austria  not  agreeing  to  a 
Conference  had  been  so  serious  to  her,  and  to  many  States  of  Germany,  and 
aggression  had  been  justified  on  the  ground  of  the  refusal  to  join  one,  he 
believed  that  all  would  prefer  a  Conference  to  disunion.  He  thought  the 
guarantee  perfectly  safe,  and  believed  that  it  was  as  advantageous  to  Hol- 
land as  in  the  case  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  in  which  the  contracting 
parties  bound  themselves  to  "protect  and  guarantee  all  the  dominions, 
jurisdictions,  etc.,  which  the  Lords,  the  States-General,  possessed  against 
all  persons  whatsoever." 

Lord  Houghton,  in  reply,  thought  it  would  be  exceedingly  presump- 
tuous in  him  to  accept  the  challenge  of  the  noble  Earl  opposite  and  place 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  615 

his  interpretation  on  the  treaty,  and  the  guarantee  entered  into  under  it. 
Much  must,  of  course,  be  left  to  the  good  sense  and  good  feeling  of  the  Pow- 
ers of  Europe;  but  he  accepted  the  interpretation  of  the  noble  Earl  (Earl 
Russell)  and  of  the  noble  Duke  who  followed  him  —  that  if  the  neutrality 
of  Luxemburg  was  invaded  by  one  of  the  signataries  to  the  treaty,  and  we 
were  called  upon  by  the  other  signataries  to  cease  amicable  relations  with 
the  aggressor,  we  should  be  bound  in  honour  to  answer  that  appeal.  That, 
he  believed,  was  the  sense  in  which,  in  this  country  and  abroad,  the  treaty 
would  be  generally  understood. 

PARLIAMENTARY   DEBATES   REGARDING  THE 
NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  » 

House  of  Commons,  August  9,  1870 
Mr.  Rylands  said  in  part :  It  was  only  the  other  night,  that  the  right  hon. 
Gentleman,  the  Member  for  Tarn  worth  (Sir  Henry  Lytton  Bulwer),  whose 
distinguished  position  gave  him  great  authority  on  these  subjects,  had  told 
them  of  a  remarkable  circumstance  which  had  naturally  excited  consider- 
able attention  in  the  country.  His  right  hon.  Friend  had  said  that  before 
the  ink  with  which  the  Treaty  of  1831  guaranteeing  Belgium  was  signed 
was  hardly  dry,  there  was  a  negotiation  between  the  French  and  Prussian 
Ambassadors  of  that  day  to  break  its  conditions.  And  just  recently  there 
was  the  proposed  Secret  Treaty  between  France  and  Prussia  which  had 
been  brought  to  light  not  by  diplomatists,  but  by  the  Press,  and  which  gave 
us  the  right  to  say,  notwithstanding  every  denial  and  explanation,  that  the 
course  pursued  by  France  and  Prussia  was  open  to  grave  suspicion.  But 
according  to  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Government  had  practically  given  up 
a  Treaty  under  which  the  independence  of  Belgium  was  guaranteed  by 
the  five  great  Powers,  for  a  separate  Treaty  with  the  two  very  Powers  whose 
agents  so  recently  had  been  negotiating  an  infraction  of  the  former  Treaty. 
It  appeared  that  under  the  terms  of  the  new  Treaty  if  one  of  the  belligerents 
were  crushed  and  its  military  forces  destroyed,  we  were  to  fight  alongside 
that  crushed  Power,  against  the  victorious  Power,  should  the  latter  invade 
Belgium.  That  was  not  a  satisfactory  position.  The  hon.  Member  for 
Leicester  seemed  to  think  we  ought  to  defend  every  small  and  independent 
State  against  aggression;  why,  then,  did  we  not  interfere  on  behalf  of 
Schleswig-Holstein,  of  Hanover,  and  the  Duchies  and  Archduchies  which 
were  crushed  out  of  existence  by  Prussia  and  by  Italy?  Did  those  Sover- 
eigns not  excite  the  sympathies  of  his  hon.  Friend? 

House  of  Lords,  August  10,  1870  2 
Lord  Cairns  said,  in  part:  .  .  .  Now,  I  can  conceive  nothing  more  likely 
than  that  a  skilful  politician,  or  an  ingenious  strategist,  would  be  able  with- 
out very  great  difficulty  so  to  arrange  matters  on  behalf  of  one  of  the  belli- 
gerent Powers  that  it  would  become  absolutely  necessary  for  the  other  belli- 
gerent to  commit  some  act  which  would  be  a  violation  of  that  neutrality; 
and  then,  the  moment  that  that  act  was  done,  the  cooperation  of  England 

1  Extract  from  Hansard's   Parliamentary  Debates,  3d  Series,  vol.  ccm,  pp.  1742-43. 
s  Extracts  from  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  3d  Series,  vol.  ccm,  pp,  1751-52,  et 
seq. 


616     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

is  secured  to  that  belligerent  who  has  caused  and  necessitated  the  very  act 
of  which  we  complain.  I  ask  your  Lordships  what  would  be  the  effect  on 
public  opinion  in  this  country  if  anything  of  the  kind  occurred?  Suppose 
one  of  the  belligerents,  by  this  ingenuity, — , which  I  think  would  not  be  very 
difficult  —  succeeded  in  making  it  necessary  for  the  other  belligerent,  for 
the  sake  of  its  own  preservation,  to  do  some  act  which  would  be  a  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium;  and  suppose  the  people  of  this  country  should 
see,  as  they  certainly  would,  that  the  real  offender  was  not  the  belligerent 
who  actually  and  mechanically  violated  the  neutrality,  but  the  other,  who 
made  that  act  necessary;  what  would  the  country  say  if  it  found  the  Gov- 
ernment engaging  us  in  a  war  on  behalf  of  and  in  cooperation  with  that 
belligerent  which  was  morally  the  guilty  party  in  the  transaction?  (Pp. 
1751-52.) 

Earl  Granville  said,  in  part:  My  Lords,  I  have  heard  the  speech  of  my 
noble  and  learned  Friend  (Lord  Cairns)  with  a  feeling  of  very  great  relief. 
I  expected  —  and  my  expectations  have  certainly  been  justified  —  that  he 
would  speak  with  that  reserve  and  fairness  towards  the  Government  on  a 
great  international  question  which  he  was  likely  to  exhibit  on  such  an  occa- 
sion; but  I  knew  also  that,  with  regard  to  the  particular  form  of  the  pro- 
posal, every  possible  objection  to  it  would  be  exhausted  by  the  ability  and 
the  skill  of  the  noble  and  learned  Lord,  and  I  am  much  relieved  at  finding 
what  those  objections  seem  to  be.  The  noble  and  learned  Lord  very  fairly 
stated  what  course  ought,  in  his  judgment,  to  have  been  pursued  by  Her 
Majesty's  Government.  He  said  we  should  have  entered  into  no  engage- 
ment whatever,  but  have  declared,  without  any  menace  to  the  belligerents, 
our  determination  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Now,  I  ventured 
the  other  day,  with  regard  to  the  question  of  menace,  to  say  that  I  believed 
the  form  in  which  we  had  put  it  was  less  menacing  and  less  offensive  to  those 
Powers  than  any  other  way  in  which  it  could  have  been  put.  I  will  venture 
to  explain  my  meaning.  It  is  mainly  a  matter  as  to  form,  and  not  as  to  sub- 
stance —  because  if  there  were  a  difference  of  substance  I  should  own  we 
had  put  ourselves  in  the  wrong.  It  is  sometimes  useful  to  compare  the  ac- 
tion of  nations  and  that  of  individuals,  and  very  often  the  conduct  of  a  high- 
spirited  nation  and  of  an  honourable  man  is  very  much  the  same.  I  will 
suppose  that  one  of  your  Lordships  found  two  persons  about  to  engage  in  a 
duel,  and  at  once  declared  to  them  both  the  obligation  he  would  feel  under 
to  strike  the  one  who  took  an  unfair  part  in  that  duel.  I  believe  that  would 
be  regarded  by  both  as  an  imputation  upon  their  intentions,  and  might  al- 
most encourage  them  to  do  that  which  otherwise  they  would  have  thought 
wrong  by  being  precluded  from  doing  it  by  menace.  But  if,  instead  of  that, 
the  third  person  says  to  each  —  '"You  say,  as  I  have  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve, you  mean  to  fight  without  any  unfair  play  whatever;  but  you  express 
a  suspicion  that  fair  play  will  not  be  exhibited  by  the  person  with  whom 
you  are  engaged  in  hostilities.  If  it  is  any  pleasure  to  you  that  I  should 
agree  with  you  to  strike  your  opponent  if  he  begins  unfair  play,  I  will  do 
bo;  but,  mind,  this  is  a  bargain  which  I  must  offer  to  the  other  equally."  I 
believe  that  exactly  in  proportion  as  they  were  confident  of  their  own  good 
faith  and  suspicious  of  the  bad  faith  of  their  opponent  they  would  accept,  as 
France  and  Prussia  have  accepted,  the  proposal  so  made  to  them.   The 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  617 

noble  and  learned  Lord  says  we  ought,  without  menace,  to  have  told  them 
what  we  were  going  to  do,  and  then,  he  says,  you  should  have  strengthened 
yourselves  by  going  to  the  other  great  Powers  parties  to  the  guarantee  of 
1839;  and  this,  he  says,  would  have  strengthened  our  position.  Now,  the 
facts  as  they  have  happened  show  that  the  course  which  he  suggests  would 
not  have  been  successful.  I  stated  the  other  day  that  we  had  received  the 
most  friendly  assurances  from  both  Russia  and  Austria.  Now,  it  is  rather 
curious  that  we  have  since  received  from  Austria  her  distinct  readiness  to 
agree  to  our  proposal,  supposing  that  France  and  Prussia  do  not  object  to 
sign  the  Treaty.  So  that  with  regard  to  Austria  we  have  exactly  secured  the 
very  promise  and  consent  to  our  proposal  which  she  would  not  have  given 
to  a  single  menace  on  our  part.  From  Russia  we  have  received  the  most 
friendly  assurances;  but  there  is  certainly  a  disinclination  on  the  part  of 
Russia  to  accede  to  this  proposal;  because  Russia  considers,  and  says  that 
the  original  Treaty  binds  them,  and  they  would  wish  to  have  an  understand- 
ing of  a  much  wider  description  —  on  the  merits  of  which  I  do  not  now 
say  one  word,  one  way  or  the  other,  but  which  understanding  would  cer- 
tainly bring  us  under  obligations  we  do  not  hold  at  this  moment.  Russia 
would,  therefore,  in  the  same  manner,  have  refused  simply  and  solely  to 
join  us  in  a  single  menace  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  These 
facts  show  that  the  course  advocated  by  the  noble  and  learned  Lord  would 
not  have  been  the  most  judicious  one.    (Pp.  1754-55.) 

Lord  Granville  said,  in  part:  ...  As  to  this  instrument  in  the  slight- 
est degree  weakening  the  effect  of  the  previous  Treaty  of  1839,  I  entirely 
deny  it.  There  is  an  express  reservation  of  that  Treaty;  and,  besides  that, 
as  I  mentioned  the  other  day,  there  is  an  exact  precedent  to  this  case.  The 
seventh  Article  of  the  General  Treaty  of  Paris,  of  March  30,  1856,  between 
England,  France,  Austria,  Italy,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  stipulates  as  follows 
—  I  am  afraid  I  must  read  it  in  French,  as  I  have  no  other  copy  by  me  — 
"  Leurs  Majestfe  s'engagent,  chacune  de  son  cote\  a  respecter  l'in- 
dependance  et  l'int6grite'  territorial^  de  l'Empire  Ottoman;  garantis- 
sent  en  commun  la  stricte  observation  de  cet  engagement,  et  consid- 
ereront  en  consequence  tout  acte  de  nature  a  y  porter  atteinte  comme 
une  question  d'interet  general." 
But  a  fortnight  after  this,  without  any  event  of  importance  having  inter- 
vened, England,  Austria,  and  France  signed,  on  the  16th  of  April  follow- 
ing, a  separate  treaty,  by  the  first  Article  of  which  — 

"  Les  Hautes  Parties  contractantes  garantissent  solidairement  entre 
elles  l'independance  et  l'integrite*  de  l'Empire  Ottoman  conserves  par 
le  Traite  conclu  a  Paris  30,  Mars,  1856." 
This,  I  say,  is  a  most  complete  precedent,  and  justifies  us  in  saying  that 
the  Treaty  now  almost  concluded  does  not  in  the  slightest  degree  weaken 
the  guarantee,  whatever  that  may  be,  which  was  given  by  the  Treaty  of 
1839.   (Pp.  1757-58.r 

Viscount  Stratford  de  Redcliffe  said,  in  part:  ...  I  cannot  doubt 
that,  while  standing  to  our  guarantee  of  Belgian  independence  and  neu- 
trality without  prejudice  to  our  desire  of  remaining  at  peace,  it  is  the  object 
of  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  no  less  than  the  feeling  of  the  country  that  we 


618     THE  DIPLOMACY   OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

should  keep  in  our  hands  as  far  as  possible  the  means  of  limiting  the  range 
and  continuance  of  the  war,  and  of  tendering  our  mediation  with  good  effect 
whenever  the  opportunity  occurs.  Supposing  that  either  of  the  two  great 
parties  now  opposed  to  each  other  should  obtain  an  ascendancy  dangerous 
to  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  even  to  the  very  existence  of  some 
independent  States,  it  would  surely  be  desirable  that  our  position  should  be 
such  as  to  offer  a  limit  to  the  excessive  pretensions  of  victory.  (Pp.  1760- 
61.) 

House  of  Commons,  August  10,  1870} 
Mr.  Gladstone  said,  in  part:  ...  I  will  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity 
of  expressing  my  opinion,  if  I  may  presume  to  give  it,  that  too  much  has  been 
said  by  my  hon.  and  gallant  Friend  and  others  of  the  specially  distinct,  sepa- 
rate, and  exclusive  interest  which  this  country  has  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  What  is  our  interest  in  maintaining  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium?  It  is  the  same  as  that  of  every  great  Power  in  Europe.  It  is  con- 
trary to  the  interest  of  Europe  that  there  should  be  unmeasured  aggran- 
dizement. Our  interest  is  no  more  involved  in  the  aggrandizement  supposed 
in  this  particular  case  than  is  the  interest  of  the  other  Powers.  That  it  is  real 
interest,  a  substantial  interest,  I  do  not  deny;  but  I  protest  against  the 
attempt  to  attach  to  it  the  exclusive  character  which  I  never  knew  carried 
into  the  region  of  caricature  to  such  a  degree  as  it  has  been  by  my  hon.  and 
gallant  Friend.  What  is  the  immediate  moral  effect  of  those  exaggerated 
statements  of  the  separate  interest  of  England?  The  immediate  moral 
effect  of  them  is  this  —  that  every  effort  we  make  on  behalf  of  Belgium  on 
other  grounds  than  those  of  interest  —  as  well  as  on  grounds  of  interest, 
goes  forth  to  the  world  as  a  separate  and  selfish  scheme  of  ours;  and  that 
which  we  believe  to  be  entitled  to  the  dignity  and  credit  of  an  effort  on 
behalf  of  the  general  peace,  stability,  and  interest  of  Europe  actually  con- 
tracts a  taint  of  selfishness  in  the  eyes  of  other  nations  because  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  subject  of  Belgian  neutrality  is  too  frequently  treated  in 
this  House.  If  I  may  be  allowed  to  speak  of  the  motives  which  have  actu- 
ated Her  Majesty's  Government  in  the  matter,  I  would  say  that  while  we 
have  recognized  the  interest  of  England,  we  have  never  looked  upon  it  as 
the  sole  motive,  or  even  as  the  greatest  of  those  considerations  which  have 
urged  us  forward.  There  is,  I  admit,  the  obligation  of  the  Treaty.  It  is  not 
necessary,  nor  would  time  permit  me,  to  enter  into  the  complicated  question 
of  the  nature  of  the  obligations  of  that  Treaty;  but  I  am  not  able  to  sub- 
scribe to  the  doctrine  of  those  who  have  held  in  this  House  what  plainly 
amounts  to  an  assertion,  that  the  simple  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  guarantee 
is  binding  on  every  party  to  it  irrespectively  altogether  of  the  particular 
position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when  the  occasion  for  acting 
on  the  guarantee  arises.  The  great  authorities  upon  foreign  policy  to  whom 
I  have  been  accustomed  to  listen  —  such  as  Lord  Aberdeen  and  Lord 
Palmerston  —  never,  to  my  knowledge,  took  that  rigid  and,  if  I  may  ven- 
ture to  say  so,  that  impracticable  view  of  a  guarantee.  The  circumstance 
that  there  is  already  an  existing  guarantee  in  force  is  of  necessity  an  impor- 
tant fact,  and  a  weighty  element  in  the  case,  to  which  we  are  bound  to  give 
1  Extracts  from  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  3d  Series,  vol.  ccm,  pp.  1786-89. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  619 

full  and  ample  consideration.  There  is  also  this  further  consideration,  the 
force  of  which  we  must  all  feel  most  deeply,  and  that  is  the  common  interest 
against  the  unmeasured  aggrandizement  of  any  Power  whatever.  But  there 
is  one  other  motive,  which  I  shall  place  at  the  head  of  all,  that  attaches 
peculiarly  to  the  preservation  of  the  independence  of  Belgium.  What  is  that 
country?  It  is  a  country  containing  4,000,000  or  5,000,000  of  people,  with 
much  of  an  historic  past,  and  imbued  with  a  sentiment  of  nationality  and 
a  spirit  of  independence  as  warm  and  as  genuine  as  that  which  beats  in  the 
hearts  of  the  proudest  and  most  powerful  nations.  By  the  regulation  of  its 
internal  concerns,  amid  the  shocks  of  revolution,  Belgium,  through  all  the 
crises  of  the  age,  has  set  to  Europe  an  example  of  a  good  and  stable  govern- 
ment gracefully  associated  with  the  widest  possible  extension  of  the  liberty 
of  the  people.  Looking  at  a  country  such  as  that,  is  there  any  man  who 
hears  me  who  does  not  feel  that  if,  in  order  to  satisfy  a  greedy  appetite  for 
aggrandizement,  coming  whence  it  may,  Belgium  were  absorbed,  the  day 
that  witnessed  that  absorption  would  hear  the  knell  of  public  right  and 
public  law  in  Europe?  But  we  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of  Bel- 
gium which  is  wider  than  that  —  which  is  wider  than  that  which  we  may 
have  in  the  literal  operation  of  the  guarantee.  It  is  found  in  the  answer  to 
the  question  whether,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  this  country, 
endowed  as  it  is  with  influence  and  power,  would  quietly  stand  by  and  wit- 
ness the  perpetration  of  the  direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of 
history,  and  thus  become  participators  in  the  sin?   (Pp.  1786-88.) 

Mr.  Gladstone  said,  in  part:  ...  It  is  said  that  the  Treaty  of  1839 
would  have  sufficed,  and  that  we  ought  to  have  announced  our  determina- 
tion to  abide  by  it.  But  if  we  were  disposed  at  once  to  act  upon  the  guaran- 
tee contained  in  that  Treaty,  what  state  of  circumstances  does  it  contem- 
plate? It  contemplates  the  invasion  of  the  frontiers  of  Belgium  and  the 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  that  country  by  some  other  Power.  That  is 
the  only  case  in  which  we  could  have  been  called  upon  to  act  under  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  and  that  is  the  only  case  in  which  we  can  be  called  upon  to 
act  under  the  Treaty  now  before  the  House.  But  in  what,  then,  lies  the 
difference  between  the  two  Treaties?  It  is  in  this  —  that,  in  accordance 
with  our  obligations,  we  should  have  had  to  act  under  the  Treaty  of  1839 
without  any  stipulated  assurance  of  being  supported  from  any  quarter 
whatever  against  any  combination,  however  formidable;  whereas  by  the 
Treaty  now  formally  before  Parliament,  under  the  conditions  laid  down  in 
it,  we  secure  powerful  support  in  the  event  of  our  having  to  act  —  a  sup- 
port with  respect  to  which  we  may  well  say  that  it  brings  the  object  in  view 
within  the  sphere  of  the  practicable  and  attainable,  instead  of  leaving  it 
within  the  sphere  of  what  might  have  been  desirable,  but  which  might  have 
been  most  difficult,  under  all  the  circumstances,  to  have  realized.  The  hon. 
Member  says  that  by  entering  into  this  engagement  we  have  destroyed  the 
Treaty  of  1839.  But  if  he  will  carefully  consider  the  terms  of  this  instru- 
ment he  will  see  that  there  is  nothing  in  them  calculated  to  bear  out  that 
statement.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  this  is  a  cumulative  Treaty,  added  to 
the  Treaty  of  1839,  as  the  right  hon.  Gentleman  opposite  (Mr.  Disraeli), 
with  perfect  precision,  described  it.  Upon  that  ground,  I  very  much  agree 
with  the  general  opinion  he  expressed;  but,  at  the  same  time,  peculiar  cir- 


620     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1914 

cumstances  call  for  a  departure  from  general  rules,  and  the  circumstances 
are  most  peculiar  under  which  we  have  thought  it  right  to  adopt  the  method 
of  proceeding  which  we  have  actually  done.  The  Treaty  of  1839  loses  noth- 
ing of  its  force  even  during  the  existence  of  this  present  Treaty.  There  is 
no  derogation  from  it  whatever.  The  Treaty  of  1839  includes  terms  which 
are  expressly  included  in  the  present  instrument,  lest  by  any  chance  it 
should  be  said  that,  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of  this  instrument,  the 
Treaty  of  1839  had  been  injured  or  impaired.  That  would  have  been  a  mere 
opinion;  but  it  is  an  opinion  which  we  thought  fit  to  provide  against.  (Pp. 
1788-89.) 

SPEECH   MADE  BY  SIR  EDWARD  GREY  IN  THE  HOUSE 
OF  COMMONS,   AUGUST  3,  1914  > 

After  discussing  the  obligations  of  England  to  support  France*  Sir  Ed- 
ward said :  And,  Sir,  there  is  the  more  serious  consideration  —  becoming 
more  serious  every  hour  —  there  is  the  question  of  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium. 

I  shall  have  to  put  before  the  House  at  some  length  what  is  our  position 
in  regard  to  Belgium.  The  governing  factor  is  the  Treaty  of  1839,  but  this 
is  a  Treaty  with  a  history  —  a  history  accumulated  since.  In  1870,  when 
there  was  war  between  France  and  Germany,  the  question  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  arose,  and  various  things  were  said.  Amongst  other  things, 
Prince  Bismarck  gave  an  assurance  to  Belgium  that,  confirming  his  verbal 
assurance,  he  gave  in  writing  a  declaration  which  he  said  was  superfluous 
in  reference  to  the  Treaty  in  existence  —  that  the  German  Confederation 
and  its  allies  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  being  always  under- 
stood that  that  neutrality  would  be  respected  by  the  other  belligerent 
Powers.  That  is  valuable  as  a  recognition  in  1870  on  the  part  of  Germany  of 
the  sacredness  of  these  Treaty  rights. 

What  was  our  own  attitude?  The  people  who  laid  down  the  attitude  of 
the  British  Government  were  Lord  Granville  in  the  House  of  Lords,  and 
Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Lord  Granville,  on  the  8th  of 
August,  1870,  used  these  words.  He  said:  — 

"We  might  have  explained  to  the  country  and  to  foreign  nations  that 
we  did  not  think  this  country  was  bound  either  morally  or  internation- 
ally or  that  its  interests  were  concerned  in  the  maintenance  of  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  though  this  course  might  have  had  some  conven- 
iences, though  it  might  have  been  easy  to  adhere  to  it,  though  it  might 
have  saved  us  from  some  immediate  danger,  it  is  a  course  which  Her 
Majesty's  Government  thought  it  impossible  to  adopt  in  the  name  of 
the  country  with  any  due  regard  to  the  country's  honour  or  tO/the 
country's  interests." 
Mr.  Gladstone  spoke  as  follows  two  days  later:  — 

"There  is,  I  admit,  the  obligation  of  the  Treaty.  It  is  not  necessary, 
nor  would  time  permit  me,  to  enter  into  the  complicated  question  of 
the  nature  of  the  obligations  of  that  Treaty ;  but  I  am  not  able  to  sub- 
scribe to  the  doctrine  of  those  who  have  held  in  this  House  what  plainly 
amounts  to  an  assertion,  that  the  simple  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  guar- 
»  Extracts  relating  to  Belgium,  London  Times,  August  4,  1914. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  621 

antee  is  binding  on  every  party  to  it,  irrespectively  altogether  of  the 
particular  position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when  the 
occasion  for  acting  on  the  guarantee  arises.  The  great  authorities  upon 
foreign  policy  to  whom  I  have  been  accustomed  to  listen,  such  as  Lord 
Aberdeen  and  Lord  Palmerston,  never  to  my  knowledge  took  that  rigid 
and,  if  I  may  venture  to  say  so,  that  impracticable  view  of  the  guaran- 
tee.  The  circumstance  that  there  is  already  an  existing  guarantee  in 
force  is  of  necessity  an  important  fact,  and  a  weighty  element  in  the 
case  to  which  we  are  bound  to  give  full  and  ample  consideration.  There 
is  also  this  further  consideration,  the  force  of  which  we  must  all  feel 
deeply,  and  that  is,  the  common  interests  against  the  unmeasured 
aggrandisement  of  any  Power  whatever." 
The  Treaty  is  an  old  Treaty  —  1839  —  and  that  was  the  view  taken  of  it 
in  1870.  It  is  one  of  those  Treaties  which  are  founded,  not  only  on  considera- 
tion for  Belgium,  which  benefits  under  the  Treaty,  but  in  the  interests  of 
those  who  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  The  honour  and  interests 
are,  at  least,  as  strong  to-day  as  in  1870,  and  we  cannot  take  a  more  narrow 
view  or  a  less  serious  view  of  our  obligations,  and  of  the  importance  of  those 
obligations,  than  was  taken  by  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government  in  1870. 

I  will  read  to  the  House  what  took  place  last  week  on  this  subject.  When 
mobilization  was  beginning,  I  knew  that  this  question  must  be  a  most  im- 
portant element  in  our  policy  —  a  most  important  subject  for  the  House  of 
Commons.  I  telegraphed  at  the  same  time  in  similar  terms  to  both  Paris 
and  Berlin  to  say  that  it  was  essential  for  us  to  know  whether  the  French 
and  German  Governments  respectively  were  prepared  to  undertake  an 
engagement  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  These  are  the  replies.  I 
got  from  the  French  Government  this  reply :  — 

"The  French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  and  it  would  only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power  violat- 
ing that  neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  necessity, 
in  order  to  assure  the  defense  of  her  security,  to  act  otherwise.  This 
assurance  has  been  given  several  times.  The  President  of  the  Repub- 
lic spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance  to  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  to-day." 
From  the  German  Government  the  reply  was :  — 

"The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  could  not  possibly  give 
an  answer  before  consulting  the  Emperor  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor." 
Sir  Edward  Goschen,  to  whom  I  had  said  it  was  important  to  have  an 
answer  soon,  said  he  hoped  the  answer  would  not  be  too  long  delayed.  The 
German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  then  gave  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to  un- 
derstand that  he  rather  doubted  whether  they  could  answer  at  all,  as  any 
reply  they  might  give  could  not  fail,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  have  the  unde- 
sirable effect  of  disclosing,  to  a  certain  extent,  part  of  their  plan  of  campaign. 
I  telegraphed  at  the  same  time  to  Brussels  to  the  Belgian  Government,  and 
I  got  the  following  reply  from  Sir  Francis  Villiers :  — 

"The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thanks  me  for  the  communication, 
and  replies  that  Belgium  will,  to  the  utmost  of  her  power,  maintain 
neutrality,  and  expects  and  desires  other  Powers  to  observe  and  uphold 
it.   He  begged  me  to  add  that  the  relations  between  Belgium  and  the 


622     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF   1914 

neighboring  Powers  were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suspect 
their  intentions,  but  that  the  Belgian  Government  believe,  in  the  case 
of  violation,  they  are  in  a  position  to  defend  the  neutrality  of  their 
country." 
It  now  appears  from  the  news  I  have  received  to-day  —  which  has  come 
quite  recently,  and  I  am  not  yet  quite  sure  how  far  it  has  .reached  me 
in  an  accurate  form  —  that  an  ultimatum  has  been  given  to  Belgium  by 
Germany,  the  object  of  which  was  to  offer  Belgium  friendly  relations  with 
Germany  on  condition  that  she  would  facilitate  the  passage  of  German 
troops  through  Belgium.   Well,  Sir,  until  one  has  these  things  absolutely 
definitely,  up  to  the  last  moment,  I  do  not  wish  to  say  all  that  one  would 
say  if  one  were  in  a  position  to  give  the  House  full,  complete,  and  absolute 
information  upon  the  point.  We  were  sounded  in  the  course  of  last  week  as 
to  whether  if  a  guarantee  were  given  that,  after  the  war,  Belgian  integrity 
would  be  preserved  that  would  content  us.   We  replied  that  we  could  not 
bargain  away  whatever  interests  or  obligations  we  had  in  Belgian  neutral- 
ity. 

Shortly  before  I  reached  the  House  I  was  informed  that  the  following 
telegram  had  been  received  from  the  King  of  the  Belgians  by  our  King  — 
King  George:  — 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship 
and  that  of  your  predecessors,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in 
1870,  and  the  proof  of  friendship  she  has  just  given  us  again,  I  make 
a  supreme  appeal  to  the  Diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's 
Government  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium." 
Diplomatic  intervention  took  place  last  week  on  our  part.    What  can 
diplomatic  intervention  do  now?   We  have  great  vital  interests  in  the 
independence  —  and  integrity  is  the  least  part  —  of  Belgium.   If  Belgium 
is  compelled  to  submit  to  allow  her  neutrality  to  be  violated,  of  course  the 
situation  is  clear.  Even  if  by  agreement  she  admitted  the  violation  of  her 
neutrality,  it  is  clear  she  could  only  do  so  under  duress.  The  smaller  States 
in  that  region  of  Europe  ask  but  one  thing.   Their  one  desire  is  that  they 
should  be  left  alone  and  independent.  The  one  thing  they  fear  is,  I  think, 
not  so  much  that  their  integrity  but  that  their  independence  should  be  inter- 
fered with.   If  in  this  war  which  is  before  Europe  the  neutrality  of  one  of 
those  countries  is  violated,  if  the  troops  of  one  of  the  combatants  violate  its 
neutrality  and  no  action  be  taken  to  resent  it,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  whatever 
the  integrity  may  be,  the  independence  will  be  gone. 

I  have  one  further  quotation  from  Mr.  Gladstone  as  to  what  he  thought 
about  the  independence  of  Belgium.  It  will  be  found  in  Hansard,  volume 
203,  page  1787.  I  have  not  had  time  to  read  the  whole  speech  and  verify 
the  context,  but  the  thing  seems  to  me  so  clear  that  no  context  could  make 
any  difference  to  the  meaning  of  it.  Mr.  Gladstone  said:  — 

"We  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of  Belgium  which  is  wider 
than  that  which  we  may  have  in  the  literal  operation  of  the  guaranty. 
It  is  found  in  the  answer  to  the  question  whether  under  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  this  country,  endowed  as  it  is  with  influence  and 
power,  would  quietly  stand  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of  the 
direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of  history,  and  thus  become 
participators  in  the  sin." 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  623 

No,  Sir,  if  it  be  the  ease  that  there  has  been  anything  in  the  nature  of  an 
ultimatum  to  Belgium,  asking  her  to  compromise  or  violate  her  neutrality, 
whatever  may  have  been  offered  to  her  in  return,  her  independence  is  gone 
if  that  holds.  If  her  independence  goes,  the  independence  of  Holland  will 
follow.  I  ask  the  House  from  the  point  of  view  of  British  interests,  to  con- 
sider what  may  be  at  stake.  If  France  is  beaten  in  a  struggle  of  life  and 
death,  beaten  to  her  knees,  loses  her  position  as  a  great  power,  becomes  sub- 
ordinate to  the  will  and  power  of  one  greater  than  herself  —  consequences 
which  I  do  not  anticipate,  because  I  am  sure  that  France  has  the  power 
to  defend  herself  with  all  the  energy  and  ability  and  patriotism  which  she 
has  shown  so  often  —  still,  if  that  were  to  happen,  and  if  Belgium  fell 
under  the  same  dominating  influence,  and  then  Holland,  and  then  Denmark, 
then  would  not  Mr.  Gladstone's  words  come  true,  that  just  opposite  to  us 
there  would  be  a  common  interest  against  the  unmeasured  aggrandisement 
of  any  power. 

It  may  be  said,  I  suppose,  that  we  might  stand  aside,  husband  our 
strength,  and  that,  whatever  happened  in  the  course  of  this  war,  at  the  end 
of  it  intervene  with  effect  to  put  things  right,  and  to  adjust  them  to  our  own 
point  of  view.  If,  in  a  crisis  like  this,  we  run  away  from  those  obligations  of 
honour  and  interest  as  regards  the  Belgian  Treaty,  I  doubt  whether,  what- 
ever material  force  we  might  have  at  the  end,  it  would  be  of  very  much 
value  in  face  of  the  respect  that  we  should  have  lost.  And  I  do  not  believe, 
whether  a  great  power  stands  outside  this  war  or  not,  it  is  going  to  be  in  a 
position  at  the  end  of  it  to  exert  its  superior  strength.  For  us,  with  a  pow- 
erful fleet,  which  we  believe  able  to  protect  our  commerce,  to  protect  our 
shores,  and  to  protect  our  interests,  if  we  are  engaged  in  war,  we  shall  suffer 
but  little  more  than  we  shall  suffer  even  if  we  stand  aside. 

We  are  going  to  suffer,  I  am  afraid,  terribly  in  this  war,  whether  we  are 
in  it  or  whether  we  stand  aside.  Foreign  trade  is  going  to  stop,  not  because 
the  trade  routes  are  closed,  but  because  there  is  no  trade  at  the  other  end. 
Continental  nations  engaged  in  war  —  all  their  populations,  all  their  ener- 
gies, all  their  wealth,  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  —  they  cannot  carry 
on  the  trade  with  us  that  they  are  carrying  on  in  times  of  peace,  whether  we 
are  parties  to  the  war  or  whether  we  are  not.  I  do  not  believe  for  a  moment 
that  at  the  end  of  this  war,  even  if  we  stood  aside  and  remained  aside,  we 
should  be  in  a  position,  a  material  position,  to  use  our  force  decisively  to 
undo  what  had  happened  in  the  course  of  the  war,  to  prevent  the  whole  of 
the  West  of  Europe  opposite  to  us  —  if  that  had  been  the  result  of  the  war 
—  falling  under  the  domination  of  a  single  power,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that 
our  moral  position  would  be  such  as  to  have  lost  us  all  respect.  I  can  only 
say  that  I  have  put  the  question  of  Belgium  somewhat  hypothetically,  be- 
cause I  am  not  yet  sure  of  all  the  facts,  but,  if  the  facts  turn  out  to  be  as  they 
have  reached  us  at  present,  it  is  quite  clear  that  there  is  an  obligation  on 
this  country  to  do  its  utmost  to  prevent  the  consequences  to  which  those 
facts  will  lead  if  they  are  undisputed. 

I  have  read  to  the  House  the  only  engagements  that  we  have  yet  taken 
definitely  with  regard  to  the  use  of  force.  I  think  it  is  due  to  the  House  to 
say  that  we  have  taken  no  engagement  yet  with  regard  to  sending  an  ex- 
peditionary armed  force  out  of  the  country.  Mobilization  of  the  fleet  has 
taken  place;  mobilization  of  the  army  is  taking  place;  but  we  have  as  yet 


624     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

taken  no  engagement,  because  I  do  feel  that  in  the  case  of  a  European  con- 
flagration such  as  this,  unprecedented,  with  our  enormous  responsibilities 
in  India  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  or  in  countries  in  British  occupation, 
with  all  the  unknown  factors,  we  must  take  very  carefully  into  considera- 
tion the  use  which  we  make  of  sending  an  expeditionary  force  out  of  the 
country  until  we  know  how  we  stand.  One  thing  I  would  say. 

The  one  bright  spot  in  the  whole  of  this  terrible  situation  is  Ireland.  The 
general  feeling  throughout  Ireland  —  and  I  would  like  this  to  be  clearly 
understood  abroad  —  does  not  make  the  Irish  question  a  consideration 
which  we  feel  we  have  now  to  take  into  account.  I  have  told  the  House  how 
far  we  have  at  present  gone  in  commitments  and  the  conditions  which  influ- 
ence our  policy,  and  I  have  put  to  the  House  and  dwelt  at  length  upon  how 
vital  is  the  condition  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

What  other  policy  is  there  before  the  House?  There  is  but  one  way  in 
which  the  Government  could  make  certain  at  the  present  moment  of  keep- 
ing outside  this  war,  and  that  would  be  that  it  should  immediately  issue  a 
proclamation  of  unconditional  neutrality.  We  cannot  do  that.  We  have 
made  the  commitment  to  France  that  I  have  read  to  the  House  which  pre- 
vents us  from  doing  that.  We  have  got  the  consideration  of  Belgium  which 
prevents  us  also  from  any  unconditional  neutrality,  and,  without  those 
conditions  absolutely  satisfied  and  satisfactory,  we  are  bound  not  to  shrink 
from  proceeding  to  the  use  of  all  the  forces  in  our  power.  If  we  did  take 
that  line  by  saying,  "We  will  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  this  matter  " 
under  no  conditions  —  the  Belgian  Treaty  obligations,  the  possible  posi- 
tion in  the  Mediterranean,  with  damage  to  British  interests,  and  what  may 
happen  to  France  from  our  failure  to  support  France  —  if  we  were  to  say 
that  all  those  things  mattered  nothing,  were  as  nothing,  and  to  say  we 
would  stand  aside,  we  should,  I  believe,  sacrifice  our  respect  and  good  name 
and  reputation  before  the  world,  and  should  not  escape  the  most  serious  and 
grave  economic  consequences. 

GLADSTONE'S  LETTER  TO  BRIGHT1 

.  .  .  On  July  25  the  Times  divulged  the  text  of  a  projected  agreement  in 
1869  (it  was  in  truth  1867)  between  the  French  and  Prussian  Governments 
in  five  articles,  including  one  that  the  incorporation  of  Belgium  by  France 
would  not  be  objected  to  by  Prussia.  The  public  was  shocked  and  startled, 
and  many  were  inclined  to  put  down  the  document  for  a  forgery  and  a  hoax. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  substance  it  was  neither.  The  Prussian  Ambassador 
a  few  days  before  had  informed  Mr.  Gladstone  and  Lord  Granville,  per- 
sonally and  in  strict  secrecy,  that  the  draft  of  such  a  project  existed  in  the 
handwriting  of  M.  Benedetti.  This  private  communication  was  taken  by 
Mr.  Gladstone  to  have  been  made  with  the  object  of  prompting  him  to  be 
the  agent  in  producing  the  evil  news  to  the  world,  and  thus  to  prejudice 
France  in  the  judgment  of  Europe.  He  thought  that  no  part  of  his  duty,  and 
took  time  to  consider  it,  in  the  expectation  that  it  was  pretty  sure  to  find 
its  way  into  print  by  some  other  means,  as  indeed  soon  happened.  "For 
the  sake  of  peace,"  Bismarck  explained  to  Lord  Granville  (July  28,  1870), 

1  Extract  from  The  Life  of  William  Ewart  Gladstone,  by  John  Morley.  New  York, 
1911,  vol.  ii  (bound  in  vol.  i),  pp.  340-42. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  623 

"I  kept  the  secret,  and  treated  the  propositions  in  a  dilatory  manner." 
When  the  British  Ambassador  on  one  occasion  had  tried  to  sound  him  on 
the  suspected  designs  of  France,  Bismarck  answered,  "It  is  no  business  of 
mine  to  tell  French  secrets." 

There  were  members  of  the  Cabinet  who  doubted  the  expediency  of  Eng- 
land taking  any  action.   The  real  position  of  affairs,  they  argued,  was  not 
altered:  the  draft  treaty  only  disclosed  what  everybody  believed  before, 
namely  that  France  sought  compensation  for  Prussian  aggrandisement,  as 
she  had  secured  it  for  Italian  aggrandisement  by  taking  Savoy  and  Nice. 
That  Prussia  would  not  object,  provided  the  compensations  were  not  at 
the  expense  of  people  who  spoke  German,  had  all  come  out  at  the  time  of 
the  Luxemburg  affair.    If  France  and  Prussia  agreed,  how  could  we  help 
Belgium,  unless  indeed  Europe  joined?  But,  then,  what  chance  was  there 
of  Russia  and  Austria  joining  against  France  and  Prussia  for  the  sake  of 
Belgium,  in  which  neither  of  them  had  any  direct  interest?   At  the  same 
time  Ministers  knew  that  the  public  in  England  expected  them  to  do  some- 
thing, though  a  vote  for  men  and  money  would  probably  suffice.  The  Cabi- 
net, however,  advanced  a  step  beyond  a  parliamentary  vote.   On  July  30 
they  met  and  took  a  decision  to  which  Mr.  Gladstone  then  and  always  after 
attached  high  importance.    England  proposed  a  treaty  to  Prussia  and 
France,  providing  that  if  the  armies  of  either  violated  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, Great  Britain  would  cooperate  with  the  other  for  its  defence,  but 
without  engaging  to  take  part  in  the  general  operations  of  the  war. '  The 
treaty  was  to  hold  good  for  twelve  months  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war. 
Bismarck  at  once  came  into  the  engagement.   France  loitered  a  little,  but 
after  the  battle  of  Worth  made  no  more  difficulty,  and  the  instrument  was 
signed  on  August  9. 

The  mind  of  the  Government  was  described  by  Mr.  Gladstone  in  a  letter 
to  Bright  (August  1):  — 

"  Although  some  members  of  the  Cabinet  were  inclined  on  the  out- 
break of  this  most  miserable  war  to  make  military  preparations,  others, 
Lord  Granville  and  I  among  them,  by  no  means  shared  that  disposition' 
nor  I  think  was  the  feeling  of  parliament  that  way  inclined.   But  the 
publication  of  the  treaty  has  altered  all  this,  and  has  thrown  upon  us 
the  necessity  either  of  doing  something  fresh  to  secure  Belgium,  or  else 
of  saying  that  under  no  circumstances  would  we  take  any  step  to  se- 
cure her  from  absorption.  This  publication  has  wholly  altered  the  feel- 
ing of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  no  Government  could  at  this  mo- 
ment venture  to  give  utterance  to  such  an  intention  about  Belgium. 
But  neither  do  we  think  it  would  be  right,  even  if  it  were  safe,  to  an- 
nounce that  we  would  in  any  case  stand  by  with  folded  arms,  and  see 
actions  done  which  would  amount  to  a  total  extinction  of  public  right 
in  Europe." 
The  idea  of  engagements  that  might  some  day  involve  resort  to  force 
made  Bright  uneasy,  and  Mr.  Gladstone  wrote  to  him  again  (August  4)) :  — 
"  It  will  be  a  great  addition  to  the  domestic  portion  of  the  griefs  of  this 
most  unhappy  war,  if  it  is  to  be  the  cause  of  a  political  severance  be- 
tween you  and  the  present  Administration.  To  this  I  know  you  would 
justly  reply  that  the  claims  of  conviction  are  paramount.  I  hope,  how- 
ever, that  the  moment  has  not  quite  arrived.  .  .  .  You  will,  I  am  sure, 


626     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

give  me  credit  for  good  faith  when  I  say,  especially  on  Lord  Granville's 
part  as  on  my  own,  who  are  most  of  all  responsible,  that  we  take  this 
step  in  the  interest  of  peace.  .  .  .  The  recommendation  set  up  in  oppo- 
sition to  it  generally  is,  that  we  should  simply  declare  we  will  defend 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  arms  in  case  it  should  be  attacked.  Now 
the  sole  or  single-handed  defence  of  Belgium  would  be  an  enterprise 
which  we  incline  to  think  Quixotic;  and  if  these  two  great  military 
powers  combined  against  it  —  that  combination  is  the  only  serious 
danger;  and  this  it  is  which  by  our  proposed  engagements  we  should 
I  hope  render  improbable  to  the  very  last  degree.  I  add  for  myself  this 
confession  of  faith.  If  the  Belgian  people  desire,  on  their  own  account, 
to  join  France  or  any  other  country,  I  for  one  will  be  no  party  to  taking 
up  arms  to  prevent  it.  But  that  the  Belgians,  whether  they  would  or 
not,  should  go  'plump'  down  the  maw  of  another  country  to  satisfy 
dynastic  greed,  is  another  matter.  The  accomplishment  of  such  a  crime 
as  this  implies  would  come  near  to  an  extinction  of  public  right  in 
Europe,  and  I  do  not  think  we  could  look  on  while  the  sacrifice  of  free- 
dom and  independence  was  in  course  of  consummation." 

ANGLO-BELGIAN   MILITARY  PREPARATIONS 

Document  No.  1:  Report  of  General  Ducarme,  Chief  of  the 
Belgian  General  Staff,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War 

Confidential 
Letter  to  the  Minister  Concerning  the  Confidential  Conversations 

Brussels,  April  10,  1906. 
Mr.  Minister:  — 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  briefly  about  the  conversations  which 
I  had  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  and  which  have  already  been 
the  subject  of  my  oral  communications. 

The  first  visit  took  place  in  the  middle  of  January.  Mr.  Barnardiston 
referred  to  the  anxieties  of  the  General  Staff  of  his  country  with  regard  to 
the  general  political  situation,  and  because  of  the  possibility  that  war  may 
soon  break  out.  In  case  Belgium  should  be  attacked,  the  sending  of  about 
100,000  troops  was  provided  for. 

The  Lieutenant-Colonel  asked  me  how  such  a  measure  would  be  regarded 
by  us.  I  answered  him,  that  from  a  military  point  of  view  it  could  not  be 
but  favorable,  but  that  this  question  of  intervention  was  just  as  much  a 
matter  for  the  political  authorities,  and  that,  therefore,  it  was  my  duty  to 
inform  the  Minister  of  War  about  it. 

Mr.  Barnardiston  answered  that  his  Minister  in  Brussels  would  speak 
about  it  with  our  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

He  proceeded  in  the  following  sense:  The  landing  of  the  English  troops 
would  take  place  at  the  French  coast  in  the  vicinity  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais, 
so  as  to  hasten  their  movements  as  much  as  possible.  The  entry  of  the  Eng- 
lish into  Belgium  would  take  place  only  after  the  violation  of  our  neutrality 
by  Germany.  A  landing  in  Antwerp  would  take  much  more  time,  because 
larger  transports  would  be  needed,  and  because  on  the  other  hand  the  safety 
would  be  less  complete. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  627 

This  admitted,  there  would  be  several  other  points  to  consider,  such  as 
railway  transportation,  the  question  of  requisitions  which  the  English  army 
could  make,  the  question  concerning  the  chief  command  of  the  allied  forces. 

He  inquired  whether  our  preparations  were  sufficient  to  secure  the  de- 
fense of  the  country  during  the  crossing  and  the  transportation  of  the  Eng- 
lish troops  —  which  he  estimated  to  last  about  ten  days. 

I  answered  him  that  the  places  Namur  and  Liege  were  protected  from 
a  "coup  de  main"  and  that  our  field  army  of  100,000  men  would  be  capable 
of  intervention  within  four  days. 

After  having  expressed  his  full  satisfaction  with  my  explanations,  my 
visitor  laid  emphasis  on  the  following  facts:  (1)  that  our  conversation  was 
entirely  confidential;  (2)  that  it  was  not  binding  on  his  Government;  (3) 
that  his  Minister,  the  English  General  Staff  ,jhe  and  I  were, up  to  the  present, 
the  only  ones  informed  about  the  matter;  (4)  that  he  did  not  know  whether 
the  opinion  of  his  Sovereign  had  been  consulted. 

In  a  following  discussion  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  assured  me 
that  he  had  never  received  confidential  reports  of  the  other  military  at- 
tachds  about  our  army.  He  then  gave  the  exact  numerical  data  of  the  Eng- 
lish forces;  we  could  depend  on  it,  that  in  twelve  or  thirteen  days  two  army 
corps,  four  cavalry  brigades  and  two  brigades  of  horse  infantry  would  be 
landed. 

He  asked  me  to  study  the  question  of  the  transport  of  these  forces  to  that 
part  of  the  country  where  they  would  be  useful,  and  he  promised  to  give 
me  for  this  purpose  details  about  the  composition  of  the  landing  army. 

He  reverted  to  the  question  concerning  the  effective  strength  of  our  field 
army,  and  he  emphasized  that  no  detachments  should  be  sent  from  this 
army  to  Namur  and  Liege,  because  these  places  were  provided  with  garri- 
sons of  sufficient  strength. 

He  asked  me  to  direct  my  attention  to  the  necessity  of  granting  the  Eng- 
lish army  the  advantages  which  the  regulations  concerning  the  military 
requisitions  provided  for.  Finally  he  insisted  upon  the  question  of  the  chief 
command. 

I  answered  him  that  I  could  say  nothing  with  reference  to  this  last  point 
and  promised  him  that  I  would  study  the  other  questions  carefully. 

Later  on  the  English  Military  Attache  confirmed  his  former  calculations: 
twelve  days  would  at  least  be  necessary  to  carry  out  the  landing  at  the 
French  coast.  It  would  take  a  considerably  longer  time  (one  to  two  and  a 
half  months)  to  land  100,000  men  in  Antwerp. 

Upon  my  objection  that  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  await  the  end  of 
the  landing  in  order  to  begin  with  the  railway  transportations,  and  that  it 
would  be  better  to  proceed  with  these,  as  when  the  troops  arrived  at  the 
coast,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  promised  to  give  me  exact  data  as 
to  the  number  of  troops  that  could  be  landed  daily. 

As  regards  the  military  requisitions,  I  told  my  visitor  that  this  question 
could  be  easily  regulated. 

The  further  the  plans  of  the  English  General  Staff  progressed,  the  clearer 
became  the  details  of  the  problem.  The  Colonel  assured  me  that  one  half  of 


628     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

the  English  army  could  be  landed  within  eight  days;  the  rest  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  twelfth  or  thirteenth  day,  with  the  exception  of  the  horse  infan- 
try, which  could  not  be  counted  upon  until  later. 

In  spite  of  this  I  thought  I  had  to  insist  again  upon  the  necessity  of  know- 
ing the  exact  number  of  the  daily  shipments,  in  order  to  regulate  the  rail- 
way transportation  for  every  day. 

The  English  Military  Attache  conversed  with  me  about  several  other 
questions,  namely :  — 

(1)  The  necessity  of  keeping  the  operations  secret  and  of  demanding  strict 
secrecy  from  the  Press; 

(2)  The  advantages,  which  would  accrue  from  giving  one  Belgian  officer  to 
each  English  General  Staff,  one  interpreter  to  each  commanding  officer,  and 
gendarmes  to  each  unit  of  troops,  in  order  to  assist  the  British  police  troops. 

In  the  course  of  another  interview  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  and 
I  studied  the  combined  operations  to  take  place  in  the  event  of  a  German 
offensive  with  Antwerp  as  its  object  and  under  the  hypothesis  of  the  German 
troops  marching  through  our  country  in  order  to  reach  the  French  Ardennes. 

In  this  question,  the  Colonel  said  he  quite  agreed  with  the  plan  which  I 
had  submitted  to  him,  and  he  assured  me  also  of  the  approval  of  General 
Grierson,  Chief  of  the  English  General  Staff. 

Other  secondary  questions  which  were  likewise  settled,  had  particular 
reference  to  intermediary  officers,  interpreters,  gendarmes,  maps,  photo- 
graphs of  the  uniforms,  special  copies,  translated  into  English,  of  some  Bel- 
gian regulations,  the  regulations  concerning  the  import  duties  on  English 
provisions,  to  the  accommodation  of  the  wounded  of  the  allied  armies,  etc. 
Nothing  was  resolved  on  as  regards  the  activity  which  the  Government  or 
the  military  authorities  might  exert  on  the  Press. 

During  the  final  meetings  which  I  had  with  the  British  Attache,  he  in- 
formed me  about  the  numbers  of  troops  which  would  be  daily  disembarked 
at  Boulogne,  Calais  and  Cherbourg.  The  distance  of  the  last  place,  which 
is  necessary  for  technical  considerations,  will  involve  a  certain  delay.  The 
first  corps  would  be  disembarked  on  the  tenth  day,  and  the  second  on  the 
fifteenth  day.  Our  railways  would  carry  out  the  transportation  so  that  the 
arrival  of  the  first  corps,  either  in  the  direction  of  Brussels-Louvain  or  of 
Namur-Dinant,  would  be  assured  on  the  eleventh  day,  and  that  of  the  sec- 
ond on  the  sixteenth  day. 

I  again,  for  a  last  time,  and  as  emphatically  as  I  could,  insisted  on  the 
necessity  of  hastening  the  sea-transports  so  that  the  English  troops  could 
be  with  us  between  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  days.  The  happiest  and  most 
favorable  results  can  be  reached  by  a  convergent  and  simultaneous  action 
of  the  allied  forces.  But  if  that  cooperation  should  not  take  place,  the  fail- 
ure would  be  most  serious.  Colonel  Barnardiston  assured  me  that  every- 
thing serving  to  this  end  would  be  done. 

In  the  course  of  our  conversations,  I  had  occasion  to  convince  the  Brit- 
ish Military  Attache  that  we  were  willing,  so  far  as  possible,  to  thwart  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  not  to  take  refuge  in  Antwerp  from  the  be- 
ginning. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  629 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  on  his  part  told  me  that,  at  the  time, 
he  had  little  hope  for  any  support  or  intervention  on  the  part  of  Holland. 
At  the  same  time  he  informed  me  that  his  Government  intended  to  transfer 
the  basis  of  the  British  commissariat  from  the  French  coast  to  Antwerp  as 
soon  as  all  German  ships  were  swept  off  the  North  Sea. 

In  all  our  conversations  the  Colonel  regularly  informed  me  about  the 
secret  news  which  he  had  concerning  the  military  circumstances  and  the 
situation  of  our  Eastern  neighbors,  etc.  At  the  same  time  he  emphasized 
that  Belgium  was  under  the  imperative  necessity  to  keep  herself  constantly 
informed  of  the  happenings  in  the  adjoining  Rhinelands.  I  had  to  admit 
that  with  us  the  surveillance-service  abroad  was,  in  times  of  peace,  not 
directly  in  the  hands  of  the  General  Staff,  as  our  Legations  had  no  Mili- 
tary Attaches.  But  I  was  careful  not  to  admit  that  I  did  not  know  whether 
the  espionage  service  which  is  prescribed  in  our  regulations,  was  in  working 
order  or  not.  But  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  point  out  this  position  which 
places  us  in  a  state  of  evident  inferiority  to  our  neighbors,  our  presumable 
enemies. 

Major-General,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 
(Initials  of  General  Ducarme.) 

Note.  When  I  met  General  Grierson  at  Compiegne,  during  the  manoeu- 
vres of  1906,  he  assured  me  the  result  of  the  reoganization  of  the  English 
army  would  be  that  the  landing  of  150,000  would  be  assured  and,  that, 
moreover,  they  would  stand  ready  for  action  in  a  shorter  time  than  has  been 
assumed  above. 

Concluded  September,  1906. 
(Initials  of  General  Ducarme.) 
[Document  No.  2  has  been  given  in  full  in  Chapter  IX,  §  5.] 

Document  No.  3.  Report  of  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister 
in  Berlin,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 


Section 

No 

Enclosure 

Reply  to  No. 
General  Department 
Office  of 

Belgian  Legation, 
No.  3022-1626. 


(Copy) 


Berlin,  December  23,  1911. 


Strictly  Confidential 
What  is  Belgium  to  do  in  Case  of  War  ? 
Mr.  Minister:  — 

I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  the  dispatch  of  the  27  November  last, 
P  without  docket-number,  registration  number  1108.  .  .  . 


630     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

[After  the  superscription  and  opening  sentence  the  contents  of  this  doc- 
ument have  not  been  made  public  except  for  the  following  extract.  The 
following  explanations  of  the  nature  of  this  document  and  the  reason  for 
withholding  the  remainder  are  given :] 

On  the  23d  of  December,  1911,  Baron  Greindl,  then  and  for  many  years 
Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  made  a  report  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  There  was  found  in  Brussels  a  copy  of  this  report ;  although  a 
copy,  the  official  character  of  this  third  document  found  in  Brussels  is  evi- 
dent from  the  official  imprint  on  the  paper  on  which  the  copy  stands. 

"Baron  Greindl's  report  is  an  extremely  long  one.  Extracts  from  it 
were  published  in  the  North  German  Gazette  of  October  13.  A  facsimile 
has  been  made  of  the  first  page  only  of  the  document,  because  of  its  great 
length. 

"  From  the  French  side  danger  threatens  not  only  in  the  south  of  Luxem- 
burg, it  threatens  us  on  our  entire  joint  frontier.  We  are  not  reduced  to 
conjectures  for  this  assertion.  We  have  positive  evidence  of  it. 

"Evidently  the  project  of  an  outflanking  movement  from  the  north 
forms  part  of  the  scheme  of  the  Entente  Cordiale.  If  that  were  not  the 
case,  then  the  plan  of  fortifying  Flushing  would  not  have  called  forth  such 
an  outburst  in  Paris  and  London.  The  reason  why  they  wished  that  the 
Scheldt  should  remain  unfortified  was  hardly  concealed  by  them.  Their 
aim  was  to  be  able  to  transport  an  English  garrison,  unhindered,  to  Ant- 
werp, which  means  to  establish^in  our  country  a  basis  of  operation  for  an 
offensive  in  the  direction  of  the  Lower  Rhine  and  Westphalia,  and  then  to 
make  us  throw  our  lot  in  with  them,  which  would  not  be  difficult,  for,  after 
the  surrender  of  our  national  center  of  refuge,  we  would,  through  our  own 
fault,  renounce  every  possibility  of  opposing  the  demands  of  our  doubtful 
protectors  after  having  been  so  unwise  as  to  permit  their  entrance  into  our 
country.  Colonel  Barnardiston's  announcements  at  the  time  of  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  which  were  just  as  perfidious  as  they  were 
naive,  have  shown  us  plainly  the  true  meaning  of  things.  When  it  became 
evident  that  we  would  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  frightened  by  the  pretended 
danger  of  the  closing  of  the  Scheldt,  the  plan  was  not  entirely  abandoned, 
but  modified  in  so  far  as  the  British  army  was  not  to  land  on  the  Belgian 
coast,  but  at  the  nearest  French  harbors. 

"The  revelations  of  Captain  Faber,  which  were  denied  as  little  as  the 
newspaper  reports  by  which  they  were  confirmed  or  completed  in  several 
respects,  also  testify  to  this.  This  British  army,  at  Calais  and  Dunkirk, 
would  by  no  means  march  along  our  frontier  to  Longway  in  order  to  reach 
Germany.  It  would  directly  invade  Belgium  from  the  northwest.  That 
would  give  it  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  begin  operations  immediately, 
to  encounter  the  Belgian  army  in  a  region  where  we  could  not  depend  on 
any  fortress,  in  case  we  wanted  to  risk  a  battle.  Moreover,  that  would  make 
it  possible  for  it  to  occupy  provinces  rich  in  all  kinds  of  resources  and,  at 
any  rate,  to  prevent  our  mobilization  or  only  to  permit  it  after  we  had  for- 
mally pledged  ourselves  to  carry  on  our  mobilization  to  the  exclusive  ad- 
vantage of  England  and  her  allies. 

"It  is  therefore  of  necessity  to  prepare  a  plan  of  battle  for  the  Belgian 
army  also  for  that  possibility.  This  is  necessary  in  the  interest  of  our  mili- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  631 

tary  defense  as  well  as  for  the  sake  of  the  direction  of  our  foreign  policy,  in 
case  of  war  between  Germany  and  France."  ' 

REMARKS   INTRODUCTORY  TO  THE  SECRET   DOCU- 
MENTS  BY   DR.   BERNHARD   DERNBURG 

Herewith  are  published  facsimiles  of  papers  found  among  the  docu- 
ments of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  at  Brussels,  referring  to  arrangements 
between  the  English  Military  Attache"  and  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War  re- 
garding British  intervention  in  Belgium. 

It  will  be  remembered  from  the  British  White  Book  that  in  November, 
1912,  a  correspondence  passed  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  French 
Minister  in  London,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  British  and  French  military 
and  naval  experts  had  consulted  together  from  time  to  time  as  to  plans  to 
be  followed  in  case  of  war,  and  it  was  stated  in  this  correspondence  that  in 
accordance  with  such  prearranged  plans  the  French  fleet  would  stay  in  the 
Mediterranean  to  safeguard  the  joint  interests  there,  whereas  the  British 
fleet  would  safeguard  their  interests  in  the  north.  Of  this  correspondence 
the  members  of  the  British  Cabinet  remained  ignorant  until  the  Cabinet 
meeting  immediately  preceding  the  written  statement  by  Great  Britain  on 
August  2  that  in  case  a  German  fleet  attacked  the  French  coast  or  passed 
into  the  channel,  England  would  give  all  the  assistance  in  her  power  (Bri- 
tish White  Papers,  no.  148),  and  it  was  also,  of  course,  concealed  from  the 
British  public  until  the  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  August  3.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  in  consequence  of  this  revelation  the  British  Minister  of 
Commerce,  Mr.  John  Burns,  and  two  other  members,  Lord  Morley  and 
Mr.  Trevelyan,  left  the  British  Cabinet  under  protest;  that  the  leader  of 
the  British  Labor  Party,  Mr.  Ramsey  McDonald,  resigned  from  the  leader- 
ship and  that  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby  in  his  famous  letter  denounced  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  practices. 

Mr.  Ponsonby  said  that  time  and  again  they  had  been  assured  that  there 
were  no  obligations  whatsoever  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  come  to 
France's  assistance  and  yet  they  found  themselves  now  so  hopelessly  en- 
tangled that  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  British  Government  could  not  back  out. 

The  fact  of  these  consultations,  by  which,  of  course,  all  the  plans  of  mobi- 

1  This  document  with  a  commentary  appeared  in  the  North  German  Gazette  of  October  13, 
1914,  and  is  included  as  Exhibit  39  in  the  German  edition  of  the  German  White  Book  [Deut- 
sches  Weissbuch  mit  nachtr&glichen  Erganzungen].  The  comment  reads:  "The  above  exposi- 
tion, coming  from  an  unprejudiced  source,  convincingly  proves  the  fact  that  the  same  Eng- 
land which  is  now  posing  as  the  protector  of  Belgian  neutrality,  has  forced  Belgium  to  a 
one-sided  partisanship  in  favor  of  the  powers  of  the  Entente,  and  that  she  at  one  time  even 
thought  of  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Holland.  It  is,  furthermore,  clear  that  the  Bel- 
gian government,  by  lending  an  ear  to  the  English  whisperings,  is  guilty  of  a  severe  violation 
of  the  duties  incumbent  upon  it  as  a  neutral  power.  The  right  fulfillment  of  these  duties 
would  have  compelled  the  Belgian  Government  to  foresee  in  her  plans  for  defense  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  by  France  and  to  conclude,  for  this  eventuality,  with  Germany 
agreements  analogous  to  those  concluded  with  France  and  England.  The  discovered  offi- 
cial papers  constitute  a  documentary  proof  of  the  fact,  well  known  to  competent  German  au- 
thorities, long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  that  Belgium  connived  with  the  powers  of  the 
Entente.  They  serve  as  a  justification  for  our  military  procedure  and  as  a  confirmation  of  the 
information  obtained  by  the  German  military  authorities  about  France's  intentions.  They 
may  open  the  eyes  of  the  Belgian  people  with  regard  to  the  question  to  whom  it  owes  the 
catastrophe  which  has  swept  over  the  unfortunate  country." 


632     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

lization  of  both  the  British  and  French  armies  were  disclosed  to  the  two 
allies  and  which  include  the  landing  of  English  troops  in  France,  is  now  fully 
established  by  the  annexed  documents.  They  show  that  these  conversations 
were  also  held  with  Belgium,  that  plans  had  been  concerted  to  invade  Bel- 
gium with  an  army  of  100,000  men  by  way  of  three  French  ports  —  viz., 
Dunkirk,  Calais  and  Boulogne  —  and  that  the  British  plans  even  consid- 
ered a  landing  by  way  of  the  Scheldt,  thus  violating  also  Dutch  neutrality. 

The  documents,  giving  all  the  details  as  translated  and  showing  that 
Belgian  railway  cars  were  to  be  sent  to  the  named  French  ports  in  order 
to  transport  the  British  troops  into  Belgium,  are  dated  from  1906. 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Baron  Greindl,  a  well-known  Belgian 
patriot,  protested  to  his  Government.  The  heading  of  his  protest  is  also 
given  in  facsimile.  In  it  he  said  that  it  was  not  quite  safe  to  trust  to  the 
British  and  French  to  keep  the  Belgian  neutrality,  that  it  was  not  wise  to 
take  all  measures  only  against  a  German  infraction  of  Belgian  neutrality 
and  that  the  British  spirit  was  clearly  shown  by  the  words  of  Colonel  Barn- 
ardiston  that  the  Scheldt  might  be  used  for  transporting  troops  into  Bel- 
gium. 

Furthermore,  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  British  and  French  Gov- 
ernments violently  protested  when  the  plans  were  made  public  that  the 
Dutch  Government  intended  to  fortify  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt  in  1906. 
But  in  1912,  when  the  Balkan  crisis  became  acute,  the  British  went  one 
step  further.  When  Colonel  Bridges,  in  a  conversation  with  General  Jung- 
bluth,  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  said  that  England  was  ready 
to  strike,  that  160,000  men  were  ready  to  be  landed,  and  that  they  would 
land  them  as  soon  as  any  European  conflict  should  break  out,  General 
Jungbluth  protested  that  for  such  a  step  the  permission  of  Belgium  was 
necessary.  The  cool  reply  was  that  the  English  knew  it,  but  thought  that, 
as  Belgium  was  not  strong  enough  alone  to  protect  herself,  England  would 
land  troops  anyway.  General  Jungbluth  answered  that  Belgium  felt  strong 
enough  to  protect  herself,  which  is  in  keeping  with  her  declaration  to  France, 
when  she  offered  to  protect  Belgium  by  five  army  corps,  as  reported  in  the 
British  White  Book.  The  position  of  England  was  therefore  that,  while  in 
1906  they  had  already  concerted  plans  for  a  joint  action,  in  1912  England 
intended  action  in  any  case,  should  a  European  conflagration  break  out. 

Now,  it  must  be  recollected  that  as  early  as  July  28,  1914,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  said  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  as  mentioned  in  his  communication  to  Sir 
E.  Goschen:  "  The  situation  was  very  grave.  While  it  was  restricted  to  the 
issues  at  present  actually  involved,  we  had  not  thought  of  interfering  in  it. 
But  if  Germany  became  involved  in  it  and  then  France,  the  issue  might  be 
so  great  that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests,  and  I  did  not  wish 
him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversation  —  which  I  hoped 
would  continue  —  into  thinking  that  we  should  stand  aside."  (British 
White  Papers,  no.  89.) 

This  was  at  a  time  when  the  Belgian  issue  had  not  been  raised  at  all.  It 
only  came  about  by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  notes  written  on  July  31.  Thus  the 
British  entanglement  with  France,  as  evidenced  by  the  British  White  Book, 
prevented  England  taking  the  same  attitude  in  1914  which  she  had  taken 
in  1870,  when  she  made  a  treaty  with  France  as  against  the  German  inva- 
sion of  Belgium  and  with  Germany  as  against  the  French  invasion  of  Bel- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  633 

gium.  A  similar  agreement  was  suggested  by  Prince  Lichnowsky  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  on  August  1,  1914,  as  reported  in  the  English  White  Book, 
no.  123,  when  the  former  asked  Sir  Edward  Grey  whether  if  Germany  gave 
a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  England  would  engage  to  remain 
neutral,  upon  which  Grey  replied  that  he  could  not  say  that. 

It  is  therefore  perfectly  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that  in  case  of  a  Ger- 
man war  that  was  sure  to  be  brought  about  by  Russia's  mobilization  against 
Germany,  England  would  go  to  war  against  Germany,  and  it  has  been 
proved  that  the  English  assurance  to  that  effect  has  strengthened  the  hands 
of  the  Russian  war  party,  which  thereupon  got  the  upper  hand  and  forced 
the  Russian  Czar  into  the  war.  (See  report  of  Belgian  Charge"  d'Affaires  at 
St.  Petersburg  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Brussels,  July  30.) 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  shown  that  England  meant,  with  or  without 
Belgium's  will,  to  land  her  troops,  in  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality, 
in  Belgium,  irrespective  of  whether  German  troops  were  marching  through 
Belgium  or  not,  because  no  such  declaration  had  been  made  in  1912  or  any 
time  thereafter  until  August  4  in  the  German  Reichstag.  It  is  further 
evident  that  as  soon  as  Russia  mobilized,  Germany  would  have  to  fight 
Russia  as  well  as  France  and  England  and  that  in  such  a  fight  she  was 
forced  to  draw  quickly  when  she  saw  her  enemies  reaching  for  their  hip 
pockets.  And  only  the  prompt  action  at  Liege  that  put  this  important  rail- 
way center  commanding  the  railway  connections  to  France  and  Germany 
into  German  hands  prevented  the  English  landing  and  invading  Belgium. 
The  guilt  of  the  Belgian  Government  in  this  matter  consists,  in  the  first 
place,  in  making  and  concerting  plans  with  the  English  and  French  Govern- 
ments as  to  what  steps  to  take  in  case  of  war.  A  plan  of  the  French  mobi- 
lization was  found  in  the  same  docket,  and  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the 
conference  between  British  and  French  experts  was  unknown  to  the  British 
Military  Attache"  in  Brussels.  It  is  furthermore  impossible  to  believe  that 
the  French  railway  for  the  shipping  of  British  troops  from  Calais,  Dunkirk 
and  Boulogne  into  Belgium  in  Belgian  cars  could  have  been  used  without 
the  knowledge  of  the  French  authorities.  Secondly,  that  Belgium  did  not 
heed  the  advice  of  Baron  Greindl  and  did  not  try  to  insure  her  independence 
in  the  same  way  by  approaching  Germany  and  making  a  similar  contract 
with  her.  This  disposes  of  the  contention  that  the  Belgian  conversation 
had  a  purely  defensive  character  as  against  all  comers.  It  shows  the  one- 
sidedness  of  the  inclination,  which  is  evidenced  also  by  the  placing  of  all 
Belgium's  fortresses  on  the  eastern  frontier. 

The  Belgian  people  had  been  told  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  that  Ger- 
many demanded  that  the  Belgian  forces  should  fight  with  the  Germans 
against  the  French  and  the  English,  and  the  truth  had  become  known  only 
three  full  months  later,  when  the  Belgian  Gray  Book  was  published.  Then 
Belgium  was  practically  occupied  territory.  While  Belgium  pretended  neu- 
trality and  friendship  toward  Germany,  it  was  secretly  planning  for  her  de- 
feat in  a  war  which  was  considered  unavoidable.  The  poor  Belgian  people, 
however,  must  suffer  because  of  the  large  ambitions  of  King  Leopold  of 
Congo  fame  and  of  a  broken-down  diplomacy. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  has  declared  that  there  was  irrefutable  proof 
that  if  Germany  did  not  march  through  Belgium,  her  enemies  would.  This 
proof,  as  now  being  produced,  is  of  the  strongest  character.  So  the  Chan- 


634     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

cellor  was  right  in  appealing  to  the  law  of  necessity,  although  he  had  to 
regret  that  it  violated  international  law.  This  law  of  necessity  has  been 
recognized  as  paramount  by  nearly  every  prominent  statesman,  including 
Gladstone,  and  by  all  teachers  of  international  law,  even  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court's  decision,  volume  130,  page  601,  stating  in  regard  to 
the  treaty  with  China  concerning  Chinese  immigration  into  the  United 
States:  "  It  will  not  be  presumed  that  the  legislative  department  of  the 
Government  will  lightly  pass  laws  which  are  in  conflict  with  the  treaties  of 
the  country,  but  that  circumstances  may  arise  which  would  not  only  justify 
the  Government  in  disregarding  their  stipulations,  but  demand  in  the  in- 
terests of  the  country  that  it  should  do  so,  there  can  be  no  question.  Unex- 
pected events  may  call  for  a  change  in  the  policy  of  the  country."  And  to 
strengthen  this  opinion  another  decision  by  Justice  Curtis,  rendered  in  1908, 
may  be  cited,  stating  that,  "while  it  would  be  a  matter  of  the  utmost  grav- 
ity and  delicacy  to  refuse  to  execute  a  treaty,  the  power  to  do  so  was  a  pre- 
rogative of  which  no  country  could  be  deprived  without  deeply  affecting 
its  independence." 

We  now  let  these  Belgian  documents  speak  for  themselves. 

VIOLATION   OF  BELGIAN   NEUTRALITY   BY  ENGLAND 
AND  BELGIUM  1 

The  assertion  of  the  British  Government  that  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  Germany  has  caused  England's  intervention  in  the  present 
war  has  already,  through  Sir  Edward  Grey's  own  statements,  been  proven 
untenable.  The  moral  indignation  with  which  the  entrance  of  German 
troops  into  Belgium  was  utilized  by  England  to  create  ill-feeling  against 
Germany  in  the  neutral  countries  undergoes  a  new  and  peculiar  elucidation 
through  certain  documents  which  the  German  army  administration  dis- 
covered in  the  archives  of  the  Belgian  General  Army  Staff  in  Brussels. 

From  the  contents  of  a  portfolio  which  bears  the  title  Intervention  An- 
glaise  en  Belgique,  —  English  intervention  in  Belgium,  —  it  is  clear  that 
as  early  as  1906  the  dispatch  of  an  English  expeditionary  force  to  Belgium 
in  case  of  a  Franco-German  war  had  been  arranged  for.  According  to  a 
report  dated  April  10,  1906,  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Army  Staff, 
in  collaboration  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  at  that  time  Brit- 
ish Military  Attache  in  Brussels,  had,  at  the  latter's  instigation,  in  repeated 
conferences  drawn  up  a  detailed  plan  for  the  joint  operation  of  an  English 
expeditionary  corps  of  100,000  troops  with  the  Belgian  army  against  Ger- 
many. The  plan  was  approved  by  the  Chief  of  the  English  General  Staff, 
Major-General  Grierson.  The  Belgian  General  Army  Staff  was  furnished 
with  all  the  data  concerning  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  various 
parts  of  the  British  army,  the  composition  of  the  expeditionary  corps,  the 
ports  for  debarkation,  together  with  an  exact  computation  with  regard  to 
the  time  of  transportation,  etc.  On  the  basis  of  these  data  the  Belgian 
General  Army  Staff  had  made  careful  preparations  for  the  transportation 
of  the  English  troops  into  the  Belgian  line  of  defense,  for  their  quartering 

1  This  is  the  translation,  given  out  by  the  German  Information  Service,  of  Exhibit  38  of 
the  German  White  Book  [Deutsches  Weissbuch  mil  nachtr&glichen  Ergdnzungen],  which  was 
printed  in  the  North  German  Gazette  of  October  13,  1914,  as  an  officially  inspired  statement. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  635 

and  provisioning.  The  plans  for  this  cooperation  were  carefully  worked  out 
to  the  last  detail.  For  instance,  a  large  number  of  interpreters  and  Belgian 
gendarmes  were  to  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  English  forces  and  the  neces- 
sary maps  delivered  to  them.  Even  for  the  care  of  the  English  wounded 
provision  had  been  made. 

Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  Boulogne  had  been  decided  upon  as  the  points  of 
landing  for  the  British  troops.  From  there  they  were  to  be  brought  by 
Belgian  railways  to  the  line  of  defense.  The  fact  that  it  had  been  decided 
to  land  those  troops  in  French  ports  and  transport  them  through  French 
territory  proves  that  the  English-Belgian  arrangement  had  been  preceded 
by  an  agreement  with  the  French  General  Army  Staff.  Those  three  powers, 
then,  had  minutely  determined  the  plans  for  a  cooperation  of  the  "  allied 
armies,"  as  they  are  termed  in  the  document.  The  fact  that  a  map  for  use 
in  the  French  border  mobilization  was  found  in  the  secret  archives  also  tes- 
tifies to  this. 

The  above-mentioned  report  contains  several  remarks  of  special  interest. 
In  one  place  it  is  stated  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  had  made 
the  remark  that  the  support  of  Holland  could  not  be  counted  on  at  the  time. 
He  had,  moreover,  given  the  confidential  information  that  the  British 
Government  had  the  intention  of  establishing  the  basis  for  the  English 
supplies  in  Antwerp  as  soon  as  the  North  Sea  should  be  swept  clean  of  Ger- 
man warships.  Furthermore,  the  British  Military  Attach6  proposed  the 
establishment  of  a  Belgian  spy  service  in  the  German  Rhine  province. 

The  above-mentioned  plans,  discovered  at  Brussels,  are  supplemented  in 
a  most  striking  manner  by  a  diplomatic  document,  likewise  found  among 
the  secret  papers.  This  is  a  report  of  Baron  Greindl,  for  many  years  Belgian 
Envoy  in  Berlin,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  the 
writer  reveals  with  great  astuteness  the  ulterior  motives  underlying  the 
English  proposal  and  draws  attention  to  the  danger  of  the  situation  in  which 
Belgium  had  become  involved  by  a  one-sided  partisanship  in  favor  of  the 
powers  of  the  Entente.  In  this  very  detailed  report,  dated  December  23, 
1911  (which  may  be  published  in  full  at  some  future  opportunity),  Baron 
Greindl  explains  that  the  plan  of  the  General  Army  Staff  for  the  defense  of 
Belgian  neutrality  in  a  Franco-German  war  as  communicated  to  him  only 
concerned  the  question  as  to  what  military  measures  should  be  adopted  in 
case  Germany  violated  Belgian  neutrality.  The  hypothesis  of  a  French 
attack  on  Germany  through  Belgium  had,  however,  just  as  much  probabil- 
ity in  itself. 


STATEMENT    OF    M.    HAVENITH,    BELGIAN    MINISTER    TO 

THE  UNITED  STATES,   REGARDING  THE   PUBLICATION 

OF  THE  BELGIAN  DOCUMENTS  WITH  EXPLANATION 

BY  DR.   DERNBURG1 

The  German  Government  has  at  last  decided  to  publish  the  documents 
which  it  says  were  found  in  Brussels,  and  which  it  claims  prove  that  Bel- 
gium violated  her  neutrality. 

As  the  Belgian  Government  has  no  press  bureau  in  the  United  States  to 
1  From  the  New  York  Times,  December  22,  1914. 


636     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

disseminate  its  views,  the  Legation  of  the  King  will,  on  this  one  occasion, 
respond  to  the  communication  published  in  the  American  newspapers  on 
behalf  of  Germany. 

The  Belgian  Minister  does  not  know  whether  or  not  these  published  docu- 
ments are  authentic;  but,  far  from  discussing  their  authenticity,  he  declares 
that  if  he  had  had  them  in  his  possession  he  would  have  published  them  long 
ago,  as  they  constitute  the  strongest  proof  of  the  innocence  of  the  Belgian 
Government. 

It  seems  unnecessary  that  these  documents  should  have  been  published 

with  a  preface  of  long  explanations.   The  text  itself  is  the  interesting  part, 

and  there  seems  no  need  to  teach  the  American  people  to  read  or  to  think. 

Document  No.  1  refers  to  a  conversation  between  Major-General  Du- 

carme  and  the  English  Military  Attache,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston. 

"  The  English  Military  Attache  went  to  call  on  the  Belgian  General 

and  told  him  of  the  anxiety  on  the  part  of  the  English  General  Staff 

in  regard  to  the  general  political  situation  and  the  possibility  of  war. 

In  case  Belgium  should  be  attacked   the  sending  of   about  100,000 

troops  was  provided  for. 

"  He  [the  British  Military  Attache]  proceeded  in  the  following  terms: 

'The  landing  of  the  British  troops  would  take  place  on  the  French 

coast.  .  .  .  The  entry  of  the  English  into  Belgium  would  take  place 

only  after  the  violation  of  our  [Belgian]  neutrality  by  Germany.'  " 

It  almost  seems  as  if  Colonel  Barnardiston  had  foreseen  the  future.  The 

document  continues  as  follows:  — 

"My  visitor  laid  emphasis  on  the  following  fact:  That  it  was  not 
binding  on  his  Government." 
It  was  thus  clearly  shown  by  the  British  Military  Attache  that  his  com- 
munication was  simply  a  conversation ;  it  is,  moreover,  perfectly  well  known 
that  military  attaches  have  no  power  to  make  conventional  agreements. 
The  document  further  continues:  — 

"  In  the  course  of  another  interview  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnard- 
iston and  I  studied  the  combined  operations  to  take  place  in  the  event 
of  a  German  offensive  with  Antwerp  as  its  object,  and  under  the  hypo- 
thesis of  the  German  troops  marching  through  our  [Belgium]  country 
in  order  to  reach  the  French  Ardennes; " 
—  an  additional  proof  that  the  object  of  the  conversation  was  solely  to 
prevent  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

Document  2  refers  to  a  conversation  between  the  British  Military  At- 
tache" and  General  Jungbluth,  in  which  the  former  said  that  the  British 
troops  would  effect  a  landing  even  if  we  [the  Belgians]  did  not  ask  for 
assistance.  This  is  an  additional  proof  that  no  agreement  or  convention 
had  been  made. 

To  this  the  Belgian  General  replied  that  our  [Belgium's]  consent  was 
necessary,  and  he  added  that  we  [Belgians]  were,  moreover,  perfectly  able 
to  prevent  the  Germans  from  passing  through  Belgium,  showing  his  anxiety 
to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

Document  3  contains,  according  to  Dr.  Dernburg,  the  personal  views  of 
the  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  but  it  does  not  in  any  way  indicate  the  exist- 
ence of  an  agreement  between  Belgium  and  England  against  Germany. 
The  Belgian  Minister  is  unable  to  see  how  it  can  be  said  that  these  docu- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  637 

ments  constitute  a  proof  of  an  agreement  between  England  and  Belgium 
against  Germany,  unless  one  accepts  the  idea  that  Germany  had  a  right  to 
violate  Belgium's  neutrality,  and  that  all  measures  taken  as  a  precaution 
against  violation  of  neutrality  must  therefore  have  been  taken  against  Ger- 
many. 

The  documents  contain  merely  conversations  between  military  officers  in 
regard  to  a  possible  future  cooperation  of  their  armies  in  the  event  of  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  territory  by  Germany.  They  never  even  resulted  in  an 
agreement  between  those  Governments,  military  attachds  having  no  au- 
thority to  make  such  agreements. 

The  events  that  happened  last  August  and  the  sudden  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium by  Germany  show  that  the  British  Government  was  fully  justified  in 
fearing  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory  by  Germany.  It  seems  incredible, 
after  what  has  passed,  that  the  German  Government  should  denounce  the 
British  Government  for  approaching  the  Belgian  military  officers  and  tak- 
ing precautions  against  the  very  thing  which  eventually  happened. 

In  the  preface  published  with  the  documents  it  is  said  that  "only  the 
prompt  action  at  Liege  that  put  this  important  railway  center  commanding 
the  railway  connections  to  France  and  Germany  into  German  hands  pre- 
vented the  English  landing  and  invading  Belgium." 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  how  the  taking  of  Liege  prevented  the  Eng- 
lish from  landing  and  invading  Belgium.  That  statement  is  hardly  a  com- 
pliment to  the  intelligence  or  the  geographical  knowledge  of  the  American 
people.  The  fact  is  that  Liege  was  taken  a  long  time  before  the  British 
troops  arrived  at  Calais,  and  it  is  still  to-day  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans, 
without  in  the  least  interfering  with  the  arrival  of  British  reinforcements  in 
France  and  in  the  territory  still  left  in  the  possession  of  Belgium. 

The  fact  is  that  Liege  was  not  taken  to  prevent  the  British  from  entering 
Belgium,  but  because  it  was  part  of  the  plan  of  the  German  Staff  to  invade 
Belgium  at  once,  and,  marching  across  her  territory,  to  crush  the  army  of 
France  as  soon  as  possible,  and  then  turn  to  attack  the  Russians  on  the 
east.  Did  not  Herr  von  Jagow  say  to  the  British  Ambassador  that  the 
shortest  and  easiest  way  was  through  Belgium? 

The  truth  is  that  every  step  taken  by  Germany  was  a  clear  indication  of 
her  intentions  against  Belgium.  Her  strategic  railroads  are  concentrated 
on  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  her  military  writers,  Von  Bernhardi,  Von 
Schliefenbach,  and  Von  der  Goltz,  made  no  secret  of  her  plan  to  carry  on 
her  war  by  means  of  an  invasion  of  Belgium's  neutral  country.  Events 
have  shown  how,  long  before  the  war,  preparations  had  been  made  to  carry 
this  plan  into  effect. 

Dr.  Dernburg  says  that  the  one-sidedness  of  the  Belgian  inclination  is 
indicated  by  the  placing  of  all  Belgian  fortresses  on  the  eastern  frontier. 
The  distinguished  statesman  (apparently  confused  by  the  ardor  of  discus- 
sion) has  already  in  another  article,  published  in  The  Independent  of  Decem- 
ber 7,  1914,  placed  Antwerp  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhine;  to-day  he  places 
Namur  on  the  German  frontier,  whereas  that  fortress  is  situated  near  the 
frontier  of  France.  There  are  two  fortresses  in  East  Belgium  —  Liege  and 
Namur;  Namur  being  near  the  French  frontier,  could  menace  Germany 
only  in  case  the  Germans  should  have  penetrated  about  one  third  of  Bel- 
gium. It  is,  in  fact,  a  fortress  against  France. 


/ 


638     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

No  proof  has  been  brought  forward  to  show  that  if  Germany  had  not 
invaded  Belgium,  France  or  England  would  have  done  so. 

The  advocates  of  Germany  cite  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  and  attempt  to  apply  it  to  the  case  of  Germany's  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  and  to  justify  Germany  by  the  law  of  necessity.  The 
example  chosen  (the  Chinese  question)  does  not  involve  massacres,  bom- 
bardments, nor  the  burning  of  towns.  It  is  not  an  analogous  case.  The 
following  would  be  a  closer  analogy  to  Germany's  action  in  regard  to  Bel- 
gium: A  man,  pretending  that  he  has  been  attacked  in  the  street  by  a  power- 
ful enemy,  claims  that  he  is  justified  in  killing  an  innocent  person  if  by 
doing  so  he  gets  the  best  of  his  adversary. 

I  do  not  believe  that  any  one  could  produce  a  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  justifying  a  crime  on  the  plea  that  the  perpetration  of  the  crime  was 
advantageous  to  the  culprit  who  committed  it. 

When  a  nation  has  to  resort  to  such  arguments  to  defend  its  actions,  it 
must  realize  that  its  case  is  desperate. 

Germany  has  converted  smiling  and  peaceful  Belgium  into  a  land  of  sor- 
row, of  mourning,  and  of  ruins.  There  is  not  a  family  that  does  not  mourn 
one  of  its  dear  ones.  In  the  face  of  the  indignation  which  has  aroused  the 
world,  Germany  to-day  endeavors  to  refute  the  accusation  which  rises 
against  her  from  so  many  tombs,  and  she  endeavors  to  throw  upon  the 
innocent  the  terrible  responsibility  of  her  own  crimes. 

The  Belgian  Minister  cannot  believe  that  this  course  of  action  will  win 
back  Germany  the  sympathy  which  she  has  lost  throughout  the  world. 

THE   NATURE   OF  NEUTRALITY1 

.  .  .  Civilized  nations  cannot  permit  barbarities  to  be  perpetrated  by 
their  next-door  neighbors,  any  more  than  individuals  living  in  a  commun- 
ity can  tolerate  lawlessness  on  the  part  of  other  persons.  Hence  arise  the 
rights  of  supervision,  intervention,  and  compulsory  reform;  rights  which, 
upon  close  analysis,  are  found  to  be  rather  of  the  nature  of  public  duties. 

International  Intervention  and  Supervision 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  this  line  of  obligation,  that  the  so-called  "  Concert 
of  Europe"  was  formed,  a  syndicate  of  the  Great  Powers  acting  —  nomi- 
nally at  least  —  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  order  in  less  perfectly  organ- 
ized and  less  highly  developed  States,  whose  conduct  had  become  intoler- 
able; but,  unfortunately,  this  concert  was  so  frequently  actuated  in  its 
operations  by  conflicting  national  interests  as  to  defeat  in  great  measure 
the  reforms  which  it  professed  to  be  aiming  to  accomplish.  More  recently, 
the  United  States,  in  the  interest  of  tranquillity  and  humanity,  without  in 
the  least  wishing  to  extend  its  territories,  —  but  not  always  fully  under- 
stood by  others  as  respects  its  philanthropic  motives,  —  has  twice  occu- 
pied and  attempted  to  regenerate  Cuba,  and  is  at  present  undertaking  to 
maintain  order  in  the  Philippines. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  these  supervisory  undertakings  are,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  guarantees  that  juristic  principles  will  be  applied  in  portions 

1  Extract  from  World  Organization  as  Affected  by  the  Nature  of  the  Modern  State,  by  David 
Jayne  Hill.   New  York,  1911,  pp.  140-43. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  639 

of  the  world  not  yet  completely  brought  under  the  rule  of  justice  as  opposed 
to  the  rule  of  force.  In  so  far  as  they  are  loyal  to  the  high  sense  of  duty 
which  justifies  them,  they  are  to  be  commended;  and  should  be  recognized 
as  among  the  tasks  which  fall  to  the  elder  brothers  in  the  family  of  man- 
kind. But  it  is  important  that  here  also  international  guarantees  should  be 
given.  As  an  evidence  of  high  and  unselfish  purpose,  the  best  form  of 
guarantee  is  the  open  door  of  trade,  the  equality  of  rights  for  all  nations 
in  the  domain  of  business  enterprise,  each  protecting  State  taking  only  so 
much  revenue  from  the  inhabitants  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  support  of 
its  administration.  By  this  method,  all  the  outlying  portions  of  the  world 
which  might  otherwise  become  the  field  of  conflicting  national  interests, 
and  even  of  armed  strife,  may  be  taken  out  of  the  arena  of  dispute,  and 
placed  under  a  just  and  educative  police  surveillance  useful  to  their  in- 
habitants and  beneficial  to  all  mankind. 

The  Principle  of  Neutralization 

Independent  States,  which  have  proved  their  capacity  to  maintain  a 
responsible  government,  being  members  of  the  society  of  States,  possess 
equally  perfect  rights,  without  regard  to  the  size  of  their  territory  or  the 
extent  of  their  population.  Some  of  them  may,  however,  from  a  material 
point  of  view,  require  special  guarantees  of  rights  which  unaided  they  might 
not  be  able  to  defend  against  foreign  aggression.  This  necessity  has  been 
in  some  cases  recognized,  and  provided  for  by  "neutralization";  that  is, 
certain  States  have  been  declared  "neutral"  in  the  conflicts  that  may  arise 
between  their  more  powerful  neighbors,  and  their  independence  has  by 
special  compacts  been  taken  under  the  united  protection  of  the  guarantors. 

Thus  Switzerland  since  1815,  Belgium  since  1831,  and  Luxemburg  since 
1867  —  while  retaining  their  entire  political  independence,  which  is  guaran- 
teed by  the  Greater  Powers  —  are  by  treaty  rendered  perpetually  neutral. 
While  this  arrangement  prevents  making  their  territories  the  scene  of  hos- 
tilities, it  does  not  deprive  these  States  of  the  right  of  self-defence.  On  the 
contrary,  it  imposes  upon  them  the  duty  of  defending  their  neutrality  to 
the  best  of  their  ability;  but,  as  they  enjoy  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers  that 
they  will  aid  them  in  this  respect,  it  is  improbable  that  their  neutrality  will 
ever  be  violated.  During  the  entire  period  since  the  neutralization  of  the 
three  countries  just  named,  their  right  of  neutrality  has  been  uniformly 
respected.1 

By  the  neutralization  of  these  countries,  the  Powers  which  border  upon 
them  have  voluntarily  renounced  an  apparent  advantage  in  case  of  war; 
for,  if  this  restriction  did  not  exist,  the  border  State  that  could  soonest 
mobilize  its  forces  and  take  possession  of  the  adjacent  territory  could 
thereby  cover  its  own  frontiers  from  attack,  and  thus  obtain  a  considerable 
strategic  advantage.  It  is  evident,  however,  that,  if  defence  is  the  object 
in  question,  it  is  greatly  promoted  by  the  erection  of  such  moral  barriers; 
for  neutralization  not  only  limits  the  field  of  hostilities  but  diminishes  the 
avenues  through  which  invasion  is  legally  possible.  There  can  be  no  doubt, 
that,  in  every  instance  where  neutralization  has  been  applied,  the  arrange- 
ment has  been  a  wise  and  useful  one  for  all  the  Powers  concerned. 

1  For  the  neutralization  treaties,  with  comments,  see  Wicker,  Neutralization.  London  and 
New  York,  1911. 


640     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

"THE  ALLEGED   INHERENT  RIGHT  OF  SELF- 
PRESERVATION"1 

The  objections  which  we  have  urged  against  the  general  doctrine  of  the 
inherent  rights  of  states  must  now  be  followed  by  an  examination  of  the 
one  of  those  rights  which  is  recognized  on  all  hands  as  being  the  most  im- 
portant, that  of  self-preservation.  We  will  take  the  account  of  what  we 
oppose  from  Rivier,  honoris  causa,  and  especially  because  of  his  authority 
in  Roman  law,  the  doctrine  of  which  with  regard  to  individuals  has  been 
made  a  foundation  for  what  is  asserted  in  the  case  of  states. 

"When,"  Rivier  says,  a  "conflict  arises  between  the  right  of  self- 
preservation  of  a  state  and  the  duty  of  that  state  to  respect  the  right 
of  another,  the  right  of  self-preservation  overrides  the  duty.  Primum 
vivere.  A  man  may  be  free  to  sacrifice  himself.  It  is  never  permitted  to  a 
government  to  sacrifice  the  state  of  which  the  destinies  are  confided 
to  it.  The  government  is  then  authorized,  and  even  in  certain  circum- 
stances bound,  to  violate  the  right  of  another  country  for  the  safety 
(salut)  of  its  own.  That  is  the  excuse  of  necessity,  an  application  of  the 
reason  of  state.  It  is  a  legitimate  excuse."  2 
We  will  here  pause  to  remark  that  an  argument  which  may  be  good  as 
between  a  state  and  a  government  entrusted  by  it  with  its  destinies  is  not 
necessarily  good  between  it  and  that  government  together  and  another 
state;  or  we  may  put  it  that  no  state  can  entrust  its  government  with  wider 
powers  than  itself  possesses.  But  Rivier  adds:  — 

"The  excuse  of  necessity  has  always  been  allowed  to  private  persons ; 
a  fortiori  it  will  not  be  refused  to  states. — Ulpian,  1.  29,  Sec.  3,  Ad  legem 
Aquiliam,  9,  2:  Item  Labeo  scribit  si,  cum  vi  ventorum  navis  impulsa 
esset  in  Junes  anchorarum  alterius  et  nautae  funes  praecidissent,  si  nullo 
alio  modo  nisi  praecisis  funibus  explicare  se  potuit,  nullam  actionem 
dandam.  The  same,  1.  49,  Sec.  1,  same  title."3 
In  the  case  so  put  by  Labeo  there  seems  to  have  been  an  accidental  physi- 
cal entanglement  of  two  ships  which  had  to  be  ended  in  one  way  or  another, 
but  the  cases  in  which  the  right  of  self-preservation  is  invoked  to  justify 
the  political  action  of  a  state  are  those  in  which  action  clearly  aggressive  in 
its  external  character,  and  not  demanded  by  any  physical  necessity,  is  as- 
serted to  fall  in  its  intrinsic  character  within  that  right.   There,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  Roman  law,  British  law  does  not  permit  a  man  to  ward 
off  danger  from  himself  by  transferring  it  to  an  innocent  person.  If  he  has 
preserved  himself  by  action  externally  aggressive  against  another,  he  can- 
not justify  his  action  as  intrinsically  defensive  unless  the  person  against 
whom  it  was  directed  was  in  fault  towards  him.   Thus  it  has  been  held  in 
England  that,  when  a  shipwrecked  crew  is  in  danger  of  starvation,  it  is  not 
lawful  for  them  to  kill  and  eat  one  of  their  number,  however  pressing  the 
necessity.4  And  it  has  been  held  in  Scotland  that  a  ship,  in  harbour  during 

1  Extract  from  John  Westlake,  International  Law,  Part  I,  "Peace."  Cambridge,  1910, 
pp.  309,  310,  311,  312. 

2  Principes  du  Droit  des  Gens,  t.  I,  p.  277.  [Westlake's  note.] 
«  Ibid.,  p.  278.    [Westlake's  note.] 

4  Queen  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens,  14  Q.B.D.  273;  decided  unanimously  by  Lord  Chief  Jus- 
tice Coleridge,  Justices  Grove  and  Denman,  and  Barons  Pollock  and  Huddleston.  Their 
lordships  stated  that  they  had  Justice  Stephen's  authority  for  repudiating  an  inference  in 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  641 

a  gale  and  in  want  of  searoom,  may  not  cut  the  ropes  of  another  ship  and 
send  her  adrift  even  though  it  is  her  only  means  of  escape,  but  must  pay 
compensation.1  Liability  to  suffer  hurt,  whether  in  person,  in  property  or 
in  rights,  and  whether  by  sentence  of  law  or  by  private  action  which  the 
law  permits,  presupposes  a  duty  violated  by  the  person  who  is  to  suffer  it. 
When  a  small  injury  is  inflicted  in  obedience  to  an  almost  irresistible  im- 
pulse, the  law  may  overlook  it,  but  in  principle  we  may  not  hurt  another 
or  infringe  his  rights,  even  for  our  self-preservation,  when  he  has  not  failed 
in  any  duty  towards  us. 

Self-preservation,  when  carried  beyond  this  point,  is  a  natural  impulse, 
an  effect  of  the  laws  to  which  human  nature  is  subject  in  the  stage  of  ad- 
vancement to  which  it  has  yet  attained.  But  the  office  of  jural  law  is  not 
to  register  and  consecrate  the  effect  of  the  laws  of  nature,  but  to  control 
them  by  the  introduction  of  the  principle  of  justice,  where  an  unreflecting 
submission  to  the  tendencies  which  in  their  untamed  state  they  promote 
would  be  destructive  of  society.  In  that  way  human  nature  itself  has  been 
gradually  improved,  and  we  may  hope  will  continue  to  be  so;  but  the  con- 
trast between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  generalisations  which  express  whatever 
with  regard  to  self-preservation  may  be  its  actual  condition  from  time  to 
time,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  rules  to  be  enforced  by  government  on  the 
same  subject,  furnish  an  instructive  instance  of  the  difference,  too  often  over- 
looked, between  the  laws  of  nature,  which  are  the  generalised  expression  of 
what  is,  and  jural  laws,  which  lay  down  what  is  to  be  done.2  In  the  case  of  a 
state  the  impulse  or  tendency  which  justice  must  control  is  not  even  that 
which  arises  spontaneously  on  the  appearance  of  danger  to  natural  life  or 
individual  welfare,  but  that  which  arises  from  the  secondary  attachment 
formed  to  human  institutions.  No  doubt  the  state  is  of  all  human  institu- 
tions that  to  which  attachment  is  the  most  elevating  to  the  emotions  and 
the  moral  sentiments,  especially  when,  as  is  the  case  of  most  states,  its  ori- 
gin is  so  remote  that  the  steps  which  have  led  up  to  it  are  forgotten,  and  it 
wears  the  semblance  of  being  a  mould  appointed  by  superior  power  for  the 
feelings  of  its  members  to  take  shape  from.  Then  those  feelings,  directed 
towards  it,  come  nearest  to  pure  altruism,  having  the  smallest  ingredient  of 
satisfaction  for  ourselves  or  in  our  own  work.  But  even  then,  although  as  a 
general  rule  we  must  admit  the  truth  of  Wolff's  principle,  that  a  state  ought 
to  preserve  and  perfect  itself  as  an  association  of  its  citizens  in  order  to 
promote  their  common  good,  patriotism  should  not  allow  us  to  forget  that 
even  our  own  good,  and  still  less  that  of  the  world,  does  not  always  and 
imperatively  require  the  maintenance  of  our  state,3  still  less  its  maintenance 

favor  of  the  contrary  opinion  which  had  been  drawn  from  some  passages  in  his  writings 
(p.  286).   [Westlake's  note.] 

1  Currie  v.  Allan,  31  Scottish  Law  Reporter,  814.  See  the  article  on  that  case  in  6  Juridical 
Review,  354—61,  in  which  Mr.  W.  Galbraith  Meller  criticizes  the  common  view  of  the 
Roman  law.    [Westlake's  note.] 

2  See  Westlake:  International  Law,  part  I,  p.  5.    [Westlake's  note.] 

3  Rivier  gets  a  glimpse  of  this.  Un  etat  peut-il  perdre  son  droit  a  Vexistence,  en  itre  diclare 
dechut  C'est  d  quoi  s' exposerait  sans  doute  celui  qui  violerait  d'une  maniere  persistante  les 
regies  du  droit  des  gens,  qui  agirait  contrairement  a  toute  bonne  foi,  a  toute  humanite;  il  se  met- 
trait  ainsi  hors  du  droit  des  gens,  hors  la  loi  internationale.  Immediately,  however,  he  seems 
to  set  upaga  in  the  absolute  right  to  existence,  by  asking  mais  qui  sera  jugef  (Principes  du 
Droit  des  Gens,  t.  I,  p.  256.)  If  such  a  case  arose,  as  it  may  arise  with  regard  to  Turkey,  the 
states  called  on  by  the  circumstances  to  deal  with  it  must  in  the  present  imperfect  organiza- 


642     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF   1914  ' 

in  its  actual  limits  and  with  undiminished  resources.  The  first  interest  of  a 
society,  national  or  international,  is  justice;  and  justice  is  violated  when  any 
state  which  has  not  failed  in  its  duty  is  subjected  to  aggression  intended  for 
the  preservation  or  perfection  of  another. 

THE   QUEEN  v.  DUDLEY  AND   STEPHENS  l 

Indictment  for  the  murder  of  Richard  Parker  on  the  high  seas  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Admiralty. 

At  the  trial  before  Huddleston,  B.,  at  the  Devon  and  Cornwall  Winter 
Assizes,  November  7,  1884,  the  jury,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  learned  judge, 
found  the  facts  of  the  case  in  a  special  verdict  which  stated  "that  on  July 
5,  1884,  the  prisoners,  Thomas  Dudley  and  Edward  Stephens,  with  one 
Brooks,  all  able-bodied  English  seamen,  and  the  deceased  also  an  English 
boy,  between  seventeen  and  eighteen  years  of  age,  the  crew  of  an  English 
yacht,  a  registered  English  vessel,  were  cast  away  in  a  storm  on  the  high 
seas  1600  miles  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  were  compelled  to  put 
into  an  open  boat  belonging  to  the  said  yacht.  That  in  this  boat  they  had  no 
supply  of  water  and  no  supply  of  food,  except  two  1  lb.  tins  of  turnips,  and 
for  three  days  they  had  nothing  else  to  subsist  upon.  That  on  the  fourth 
day  they  caught  a  small  turtle,  upon  which  they  subsisted  for  a  few  days, 
and  this  was  the  only  food  they  had  up  to  the  twentieth  day  when  the  act 
now  in  question  was  committed.  That  on  the  twelfth  day  the  remains  of 
the  turtle  were  entirely  consumed,  and  for  the  next  eight  days  they  had 
nothing  to  eat.  That  they  had  no  fresh  water,  except  such  rain  as  they  from 
time  to  time  caught  in  their  oilskin  capes.  That  the  boat  was  drifting  on 
the  ocean,  and  was  probably  more  than  1000  miles  away  from  land.  That 
on  the  eighteenth  day,  when  they  had  been  seven  days  without  food  and 
five  without  water,  the  prisoners  spoke  to  Brooks  as  to  what  should  be 
done  if  no  succour  came,  and  suggested  that  some  one  should  be  sacrificed  to 
save  the  rest,  but  Brooks  dissented,  and  the  boy,  to  whom  they  were  under- 
stood to  refer,  was  not  consulted.  That  on  the  24th  of  July,  the  day  before 
the  act  now  in  question,  the  prisoner  Dudley  proposed  to  Stephens  and 
Brooks  that  lots  should  be  cast  who  should  be  put  to  death  to  save  the 
rest,  but  Brooks  refused  to  consent,  and  it  was  not  put  to  the  boy,  and  in 
point  of  fact  there  was  no  drawing  of  lots.  That  on  that  day  the  prisoners 
spoke  of  their  having  families,  and  suggested  it  would  be  better  to  kill  the 
boy  that  their  lives  should  be  saved,  and  Dudley  proposed  that  if  there^vas- 
no  vessel  in  sight  by  the  morrow  morning  the  boy  should  be  killed.  That 
next  day,  the  25th  of  July,  no  vessel  appearing,  Dudley  told  Brooks  that 
he  had  better  go  and  have  a  sleep,  and  made  signs  to  Stephens  and  Brooks 
that  the  boy  had  better  be  killed.  The  prisoner  Stephens  agreed  to  the  act, 
but  Brooks  dissented  from  it.  That  the  boy  was  then  lying  at  the  bottom 
of  the  boat  quite  helpless,  and  extremely  weakened  by  famine  and  by  drink- 
ing sea  water,  and  unable  to  make  any  resistance,  nor  did  he  ever  assent  to 

tion  of  the  world  be  the  judges  of  their  own  political  action,  as  the  great  powers  were  in  1815, 
when  they  justly  determined  to  exclude  Napoleon  from  the  throne  of  France,  whatever 
other  government  France  might  give  herself.    [Westlake's  note.] 

1  Law  Reports  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Judicature,  Queen's  Bench  Division,  vol.  xiv, 
pp.  273-88. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  643 

his  being  killed.  The  prisoner  Dudley  offered  a  prayer  asking  forgiveness 
for  them  all  if  either  of  them  should  be  tempted  to  commit  a  rash  act,  and 
that  their  souls  might  be  saved.  That  Dudley,  with  the  assent  of  Stephens, 
went  to  the  boy,  and  telling  him  that  his  time  was  come,  put  a  knife  into 
his  throat  and  killed  him  then  and  there;  that  the  three  men  fed  upon  the 
body  and  blood  of  the  boy  for  four  days;  that  on  the  fourth  day  after  the 
act  had  been  committed  the  boat  was  picked  up  by  a  passing  vessel,  and  the 
prisoners  were  rescued,  still  alive,  but  in  the  lowest  state  of  prostration. 
That  they  were  carried  to  the  port  of  Falmouth,  and  committed  for  trial  at 
Exeter.  That  if  the  men  had  not  fed  upon  the  body  of  the  boy  they  would 
probably  not  have  survived  to  be  so  picked  up  and  rescued,  but  would 
within  the  four  days  have  died  of  famine.  That  the  boy,  being  in  a  much 
weaker  condition,  was  likely  to  have  died  before  them.  That  at  the  time  of 
the  act  in  question  there  was  no  sail  in  sight,  nor  any  reasonable  prospect 
of  relief.  That  under  these  circumstances  there  appeared  to  the  prisoners 
every  probability  that  unless  they  then  fed  or  very  soon  fed  upon  the  boy 
or  one  of  themselves  they  would  die  of  starvation.  That  there  was  no 
appreciable  chance  of  saving  life  except  by  killing  some  one  for  the  others 
to  eat.  That  assuming  any  necessity  to  kill  anybody,  there  was  no  greater 
necessity  for  killing  the  boy  than  any  of  the  other  three  men.  But  whether, 
upon  the  whole  matter  by  the  jurors  found,  the  killing  of  Richard  Parker 
by  Dudley  and  Stephens  be  felony  and  murder,  the  jurors  are  ignorant, 
and  pray  the  advice  of  the  Court  thereupon,  and  if  upon  the  whole  matter 
the  Court  shall  be  of  opinion  that  the  killing  of  Richard  Parker  be  felony 
and  murder,  then  the  jurors  say  that  Dudley  and  Stephens  were  each  guilty 
of  felony  and  murder  as  alleged  in  the  indictment." 

The  learned  judge  then  adjourned  the  assizes  until  the  25th  of  Novem- 
ber at  the  Royal  Courts  of  Justice.  On  the  application  of  the  Crown  they 
were  again  adjourned  to  the  4th  of  December,  and  the  case  ordered  to  be 
argued  before  a  Court  consisting  of  five  judges. 

[After  hearing  argument  of  counsel,  Lord  Coleridge,  Chief  Justice,  deliv- 
ered the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  court.  The  Chief  Justice  reviewed  the 
arguments  brought  forward  for  the  defendants.  He  declared  that  the  ob- 
jections to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  were  not  well  taken  and  that  there 
were  no  precedents  to  guide  the  court.  In  regard  to  the  opinion  of  Lord 
Bacon  Lord  Coleridge  said :] 

"The  one  real  authority  of  former  time  is  Lord  Bacon,  who,  in  his  com- 
mentary on  the  maxim,  'necessitas  inducit  privilegium  quoad  jura  privata,' 
lays  down  the  law  as  follows:  —  'Necessity  carrieth  a  privilege  in  itself. 
Necessity  is  of  three  sorts  —  necessity  of  conservation  of  life,  necessity  of 
obedience,  and  necessity  of  the  act  of  God  or  of  a  stranger.  First  of  conser- 
vation of  life;  if  a  man  steal  viands  to  satisfy  his  present  hunger,  this  is  no 
felony  nor  larceny.  So  if  divers  be  in  danger  of  drowning  by  the  casting 
away  of  some  boat  or  barge,  and  one  of  them  get  to  some  plank,  or  on  the 
boat's  side  to  keep  himself  above  water,  and  another  to  save  his  life  thrust 
him  from  it,  whereby  he  is  drowned,  this  is  neither  se  defendendo  nor  by 
misadventure,  but  justifiable.'  On  this  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Lord  Bacon's 
proposition  that  stealing  to  satisfy  hunger  is  no  larceny  is  hardly  supported 
by  Staundforde,  whom  he  cites  for  it,  and  is  expressly  contradicted  by  Lord 
Hale  in  the  passage  already  cited.  And  for  the  proposition  as  to  the  plank 


644     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

or  boat,  it  is  said  to  be  derived  from  the  canonists.  At  any  rate  he  cites  no 
authority  for  it,  and  it  must  stand  upon  his  own.  Lord  Bacon  was  great 
even  as  a  lawyer;  but  it  is  permissible  to  much  smaller  men,  relying  upon 
principle  and  on  the  authority  of  others,  the  equals  and  even  the  superiors 
of  Lord  Bacon  as  lawyers,  to  question  the  soundness  of  his  dictum.  There 
are  many  conceivable  states  of  things  in  which  it  might  possibly  be  true, 
but  if  Lord  Bacon  meant  to  lay  down  the  broad  proposition  that  a  man 
may  save  his  life  by  killing,  if  necessary,  an  innocent  and  unoffending  neigh- 
bor, it  certainly  is  not  law  at  the  present  day." 

[The  conclusion  of  the  judgment  was  as  follows]: 

"Now,  except  for  the  purpose  of  testing  how  far  the  conservation  of  a 
man's  own  life  is  in  all  cases  and  under  all  circumstances,  an  absolute,  un- 
qualified, and  paramount  duty,  we  exclude  from  our  consideration  all  the 
incidents  of  war.  We  are  dealing  with  a  case  of  private  homicide,  not  one 
imposed  upon  men  in  the  service  of  their  Sovereign  and  in  the  defence  of 
their  country.  Now  it  is  admitted  that  the  deliberate  killing  of  this  un- 
offending and  unresisting  boy  was  clearly  murder,  unless  the  killing  can  be 
justified  by  some  well-recognised  excuse  admitted  by  the  law.  It  is  further 
admitted  that  there  was  in  this  case  no  such  excuse,  unless  the  killing  was 
justified  by  what  has  been  called  'necessity.'  But  the  temptation  to  the 
act  which  existed  here  was  not  what  the  law  has  ever  called  necessity.  Nor 
is  this  to  be  regretted.  Though  law  and  morality  are  not  the  same,  and 
many  things  may  be  immoral  which  are  not  necessarily  illegal,  yet  the  abso- 
lute divorce  of  law  from  morality  would  be  of  fatal  consequence;  and  such 
divorce  would  follow  if  the  temptation  to  murder  in  this  case  were  to  be 
held  by  law  an  absolute  defence  of  it.  It  is  not  so.  To  preserve  one's  life  is 
generally  speaking  a  duty,  but  it  may  be  the  plainest  and  the  highest  duty 
to  sacrifice  it.  War  is  full  of  instances  in  which  it  is  a  man's  duty  not  to  live, 
but  to  die.  The  duty,  in  case  of  shipwreck,  of  a  captain  to  his  crew,  of  the 
crew  to  the  passengers,  of  soldiers  to  women  and  children,  as  in  the  noble 
case  of  the  Birkenhead;  these  duties  impose  on  men  the  moral  necessity, 
not  of  the  preservation,  but  of  the  sacrifice  of  their  lives  for  others,  from 
which  in  no  country,  least  of  all,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  in  England,  will  men  ever 
shrink,  as  indeed,  they  have  not  shrunk.  It  is  not  correct,  therefore,  to  say 
that  there  is  any  absolute  or  unqualified  necessity  to  preserve  one's  life. 
'  Necesse  est  ut  earn,  non  ut  vivam,'  is  a  saying  of  a  Roman  officer  quoted 
by  Lord  Bacon  himself  with  high  eulogy  in  the  very  chapter  on  necessity  to 
which  so  much  reference  has  been  made.  It  would  be  a  very  easy  and  cheap 
display  of  commonplace  learning  to  quote  from  Greek  and  Latin  authors, 
from  Horace,  from  Juvenal,  from  Cicero,  from  Euripides,  passage  after 
passage,  in  which  the  duty  of  dying  for  others  has  been  laid  down  in  giow- 
ing  and  emphatic  language  as  resulting  from  the  principles  of  heathen  ethics; 
it  is  enough  in  a  Christian  country  to  remind  ourselves  of  the  Great  Ex- 
ample whom  we  profess  to  follow.  It  is  not  needful  to  point  out  the  awful 
danger  of  admitting  the  principle  which  has  been  contended  for.  Who  is 
to  be  the  judge  of  this  sort  of  necessity?  By  what  measure  is  the  compara- 
tive value  of  lives  to  be  measured?  Is  it  to  be  strength,  or  intellect,  or  what? 
It  is  plain  that  the  principle  leaves  to  him  who  is  to  profit  by  it  to  determine 
the  necessity  which  will  justify  him  in  deliberately  taking  another's  life  to 
save  his  own.  In  this  case  the  weakest,  the  youngest,  the  most  unresisting, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  645 

was  chosen.  Was  it  more  necessary  to  kill  him  than  one  of  the  grown  men? 
The  answer  must  be  '  No '  — 

"  '  So  spake  the  Fiend,  and  with  necessity, 

The  tyrant's  plea,  excused  his  devilish  deeds.' 

It  is  not  suggested  that  in  this  particular  case  the  deeds  were  'devilish,' 
but  it  is  quite  plain  that  such  a  principle  once  admitted  might  be  made  the 
legal  cloak  for  unbridled  passion  and  atrocious  crime.  There  is  no  safe  path 
for  judges  to  tread  but  to  ascertain  the  law  to  the  best  of  their  ability  and 
to  declare  it  according  to  their  judgment;  and  if  in  any  case  the  law  appears 
to  be  too  severe  on  individuals,  to  leave  it  to  the  Sovereign  to  exercise  that 
prerogative  of  mercy  which  the  Constitution  has  intrusted  to  the  hands 
fittest  to  dispense  it. 

"  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  in  refusing  to  admit  temptation  to  be  an 
excuse  for  crime  it  is  forgotten  how  terrible  the  temptation  was;  how  awful 
the  suffering;  how  hard  in  such  trials  to  keep  the  judgment  straight  and  the 
conduct  pure.  We  are  often  compelled  to  set  up  standards  we  cannot  reach 
ourselves,  and  to  lay  down  rules  which  we  could  not  ourselves  satisfy.  But 
a  man  has  no  right  to  declare  temptation  to  be  an  excuse,  though  he  might 
himself  have  yielded  to  it,  nor  allow  compassion  for  the  criminal  to  change 
or  weaken  in  any  manner  the  legal  definition  of  the  crime.  It  is  therefore 
our  duty  to  declare  that  the  prisoners'  act  in  this  case  was  wilful  murder, 
that  the  facts  as  stated  in  the  verdict  are  no  legal  justification  of  the  homi- 
cide; and  to  say  that  in  our  unanimous  opinion  the  prisoners  are  upon  this 
special  verdict  guilty  of  murder."  1 

[The  following  note  was  appended  to  the  judgment! : 

"My  brother  Grove  has  furnished  me  with  the  following  suggestion,  too 
late  to  be  embodied  in  the  judgment  but  well  worth  preserving:  '  If  the  two 
accused  men  were  justified  in  killing  Parker,  then  if  not  rescued  in  time, 
two  of  the  three  survivors  would  be  justified  in  killing  the  third,  and  of  the 
two  who  remained  the  stronger  would  be  justified  in  killing  the  weaker,  so 
that  three  men  might  be  justifiably  killed  to  give  the  fourth  a  chance  of 
surviving.'  " 

THE   MELIANS'   DEFENSE  OF  THEIR  NEUTRALITY 
AGAINST  THE  ATHENIANS2 

In  the  ensuing  summer,  Alcibiades  sailed  to  Argos  with  twenty  ships,  and 
seized  any  of  the  Argives  who  were  still  suspected  to  be  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian faction,  to  the  number  of  three  hundred;  and  the  Athenians  deposited 
them  in  the  subject  islands  near  at  hand.  The  Athenians  next  made  an 
expedition  against  the  island  of  Melos  with  thirty  ships  of  their  own,  six 
Chian,  and  two  Lesbian,  twelve  hundred  hoplites  and  three  hundred  archers 
besides  twenty  mounted  archers  of  their  own,  and  about  fifteen  hundred 
hoplites  furnished  by  their  allies  in  the  islands.  The  Melians  are  colonists 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  who  would  not  submit  to  Athens  like  the  other 
islanders.  At  first  they  were  neutral  and  took  no  part.  But  when  the  Athen- 
ians tried  to  coerce  them  by  ravaging  their  lands,  they  were  driven  into 

1  This  sentence  was  afterwards  commuted  by  the  Crown  to  six  months'  imprisonment. 
J  Thucydides,  translated  into  English,  by  B.  Jowett,  vol.  II,  pp.   167-77.  Second  edition, 
revised,  Oxford,  1900. 


644     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

or  boat,  it  is  said  to  be  derived  from  the  canonists.  At  any  rate  he  cites  no 
authority  for  it,  and  it  must  stand  upon  his  own.  Lord  Bacon  was  great 
even  as  a  lawyer;  but  it  is  permissible  to  much  smaller  men,  relying  upon 
principle  and  on  the  authority  of  others,  the  equals  and  even  the  superiors 
of  Lord  Bacon  as  lawyers,  to  question  the  soundness  of  his  dictum.  There 
are  many  conceivable  states  of  things  in  which  it  might  possibly  be  true, 
but  if  Lord  Bacon  meant  to  lay  down  the  broad  proposition  that  a  man 
may  save  his  life  by  killing,  if  necessary,  an  innocent  and  unoffending  neigh- 
bor, it  certainly  is  not  law  at  the  present  day." 

[The  conclusion  of  the  judgment  was  as  follows]: 

"Now,  except  for  the  purpose  of  testing  how  far  the  conservation  of  a 
man's  own  life  is  in  all  cases  and  under  all  circumstances,  an  absolute,  un- 
qualified, and  paramount  duty,  we  exclude  from  our  consideration  all  the 
incidents  of  war.  We  are  dealing  with  a  case  of  private  homicide,  not  one 
imposed  upon  men  in  the  service  of  their  Sovereign  and  in  the  defence  of 
their  country.  Now  it  is  admitted  that  the  deliberate  killing  of  this  un- 
offending and  unresisting  boy  was  clearly  murder,  unless  the  killing  can  be 
justified  by  some  well-recognised  excuse  admitted  by  the  law.  It  is  further 
admitted  that  there  was  in  this  case  no  such  excuse,  unless  the  killing  was 
justified  by  what  has  been  called  'necessity.'  But  the  temptation  to  the 
act  which  existed  here  was  not  what  the  law  has  ever  called  necessity.  Nor 
is  this  to  be  regretted.  Though  law  and  morality  are  not  the  same,  and 
many  things  may  be  immoral  which  are  not  necessarily  illegal,  yet  the  abso- 
lute divorce  of  law  from  morality  would  be  of  fatal  consequence;  and  such 
divorce  would  follow  if  the  temptation  to  murder  in  this  case  were  to  be 
held  by  law  an  absolute  defence  of  it.  It  is  not  so.  To  preserve  one's  life  is 
generally  speaking  a  duty,  but  it  may  be  the  plainest  and  the  highest  duty 
to  sacrifice  it.  War  is  full  of  instances  in  which  it  is  a  man's  duty  not  to  live, 
but  to  die.  The  duty,  in  case  of  shipwreck,  of  a  captain  to  his  crew,  of  the 
crew  to  the  passengers,  of  soldiers  to  women  and  children,  as  in  the  noble 
case  of  the  Birkenhead;  these  duties  impose  on  men  the  moral  necessity, 
not  of  the  preservation,  but  of  the  sacrifice  of  their  lives  for  others,  from 
which  in  no  country,  least  of  all,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  in  England,  will  men  ever 
shrink,  as  indeed,  they  have  not  shrunk.  It  is  not  correct,  therefore,  to  say 
that  there  is  any  absolute  or  unqualified  necessity  to  preserve  one's  life. 
'  Necesse  est  ut  earn,  non  ut  vivam,'  is  a  saying  of  a  Roman  officer  quoted 
by  Lord  Bacon  himself  with  high  eulogy  in  the  very  chapter  on  necessity  to 
which  so  much  reference  has  been  made.  It  would  be  a  very  easy  and  cheap 
display  of  commonplace  learning  to  quote  from  Greek  and  Latin  authors, 
from  Horace,  from  Juvenal,  from  Cicero,  from  Euripides,  passage  after 
passage,  in  which  the  duty  of  dying  for  others  has  been  laid  down  in  giow- 
ing  and  emphatic  language  as  resulting  from  the  principlesof  heathen  ethics; 
it  is  enough  in  a  Christian  country  to  remind  ourselves  of  the  Great  Ex- 
ample whom  we  profess  to  follow.  It  is  not  needful  to  point  out  the  awful 
danger  of  admitting  the  principle  which  has  been  contended  for.  Who  is 
to  be  the  judge  of  this  sort  of  necessity?  By  what  measure  is  the  compara- 
tive value  of  lives  to  be  measured?  Is  it  to  be  strength,  or  intellect,  or  what? 
It  is  plain  that  the  principle  leaves  to  him  who  is  to  profit  by  it  to  determine 
the  necessity  which  will  justify  him  in  deliberately  taking  another's  life  to 
Bave  his  own.  In  this  case  the  weakest,  the  youngest,  the  most  unresisting, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  645 

was  chosen.  Was  it  more  necessary  to  kill  him  than  one  of  the  grown  men? 
The  answer  must  be  '  No '  — 

"  '  So  spake  the  Fiend,  and  with  necessity, 

The  tyrant's  plea,  excused  his  devilish  deeds.' 

It  is  not  suggested  that  in  this  particular  case  the  deeds  were  'devilish,' 
but  it  is  quite  plain  that  such  a  principle  once  admitted  might  be  made  the 
legal  cloak  for  unbridled  passion  and  atrocious  crime.  There  is  no  safe  path 
for  judges  to  tread  but  to  ascertain  the  law  to  the  best  of  their  ability  and 
to  declare  it  according  to  their  judgment;  and  if  in  any  case  the  law  appears 
to  be  too  severe  on  individuals,  to  leave  it  to  the  Sovereign  to  exercise  that 
prerogative  of  mercy  which  the  Constitution  has  intrusted  to  the  hands 
fittest  to  dispense  it. 

"  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  in  refusing  to  admit  temptation  to  be  an 
excuse  for  crime  it  is  forgotten  how  terrible  the  temptation  was;  how  awful 
the  suffering;  how  hard  in  such  trials  to  keep  the  judgment  straight  and  trhe 
conduct  pure.  We  are  often  compelled  to  set  up  standards  we  cannot  reach 
ourselves,  and  to  lay  down  rules  which  we  could  not  ourselves  satisfy.  But 
a  man  has  no  right  to  declare  temptation  to  be  an  excuse,  though  he  might 
himself  have  yielded  to  it,  nor  allow  compassion  for  the  criminal  to  change 
or  weaken  in  any  manner  the  legal  definition  of  the  crime.  It  is  therefore 
our  duty  to  declare  that  the  prisoners'  act  in  this  case  was  wilful  murder, 
that  the  facts  as  stated  in  the  verdict  are  no  legal  justification  of  the  homi- 
cide; and  to  say  that  in  our  unanimous  opinion  the  prisoners  are  upon  this 
special  verdict  guilty  of  murder."  1 

[The  following  note  was  appended  to  the  judgmentl : 

"My  brother  Grove  has  furnished  me  with  the  following  suggestion,  too 
late  to  be  embodied  in  the  judgment  but  well  worth  preserving:  'If  the  two 
accused  men  were  justified  in  killing  Parker,  then  if  not  rescued  in  time, 
two  of  the  three  survivors  would  be  justified  in  killing  the  third,  and  of  the 
two  who  remained  the  stronger  would  be  justified  in  killing  the  weaker,  so 
that  three  men  might  be  justifiably  killed  to  give  the  fourth  a  chance  of 
surviving.'  " 

THE   MELIANS'   DEFENSE  OF  THEIR  NEUTRALITY 
AGAINST  THE  ATHENIANS2 

In  the  ensuing  summer,  Alcibiades  sailed  to  Argos  with  twenty  ships,  and 
seized  any  of  the  Argives  who  were  still  suspected  to  be  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian faction,  to  the  number  of  three  hundred;  and  the  Athenians  deposited 
them  in  the  subject  islands  near  at  hand.  The  Athenians  next  made  an 
expedition  against  the  island  of  Melos  with  thirty  ships  of  their  own,  six 
Chian,  and  two  Lesbian,  twelve  hundred  hoplites  and  three  hundred  archers 
besides  twenty  mounted  archers  of  their  own,  and  about  fifteen  hundred 
hoplites  furnished  by  their  allies  in  the  islands.  The  Melians  are  colonists 
of  the  Lacedsemonians  who  would  not  submit  to  Athens  like  the  other 
islanders.  At  first  they  were  neutral  and  took  no  part.  But  when  the  Athen- 
ians tried  to  coerce  them  by  ravaging  their  lands,  they  were  driven  into 

1  This  sentence  was  afterwards  commuted  by  the  Crown  to  six  months'  imprisonment. 
!  Thucydides,  translated  into  English,  by  B.  Jowett,  vol.  n,  pp.   167-77.  Second  edition, 
revised,  Oxford,  1900. 


648     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

counsel  whether  or  no  you  shall  resist  an  overwhelming  force.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  one  of  honor  but  of  prudence." 

Mel.  "But  we  know  that  the  fortune  of  war  is  sometimes  impartial,  and 
not  always  on  the  side  of  numbers.  If  we  yield  now,  all  is  over;  but  if  we 
fight,  there  is  yet  a  hope  that  we  may  stand  upright." 

Ath.  "Hope  is  a  good  comforter  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and  when  men 
have  something  else  to  depend  upon,  although  hurtful,  she  is  not  ruinous. 
But  when  her  spendthrift  nature  has  induced  them  to  stake  their  all,  they 
see  her  as  she  is  in  the  moment  of  their  fall,  and  not  till  then.  While  the 
knowledge  of  her  might  enable  them  to  be  ware  of  her,  she  never  fails.  You 
are  weak  and  a  single  turn  of  the  scale  might  be  your  ruin.  Do  not  you  be 
thus  deluded;  avoid  the  error  of  which  so  many  are  guilty,  who,  although 
they  might  still  be  saved  if  they  would  take  the  natural  means,  when  visible 
grounds  of  confidence  forsake  them,  have  recourse  to  the  invisible,  to 
prophecies  and  oracles  and  the  like,  which  ruin  men  by  the  hopes  which 
they  inspire  in  them." 

Mel.  "We  know  only  too  well  how  hard  the  struggle  must  be  against 
your  power,  and  against  fortune,  if  she  does  not  mean  to  be  impartial. 
Nevertheless  we  do  not  despair  of  fortune;  for  we  hope  to  stand  as  high  as 
you  in  the  favor  of  heaven,  because  we  are  righteous,  and  you  against  whom 
we  contend  are  unrighteous,  and  we  are  satisfied  that  our  deficiency  in 
power  will  be  compensated  by  the  aid  of  our  allies  the  Lacedaemonians;  they 
cannot  refuse  to  help  us,  if  only  because  we  are  their  kinsmen,  and  for  the 
sake  of  their  own  honor.  And  therefore  our  confidence  is  not  so  utterly 
blind  as  you  suppose." 

Ath.  "As  for  the  Gods,  we  expect  to  have  quite  as  much  of  their  favor 
as  you :  for  we  are  not  doing  or  claiming  anything  which  goes  beyond  com- 
mon opinion  about  divine  or  men's  desires  about  human  things.  For  of  the 
Gods  we  believe,  and  of  men  we  know,  that  by  a  law  of  their  nature  where- 
ever  they  can  rule  they  will.  This  law  was  not  made  by  us,  and  we  are  not 
the  first  who  have  acted  upon  it;  we  did  but  inherit  it,  and  shall  bequeath 
it  to  all  time,  and  we  know  that  you  and  all  mankind,  if  you  were  as  strong 
as  we  are,  would  do  as  we  do.  So  much  for  the  Gods;  we  have  told  you  why 
we  expect  to  stand  as  high  in  their  good  opinion  as  you.  And  then  as  to  the 
Lacedaemonians  —  when  you  imagine  that  out  of  very  shame  they  will 
assist  you,  we  admire  the  innocence  of  your  idea,  but  we  do  not  envy  you 
the  folly  of  it.  The  Lacedaemonians  are  exceedingly  virtuous  among  them- 
selves, and  according  to  their  national  standard  of  morality.  But,  in  re- 
spect of  their  dealings  with  others,  although  many  things  might  be  said, 
they  can  be  described  in  a  few  words  —  of  all  men  whom  we  know  they  are  the 
most  notorious  for  identifying  what  is  pleasant  with  what  is  honorable,  and 
what  is  expedient  with  what  is  just.  But  how  inconsistent  is  such  a  charac- 
ter with  your  present  blind  hope  of  deliverance!" 

Mel.  "That  is  the  very  reason  why  we  trust  them;  they  will  look  to  their 
interest,  and  therefore  will  not  be  willing  to  betray  the  Melians,  who  are 
their  own  colonists,  lest  they  should  be  distrusted  by  their  friends  in  Hellas 
and  play  into  the  hands  of  their  enemies." 

Ath.  "But  do  you  not  see  that  the  path  of  expediency  is  safe,  whereas 
justice  and  honor  involve  danger  in  practice,  and  such  dangers  the  Lace- 
daemonians seldom  care  to  face?" 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  649 

Mel.  "On  the  other  hand,  we  think  that  whatever  perils  there  may  be, 
they  will  be  ready  to  face  them  for  our  sakes,  and  will  consider  danger  less 
dangerous  where  we  are  concerned.  For  if  they  need  our  aid  we  are  close 
at  hand,  and  they  can  better  trust  our  loyal  feeling  because  we  are  their 
kinsmen." 

Alh.  "Yes,  but  what  encourages  men  who  are  invited  to  join  in  a  con- 
flict is  clearly  not  the  good-will  of  those  who  summon  them  to  their  side, 
but  a  decided  superiority  in  real  power.  To  this  no  men  look  more  keenly 
than  the  Lacedaemonians;  so  little  confidence  have  they  in  their  own  re- 
sources, that  they  only  attack  their  neighbors  when  they  have  numerous 
allies,  and  therefore  they  are  not  likely  to  find  their  way  by  themselves  to 
an  island,  when  we  are  masters  of  the  sea." 

Mel.  "But  they  may  send  their  allies:  the  Cretan  sea  is  a  large  place; 
and  the  masters  of  the  sea  will  have  more  difficulty  in  overtaking  vessels 
which  want  to  escape  than  the  pursued  in  escaping.  If  the  attempt  should 
fail  they  may  invade  Attica  itself,  and  find  their  way  to  allies  of  yours  whom 
Brasidas  did  not  reach;  and  then  you  will  have  to  fight,  not  for  the  conquest 
of  a  land  in  which  you  have  no  concern,  but  nearer  home,  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  your  confederacy  and  of  your  own  territory." 

Ath.  "Help  may  come  from  Lacedsemon  to  you  as  it  has  come  to  others, 
and  should  you  ever  have  actual  experience  of  it,  then  you  will  know  that 
never  once  have  the  Athenians  retired  from  a  siege  through  fear  of  a  foe 
elsewhere.  You  told  us  that  the  safety  of  your  city  would  be  your  first  care, 
but  we  remark  that,  in  this  long  discussion,  not  a  word  has  been  uttered  by 
you  which  would  give  a  reasonable  man  expectation  of  deliverance.  Your 
strongest  grounds  are  hopes  deferred,  and  what  power  you  have  is  not  to 
be  compared  with  that  which  is  already  arrayed  against  you.  Unless  after 
we  have  withdrawn  you  mean  to  come,  as  even  now  you  may,  to  a  wiser 
conclusion,  you  are  showing  a  great  want  of  sense.  For  surely  you  cannot 
dream  of  flying  to  that  false  sense  of  honor  which  has  been  the  ruin  of  so 
many  when  danger  and  dishonor  were  staring  them  in  the  face.  Many  men 
with  their  eyes  still  open  to  the  consequences  have  found  the  word  '  honor ' 
too  much  for  them,  and  have  suffered  a  mere  name  to  lure  them  on,  until  it 
has  drawn  down  upon  them  real  and  irretrievable  calamities;  through  their 
own  folly  they  have  incurred  a  worse  dishonor  than  fortune  would  have 
inflicted  upon  them.  If  you  are  wise  you  will  not  run  this  risk;  you  ought 
to  see  that  there  can  be  no  disgrace  in  yielding  to  a  great  city  which  invites 
you  to  become  her  ally  on  reasonable  terms,  keeping  your  own  land,  and 
merely  paying  tribute;  and  that  you  will  certainly  gain  no  honor  if,  having 
to  choose  between  two  alternatives,  safety  and  war,  you  obstinately  prefer 
the  worse.  To  maintain  our  rights  against  equals,  to  be  politic  with  supe- 
riors, and  to  be  moderate  towards  inferiors  is  the  path  of  safety.  Reflect 
once  more  when  we  have  withdrawn,  and  say  to  yourselves  over  and  over 
again  that  you  are  deliberating  about  your  one  and  only  country,  which 
may  be  saved  or  may  be  destroyed  by  a  single  decision." 

The  Athenians  left  the  conference;  the  Melians,  after  consulting  among 
themselves,  resolved  to  persevere  in  their  refusal,  and  made  answer  as  fol- 
lows: —  "Men  of  Athens,  our  resolution  is  unchanged;  and  we  will  not  in 
a  moment  surrender  that  liberty  which  our  city,  founded  seven  hundred 
years  ago,  still  enjoys;  we  will  trust  to  the  good-fortune  which  by  the  favor 


650     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR   OF   1914 

of  the  Gods  has  hitherto  preserved  us,  and  for  human  help  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians, and  endeavor  to  save  ourselves.  We  are  ready,  however,  to  be 
your  friends,  and  the  enemies  neither  of  you  nor  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  we  ask  you  to  leave  our  country  when  you  have  made  such  a  peace  as 
may  appear  to  be  in  the  interest  of  both  parties." 

Such  was  the  answer  of  the  Melians;  the  Athenians,  as  they  quitted  the 
conference,  spoke  as  follows:  —  "Well,  we  must  say,  judging  from  the  deci- 
sion at  which  you  have  arrived,  that  you  are  the  only  men  who  deem  the 
future  to  be  more  certain  than  the  present,  and  regard  things  unseen  as  al- 
ready realized  in  your  fond  anticipation,  and  that  the  more  you  cast  your- 
selves upon  the  Lacedaemonians  and  fortune  and  hope,  and  trust  them,  the 
more  complete  will  be  your  ruin." 

The  Athenian  envoys  returned  to  the  army;  and  the  generals,  when 
they  found  that  the  Melians  would  not  yield,  immediately  commenced 
hostilities.  They  surrounded  the  town  of  Melos  with  a  wall,  dividing  the 
work  among  the  several  contingents.  They  then  left  troops  of  their  own 
and  of  the  allies  to  keep  guard  both  by  land  and  by  sea,  and  retired  with 
the  greater  part  of  their  army;  the  remainder  carried  on  the  blockade. 

About  the  same  time  the  Argives  made  an  inroad  into  Phliasia,  and  lost 
nearly  eighty  men,  who  were  caught  in  an  ambuscade  by  the  Phliasians 
and  the  Argive  exiles.  The  Athenian  garrison  in  Pylos  took  much  spoil 
from  the  Lacedaemonians;  nevertheless,  the  latter  did  not  renounce  the 
peace  and  go  to  war,  but  only  notified  by  a  proclamation  that  if  any  one  of 
their  own  people  had  a  mind  to  make  reprisals  on  the  Athenians  he  might. 
The  Corinthians  next  declared  war  upon  the  Athenians  on  some  private 
grounds,  but  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnesians  did  not  join  them.  The  Melians 
took  that  part  of  the  Athenian  wall  which  looked  towards  the  agora  by  a 
night  assault,  killed  a  few  men,  and  brought  in  as  much  corn  and  other  ne- 
cessaries as  they  could;  they  then  retreated  and  remained  inactive.  After 
this  the  Athenians  set  a  better  watch.  So  the  summer  ended. 

In  the  following  winter  the  Lacedaemonians  had  intended  to  make  an 
expedition  into  the  Argive  territory,  but  finding  that  the  sacrifices  which 
they  offered  at  the  frontier  were  unfavorable,  they  returned  home.  The 
Argives,  suspecting  that  the  threatened  invasion  was  instigated  by  citi- 
zens of  their  own,  apprehended  some  of  them;  others,  however,  escaped. 

About  the  same  time  the  Melians  took  another  part  of  the  Athenian  wall; 
for  the  fortifications  were  insufficiently  guarded.  Whereupon  the  Athen- 
ians sent  fresh  troops  under  the  command  of  Philocrates,  the  son  of  Demeas. 
The  place  was  now  closely  invested,  and  there  was  treachery  among  the 
citizens  themselves.  So  the  Melians  were  induced  to  surrender  at  discre- 
tion. The  Athenians  thereupon  put  to  death  all  who  were  of  military  age, 
and  made  slaves  of  the  women  and  children.  They  then  colonized  the  is- 
land, sending  thither  five  hundred  settlers  of  their  own.   (b.c.  416.) 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  651 

THE  WAR 


HAGUE   CONVENTION   OF  OCTOBER  18,  1907,   RELATIVE 
TO  SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES1 

Part  II.  —  Good  Offices  and  Mediation 

Article  III.  Independently  of  this  recourse,  the  Contracting  Powers 
deem  it  expedient  and  desirable  that  one  or  more  Powers,  strangers  to  the 
dispute,  should,  on  their  own  initiative  and  as  far  as  circumstances  may  al- 
low, offer  their  good  offices  or  mediation  to  the  States  at  variance. 

Powers  strangers  to  the  dispute  have  the  right  to  offer  good  offices  or 
mediation  even  during  the  course  of  hostilities. 

The  exercise  of  this  right  can  never  be  regarded  by  either  of  the  parties 
in  dispute  as  an  unfriendly  act. 

HAGUE  CONVENTION   OF   1907  RELATIVE  TO  THE 
OPENING  OF  HOSTILITIES2 

Considering  that  it  is  important,  in  order  to  ensure  the  maintenance 
of  pacific  relations,  that  hostilities  should  not  commence  without  previous 
warning. 

That  it  is  equally  important  that  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  should 
be  notified  without  delay  to  neutral  Powers; 

Being  desirous  of  concluding  a  Convention  to  this  effect,  have  appointed 
the  following  as  their  Plenipotentiaries: 

(For  names  of  Plenipotentiaries,  see  Final  Act.) 

Who,  after  depositing  their  full  powers,  found  in  good  and  due  form,  have 
agreed  upon  the  following  provisions :  — 

Article  I.  The  Contracting  Powers  recognize  that  hostilities  between 
themselves  must  not  commence  without  previous  and  explicit  warning,  in 
the  form  either  of  a  reasoned  declaration  of  war  or  of  an  ultimatum  with 
conditional  declaration  of  war. 

Article  II.  The  existence  of  a  state  of  war  must  be  notified  to  the 
neutral  Powers  without  delay,  and  shall  not  take  effect  in  regard  to  them 
until  after  the  receipt  of  a  notification,  which  may,  however,  be  given  by 
telegraph.  Neutral  Powers,  nevertheless,  cannot  rely  on  the  absence  of 
notification  if  it  is  clearly  established  that  they  were  in  fact  aware  of  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  war. 

Article  III.  Article  I  of  the  present  Convention  shall  take  effect  in  case 
of  war  between  two  or  more  of  the  Contracting  Powers. 

Article  II  is  binding  as  between  a  belligerent  Power  which  is  a  party  to 
the  Convention  and  neutral  Powers  which  are  also  parties  to  the  Conven- 
tion. 

»  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1907,  part  II,  p.  1182.  Washington,  1910. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  1202-03. 


652     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

THE   LARGER   MEANINGS  OF  THE   WAR1 

In  an  address  on  "The  Larger  Meanings  of  the  War,"  delivered  before 
the  Institute  of  Arts  and  Sciences  of  Columbia  University,  Professor  Frank- 
lin H.  Giddings  discussed  the  race  characteristics  of  the  Germans  and 
concluded  with  this  striking  analysis  of  the  conflict  of  ideas  paralleling 
the  struggle  between  the  Germans  and  the  Allies :  — 

"  But  if  Germany's  achievement  in  the  fields  of  art  and  science,  though 
great  and  admirable,  are  not  yet  surpassing,  her  achievement  in  the  do- 
main of  social  policy  and  organization  challenges  and  will  continue  to  chal- 
lenge the  attention  of  the  world.  She  has  repudiated  the  philosophy  of  laissez 
faire  and  flatly  denied  the  maxim  that  the  government  is  best  which  governs 
least.  She  has  developed  government  as  an  instrumentality  of  social  wel- 
fare on  a  scale  and  with  a  measure  of  success  never  before  or  elsewhere  seen. 
While  England  and  America  have  been  awakening  to  the  humane  convic- 
tion that  ignorance,  inefficiency,  unemployment,  vagabondage  and  misery 
ought  if  possible  to  be  prevented,  Germany  has  said  that  they  can  and  shall 
be  prevented,  and  by  preventing  them  she  has  created  a  collective  efficiency 
which  the  rest  of  Europe  will  henceforth  respect.  Whether  it  has  been 
attained  at  too  great  a  sacrifice  of  individual  liberty,  initiative,  and  self- 
reliance,  time  and  the  fortunes  of  war  may  determine.  Perhaps  the  fate 
of  the  contending  nations  will  turn  precisely  upon  this  point.  Whatever 
befalls,  it  is  a  safe  prediction  that  mankind  will  presently  inquire  whether 
a  way  can  be  found  to  conserve  liberty  and  yet  profit  by  the  German  in- 
vention of  competent  social  government. 

"  There  remain  those  supposedly  important  factors  of  civilization,  ideal- 
ism and  morality.  What  of  them?  Germany  proclaims  to  the  world  that 
her  paramount  discovery  lies  in  the  realm  of  moral  philosophy,  and  that 
her  true  greatness  is  now  to  be  seen  in  the  fearlessness  with  which  she  ap- 
plies it  to  life.  She  has  discovered,  it  seems,  as  a  truth  of  reason,  that 
'might'  really  does  make  'right'  — and  itself  is  the  only  right.  It  had  been 
suspected  that  Machiavelli  taught  something  like  this,  but  he  was  an  Italian 
and  lived  before  the  publication  of  the  Origin  of  Species  through  Natural 
Selection.  Darwin  wrote  the  Origin  of  Species,  but  he  was  an  Englishman, 
and  clung  to  an  old-fashioned  morality.  Nietzsche,  the  German,  was  the 
first  to  see  that  if  there  really  is  a  struggle  for  existence  in  which  the  strong 
alone  survive  and  the  weak  miserably  perish,  weakness  must  be  essential 
evil;  might,  essential  righteousness;  compassion,  the  only  sin.  Not  the 
Christ  but  the  superman  must  come,  and  the  German  is  the  superman. 
Treitschke  was  Nietzsche's  disciple  and  the  mantle  has  fallen  upon  Bern- 
hardi.  Promulgate  this  philosophy,  they  have  said,  embody  it  in  diplomacy, 
teach  it  to  the  army,  preach  it  to  the  people,  and  then  you  shall  see  Deutsch- 
land  iiber  Alles. 

"  What  can  the  rest  of  mankind  say?  Only  this.  The  tiger  and  the  savage 
proceed  with  simple  directness  to  the  end  of  view.  Civilized  man  has  as- 
sumed that  the  quality  of  means  no  less  than  the  desirability  of  ends  should 
receive  consideration,  and  this  attention  to  means  as  well  as  to  ends  he  has 
called  morality.   He  has  made  these  assumptions  and  adjusted  his  conduct 

1  Extract  from  an  address  by  Franklin  H.  Giddings.  This  address  was  printed  in  the 
Survey  of  November  7,  1914. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  653 

to  them  because,  long  ago,  he  stumbled  upon  two  important  discoveries. 
One  was,  that  mutual  aid  is  a  more  important  factor  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  than  claw  or  fist.  The  other  was,  that  mutual  aid  is  possible  only 
among  men  that  can  trust  one  another,  who  tell  the  truth  and  keep  their 
word,  abiding  by  their  covenants  though  they  have  sworn  to  their  own  hurt. 
And  all  this  seems  at  least  plausible.  Outside  of  Germany  it  is  held  to  be 
not  only  a  rather  decent  folkway,  but  also,  good  Darwinism. 

"And  now  we  turn  to  our  second  question:  Do  the  characteristics  of 
these  contrasted  civilizations  —  one  the  historic  Latin-Celtic-Saxon  blend; 
the  other,  a  young  and  lusty  Teutonic  —  and  the  terrific  conflict  in  which 
they  are  engaged  afford  us  intimations  of  the  future?  Must  war,  increas- 
ingly terrible,  recur  forever,  generation  after  generation,  or  may  we  reason- 
ably hope  and  work  for  lasting  peace? 

"One  thing  stands  forth  clearly  from  the  foregoing  analysis.  Peoples 
and  civilizations  grow.  They  are  supreme  manifestations  of  'the  will  to 
live.'  They  must  then  have  place  to  live  and  room  to  grow.  Hemmed  in  and 
denied,  they  burst  their  barriers,  exploding  in  the  wrath  of  war.  Now  two 
ways  and  only  two  have  been  found  in  human  experience  so  far  to  provide 
for  expansion  by  a  virile  people  developing  its  own  characteristic  civilization. 
One  is  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  conquest  or  purchase;  the  other  is  the 
removal  of  commercial  barriers.  Or,  to  put  it  more  bluntly  and  unequivo- 
cally, the  choice  is  between  war  and  free  trade.  There  are  some  millions 
of  men  and  women  in  the  United  States  and  elsewhere  who  do  not  believe 
this  or  will  not  admit  it.  They  will  be  forced  by  the  facts  of  life  and  history 
to  admit  it.  Until  they  are  ready  for  world-wide  free  trade  they  will  waste 
their  breath  in  praying  for  world  peace. 

"Commercial  freedom  would  make  peace  possible  but  not  certain.  The 
passions  of  primitive  man  survive  in  us  all  and  easily  break  through  the  in- 
hibitions that  civilization  has  with  infinite  difficulty  provided.  Of  all  known 
inhibitions  the  thinking  habit  is  most  to  be  relied  on.  It  halts  us,  to  look 
and  listen.  And  the  thinking  habit  is  bound  up  with  the  time-wasting  prac- 
tice of  discussion.  This  is  the  priceless  contribution  of  democracy  to  human 
progress.  Democracy  has  its  own  limitations  and  imperfections  but  on  the 
whole  it  is  fairly  described  and  defined  as  the  thinking  and  impulse-inhibit- 
ing habit  developed  in  an  entire  people.  Exceptional  instances  occur  to 
mind,  but  as  a  general  truth  of  history  popular  sovereignty  does  not  hast- 
ily make  war.  Monarchical  sovereignty  does.  If  we  are  to  have  universal 
peace  the  kings,  the  good  ones  with  the  bad  ones,  must  go. 

"  And  one  more  thing  must  go.  The  religion  of  barbarism  must  go.  The 
world  is  weary  of  it.  It  has  withstood  the  religion  of  peace  on  earth  already 
too  long.  The  trinity  of  king,  cannon  and  God  has  outlived  its  usefulness. 
If  civilization  is  indeed  better  than  savagery,  the  God  we  worship  must 
be  a  power  other  and  worthier  than  a  mere  Head  Devil  of  the  Universe." 

APPEAL  TO  THE   UNIVERSITIES  OF  AMERICA  » 

In  a  time  when  half  of  the  world  falls  upon  Germany  full  of  hatred  and 
envy,  we  Germans  derive  great  benefit  from  the  idea  of  our  being  sure  of 
the  friendly  feeling  of  the  American  universities.    If  from  any  quarter  in 

1  From  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  September  24,  1914. 


654     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF   THE   WAR  OF   1914 

the  world  it  must  be  from  them  that  we  expect  the  right  comprehension  of 
the  present  situation  and  present  attitude  of  Germany.  Numerous  Ameri- 
can scholars  who  received  their  scientific  training  at  our  universities  have 
convinced  themselves  of  the  quality  and  the  peaceful  tendency  of  German 
work,  the  exchange  of  scientists  has  proved  of  deepening  influence  on  the 
mutual  understanding,  the  lasting  intercourse  of  scholarly  research  gives 
us  the  feeling  of  being  members  of  one  great  community.  This  is  why  we 
entertain  the  hope  that  the  scientific  circles  of  America  will  not  give  credit 
to  the  libels  our  enemies  propagate  against  us. 

Those  libels  above  all  accuse  Germany  of  having  brought  about  the  pres- 
ent war,  she  being  responsible  for  the  monstrous  struggle  which  is  extend- 
ing more  and  more  over  the  whole  world.  The  truth  points  to  the  contrary. 
Our  foes  have  disturbed  us  in  our  peaceful  work  forcing  the  war  upon  us 
very  much  against  our  desire.  We  are  at  a  righteous  war  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  our  existence  and  at  the  same  time  of  sacred  goods  of  humanity. 
The  murder  of  Serajevo  was  not  our  work;  it  was  the  outcome  of  a  widely 
extended  conspiracy  pointing  back  to  Servia  where  for  many  years  already 
a  passionate  agitation  against  Austria  had  been  carried  on,  supported  by 
Russia.  It  was  Russia,  therefore,  that  took  the  assassins  under  her  wings, 
and  some  weeks  already  before  the  war  broke  out  she  promised  her  assistance 
to  the  blood-stained  state.  Nobody  but  Russia  has  given  the  dangerous 
turn  to  the  conflict,  nobody  but  Russia  is  to  blame  for  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  The  German  Emperor,  who  has  proved  his  love  of  peace  by  a  peaceful 
reign  of  more  than  twenty-five  years  in  face  of  the  imminent  danger,  tried 
to  intermediate  between  Austria  and  Russia  with  the  greatest  zeal,  but 
while  he  was  negotiating  with  the  Tsar  Russia  was  busy  with  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  a  large  army  towards  the  German  frontier.  This  necessitated  an 
open  and  decisive  inquiry  that  led  to  the  war.  This  only  happened  because 
Russia  wanted  it  so,  because  she  wanted  to  raise  the  Moscovites  against 
the  Germans  and  the  Western  Slavs  and  to  lead  Asia  into  the  field  against 
Europe. 

France,  too,  might  have  kept  the  peace,  the  decision  resting  solely  with 
her.  The  security  of  Germany  demanded  that  she  should  inquire  what 
France  would  do  in  the  impending  war;  the  answer  of  France  unmistakably 
betrayed  her  intention  to  join  in  the  war.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  not 
Germany  but  France  who  commenced  the  war. 

England  already  before  the  war  stood  in  close  relations  to  France.  From 
the  very  beginning  she  has  clearly  shown  that  she  by  no  means  wanted  to 
keep  absolutely  neutral.  From  the  very  beginning  she  made  endeavors  to 
protect  France  against  Germany.  Undoubtedly  the  German  invasion  in 
Belgium  served  England  as  a  welcome  pretext  to  openly  declare  her  hos- 
tility. In  reality,  before  the  German  invasion  already  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  had  been  given  up  in  favor  of  the  French.  It  has  been  officially 
stated,  e.g.,  that  not  only  before  but  also  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  French 
officers  have  been  at  Liege  in  order  to  instruct  the  Belgian  soldiers  as  to  the 
fortification  service.  England's  complaints  of  the  violation  of  international 
law,  however,  are  the  most  atrocious  hypocrisy  and  the  vilest  Pharisaism.  At 
all  times  English  politics  have  unscrupulously  disregarded  all  forms  of 
law  as  soon  as  their  own  interest  was  touched.  During  the  last  few  weeks 
the  same  method  has  been  quite  sufficiently  manifested  in  the  unlawful  cap- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  655 

ture  of  the  Turkish  warships  and  still  more  so  in  the  instigation  of  the  Japan- 
ese to  undertake  the  detestable  raid  upon  the  German  territory  in  China 
which  needs  must  end  in  strengthening  the  power  of  that  Mongolian  nation 
at  the  cost  of  Europeans  and  Americans. 

How  is  it  possible  for  a  nation  that  in  such  a  way  has  betrayed  precious 
interests  of  Western  culture  as  soon  as  it  seems  to  benefit  them,  how  is  it 
possible  for  those  accomplices  of  the  Japanese  robbery  to  put  on  the  air  of 
being  the  guardians  of  morality? 

We  Germans  did  not  want  this  war,  but  as  it  has  been  forced  upon  us 
we  shall  carry  it  on  bravely  and  vigorously.  In  the  face  of  all  envy  and 
hatred,  all  brutality  and  hypocrisy  Germany  feels  unshakably  conscious  of 
serving  a  righteous  cause  and  of  standing  up  for  the  preservation  of  her 
national  self  as  well  as  for  sacred  goods  of  humanity,  indeed  for  the  very 
progress  of  true  culture.  It  is  from  this  conviction  that  she  draws  her  unre- 
lenting force  and  the  absolute  certainty  that  she  will  beat  back  the  assault 
of  all  her  enemies.  This  conviction  does  not  stand  in  need  of  any  encourage- 
ment from  abroad,  our  country  absolutely  relies  upon  itself  and  confides 
in  the  strength  of  its  right. 

Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  our  American  friends'  thoughts  and  sympathies 
being  with  us  gives  us  a  strong  feeling  of  comfort  in  this  gigantic  struggle. 
We  both  of  us  feel  especially  justified  in  pronouncing  this  as  being  the  con- 
viction of  all  German  scientists,  as  so  many  scientific  and  personal  relations 
connect  us  both  with  the  universities  of  America.  These  universities  know 
what  German  culture  means  to  the  world,  so  we  trust  they  will  stand  by 
Germany. 

Rudolf  Eucken. 

Jena,  August  31.  Ernst  HAECKEL. 

AMERICA  AND  THE  ISSUES  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR1 
By  Charles  W.  Eliot,  President  Emeritus  op  Harvard 

To  the  Editor  of  the  New  York  Times: 

The  numerous  pamphlets  which  German  writers  are  now  distributing 
in  the  United  States,  and  the  many  letters  about  the  European  war  which 
Americans  are  now  receiving  from  German  and  German-American  friends, 
are  convincing  thoughtful  people  in  this  country  that  American  public 
opinion  has  some  weight  with  the  German  Government  and  people,  or,  at 
least,  some  interest  for  them;  but  that  the  reasons  which  determine  Ameri- 
can sympathy  with  the  Allies,  rather  than  with  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  are  not  understood  in  Germany  and  are  not  always  appreci- 
ated by  persons  of  German  birth  who  have  lived  long  in  the  United  States. 

It  would  be  a  serious  mistake  to  suppose  that  Americans  feel  any  hostility 
or  jealousy  toward  Germany,  or  fail  to  recognize  the  immense  obligations 
under  which  she  has  placed  all  the  rest  of  the  world,  although  thej'  now  feel 
that  the  German  nation  has  been  going  wrong  in  theoretical  and  practical 
politics  for  more  than  a  hundred  years,  and  is  to-day  reaping  the  conse- 
quences of  her  own  wrong-thinking  and  wrong-doing. 

There  are  many  important  matters  concerning  which  American  sympa- 
thy is  strongly  with  Germany:  (l)The  unification  of  Germany,  which  Bis- 
1  Published  in  the  New  York  Times  of  October  2,  1914. 


656     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

marck  and  his  co-workers  accomplished,  naturally  commended  itself  to 
Americans,  whose  own  country  is  a  firm  federation  of  many  more  or  less 
different  States,  containing  more  or  less  different  peoples.  While  most 
Americans  did  not  approve  Bismarck's  methods  and  means,  they  cordially 
approved  his  accomplishment  of  German  unification.  (2)  Americans  have 
felt  unqualified  admiration  for  the  commercial  and  financial  growth  of  Ger- 
many during  the  past  forty  years,  believing  it  to  be  primarily  the  fruit  of 
well-directed  industry  and  enterprise.  (3)  All  educated  Americans  feel 
strong  gratitude  to  the  German  nation  for  its  extraordinary  achievements 
in  letters,  science,  and  education  within  the  last  hundred  years.  Jealousy 
of  Germany  in  these  matters  is  absolutely  foreign  to  American  thought, 
and  that  any  external  power  or  influence  should  undertake  to  restrict  or 
impair  German  progress  in  these  respects  would  seem  to  all  Americans  in- 
tolerable, and,  indeed,  incredible.  (4)  All  Americans  who  have  had  any  ex- 
perience in  governmental  or  educational  administration  recognize  the  fact 
that  German  administration  —  both  in  peace  and  in  war  —  is  the  most 
efficient  in  the  world;  and  for  that  efficiency  they  feel  nothing  but  respect 
and  admiration,  unless  the  efficiency  requires  an  inexpedient  suppression 
or  restriction  of  individual  liberty.  (5)  Americans  sympathize  with  a 
unanimous  popular  sentiment  in  favor  of  a  war  which  the  people  believe 
to  be  essential  to  the  greatness,  and  even  the  safety,  of  their  country,  —  a 
sentiment  which  prompts  to  family  and  property  sacrifices  very  distress- 
ing at  the  moment,  and  irremediable  in  the  future;  and  they  believe  that 
the  German  people  to-day  are  inspired  by  just  such  an  overwhelming  sen- 
timent. 

How  is  it,  then,  that,  with  all  these  strong  American  feelings  tending  to 
make  them  sympathize  with  the  German  people  in  good  times  or  bad,  in 
peace  or  in  war,  the  whole  weight  of  American  opinion  is  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies  in  the  present  war?  The  reasons  are  to  be  found,  of  course,  in  the 
political  and  social  history  of  the  American  people,  and  in  its  govern- 
mental philosophy  and  practice  to-day.  These  reasons  have  come  out  of  the 
past,  and  are  intrenched  in  all  the  present  ideals  and  practices  in  the 
American  Commonwealth.  They  inevitably  lead  Americans  to  object 
strongly  and  irrevocably  to  certain  German  national  practices  of  great  mo- 
ment, practices  which  are  outgrowths  of  Prussian  theories,  and  experi- 
ences that  have  come  to  prevail  in  Germany  during  the  past  hundred  years. 
In  the  hope  that  American  public  opinion  about  the  European  war  may  be 
a  little  better  understood  abroad  it  seems  worth  while  to  enumerate  those 
German  practices  which  do  not  conform  to  American  standards  in  the  con- 
duct of  public  affairs :  — 

(a)  Americans  object  to  the  committal  of  a  nation  to  grave  measures  of 
foreign  policy  by  a  permanent  Executive  —  Czar,  Kaiser,  or  King  —  ad- 
vised in  secret  by  professional  diplomatists  who  consider  themselves  the 
personal  representatives  of  their  respective  sovereigns.  The  American 
people  have  no  permanent  Executive,  and  the  profession  of  diplomacy 
hardly  exists  among  them.  In  the  conduct  of  their  national  affairs  they  ut- 
terly distrust  secrecy,  and  are  accustomed  to  demand  and  secure  the  ut- 
most publicity. 

(b)  They  object  to  placing  in  any  ruler's  hands  the  power  to  order 
mobilization  or  declare  war  in  advance  of  deliberate  consultation  with  a 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  657 

representative  assembly,  and  of  cooperative  action  thereby.  The  fact  that 
German  mobilization  was  ordered  three  days  in  advance  of  the  meeting  of 
the  Reichstag  confounds  all  American  ideas  and  practices  about  the  rights 
of  the  people  and  the  proper  limits  of  Executive  authority. 

(c)  The  secrecy  of  European  diplomatic  intercourse  and  of  international 
understandings  and  terms  of  alliance  in  Europe  is  in  the  view  of  ordinary 
Americans  not  only  inexpedient,  but  dangerous  and  unjustifiable.  Under 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  no  treaty  negotiated  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  Cabinet  is  valid  until  it  has  been  publicly  discussed  and  rati- 
fied by  the  Senate.  During  this  discussion  the  people  can  make  their  voice 
heard  through  the  press,  the  telegraph,  and  the  telephone. 

(d)  The  reliance  on  military  force  as  the  foundation  of  true  national 
greatness  seems  to  thinking  Americans  erroneous,  and  in  the  long  run  de- 
grading to  a  Christian  nation.  They  conceive  that  the  United  States  may 
fairly  be  called  a  great  nation;  but  that  its  greatness  is  due  to  intellectual 
and  moral  forces  acting  through  adequate  material  forces  and  expressed  in 
education,  public  health  and  order,  agriculture,  manufacturing,  and  com- 
merce, and  the  resulting  general  well-being  of  the  people.  It  has  never  in 
all  its  history  organized  what  could  be  called  a  standing  or  a  conscripted 
army;  and,  until  twenty  years  ago,  its  navy  was  very  small,  considering 
the  length  of  its  seacoasts.  There  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the  American 
people  to  make  them  believe  that  the  true  greatness  of  nations  depends  on 
military  power. 

(e)  They  object  to  the  extension  of  national  territory  by  force,  contrary 
to  the  wishes  of  the  population  concerned.  This  objection  is  the  inevitable 
result  of  democratic  institutions:  and  the  American  people  have  been  faith- 
ful to  this  democratic  opinion  under  circumstances  of  considerable  difficulty 
—  as,  for  example,  in  withdrawing  from  Cuba,  the  rich  island  which  had 
been  occupied  by  American  troops  during  the  short  war  with  Spain  (1898) 
and  in  the  refusing  to  intervene  by  force  in  Mexico  for  the  protection  of 
American  investors,  when  that  contiguous  country  was  distracted  by  fac- 
tional fighting.  This  objection  applies  to  long-past  acts  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, as  well  as  to  its  proceedings  in  the  present  war  —  as,  for  example, 
to  the  taking  of  Schleswig-Holstein  and  Alsace-Lorraine,  as  well  as  to  the 
projected  occupation  of  Belgium. 

(/)  Americans  object  strenuously  to  the  violation  of  treaties  between 
nations  on  the  allegation  of  military  necessity  or  for  any  other  reason  what- 
ever. They  believe  that  the  progress  of  civilization  will  depend  in  future 
on  the  general  acceptance  of  the  sanctity  of  contracts  or  solemn  agreements 
between  nations  and  on  the  development  by  common  consent  of  interna- 
tional law.  The  neutralization  treaties,  the  arbitration  treaties,  the  Hague 
Conferences,  and  some  of  the  serious  attempts  at  mediation,  although  none 
of  them  go  far  enough,  and  many  of  them  have  been  rudely  violated  on 
occasion,  illustrate  a  strong  tendency  in  the  civilized  parts  of  the  world  to 
prevent  international  wars  by  means  of  agreements  deliberately  made  in 
time  of  peace.  The  United  States  has  proposed  and  made  more  of  these 
agreements  than  any  other  power,  has  adhered  to  them,  and  profited  by 
them.  Under  one  such  agreement,  made  nearly  a  hundred  years  ago, 
Canada  and  the  United  States  have  avoided  forts  and  armaments  against 
each  other,  although  they  have  had  serious  differences  of  opinion  and  clashes 


658     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

of  interests,  and  the  frontier  is  three  thousand  miles  long  and  for  the  most 
part  without  natural  barriers.  Cherishing  the  hope  that  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope and  the  rights  of  its  peoples  may  be  secured  through  solemn  com- 
pacts (which  should  include  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  international 
judicial  tribunal,  supported  by  an  international  force)  Americans  see,  in 
the  treatment  of  the  German  Government  of  the  Belgium  neutralization 
treaty  as  nothing  but  a  piece  of  paper  which  might  be  torn  up  on  the  ground 
of  military  necessity,  evidence  of  the  adoption  by  Germany  of  a  retrograde 
policy  of  the  most  alarming  sort.  That  single  act  on  the  part  of  Germany 
—  the  violation  of  the  neutral  territory  of  Belgium  —  would  have  deter- 
mined American  opinion  in  favor  of  the  Allies,  if  it  had  stood  alone  by  it- 
self —  the  reason  being  that  American  hopes  for  the  peace  and  order  of  the 
world  are  based  on  the  sanctity  of  treaties. 

(g)  American  public  opinion,  however,  has  been  greatly  shocked  in 
other  ways  by  the  German  conduct  of  the  war.  The  American  common 
people  see  no  justification  for  the  dropping  of  bombs,  to  which  no  specific 
aim  can  be  given,  into  cities  and  towns  chiefly  inhabited  by  non-combatants, 
the  burning  or  blowing  up  of  large  portions  of  unfortified  towns  and  cities, 
the  destruction  of  precious  monuments  and  treasuries  of  art,  the  strewing 
of  floating  mines  through  the  North  Sea,  the  exacting  of  ransoms  from  cities 
and  towns  under  threat  of  destroying  them,  and  the  holding  of  unarmed 
citizens  as  hostages  for  the  peaceable  behavior  of  a  large  population  under 
threat  of  summary  execution  of  the  hostages  in  case  of  any  disorder.  All 
these  seem  to  Americans  unnecessary,  inexpedient,  and  unjustifiable  methods 
of  warfare,  sure  to  breed  hatred  and  contempt  toward  the  nation  that  uses 
them,  and  therefore  to  make  it  difficult  for  future  generations  to  maintain 
peace  and  order  in  Europe.  They  cannot  help  imagining  the  losses  civiliza- 
tion would  suffer  if  the  Russians  should  every  carry  into  western  Europe 
the  kind  of  war  which  the  Germans  are  now  waging  in  Belgium  and  France. 
They  have  supposed  that  war  was  to  be  waged  in  this  century  only  against 
public,  armed  forces  and  their  supplies  and  shelters. 

These  opinions  and  prepossessions  on  the  part  of  the  American  people 
have  obviously  grown  out  of  the  ideals  which  the  early  English  colonists 
carried  with  them  to  the  American  wilderness  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
out  of  the  long  fighting  and  public  discussion  which  preceded  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  out 
of  the  peculiar  experiences  of  the  free  Commonwealths  which  make  up  the 
United  States,  as  they  have  spread  across  the  almost  uninhabited  continent 
during  the  past  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  years. 

The  experience  and  the  situation  of  modern  Germany  have  been  utterly 
different.  Germany  was  divided  for  centuries  into  discordant  parts,  had 
ambitious  and  martial  neighbors,  and  often  felt  the  weight  of  their  attacks. 
Out  of  the  war  came  accessions  of  territory  for  Prussia,  and  at  last  German 
unity.  The  reliance  of  intelligent  and  patriotic  Germany  on  military  force 
as  the  basis  of  national  greatness  is  a  natural  result  of  its  experiences. 
Americans,  however,  believe  that  this  reliance  is  unsound  both  theoretically 
and  practically.  The  wars  in  Europe  since  1870-71,  the  many  threateninga 
of  war,  and  the  present  catastrophe  seem  to  Americans  to  demonstrate 
that  no  amount  of  military  preparedness  on  the  part  of  the  nations  of  Eu- 
rope can  possibly  keep  the  peace  of  the  continent,  or  indeed  prevent  fre- 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  659 

quent  explosions  of  destructive  warfare.  They  think,  too,  that  preparation 
for  war  on  the  part  of  Germany  better  than  any  of  her  neighbors  can  make 
will  not  keep  her  at  peace  or  protect  her  from  invasion,  even  if  this  better 
preparation  include  advantages  of  detail  which  have  been  successfully 
kept  secret.  All  the  nations  which  surround  Germany  are  capable  of  develop- 
ing a  strong  fighting  spirit;  and  all  the  countries  of  Europe,  except  England 
and  Russia,  possess  the  means  of  quickly  assembling  and  getting  into  action 
great  bodies  of  men.  In  other  words,  all  the  European  states  are  capable  of 
developing  a  passionate  patriotism,  and  all  possess  the  railroads,  roads, 
conveyances,  telegraphs,  and  telephones  which  make  rapid  mobilization 
possible.  No  perfection  of  military  forces,  and  no  amount  of  previous  study 
of  feasible  campaigns  against  neighbors,  can  give  peaceful  security  to  Ger- 
many in  the  present  condition  of  the  great  European  states.  In  the  actual 
development  of  weapons  and  munitions,  and  of  the  art  of  quick  intrenching, 
the  attacking  force  in  battle  on  land  is  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  compari- 
son with  the  force  on  the  defensive.  That  means  indecisive  battles  and  ulti- 
mately an  indecisive  war,  unless  each  party  is  resolved  to  push  the  war  to 
the  utter  exhaustion  and  humiliation  of  the  other  —  a  long  process  which 
involves  incalculable  losses  and  wastes,  and  endless  miseries.  Americans 
have  always  before  them  the  memory  of  their  four  years'  civil  war,  which, 
although  resolutely  prosecuted  on  both  sides,  could  not  be  brought  to  a 
close  until  the  resources  of  the  Southern  States  in  men  and  material  were 
exhausted.  In  that  dreadful  process  the  whole  capital  of  the  Southern 
States  was  wiped  out. 

Now  that  the  sudden  attack  on  Paris  has  failed,  and  adequate  time  has 
been  secured  to  summon  the  slower-moving  forces  of  Russia  and  England, 
and  these  two  resolute  and  persistent  peoples  have  decided  to  use  all  their 
spiritual  and  material  forces  in  cooperation  with  France  against  Germany, 
thoughtful  Americans  can  see  but  one  possible  issue  of  the  struggle,  whether 
it  be  long  or  short,  namely,  the  defeat  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
in  their  present  undertakings,  and  the  abandonment  by  both  peoples  of  the 
doctrine  that  their  salvation  depends  on  militarism  and  the  maintenance 
of  autocratic  executives  entrusted  with  the  power  and  the  means  to  make 
sudden  war.  They  believe  that  no  human  being  should  ever  be  trusted  with 
such  power.  The  alternative  is,  of  course,  genuine  constitutional  govern- 
ment, with  the  military  power  subject  to  the  civil  power. 

The  American  people  grieve  over  the  fruitless  sacrifices  of  life,  property, 
and  the  natural  human  joys  which  the  German  people  are  making  to  a  wrong 
and  impossible  ideal  of  national  power  and  welfare.  The  sacrifices  which 
Germany  is  imposing  on  the  Allies  are  fearfully  heavy,  but  there  is  reason 
to  hope  that  these  will  not  be  fruitless,  for  out  of  them  may  come  great  gains 
for  liberty  and  peace  in  Europe. 

All  experienced  readers  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  are  well  aware  that 
nine  tenths  of  all  the  reports  they  get  about  the  war  come  from  English  and 
French  sources,  and  this  knowledge  makes  them  careful  not  to  form  judg- 
ments about  details  until  the  events  and  deeds  tell  their  own  story.  They 
cannot  even  tell  to  which  side  victory  inclines  in  a  long,  far-extended  battle 
until  recognizable  changes  in  the  positions  of  the  combatants  show  what  the 
successes  or  failures  must  have  been.  The  English  and  French  win  some  ad- 
vantage so  far  as  the  formation  of  public  opinion  in  this  country  is  concerned, 


660     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF    1914 

because  those  two  Governments  send  hither  official  reports  on  current 
events  more  frequently  than  the  German  Government  does,  and  with  more 
corroborative  details.  The  amount  of  secrecy  with  which  the  campaign  is 
surrounded  on  both  sides  is,  however,  a  new  and  unwelcome  experience  for 
both  the  English  and  the  American  public. 

The  pamphlets  by  German  publicists  and  men  of  letters  which  are  now 
coming  to  this  country,  and  the  various  similar  publications  written  here, 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  German  public  is  still  kept  by  its  Government  in 
ignorance  about  the  real  antecedents  of  the  war  and  about  many  of  the 
incidents  and  aspects  of  the  portentous  combat.  These  documents  seem 
to  Americans  to  contain  a  large  amount  of  misinformation  about  the  attack 
of  Austria- Hungary  on  Servia,  the  diplomatic  negotiations  and  the  corres- 
pondence between  the  sovereigns  which  immediately  preceded  the  war, 
and  the  state  of  mind  of  the  Belgian  and  English  peoples.  American  be- 
lievers in  the  good  sense  and  good  feeling  of  the  common  people  naturally 
imagine,  when  an  awful  calamity  befalls  a  nation,  that  the  people  cannot 
have  been  warned  of  its  approach,  else  they  would  have  avoided  it.  In  this 
case  they  fear  that  the  Emperor,  the  Chancellery,  and  the  General  Staff 
have  themselves  been  misinformed  in  important  respects,  have  made  serious 
miscalculations  which  they  are  proposing  to  conceal  as  long  as  possible, 
and  are  not  taking  the  common  people  into  their  confidence.  American 
sympathies  are  with  the  German  people  in  their  sufferings  and  losses,  but 
not  with  their  rulers,  or  with  the  military  class,  or  with  the  professors  and 
men  of  letters  who  have  been  teaching  for  more  than  a  generation  that 
Might  makes  Right.  That  short  phrase  contains  the  fundamental  fallacy 
which  for  fifty  years  has  been  poisoning  the  springs  of  German  thought  and 
German  policy  in  public  affairs. 

Dread  of  the  Muscovite  does  not  seem  to  Americans  a  reasonable  ex- 
planation of  the  present  actions  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  except 
so  far  as  irrational  panic  can  be  said  to  be  an  explanation.  Against  possible, 
though  not  probable,  Russian  aggression,  a  firm  defensive  alliance  of  all 
western  Europe  would  be  a  much  better  protection  than  the  single  Might  of 
Germany.  It  were  easy  to  imagine  also  two  new  "buffer"  States  —  a  re- 
constructed Poland  and  a  Balkan  Confederation.  As  to  French  "revenge," 
it  is  the  inevitable  and  praiseworthy  consequence  of  Germany's  treatment 
of  France  in  1870-71.  The  great  success  of  Germany  in  expanding  her  com- 
merce during  the  past  thirty  years  makes  it  hard  for  Americans  to  under- 
stand the  hot  indignation  of  the  Germans  against  the  British  because  of 
whatever  ineffective  opposition  Great  Britain  may  have  offered  to  that  ex- 
pansion. No  amount  of  commercial  selfishness  on  the  part  of  insular  Eng- 
land can  justify  Germany  in  attempting  to  seize  supreme  power  in  Eu- 
rope and  thence,  perhaps,  in  the  world. 

Finally,  Americans  hope  and  expect  that  there  will  be  no  such  fatal  issue 
of  the  present  struggle  as  the  destruction  or  ruin  of  the  German  nation.  On 
the  contrary,  they  believe  that  Germany  will  be  freer,  happier,  and  greater 
than  ever,  when  once  she  has  got  rid  of  the  monstrous  Bismarck  policies 
and  the  Emperor's  archaic  conception  of  his  function,  and  has  enjoyed 
twenty  years  of  real  peace. 

Asticou,  Maine,  Your  obedient  servant, 

September  28,  1914.  CHARLES   W.   EUOT. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  661 

GERMANY'S  TREATY  RECORD* 
By  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburq 

To  the  Editor  of  the  New  York  Times: 

Professor  Eliot  is  conferring  a  great  favor  on  the  exponents  of  the  Ger- 
man side  in  the  present  struggle  in  explaining  to  them  what  he  thinks  of 
the  so-called  anti-German  feeling  in  the  United  States.  I  am  sure  his  views 
will  be  read  also  in  Germany  with  a  great  deal  of  attention,  although  he 
will  certainly  not  remain  unchallenged  in  nearly  all  essential  points.  The 
compliment  that  Professor  Eliot  pays  to  the  German  people  as  a  whole  must 
be  specially  appreciated,  the  more  so  as  it  comes  from  a  scientist  whose  great 
authority  is  equally  recognized  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 

The  anti-German  feeling,  according  to  Professor  Eliot,  takes  its  source 
from  the  American  objection  to  the  committal  of  a  nation  to  grave  mistakes 
by  a  permanent  executive.  But  then,  with  the  exception  of  France,  all  the 
warring  nations  have  permanent  executives,  professional  diplomatists; 
all  their  affairs  are  conducted  in  secret,  and  all  their  rulers  have  the  power, 
including  the  President  of  France,  to  embroil  their  nations  in  war.  The  Ger- 
man Emperor  is  in  this  respect  certainly  more  restricted  than  the  other 
heads  of  state,  and  I  have  not  read  that  the  declaration  of  war  has  been 
expressly  sanctioned  by  the  English  Parliament,  and  certainly  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  English  fleet  that  took  place  in  July,  and  the  mobilization  of  the 
Russian  army  that  took  place  at  the  same  time,  have  not  even  been  brought 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  respective  Parliaments.  When,  therefore,  the  same 
conditions  prevail  in  all  the  warring  states,  how  can  they  be  made  the  rea- 
son for  such  an  anti-German  feeling? 

The  same  objection  holds  good  with  the  American  antipathy  against  the 
power  of  rulers  to  order  mobilization  or  declare  war  in  advance  without 
consultation  of  Parliament,  to  which  I  have  only  to  say  that  the  English 
fleet  was  mobilized  without  consulting  the  English  Parliament,  while  in 
Germany  the  Bundesrat,  the  representatives  of  the  Federal  States,  as 
well  as  of  the  Federal  Diets,  had  been  duly  consulted.  I  may  add  that  also 
the  party  leaders  of  the  Reichstag,  which  could  not  be  convoked  earlier 
than  two  days  after  the  declaration  of  the  war,  have  been  continuously 
informed  and  consulted. 

Against  the  next  paragraph,  where  Professor  Eliot  complains  of  the 
secrecy  of  European  diplomacy  and  of  international  treaties  and  under- 
standings, the  same  objection  must  be  made.  The  state  described  here  as 
particular  to  Germany  prevails  in  all  European  countries,  and  neither  the 
treaty  of  the  Russian- French  alliance  nor  the  arrangements  of  the  Triple 
Entente  have  ever  been  submitted  to  the  French  or  British  Parliaments. 
As  regards  the  American  attitude  toward  armaments,  I  purposely  refrain 
from  adducing  the  American  example  into  my  argument,  much  as  I  could 
show  that  with  a  very  large  part  of  the  American  nation  the  idea  of  defend- 
ing the  American  coast  against  any  invader  and  the  maintenance  of  a  strong 
Pan-American  policy,  if  need  be  by  arms,  is  just  as  fixed  a  tenet  as  the 
German  idea  that  the  Fatherland  should  be  held  safe  from  invasion  or  de- 
struction by  the  will  and  the  strength  of  its  people.  England  has  always 
held  the  same,  if  not  through  her  army  so  through  her  navy,  and  so  did  the 
•  Letter  to  the  New  York  Times,  October  5,  1914,  in  answer  to  Dr.  Eliot's  letter. 


662     THE   DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

rest  of  Europe;  and  there  is  no  argument  to  be  gotten  from  that  for  an  anti- 
German  feeling. 

Americans  object  to  the  extension  of  territory  by  force.  Germany  has 
never  done  that,  even  if  one  goes  back  as  far  as  Professor  Eliot  wishes  to  go. 
Mr.  Eliot  is  absolutely  mistaken  as  to  the  history  of  the  incorporation  of 
Schleswig-Holstein  into  Prussia.  Schleswig-Holstein  was  a  dual-dukedom, 
had  never  belonged  to  Denmark,  but  having  a  duke,  was  under  the  sway 
of  the  King  of  Denmark  as  long  as  he  belonged  to  the  elder  line  of  the  House 
of  Oldenburg.  This  elder  line  was  extinct  when  King  Christian  VIII  died 
without  male  issue.  His  successor  wanted  to  incorporate  the  two  German 
dukedoms  into  Denmark.  Then  the  people  stood  up  and  expressed  the  desire 
to  remain  with  the  German  Federation,  to  which  it  had  always  belonged, 
and  there  it  is  now,  of  its  own  free  will.  The  natural  dividing  line  between 
Denmark  and  Germany,  however,  is  the  river  Eider.  There  are  about 
30,000  Danes  south  of  the  Eider,  who  have  been  absorbed  against  their 
will,  a  thing  that  can  never  be  avoided  and  that  has  sometimes  given  Prussia 
a  little  trouble. 

As  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  facts  are  known  to  be  that  it  had  belonged  to 
Germany  until  it  had  been  taken,  against  the  will  of  the  people,  by  France 
under  Louis  XIV,  and  it  was  returned  to  Germany  as  a  matter  of  right, 
more  than  three  quarters  of  the  population  being  of  German  descent  and 
speaking  the  German  language.  '■'    : ' 

But  let  me  ask  in  return,  Mr.  Eliot,  when  did  ever  in  her  political  career 
England  consult  the  will  of  the  people  when  she  took  a  country?  Can  he 
say  that,  when  England  tore  the  treaty  of  Majuba  Hill,  like  a  "  scrap  of 
paper,"  and  made  war  on  the  Boers?  Did  she  consult  the  people  of  Cyprus 
in  1878?  Does  he  know  of  any  plebiscite,  in  India?  Has  she  consulted  the 
Persians,  or  has  France  consulted  the  people  of  Morocco,  or  of  Indo-China, 
Italy  the  people  of  Tripoli?  Since  Germany  has  not  acted  here  in  any  other 
way  forty  years  ago  than  all  the  other  nations,  why  does  Dr.  Eliot  consider 
the  American  people  justified  in  taking  anti-German  views  for  reason  of 
such  an  old  date,  while  he  forgives  the  nations  of  the  party  he  favors  for 
much  more  recent  infringements  of  his  rule? 

"  Americans  object  to  the  violation  of  treaties."  So  do  the  Germans.  We 
have  always  kept  our  treaties,  and  mean  to  do  so  in  the  future.  The  fact 
with  Belgium  is  that  her  neutrality  was  very  one-sided;  that,  as  can  be 
proved,  as  early  as  the  25th  of  June,  Liege  was  full  of  French  soldiers, 
that  Belgian  fortifications  were  all  directed  against  Germany,  and  that, 
for  years  past,  it  was  the  Belgian  press  that  outdid  the  French  press  in 
attacks  against  Germany.  But  I  can  give  Mr.  Eliot  here  some  authority 
that  he  has  so  far  not  challenged.  When  Sir  Edward  Grey  presented  the 
English  case  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  3d  of  August,  he  declared 
that  the  British  attitude  was  laid  down  by  the  British  Government  in 
1870,  and  he  verbally  cited  Mr.  Gladstone's  speech,  in  which  he  said  he 
could  not  subscribe  to  the  assertion  that  the  simple  fact  of  the  existence  of 
a  guarantee  was  binding  on  every  party,  irrespective  altogether  of  the 
particular  position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when  the  occa- 
sion for  acting  on  the  guarantee  arises.  He  called  that  assertion  a  "string- 
ent and  impracticable"  view  of  the  guarantee,  and  the  whole  treaty  a 
"complicated  question."    So  Mr.  Gladstone,  and  with  him  Sir  Edward 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR  663 

Grey,  has  held  the  Belgian  neutrality  treaty  not  binding  on  every  party, 
when  it  was  against  the  interest  which  the  particular  situation  dictated 
when  the  war  broke  out.  It  was  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  maintain 
the  treaty,  and  that  is  why  she  acted.  It  was  against  German  interest  to 
maintain  the  treaty,  and  that  is  why  she  broke  it.  That  is  the  British 
and  not  the  German  theory,  and  I  could  very  well  rest  my  case  here.  My 
theory  is  with  the  German  Chancellor,  that  I  greatly  regret  the  necessity 
of  violating  the  Belgian  neutrality,  after  Belgium  had  chosen  to  repel  the 
German  overtures  for  a  free  passage. 

It  is  quite  certain  that  the  breach  of  the  Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany 
was  used  in  Great  Britain  as  a  powerful  instrument  to  influence  the  public 
sentiment.  Every  war  must  be  borne  by  national  unity,  and  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  nation's  leaders  to  secure  such  unity  by  all  practicable  means.  But 
has  it  been  forgotten  that  the  attitude  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  caused  such 
excellent  men  as  Lord  Morley,  John  Burns,  and  Sir  John  Trevelyan  to 
leave  the  Cabinet,  where  they  were  looked  upon  as  the  best  and  most  liberal 
members  of  the  ruling  combination?  Bernard  Shaw  says  of  Great  Britain 
that  she  has  never  been  at  a  loss  for  an  effective  moral  attitude.  Such  an 
attitude  is  a  powerful  weapon  in  diplomatical  and  actual  warfare,  and  it 
must  be  resorted  to,  if  the  necessity  arises.  But  that  cannot  blind  us  to  the 
fact  that  the  British  Government  allowed  the  political  interest  to  be  the 
paramount  consideration  in  this  Belgian  neutrality  matter.  The  German 
interest  for  not  acting  on  the  guarantee  was  just  as  strong  as  the  English 
to  act  for  it. 

The  proof  is  found  in  the  English  "  White  Paper."  I  cite  the  famous  re- 
print of  the  Times  (dispatch  no.  148  of  August  2  to  Paris).  Here  Sir  Edward 
Grey  says:  "We  were  considering  .  .  .  whether  we  should  declare  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a  casus  belli." 

I  am  an  ardent  believer  in  all  international  arrangements  to  prevent  diffi- 
culties and  wars  between  nations,  and  I  rejoice  with  the  American  people  in 
the  signal  success  this  policy  is  now  having  in  this  country.  But  interna- 
tional treaties  must  not  be  overrated.  There  are  questions  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  them.  It  is  too  difficult  to  explain  just  the  nature  of  such  situa- 
tions as  arose  in  Europe,  so  I  may  be  permitted  for  once  to  ask  this  question : 
Does  Professor  Eliot  believe  that  the  majority  of  the  American  people  think 
that  the  unwritten  Monroe  Doctrine  could  be  made  the  subject  of  arbitra- 
tion, whether  it  had  a  right  to  exist  or  to  be  enforced?  I  must  emphatically 
say,  No,  it  could  not.  It  can  be  as  little  arbitrated  upon  as  a  matter  of  re- 
ligion or  of  personal  morals. 

Mr.  Eliot  thinks  a  happy  result  of  the  war  would  be  that  American  insti- 
tutions should  prevail  in  Germany  thereafter.  Why  should  Germany  only 
become  a  representative  republic?  Does  he  not  demand  the  same  regarding 
Russia,  England,  Italy,  Austria,  and  Japan?   And  if  not,  why  not? 

From  all  this  I  fail  to  see  the  point  in  the  reasons  given  by  Professor 
Eliot  why  fair-minded  Americans  should  side  with  the  Allies,  because  the 
objections  made  against  German  procedure,  down  to  the  breach  of  the 
Belgian  neutrality,  must  be  made  against  all  other  European  states.  Brit- 
ish history  is  just  teeming  with  examples  of  broken  treaties  and  torn  "  scraps 
of  paper."  The  chasing  of  German  diplomatic  representatives  out  of  neutral 
Egypt  is  a  case  in  point. 


664     THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  WAR  OF   1914 

I  must  insist  that  whatever  anti-German  feeling  there  is  is  not  fully  ex- 
plained by  Professor  Eliot,  and  his  article  cannot  be  made  a  code  by  which 
German  behavior  could  be  regulated  in  the  future.  Professor  Eliot  is  a 
scholar;  business  interests  do  not  come  very  near  him.  So  he  is  especially 
concerned  with  the  ethical  aspect  of  the  matter.  He  believes  the  Germans 
think  that  "  might  is  right."  This  is  very  unjust.  Our  history  proves  that  we 
have  never  acted  on  this  principle.  We  have  never  got  or  attempted  to  get 
a  world  empire  such  as  England  has  won,  all  of  which,  with  a  very  few  ex- 
ceptions, by  might,  by  war,  and  by  conquest.  The  German  writers  who  have 
expounded  this  doctrine  have  only  shown  how  the  large  world  empires 
of  England  and  France  were  welded  together,  what  means  have  been 
adopted  for  that  purpose,  and  against  what  sort  of  political  doctrines  we 
must  beware. 

As  Dr.  Eliot  makes  his  remarks  for  the  benefit  of  his  German  confreres, 
may  I  be  permitted  to  say  to  them  what  I  consider  the  reason  for  the 
American  attitude?  There  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  ethical  side.  Americans 
have  a  very  strong  sense  of  generosity,  and  are,  as  a  rule,  very  good  sports. 
They  think  Belgium  a  small  nation,  brutally  attacked  by  a  much  bigger 
fellow;  they  feel  that  the  little  man  stands  up  bravely  and  gamely,  and  fights 
for  all  he  is  worth.  Such  a  situation  will  always  command  American  sym- 
pathy and  antagonism  against  the  stronger.  Then  there  is  the  business  side. 
Americans  feel  that  this  war  is  endangering  their  political  and  commer- 
cial interests,  so  they  are  naturally  angry  against  the  people  who,  they 
believe,  have  brought  the  war  about. 

As  Germany  has  not  had  an  opportunity  to  make  herself  heard  as  amply 
as  her  adversaries,  they  think  that  it  was  Germany  which  set  the  world 
afire,  and  that  is  what  they  resent,  and  in  which  they  were  justified,  if  it 
were  true.  But  the  question  of  the  hour  is  not  the  question  of  the  past,  but 
of  the  present  and  of  the  future,  and  the  people  on  this  side  who  will  give 
Germany  fair  play  because  it  is  just  in  them  will  examine  the  situation  in 
the  light  of  their  interests.  Then  they  will  find  that  Belgium  has  been  in 
league  with  the  Allies  long  before  the  conflagration  broke  out,  only  to  be 
left  to  its  own  resources  when  the  critical  hour  arose.  They  will  further  find 
that  it  is  not  Germany  but  England  and  her  allies  that  are  throttling 
commerce,  maiming  cables,  stopping  mails,  and  breaking  neutrality  and 
other  treaties  to  further  their  aims;  that,  finally,  to-day  England  has  estab- 
lished a  world  rule  on  the  sea  to  which  even  America  must  submit.  They 
will  then  soon  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  no  matter  what  happened  in 
the  past,  the  peace  of  the  world  can  only  be  assured  by  a  good  understanding 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States  as  a  sort  of  counterbalance  against 
the  unmeasured  aggrandizement  of  English  sea  power.  Then  the  feeling 
toward  Germany  will  be  considerably  better,  and  I  may  add  that  even  now 
it  is  not  so  very  bad  after  all. 

I  make  these  remarks  with  due  respect  to  Professor  Eliot  and  his  views, 
and  with  great  reluctance  for  being  compelled  to  enter  the  field  against  a 
personality  whose  undoubted  superiority  I  wish  to  be  the  first  to  acknow- 
ledge. 

Bernhard  Dernbtjrg. 

New  York,  October  4,  1914. 


APPENDIX 

CHRONOLOGY 
CITATION  OF  DOCUMENTS 


APPENDIX 

CHRONOLOGY 

June  24.  The  Kaiser  inaugurates  the  enlarged  Kiel  Canal. 

June  28.  The  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg 
assassinated  at  Serajevo. 

July  2.  The  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  reports  resentment  against 
Servia  because  of  Serajevo  assassination,  and  preparations  to  force 
an  issue  on  Servia.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  8.) 

July  4.  The  German  Foreign  Office  gives  reasons  for  being  confident  that 
Servia  will  give  satisfaction  to  Austria's  demands,  and  thus  avoid 
possibility  of  tension.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  9.) 

July  6.  The  intimation  of  the  Austrian  representative  that  his  Govern- 
ment may  be  forced  to  carry  on  an  investigation  on  Servian  terri- 
tory is  met  by  indignant  warning  from  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  10.) 

July  10.  M.  N.  de  Hartwig,  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  died  suddenly 
while  paying  a  visit  to  the  Austrian  Minister. 

July  11.  The  French  Consul  at  Budapest  sends  his  Government  a  remark- 
able report,  discussing  the  attitude  of  the  Hungarian  Government 
and  public  toward  Servia,  in  which  he  points  out  the  various  signs 
indicating  that  Austria  is  preparing  a  coup.  He  also  draws  at- 
tention to  the  unprecedented  fall  of  the  Hungarian  4  per  cents. 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  11.) 

July  14.  The  French  Minister  of  War  in  the  Senate  admitted  serious  defi- 
ciencies in  the  state  of  preparedness  of  the  army. 

July  15.  The  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  reports  bellicose  tone  of  Vien- 
nese press  toward  Servia,  and  opines  that  the  situation  in  France 
and  Russia  affords  a  favorable  opportunity  for  action.  (F.  Y.  B. 
no.  12.) 

July  16.  Sir  Edward  Grey  learns  from  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  a  forecast  derived  from  a  private  source 
of  the  "  impending  storm."    (B.  W.  P.  Miscellaneous,  no.  10.) 

Editorial  in  the  London  Times  criticizing  Servia  for  her  anti- 
Austrian  propaganda,  and  for  not  making  an  inquiry,  and  declar- 
ing that  Austria  was  "  entitled  to  effective  guaranties  against  the 
support  of  what  is  a  seditious  movement  by  the  subjects  of  King 
Peter." 

President  Poincare"  and  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  Viviani  depart  for  St.  Petersburg. 

July  17.  The  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  warns  Austria  against 
insulting  Servia  or  interfering  with  her  independence.  (S.  B.  B. 
no.  28.) 

July  20.  The  Russian  Ambassador  leaves  Vienna.  (B.  W.  P.,  Miscellane- 
ous, no.  10.) 


668  APPENDIX 

French  consular  report  from  Vienna,  pointing  out  Austria's 
plans  and  reasons  for  bringing  on  a  general  war,  and  predicting  the 
nature  of  the  Austrian  demands.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  14.) 

Poincare"  and  Viviani  arrive  at  Cronstadt. 
July  21.  Extreme  weakness  of  the  Berlin  Bourse.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  16.) 

Von  Jagow,  alluding  to  the  forthcoming  Austrian  d-marche  at 
Belgrade,  in  conversation  with  the  British  Charge1,  insisted  that 
the  question  at  issue  should  be  settled  between  Servia  and  Aus- 
tria alone,  and  considered  it  inadvisable  that  Germany  should 
approach  Austria  on  the  matter.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  2;  cf.  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  16.) 

Meeting  of  Home  Rule  Conference  in  Buckingham  Palace  at 
King's  suggestions. 

Trial  of  Madame  Caillaux  at  Paris  commences. 
July  22.  The  Russian  Ambassador,  on  leaving  Vienna  for  Russia,  after 
receiving  reassuring  declarations  from  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  confides  to  the  French  Ambassador  that  Russia  will  make 
no  objection  to  Austria's  taking  steps  for  the  punishment  of  the 
guilty  and  for  the  dissolution  of  revolutionary  associations,  but 
cannot  admit  exactions  humiliating  to  Servian  national  feeling. 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  18.) 

Von  Tchirsky,  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  shows  himself  a 
partisan  of  Austria  in  her  "  violent  resolution"  against  Servia.  At 
the  same  time  he  lets  it  be  understood  that  the  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  may  not  be  in  complete  agreement  with  him.  (F.  Y.  B. 
no.  18.) 
July  23.  The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  explains  privately  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  the  nature  of  the  Austrian  demand.  Sir  Edward's 
objection  to  an  ultimatum.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  3.) 

Austrian  ultimatum  delivered  to  Servia  at  6  p.m. 

Austria  allows  forty-eight  hours  for  an  unconditional  accept- 
ance.  (R.  O.  P.  nos.  1,  2.) 

According  to  official  statement  120,000  workers  in  the  strike  at 
St.  Petersburg. 
July  24.  Austrian  ultimatum  communicated.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  4.) 

Russia  learned  the  contents  of  the  note  at  10  a.m.  (R.  O.  P. 
no.  3.) 

Russian  Cabinet  Council  at  which  it  is  decided  to  make  military 
preparations.    (G.  W.  B.  Exhibit  23a.) 
*~**-  Germany  supports  Austria's  demands  and  insists  upon  the 
"  localization "  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  9; 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  28.) 

Sazonof  directs  protest  to  be  made  at  Vienna  against  the  short 
delay  of  the  ultimatum.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  4.) 

Prince  Alexander  of  Servia  appeals  to  the  Tsar  for  support. 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  6.) 

Austria  assures  Russia  as  to  her  intentions  regarding  Servia. 
(G.  W.  B.  exhibit  3.) 

Russia  says  that  she  cannot  permit  localization  of  the  dispute. 
(G.  W.  B.  exhibit  4.) 


APPENDIX  669 

^French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  gives  British  colleague  to 
understand  that  France  will  support  Russia.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  6-  cf 
F.  Y.  B.  no.  22.)  '     ' 

Sazonof  and  the  French  and  British  representatives  discuss  the 
action  to  be  taken. 

French  Ambassador  says  his  Government  will  support  Russia. 
British  Ambassador  explains  England's  position:  no  interest  in 
Servia;  concern  for  European  peace;  will  not  make  declaration  of 
solidarity  with  France  and  Russia;  perhaps  will  make  representa- 
tions to  Germany  and  Austria.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  6;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  22.) 
Sir  Edward  Grey  plans  quadruple  mediation  in  event  of  Russia's 
mobilization.  But  M.  Paul  Cambon  advises  immediate  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Servia.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  10;  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  32, 34.) 
Prince  Lichnowsky  suggests  effort  to  secure  favorable  replv  from 
Servia.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  11.) 

The  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  suggests  that 
Servia  propose  arbitration  "  to  escape  from  the  direct  clutch  of 
Austria."   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  26.) 

The  French  Premier  Viviani  from  Reval  informs  acting  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs  for  transmission  to  Vienna,  that  he  has 
agreed  with  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  try  to  prevent 
a  demand  on  Servia  equivalent  to  intervention,  and  wishes  to 
secure  cooperation  of  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  counsel 
moderation.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  22.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  criticizes  the  unusual  terms  of  the  Austrian 
Ultimatum.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  4.) 

Sir  Edward  declares  he  should  concern  himself  from  point  of 
view  of  the  peace  of  Europe.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  5.) 

The  French  Foreign  Office  comments  to  the  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador upon  the  effect  upon  public  opinion  of  the  presentation  of 
the  Austrian  note  at  a  time  when  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
and  the  Premier,  who  is  also  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  were  on 
the  high  seas.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  25.) 

The  French  Ambassador,  at  Berlin,  in  a  personal  exchange  of 
views,  expresses  surprise  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  should  have  supported  the  Austrian  pretensions 
when  he  was  ignorant  of  the  nature  and  limit  of  them.   (F  Y  B 
no.  30.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  tells  his  French  colleague 
he  suspects  a  surprise,  and  gives  the  reasons  why  he  thinks  Ger- 
many wants  war  with  Russia.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  32.) 

The  First  Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty  stops  the  demobiliza- 
tion of  the  First  Fleet.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  66.) 

Belgium  sends  note  to  the  Belgian  representatives,  for  use  when 
instructed  by  telegraph,  declaring  her  intention  to  fulfill  her  inter- 
national obligations  in  respect  to  her  neutrality.  (B.  G.  P.  no.  2.) 
July  25.  Germany  "  passes  on  "  to  Vienna  British  suggestion  for  mediation. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 

The  German  Government  makes  an  official  statement  of  its 
view  regarding  the  Austro-Servian  conflict.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  18.) 


670  APPENDIX 

Russia  makes  communique  that  she  is  attentively  watching  the 
course  of  events,  and  cannot  remain  indifferent  to  the  develop- 
ments of  the  Serbo-Austrian  conflict.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  10.) 

Russian  Charge"  at  Vienna  telegraphs  Count  Berchtold,  asking 
Austria  to  increase  the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum.  (R.  O.  P.  no. 
11;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  42.) 

The  French  and  English  representatives  at  Vienna  are  instructed 
to  support  the  Russian  request.  (R.  O.  P.  nos.  15,  16;  B.  W.  P.  no. 
26;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  44.) 

Von  Jagow  refuses  to  counsel  Austria  to  extend  the  time  limit. 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  14.) 

Austria  refuses  to  extend  the  time  limit.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  12.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  also  directs  the  British  Ambassador,  in  case 
it  is  too  late  to  raise  the  question  of  extending  the  time-limit,  to 
try  to  obtain  a  stay  of  operations  to  serve  as  a  base  of  discussions. 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  16;  B.  W.  P.  no.  26.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  says  he  is  ready,  if  Germany  agrees  to 
mediation  proposal,  to  tell  French  Government  that  he  thinks  it 
the  right  thing  to  act  upon  it.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  25.) 

Austrian  Minister  informs  the  Servian  Government  that  the 
reply  is  not  satisfactory,  and  leaves  Belgrade  at  6.30  p.m.  (R.  O. 
P.  no.  2;  B.  W.  P.  no.  23;  S.  B.  B.  no.  40.) 

If  Servia  appeals  to  the  powers,  Russia  is  ready  to  stand  aside. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 

If  situation  becomes  threatening,  Germany  is  ready  to  take  part 
in  mediation  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  18.) 

Germany  declares  that  she  had  not  known  about  the  Austrian 
note.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  18;  R.  O.  P.  no.  18;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  41 ;  cf .  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  30.) 

Sazonof  instructs  the  Russian  representative  at  London  to  urge 
England,  in  case  the  situation  becomes  worse,  to  stand  on  the  side 
of  France  and  Russia.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  17.) 

Prince  Lichnowsky  says  that  Germany  might  be  able  to  accept 
mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  25.) 

Servian  Government  and  the  diplomatic  corps  leave  Belgrade 
in  the  evening  for  Nish.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  23;  R.  O.  P.  no.  21.) 

From  Vienna  the  British  Ambassador  reports  that  war  is 
thought  to  be  imminent.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  31.) 

Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  tells  Sir  Edward  Grey  that,  on 
breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Servia,  Austria  would  com- 
mence military  preparations,  but  not  military  operations.  (B.  W. 
P.  no.  25.) 

Count  Berchtold  goes  to  Ischl  to  communicate  to  the  Emperor 
Servian  reply  when  it  arrives.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  20.) 

Sazonof  says  Germany's  attitude  decided  by  England's,  and 
Germany  thinks  England  will  remain  neutral.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 

England  warns  Russia  that  her  mobilization  might  decide 
-Germany  to  declare  war.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 

Russia  cannot  allow  Austria  to  crush  Servia  and  become  pre- 
/  dominant  power  in  the  Balkans.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  17.) 


APPENDIX  671 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  considers  that  between  Austria 
and  Servia  there  was  no  question  of  war,  but  of  "execution"  in  a 
local  matter,  and  refuses  to  believe  that  any  danger  of  a  general 
war  exists.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  43.) 

The  Belgian  Minister  considers  that  Austria  and  Germany  are 
attempting  to  take  advantage  of  the  domestic  difficulties  of 
France,  England,  and  Russia,  and  of  the  disorganization  of  the 
Entente.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  35.) 

The  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  tells  German 
Ambassador  that  the  terms  of  his  declaration  disclose  the  wish  of 
Germany  to  thrust  herself  between  the  powers  and  Austria 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  36.) 

The  German  Honorary  Aide-de-camp  to  the  Tsar  reports  Russia 
making  certain  military  preparations  against  Austria.  (G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  6.) 

Servia  issues  the  decree  for  mobilization  shortly  after  3  00  p  m 
(B.  G.  P.  no.  5.  Cf.  A.  R.  B.  no.  39.) 

It  is  reported  that  partial  mobilization  has  been  begun  in  Rus- 
sia.   (See  M.  P.  Price,  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  d   96  •  cf 
B.  W.  P.  no.  44.) 
July  26.  Russia  advises  Servia  to  appeal  to  English  mediation.    (F.  Y  B 
no.  53.) 

Sazonof  instructs  Russian  Ambassador  to  express  to  Count 
Berchtold  his  hope  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  may  be  author- 
ized to  exchange  views  relative  to  a  modification  of  the  Austrian 
note.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  25;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  54.) 

Hostile  demonstrations  before  the  Russian  Embassv  at  Berlin 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  30.) 

Emperor  William  returns  to  Berlin  on  his  own  initiative,  and 
to  the  regret  of  the  German  Foreign  Office.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  33.) 

German  Government,  in  spirit  of  cooperation,  instructs  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  pass  on  to  Austrian  Government  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  hopes  that  they  may  take  a  favorable  view  of  the 
Servian  reply.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  34;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  68.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  issues  invitation  to  three  powers  to  join  a 
conference  at  London,  and  asks  them  to  request  Belgrade,  Vienna, 
and  St.  Petersburg  to  suspend  all  military  operations.  (B  W  P 
no.  36.) 

Fighting  in  Dublin  streets,  3  killed,  32  wounded.  (London 
Times,  July  28.) 

_  The  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  suggests  to  the  French  For- 
eign Office  a  communique  to  the  press.  "  The  German  Ambassador, 
after  his  demarche  yesterday  with  a  view  to  the  soothing  interven- 
tion of  France  in  St.  Petersburg,  returned,  as  I  have  informed  you, 
to  the  Political  Direction,  on  the  pretext  that  it  might  be  well  to 
communicate  a  short  note  to  the  press  showing  the  pacific  and 
friendly  nature  of  the  conversation.  He  even  suggested  the  follow- 
ing terms:  'The  Ambassador  and  the  Minister  have  had  a  further 
interview,  in  the  course  of  which  the  means  which  might  be  em- 
ployed for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  were  examined  in  a 


672  APPENDIX 

very  friendly  spirit  and  with  a  feeling  of  pacific  solidarity.'  It  was 
at  once  replied  to  him  that  the  terms  appeared  to  be  excessive  and 
calculated  to  create  illusions  in  public  opinion  as  to  the  actual  sit- 
uation, but  that,  nevertheless,  a  brief  note  of  the  nature  indicated, 
that  is  to  say,  a  note,  reporting  a  conversation  in  which  were  dis- 
cussed the  means  adopted  for  the  safeguard  of  peace,  might  be 
issued  if  the  Minister  approved  of  it.  The  following  is  the  com- 
munication made :  '  The  German  Ambassador  and  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  have  had  a  further  interview,  in  the  course  of  which 
they  sought  for  a  means  of  action  of  the  powers  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace.'"  But  when  issued,  it  was  modified  to  avoid 
"solidarity  with  Germany."   (F.  Y.  B.  nos.  57,  62.) 

Sazonof  asks  Von  Jagow  to  influence  Vienna  to  that  effect. 
(R.  O.  P.  no.  26.) 

The  French  Director  of  the  Political  Department  considers  that 
German  action  at  Paris  is  intended  to  intimidate  France,  and  lead 
to  her  intervention  at  St.  Petersburg.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  29.) 

Prince  Lichnowsky  considers  the  Servian  reply  a  sham.  (B.  W. 
P.  no.  26.) 

The  German  military  attache"  at  St.  Petersburg  reports  mobiliza- 
tion as  certain  in  Kieff  and  Odessa;  (in  Warsaw  and  Moscow?)as 
open  to  doubt.    (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  7.) 
July  27.  Germany  says  she  cannot  accept  quadruple  conference  at  Lon- 
don.  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  12;  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  73,  74;  A.  R.  B.  no.  35.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  warns  Austria  of  the  dangers  of  using  force 
against  Servia.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  48;  A.  R.  B.  no.  38.) 

The  French  Government  accepts  the  British  proposal  for  medi- 
ation, and  suggests  that  the  success  of  the  British  proposal  de- 
pends upon  the  cooperation  of  Germany.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  51.) 

Von  Jagow  refuses  to  agree  to  the  Cambon  formula  as  a  basis 
upon  which  to  constitute  the  proposed  mediation.  (R.  O.  P. 
no.  39.) 

Russia  willing  to  accept  quadruple  mediation  if  the  direct  nego- 
tiations with  Austria  already  commenced  should  fail.  (R.  O.  P. 
no.  32;  B.  W.  P.  nos.  53,  55.) 

Austrian  Government  announces  that  it  is  obliged  to  use  force 
against  Servia.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  48.) 

The  Tsar  counsels  Servia  to  make  every  effort  to  conciliate,  and 
promises  Russian  support  in  case  of  need.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  40.) 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  informs  Sir  Edward  Grey 
of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano's  suggestion  that  mediation  should 
be  based  on  Servian  acceptance  of  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  57;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  no.  64;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  72.) 

Germany  has  not  yet  accepted  the  British  mediation  proposal. 
The  Emperor  will  decide.   (B.  G.  P.  no.  6.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  considers  mediatory  action  required  by  Ger- 
many should  be  taken  at  Vienna  rather  than  at  St.  Petersburg, 
since  Austria  refuses  to  consider  the  conciliatory  reply  due  to 
Russia's  influence.  The  British  Government  was  ready  to  coop- 
erate with  Germany  when  wishing  for  peace,  but  when  Germany 


APPENDIX  673 

was  acting  contrarily,  the  British  Government  reserved  its  full 
liberty  of  action.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  42;  B.  W.  P.  no.  46.) 

The  French  Minister  of  Justice  thinks  Germany  aims  to  sepa- 
rate Russia  and  France.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  35.) 

Austria  thought  to  have  purposely  delayed  French  and  Russian 
telegrams  about  Servia's  reply.  (R.  O.  P.  no.  36;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no. 
69.) 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  returns  to  Rome,  and  tells  the  French  Ambassador  that  he 
had  been  aware  that  the  Austrian  note  would  be  vigorous,  but  had 
no  idea  that  it  would  take  such  a  form.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  72.) 

Germany  answers  France  that  she  will  not  consider  it  necessary 
to  mobilize  if  Russia  mobilizes  only  on  her  Austrian  frontier. 
(F.  Y.  B.  no.  67.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  the  order  to 
keep  the  First  Fleet  concentrated  should  dispel  the  idea  that  Eng- 
land would  in  any  event  stand  aside.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  47;  cf.  F.  Y.  B. 
nos.  63,  65.) 

French  Fourteenth  Army  Corps  discontinues  maneuvers. 
(G.  W.  B.  exhibit  27.) 

The  German  Chancellor  instructs  the  German  Ambassador  at 
London  that  Russia  expected  to  call  reserves  immediately;  if  true, 
will  force  Germany  to  take  counter  measure.  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  10.) 
^    Russian  Secretary  of  War  declares  no  order  for  mobilization 
has  been  issued.    (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  11.) 
< — -;-Servia  opens  hostilities  against  Austria  on  the  Hungarian  bor- 
der.   (A.  R.  B.  nos.  40,  41.) 
July  28.  Austria  refuses  to  consider  any  suggestion  of  negotiations  on  basis 
of  the  Servian  reply.   (B.  W.  P.  nos.  61,  74;  R.  O.  P.  no.  45;  G.  W. 
B.  exhibit  16;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  83;  A.  R.  B.  nos.  38,  40,  41.) 

Germany,  considering  the  declaration  of  war  has  not  altered  the 
situation  between  Austria  and  Russia,  urges  Vienna  to  elucidate 
satisfactorily  to  Russia  the  object  and  scope  of  her  action  against 
Servia.    (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  14;  B.  W.  P.  no.  75.) 

Two  Servian  steamers  fired  on  and  damaged.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  65.) 
N  Austria  declares  war  against  Servia.    (B.  W.  P.  nos.  66,  71; 
A.  R.  B.  no.  37;  S.  B.  B.  no.  45.) 

Servian  Charg6  at  Rome  thinks  that  Servia  might  be  willing  to 
accept  the  whole  Austrian  note  if  Austria  should  give  certain 
explanations  to  the  powers.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  64.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  brings  forward  the  Eng- 
lish proposal  that  Austria  accept  the  Servian  note  or  consider  it  a 
basis  for  negotiation.    (A.  R.  B.  no.  43.) 

Russia  considers  that  the  Austrian  declaration  of  war  puts  an 
end  to  the  idea  of  direct  communications  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  But  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  is  not  recalled, 
and  considers  that  the  only  hope  of  peace  lies  in  mediation  on  the 
basis  of  a  suspension  of  Austrian  military  operations  against 
Servia.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  70.) 

Sazonof  says  that  if  Servia  is  attacked,  Russia  will  not  be  satis- 


674  APPENDIX 

fled  with  any  engagement  which  Austria  may  take  regarding 
Servian  integrity  and  independence,  and  that  the  order  for  mobil- 
ization against  Austria  will  be  issued  on  the  day  Austria  crossed 
the  Servian  frontier.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  72.) 

The  German  Imperial  Government  makes  a  confidential  com- 
munication to  the  Governments  of  the  German  Empire  of  its  views 
of  the  situation,  explaining  why  Germany  must  support  Austria. 
(G.  W.  B.  exhibit  no.  2.) 

Sazonof  blames  Germany  for  the  crisis,  and  thinks  that  England 
is  best  situated  to  influence  Germany  to  exert  the  necessary  check 
on  Austria.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  43.) 

The  British  and  Italian  Ambassadors  at  Berlin  hold  a  conference 
with  the  French  Ambassador  and  agree  that  German  objection  to 
the  form  of  mediation  might  be  obviated  by  change  of  label.  (F. 
Y.  B.  no.  81.) 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  thinks  war  unlikely,  since 
Russia  neither  wants  nor  is  in  a  position  to  make  war.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  71.) 

Russia  receives  reports  that  Austria  has  mobilized  in  Slavonia, 
Croatia,  and  Fiume,  and  that  the  decree  for  the  general  mobiliza- 
tion has  been  signed.   (R.  O.  P.  nos.  44,  47;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  77.) 

In  consequence  of  Austria's  declaration  of  war,  Russia  informs 
Germany  that  she  will  mobilize  the  next  day,  July  29,  in  the  mili- 
tary districts  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow,  and  Kazan,  but  disclaims 
any  hostile  intention  toward  Germany.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  70.) 

Austria  urges  Germany  to  inform  Russia  that  the  latter's 
mobilization  against  Austria  would  be  answered  by  both  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  (A.  R.  B.  no.  42.) 
July  29.  At  Germany's  suggestion  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg is  authorized  to  enter  into  conversations  with  Sazonof.  (G. 
W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  7.) 

Germany  makes  offers  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  France's 
European  territory,  to  secure  England's  neutrality  in  case  of  a  war. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  85.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  asks  the  German  Government  to  indicate  what 
form  of  mediation  would  be  acceptable.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  54.) 

The  Tsar  appeals  to  the  Kaiser  to  restrain  Austria  (G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  21),  to  which  the  Kaiser  replies  by  confirming  Austria's 
declarations  as  to  her  intentions,  giving  his  opinion  that  Russia 
may  well  stand  aside.  The  Kaiser  says  that  he  agrees  to  the  Tsar's 
request  that  he  act  as  mediator  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
(G.  W.  B.  exhibit  22.  Cf .  also  King  George  to  Tsar,,London  Times, 
August  5.) 

Sazonof  informs  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  that  the 
German  Ambassador  has  notified  the  Russian  Government  that 
Germany  will  mobilize  unless  Russia  ceases  her  military  prepara- 
tions; and,  since  they  cannot  agree,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs thinks  that  they  must  consider  war  probably  inevitable  and 
hasten  their  armament.    (R.  O.  P.  no.  58.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  M.  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador, 


APPENDIX  675 

that  he  purposes  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  that  they  must 
not  feel  secure  that  England  will  stand  aside  in  case  of  war,  but 
Sir  Edward  also  tells  M.  Cambon  that  England  does  not  consider 
herself  bound  to  support  France  if  she  becomes  involved.  (B.  W. 
P.  no.  87.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  points  out  to  the  German  Ambassador  that 
mediation  might  be  established  on  the  basis  of  Austria's  occupa- 
tion of  Belgrade.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  88.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  without  wanting  to  say  that  England  will- 
intervene,  warns  the  German  Ambassador  that  if  France  is  in- 
volved she  may  feel  that  British  interests  require  her  to  do  so. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  89.) 

The  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  informs  his  Govern- 
ment that  from  this  moment  he  is  able  to  give  assurance  that 
Russia  will  acquiesce  in  any  step  proposed  by  France  and  England 
to  safeguard  peace.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  86.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  tells  the  French  Ambassador 
that  the  Servian  reply  might  constitute  a  possible  basis  of  negotia- 
tion, the  capital  point  relating  to  Servia's  guaranties.  (F.  Y.  B. 
no.  92.) 

Poincare  and  Viviani  reach  Paris  on  return  from  Russia. 

Count  Berchtold  hands  the  German  Ambassador  a  memorial 
explaining  the  reasons  for  refusing  the  English  suggestion  for 
mediation  communicated  by  the  German  Ambassador.  (A.  R.  B. 
no.  44.) 

Viviani,  French  Premier  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
instructs  M.  Paul  Cambon  to  ask  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  renew  his 
proposal  for  mediation.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  97.) 

The  French  Ambassador  learns  that  this  action  was  taken  be- 
cause of  the  tone  employed  by  the  German  Ambassador.  (F.  Y. 
B.  no.  100.) 

M.  Cambon  makes  a  suggestion  of  mediation  on  the  basis  of 
Austrian  occupation  of  Servian  territory.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 

The  Italian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  thinks  that  Russia  would  be 
satisfied  if  Austria  converted  the  assurances  regarding  her  inten- 
tions toward  Servia  into  a  binding  engagement  to  Europe,  but  is 
convinced  that  Austria  would  refuse.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  79.) 

The  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thinks  that  Germany 
is  opposed  to  conference,  but  is  going  to  urge  Berlin  to  adhere  to 
the  idea  of  an  exchange  of  views  in  London.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  80.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  says  that  he  cannot  initiate  discussions,  since 
Austria  will  not  accept  any  discussion  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian 
reply,  and  he  infers  that  she  will  accept  no  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Servia.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  81.) 

Because  of  the  failure  of  direct  negotiations,  Sazonof  suggests 
return  to  the  British  mediation  proposal,  and  says  that  Russia  is 
ready  to  agree  to  any  arrangement  acceptable  to  England  and 
France  for  the  carrying  on  of  the  conversations.  He  considers  that 
the  only  way  to  avert  war  is  to  find  some  formula  that  Austria  can 
be  induced  to  accept.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  78.) 


676  APPENDIX 

Sazonof  says  that  Russia  will  agree  to  the  proposal  for  a  col- 
lective guaranty  (see  B.  W.  P.  no.  57)  if  acceptable  to  Servia,  but 
says  that  some  supplementary  statement  or  explanation  will 
have  to  be  made  to  tone  down  the  sharpness  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  78.) 

Austria  and  Russia  seem  to  continue  in  constant  touch.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  84.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  expresses  the  opin- 
ion that  after  Russia's  mobilization,  an  exchange  of  ideas  proposed 
by  Russia  is  extremely  difficult  if  not  impossible.  (G.  W.  B., 
Memorandum,  p.  6;  A.  R.  B.  no.  46.) 

Bulgaria  declares  her  neutrality.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  52.) 

Sazonof,  before  he  learns  of  Austria's  refusing  to  continue 
negotiations,  suggests  to  the  German  Ambassador  that,  while 
Austria  and  Russia  continue  a  direct  exchange  of  views,  the  four 
powers  should  arrange  for  a  conference  to  carry  on  parallel  dis- 
cussions.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  93;  R.  O.  P.  nos.  49,  50.) 

M.  Paul  Cambon  tells  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  he  anticipates  a 
demand  from  Germany  that  France  remain  neutral  while  Germany 
attacks  Russia.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  87.) 

The  French  Government  assures  the  Russian  Government  of 
its  determination  to  support  Russia,  and  urges  Sir  Edward  Grey 
to  renew  as  soon  as  possible  the  proposal  for  mediation.  (R.  O. 
P.  nos.  55,  58.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  brings  to  the  attention  of  the  German  Ambas- 
sador the  Italian  suggestion  for  mediation  (July  28,  B.  W.  P.  no. 
64),  though  he  does  not  propose  it  because  of  Austria's  refusal 
to  consider  any  proposal.  He  also  says  that  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Russia  cannot  be  simply  putting  pressure  on  Russia 
in  the  interests  of  Austria.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  90.) 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  advocates  that  England  and  Italy, 
each  representing  one  group,  should  continue  to  exchange  views 
even  if  impossible  to  induce  Germany  to  take  part  in  mediation. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  80.) 

Although  Austria  is  not  willing  to  discuss  text  of  note  she  is 
ready  to  discuss  Austro-Russian  relations.   (A.  R.  B.  no.  47.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  fears  that  as  a  result  of  his  com- 
munication of  the  English  suggestion,  regarding  the  discussion  of 
the  terms  of  the  note  to  Servia,  Austria  has  felt  that  she  was  being 
pressed  and  caused  them  to  present  a  fait  accompli  by  hastening 
the  declaration  of  war  against  Servia.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  M.  Cambon  that  he  has  little  hope  of  a 
pacific  solution.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  98.) 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  remarks  that  before  the 
Balkan  War  Servia  had  always  been  regarded  as  being  in  the 
Austrian  sphere  of  influence.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  91.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  and  the  French  Ambassador  at 
"~s  Berlin  each  considers  that   the  other's  Government   is  making 

military  preparations.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 

The  French  Government  receives  report  of  military  preparation 


APPENDIX  677 

in  Germany  and  Austria,  and  of  mobilization  on  the  Russian 
frontier.    (F.  Y.  B.  nos.  88,  91.) 

Austria  urges  Germany  to  make  representations  at  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Paris  that  Russian  mobilization  if  continued  will  lead 
to  counter  measures  entailing  serious  consequences.  (A.  R.  B. 
no.  48.) 

The  Russian  Ambassador  returns  to  Berlin,  and  informs  the 
German  Government  that  Russia  is  mobilizing  in  four  southern 
governments.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  76.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  tells  the  British  Ambassador 
that  he  is  much  troubled  by  reports  of  mobilization  in  Russia 
and  of  certain  military  measures  being  taken  in  France.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  76.) 

The  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  explains  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  the  necessity  of  Russia's  mobiliza- 
tion.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  78;  A.  R.  B.  no.  47.) 

Belgium  makes  certain  military  preparation  for  defense.  (B. 
G.  P.  no.  8;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  87.) 

The  German  Military  Attache"  at  St.  Petersburg  considers  that 
the  Russian  Government  is  trying  to  deceive  Germany  as  to  the 
military  preparations  actually  being  carried  out.  (G.  W.  B., 
Memorandum,  p.  7;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  102.) 

-  The  German  Chancellor  instructs  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Paris  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  French  Government  to  the  fact 
that  their  military  preparations,  if  continued,  will  necessitate 
countermeasures  such  as  "  Drohende  Kriegesgefahr,"  which  would 
increase  the  tension.    (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  17;  A.  R.  B.  no.  45.) 

Extraordinary  council  meets  in  the  evening  at  Potsdam  under 
presidency  of  the  Kaiser  and  decides  upon  mobilization.    (F.  Y. 
B.  no.  105.)    [For  various  reasons  this  decision  was  changed.] 
July  30.  Austria  bombards  Belgrade.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  113.) 

The  Kaiser  telegraphs  the  Tsar  that  his  mission  as  mediator  is 
rendered  difficult  if  not  impossible  by  Russia's  mobilization  against 
Austria.   (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  23.) 

To  which  the  Tsar  explains  that  the  measures  are  for  defense, 
and  hopes  that  the  Kaiser  will  continue  his  mediation.  (G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  23A.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  declares  that  the 
German  Government  will  guarantee  that  Austria  will  respect 
Servian  integrity.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  97.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  asks  M.  Sazonof  to 
indicate  the  conditions  upon  which  Russia  could  agree  to  suspend 
her  armament,  whereupon  Sazonof  dictates  the  following  declara- 
tion: "If  Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict  with  Servia  has 
assumed  character  of  question  of  European  interest,  declares  her- 
self ready  to  eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  points  which  violate 
principle  of  sovereignty  of  Servia,  Russia  engages  to  stop  all  mili- 
tary preparations."  (B.  W.  P.  no.  97;  R.  O.  P.  no.  60;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  103.) 

The  German  Government  declares  that  it  considers  (trouvait) 


678  APPENDIX 

the  Russian  formula  (R.  O.  P.  no.  60)  proposed  by  Sazonof  unac- 
ceptable for  Austria.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  63;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  107.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  gives  his  reasons  for  refusing  the  German 
Chancellor's  proposal  to  secure  British  neutrality.  He  declares 
that  the  British  Government  must  reserve  its  freedom  of  action, 
but  holds  out  hope  of  a  general  agreement  between  the  powers 
to  prevent  aggression  against  Germany  if  the  present  crisis  can 
be  surmounted.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  101.) 

M.  Paul  Cambon  reminds  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  an  exchange  of 
letters  agreeing,  if  the  peace  of  Europe  should  be  threatened,  to 
discuss  what  they  were  prepared  to  do.  M.  Cambon  does  not  ask 
Sir  Edward  to  agree  to  intervene,  but  asks  him  to  say  what  the 
British  Government  will  do  in  case  of  aggression  by  Germany  on 
France.  Sir  Edward  replies  that  he  will  see  him  after  the 
Cabinet  meeting  next  day.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  105;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  no.  108.) 

British  Cabinet  postpones  the  second  reading  of  the  Amending 
Bill  in  the  interest  of  national  unity  in  the  face  of  the  European 
crisis.   (London  Times,  July  31.) 

The  President  of  the  French  Republic  considers  England  might 
prevent  war  by  standing  with  Russia  and  France,  and  says  that 
she  will  be  drawn  in  the  war  in  any  event  to  protect  her  vital  inter- 
ests. He  further  states  that  all  France  had  done  was  to  make 
preparations  for  mobilization.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  99;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106.) 

As  a  slender  chance  of  preserving  peace,  Sir  Edward  Grey  pro- 
poses to  Russia  to  modify  the  Russian  formula  so  as  to  make  it 
more  acceptable  to  Austria.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  103.) 

The  German  Government,  when  asked  to  suggest  some  proposal 
for  mediation,  had  thought  to  save  time  by  asking  Austria  what 
would  satisfy  her,  but  no  answer  has  as  yet  been  received. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  107;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  109.) 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg  informs  his  Government 
that,  feeling  at  last  secure  of  England's  support  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit 
28),  the  war  party  in  Russia  has  the  upper  hand,  and  is  pushing 
preparations. 

M.  Paul  Cambon  submits  to  the  British  Government  a  memo- 
randum showing  the  efforts  of  France  to  preserve  peace,  and  how 
she  has  retired  her  troops  ten  kilometers  from  the  frontier.  Ger- 
many, on  the  other  hand,  is  accused  of  aggressively  pushing  her 
preparation.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  105,  enclosure  3;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  106.) 

A  German  newspaper  issues  an  extra  with  a  premature  an- 
nouncement of  the  promulgation  of  the  German  order  of  mobiliza- 
tion.   (R.  O.  P.  nos.  61,  62;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  105.) 

Sazonof  says  that  he  has  proof  of  German  military  and  naval 
preparations  against  Russia,  more  particularly  in  the  direction  of 
the  Gulf  of  Finland.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  97;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  102.) 

The  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  tells  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  that  his  saying  Germany  would  not  con- 
sider herself  forced  to  mobilize  unless  Russia  mobilized  on  the 
German  frontier  did  not  constitute  a  firm  engagement  on  his 
part.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  109.) 


APPENDIX  679 

Germany  urges  Austria  to  exchange  views  with  Russia.  (In- 
structions printed  in  the  Westminster  Gazette,  August  1,  see  C.  M. 
Price,  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  pp.  51,  251.) 

Count  Berchtold  tells  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  that 
Austria  must  as  a  measure  of  precaution  mobilize  in  answer  to 
Russia.  He  says  he  has  no  objection  to  continuation  of  conversa- 
tions at  St.  Petersburg.  These  communications  make  a  favorable 
impression  on  the  Ambassador,  who  was  preparing  to  depart  in 
expectation  that  Austria  would  declare  war  against  Russia.  (B. 
W.  P.  no.  96;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  104;  A.  R.  B.  50.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  London  asks  why  England  is 
making  military  preparations,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  says  that  the 
measures  are  not  aggressive,  but  the  situation  is  such  that  each 
power  must  prepare.  (R.  O.  P.  no.  65;  cf.  B.  W.  P.  nos.  89,  101, 
102;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  108.) 
July  31.  Germany  closes  bridges  across  the  Luxemburg-German  frontier, 
and  the  Luxemburg  Minister  of  State  asks  the  French  and  German 
Ministers  if  they  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  (F. 
Y.  B.  no.  111.) 

The  German  Chancellor  tells  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
that  Count  Berchtold  replied  last  night,  to  a  request  for  an  answer 
to  the  British  proposal,  that  he  would  consult  the  Emperor  this 
morning.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  112.) 

The  Belgian  Government  call  the  attention  of  the  German 
Minister  to  the  assurances  that  Germany  had  already  given  of  her 
intention  to  respect  Belgium's  neutrality,  and  receive  the  assur- 
ance that  Germany  has  not  changed  her  views.   (B.  G.  P.  no.  12.) 

The  German  Chancellor  instructs  the  German  Ambassador  at-*-^ 
St.  Petersburg  to  present  an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  threatening,    r- 
unless  she  demobilizes  within  twelve  hours,  that  German  mobiliza- 
tion will  be  ordered.    (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  24.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  is  not  ready  to  answer  what 
course  Germany  will  take  regarding  Belgium  and  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  informs  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  a  definite 
answer  seems  remote.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  122.) 

The  British  Government  unwilling  to  give  any  pledge  of  inter- 
vention, but  tell  France  that  they  will  consider  the  situation  again 
directly  there  is  a  new  development.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  116;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  110.) 

The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  informs  England  of  the 
German  ultimatum  to  Russia  and  the  impending  German  mobili- 
zation, and  asks  what  will  be  the  attitude  of  England.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  117.) 

Assassination  of  Jaures  in  a  Paris  cafe. 

Bank  of  England  doubles  discount  rate  —  8  per  cent. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  the  French  Ambassador  that  the  British 
Government  cannot  give  any  pledge  at  the  present  time.  The  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  might  be,  Sir  Edward  would  not  say  a  decisive, 
but  an  important,  factor  in  determining  their  attitude.  Parliament 
would  wish  to  know  how  they  stood  regarding  Belgian  neutrality. 


680  APPENDIX 

Sir  Edward  also  says  that  he  has  informed  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, that  if  France  and  Germany  become  involved  in  war,  Eng- 
land will  be  drawn  into  it,  but  that  that  was  not  the  same  thing 
as  making  an  engagement  to  France.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  119.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  suggests  that  Germany  might  sound  Vienna 
and  he  St.  Petersburg  as  to  four  powers  guaranteeing  Austria 
satisfaction  from  Servia  without  impairing  the  latter's  sovereignty 
or  integrity,  all  powers  meanwhile  suspending  military  operations 
and  preparations.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  Ill;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  112.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  Lichnowsky  that  if  France  and  Russia 
rejected  any  reasonable  Austro-German  proposal,  the  British 
Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  conse- 
quences.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  111.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  asks  France  and  Germany  whether  they  will 
respect  Belgian  neutrality,  and  notifies  Belgium  that  he  assumes 
she  will  defend  to  the  utmost  her  neutrality,  which  he  expects 
other  powers  to  uphold  and  observe.  (B.  W.  P.  nos.  114,  115.) 
J  Sir  Edward  Goschen  urges  the  German  Secretary  of  State  to 
accept  mediation  after  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  on  the  basis  of 
a  collective  guaranty  (see  B.  W.  P.  no.  Ill;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  112).  But 
Von  Jagow  said  it  was  no  use  to  discuss  it  till  Russia  had  answered 
Germany's  ultimatum.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  121.) 

The  French  Minister  at  Brussels  declares  to  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment that  French  troops  will  not  invade  Belgium  even  if  an 
important  massing  of  troops  on  the  Belgian  frontier  should  occur. 
(B.  G.  P.  no.  9.) 

The  French  Government  declare  that  they  will  respect  Bel- 
gium's neutrality.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  125;  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  119,  122.) 

The  Tsar  appeals  to  the  Kaiser  to  continue  to  exert  his  media- 
tory influence.   (G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  8.) 

Sazonof  communicates  to  the  French  and  British  Ambassadors 
at  St.  Petersburg  the  Russian  formula  (see  B.  W.  P.  no.  97)  modi- 
fied in  accordance  with  Sir  Edward  Grey's  request.  (R.  O.  P.  no. 
67;  B.  W.  P.  no.  120;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  113.) 

Italy  declares,  in  answer  to  Germany's  interrogations,  "The  war 
undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences  which  might  result, 
had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Ambassador  himself,  an  aggres- 
sive object.  Both  were,  therefore,  in  conflict  with  the  purely 
defensive  character  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  in  such  circum- 
stances Italy  would  remain  neutral."  (B.  W.  P.  no.  152;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  124.) 

At  the  British  Foreign  Office  the  French  Ambassador  is  told  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey  will  resume  the  discussion  of  cooperation  with 
France  at  the  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  next  day.  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  1 10.) 

The  arrangements  are  made  for  the  delivery  of  President  Poin- 
car6's  autograph  letter  to  King  George.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  110.) 

The  German  Chancellor  says  that  his  peace  efforts  at  Vienna  are 
handicapped  by  Russian  mobilization  against  Austria.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  108.) 

The  German  Chancellor  says  that  Germany  must  shortly  take 


APPENDIX  681 

some  serious  step  in  answer  to  measures  Russia  is  taking  against 
her,  and  that  he  was  about  to  have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor. 
The  news  of  these  preparations  arrived  just  when  the  Emperor,  in 
answer  to  the  Tsar's  appeal,  was  mediating  at  Vienna.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  108.) 

The  Kaiser  reproaches  the  Tsar  for  threatening  peace  by  un- 
necessarily mobilizing.    (G.  W.  B.,  Memorandum,  p.  8.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  informs  Prince  Lichnowsky  that  he  cannot 
urge  Russia  to  suspend  military  preparations  unless  some  limit  is 
put  on  the  advance  of  Austrian  troops  into  Servia.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  110.) 

General  mobilization  decreed  in  Austria.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  115.) 

The  mobilization  of  the  Belgian  army  is  ordered.  (B.  G.  P. 
no.  10.  ) 

The  German  Chancellor  explains  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  the  nature  of  Kriegsgefahrzustandt,  which  he  says  will  be 
proclaimed  at  once.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  112;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  116.) 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  explains  why  Germany  had 
demanded  that  Russia  demobilize  in  the  south  as  well.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  121.) 

Sazonof  explains  that  Russia  cannot  arrest  her  mobilization 
once  in  progress,  but  declares  that  Russia  has  no  hostile  intention 
and  will  not  cross  the  frontier.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  120.) 

When  Russia  learns  that  Austria  will  not  yield  to  the  inter- 
vention of  the  powers,  and  that  Austria  and  Germany  are  making 
military  preparations  against  her,  she  decides  to  give  orders  for 
general  mobilization.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  113;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  118;  R.  O. 
P.  nos.  77,  78.) 

A  further  exchange  of  telegrams  between  the  Tsar  and  the 
Kaiser  regarding  Russian  mobilization.  (G.  W.  B.,  Memoran- 
dum, p.  9.) 

The  French  Ambassador  presents  Poincar£'s  letter  to  King 
George.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  110;  London  Times,  Aug.  3.) 

Kaiser  telegraphs  King  George  informing  him  of  Russian  mo- 
bilization. 

At  midnight  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  presents 
the  ultimatum  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  but  when  ques- 
tioned says  it  does  not  constitute  war,  though  very  near  it.  (R. 
O.  P.  no.  70.) 
Aug.  i.  At  7.10  p.m.  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  presents  a 
note  declaring  war  against  Russia.  (R.  O.  P.  no.  76;  G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  26.) 

King  George  telegraphs  the  Tsar  urging  the  acceptance  of  medi- 
ation. 

The  Tsar  replies  he  would  gladly  accept  but  that  Germany  has 
just  declared  war.    (London  Times,  Aug.  5,  1914.) 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris  says  that  his  Government  is 
ready  to  discuss  with  the  other  powers  the  settlement  of  its  conflict 
with  Servia.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  73;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  120.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  learns  that  Austria  is  ready  to  consider  favor- 


682  APPENDIX 

ably  his  proposal  for  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia,  and 
tells  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that  if  Russia  can 
agree  to  stop  mobilization  it  still  appears  possible  to  preserve 
peace.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  135.) 

The  Belgian  Government  informs  the  British  Minister  that  they 
consider  themselves  in  a  position  to  make  good  their  intention 
of  defending  their  territory  against  intrusion.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  128.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  the  German  Ambassador  that  they  regret 
Germany's  failure  to  give  an  assurance  that  she  would  respect 
Belgian  neutrality.  The  Secretary  adds  that  they  are  considering 
the  course  they  should  take,  and  that,  though  respect  for  Belgium's 
neutrality  would  be  an  important  factor,  they  could  not  promise 
neutrality  on  that  condition  alone.  But  when  asked,  Sir  Edward 
declines  to  specify  what  conditions  would  be  satisfactory,  though 
Prince  Lichnowsky  suggests  that  the  integrity  of  France  and  her 
colonies  might  be  guaranteed.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  123.) 

Prince  Lichnowsky  informs  his  Government  that  Sir  Edward 
Grey  has  just  asked  him  by  telephone  whether  Germany  would 
agree  not  to  attack  France  if  she  remained  neutral.  (G.  W.  B. 
exhibit  33.)  The  Kaiser  and  Chancellor  telegraph  to  accept  the 
proposal  (G.  W.  B.  exhibits  32,  34),  but  King  George  telegraphs 
that  there  must  be  some  misunderstanding.  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  35.) 

France  replies  to  the  German  inquiry  if  she  will  remain  neutral 
in  the  event  of  a  Russo-German  war,  that  France  will  take  the 
course  her  interests  dictate.  (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  27;  F.  Y.  B.  nos. 
116,  117.) 
. France  declares  that  she  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxem- 
burg.  (F.  Y.  B.  nos.  128,  129.) 

Austria  gives  assurances  regarding  Servia  and  informs  St. 
Petersburg  that  she  has  not  "banged  the  door"  on  all  further 
conversations.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  137.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  protests  against  the  detention  of  British  ves- 
sels at  Hamburg  (B.  W.  P.  no.  130),  which  are  ordered  released. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  143.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  tells  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  he  con- 
siders the  new  Russian  formula  offers  the  best  chance  for  a  peaceful 
settlement,  and  that  he  hopes  no  power  will  commence  hostilities 
before  examining  it.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  71.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphs  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
of  the  telegram  of  July  31  from  Sazonof,  communicated  by  De 
Etter  regarding  Austria's  acceptance  of  mediation  and  Sazonof's 
desire  that  England  assume  direction  of  discussions.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  133.) 

Mobilization  of  French  army  ordered.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  136.) 

General  mobilization  of  the  Austrian  army  and  fleet.  (B.  W.  P. 
no.  127.) 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  tries  to  persuade  the  German  Secretary  of 
State  that  Germany  should  hold  her  hand  now  that  the  principals, 
Austria  and  Russia,  are  ready  to  discuss.  But  Von  Jagow  replies 
that  Russia  by  mobilizing  has  made  this  impossible,  since  Ger- 


APPENDIX  683 

many,  having  the  speed  and  Russia  the  numbers,  could  not  allow 
Russia  time  to  bring  up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts  of  her  wide 
dominions.  Hence  Germany  must  consider  Russia's  refusal  to 
demobilize  as  creating  a  state  of  war.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  138;  F.  Y.  B. 
no.  121.) 

Germany  issues  orders  for  the  general  mobilization  of  the  navy 
and  army,  the  first  day  of  the  mobilization  to  be  August  2.  (B. 
W.  P.  no.  142.) 

Poincar6  tells  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  that  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  says  that  Austria  declared  to  Russia  that  she 
was  ready  to  respect  not  only  Servia's  integrity,  but  also  her 
sovereign  rights,  and  that  Russia  had,  according  to  the  Austrian 
Ambassador,  taken  no  notice  of  this  declaration.  This  the  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  denied  categorically.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  75.) 

Sazonof  states  Russia's  view  in  regard  to  Servia  and  the  Balkan 
situation,  and  compares  Russia's  conciliatory  efforts  with  ob- 
stacles placed  in  the  way  of  a  peaceful  solution  by  Germany. 
(B.  W.  P.  no.  139.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  learns  the  text  of  the  Russian  formula  amended 
to  meet  his  suggestion.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  132.) 

The  French  Government  orders  mobilization  as  soon  as  it  learns 
from  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  of  Germany's 
announcement  that  she  had  decided  to  order  mobilization  that 
day.   (R.  O.  P.  no.  74.) 

The  French  Government  thinks  that  Germany  is  mobilizing 

under  cover  of  "  Kriegszustand."   (R.  O.  P.  no.  73.) 

Aug.    2.  Germany  presents  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium,  declaring  that  she 

"""'has  reason  to  believe  that  France  is  preparing  to  violate  Belgium's 

neutrality,  and  demanding  that  Belgium  allow  her  to  pass  through 

her  territory.   (G.  W.  B.  exhibit  37;  B.  G.  P.  no.  20.) 

Germany  notifies  the  Belgian  Government  of  the  violation  of 
German  territory  by  France  as  indicating  the  probability  of 
other  violations  of  international  law  by  France.  (B.  G.  P.  no.  21.) 

French  representatives  abroad  are  informed  of  German  viola- 
tion of  French  territory  (F.  Y.  B.  no.  136),  and  the  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  is  instructed  to  protest.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  139.) 
s>>      Germany  violates  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.    (B.  W.  P. 
nos.  129,  146,  147.) 

M.  Paul  Cambon  asks  Sir  Edward  Grey  about  the  attitude  of 
the  British  Government  regarding  the  violation  of  the  neutrality 
of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  148.) 

Germany  considers  state  of  war  exists  by  reason  of  Russian 
troops  crossing  the  frontier.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  144.) 

Prince  Lichnowsky  from  London  telegraphs:  "Sir  E.  Grey's 
suggestions  were  prompted  by  a  desire  to  make  it  possible  for 
England  to  keep  permanent  neutrality,  but  as  they  were  not  based 
on  a  previous  understanding  with  France,  and  made  without 
knowledge  of  our  mobilization,  they  have  been  abandoned  as 
absolutely  hopeless."   (G.  W.  B.,  exhibit  36.) 

England  assures  France  that  if  the  German  fleet  comes  into  the 


684  APPENDIX 

Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations 
against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the 
protection  in  its  power.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  148;  cf.  F.  Y.  B.  nos.  126, 
137,  138.) 

A.  Bonar  Law  pledges  the  Unionist  Party  by  writing  Asquith 
that  in  the  opinion  of  Lord  Landsdowne,  of  himself,  and  of  his 
colleagues,  it  would  be  fatal  to  the  honor  and  security  of  England 
to  hesitate  in  supporting  France  and  Russia.  (Published  in  the 
London  Times,  December  15.) 

The  German  Government  explains  that  detention  of  British 
vessels  was  due  to  laying  of  mines.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  145.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey  instructs  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to  protest 
against  the  detention  of  cargoes  of  sugar  unloaded  from  British 
vessels.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  149.) 

Germany  informs  France  that  the  measures  taken  in  Luxemburg 
are  not  hostile,  but  merely  preventive.  (F.  Y.  B.  nos.  132,  133.) 
Aug.  3.  The  German  Ambassador  at  London  in  communique  to  press 
states  that  if  England  remains  neutral  Germany  will  forego  all 
naval  operations,  and  will  not  use  the  Belgian  coasts  as  supporting 
base.   (F.  Y.  B.  no.  144.) 

The  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  declares  that,  in  view  of 
French  violation  of  Belgian  and  German  territory,  the  German 
Empire  considers  itself  to  be  in  a  state  of  war  with  France.  (F.  Y. 
B.  nos.  147,  157.) 

~  Belgium  appeals  to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  England  to 
protect  her  neutrality.   (B.  G.  P.  no.  25.) 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphs  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  no  in- 
formation is  obtainable  regarding  the  detention  of  British  vessels 
at  Hamburg.    (B.  W.  P.  no.  150.) 

Belgium,  declining  for  the  present  French  offers  of  assistance, 
announces  that  she  does  not  intend  in  the  actual  circumstances  to 
appeal  to  the  guaranty  of  the  powers.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  151;  B.  G.  P. 
no.  24;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  142.) 
Aug.  4.  Germany  informs  Belgium  that  she  is  obliged  to  use  force  to 
protect  herself  against  France.    (B.  G.  P.  no.  27.) 

German  troops  enter  Belgium.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  158;  B.  G.  P.  no. 
30;  F.  Y.  B.  no.  140.) 

Germany  assures  England  that  she  will  not  annex  Belgian  ter- 
ritory, and  excuses  the  necessity  of  violating  Belgium's  neutrality 
on  the  ground  of  an  intended  French  invasion  of  Belgium.  (B.  W. 
P.  no.  157.) 

England  presents  ultimatum  to  Germany  demanding  assurances 
regarding  the  respecting  of  Belgian  neutrality.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  159.) 

England  informs  Belgium  that  she  expects  Belgium  to  resist  any 
attempt  by  Germany  to  violate  her  neutrality,  and  that  the  British 
Government  will  support  her,  and  that  they  are  ready  to  join  with 
Russia  and  France  to  aid  her  in  resisting,  and  to  guarantee  and 
maintain  her  independence  and  integrity.  (B.  W.  P.  no.  155;  B.  G. 
P.  no.  28.) 

The  Belgian  Government  hands  his  passports  to  the  German 


APPENDIX  685 

Minister  (B.  G.  P.  no.  31),  who  turns  over  the  legation  to  the 
Minister  of  the  United  States.    (B.  G.  P.  no.  32.) 

England  notifies  Norway  and  Holland,  as  well  as  Belgium,  that 
she  will  assist  them  to  protect  their  neutrality  and  to  maintain 
their  independence.   (B.  G.  P.  no.  37.) 

The  British  Government  protests  to  Germany  against  further 
detentions  of  British  vessels.   (B.  W.  P.  no.  156.) 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  writes  a  letter  of  protest  to 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  at  the  treatment  he  received  while 
returning  to  France.    (F.  Y.  B.  no.  155.) 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin  transmits  to  his  Government 
an  account  of  the  German  Chancellor's  speech  in  the  Reichstag, 
admitting  that  Germany's  action  was  a  violation  of  international 
law,  but  to  be  excused  by  necessity.   (B.  G.  P.  no.  35.) 


CITATIONS  OF  DOCUMENTS 

This  list  gives  the  pages  on  which  will  be  found  the  extracts  or  modified  quotations 
from  the  various  official  publications  relative  to  the  causes  of  the  war.  Simple  references 
to  documents  are  indicated  by  "cf."  after  the  page  number. 


No. 


RITISH  WHITE  PAPER 

No.  34:  228. 

35:  86  c/;  204;  461.  • 

2:  129  c/. 

36:  203;  206. 

3:  51;  56  cf;  80;  189;  219. 

38:  46  c/;  91;  107;  121. 

4:  52;  54;  574. 

39:  65;  66;  576. 

5:54;  130  cf;  189;  270;  293. 

40:  59;  61;  129  c/. 

6:  42;  59;  64;  98;  118;  189; 

41:  59. 

270;  274;  293;  294  c/. 

42 :  204. 

7:  55;  96;  129. 

43:  110;  129  cf;  133;  187;  191; 

8:  55. 

209;  210  cf;  232. 

9:  69  cf;  129  cf. 

44 :56  c/;  108;  186;  270;  466. 

10:  55;  59;  62  cf;  130  cf;  152; 

46:  78  cf;  79;  83;  211;  232;  270; 

189;  199;  293. 

305. 

11:  50  cf;  62  cf;  63;  201;  207; 

47:  274; 305. 

229  cf;  270. 

48:  71;  85;  89;  129  c/. 

12:  63;  80. 

49:  204. 

13:  56;  60. 

50:  87. 

14:  57;  87. 

51 :  204. 

15:  57;  63. 

52:204. 

16:  55  cf;  64. 

53:163. 

17:  55  c/;  57;  64;  99;  105;  133; 

54:  79;  80. 

189;  201;  215;  236;  239; 

55=82;  129  cf;  216. 

270;  274;  296. 

56:  81;  82;  99;  215  c/. 

18:  55;  56;  58;  61;  120  cf;  159; 

57:  83;  207;  234;  461. 

207;  224;  230;  270. 

59:85. 

19:  62;  91  cf. 

60:  232  c/. 

20:  227. 

61 :  85  cf;  91  cf;  107;  129  c/. 

21:  78  c/;  83  c/. 

62:82;  129  cf;  212;  222. 

22:  78  c/. 

63:  83;  461. 

24:  186;  203;  216;  274  cf;  293 

64:  75;  228  c/;  234  c/;  463. 

cf;  294  cf. 

65:  82;  87;  270. 

25 :  56  cf;  57  cf;  81 ;  119;  125  cf; 

67:  209  cf;  210;  212;  218. 

130  cf;   159  cf;   202;  206; 

68:  218  c/;  232. 

294  cf. 

69:  204;  218. 

26:  57  c/;  81. 

70:  220;  221. 

27:  83. 

71:  105;  131;  210;  228. 

29:  461. 

72:  109;  270. 

30:  73;  74  c/;  78  c/;  270. 

73:88. 

32:  55  c/;  79;  101;  102;  126. 

74:  220;  222  c/;  231. 

33:  102;  140. 

75:  90;  228. 

APPENDIX                                   687 

No.    76:  107;  111;  212  cf;  213;  236. 

No.  119:  288. 

77:  228. 

120:  229;  249. 

78:  109  c/;  110;  204;  218;  231; 

121:  139;  242. 

235;  243;  246;  260. 

122:  317. 

79:  89;  240  cf. 

123:  301; 302; 358; 446. 

80:  229;  232;  277;  461  cf;  464; 

124: 318. 

466. 

125:318. 

81:  84;  228;  229. 

126:  175. 

82:91. 

128:  319;  320  cf. 

84:  222;  232. 

129:  338. 

85:281;  298;  302;  355;  357; 

130: 337. 

359. 

131:  227. 

86:  94;  461. 

132:249. 

87:  167;  287  cf;  295;  296  cf; 

133=257. 

306;  355. 

135:258. 

88:  236. 

136: 171. 

89:  296;  328;  355;  441  cf. 

137:  121  cf;  226;  231. 

90:  92;  105  cf;  228  cf;  235;  270; 

138:  144;  185. 

294;  461. 

139:99;  143;  229;  466  c/. 

91:  89;  93;  105  cf;  129  cf;  293. 

140:  171  cf. 

92:  232  c/;  266;  465. 

141:  116. 

93:  85;  112;  211;  220;  221  cf; 

142:  144. 

222  c/;  229;  231;  243;  244; 

143:  337. 

246. 

144: 145. 

94:  244. 

145:337. 

95:  110;  120;  224. 

147:  338. 

96:  187;  226  cf;  255. 

148 :  338 ;  340;  341 ;  428  cf;  431  cf. 

97:  93;  140;  245;  vi. 

150:  337. 

98:  141  cf;  168;  187;  224;  237; 

152:470. 

300;  355. 

153:  302;  324  c/;  362;  363. 

99:  138;  167;  248;  275. 

155:  435. 

100:  232;  236  cf;  239. 

157:  362. 

101:  282;  299;  307;  441c/. 

158:  362. 

103:  237;  238;  249. 

159: 363. 

104:  229  c/;  239  c/;  270. 

105:  283;  284;  285;  286;  357;  vi. 

Miscellaneous.no.  8  (1914) :  137;363- 
370. 

106:  240;  278;  465;  466. 

107:  107;  213  c/;  233;  256. 
108:  115;  141;  300. 

10  (1914):  32;  47; 
52;  65;  84  cf; 

109: 299. 

no:  115;  116;  188;  223  cf;  226 

cf;  257;  270. 
in:  138  c/;  229  c/;   233;    241; 

270;  273;  306;  311;  441  cf. 

88;  92;  101c/; 
103;  120  cf; 
122  cf;  129  c/; 
176  cf;  223; 
230;  262; 468. 

112:  141. 
113:  114;  257. 

RUSSIAN  ORANGE  PAPER 

114:310;  317. 

No.      1 :55  c/;  62. 

115:  319;  320  c/. 

4:  36  cf;  60;  81  cf. 

116:  288  cf. 

6:  55  c/;  64;  99  c/. 

117:  114. 

8:  129  c/. 

688 


APPENDIX 


No. 


10 
ii 

12 

13 
14 
16 
18 
19 

20 
22 
23 
25 

26 

27 
28 

29 

30 
3i 
32 
33 
34 
35 
37 
38 
39 
40 

4i 
42 

43 

44 
45 
46 

47 
48 
49 


50 

5i 
53 

54 
55 
56 
57 
58 


98. 
61. 
61. 

66. 

61;  107. 

57  cf;  81  cf. 

57  cf;  129  cf. 

119  cf;  125. 

293. 

202  cf. 

462. 

55  cf;  56;  68  c/;  71;  105  cf; 

215. 

215  cf. 

65;  79. 

129  c/;  151;  163  c/. 

153. 

103. 

215. 

163;  217. 

79  c/. 

129  cf;  209  cf. 

84;  154. 

85  c/. 

219;  228  cf. 

209. 

82;  100. 

56;  99;  129  cf. 

79  cf;  229  cf;  233  cf;  272  cf; 

282. 

219  cf. 

109. 

104;  107;  220;  221;  243. 

80. 

109;  186. 

108;  159  c/;  220;  221;  243. 

112;  135;  137  cf;  187;  190; 

211;  221;  243;  244;  246; 

246  cf. 

221  cf;  222;  229;  231;  243; 

246. 

107;  187;  213  cf;  228  cf;  266. 

108;  109  cf;  155;  159  cf;  230; 

232  cf. 

231;  232  cf. 

165. 

100. 

101. 

114;  135;  137  cf;  166;  187; 

191;  246;  296. 


No.  60:  244;  245;  vi. 
61:  137. 
62:  137. 
63:  244;  248. 
64:  248. 
67:  249. 
68:  142. 
69:  229;  256. 
70:  142. 
75:  105  cf. 
76:  145. 
77:  56;  105  cf;  192. 

GERMAN   WHITE   BOOK 

MEMORANDUM 

Page  4:  94;  102;  125. 

5:71;  118;  125;  131. 

6:  125;  128  c/;  129  c/;  130. 

7:  84;  130. 

8:  134;  167;  210  cf;  253. 

9:  167;  187;  190;  211;  230; 
244. 
10:  113;  129  c/;  137  c/;  211;  244. 
11:  113;  223;  237. 
12:  115. 
21:  109  c/. 
24:  138. 
25:  66. 


Ex.   1:  128;  129  c/. 

2:  117;  129  cf;  130;  132. 

3:84;  101. 

5:  84  cf;  104. 

6:  86  cf;  110. 

7:  110. 

8: 111. 

10:  84  cf;  129  cf;  133;  151. 
11:  111; 134. 
12:  208. 

13:  159;  207;  230. 
14:  228  cf. 
15:  228  c/. 
16:  212. 
17:  167. 
18:  139. 
20:  125  cf;  252. 
21:  109  c/;  112;  252. 
22:  222  cf;  228  cf;  253. 


APPENDIX 


689 


Ex.    23:  112;  167;  253. 
24:  98. 
25:  175. 
26:  142;  145. 
27:  176. 
28:  192;  253. 
29:  253;  330. 
30:  330. 
32:329. 
33=328. 
34: 329. 
35:  329. 
36:333. 
38:  634. 

FRENCH  YELLOW  BOOK 

No.   1 :  35. 

5:  155;  vi. 

8:  155. 

9:  126  cf;  129  cf. 
10:  206  c/. 

xi :  45;  58;  121c/;  213  c/. 
13:  44. 
14:  45;  156. 
15:  120  c/;  166;  206  c/. 

16:  126  cf;  157. 

17:  206  c/;  461  cf. 

18:  104  cf;  vi. 

19:  461  cf. 

ax:  120  c/. 

26:  65;  201  cf;  467. 

27:  461  cf. 

28:  57;  129  cf;  150. 

29: 157. 

30:  71;  120;  121;  125;  158. 

3i:274. 

32:  158;  287  cf. 

35:  120;  121;  467. 

36:  57  cf;  119;  150. 

38:  104. 

40:  81  cf. 

45:  77. 

47:  274. 

50:  182  cf;  190  cf;  199  cf;  203  cf. 

468. 
51:  465;  469. 
52:  10Sc/;469. 
S3: 199. 
54:  214. 


No.  55-  vi. 

56:  121c/;  152;  163. 

57: 161. 

59:  166  c/. 

60:  166  c/. 

61:  154  c/;  161;  231. 

62:  151;  154  c/;  163. 

63:295. 

64:  104. 

65:93;  105  c/. 

66:  211;  305. 

67:  186  c/. 

68:  199;  208. 

69:  199  c/;  208  c/. 

70:  230. 

72:  121;  234  cf;  277  cf;  461  cf; 

462;  469. 
73:209  c/. 

74:  48  c/;  161;  164;  209  c/. 
75:  54;  69;  574  c/. 
76:  206  c/;  207. 
81:  162;  210;  230. 
82:219. 

83:  131c/;  159;  162. 
84:  229. 
85:  109;  155  c/. 
88:  166  c/. 
89:  166  c/. 
92:  92;  204;  242;  274;  275  c/. 

93:129  c/. 

96:  103;  105  cf;  108  c/;  190  c/; 

277  cf. 
98:  296  c/;  315. 
100:  137;  246. 

101 :  166  cf;  167  cf;  186  cf;  229  cf. 
102:  165. 

103:  139;238c/;vi. 
104:  226;  238;  255  c/. 
105:  169;  250  c/. 
106:  170;285;2S6. 
109:  140;  162;  250. 
no:  277;  287  c/;  310. 
in:  429. 
112:239. 
113:  141. 
114:  163. 
115:  335  c/. 
116: 171. 
117:  175. 
119:  318  c/. 


690 

APPENDIX 

No.  120:  142  c/;  176;  259. 

No.      9:  49. 

121 :256  c/;  261. 

10:  71  cf. 

124:  470. 

11:  71  cf;  164  c/. 

126:  299;  303  c/;  340. 

13:  63  c/;  125  c/;  164. 

127:  335. 

14:  53  cf;  69;  98. 

128:429  c/. 

17:  57;  61  cf;  263  cf. 

129:  430. 

18:  84  cf;  89  cf;  97;  101  cf;  125 

131:  430. 

cf;  158  cf. 

133:430. 

19:  48  cf;  54  cf;  69;  574  cf. 

137:  339;  353;  431. 

20:  61;  234. 

138:  344. 

21:  60  c/;  62. 

139:  286. 

22:  65  cf. 

141:  v. 

24:  64  cf;  65  cf. 

143:  344;  353. 

27:71. 

144:  303. 

30:  84  cf. 

145:  360. 

31 :70  c/;  91c/;  107. 

146:  325  c/. 

32:  85  cf. 

147:  325  c/;  350;  418. 

35:208  c/. 

148:  176;  286;  325 

cf;  350. 

37:  87  cf. 

149:  325  c/;  419. 

38:  270. 

155:  173;  174;  286; 

325 

cf. 

39:  80. 

157:  350. 

40:  80  c/;  86;  220. 

159:  171;  172;  184. 

4i:212. 

Page  188:  286. 

42:  134;  187;  246;  247;  492  cf. 
43:  212  cf. 

BELGIAN   GRAY 

PAPI 

44:90  c/;  107  cf;  212  cf. 

45:  167  cf. 

No.      6:  209  cf. 

46:  136  cf. 

9:  416  cf. 

47:  108;  111;  223. 

11:  320. 

48:  136;  187;  246. 

12:  321;  322;  386; 

404 

cf. 

49:  223  cf;  225;  255;  257  cf. 

15:  323;  416. 

50:  112;  139  c/;  225;  257  c/. 

20:  324;  420. 

51:  256;  264. 

21:  325; 420. 

52:  141  cf. 

22:327. 

53:  231. 

24:  327;  328;  436 

"/• 

55:  262. 

25:362  c/. 

56:  256  cf;  263. 

28:  435  cf. 

57:  145  cf. 

35:  416  cf. 

59:  350. 

38:  439;  vi. 

40:  439. 

SERVIAN   BLUE  BOOK 

44:  440. 

79:  317. 

No.      2:45. 
8:53. 

AUSTRIAN   RED 

boo: 

11:  89. 

16:  68  cf. 

No.     2:49. 

17:43. 

4:50. 

20:  45;  156  cf. 

6:  267. 

22:  45  cf. 

8:  52  cf. 

23:42. 

No. 


APPENDIX 

25:  43;  91  cf;  107 

28:  461. 

30:  50;  68  cf. 

31:  48. 

35:  55  c/;  199  c/. 

36:  129. 

cf. 

No.    40:  65  cf. 
41:  80  c/. 
44:  100  cf 
45=  87  cf. 

47:  100. 

52:  42. 

691 


INDEX 


INDEX 


In  order  to  avoid  a  confusion  'of  unimportant  references,  in  certain  instances  where 
the  names  and  titles  of  the  principal  diplomats  have  been  included  in  this  index,  no  ac- 
companying reference  to  the  pages  of  the  volume  has  been  added. 


Abyssinia:  11,  24. 

Acland,  Parliamentary  Under-Sec- 
retary for  Foreign  Affairs:  435  n. 

Adriatic:  21,  28-29,  32. 

iEgean  Islands:  26-27. 

iEgean  Sea:  30,  123. 

Aerenthal :  20. 

Afghanistan:  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment concerning,  548-549. 

Agadir  incident  (1911):  22-24;  effect 
on  Germany,  35;  Grey  on  English 
policy  regarding,  289-290. 

Aggression :  condemnation  of,  14  n, 
189-490  n,  4S9;  difficulty  in  deter- 
mining what  constitutes,  459-460; 
Italy  says  Triple  Alliance  does  not 
cover,  470;  significance  of  Italy's 
stand  as  showing  Austro-German, 
472-473;  forced  on  Germany  be- 
cause of  hostage  policy  towards 
France,  488;  fundamental  reasons 
for  German,  505-508;  England's 
policy  had  nothing  of,  511-512  n; 
aim  of  diplomacy  to  force  upon 
opponent,  521;  territorial,  denied 
by  United  States  (1898)  and  Aus- 
tria (1914),  585. 

Agram:  trial  at,  43  n,  125. 

Albania:  made  independent  state  by 
powers,  28-29,  149;  designs  of 
Italy  and  Austria  on,  32,  41 ;  ques- 
tion, how  settled  (1913),  229. 

Albert,  King  of  Belgium:  telegram  of, 
to  King  George,  355-358;  World 
interview  with,  regarding  Anglo- 
Belgian  conversations,  407;  de- 
fense of  Belgian  neutrality,  407  n. 

Alexander,  King  of  Servia:  30,  147. 

Alexander,  Prince  of  Servia:  S2;  tele- 
graphs Tsar,  99-100. 

Algeciras  Conference:  12-18;  Grey 
on  English  policy  at  time  of,  289- 
290;  Italy  at,  457. 

Algiers:  11. 

Allen,  Clifford:  England's  reason  for 
entering  war,  314-315  n. 


Alsace-Lorraine:  effect  upon  rela- 
tions of  France  and  Germany,  13- 
15,  503;  inhabitants  of,  forbidden 
to  cross  frontier  (July  1914),  170; 
proposal  (1870)  to  neutralize, 
453  n. 

Ambassador:  see  English,  French, 
German,  etc.,  Ambassador. 

America  (see  also  United  States) :  and 
the  issues  of  the  European  War, 
655-660. 

American  affairs:  Anglo-American 
cooperation  in  regard  to,  542. 

American  Association  for  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  publications 
of:64n,  130  n,  445  n. 

American  Delegation  at  the  First 
Hague  Conference :  declaration  of, 
concerning  Monroe  Doctrine,  539. 

American  Journal  of  International 
Law:  viii,  541  n,  544  n,  551,  572. 

Andrassy,  Count:  interpellation  on 
Austro-Servian  situation,  46. 

Anglo-American  cooperation:  in  re- 
gard to  American  affairs,  542. 

Anglo-American  treaty:  concerning 
arbitration,  543. 

Anglo-Belgian  agreement:  no  reality 
to,  405-406. 

Anglo-Belgian  conversations:  395- 
411;  nature  of  (Munroe-Smith), 
405  n;  World  interview  with  King 
of  Belgium,  407:  statement  of 
Belgian  Government  regarding, 
(transmitted  by  Havenith),  407- 
408;  German  Minister  informed 
of,  by  Belgian  Government,  407- 
408;  Chancellor  comments  on, 
455  n. 

Anglo-French  Entente :  formation  of, 
12;  disturbs  Germany,  15-16; 
strength  of,  shown  at  Algeciras, 
17;  England  will  not  support  if 
France  rejects  reasonable  German 
proposal,  233;  Poincare's  letter  to 
King  George,  276;  Grey-Cambon 


696 


INDEX 


letters  1912,  283-284;  Cambon- 
Grey  conversations,  285-288; 
Grey's  speech  in  Commons  Aug.  3, 
288-292,  345-352;  cooperative  dis- 
position of  Anglo-French  fleets, 
498;  extent  to  which  England 
bound  to  aid  France,  527. 

Anglo-German  agreement  (see  also 
Anglo-German  relations) :  Asquith 
remarks,  282  n;  obstacle  to,  511  n. 

Anglo-German  conflict:  was  not 
inevitable,  488  n. 

Anglo-German  relations:  Delbriick 
predicts  war,  560;  price  of  Anglo- 
German  Entente  (Delbriick),  561; 
secret  treaty  of  1898  relative  to 
the  eventual  dismemberment  of 
the  Portuguese  Colonies,  refer- 
ences to,  562-563;  colonial  devel- 
opment and  removal  of  conflicting 
interests  (Johnston),  566;  com- 
mercial and  economic  competition 
(Rathgen),  567-568;  Bethmann- 
Hollweg's  speech  in  Reichstag 
regarding,  568-569;  Asquith's 
Cardiff  speech  concerning,  568. 

Anglo- Japanese  Alliance:  12,  498. 

Anglo-Russian  agreement,  concern- 
ing Persia,  17-18,  498,  546-548. 

Anglo-Russian  Entente:  292  n,  556- 
557. 

Antwerp:  England's  intention  to  use 
as  base,  410. 

Apponyi,  Count  Albert:  Criticism  of 
Servia,  588. 

Arbitration:  suggested  by  Servia,  64; 
Sazonof  thinks  Servia  may  pro- 
pose, 201 ;  Germany  thinks  Grey's 
conference  equivalent  to,  208;  Saz- 
onof modified  formula,  constitutes 
powers  arbitrators,  238  n;  obliga- 
tory, Germany's  attitude  towards, 
503;  Biberstein  opposes  obliga- 
tory, at  Hague,  513;  Anglo-Ameri- 
can treaty,  543;  offered  by  Servia 
(1914)  and  Spain  (1898),  584. 

Areopagus:  German  Chancellor  ob- 
jects to,  210;  a  European,  230; 
judgment  of,  272-273. 

Armament  of  Powers :  increase  of,  35. 

Asia:  agreement  of  England  and 
Russia  concerning  their  interests 
in,  546-550. 

Asia  Minor:  20,  123. 

Asquith,  English  Premier:  Cardiff 
speech,    282  n,    569;    statement, 


July  31,  regaiding  Russian  mobil- 
ization, 335;  the  Cabinet  crisis, 
341-342;  342  n;  Shaw  on,  356  n; 
England's  Entente  policy  and 
Anglo-German  agreement:  511- 
512,  512  n. 

Assassination:  see  regicide. 

Associated  Press:  365  n;  Grey  au- 
thorizes statement  (Jan.  27)  com- 
menting on  Chancellor's  interview 
with,  406-407,  407  n. 

Atlantic  Monthly:  185-186  n;  275  n; 
405  n;  415  n;  488  n. 

Austria  (see  also,  Austrian  ultima- 
tum —  Austro-Servian  conflict  — 
Balkans  —  Conversations  —  Lo- 
calization —  Mediation  —  Mobil- 
ization) :  obtains  administrative 
control  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
(1878),  7-8;  joins  with  Germany 
in  Dual  Alliance  (1879),  7-8; 
540-541;  racial  and  political  ele- 
ments of,  8,  33;  joins  with  Ger- 
many and  Italy  in  Triple  Alliance 
(1883),  8;  rivalry  with  Russia  in 
Balkans,  19,  91-94,  96,  147-149; 
annexes  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
(1908),  20,  30-31,  76  n;  Entente 
powers  resent  annexation  of  Bos- 
nia by,  21,  457,  520;  threatened 
by  Servia's  increased  strength, 
29-35,  89,  91  n,  93,  123-124, 
127-128,  148-149;  "Pig  War," 
30,  147;  designs  of,  upon  Alba- 
nia, 32,  41;  designs  on  Salonika, 
524;  Archduke  of,  assassinated 
(June  28)  1914,  34,  155;  intends 
war  on  Servia  (1913)  with  Ger- 
many's consent,  35;  presents  ul- 
timatum to  Servia  (July  23), 
1914,  36-37;  prepares  public  for 
ultimatum  through  press,  44-45  n, 

*  46-47  n,  50,  74-75  n,  88-89  n,  92, 
156;  lays  on  Russia  responsibility 
for  a  possible  European  war,  50- 
51;  assumes  Servia  responsible  to 
her  alone  and  not  to  powers,  52, 
61-62  n,  107-108;  furnishes  Eng- 
land with  special  explanation  of 
ultimatum,  56-58;  refuses  to  ex- 
tend time  limit  of  ultimatum,  61, 
234  n;  rejects  Servia's  reply,  65, 
78-81;  popular  feeling  in,  against 
Servia,  65,  85,  88  and  n,  91-92; 
rejoinder  of,  to  Servian  note,  65- 
75;  79;  begins  military  prepara- 


INDEX 


697 


tions,  not  operations,  80-81 ;  urged 
by  powers  to  accept  Servian  reply 
as  basis  for  discussion,  81-83;  pur- 
pose of,  regarding  Servia,  84-85, 
89-95,  97,  101,  104,  105,  106,  128, 
139,  153,  154,  223-224;  believes 
Russia  will  yield  (July  26),  468; 
declares  war  on  Servia  (July  28), 
85-89,  100;  action  of,  against  Ser- 
via for  prestige,  91-92,  107,  213; 
public  opinion  of  against  Russia, 
103,  105;  shares  with  Russia  con- 
trol of  Balkan  matters,  147,  188; 
hegemony  of,  in  the  Balkans,  188- 
189;  refuses  mediation  on  basis  of 
Servian  note,  212;  refuses  direct 
conversations  with  Russia  con- 
cerning Servia,  219^222,  226; 
assumes  a  more  conciliatory  atti- 
tude, 223-224,  226;  exchange  of 
views  with  Russia,  225-226;  did 
not  "bang  the  door,"  226,  231; 
after  rupture  Servia  must  also  in- 
demnize  Austria,  234  n,  263;  prob- 
ably not  to  be  satisfied  even  with 
Servia's  complete  acceptance  of 
ultimatum  (Grey),  234-235;  Saz- 
onof's  remark  concerning  rupture 
of  conversations  by,  243  n;  unjust 
to  accuse  of  dilatory  tactics,  251; 
agrees  to  mediation,  252-264 ;  Saz- 
onof  emphasizes  importance  of 
arresting  action  against  Servia  by, 
257;  considers  Grey's  proposal  for 
mediation  between  Austria  and 
Servia,  258;  diplomacy  of,  de- 
scribed by  Viviani,  258-259;  might 
give  Servia  or  power  speaking  for 
Servia  her  terms,  259;  agreement 
with  Russia  almost  in  sight,  261, 
263;  could  not  be  expected  to  put 
off  attack  on  Servia  (Bunsen),  262; 
and  Russia,  agreement  of,  not  in- 
terrupted by  German  ultimatum, 
263;  limits  of  concessions  of,  to 
Russia,  263;  Russia  could  not  al- 
low invasion  of  Servia  by,  264;  op- 
posed to  compromise,  266-267  n; 
attitude  of,  toward  mediation, 
271-273;  believes  England  will 
remain  neutral,  274;  appeals  to 
England  to  prevent  war,  278;  de- 
clares war  on  Russia  Aug.  5,  350  n; 
Italy  considers  action  of,  against 
Servia  aggressive,  470;  to  blame  for 
disregarding  diplomatic  procedure, 


483;  measures  of  force  justifiable 
against  Servia,  483;  threat  of,  to 
mobilize  as  excuse  for  Russian 
mobilization,  487  n;  responsibility 
of,  for  war  less  than  Germany's, 
491;  claims  to  use  "peace  power" 
towards  Servia,  501-502;  did  pre- 
cipitate the  war?  519;  intentions  of, 
concerning  Servian  independence, 
525;  action  in  1914  compared  with 
action  of  the  United  States  in 
1898,  579,  583-586. 

Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin: 
see  Count  Szogyeny. 

Austrian  Ambassador  at  London :  see 
Mensdorff. 

Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris:  see 
Szecsen. 

Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg: see  Count  Szapary. 

Austrian  Ambassador  to  United 
States:  see  Dumba. 

Austrian  Councilor,  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs:  see  Macchio. 

Austrian  General  Secretary  of  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs:  see 
Macchio. 

Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade:  see 
Geisl  von  Geislingen. 

Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs: see  Berchtold. 

Austrian  Red  Book:  substantiates 
statements  in  British  White  Pa- 
per, v. 

Austrian  Ultimatum :  (see  also  Austro- 
Servian  conflict  —  Localization  — 
Servian  Note):  delivered  July  23, 
1914,  33-37;  secrecy  surrounding 
drafting  of,  41-47;  tenor  of,  known 
by  von  Tchirsky,  42;  did  Tchirsky 
telegraph  to  Kaiser,  529;  foreseen 
by  Servia,  42-43  n,  45,  47-48;  ac- 
tivities of  Austrian  press  preced- 
ing, 44-45  n;  46-47  and  n,  50  n, 
74-75  n,  88-89  n,  92,  156;  drawn 
up  by  Forgach,  42  n;  Italy  not 
informed  of  preparation  of,  45, 
120-121,  467-468;  not  communi- 
cated to  England  or  Russia  until 
day  after  its  communication  to 
Servia,  48,  51,  60;  terms  not 
known  to  Germany,  but  Germany 
back  of,  119-125,  520-521;  as- 
sumes Servia  responsible  to  Aus- 
tria alone  and  not  to  powers,  52, 
61-62  n,  107-108;  terms  of,  52-53; 


698 


INDEX 


text  of,  574-576;  charges  of, 
against  Servia  not  proved,  53,  98; 
time  limit  of,  53-54, 56;  diplomatic 
consensus  of  opinion  regarding, 
54-56,  58-59,  64,  70-71  n,  98,  106, 
119;  effect  of,  on  neutral  sympa- 
thy, 55  n;  a  demarche  with  time 
limit  or  an  ultimatum?  56-58,  86-  I 
87;  efforts  of  powers  to  secure  ex-  j 
tension  of  time  limit  of,  59-61; 
Entente  powers  influence  Servia  to 
make  conciliatory  reply  to,  62-64 ; 
Servia's  reply  to,  rejected  by  Aus- 
tria, 65;  correlation  of,  with  Ser- 
via's reply  and  Austrian  rejoinder, 
64-75 ;  sixth  demand  of,  supported 
by  precedent,  72  n,  76  n;  Fischer- 
auer  on,  76-77  n;  Lloyd  George  re- 
marks upon,  586;  inevitable  mobili- 
zation following,  186;  Berchtold 
refuses  mediation  concerning,  212; 
discussed  by  Sazonof,  214;  pro- 
posed modification  of,  214;  Berch- 
told does  not  agree  to  discuss  mod- 
ification of,  255 ;  Berchtold  author- 
izes Schebeko  to  give  explanation 
about,  257;  Sazonof  announces 
readiness  of  Austria  to  discuss, 
257;  Austria  agrees  to  submit 
terms  to  mediation  (Bunsen),  261; 
Austria  not  willing  to  modify,  263 ; 
Servia  should  have  accepted  (San 
Giuliano),  462;  not  intended  to  be 
accepted,  519;  affected  Servian 
independence,  525. 

Austrian  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs:  see  Forgach. 

Austro-German  Alliance:  treaty  of 
Oct.  7,  1879,  540. 

Austro-Servian  conflict:  Russia's  in- 
terest in,  96-104;  Dumba  on,  587. 

Avarna,  Due  d',  Italian  Ambassador 
at  Vienna:  kept  in  dark  about 
Austrian  ultimatum,  45-46,  468. 

Aviators,  French:  alleged  violation 
by,  of  German  territory,  173-174 
n,  325. 

Avlona:  designs  of  Italy  and  Austria 
on,  32. 

Bagdad  Railway:  20,  123. 

Balance  of  Power:  Dual  Alliance 
helps  to  effect,  9;  reestablished  by 
Dual  Alliance,  15;  between  En- 
tente and  Albania,  effect  on  peace 
of  Europe,  15;  affected  not  merely 


by  annexation  of  territory  (Mun- 
roe  Smith),  99  n;  reaffirmation  of, 
276;  English  policy  of,  313-314; 
displacement  of,  cause  of  the  war, 
476-479;  Germany  checked  by 
English  policy  of,  511  n.  Belgium 
and  the  balance  of  power  (Usher), 
597. 

Balance  of  power  in  Balkans:  Aus- 
trian assurances  regarding,  84-85, 
97,  101,  139;  Russian  fears  regard- 
ing, 1057108. 

Balin:  criticizes  Grey,  354  n. 

Balkans  (see  also  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina —  Bulgaria  —  Servia  — 
Turkey):  general  concern  of  Eu- 
rope, 4,  195-197,  519;  Russian 
and  Austrian  ambitions  in,  19,  91- 
94,  96,  147-149,  482;  attitude  of 
France  and  England  toward,  21, 
29,  31, 147, 195-196,  289,  293-295; 
bi-partisan  control  of,  147,  188, 
195;  Bismarck's  policy  regarding, 
485  n;  unite  against  Turkey,  26- 
27;  Treaty  of  London  (1913),  27; 
quarrel  over  spoils,  28-29;  Treaty 
of  Bukharest  (1913),  29;  how  af- 
fected by  Balkan  wars,  78;  Aus- 
trian assurances  regarding  balance 
of  power  in,  84-85,  97,  101,  139; 
Russia's  interpretation  of  Austrian 
assurances,  105-108,  254  n;  Eng- 
lish position  regarding  question  of, 
278. 

Balkan  Wars:  26-34. 

Bank  of  England:  308. 

Barnardiston,  Lieutenant  Colonel: 
395^.;  perfidious  announcements 
of,  398. 

Barrere,  French  Ambassador  to  Italy. 

Beer,  George  Louis:  answers  Dern- 
burg  on  "  Willy-Georgie-Nicky" 
correspondence,  335  n. 

Belgian  Documents  (see  also  Anglo- 
Belgian  Conversations) :  method 
of  publication  of,  399  n. 

Belgian  Gray  Paper:  viii. 

Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin:  see  Bey- 
ens,  Greindl. 

Belgian  Minister  at  Washington:  see 
Havenith. 

Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  Davignan. 

Belgian  neutrality  (see  also  Neutrali- 
zation —  Neutrality) :  established 
(1831)  by  Concert  of  Powers,  5-6; 


INDEX 


699 


international  treaties  (1831,  1839, 
1870)  regulating,  GOO,  602;  re- 
spected during  Franco-Prussian 
War,  6-7 ;  English  position  regard- 
ing, 287;  part  of  Germany's  bid 
for  England's  neutrality,  297-303, 
332  n,  353-364;  affects  English 
opinion,  300-301;  diplomatic  im- 
portance to  England  of  question 
of,  313-316,  332  n;  Henry  James 
on  violation  of,  314;  England, 
France,  Germany  and  Belgium 
regarding,  316-323,  332  n;  Eng- 
land's inquiry  relative  to,  316- 
328;  Germany's  reason  for  not 
stating  attitude,  317,  321,  404; 
Jagow  on,  321-322,  362-364;  Ger- 
many's ultimatum  and  Belgium's 
reply,  323-328,  361-362;  violation 
of,  casus  belli  for  England,  352- 
370;  violated  by  Germany  (Aug. 
4),  362-363;  "scrap  of  paper" 
(Bethmann-Hollweg),  365-366; 
(David  Jayne  Hill),  382;  Grey's 
statement  (1913)  regarding,  401- 
402;  England's  intention  of  violat- 
ing, 396-397,  401,  402-405;  Grey 
gives  no  assurance  that  France  will 
respect  (Delbriick),  405  n;  right  to 
defend  without  appeal  from  Bel- 
gium, 405;  King  Albert's  defense 
of,  407  n;  attitude  of  Holland  to- 
wards defense  of,  411;  alleged  vio- 
lations of,  415-422;  French  viola- 
tions of,  415-422;  France  not 
likely  to  violate,  417-418;  right  of 
Belgium  to  defend,  431-441;  Grey 
calls  upon  Belgium  to  defend,  435; 
and  English  intervention  (Beth- 
mann-Hollweg), 443-445;  did 
France  plan  violation  of,  520;  no 
evidence  of  violations  of,  alleged 
by  Germany,  526;  parliamentary 
debates  regarding  (text),  615  ff. 
Anglo-Belgian  military  prepara- 
tions to  defend  (text  of  secret  docu- 
ments), 626;  documents  published 
by  Germany  relative  to  violation 
of,  by  England  and  Belgium,  631, 
634. 

Belgian  preparations:  against  Ger- 
man invasion,  effects  of,  411- 
415. 

Belgian  resistance:  reasons  for,  434; 
necessary  to  preserve  independ- 
ence, 453. 


Belgian  Secretary  General  to  Minis- 
try of  Foreign  Affairs:  see  Elst. 

Belgian  spy  system:  Barnardiston 
urges  adoption  of,  395  n. 

Belgium  (see  also  Belgian  neutrality 
—  Belgian  resistance  —  mobiliza- 
tion, Belgian,  etc.):  Richelieu's 
proposal  regarding,  595;  united  to 
Holland  by  Congress  of  Vienna 
(1815),  5;  a  "buffer"  or  "stopper" 
state,  5  n;  revolts  from  Holland 
(1830),  5;  England  wishes  to  main- 
tain independence  of,  5;  made  per- 
petually neutral  by  Concert  of 
Powers  (1831),  6;  French  designs 
upon,  befole  Franco-Prussian  War, 
5-6;  mobilization  of,  310  n;  hostile 
acts  of,  317;  to  maintain  neutral- 
ity, 319-320;  relations  with  Ger- 
many, 322-323,  409-410;  at  the 
Hague  Conference,  322,  409;  Ger- 
man ultimatum  to,  323-324;  an- 
swers German  demands,  326-327; 
Germany  violates,  362-363;  mean- 
ing of  Gladstone's  statement  re- 
garding, 386;  changed  conditions, 
effect  on  treaty  of  (1839),  387; 
obligation  of  United  States  to 
protect,  391;  England's  plans  for 
the  invasion  of,  398;  warns  Ger- 
man Minister  against  unauthor- 
ized conversations,  407-408;  Min- 
ister of,  at  Washington,  transmits 
statement  regarding  Anglo-Bel- 
gian conversations,  407-408;  right 
to  defend  neutralization,  431-441; 
and  the  balance  of  power  (Usher) , 
597;  England's  position  in  regard 
to  (Grey),  620 Jf.;  Gladstone's  let- 
ter to  Bright  concerning  incorpo- 
ration of,  by  France,  624. 

Belgium,  the  case  of  (see  also  Anglo- 
Belgian  Conversations):  624-631. 

Belgium,  invasion  of:  duty  of  all 
states  to  prevent,  390-391;  Eng- 
land's plans  for,  398;  list  of  Ger- 
man excuses,  402;  violation  of  in- 
ternational law  (Bethmann-Holl- 
weg), 445;  France  not  intending, 
448 ;  Germany  has  another  feasible 
plan,  449;  compared  to  trespass, 
452;  causes  influencing  Germany 
to,  480-481;  France  intends  (Del- 
briick), 488  n;  forced  on  Germany 
because  of  "hostage"  policy  to- 
wards France,  488;  strategic  con- 


700 


INDEX 


siderations  leading  Germany  to 
make  (Delbriick),  488  n;  why  Ger- 
many provoked  England  by,  522; 
not  necessary,  522;  England's  atti- 
tude towards,  526;  popular  error 
concerning,  in  England  and  Ger- 
many, 526;  effect  upon  England, 
as  compared  with  effect  of  inva- 
sion of  Holland,  526. 

Belgium,  King  of :  see  Albert,  King  of 
Belgium. 

Belgrade:  bombardment  of,  140,  244; 
induced  to  yield  by  powers,  231; 
occupation  of,  236-239 ;  mediation 
after  occupation  of,  236-239. 

Below-Saleske,  von,  German  Minis- 
ter at  Brussels:  announces  that 
Germany  will  employ  force  against 
Belgium,  439. 

Benckendorff,  Count,  Russian  Am- 
bassador at  London. 

Benedetti :  proposes  partition  of  Bel- 
gium, 6;  plan  of,  to  incorporate 
Belgium  in  France  (Gladstone), 
624. 

Benton,  William  S.:  76  n. 

Berchtold,  Count,  Austrian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs:  on  Treaty  of 
London  (1913),  32  n;  tells  of  Aus- 
trian demarche,  57;  on  Servian 
note,  79;  Austrian  "prestige  en- 
gaged," 107;  instructions  of,  to 
German  representatives  (July  28), 
131-132;  refuses  mediation  pro- 
posal, 212;  urges  Germany  to 
threaten  Russia  to  arrest  mobiliza- 
tion, 246  n;  authorizes  Szapary  to 
give  explanations  about  Austrian 
ultimatum,  257. 

Berthelot,  of  the  French  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs:  Germany  aims  at 
war  (July  27),  161. 

Bertie,  Sir  Francis,  English  Ambas- 
sador at  Paris. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  German 
Chancellor:  efforts  of,  to  preach 
peace  at  Vienna,  114-115;  speech 
of,  in  Reichstag  (Aug.  4),  130  n, 
145-146,  173;  announces  danger  of 
war,  138,  141;  tells  of  Emperor's 
mediation,  141;  counsel  to  Aus- 
tria, 233;  blames  rupture  on  Rus- 
sian mobilization,  242;  England 
responsible  for  war,  278  n;  English 
replies,  278  n,  282  n;  policy  of,  to 
effect   better   understanding   be- 


tween England  and  Germany, 
280-282,  364-366;  bids  for  Eng- 
land's neutrality,  297-299,  307; 
asks  French  reply  on  Belgium, 
317-318;  Belgian  neutrality,  321, 
416;  telegram  on  French  neutral- 
ity, 329;  states  Germany's  posi- 
tion regarding  Luxemburg,  338; 
"just  for  a  scrap  of  paper,"  365- 
366;  Grey's  commentary  on  press 
interview  with,  406-407  n;  remark 
in  Reichstag  about  England  and 
Belgian  neutrality  (speech  Dec.  2), 
443; text  of  speech,  568-569;  inva- 
sion of  Belgium,  violation  of  inter- 
national law,  445;  translation  of 
remarks  of,  concerning  necessity, 
445-446  n;  remarks  concerning 
observance  of  treaties  compared 
with  Bismarck,  453  n;  "scrap  of 
paper"  remark  causes  unfavorable 
impression  in  U.S.,  454  n;  remarks 
on  Grey  statement  of  England's 
intentions  toward  Belgium,  455  n; 
England's  policy  to  check  Ger- 
many through  balance  of  power, 
511  n.  (Speech  Dec.  2)  England's 
policy  prevents  agreement,  568- 
569. 

Bey  ens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin: 
disbelief  of,  regarding  Germany's 
ignorance  of  Austrian  ultimatum, 
121;  interview  with  Jagow,  436- 
438. 

Bieberstein,  Baron,  Marschall  von: 
diplomacy  of,  at  Constantinople, 
20,  22-23  n,  505;  opposes  obliga- 
tory arbitration  at  Hague,  513. 

Bienvenu-Martin,  French  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Minister  of  Justice:  believes  Ger- 
many is  trying  to  alienate  France 
and  Russia,  153-154;  sums  up 
situation  (July  29),  154-155;  on 
attitude  of  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria (July  27),  160-161;  concern- 
ing French  representations  at  St. 
Petersburg,  163-164. 

Biological  test :  states  favored  by,  452. 

Bipartisan  control  of  Balkan  affairs: 

'    195. 

Birth  control:  Germany's  view  of, 
506-507. 

Bismarck:  diplomacy  regarding  pro- 
posed partition  of  Belgium,  6;  pol- 
icy of,  toward  Austria,  7-8;  speech 


INDEX 


701 


(Feb.  6,  188S),  533  jr.;  distrust  of 
policy  of  settlement  colonies,  13; 
against  aggression,  14  n,  189- 
190  n,  489;  on  mobilization,  135  n; 
"le  plus  sage  cede,"  247  n;  re- 
marks about  observing  treaties 
compared  with  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg's,  453  ft;  anticipated  action  of 
Italy,  472;  evil  consequences  of 
example  of,  493-495,  514. 

Black  Sea:  Bulgarian  forts  on,  30. 

Bokhara:  93. 

Bombardment  of  Belgrade:  140,  244. 

Bompard,  French  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople. 

Bonar  Law,  A:  pledges  support  to 
Asquith,  343. 

Boppe,  French  Minister  to  Servia. 

Boschkovitch,  Servian  Minister  at 
London^-- 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  falls  under 
administrative  control  of  Austria 
(1878),  7-8;  Austria  annexes 
(1908),  19-22,  25,  30-31;  Entente 
powers  object  to  annexation  of,  21, 
457,  520;  Turkish  sympathies  of 
(1908),  20;  designs  of  Servia  on, 
30,  66-67,  124,  147-148;  Young- 
Turk  movement  to  recover,  76  ft. 

Bourse  (Berlin) :  156-157. 

Bresslau,  Harry:  537  n. 

Bridges,  Lieutenant-Colonel:  395 Jf. 

Bright:  Gladstone's  letter  to,  624- 
626. 

British  Empire:  classification  of  the 
possessions  of,  497. 

British  White  Paper:  veracity  of,  v, 
285-286  n,  335  ft. 

British:  see  English. 

Bronewsky,  Russian  Charge  a" 'Af- 
faires at  Berlin:  157. 

Buch,  von,  German  Minister  to 
Luxemburg. 

Buchanan,  Sir  George,  British  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg:  Russian 
mobilization  means  declaration  of 
war  by  Germany,  133 ;  urges  Rus- 
sia to  defer  order  for  mobilization, 
186. 

Budapest:  46. 

"Buffer"  State  (see  also  "Stopper 
State"):  Belgium  to  serve  as,  5  n. 

Bulgaria:  20,  26-33,  94,  124,  149; 
secret  appendix  to  treaty  of  friend- 
ship and  alliance  with  Servia, 
572-574. 


Billow,  Prince  von,  Ex-Chancellor  of 
Germany:  the  Triple  Alliance,  9  n, 
478-479  n;  Franco-Russian  and 
German-Russian  relations,  16  n; 
Germany's  interest  in  Morocco, 
23  n;  Germany  and  the  Near  East, 
27-28  ft;  Italy  and  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, 457,  471-472. 

Bunsen,  Sir  Maurice:  British  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna:  account  of  events 
preceding  war,  42-47 ;  England  has 
no  sympathy  for  Servia,  127  n; 
Austria  agrees  to  submit  ultima- 
tum to  mediation,  261;  Sazonof 
accepts  mediation  if  Servia  is  not 
invaded,  261;  Austria  could  not 
be  expected  to  put  off  attack  on 
Servia,  262;  statement  at  variance 
with  Austrian  Red  Book,  262. 

Bureaucracy:  efficient,  of  Germany, 
514. 

Burns:  resigns  from  Cabinet,  341- 
342  ft. 

Cabinet,  English:  crisis  in,  311, 
340  ft,  355  ft;  responsibility  of,  to 
Parliament  (George  Louis  Beer), 
335  n;  changes  in,  341-343  n. 

Caillaux:  trial  of  Mme.,  36. 

Cairo:  11. 

Camarilla,  court :  of  military  authori- 
ties, possibility  of,  140. 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  Ambassador 
at  Berlin:  remarks  German  efforts 
to  explain  ignorance  of  Austrian 
ultimatum,  121;  on  situation  July 
24,  125;  distrust  of  Germany,  161- 
162;  suggests  formula,  209;  sug- 
gestion for  mediation  after  Aus- 
trian occupation  of  Belgrade,  236- 
239;  German  ultimatum  signifi- 
cant of  bellicose  policy,  260. 

Cambon,  Paul,  French  Ambassador 
at  London:  on  Austrian  ultimatum, 
55;  criticism  of  views  of,  200;  sug- 
gests] deferring  proposal  of  medi- 
ation to  jRussia,  200;  asks  Grey 
about  violation  of  Luxemburg, 
338 ;  violation  of  Belgium  would  be 
considered  a  casus  belli  by  Eng- 
land, 353;  negotiations  of,  with 
Grey  regarding  unprovoked  attack 
on  France  by  a  third  power,  283- 
288,  290-291. 

Cambon  suggestion  of  mediation 
after  Austria's  occupation  of  Bel- 


702 


INDEX 


grade:  236-239;  why  so  desig- 
nated, 236  n;  Jagow  thinks  pos- 
sible to  accept  if  Russia  does,  236- 
237 ;  Germany  forwards  to  Vienna, 
237;  Viviani  urges  Russia  to  ad- 
here to,  238-239;  Viviani  says 
Russia  ready  to  accept,  259. 

Cape  Colony:  5,  11. 

Casablanca  Affair  (1908) :  18-19,  22. 

Casus  foederis:  459;  Italy  only  bound 
if  consulted  beforehand,  468;  Italy 
says  Triple  Alliance  does  not  in- 
clude aggressive  war,  470;  under 
Triple  Alliance  Italy  considers 
(1913)  aggression  on  Servia  does 
not  constitute,  470-471;  no,  for 
Italy  when  England  involved,  473; 
for  Italy  under  Triple  Alliance, 
490  to. 

Causes  of  the  war:  suggested  and 
alleged,  475-476;  significance  of 
variety  of  alleged,  476;  what  we 
mean  by,  479;  immediate  causes, 
479,  491;  voluntary  or  rational 
as  opposed  to  irrational,  479-480; 
determining  causes,  491-495;  re- 
sponsibility of  William  II,  521. 

Chancellor,  German:  see  Bethmann- 
Hollweg. 

Chimay,  Trouee  of:  413  to. 

China  (see  also  Manchuria):  12,  13, 
24;  collective  intervention,  501; 
treaty  of  Japan  and  Russia  guar- 
anteeing integrity  of,  and  "Open 
Door"  in,  550. 

Chirol,  Sir  Valentine:  224  to. 

Chronology:  667-685. 

Ciganovic :  49  to,  74. 

Citation  of  documents:  686^. 

Cities:  determine  national  attitude 
towards  peace,  188  to. 

Clarendon,  Lord:  338-339. 

Coblenz:  173  to. 

Collective  action:  204  to;  purpose  of, 
501. 

Collective  guaranty:  see  Guaranty- 
Luxemburg. 

Collective  note  of  October  8,  1912: 
27. 

Cologne:  169-170. 

Colonial  policy  of  England:  4-5. 

Colonies:  Germany  desires,  504. 

Commercial  competition :  of  England 
and  Germany,  567-568. 

Commons,  House  of:  freedom  of 
action,  291. 


Communique  of  Baron  Kuhlmann: 
360-361. 

Competition:  commercial,  of  Eng- 
land and  Germany,  567-568. 

Compromise:  Sazonof  thinks  can 
reach,  at  London,  256;  Russia 
ready  to  accept  any  reasonable, 
262;  failure  to  reach,  264-267; 
Giesl  opposed  to,  266  to;  Jagow 
says   Sazonof   more   inclined   to, 

266  to;  importance  of,  in  diplo- 
macy, 266-267 ;  Austria  opposed  to, 

267  to;  treaty  of  peace  will  be,  515. 
Concert  of  Powers:  formation  of,  3- 

4;  ratifies  Treaty  of  Vienna  1815, 
3,  4;  serves  as  shock-absorber, 
4;  establishes  Belgian  neutrality 
(1831),  6;  effect  of  Dual  Alliance 
upon  balance  of  power,  9;  divides 
into  Triple  Alliance  and  Triple 
Entente,  7-18;  position  of  Eng- 
land in,  9;  weakness  of,  27;  estab- 
lishes independent  Albania,  28; 
restrains  Servia,  31-32;  settlement 
of  Balkan  affairs,  195;  Italy  takes 
place  in,  425. 

Conference:  of  the  powers  proposed 
by  Grey,  197-204,  206-207;  Saz- 
onof proposes  to  parallel  "conver- 
sations" by,  221 ;  urged  by  powers, 
229-231;  made  difficult  by  Rus- 
sian mobilization  (Pourtales),  243- 
244 ;  responsibility  of  Germany  for 
refusal  to  participate  in,  484. 

Congo:  11,  505. 

Congo  Free  State:  effect  on  Belgian 
policy,  410  to. 

Congo,  French:  24. 

Congress  of  Vienna  (1815) :  3-5. 

Conservatives:  support  Entente, 
309. 

Constantinople:  Russian  ambitions 
to  secure,  10, 19;  German  influence 
at,  16,  19-20,  22-23;  Austrian 
ambitions  regarding,  33,  106. 

Constitution :  Bismarck  violates 
Prussian,  493-494. 

Contemporary  Review:  (Delbruck), 
561. 

Continental  policy  of  England:  10. 

Continental  Times,  Berlin:  (Apponyi), 
588. 

Convention:  see  Treaty. 

Conversations  (see  also  Anglo-Bel- 
gian conversations) :  between  Vien- 
na and  St.  Petersburg,  209-210, 


INDEX 


703 


213,  227;  Sazonof  proposes  to 
parallel,  by  conference,  221;  Du- 
maine  explains  interruption  of, 
226;  Kaiser  urges  Austria  to  con- 
tinue, 242;  Sazonof  statement  in 
regard  to  the  breaking  off,  by  Aus- 
tria, 243  n;  Russia  receives  word 
of  Austria's  refusal  to  continue, 
246;  Berchtold  (July  30)  has  no 
objection  to  continuance  of,  255; 
Austro-Russian,  interrupted  by 
German  ultimatum,  262;  Szapary 
explains  Austria  ready  to  con- 
tinue, 262-263;  Sazonof  (Aug.  1) 
expresses  satisfaction  that  Austria 
will  continue,  263. 

Conybeare,  Dr.  F.  C. :  attacks  Grey, 
357-359  n. 

Cook,  Sir  Edward:  352  n. 

Correspondence  Bureau.  Austrian: 
activities  of,  against  Servia,  44- 
45  n. 

Counter-mobilization:  see  Mobiliza- 
tion. 

Crandall,  S.  B.:  succession  of  treaty 
obligations,  385  n. 

Crete:  19. 

Crimea:  10. 

Crises:  European,  before  war,  9-10. 

Croatia:  109. 

Cyrenaica:  25-26. 

Damascus:  23. 

Dardanelles:  Russian  commerce 
through, 524. 

Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs. 

Davis,  J.  C.  Bancroft:  succession  of 
treaty  obligations,  385  n. 

Declaration  of  London,  February  26, 
1909:  Austria  will  observe,  88. 

Defensive  alliance:  right  of  neutra- 
lized states  to  enter  into,  408; 
nature  of,  460. 

Delbriick,  Prof.  Hans:  Russian  mo- 
bilization, 185-186  n;  Grey  re- 
sponsible for  war,  275  n;  Grey 
gives  no  assurance  that  France 
will  respect  Belgium,  405  n; 
French  and  English  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality,  415  n;  why 
Germany  invaded  Belgium,  448; 
strategic  reason  for  invasion  of 
Belgium,  488  n;  predicts  war  be- 
tween Germany  and  England,  560. 

Delcass6,  French  Minister  for  Foreign 


Affairs:  diplomacy  of,  after  Fash- 
oda,  12;  Germany  secures  resigna- 
tion of,  17. 

Demarche:  defined,  57  n  2,  86  n  2.  | 

Denis:  see  Durkheim  and  Denis. 

Derby,  Lord:  338. 

Dernburg,  Dr.  Bernhard:  Grey  re- 
sponsible for  war,  275  n,  296  n; 
criticism  of  British  White  Paper 
and  reply  of  B.  L.  Beer,  335  n; 
Bethmann-Hollweg's  right  to  ap- 
peal to  law  of  necessity,  416  n.;  re- 
marks introductory  to  Belgian  se- 
cret documents,  631-634;  Ger- 
many's treaty  record,  661-664. 

Destruction  of  the  Maine:  negotia- 
tions of  the  Spanish  and  American 
governments  following,  579,  584. 

Determining  causes  of  the  war  (see 
also  Causes  of  the  war):  491-495. 

Diplomacy:  Viviani  describes  Aus- 
trian, 258-259;  of  England,  268; 
governments  express  in  foreign 
relations  resultant  of  internal 
forces,  492;  of  Germany,  weakness 
of,  521;  aim  of,  521;  correctness  of 
Russian,  522. 

Diplomatic  documents,  their  verac- 
ity: v,  vi,  155-156  n,  285-286  n, 
335  n. 

Diplomatic  intervention:  see  Inter- 
vention, diplomatic. 

Diplomatic  procedure:  powers  hope 
to  employ  same,  as  for  Albanian 
negotiation,  230;  must  be  em- 
ployed before  recourse  to  force, 
454;  Austria  to  blame  for  disre- 
garding, 483. 

Diplomats:  efforts  of,  to  preserve 
peace,  187-188,  197. 

Direct  conversations:  see  Conver- 
sations. 

Disarmament :  reason  why  Germany 
opposed,  477;  super-empire  per- 
mits limitation  of  armaments,  499; 
Germany  refuses  to  consider,  513. 

Discrimination:  against  state  disre- 
garding ideals  of  humanity,  451. 

Documents,  diplomatic:  see  Diplo- 
matic documents. 

Dollot;  Les  Origines  de  la  Neutralite 
de  la  Belgique:  316  n,  373-375. 

Draga,  Queen,  of  Servia:  147. 

Dual  Alliance  between  Austria  and 
Germany:  formed  (1879),  8;  text 
of,  540-541;  becomes  Triple  Al- 


704 


INDEX 


.  liance  (1883),  8;  prestige  of,  af- 
fected by  Balkan  Wars,  35. 

Dual  Alliance  between  Russia  and 
France:  formed  (1891),  8-9;  effect 
of,  and  Triplice  in  maintaining 
balance  of  power,  15;  weakened  by 
Russo-Japanese  War,  16. 

Dual  Monarchy:  see  Austria. 

Ducarne,  General :  395  ff. 

Duggan,  S.  P.:  20  n,  21  n,  32  n. 

Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at 
Vienna:  suspicions  of,  regarding 
Germany,  161-162;  explains  inter- 
ruption of  conversations,  226. 

Dumba,  Constantin  Theodor,  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  to  United  States: 
69  n;  The  Austro-Servian  Conflict, 
587. 

Durkheim  and  Denis:  164  n,  256  n, 
261  n,  325  n,  336  n. 

Echo  de  Paris:  150. 

Economist:  309. 

Edward  VII:  efforts"  toward  Anglo- 
French  accord,  12-13;  attempt 
upon  the  life  of,  at  Brussels,  410  n. 

Efficiency:  basis  of  super-empire, 
500. 

Egypt:  clash  of  English  and  French 
interests  in,  11,  22;  Fashoda  in- 
cident,   11;    agreement    between 

"  France  and  England  regarding,  13. 

Elst,  Baron  von  der,  Belgian  Secre- 
tary General  to  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Emigration:  Germany  objects  to  loss 
by,  502,  506. 

Empires:  growth  of,  496-497. 

Encyclopaedia  Britannica:  8  n,  30  n, 
91  n. 

England  (see  also  Asquith  —  Bel- 
gium —  Belgian  neutrality  — 
England's  intervention  —  Grey  — 
Luxemburg):  colonial  possessions 
of,  4-5;  efforts  of,  in  establishing 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  5-6;  trea- 
ty regarding  Belgian  neutrality 
(text),  602;  does  not  at  first  join 
continental  alliances,  9-10;  con- 
tinental policy  of,  9-10,  15,  477; 
former  fear  of  Russian  expansion, 
10;  rivalry  with  France  for  colonial 
possessions,  11;  defensive  alliance 
with  Japan  against  Russia  (1902), 
12;  friendly  understanding  with 
France    (1904),    12-13,   283-284; 


understanding  with  France  (1904) 
respecting  Egypt  and  Morocco 
(text),  544-546;  supports  France 
in  Morocco,  16-17;  considers  Ger- 
many as  rival,  17;  agreement  with 
Russia  (1907)  regarding  Asia,  17- 
18;  (text),  546-550;  replaced  by 
Germany  as  protector  of  Turkey, 
19;  supports  France  at  Agadir,  23; 
increasing  friendly  relations  of, 
with  Germany,  280-282,  304,  364 
-366;  Anglo-German  Relations, 
560-571;  on  verge  of  civil  war 
(1914),  36,  307-308;  receives  from 
Austria  special  explanation  of 
ultimatum,  56-58;  endeavors  to 
secure  extension  of  time  limit  of 
Austrian  ultimatum,  59,  270;  in- 
fluences Servia  to  make  concilia- 
tory reply,  63-64,  270;  tries  to  de- 
lay hostilities  between  Austria  and 
Servia,  82-83;  and  France  unable 
to  advise  Russia  to  submit,  189; 
belief,  would  support  Russia,  192; 
and  Italy  possible  mediators,  193- 
194;  refuses  to  take  sides — wisdom 
of  this  course,  194,  273-282,  286- 
288,  293-295,  303-307,  310-311, 
356  n,  367-369  n;  not  willing  to 
fight  over  Balkan  question,  21,  29, 
31,  130,  148,  289,  293-295;  policy 
concerning  Balkan  affairs,  195- 
196;  weakness  of  Balkan  policy, 
197;  urges  mediation  on  basis  of 
Servian  note,  211-212;  mediation 
proposal  of,  accepted  by  Russia, 
217;  proposes  Cambon  suggestion, 
237-239;  and  France  not  notified 
of  Russian  general  mobilization, 
253  n;  important  role  of,  268-269; 
efforts  of,  to  organize  mediation, 
270-273 ;  influence  for  peace,  docu- 
ments showing,  270  n;  declaration 
of,  to  support  France,  275;  urged 
by  Austria  and  Germany  to  pre- 
vent war,  278;  obligation  of,  to 
France  (Grey),  288-292;  negotia- 
tions of,  with  France  and  Russia, 
292  n;  warns  Germany  she  will 
not  hold  aloof  if  France  is  involv- 
ed, 295-296;  Baron  Kuhlmann's 
communique,  360-361 ;  refuses  Ger- 
many's bid  for  England's  neutral- 
ity, 297-303,  348,  355  n;  diverg- 
ence of  opinion  in,  303-3 1 1 ;  Liberal 
Party  in  power  and  opposed  to 


INDEX 


705 


war,  309;  vital  interests  of,  311— 
316,  339-352;  position  in  regard  to 
Belgium  (Grey),  620;  inquiry  of, 
relative  to  Belgium's  neutrality, 
316-328;  asked  to  guarantee  neu- 
trality of  France,  328-336;  respon- 
sibility of  English  Cabinet  (Beer), 
335  n;  merchant  vessels  of,  de- 
tained by  Germany,  336-337; 
agrees  to  protect  French  coast, 
339-352;  thus  conditionally  enter- 
ing war,  351-352;  violation  of  Bel- 
gium casus  belli  for,  352-370;  in- 
tends to  land  troops  in  Belgium 
without  her  permission,  396-397; 
objects  to  fortification  of  the 
Scheldt,  397-398;  Anglo-Belgian 
agreement  against  Germany  (Del- 
briick),405  n;  violation  of  the  neu- 
trality of  Holland,  410;  right  to 
use  Scheldt  as  route  to  Antwerp, 
411;  Bethmann-Hollweg  discusses 
reasons  for  intervention,  455  n; 
abandons  "splendid  isolation," 
476-477;  supremacy  at  sea,  511  n; 
no  policy  of  aggression  towards 
Germany  (Asquith),  511  n;  policy 
to  check  Germany  through  bal- 
ance of  power  (Bethmann-Holl- 
weg), 511  n;  not  responsible  for 
the  war,  528. 

England's  intervention:  England's 
reasons  for,  312-313;  effect  of  Ger- 
man attitude  towards  Belgium, 
481;  reasons  for,  487,  525-526; 
how  Germany  might  have  pre- 
vented, 489. 

English:  see  also  British. 

English  Ambassador  at  Berlin:  see 
Goschen. 

English  Ambassador  at  Paris:  see 
Bertie. 

English  Ambassador  at  Rome:  see 
Rodd. 

English  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg: see  Buchanan. 

English  Ambassador  at  Vienna:  see 
Bunsen. 

English  Councilor  of  Embassy  at 
Berlin:  see  Rumbold. 

English  Minister  to  Belgium:  see 
Villiers. 

English  Minister  to  Luxemburg:  see 
Johnstone. 

English  neutrality:  Germany's  bid 
for,  297-303,  348,  355  n. 


English  Premier:  see  Asquith. 

English  Secretary  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs: see  Grey. 

English  ultimatum:  352-370.  " 

English  Under  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs:  see  Nicholson. 

Entente:  {see  also  Anglo-French  En- 
tente —  Anglo-Russian  Entente 
—  Triple  Entente) :  nature  of, 
292  n;  Jagow's  objection  to  group- 
ing of,  against  Triplice,  209;  Eng- 
land will  not  sacrifice,  312  n; 
difficult  for  English  to  remember 
attitude  towards,  in  July,  488. 

Entente  cordiale:  see  Anglo-French 
Entente. 

Ententes:  Asquith  refers  to  Eng- 
land's policy  of,  511  n. 

Equality  of  states:  and  the  right  to 
make  war,  391  ff.;  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium violates  principle  of,  390- 
391 ;  before  the  law,  454. 

Etter,  de,  Russian  Councilor  of 
Embassy  at  London. 

Europe:  evolution  towards  dual 
grouping  of  powers,  8-18,  476-477. 

European  Concert:  see  Concert  of 
Powers. 

Expansion:  conflict  in  policies  of 
Austria  and  Servia,  483. 

Explanations  about  Austrian  ulti- 
matum authorized  by  Berchtold, 
257. 

Extraterritorial  jurisdiction:  19. 

Eyschen,  President  of  Luxemburg 
Government. 

Faber,  Captain:  revelations  of,  398. 

Fait  accompli:  Austria  brings  about 
a,  271. 

Far  East:  22,  31,  188. 

Fashoda:  England  encounters  France 
at,  10;  claim  to,  yielded  by  France 
to  England  (1898),  11-12,  17. 

Fatherland:  447  n. 

Finland,  Gulf  of:  140. 

Fischer auer,  Fritz,  Austrian  vice- 
Consul:  on  Austro-Servian  rela- 
tions and  Austrian  ultimatum, 
76-77  n. 

Fiume:  109. 

Fleuriau,  de,  French  Charge  d'Af- 
f aires  at  London. 

Flotow,  von,  German  Ambassador  to 
Italy. 

Flushing:  fortification  of,  397;  Eng- 


706 


INDEX 


land's  view  of  fortification  of,  410, 
411  n. 

Force:  use  of,  302;  should  be  consid- 
ered in  political  matters,  393;  con- 
ditions for  rightful  use  of,  394- 
395 ;  [obligation  |to  observe  i  for- 
malities before  employing,  454; 
measures  of,  Austria  justified  in 
using,  483;  use  of,  more  favorably 
considered  in  Germany,  495;  use  of 
"peace  power"  to  compel  respect 
for  international  law,  500;  danger 
in  the  use  of,  501. 

Foreign  Legion  in  Morocco:  18. 

Forgach,  Count,  Austrian  Under 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs:  42-43  n,  44. 

Formalities:  obligation  of  states  to 
observe,  454. 

Formula  for  mediation:  efforts  to 
discover,  229-231. 

Fortnightly  Review:  413  n. 

France  {see  also  Belgian  Neutrality 
—  Bienvenu-Martin  —  Mobiliza- 
tion —  Neutralization,  the  various 
treaties  —  Viviani) :  wishes  to  an- 
nex Belgium,  5-6;  policy  toward 
Belgium,  6;  enters  into  alliance 
with  Russia  (1891),  8-9;  rivalry 
with  England  for  Colonial  posses- 
sions, 11;  yields  Fashoda  to  avoid 
war  with  England,  1 1 ;  enters  into 
friendly  understanding  with  Eng- 
land (1904),  12-13,  283-284;  atti- 
tude toward  Germany  on  account 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  13-15;  rela- 
tions with  Russia  undermined  by 
Japanese  war,  16;  Anglo-French 
understanding  in  regard  to  Mo- 
rocco confirmed  by  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, 17;  the  Casablanca  affair 
in  Morocco  (1908),  18-19;  Mo- 
roccan protectorate  by,  recognized 
by  Germany  (1911),  23-24;  posi- 
tion of,  in  Morocco  resented  by 
Germany,  35;  increases  armament, 
35;  critical  internal  situation  of 
(1914),  36;  endeavors  to  secure 
extension  of  time  limit,  59-61,  270; 
Ambassador  of,  at  St.  Petersburg 
believes  that  only  firm  united 
action  of  Entente  can  avert  war, 
59 ;  influences  Servia  to  make  con- 
ciliatory reply,  62-64,  270;  atti- 
tude towards  Balkan  matters, 
147-148;  asked  by  Germany  to 


influence  Russia  against  war,  147- 
155;  believes  Germany  intends  to 
precipitate  a  war,  155-163;  will 
supports  Russia  (July  29),  163- 
166;  military  preparations,  166- 
174;  receives  German  ultimatum, 
174-177;  Germany  plans  to  make, 
hostage  for  Russia,  180,  488;  mo- 
bilization system,  180-181;  weak 
spots  in  frontier,  180-181;  and 
England  unable  to  advise  Russia 
to  submit,  189;  French  representa- 
tives instructed  to  support  British 
proposal,  231  n;  England  refuses 
to  side  with,  to  prevent  war,  273- 
282;  Germany's  bid  for  England's 
neutrality  refused  by  England, 
297-303,  348;  respects  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  318;  England  asked  to 
guarantee  neutrality  of,  328-336; 
assured  of  England's  support  in 
case  of  German  attack  on  French 
coast,  339-352;  neutrality  of  (Ox- 
ford Faculty  of  Modern  History), 
336  n;  why  agreed  to  neutraliza- 
tion of  Belgium,  387-388;  reasons 
why  unlikely  to  violate  Belgian 
neutrality,  417-418;  Germany  ac- 
cuses, of  violating  Belgian  and 
German  territory,  419-425;  offers 
assistance  to  Belgium  to  defend 
neutrality,  438-439;  no  intention 
to  invade  Belgium,  448;  learns 
Italy  is  likely  to  maintain  an  atti- 
tude of  observation,  468-469;  plan 
of  campaign  through  Belgium 
(Delbnick),  4S8;  did  she  first  cross 
frontier,  519;  did  she  influence 
Russia  for  peace,  519-520;  peace- 
ful intentions  of,  520. 

Franco-Prussian  War:  readjustment 
of  Europe  following  upon,  7-9. 

Franco-Russian  Alliance :  signed 
(1891),  8-9. 

Frankischer  Kurrier:  325  n. 

Franklin:  proposal  for  the  immunity 
of  private  property  at  sea,  503- 
504. 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke:  active 
in  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, 20;  plans  of,  for  political 
reconstruction,  32-33;  assassina- 
ted (June  28,  1914),  34,  155. 

Franz  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria: 
34. 

Frederick  the  Great:  503. 


INDEX 


707 


Freie  Presse:  127. 

Fremdenblatt:  46. 

French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs:  see  Bienvenu-Martin. 

French  Ambassador  to  Austria- 
Hungary:  see  Dumaine. 

French  Ambassador  at  Berlin:  see 
Cambon,  Jules. 

French  Ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople: see  Bompard. 

French  Ambassador  to  Italy:  see 
Barrere. 

French  Ambassador  at  London:  see 
Cambon,  Paul. 

French  Ambassador  to  Russia:  see 
Paleologue. 

French  Charge"  d' Affaires  at  London : 
see  Fleuriau,  de. 

French  Coast :  obligation  of  England 
to  protect,  307  n. 

French  Consul  General  at  Budapest : 
see  d'Apchier  Le  Maugin. 

French  frontier:  violation  of,  170, 
173-174,  286  n. 

French  Minister  at  Brussels:  see 
Klobukowski. 

French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  Delcasse. 

French  Minister  of  Justice:  see  Bien- 
venu-Martin. 

French  Minister  to  Luxemburg:  see 
Mollard. 

French  Minister  to  Servia:  see 
Boppe. 

French  Minister  for  War  (former): 
see  Messimy. 

French  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  Berthelot. 

French  Yellow  Book:  discrepancies 
of,  vi,  285-286  n. 

Friedjung:  trial  at,  43  n,  125. 

Frontier,  Franco-German :  alleged 
violations  of,  170,  173-174,  286  n, 
325,  386  n. 

Fuller,  Chief  Justice:  Terlinden  v. 
Ames,  succession  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions, 385  n. 

Fullerton,  Wm.  Morton:  Problems  of 
Power,  562  n. 

Galicia:  191. 

Gambetta:  15. 

Gauvin:  date  of  Austrian  mobiliza- 
tion, 335-336  n. 

George  V,  King  of  England:  trans- 
mits Kaiser's  telegram  and  appeals 


to  Tsar  in  interest  of  peace,  254  n; 
Tsar  answers  that  German  declar- 
ation of  war  prevents  acceptance 
of  English  proposal,  254-255  n; 
letter  to  Poincare  (Aug.  1),  276- 
277  n;  Kaiser's  telegram  to,  286; 
efforts  of,  to  avoid  civil  war,  308; 
telegram  to  Kaiser  (Aug.  1),  329; 
telegram  (July  30)  to  Henry  of 
Prussia,  330;  visit  to  Paris  relative 
to  Triple  Entente,  553-554. 

Gerard,  American  Ambassador  to 
Germany:  370. 

German  Ambassador  to  Italy:  see 
von  Flotow. 

German  Ambassador  at  London:  see 
Lichnowsky. 

German  Ambassador  at  Paris:  see 
Schoen. 

German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg: see  Pourtales. 

German  Ambassador  at  Vienna:  see 
Tchirsky. 

German  Chancellor:  see  Bethmann- 
Hollweg. 

German  frontier:  violation  of,  173, 
286  n,  325. 

German  General  Staff,  Chief  of:  see 
von  Moltke. 

German  Minister  at  Brussels:  see 
Below-Saleske. 

German  Minister  to  Luxemburg: 
see  von  Buch. 

German  Minister  of  War:  see 
Heeringen. 

German  proposal:  England  will 
desert  France  and  Russia  if  they 
reject  reasonable,  233. 

German  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs:  see  Jagow. 

German  ultimatum  to  Belgium :  323- 
326,  353,  361-362;  Belgium's  reply 
to,  326-328;  Germany  justifies,  by 
French  intentions  and  acts,  4 19-' 
421. 

German  ultimatum  to  France:  174- 
177. 

German  ultimatum  to  Russia:  de- 
mands Russian  demobilization 
within  twelve  hours,  138-139,  142, 
174;  followed  by  declaration  of 
war  on  Russia,  142-145;  Jagow 
refuses  to  accept  Grey  formula 
until  Russia  answers,  241-242;  not 
justified  since  Russia  agrees  to 
arrest  mobilization,   259;  signifi- 


708 


INDEX 


cant  of  bellicose  policy,  260;  effect 
on  Austro-Russian  relations,  262- 
263;  only  one  answer  possible,  262. 

German  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs:  see  Zimmer- 
man. 

German  White  Book:  vii. 

Germany  (see  also  Belgian  Neutral- 
ity —  Belgium,  invasion  of  — 
Bethmann-Hollweg  —  German 
ultimatum  —  Jagow  —  Localiza- 
tion of  Austro-Servian  conflict  — 
Mobilization,  German  —  Prussia) : 
gains  for  Austria  administrative 
control  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegov- 
ina (1878),  7-8;  joins  with  Aus- 
tria and  Italy  in  Triple  Alliance 
(1883),  8;  joins  with  Austria  in 
Dual  Alliance  (1879),  8;  appre- 
hension at  formation  of  Anglo- 
French  Entente,  12;  policy  to  re- 
main on  good  terms  with  Eng- 
land, 13;  modifies  colonial  policy 
of  Bismarck,  13;  interest  of,  in 
maintaining  open  door  in  Mo- 
rocco and  China,  13;  sees  danger 
of  French-English  plans  for  Mo- 
rocco, 15-16;  Moroccan  designs  of, 
thwarted  by  Algeciras  Conference, 
17;  compels  resignation  of  Del- 
casse,  17;  attitude  toward  France 
on  account  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  13- 
15;  development  of,  on  sea,  alarms 
England,  17;  hemmed  in  by  Triple 
Entente,  18;  clashes  with  France 
over  Casablanca  affair  in  Morocco 
(1908),  18-19;  joins  Austria  in  be- 
friending Turk  against  Russian 
ambitions,  19;  Turkish  policies  of, 
threatened  by  Young  Turks 
(1908),  20;  supports  Austria  in 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, 20-21;  at  Agadir,  again 
attacks  French  Moroccan  inter- 
ests, 22-23;  fears  Italy  will  desert 
Alliance,  25;  new  Army  Bill  neces- 
sary after  Turkey's  dismember- 
ment, 27-28,  35;  cherishes  resent- 
ment against  France  for  Morocco, 
35 ;  increasing  friendly  relations  of, 
with  England,  280-282,  304,  364- 
366,  560-571  ;5Anglo-German  Rela- 
tions, 560-571;  "passes  on"  to 
Austria  Grey's  suggestion  regard- 
ing time  limit  of  Austrian  ultima- 
tum, 60-61 ;  view  of,  regarding  Ser- 


vian note,  79;  Servian  note  not 
published  in,  80;  lacks  will  to  pre- 
serve peace,  80;  backs  Austria,  84, 
92, 117-118, 123-126, 132, 156-157; 
public  opinion  of,  against  Russia 
and  France,  103,  105  n;  handi- 
capped in  mediation  between  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  by  Russian  mobili- 
zation, 1 14-115, 523 ;  interest  in  the 
dispute,  117-118;  denies  previous 
knowledge  of  Austrian  ultima- 
tum, 119-123,  125;  situation  with 
Russia  becomes  acute,  133-142; 
delivers  an  ultimatum  to  Russia, 
142-146;  asks  France  to  use  her 
influence  with  Russia,  147-155; 
believed  by  France  to  be  precipitat- 
ing war,  155-163,  490;  attitude  of, 
toward  mediation,  158-165,  271- 
273 ;  ultimatum  of,  to  France,  174- 
277;  purpose  of,  to  make  France 
"hostage"  for  Russia,  180;  pre- 
paredness of,  181;  did  not  want 
war,  191;  believes  war  inevitable, 
191-192;  complains  of  prepara- 
tions in  France  and  Russia,  192; 
cooperation  of,  necessary  to  medi- 
ation, 200-201,  216;  objects  to 
mediation,  205  ff.;  declines  con- 
ference, 208-210;  warned  by  Grey 
of  consequences  of  supporting 
Austria,  211;  influence  of,  on  Aus- 
tria, 213,  224;  discourages  direct 
conversations,  219;  position  of,  as 
Austria's  ally,  223-224;  Chancel- 
lor advises  Austria  to  speak  openly, 
228;  powers  consider,  alone  able  to 
speak  at  Vienna,  228;  asked  to 
"press  the  button,"  231-234;  in- 
consistency regarding  mediation, 
232;  England  will  desert  France 
and  Russia  if  they  reject  reasona- 
ble proposal  of,  233 ;  Jagow  thinks 
possible  to  accept  Cambon  sugges- 
tion if  Russia  does,  236-237;  for- 
wards Cambon  suggestion  to  Vi- 
enna, 237;  refuses  to  accept  Grey 
proposal  till  Russia  answers  ulti- 
matum, 241-242;  Kaiser  urges 
Austria  to  continue  conversations, 
242 ;  asks  Russia  to  propose  a  for- 
mula, 242-252;  readiness  to  act  as 
mediator,  244;  cannot  allow  Rus- 
sia to  mobilize,  250;  by  accepting 
Grey  proposal  might  have  avoided 
war,  251 ;  declaration  of  war  forced 


INDEX 


709 


by  Russian  mobilization,  251,  254- 
255;  unjust  to  accuse  of  dilatory 
tactics,  251 ;  advantage  of,  to  force 
issue,  251-252  267;  belief  that  war 
could  be  avoided,  251-252;  recom- 
mends to  Vienna  consideration  of 
English  proposals,  254  n;  effect  of 
ultimatum  of,  upon  peace  pros- 
pects, 259-260;  direct  conflict  with 
Russia,  262;  believes  England  will 
remain  neutral,  273-278,  286-287, 
295;  appeals  to  England  to  pre- 
vent war,  278;  warned  that  Eng- 
land will  not  hold  aloof  if  France  is 
involved,  295-296;  bids  for  Eng- 
land's neutrality,  297-303,  34S; 
proclaims  martial  law,  310  n; 
charges  violations  of  frontier,  325; 
believes  England  will  guarantee 
French  neutrality,  328-336,  355  n, 
522;  detention  by,  of  English  ves- 
sels, 336-337;  invades  Luxemburg, 
337-339;  England  will  protect 
France  against  naval  attack  of, 
339-352;  violation  of  Belgium 
casus  belli  to  England,  352-370; 
popular  demonstration  against 
English  Ambassador,  367-370; 
good  faith  assailed  by  the  Belgian 
government,  400;  warned  by  Bel- 
gian Government  of  unauthorized 
Anglo-Belgium  military  conversa- 
tions, 407-408;  view  concerning 
sanctity  of  treaties,  417;  calls  vio- 
lation of  Luxemburg  not  hostile 
but  preventive  act,  430;  conse- 
quence and  purpose  of  invasion  of 
Belgium,  432-433;  view  concern- 
ing Belgian  resistance,  441;  ac- 
cuses England  of  misrepresenta- 
tions in  regard  to  Belgium,  441- 
445;  plea  of,  of  necessity,  445-456; 
consideration  actuating,  in  regard 
to  invasion  of  Belgium,  448;  di- 
plomacy of,  in  Turco-Italian  War, 
458;  will  not  put  pressure  on  Aus- 
tria (Giuliano),  462;  asks  Italy  her 
intentions  (Aug.  1),  469-470;  pol- 
icy of,  477;  dilemma  of,  requiring 
immediate  decision,  478  n;  why 
opportune  moment  to  make  war, 
479;  should  have  foreseen  English 
intervention,  480;  philosophy  and 
military  influence  led  to  Belgian 
invasion,  480-481 ;  sacrifices  inter- 
national law  to  strategic  consider- 


ations, 480-481;  risked  peace  of 
Europe  to  gain  prestige,  485; 
blames  war  on  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion, 485-486;  to  blame  for  Eng- 
land's intervention,  487,  489;  had 
a  better  plan  of  campaign,  489; 
responsibility  of,  for  the  war,  491; 
responsible  for  war,  because  sup- 
ported Austria's  localization  of 
question,  484;  responsible  for  Rus- 
sian and  Austrian  causal  action  for 
war,  491;  responsibility  for  change 
of  attitude  towards  Russian  mobil- 
ization, 492;  thinks  differently 
from  rest  of  world,  493 ;  geographi- 
cal position,  and  effects  of,  493, 
500;  refused  to  join  the  super- 
empire,  499-500;  nationalistic  con- 
ceptions of,  502-508,  510-511;  at 
parting  of  the  ways,  503;  embit- 
tered by  diplomatic  checks,  505; 
aggression,  reason  for,  505-508; 
increase  of  population,  506;  race- 
suicide,  506-507;  doctrine  of  na- 
tional necessity,  508-509;  won- 
derful mental  mobilization,  510; 
opposed  to  status  quo,  511;  free  de- 
velopment checked  by  balance  of 
power  (Bethmann-Hollweg),  511  n; 
national  philosophy  of  force,  512; 
view  of,  of  international  law 
anachronism,  513;  lesson  taught 
by,  514;  efforts  to  avoid  war, 
520-521;  conduct  of,  likely  to 
force  war,  521;  aggression  against 
France,  521;  weakness  of  diplom- 
acy of,  521;  why  did,  disregard 
usual  procedure,  528;  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Austria,  540-541; 
treaty  record  of  (Dernburg),  661. 

Gibraltar:  24. 

Giddings,  Franklin  H.:  The  Larger 
Meanings  of  the  War,  652. 

Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  Baron,  Aus- 
trian Minister  at  Belgrade:  opposed 
to  "foul  compromise,"  266  n. 

Giolitti,  ex-Premier  of  Italy:  Italy 
refuses  (1913)  to  countenance  Aus- 
tria's intended  aggression  against 
Servia,  35,  121,  470-471. 

Giuliano:  see  San  Giuliano. 

Givet:  323. 

Gladstone :  binding  effect  of  treaty  of 
1839,  386;  view  of  obligations  re- 
garding Belgian  guaranty,  389- 
390;  meaning  of  obscure  statement 


710 


INDEX 


regarding  Belgium,  386;  letter  to 
Bright  concerning  Belgium,  624. 

Goltz,  von  der:  20. 

Good  faith:  of  Germany,  assailed  by 
the  Belgian  Government,  400;  in 
observance  of  treaties,  453;  of 
Italy,  460. 

Good  offices:  nature  of,  205,  227  n, 
244 ;  powers  employ  at  Vienna  and 
Petersburg,  227-229;  King  George 
appeals  to  Tsar  in  interest  of 
peace,  254  n;  Germany  recom- 
mends to  Austria  consideration  of 
English  proposal,  254  n;  Hague 
Convention  (Oct.  18,  1907)  rela- 
tive to,  651. 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin:  final  interviews 
in  Berlin  (Aug.  4),  363-370. 

Governments:  trustees  for  human- 
ity, 451;  responsibility  of,  easier  to 
fix  in  foreign  than  internal  affairs, 
492. 

Grain:  Belgian  retention  of,  bound 
to  Germany,  421. 

Great  Britain:  see  England. 

Greater  Servia:  hope  of,  21,  30-31; 
secret  organizations  of,  33-34; 
(London  Times),  74-75. 

Greece:  19,  26-27. 

Greindl,  Baron,  Belgian  Minister  at 
Berlin:  aware  of  English  prepar- 
ations to  invade  Belgium,  396  n- 
397;  necessity  of  preparations 
against  England,  398-399;  consid- 
eration of  report  of,  399;  report  of, 
evidence  of  Belgian  good  faith, 
400;  Belgian  Government  explains 
meaning  of  report  of,  400  n. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  English  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs:  biographical 
note,  268  n;  responsibility  of,  268- 
279;  Treaty  of  London,  27;  sees 
danger  of  time  limit  in  Austrian 
ultimatum,  48,  54,  270;  fears  war, 
51;  on  Servian  note,  79,  83;  on 
Russian  mobilization,  115-116, 
186;  "Servia  a  danger  to  European 
peace,"  127  n;  Austrian  ultima- 
tum made,  powerless  to  influence 
Russia,  189;  unable  to  intervene 
for  peace,  194;  policy  of  not  taking 
sides  and  the  preservation  of 
peace,  194,  273-282,  293-295; 
303-307,  354-359  n;  proposes  con- 
ference of  the  powers,   197-213, 


guarantees  France  will  accept 
mediation,  202;  urges  moderation 
at  Vienna,  211;  warns  Germany  of 
consequences  of  supporting  Aus- 
tria, 211;  makes  official  proposal 
of  mediation,  215-216;  approves 
direct  conversations  between  Rus- 
sia and  Austria,  217-218;  deplores 
European  conflict,  217-218;  asks 
Chancellor's  aid,  228-229;  plan  of 
mediation  of  powers,  231;  says 
England  will  support  France  and 
Russia  only  if  they  do  not  reject 
reasonable  German  proposal,  233; 
can  do  nothing  in  face  of  Austrian 
refusal  of  mediation,  228,  235; 
Germany  criticizes,  for  not  pressing 
mediation,  235  n;  approves  Cam- 
bon  suggestion,  237-238;  asks 
Russia  to  change  Sazonof  formula, 
237-238;  proposal  of,  for  a  collec- 
tive guaranty  of  powers,  239-242; 
stumbling-block  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  240;  Germany  refuses 
to  accept  proposal  of,  till  Russia 
answers  ultimatum,  241-242; 
promises  to  take  into  account 
Germany's  unconciliatory  atti- 
tude, 247-248;  Sazonof  modifies 
formula  at  request  of,  249 ;  accept- 
ance of  proposal  of,  might  have 
avoided  war,  251;  possibility  of 
preserving  peace  if  Russia  will 
arrest  mobilization,  258;  situation 
in  which  he  brought  forward  his 
proposal,  265-266;  gives  reasons 
for  failure  of  peace  negotiations, 
267;  efforts  of,  to  organize  media- 
tion, 270-273;  influence  of  Eng- 
land for  peace,  list  of  references, 
270  n;  refrains  from  forcing  issue, 
279-280;  encourages  Germany  to 
peaceful  concession,  282;  letter  to 
P.  Cambon,  1912,  and  his  reply 
regarding  unprovoked  attack  by  a 
third  power,  283-284,  290-291, 
552-553;  account  of  formation  of 
Entente,  288,  291;  reserves  inde- 
pendence of  action,  294-295 ;  warns 
Germany  England  will  not  hold 
aloof  if  France  is  involved,  295- 
296;  refuses  Germany's  bid  for 
English  neutrality,  298-303, 332  n, 
348;  answers  Keir  Hardie  in  Par- 
liament Aug.  27,  302-303  n,  358- 
359  n;  attacked  by  MacDonald: 


INDEX 


711 


302  n;  diplomatic  importance  of 
question  of,  addressed  to  Bel- 
gian regarding  neutrality,  3 1 1-3 16, 
332  n;  the  question  of,  to  Belgium 
and  its  reply,  316-318,  332  n; 
asks  assurance  of  Belgium  regard- 
ing resistance,  318-320;  Lichnow- 
sky  incident  (guaranty  by  England 
of  neutrality  of  France),  328-336, 
355  n,  358-359  n;  protests  against 
German  detention  of  English  ves- 
sels, 336-337;  on  Luxemburg  neu- 
trality, 338-339;  agreement  to 
France  to  protect  French  coasts, 
339-352 ;  England's  interest  and  ob- 
ligation to  protect  France  (speech 
in  Commons  Aug.  3),  345-351; 
nature  of  Anglo-French  Entente 
(speech  in  Commons,  Aug.  3), 
351-352;  neutrality  of  Belgium 
(speech  in  Commons,  Aug.  3),  353- 
360,  620;  Conybeare's  arraign- 
ment of,  357-359  n;  unjustly  as- 
sailed, 359  n;  statement  (1913) 
regarding  Belgian  neutrality,  401- 
402;  authorizes  statement  (Jan. 
27)  commenting  on  Chancellor's 
associated  press  interview,  406- 
407  n;  call  upon  Belgium  to  defend 
neutrality,  435;  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  discusses  statement  of,  con- 
cerning Belgian  neutrality,  455  n; 
effect  of  warning  to  Germany,  487 ; 
sane  conduct  of  English  policy, 
491;  attitude  regarding  German 
invasion  of  Belgium,  526;  diplo- 
macy of,  527;  considers  action  of 
Russia  defensive,  527;  statement 
of,  regarding  intervention,  persi- 
flage, 527;  admirable  diplomacy 
of,  analyzed,  528. 

Grotius:  316. 

Gruic,  General  Secretary  of  the  Ser- 
vian Foreign  Office:  49  n. 

Guardian,  Manchester:  309  n,  313  n, 
360-361  n. 

Guaranty:  Grey  proposal  for  collec- 
tive, of  powers,  239-242;  of  powers 
to  Austria  and  Russia,  265-266; 
England's  obligation  in  regard  to 
Belgium,  386;  of  neutrality,  obli- 
gation to  make  good,  387  ff.;  of 
Belgian  neutrality,  England  will 
not  violate  first,  401;  of  England 
and  France  under  Treaty  of 
(1839),  405;  nature  of  collective, 


applying  to  Luxemburg,  423;  col- 
lective, opinion  of  Milovanovitch, 
424  n. 

Hague  Conventions:  application  of, 
to  neutralization  of  Belgium, 
391  n;  Belgian  Government  de- 
clares resistance  under,  not  hostile 
act,  440;  of  1907  relative  to  set- 
tlement of  international  disputes 
(text),  651;  of  1907  relative  to 
the  opening  of  hostilities,  87-88, 
352  n;  (text),  651. 

Hague  Tribunal:  decision  of  Casa- 
blanca affair,  19;  Servia  offers  to 
submit  dispute  with  Austria  to, 
64-65. 

Haldane:342. 

Hansard :  Parliamentary  Debates, 
606-624. 

Hardie,  Keir:  interrogates  Grey  in 
Parliament  Aug.  27,  302  n,  358- 
359  n;  Grey  answers,  301-303  n. 

Hare,  Francis:  The  Barrier  Treaty 
vindicated,  598. 

Havenith,  Belgian  Minister  at  Wash- 
ington: transmits  a  statement  of 
Belgian  Government  regarding 
Anglo-Belgian  conversations,  407- 
408 ;  statement  regarding  the  pub- 
lication of  the  Belgian  documents 
with  explanation  by  Dr.  Dern- 
burg,  635. 

Heads  of  state:  direct  action  by, 
252-253  n. 

Heeringen,  von,  German  Minister 
of  War:  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
322. 

Helfferich,  German  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury:  "menace  allemande," 
150  n;  authenticity  of  F.  Y.  B., 
155-156  n;  why  France  assured 
Russia  of  support,  165-166  n, 
296  n,  306  n;  the  peace  of  the 
world  vs.  the  Entente,  312  n;  Eng- 
land's provisional  declaration  of 
war,  352  n. 

Hengelmuller,  Baron  L. :  reason  for 
England's  intervention,  443. 

Henry,  Prince,  of  Prussia :  telegraphs 
King  George  (July  30),  329-330. 

Herzegovina:  see  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. 

Hill,  David  Jayne:  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  382;  nature  of  neutrality, 
638. 


712 


INDEX 


Hohenburg,  Duchess  of:  34,  76  n. 

Holland:  Congress  of  Vienna  (1815) 
gives  Belgium  to,  5;  Belgium  re- 
volts from,  5;  Germany  ready  to 
give  conditional  pledge  regarding 
neutrality  of,  297;  mobilization  of, 
310  n;  attitude  towards  the  treaty 
of  1839,  389;  violation  of  the  neu- 
trality of,  by  England,  410;  atti- 
tude towards  defense  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  411;  colonial  posses- 
sions of,  505 ;  England's  attitude  in 
case  of,  526;  Barrier  Treaty  of 
1709  with  England,  596,  598. 

Holls;  Peace  Conference  at  The 
Hague:  539. 

Home  Rule  Bill:  amending  of,  308. 

Hostage:  Germany  plans  to  make 
France,  for  Russia,  488. 

Hostilities:  Hague  Convention  of 
1907  relative  to  the  opening  of,  87- 
88,  352  n,  651. 

Humanity:  interests  of,  sacrificed  to 
narrow  nationalism,  496;  basis  of 
the  unity  of,  509-510. 

Ideals:  maintenance  of,  450;  survival 
of  fit,  451. 

Imperator,  the:  310  n. 

Indemnization:  Austria  requires  of 
Servia,  234  n,  263. 

Independence:  of  states,  German  in- 
vasion of  Belgium  violates  princi- 
ple of,  390-391 ;  of  Belgium,  resist- 
ance necessary  to  preserve,  453 ;  of 
Servia,  Italy  interested  in  preserv- 
ing, 461 ;  of  Servia,  Austrian  inten- 
tions concerning,  525;  difference 
between  formal  and  real,  483. 

India:  10-11. 

"Influenced":  (territories  of  the  em- 
pire states),  497. 

Intention:  of  France  to  invade  Bel- 
gium, 488  n;  of  France  made  justi- 
fication of  German  violation,  419- 
421. 

Intermediate  military  preparation : 
see  Military  preparations  —  Mo- 
bilization. 

International  commission :  to  control 
police  inquiry  in  Servia,  242. 

International  Conciliation  Pamphlet 
(no.  84) :  Speech  of  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  in  Reichstag  Aug.  4,  145- 
146  n. 

International  cooperation:  513. 


International  court:  establishment 
of,  501  n. 

International  disputes:  Hague  Con- 
vention of  Oct.  18,  1907,  relative 
to  settlement  of,  651. 

Internationalism :  development  of, 
496;  German  attitude  in  regard  to, 
513. 

International  law:  importance  of 
forms  and  courtesies  to,  77  n;  duty 
of  all  states  to  prevent  invasion  of 
Belgium,  390-391;  enforcing  of, 
391;  sanctions  of,  392;  status  of 
neutrality  according  to,  393; 
method  of  'growth  of  (Westlake), 
393  n;  fundamental  principles  of, 
453-456;  practical  nature  of,  455; 
penalty  for  violation,  456;  Ger- 
many sacrifices,  to  strategic  con- 
siderations, 480-481 ;  Bismarck's 
example  encourages  to  violation  of, 
494;  German  attitude  tends  to 
minimize,  504;  German  view  of,  an 
anachronism,  513. 

International  police  (see  also  Peace 
Power):  500;  dangers  of,  501  n. 

Intervention:  mediation  distin- 
guished from  diplomatic,  205, 
244  n,  279;  covers  political  de- 
signs, 392;  armed,  hastened  by 
destruction  of  Maine  (1898)  and 
assassination  of  Arch-Duke  (1914), 
583-5S5. 

Intervention  of  England:  see  Eng- 
land's Intervention. 

Inviolability  of  private  property  at 
sea:  503-504. 

Ireland:  political  situation  in,  308. 

Ischl:  61. 

Isvolsky,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Paris. 

Italia  irredenta :  457. 

Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  San  Guiliano. 

Italy  (see  also  Casus  foederis  —  San 
Giuliano  —  Triple  Alliance) :  joins 
Germany  and  Austria  in  Triple 
Alliance  (1883),  8;  irritated  by 
Austrian  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  21,  457;  policy  of 
expansion,  24-25;  deserts  allies  to 
wage  Turco-Italian  War  (1911- 
12),  25-26;  acquires  Tripoli  and 
Cyrenaica,  26 ;  works  with  Austria 
against  Servia  and  Montenegro, 
28-29;  designs  of,  upon  Albania, 


INDEX 


713 


32,  41;  refuses  (1913)  to  join  in 
aggression  upon  Servia,  35,  470- 
471;  kept  ignorant  regarding  Aus- 
trian ultimatum,  45,  120-121, 
467-468;  joins  Entente  powers  in 
endeavors  to  extend  time  limit  of 
Austrian  ultimatum,  61,  270;  min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  of,  criti- 
cizes Austria  for  rejecting  Servian 
note,  75;  urges  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria to  take  favorable  view  of 
Servian  note,  83;  believes  Austria 
determined  to  punish  Servia,  83;  a 
possible  mediator,  193-194;  plan 
for  mediation,  234-236;  urges 
England  to  declare  herself  on  side 
of  France  and  Russia,  277-278; 
remains  neutral,  347,  467-473; 
takes  her  place  in  European  con- 
cert (1867;,  423;  desire  for  peace, 
457-462;  obligation  to  stand  with 
allies,  460;  Russian  efforts  to  de- 
tach from  Triplice  (Price),  461  n; 
cooperation  with  England,  465- 
467,  490;  attitude  of  observation 
likely,  468-469;  Germany  asks 
intentions  of  (Aug.  1),  469-470; 
considers  Austrian  action  aggres- 
sive, 470;  significance  of  attitude 
of,  as  showing  Austro-German 
aggression,  472-473;  not  bound  by 
Triple  Alliance  to  join  war  against 
England  (Thayer),  473;  balances 
between  Entente  and  triplice, 
478  n;  restricted  by  Triple  Alli- 
ance in  action  upon  Germany, 
490  n. 
Ito,  Marquis:  12. 

Jagow,  von,  German  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs:  on  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, 56, 119-120;  declares  Aus- 
trian intentions  on  Servia,  5S; 
passes  on  suggestion  to  secure  ex- 
tension of  time  limit  at  Vienna,  61; 
believes  Russia  will  not  move,  102; 
on  Russian  mobilization  "against 
Germany,"  133,  139-140;  says 
conference  not  practical,  208-209 ; 
objects  to  grouping  of  Entente 
against  Triplice,  209;  thinks  Cam- 
bon  suggestion  may  be  acceptable, 
236-237;  refuses  to  accept  Grey 
proposal  until  Russia  answers 
ultimatum,  241-242;  on  England's 
refusal  of  Germany's  bid  for  neu- 


trality, 300;  on  Belgian  neutrality, 
(Reichstag,  April,  1913),  321-322; 
final  interviews  with  Goschen, 
(Aug.  4),  363-365;  apology  of,  to 
Goschen,  367-368;  interview  with 
the  Belgian  Minister,  436-438. 

James,  Henry:  on  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  314  n. 

Japan:  enters  into  alliance  with 
England  (1902),  12;  effect  of  war 
with,  on  Russia,  188,  195;  treaty 
with  Russia  guaranteeing  the  pres- 
ent territory  of  each,  the  integrity 
of  China  and  the  "Open  Door"  in 
China,  550;  agreement  with  Rus- 
sia concerning  Manchuria,  551; 
care  for  British  interests,  498; 
agreement  with  Great  Britain, 
1911  (text),  541-542. 

Jaures:  assassinated  (July  31,  1914), 
308  n. 

Johnstone,  Sir  A.,  British  Minister  to 
Luxemburg. 

Johnston,  Sir  Harry;  Colonial  Devel- 
opment and  Removal  of  Conflicting 
Interests:  566. 

Joint  intervention:  see  Collective 
action. 

Joncherey:  173  n. 

Jougo-Slave:  see  Southern  Slav. 

Journal  des  Debats,  Paris :  174  n, 
265  n. 

Jovanovitch,  Servian  Minister  at 
Vienna:  predicts  Austria's  action 
on  Serajevo  crime,  42-43  n,  47- 
48;  recounts  attack  on  Servian 
flag  in  Vienna,  88  n. 

Jowett,  B.:  extract  from  Thucydides, 
645. 

Jungbluth,  General:  396 if. 

Kaiser  of  Germany:  see  William  II. 

Kamerun:  24. 

Karageorgevich :  76  n. 

Kazan:  111,  135. 

Khedive  of  Egypt:  11. 

Kiderlen-Waechte :  155-156  n. 

Kieff:  110,  135. 

Kitchener:  11,  342-343  n. 

Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at 
Brussels:  on  intention  of  France 
regarding  defense  of  Belgium, 
327-328. 

Koelnische  Zeitung:  323  n,  446  n. 

Korea:  12. 

Kovno:  111. 


714 


INDEX 


Kriegsgefahr  (see  also  Mobilization) : 
denned,  141,  170-171;  proclaimed 
July  31, 138, 141, 170-171, 184, 193. 

Kriegsraison:  504  n. 

Kriegsverlauf :  409  n. 

Kudachef ,  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires 
and  Councilor  of  Embassy  at  Vi- 
enna: on  Austrian  Ultimatum,  55; 
consults  with  Count  Berchtold, 
96-97. 

Kuhlmann,  Baron:  Councilor  of  the 
German  Embassy  in  London:  com- 
munique of,  to  press  (Aug.  3),  360- 
361. 

La  Fere:  413  n. 

Lansdovvne:  pledges  support  to 
Asquith,  343. 

Laon:  413  n. 

Law,  A.  Bonar:  pledges  support  to 
Asquith,  343. 

Law  of  Nations:  see  International 
law. 

Laws  of  War:  (see  also  International 
law):  Germany  considers  Kriegs- 
raison superior  to,  504. 

Liao-tung:  12. 

Liberal  Party  (England):  309. 

Lichnowsky,  Prince,  German  Ambas- 
sador at  London:  anxiety  of,  63, 
158;  urges  localization,  211;  per- 
sonal bid  of,  for  England's  neu- 
trality, 300-303,  357-359  n;  com- 
munique to  press  Aug.  3,  303, 
360-361;  mistake  of,  regarding 
guaranty  by  England  of  French 
neutrality,  328-336,  355  n,  358- 
359  n ;  Shaw  on,  356  n. 

Liege:  362. 

Limburg:  treaty  of  the  powers  (May 
11,  1867)  relative  to  the  Duchy  of, 
603. 

Limitation  of  armament:  see  Dis- 
armament. 

Lincoln:  as  example  for  German 
youth,  494. 

Literary  Digest:  (Delbriick) :  560. 

Lloyd  George:  23,  73  n,  76  n;  speech 
on  Austrian  ultimatum  and  Serv- 
ian reply  (text),  586. 

Localization  of  Austro-Servian  con- 
flict (see  also  Austrian  Ultimatum 
—  Mobilization,  German  —  Mo- 
bilization, Russian) :  possible  (Aus- 
tria and  Germany),  101-103,  105; 
impossible  (Russia),  99,  105-111; 


favored  by  London  Times,  126, 
126  n;  Grey  and  P.  Cambon  on, 
130  n,  278;  Germany  insists  upon, 
126-130,  149-150,  158-159;  Spa- 
laikovitch  on,  129  n;  Russia  will 
be  responsible  for  failure  of  (Ger- 
many), 131-133,  151,  153;  Ger- 
many asks  French  intervention 
with  Russia  regarding,  151-155; 
Echo  de  Paris  concerning,  150; 
Bienvenu-Martin  on,  163-164  n; 
France  will  support  Russia  (July 
29),  163-166;  Germany  declares 
war  on  Russia,  143-145. 

Lockal  Anzeiger:  125,  157,  168. 

Lorraine:  see  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Louis  XIV:  9. 

Ludwig,  Ernest :  72  n. 

Luxemburg:  treaty  of  powers  guar- 
anteeing neutrality  of  (text),  603; 
declarations  (1870)  of  France  and 
Prussia  to  respect  neutrality  of 
(text),  605;  German  military  prep- 
arations extend  from,  169;  invaded 
by  Germany,  337-338;  English 
interpretation  of  treaty  guaran- 
teeing neutrality  of,  338-339,  423- 
429;  history  of,  422-423;  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of,  422-431;  col- 
lective guaranty  of  neutrality  of, 
423;  law  of  succession  to,  424;  in- 
vasion of,  Germany  considers  not 
hostile  but  preventive  act,  430, 
529;  Germany's  invasion  of,  act  of 
war  against  France,  521;  Parlia- 
mentary Debate  on  the  neutrality 
of,  606. 

Macchio,  Baron  von,  Under  Secre- 
tary of  the  Austro-Hungarian  For- 
eign Office:  "  Interest  an  excuse  for 
not  being  courteous,"  77  n. 

MacDonald,  J.  Ramsay:  attack 
upon  Grey,  302  n. 

Macedonia:  19,  26-27,  124. 

Mach,  Dr.  Edmund  von;  What  Ger- 
many wants:  130  n,  135  n,  401, 
485  n. 

Magyars:  place  in  Austro-Hungarian 
state,  and  Dual  Alliance,  8;  Franz 
Ferdinand's  plans  regarding,  32- 
33. 

Mahommedans:  23,  91. 

Mail,  London  Daily:  309  n. 

Maine,  The:  95;  negotiations  of  the 
Spanish   and   American   Govern- 


INDEX 


715 


ments  following  the  destruction  of, 
579. 

Manchuria:  agreement  between  Rus- 
sia and  Japan  concerning  (text), 
551. 

Marchand,  Captain:  11. 

Maubeuge:  presence  of  British  troops 
and  stores  at,  421. 

Mediation  (see  also  Conference) : 
distinction  between,  and  interven- 
tion, 205  n,  244  n,  279;  Hague 
Convention  (1907)  relative  to 
(text),  651;  efforts  of  Tsar  and 
Kaiser  toward,  112,  115,  145- 
146  n,  252-254  n,  329-330;  atti- 
tude of  Germany  toward,  158-165; 
renewal  of,  164;  England  and  Italy- 
could  offer,  193;  of  the  four  less 
interested  powers,  198-200,  203- 
204;  between  Austria  and  Servia, 
199  n;  Paul  Cambon  suggests  de- 
ferring proposal  of,  200;  Grey 
guarantees  France  will  accept, 
202;  Germany  objects  to,  205  ff.; 
concerning  Austrian  ultimatum, 
Berchtold  refuses,  212;  efforts  to 
discover  a  formula  for,  229-231; 
principle  of,  accepted  by  Germany, 
231 ;  Germany  inconsistent  regard- 
ing, 232;  San  Giuliano  suggestions 
for,  234-235;  Bethmann-Hollweg 
criticizes  Grey  for  not  continuing 
to  press,  235;  after  occupation 
of  Belgrade  (Cambon),  236-239; 
Austria  agrees  to,  252-264;  Berch- 
told does  not  agree  to  discuss  mod- 
ification of  Austrian  ultimatum, 
255;  Tsar  declares  Russian  troops 
will  not  attack  while  it  continues, 
255  n;  if  Russia  arrests  mobil- 
ization Austria  will  accept,  256; 
between  Austria  and  Servia,  pro- 
posal for,  258;  criticism  of  Vivi- 
ani's  statement  concerning  Rus- 
sia's acceptance  of  proposal  for, 
259-260  n;  efforts  to  organize, 
270-273;  Germany  blames  Russia 
for  mobilization  during,  523;  pos- 
sibility of  England's,  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  528. 

Mediterranean:  Italy  cannot  control, 
24;  Triple  Alliance  does  not  cover, 
478  n. 

Melians:  defend  their  neutrality 
against  Athenians,  645. 

Mensdorff,  Count,  Austrian  Ambas- 


sador at  London:  on  Servian  note, 
71  n;  on  Austrian  policy  toward 
Servia,  89. 

Mental  mobilization:  in  time  of  war, 
510. 

Messimy,  Former  French  Minister  for 
War. 

Metz:  169-170. 

Meuse  Valley:  323,  413  n. 

Michigan  Law  Review:  504. 

Mignet,  F.  A.:  N egociations  relatives 
a  la  Succession  d'Espagne,  595. 

Mikado  of  Japan:  12. 

Milhaud,  Edg. :  325  n. 

Militarism:  heads  of  German  army 
insist  upon  mobilization,  250;  pe- 
culiar view  of  military  men,  405  n. 

Military  economy:  determined  by 
political  situation,  179-190. 

Military  preparations:  in  Germany 
and  France,  166-174;  intermedi- 
ate, 183-184;  suspension  of,  by 
powers,  259;  Anglo-Belgian  (text 
of  secret  documents  regarding), 
626. 

Milovanovitch:  opinion  of,  concern- 
ing collective  guaranty,  424  n. 

Minister,  see  English,  French,  Ger- 
man, etc.,  minister. 

Ministerial  Council,  Russian:  192. 

"Mobilitis":  Europe  afflicted  with, 
184-185. 

Mobilization:  meaning  and  effect  of, 
178-181;  rapidity  of,  179;  efforts 
of  statesmen  to  withhold,  188; 
issuance  of  the  general  order  for, 
181-183;  intermediate  prepara- 
tions, 183-184;  Kriegsgefahrzu- 
stand,  nature  of,  184;  contagion  of, 
184^.;  fatal  succession  of  mobiliz- 
ations, 184-194;  Germany  obliged 
by  strategic  considerations  to 
make  war  once  mobilization  be- 
gun, 185 ;  German  attitude  to- 
wards Russia's  partial  mobiliza- 
tion, 191;  Russia  cannot  permit 
negotiations  to  cover  German  and 
Austrian,  245 ;  impossible  to  arrest, 
in  middle,  250  n. 

Mobilization,  Austrian:  against 
Servia,  80-81,  335-336  n;  how 
affected  by  Russian  mobilization, 
134-136;  why  Russia  feared,  160; 
previous  to  Russian  (Viviani), 
335  n;  Russia  cannot  permit  nego- 
tiations to  cover,  245. 


716 


INDEX 


Mobilization,  Belgian  (July  31): 
280  n,  310  n,  319-320. 

Mobilization,  Dutch:  310  n,  319. 

Mobilization,  French:  166-174, 
310  n. 

Mobilization,  German  (see  also  Ger- 
man ultimatum)  :  Germany  threat- 
ens counter  mobilization,  136-137; 
false  alarm  of,  July  30,  137,  168; 
"danger  of  war"  declared  July  31, 
138,  141,  174;  made  necessary 
by  Russian  mobilization,  133-143, 
145-146  n;  ordered  August  1,  143- 
144,  145,  146  n;  certain  reservists 
called  to  "attention"  July  21  (J. 
Cambon),  166;  against  France, 
166-174,  310  n;  excellence  of,  180; 
advantage  of,  due  to  rapidity,  185; 
Russia  cannot  permit  negotiations 
to  cloak,  245;  delay  of,  costly  to 
Germany,  250;  officers  insist  upon, 
250;  Aug.  1  pending  guaranty  of 
French  neutrality,  329. 

Mobilization,  Russian  (see  also  Ger- 
man ultimatum):  (July  29),  109- 
116, 135-136, 310  n,  335-336;  order 
for,  withheld  by  Russia,  110- 
111;  alarming  reports  of,  reach 
Germany,  110-114,  133-134;  im- 
possible to  halt,  115;  "against 
Germany"  defined  (Jagow),  133; 
effect  of,  on  Austria  and  Germany, 
133-142,  146  n;  Germany  threat- 
ens counter  mobilization,  136, 137; 
definition  of,  "against  Germany" 
modified,  139-140;  justifiable?, 
165  n;  Buchanan  urges  Russia  to 
defer  order  for,  186;  reason  for, 
against  Austria,  186;  against  Aus- 
tria, Grey  considers  inevitable, 
186;  date  of,  192-193;  reasons  for, 
193;  Hollweg  says,  spoilt  every- 
thing, 242;  Pourtales  says  makes 
conference  difficult,  243-244;  gen- 
eral mobilization  will  be  ordered 
if  Sazonof  formula  rejected,  245; 
Russia  cannot  postpone  general, 
when  Germany  is  arming,  245; 
Berchtold  urges  Germany  to  ar- 
rest, by  threats,  246  n;  Sazonof 
says  must  hasten,  246;  general 
mobilization,  effect  of  upon  term 
of  Sazonof  formula,  249-250; 
Germany  cannot  allow  Russia  to 
undertake,  250;  forced  Germany 
to  declare  war,  251;  reasons  why 


Russia  could  refrain  from,  251; 
ordered,  253;  impossible  to  arrest, 
253  n;  measures  decided  upon  July 
25,  253  n;  general  mobilization 
premature  and  regrettable  step, 
253  n;  effect  of  menacing  tone  of 
Kaiser  to  Tsar,  253  n;  general 
mobilization,  France  and  England 
not  notified  of,  253  n ;  general 
mobilization,  England  learns  of 
from  Germany,  253-254  n;  general 
mobilization,  Tsar  explains  why 
necessary,  255  n;  if  Russia  arrests, 
Austria  will  accept  mediation,  256; 
Buchanan  gives  reason  for,  257; 
Grey  says  possibility  of  preserving 
peace  if  Russia  will  arrest,  258; 
German  ultimatum  not  justified 
since  Russia  agrees  to  arrest,  259; 
Viviani  says  Russia  agrees  to  ar- 
rest, 259;  Viviani  mistaken  that 
Russia  agrees  to  arrest,  260  n; 
German  ultimatum  demands  de- 
mobilization of,  260;  Szapary 
tells  Sazonof  he  ignores  effect 
upon  Austria  of,  263;  perhaps 
caused  by  fear  of  intervention  in 
favor  of  Austria,  264;  why  could 
not  be  arrested,  264;  of  army  and 
fleet,  335;  precipitate  nature  of, 
336;  discussed  (Durkheim  and 
Denis) ,  336  n;  would  necessitate 
German  declaration  of  war,  459; 
Germany  blames,  for  war,  485- 
486;  German  change  of  attitude 
towards  partial,  486;  destroyed 
last  hope  of  peace,  486;  effects  of 
slow,  on  German  strategy  (Del- 
briick),  488  n;  effect  of  Austria's 
threat  to  mobilize,  487  n. 

Mobilization,  Servian:  (July  25), 
79-80,  86. 

Modified  quotation:  explanation  of 
term,  42  n. 

Mollard,  French  Minister  to  Luxem- 
burg. 

Monroe  Doctrine:  why  England  ac- 
cepted, 497;  excludes  Germany 
from  South  America,  505;  Declar- 
ation of  American  delegates  at 
Hague,  539;  American  policy  of, 
officially  adopted  by  Congress 
(1901),  543;  official  exposition  of 
(1901)  (Roosevelt),  543. 

Montenegro:  26,  28-30. 

Moore,  John  Basset:  539  n. 


INDEX 


717 


Morley:  resignation  of,  from  Cabi- 
net, 341-342  n;  The  Life  of  Wil- 
liam Ewart  Gladstone,  624. 

Morocco:  England  undertakes  to 
support  France  in  (1904),  13; 
declaration  (1904)  of  England  and 
France  respecting  (text),  544-546; 
coveted  by  Germany,  13,  505; 
Franco-English  understanding  in 
regard  to,  frets  Germany,  15-16; 
German  Emperor  visits  (1905), 
16;  Algeciras  Conference  confirms 
French  interests,  17;  the  Casa- 
blanca affair,  18-19;  decision  of 
Hague  Tribunal  in  regard  to  Casa- 
blanca affair,  19;  Agadir  incident 
(1911),  22-23,  289-290;  recognized 
by  Germany  as  French  protector- 
ate (1911),  23-24;  Grey  on  English 
policy  toward  P'rance  regarding, 
288-290. 

Moscow:  102,  110,  135. 

Namur:  323. 

Napoleon  I:  3-4,  6,  9-10. 

Napoleon  III:  387. 

Narodna  Odbrana:  activities  of,  69; 
dissolution  of,  demanded  by  Aus- 
tria, 68-69,  76  n;  Servia's  reply 
regarding,  65-66,  68;  Russian  sym- 
pathies for  activities  of,  69  n.  See 
also  documents,  574-578,  586-588. 

National  interest:  determines  na- 
tional policy,  508. 

National  necessity:  see  Necessity. 

National  states:  age  of,  on  the  point 
of  passing,  495. 

Nationalism:  conceptions  of,  re- 
placed by  internationalism,  495- 
496;  Germany's  nationalistic  con- 
ception, 502-508;  compared  with 
internationalism,  508-514. 

Nationality:  Italy  claims  of  Austrian 
territory  under  plea  of,  457. 

Nations:  see  also  States  —  Govern- 
ments. 

Naval  Strength:  England's  arrange- 
ments to  maintain,  498. 

Near  East :  see  Balkans. 

"Near"  —  ultimatum:  first  Sazonof 
formula  was,  248. 

Necessity:  Germany  at  first  justifies 
violation  of  Belgium  by,  400;  law 
of,  Chancellor  right  to  appeal  to, 
416  n;  translations  of  remarks  of 
Chancellor  regarding,  445-446  n ; 


why  Germany  supports  doctrine 
of,  508-509;  German  views  in  re- 
gard to  scope  of,  417;  Germany's 
plea  of,  445-456 ;  attitude  of  world 
toward  Chancellor's  plea  of,  520; 
Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium 
not  a  case  of,  522. 

Negotiations:  of  the  Spanish  and 
American  Governments  following 
the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  579, 
584. 

Netherlands:  see  Holland. 

Neue  Freie  Press:  46,  75  n. 

Neueste  Nachrichten:  Leipziger,  74  n. 

Neues  Wiener  Tageblalt:  46. 

Neutrality:  (see  also  Belgian  Neu- 
trality —  English  Neutrality  — 
French  Neutrality  —  Luxemburg 

—  Neutralization) :  nature  of 
(Hill),  638;  distinction  between, 
and  neutralization,  7;  reason  for, 
392;  in  case  of  violation  of  inter- 
national law,  393;  defended  by 
Melians  against  Athenians  (ex- 
tract from  Thucydides),  645. 

Neutrality  League :  309  n. 
Neutralization  (see  also  Luxemburg 

—  Neutrality  —  Neutralization  of 
Belgium) :  difference  between,  and 
ordinary  neutrality,  7;  purpose  of 
Belgian,  379  ff.;  Palmerston,  views 
on,  384  n;  Germany  bound  by 
treaty  (of  1839),  385;  obligation 
to  make  good  guaranty  of  neutral- 
ity, 387  jf.;  English  view  regarding 
treaty  of  1831,  388;  Wicker  criti- 
cizes right  of  neutralized  state  to 
defend,  432;  application  to  Alsace 
and  Lorraine,  453  n. 

Neutralization  of  Belgium:  intended 
to  establish  "stopper  state,"  387; 
why  France  agreed  to,  387-388; 
views  of  powers  regarding  (in 
1831),  388;  application  of  the 
Hague  Convention,  391  n;  effect 
of  fortifications  on,  412  n;  evil  re- 
sults of,  432. 

Neutral  States:  right  to  enter  into 
defensive  treaties,  408. 

Newfoundland:  13. 

News,  London  Daily:  555. 

Nicholas,  Tsar  of  Russia:  telegraphs 
Servian  Prince,  100;  appeals  to 
Kaiser  to  restrain  Austria  (July 
29),  112,  115,  145  n,  252  n;  pledges 
Kaiser  that  army  will  not  threaten 


718 


INDEX 


Austria  pending  negotiations,  115, 
146  n,  253  n;  appeals  to  England 
for  support,  255  n;  declares  Rus- 
sian troops  will  not  assemble  while 
mediation  continues,  255  n;  Ger- 
man declaration  of  war  prevents 
acceptance  of  English  proposal, 
254  n. 

Nicholson,  Sir  Arthur,  British  Under- 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs:  re- 
mark to  Paul  Cambon,  295. 

Niemeyer,  Prof.,  Kiel  University: 
view  concerning  Kriegsraison, 
504  n. 

Nile,  upper:  11. 

Nish:  100. 

Non-resistance:  doctrine  of,  501  n. 

Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung: 
denial  of  knowledge  of  Austrian 
ultimatum  (Bavarian  Govern- 
ment), 120  n;  semi-official  organ 
of  Government,  126  n;  advocates 
localization  of  Austro-Servian  dis- 
pute, 126  n;  Chancellor  condemns 
conference  of  the  powers  as  an 
"areopagus,"  210;  attacks  verac- 
ity of  B.  W.  P.;  answer  to,  285- 
286  n;  documents  on  Entente  nego- 
tiations (England,  France,  and 
Russia),  292  n,  551;  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 321-322;  telegrams  of 
Kaiser,  King  George,  Prince 
Henry,  329-330;  French  neutral- 
ity correspondence,  330-333;  Case 
of  Belgium,  395;  challenged  by 
London  Times  concerning  secret 
documents,  399  n;  secret  agree- 
ment of  Belgium  and  England, 
409-410  n;  formation  of  Triple 
Entente  (official  correspondence), 
551-559;  Document  (3)  Anglo- 
Belgian  military  preparations, 
626  ff.;  exhibit  38  of  German  White 
Book:  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality by  England  and  Belgium, 
634. 

North-German  Gazette:  see  Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine  Zeitung. 

Norway:  10. 

Novibazar:  91  n. 

Novoe  Vremya:  131. 

Nuremberg:  173  n. 

Obligation,  of  England  to  France: 

291-292. 
Obrenovic,  Milos:  76  n. 


Observation:  Italy  likely  to  maintain 
attitude  of,  468-469. 

Occupation  of  Belgrade:  see  Bel- 
grade. 

Odessa:  110,  135. 

Oligarchy,  Military:  492. 

"Open  Door":  Germany  wants,  in 
Morocco  and  China,  13;  Germany 
might  have  exerted  influence  for, 
504;  Russo-Japanese  treaty  guar- 
anteeing in  China,  550. 

Oriental  Railway:  20. 

Orsova:  87. 

Outlook:  (Dumba),  69  n,  587. 

Oxford  Faculty  of  Modern  History: 
on  Lichnowsky  incident,  336  n. 

Pacifists:  some  errors  of,  501  n. 

Pakrac:  50. 

Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  to 
Russia. 

Palmerston,  Lord:  relations  with 
Belgium ;  5-6 ;  views  on  neutraliza- 
tion, -684  n. 

Pan-Serb  agitation:  130,  145  n. 

Pan-Slav:  see  Southern  Slav. 

Panther,  The:  German  cruiser  at 
Agadir,  23. 

Parliamentary  debates :  concerning 
neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg, 606  ff. 

Pascal:  nature  of  custom,  391. 

Pashitch,  Servian  Premier  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs:  declares 
Servia  sincere,  49-50;  defends  Ser- 
vian Government  from  Austrian 
imputations  (July  1),  53  n;  state- 
ment of,  to  press  (July  1914),  74- 
75  n;  "The  Tsar  is  great  and 
clement,"  100-101. 

Peace:  of  Europe,  maintained  by  bal- 
ance between  Entente  and  Alli- 
ance, 15;  the  will  to  preserve,  80; 
London  Times,  on  European,  126; 
cities  determine  nation's  attitude 
towards,  188  n;  possibility  of 
Anglo-Italian  cooperation  to  se- 
cure, 490;  treaty  of,  will  be  a  com- 
promise, 515. 

"Peace  power":  nature  of,  500-502. 

Perpetual  neutrality  (see  Neutraliza- 
tion): difference  between,  and 
ordinary  neutrality,  7. 

Persia:  Russian  ambitions  to  se- 
cure, formerly  feared  by  England, 
10;  partition  of,  by  England  and 


INDEX 


719 


Russia  (1907),  18;  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  concerning,  498;  Anglo- 
Russian  agreement  (text),  546- 
548. 

Persian  Gulf:  20. 

Peter  the  Great:  aprocyphal  will  of, 
537-539. 

Phillips:  Modern  Europe,  422. 

"Pig  War":  30,  147. 

"Place  in  the  Sun":  504. 

Poincare,  President  of  the  French 
Republic:  France  pacific  (July  30), 
167;  believes  Sazonof  formula  will 
not  be  accepted,  248;  letter  to 
King  George  July  31,  275  and  n; 
visit  to  Russia  relative  to  Triple 
Entente,  558. 

Pola:  32. 

Poland:  3,  8  n. 

Policies:  protection  of,  of  state,  392; 
of  England,  France  and  Germany, 
477;  political  aims  of  powers, 
530  ff. 

Political  Science  Quarterly:  (Munroe 
Smith),  14  n,  55  n,  99  n,  107  n, 
140  n,  405  n,  415  n,  433  n,  442  n, 
442-443  n;  (S.  P.  Duggan),  20  n, 
21  n,  32  n. 

Post,  New  York  Evening:  302  n, 
309  n,  655. 

Port  Arthur:  12. 

Portugal:  British  satellite,  30;  Anglo- 
German  discussions  relative  to 
eventual  partition  of  colonies  of, 
304  n;  references  to  the  Anglo- 
German  secret  treaty  of  1898  rela- 
tive to  the  eventual  dismember- 
ment of  the  colonies  of,  562-563. 

Pourparlers:  see  Conversations. 

Pourtales,  German  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg:  says  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion makes  conference  difficult, 
243-244;  breaks  down  when  war 
inevitable,  244-245;  appeals  to 
Sazonof  for  suggestion,  245; 
change  of  tone  toward  Russia 
(July  29),  246. 

Powers  (see  also  Concert  of  Powers 
—  the  various  Treaties) :  neutral- 
ize Belgium,  6;  note  of  to  Balkan 
allies,  27;  try  to  secure  extension 
of  the  time  limit,  59-61;  influence 
Servia  to  make  a  conciliatory  re- 
ply, 62-64;  efforts  of,  to  prevent 
Russian  intervention,  96;  Jagow's 
objection  to  grouping  of  Entente 


against  Alliance,  209;  employ  their 
good  offices  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  227-229;  urge  ambas- 
sadorial conference,  229-231;  in- 
duce Belgrade  to  yield,  231;  collec- 
tive guaranty  of,  proposed  by 
Grey,  239-242;  guaranty  of,  to 
Russia  and  Austria,  26.5-266. 

Press:  Austrian,  44— 45  n,  46-47  n, 
50  n,  74-75  n,  88-89  n,  92,  156, 
English,  309  n,  313;  German,  80, 
137,  168,  325  n;  Servian,  see  Press, 
Austrian. 

Prestige:  of  Austria  engaged,  91, 107, 
236;  Bismarck  condemns  policy 
seeking,  485  n. 

Preventive  war:  England  did  not 
engage  in,  512  n;  1914  best  date 
for  Germany  to  make,  512  n. 

Price,  M.  P.;  The  Diplomatic  History 
of  the  War:  192-193  n,  224  n, 
238  n,  354  n,  460-461  n. 

Princip,  Gavrilo:  34. 

Procedure :  see  Diplomatic  procedure. 

Protectorates:  497. 

Prussia:  anxious  for  "buffer"  state, 
5  n;  disposition  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
14;  view  regarding  neutralization 
of  Belgium,  388;  what,  did  for 
Germany  (Sarolea),  493;  treaty  of, 
to  respect  Belgian  neutrality 
(text),  602;  promises  to  respect 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg  (text  of 
treaty  1870),  605. 

Public  opinion:  Russia  unable  to 
hold  back  unless  Austria  makes 
concession,  245;  sanction  of  inter- 
national law,  392;  in  Italy  against 
war,  464;  ultimate  force  which 
exacts  compliance  with  law,  501  n; 
comparison  of  effect  on,  of  Sera- 
jevo  crime  (1914),  and  of  Maine 
disaster  (1898),  585. 

Pulnik,  General,  Servian  Chief-of- 
Staff:  arrested  in  Hungary,  86  n. 

Quadruple  Conference:  see  Confer- 
ence. 

Quai  d'Orsay:  150  n,  176. 

Queen  Draga:  30. 

Queen  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens:  452; 
extracts  from,  642. 

Quotation,  modified,  explained,  42  n. 

Race-suicide:  German  view  of,  506- 


507. 


720 


INDEX 


Railways:  military'  operations  re- 
garding, 170;  Russia  lacks,  for 
rapid  mobilization,  488. 

Rapidity  of  mobilization :  see  Mobil- 
ization. 

Rapprochement:  between  Germany 
and  England,  281-282. 

Rathgen,  Prof.  Karl:  567-568. 

Realpolitik:  meaning  of,  494. 

Rebus  sic  standibus:  rule  of,  379. 

Regicide:  monarchical  interest  to 
suppress,  252  n. 

Reichsland:  14. 

Reichspost:  47  n,  75  n. 

Reichstag:  15. 

Relativity  of  rights:  soundness  of 
idea,  452. 

Reservists:  of  Germany  summoned, 
170-172. 

Responsibility:  Grey  promises  to 
Russia  to  take  into  account  Ger- 
many's, 247-248;  German  theory 
of,  278  n;  of  Government  easier  to 
fix  for  foreign  than  for  internal 
affairs,  492;  of  a  nation  difficult  to 
determine,  492. 

Responsibility  for  the  war:  Austrian, 
483;  Germany's  part  in,  because 
of  localization  policy,  484;  Ger- 
many's part  of,  for  refusal  to  join 
Conference,  484;  Russia's,  because 
of  mobilization,  486;  how  to  fix, 
491  ff. 

Resultant:  Governments  in  foreign 
affairs  give  expression  to,  of  inter- 
nal views,  492. 

Results  of  the  war:  514-515. 

Retaliation:  against  Germany  for 
view  of  national  necessity,  509. 

Reventlow,  Count:  15. 

Revue  de  Paris :  335-336  n. 

Richelieu:  proposal  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium,  595. 

Rights  of  states:  see  International 
law. 

Rodd,  Sir  R.,  British  Ambassador  at 
Rome. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore:  message  to 
Congress  (1901)  concerning  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  543. 

Roumelia:  20. 

Round  Table,  The:  33  n. 

Rumania:  28-29,  94,  124. 

Rumbold,  Sir  H.,  English  Councilor 
of  Embassy  at  Berlin. 

Russia  (see  also  Balkans  —  German 


ultimatum  —  Localization  of  Aus- 
tro-Servian  conflict — Mobilization 
—  Mobilization,  Russian  —  Nich- 
olas —  Responsibility  —  Sazonof ) : 
enters  into  alliance  with  France, 
(1891),  8-9;  expansion  of,  former 
fears  of  England  for,  10;  alliance 
of  England  and  Japan  against 
(1902),  12;  Russo-Japanese  war, 
reveals  weakness  of  Russia,  16; 
enters  into  convention  with  Eng- 
land, (1907),  17-18;  rivalry  with 
Austria  in  Balkans,  19,  28-29,  93- 
94,  96,  147-149;  forced  to  accept 
Austria's  fait  accompli,  1908,  21- 
22,  31;  influence  of,  strengthened 
in  Servia  after  Balkan  Wars,  32- 
33;  increases  armament,  35;  criti- 
cal internal  situation  of  (1914), 
36;  kept  ignorant  of  drafting  of 
Austrian  ultimatum,  45;  diploma- 
tic opinion  of,  regarding  Austrian 
ultimatum,  55-56,  64,  70-71  n, 
106;  endeavors  to  secure  exten- 
sion of  time  limit  of  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, 59-61,  270;  influences 
Servia  to  make  conciliatory  reply, 
62-64,  270;  tries  to  delay  hostili- 
ties between  Austria  and  Servia, 
81-83;  "protector  of  Servia,"  96- 
101,  107-108,  131-132,  216-217; 
interest  of,  in  the  Austro-Servian 
conflict,  96-104;  conciliatory  atti- 
tude of,  toward  Austria,  103-104, 
151-152;  believes  Austria's  action 
directed  against  herself,  105-108; 
considers  immediate  action  neces- 
sary, 108-109;  partially  mobilizes 
against  Austria,  109-111;  mobili- 
zation of,  ordered,  114-115;  pres- 
tige of,  in  the  Balkans,  131;  respon- 
sibility of,  for  supporting  Servia, 
131-133;  situation  with  Germany 
becomes  acute,  133-142;  mobiliza- 
tion of,  138;  Germany  declares 
war  upon  (August  1),  143-145; 
shares  with  Austria  control  of  Bal- 
kan matters,  147,  188;  France  will 
support,  (July  29),  163-166; 
mobilization  system,  179,  187; 
threatens  mobilization  if  Austria 
attacks  Servia,  186;  dilemma  of, 
186;  cannot  yield  to  Austrian  dic- 
tation, 188;  distrust  of  Austria, 
188-189;  England  and  France 
unable  to  advise  submission  of, 


INDEX 


721 


189;  war  thrust  upon,  189;  belief 
that  England  would  support,  192; 
war  party  in  control,  192;  orders 
general     mobilization,     192-193; 
proposes  conversations  with  Aus- 
tria,   213-227;    interposition    of, 
between  Austria  and  Servia,  214; 
interests  of,  in  mediation,  216-217; 
position  of,  as  protector  of  Servia, 
216-217;    ready   to   accept   Eng- 
land's  mediation    proposal,    217; 
interests  of,  in  Balkans,  223;  ex- 
change of  views  with  Austria,  225- 
226;  unable  to  hold  back  public 
opinion  without  concessions,  245; 
cause  of  change  of  attitude,  246- 
247;   Grey  promises,  to  take  into 
account  German  responsibility  for 
situation,  247-248;  efforts  to  pre- 
serve peace  up  to  July  29,  250-251 ; 
by    mobilization    forced    German 
declaration   of   war,    251;    orders 
general  mobilization,  253;  France 
and  England  not  notified  of  gen- 
eral mobilization  by,  253  n;   be- 
lieves   Germany    making    active 
military  preparations,  257;  mobil- 
ization   of,    257;    cannot    accept 
Germany's  ultimatum,  259;  criti- 
cism of  Viviani's  statement  con- 
cerning acceptance  of  mediation 
proposal,  259-260  n;  acceptance  of 
the  English  proposal,  260;  Viviani 
mistaken  as  to  agreement  to  arrest 
mobilization  by,  260  n;  ready  to 
accept  any  reasonable  compromise, 
262;  German  ultimatum  did  not 
interrupt    agreement    of    Austria 
and,  263;  limits  of  Austrian  con- 
cessions to,  263;  could  not  allow 
Austria  to  invade  Servia,  264;  fear 
of  intervention  in  favor  of  Austria 
perhaps  caused  mobilization,  264; 
England  refuses   to   side  with,  to 
prevent  war,  273-282;  war  party 
gains    control    (July   30),   308  n; 
proclaims    general    mobilization, 
310  n;  Austria  believes,  will  yield, 
468;  fear  of  Austrian  domination 
oyer  Servia,  482-483;  fears  Aus- 
trian advance  on  Salonika,  483; 
obliged  to  come  to  support  of  Ser- 
via, 484;  excuses  for  action  of,  in 
ordering  premature  mobilization, 
486;  conciliatory  attitude  of,  486; 
consideration  of  efforts  of,  to  avoid 


war,  522-524;  responsibility  of,  for 
the  war,  522-524;  English  assur- 
ances to,  against  aggression  might 
have  delayed  mobilization,  523; 
independence  of  Servia  vital  inter- 
est for,  524;  popular  reason  for 
wars  of,  524;  public  opinion  in,  for 
intervention,  524;  violations  of 
German  territory  by,  525;  Grey 
considers  action  of,  defensive,  527. 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin:  De 
Swerb6ew. 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London: 
Count  Benckendorff. 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris: 
Isvolsky. 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna:  see 
Schebeko. 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Bel- 
grade: Strandtman. 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  : 
see  Bronewsky. 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris: 
Sevastopoulo. 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna: 
see  Kudachef. 

Russian  Councilor  of  Embassy  at 
London:  De  Etter. 

Russian  Councilor  of  Embassy  at 
Vienna:  see  Kudachef. 

Russian  formula:  see  Sazonof  for- 
mula. 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  Sazonof. 

Russian  Minister  of  War:  Suchom- 
linof. 

Russian  Orange  Paper:  confusion  in, 
regarding  Sazonof's  statement, 
243  n;  date  of  Pourtales-Sazonof 
interview,  244  n. 

St.  Petersburg:  strike  in,  36,  111. 

Salandra  Italian  Premier:  statement 
concerning  the  Austrian  Ultima- 
tum, 469. 

Salonika:  30,  91,  106,  195,  524. 

Sambre:  413. 

Samouprava:  75  n. 

Sanctions:  of  international  law,  392. 

San  Giuliano,  Marquis  di,  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs:  on 
rejection  by  Austria  of  Servian 
reply,  75;  on  Russia's  probable 
move,  102-103;  on  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, 120-121;  agrees  to  media- 
tion, 232;  suggestion  for  media- 


722 


INDEX 


tion,  234-235;  thinks  Servia  may 
accept  ultimatum  uncondition- 
ally, 234;  urges  England  to  side 
with  Russia  and  France,  277-278; 
Italy's  interest  in  maintaining 
independence  of  Servia,  461; 
makes  helpful  suggestions,  462- 
465. 

Sanjak,  the,  of  Novibazar:  75  to, 
91  n,  258. 

Sarolea,  Charles;  The  Anglo-German 
Problem:  Belgian  mobilization, 
280  to;  France  and  Belgium  the 
Achilles  heel  of  Britain,  316  n; 
Prussia's  gifts  to  Germany,  493. 

Saxony:  3. 

Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  {see  also  Sazonof 
formula) :  on  Austrian  ultimatum, 
55,  64,  70-71  to,  106;  endeavors  to 
secure  extension  of  time  limit  of 
Austrian  ultimatum,  60;  Russia 
ready  to  leave  question  to  powers, 
201;  thinks  Servia  may  propose 
arbitration,  201 ;  efforts  at  concili- 
ation, 213-214;  trusts  Grey  will 
keep  in  touch,  216-217;  ready  to 
stand  aside,  216;  proposes  to  par- 
allel "conversations"  by  confer- 
ence, 221 ;  will  accept  any  arrange- 
ment approved  by  France  and 
England,  243;  statement  of,  re- 
garding rupture  of  conversations, 
243  n;  date  of  interview  with 
Pourtales,  244  n;  formula  (of  July 
30),  245;  Russia  cannot  permit 
negotiations  to  cloak  German  and 
Austrian  military  preparations, 
245;  hands  Pourtales  formula,  245; 
says  Russia  unable  to  arrest  mobil- 
ization and  must  hasten  prepara- 
tions, 246;  action  in  modifying 
first  formula,  250;  thinks  compro- 
mise can  be  reached  only  at  Lon- 
don, 256;  emphasizes  importance 
of  Austria's  arresting  action 
against  Servia,  257;  announces 
readiness  of  Austria  to  discuss  sub- 
stance of  Austrian  ultimatum, 
257 ;  accepts  mediation  if  Ser- 
via not  invaded  (Bunsen),  261; 
(Aug.  1)  satisfaction  that  Austria 
will  continue  conversations,  263; 
Jagow  says,  more  inclined  to  com- 
promise, 266  n. 

Sazonof  formula  (first):  Grey  asks 


Russia  to  change,  237-238;  differ- 
ence between,  and  suggested  modi- 
fication, 238  n;  handed  to  Pour- 
tales, 245;  Russia  will  order  gen- 
eral mobilization  if  rejected,  245; 
something  in  nature  of  ultimatum, 
245-246;  "near "-ultimatum,  248; 
will  not  be  accepted  (Poincar6), 
248;  effect  of  mobilization  upon 
modification  of,  249-250;  modifi- 
cation of,  250;  almost  ultimatum, 
254-255. 

Sazonof  formula  (modified) :  to  meet 
Grey's  request,  249;  French  text 
of,  249  n;  communicated  to  the 
powers,  249;  less  humiliating  for 
Austria,  255. 

Schaff hausen :  413  n. 

Schebeko,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Vienna:  absent  from  Vienna  (July 
23),  45;  optimism  of  (July  27),  81; 
on  localization  of  war,  99, 130-131. 

Scheldt :  reason  why  England  objects 
to  fortification  of,  397-398;  right 
to  use  in  defending  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 411. 

Schiff,  Jacob  H.:  does  not  defend 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality, 
443. 

Schluchtpass:  173. 

Schoen,  Baron  von,  German  Ambas- 
sador at  Paris:  denies  intention  to 
threaten  France,  150;  puts  blame 
on  Russia,  153;  asks  for  passports 
(Aug.  3),  176-177;  leaves  Paris 
(Aug.  3),  350  to. 

"Scrap  of  Paper":  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  on  Belgian  neutrality  treaty, 
365;  use  of  expression  causes  un- 
favorable impression  in  U.S., 
454  n;  Bethmann-Hollweg  ex- 
plains meaning  of,  454-455  to. 

Scutari:  28. 

Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs:  see 
English,  French,  German,  etc., 
Secretary. 

Security:  desire  of  England  and 
France,  497. 

Self-preservation:  restriction  of  ac- 
tion for,  449;  alleged  inherent 
right  of  (Westlake),  640. 

Serajevo  Crime  (June  28,  1914): 
34,  36,  53,  66,  73,  75-76  to. 

Servia  (see  also  Austrian  ultimatum 
—  Greater  Servia  —  Mobilization, 
Servian  —  Narodna    Odbrana  — 


INDEX 


723 


Servian  note) :  ambitions  of,  for  a 
Greater  Servia,  21,  29-31,  127- 
128;  forced  to  accept  Austria's 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, (March  31,  1909),  21-22, 
31,  52,  188;  unites  with  other  Bal- 
kan states  against  Turkey,  26-27; 
secret  appendix  to  treaty  of  friend- 
ship and  alliance  with  Bulgaria 
(1912),  572-574;  Treaty  of  Bukha- 
rest  (1913),  29;  increased  strength 
of,  threatens  Austria,  29-30,  89, 
91  n,  93,  123-124,  127-128,  148- 
149;  "Pig  War"  with  Austria 
(1906),  30,  147;  propaganda  for 
uniting  Bosnia  to,  33-34,  147-148; 
Austrian  Archduke  assassinated 
in  (June  28,  1914),  34;  confronted 
with  Austrian  ultimatum  (July  23, 
1914),  36-37;  foresees  ultimatum, 
42-43  n,  45,  47-48;  Austrian  press 
campaign  against,  44-45  n,  46- 
47  n,  50  n,  74-75  n,  88-89  n,  156; 
institutes  no  investigation  of  Sera- 
jeyo  crime,  49-50;  ready  to  bring 
criminals  to  justice,  49-50;  cannot 
accept  Austrian  ultimatum  —  dip- 
lomatic consensus  of  opinion,  54- 
56;  powers  endeavor  to  gain  time 
for,  59-61;  Entente  powers  influ- 
ence, to  make  conciliatory  reply, 
62-64,  270;  makes  conciliatory 
reply  (July  25,  1914),  64-77;  Aus- 
tria rejects  note  of,  65;  popular 
feeling  in  Austria  against,  65,  85, 
88,  91-92;  continually  confronted 
by  a  "Greater  Austrian"  propa- 
ganda, 75  n;  England  and  Russia 
try  to  prevent  hostilities  between, 
and  Austria,  81-83;  designs  of 
Austria  upon  sovereignty  of,  84- 
85,  89-95,  97,  101,  104-105,  132, 
139,  153-154,  223,  245, 254  n,  258, 
263,  525;  opens  hostilities  (July 
27),  86;  Austria  declares  war 
upon  (July  28),  86-89,  100;  for- 
merly in  the  Austrian  sphere  of 
influence,  93;  looks  to  Russia  as 
protector,  99-101;  relations  of 
powers  to,  147-149;  Sazonof  favors 
Servia's  appealing  to  powers,  201; 
sovereignty  of,  210,  223,  245,  248, 
258,  263,  266;  San  Giuliano  sug- 
gestion for  mediation  after  uncon- 
ditional acceptance  by,  of  ultima- 
tum, 234-235;  Tsar  says  Austria 


would  make  a  vassal  of,  254  rr, 
Sazonof  emphasizes  importance  of 
Austria's  arresting  action  against , 
257;    Austrian    terms    might    be 
given  to  Servia  or  power  speaking 
for  Servia,  259;  invasion  of,  261- 
262,  264;  Russia  could  not  allow 
Austria  to  invade,  264;  Italy  inter- 
ested in  maintaining  independence 
of,  461;  should  have  instituted  in 
vestigation  of  Sarajevo,  481-482 
not  to  blame  for  the  war,  482 
Russia  obliged  to  support,   484 
unable     to     arrest     propaganda 
against    Austria,    519;    Austria's 
action  in  regard  to  Servia's  answer 
(1914)   compared  with  American 
action   in   regard  to    the    Maine 
(1898),    583,    criticism    of     (Ap- 
ponyi),  588. 

Servia,  Prince  of:  see  Alexander, 
Prince  of  Servia. 

Servian  Blue  Book:  viii. 

Servian  Minister  at  Vienna:  see 
Jovanovitch. 

Servian  Minister  at  London:  see 
Boschkovitch. 

Servian  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg: 
see  Spalaikovitch. 

Servian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
see  Pashitch. 

Servian  Note,  July  25,  1914:  text  of, 
576-578;  correlated  with  Austrian 
ultimatum  and  Austrian  rejoinder, 
64-77;  satisfactory  in  opinion  of 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris, 
65  n;  Berchtold  on,  79;  Dumba  on, 
587;  Fischerauer  on,  76-77  n; 
Lloyd  George  on,  586;  Sir  E.  Grey 
on,  79,  83;  Mensdorff  on,  71  n;  von 
Tchirsky  on,  79;  San  Giuliano  on 
Austria's  rejection  of,  75;  the  case 
of  Austria  v.  Servia  summed  up, 
76-78,  see  also  65-75;  not  pub- 
lished in  German  press  up  to  July 
28,  80;  Sazonof  forecasts,  201;  a 
basis  for  discussion,  212,  217-218; 
Austria  willing  to  discuss  with 
Russia,  263-264. 

Servian  Premier:  see  Pashitch. 

Sevastopoulo,  Russian  Charge  d' Af- 
faires at  Paris. 

Shaw,  George  Bernard:  attack  upon 
Grey,  274  n;  Grey's  diplomacy, 
356  n;  criticizes  England's  inter- 
vention, 356  n. 


724 


INDEX 


Shock-absorber:  European  Concert 
acts  as  a,  4. 

Sicily:  24. 

Skoupchtina:  49  n. 

Slav  agitation:  32,  43,  148. 

Slavonia:  109. 

Small  states:  protection  of,  Eng- 
land's policy,  10,  511  n. 

Smith,  Munroe:  policy  of  Bismarck 
to  avoid  aggression,  14  n;  Servia 
cannot  accept  Austrian  ultimatum, 
55  n;  balance  of  power,  99  n;  Aus- 
trian "prestige,"  107  n;  Jagow 
overborne  by  strategists,  140  n; 
binding  force  of  treaty  (of  1839), 
386  n;  nature  of  Anglo-Belgian 
conversations,  405  n;  peculiar 
view  of  military  men,  405  n; 
German  allegations  against  Bel- 
gium, 415;  Germany's  purpose 
in  invading  Belgium,  432-433  n; 
why  England  intervened,  441- 
442  n. 

Socialists,  radical:  confidence  of,  in 
French  Government,  164. 

Solidarity,  monarchical:  125,  145  n, 
157. 

South  Africa:  24. 

South  America:  24. 

Sovereigns:  see  Heads  of  State. 

Spain:  23;  negotiations  with  Ameri- 
can Government  following  the 
destruction  of  the  Maine,  579  if. 

Spalaikovitch,  Servian  Minister  at 
St.  Petersburg:  appeal  of,  to  Rus- 
sia, 100;  on  localization  of  Austro- 
Servian  conflict,  129  n. 

Spectator,  London:  354  n. 

Speed  of  Mobilization:  see  Mobiliza- 
tion. 

Spheres  of  influence:  apportionment 
of,  between  empires,  498. 

' '  Splendid  isolation ' ' :  England 
abandons,  476-477. 

Spy  system,  Belgian:  395  n. 

Status  quo:  maintained  by  European 
concert,  4;  note  of  powers  regard- 
ing, in  Balkans,  27;  France  be- 
lieves purpose  of  war  to  overthrow, 
148;  Austria  aims  to  overthrow,  in 
Balkans,  201;  Germany  had  to 
accept  or  strike  immediately,  478; 
Germany  opposes,  511. 

Stephens  and  Dudley,  Case  of 
Queen  against,  642. 

Stock  Exchange:  Austrian,  45-46  n, 


126  n;  German,  156-157;  English, 
308. 

"Stopper"  state:  Prussia  wishes 
Belgium  to  serve  as,  against 
France,  5;  neutralization  of  Bel- 
gium intended  to  establish,  387. 

Strandtman,  Russian  Charge  d  Af- 
faires at  Belgrade. 

Sublime  Porte:  19,  26. 

Suchomlinof,  Russian  Minister  of 
War. 

Sultan:  26. 

Sun,  New  York:  76  n,  86  n,  105  n, 
335  n,  421  n,  446  n. 

"Super-Empire":  the  formation  of, 
496-500. 

Survival:  mental  mobilization  of 
war-thought  advantage  for,  510; 
of  fit  ideals,  451. 

Sweden:  10. 

Swerb6ew,  de,  Russian  Ambassador 
at  Berlin. 

Sybel:  Historische  Zeitschrift,  537  n. 

Szapary,  Count,  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg. 

Szecsen,  Count,  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor at  Paris:  thought  Servian  reply 
satisfactory,  65  n. 

Szogyeny,  Count,  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin:  believes  Russia 
will  not  move,  102-103. 

Switzerland :  perpetual  neutrality  of, 
7;  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  1912,  25- 
26;  defense  of  the  neutrality  of, 
413  n. 

Tageblatt,  Berliner:  "pestilential" 
(Jagow),  137,  367;  Sazonof  on, 
558. 

Talleyrand:  3-4. 

Tangier:  16,  23. 

Tankositch:  arrest  demanded  by 
Austria,  74. 

Tardieu:  9,  540  n,  562  n. 

Tchirsky,  von,  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna:  in  touch  with  drafting 
of  Austrian  ultimatum,  42,  122; 
on  Servian  note,  79;  believes  Rus- 
sia will  not  act,  101-102;  "Ger- 
many knows  what  she  is  about  in 
backing  Austria,"  125;  Pan-Ger- 
manist  and  Russophobe  senti- 
ments, 162;  declares  readiness  of 
Germany  to  act  as  mediator,  244; 
uncompromising  attitude  of,  492; 
disturbing    action    of,    522;    did, 


INDEX 


725 


telegraph  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Kaiser?  529. 

Tension:  national,  makes  war  likely, 
479. 

Terlinden  v.  Ames:  treaty  obliga- 
tions, 3S5  n. 

Territorial  jurisdiction:  disregard  of 
by  Austria  (1914)  and  the  United 
States  (1898),  584. 

Thayer,  Roscoe  W. :  Italy  and  the 
terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
473. 

Thibet:  12,  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment concerning,  549-550. 

Threats:  difference  between  and 
warning,  30G  n;  Berchtold  urges 
Germany  to  employ,  to  Russia, 
246;  menacing  tone  of  Kaiser  to 
Tsar,  effect  on  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion, 253  n. 

Times,  London :  policies  of,  309  n; 
reports  from  Vienna  (July  22-23), 
46-47  n;  "Greater  Servia  scare," 
74-75  n;  favors  localization  of 
Austro-Servian  conflict,  126;  Grey 
in  Commons  (July  27),  217-218  n; 
personal  messages  between  King 
George  and  Tsar,  255;  letters  be- 
tween Poincar6  and  King  George, 
275-277  n;  editorial,  "The  Ger- 
man Premise,"  278  n;  authorized 
criticism  of  German  Chancellor's 
published  interview,  282  n;  Parlia- 
mentary debate  (Aug.  27)  Keir 
Hardie  vs.  Sir  E.  Grey,  302-303  n; 
"Europe  in  Arms,"  310  n;  311  n; 
313  n;  Grey  in  Commons  on  guar- 
anty of  neutrality  of  France,  330- 
331;  publishes  Lichnowsky  letter 
omitted  by  Norddeutsche  Allge- 
meine  Zeitung,  q.  v.  comments  on 
omission,  331  n,  334-335  n,  335  n; 
English  Cabinet  crisis,  340  n,  341- 
343  n;  on  England's  vital  interests, 
340-341  n;  speech  of  Bonar  Law, 
343  n;  Balin  criticizes  Grey,  354  n; 
reply  of  Belgian  Government  to 
German  accusations  relative  to 
Anglo-Belgian  relations,  399- 
400  n;  ' '  Luxemburg  —  another 
broken  treaty,"  427  n;  San  Giuli- 
ano's  diplomacy,  464  n;  (Asquith), 
511  n,  512  n;  Lloyd  George  on 
case  of  Servia,  586;  Grey  in  Com- 
mons (Aug.  3,  1914),  624. 

Times,  N.Y.:  enterprise  of,  in  pub- 


lishing official  documents,  viii; 
article  by  Helfferich,  150  n,  155- 
156  n,  165-166  n,  296  n,  306  n, 
312  n,  352  n,  218  n,  259  n;  docu- 
ments on  entente  negotiations, 
292  n,  551,  314  n,  311  n;  (George 
Bernard  Shaw),  356  n,  401  n; 
(Grey  on  Bethmann-Hollweg), 
407  n,  409  n,  421  n,  435  n;  (Jacob 
H.  Schiff),  443  n,  446  n,  447  n,  471 
n,  472  n;  (Formation  of  the  Triple 
Entente),  551-559;  (Anglo-Ger- 
man agreement  in  regard  to  Por- 
tuguese colonies),  562  n,  563  n; 
(Apponyi),  447  n,  588;  statement 
of  M.  Havenith  regarding  publi- 
cation of  Belgian  documents,  635; 
(Eliot,  Dernburg),  655. 

Tisza,  Count:  46  n,  58  n. 

Transcript,  Boston  Evening:  403  n, 
420  n. 

Treaties  (see  also  "Scrap  of  paper"): 
rebus  sic  stantibus,  rule  of,  379;  for 
the  event  of  war,  380  ff.;  effect  of 
duress  upon,  381;  differ  from  con- 
tracts, 381  n;  English  views  re- 
garding treaty  of  1881,  388;  of  de- 
fense, right  of  neutralized  states  to 
enter  into,  408;  German  view  in 
regard  to  sanctity  of,  417,  503, 
513;  binding  force  of,  429;  observ- 
ance of,  remarks  of  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  and  Bismarck,  453  n; 
observance  of,  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, 453-454;  Germany's  treaty 
record,  661-664. 

Treaty:  Anglo-German  secret  treaty 
of  1898  relative  to  the  eventual  dis- 
memberment of  the  Portuguese 
colonies,  references  to,  562-563. 

Treaty:  "The  Barrier  Treaty"  (Oct. 
29,  1709)  between  Great  Britain 
and  Holland,  596. 

Treaty  (Nov.  4,  1911):  between 
France  and  Germany,  23-24; 
resented  by  Germany,  35. 

Treaty  of  Berlin  (July  13,  1878): 
(Article  25,  text),  572;  gives  to 
Austria  administration  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  7-8,  31;  vio- 
lated by  Austria  in  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (1908), 
20-21,  31,  148;  relative  to  Sanjak 
of  Novibazar,  91  n. 

Treaty  of  Bukharest  (Aug.  6,  1913): 
29;  Austria  tries  to  modify,  149. 


726 


INDEX 


Treaty  of  Lausanne  (Oct.  18,  1912): 
26. 

Treaty  of  London  (June  26,  1831): 
purpose  of  Belgian  neutralization, 
379  ff.;  England's  views  regarding, 
388 

Treaty  of  London  (Nov.  15,  1831): 
relative  to  separation  of  Belgium 
from  Holland,  600. 

Treaty  of  London  (April  19,  1839) : 
relative  to  neutralization  of  Bel- 
gium (text),  600;  purpose  of  Bel- 
gian neutralization,  378 Jf.;  reasons 
why  terminated,  383  ff.;  Germany 
bound  by,  385;  binding  force  of 
(Gladstone),  386;  (Munroe  Smith), 
386  n;  changed  conditions  of  Bel- 
gium, effect  on,  387;  attitude  of 
Holland  towards,  389;  serves  Eng- 
land as  excuse  for  war  (Hollweg), 
455  n;  Niemeyer's  view  of,  504. 

Treaty  of  London  (Mav  11,  1867): 
(text),  603;  338-339,  422-431; 
England's  misinterpretation  of, 
423  ff. 

Treaty  of  London  (Aug.  9,  1870) 
(see  also  Neutralization) :  between 
Great  Britain  and  Prussia,  relative 
to  the  independence  and  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  (text),  602;  effect 
of,  on  treaty  of  1839,  383. 

Treaty  of  London  (Jan.  17,  1871): 
broken  by  Austria  in  annexation 
of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  21, 
429. 

Treaty  of  London  (July  13,  1911): 
between  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
(text),  541-542. 

Treaty  of  London  (May  30,  1913): 
following  Balkan  wars,  27,  32. 

(Treaty)  Declaration  of  London 
(Feb.  26,  1909) :  88. 

Treaty  of  Sofia  (signed  at  Sofia,  Feb. 
29,  1912):  of  friendship  and  alli- 
ance between  Bulgaria  and  Servia, 
secret  appendix  to  (text),  572-574. 

Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg  (July  30, 
1907) :  between  Japan  and  Russia 
guaranteeing  the  present  territory 
of  each,  the  integrity  of  China  and 
the  "Open  Door,"  in  China  (text), 
550. 

Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg  (Aug.  31, 
1907):  agreement  of  England  and 
Russia  concerning  their  interests 
in  Asia  (text),  546-550. 


Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg  (July  4, 
1910):  convention  between  Russia 
and  Japan  concerning  Manchuria, 
(text),  551. 

Treaty  of  Vienna  (Oct.  7,  1879): 
Austro-German  Alliance,  540-541. 

Trespass:  fallacious  comparison  of 
Belgian  invasion  to,  452. 

Treves:  169-170. 

Trieste:  32. 

Triple  Alliance  (see  also  Casus 
foederis):  formation  of,  3-9;  treaty 
(1879)  between  Austria  and  Ger- 
many (text),  540-541;  (Germany, 
Austria,  Italy)  established  (1883), 
8 ;  Bulow  explains  effects  of ,  9 ;  Tur- 
key practically  a  member  of,  20; 
Italy  an  independent  member  of, 
25-26,  35,  75,  83;  increasing  arma- 
ment of,  35;  Jagow's  objection  to 
opposing  of,  by  the  Entente,  209; 
challenges  Triple  Entente  (Paris 
Journal  des  Debats),  265;  contains 
seeds  of  own  dissolution,  457; 
Italy's  interests  opposed  to,  457- 
459;  Italy  declares  defensive  na- 
ture of,  excludes  aggression,  470; 
Italy  refuses  to  agree  to  aggression 
against  Servia,  471-472;  Billow 
considers,  will  prevent  Italy  from 
attacking  Germany,  471-472; 
member  of,  required  to  commu- 
nicate diplomatic  transactions 
(Thayer),  472;  does  not  apply  to 
Mediterranean,  478  n;  stabilizing 
effect  of  (Bulow),  478;  Triple 
Entente  gaining  on,  478. 

Triple  Entente  (see  also  Anglo- 
French  Entente):  formation  of, 
3-18,  551;  declaration  (1904)  of 
England  and  France  respecting 
Egypt  and  Morocco,  544-546; 
Convention  (1907)  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  concerning  in- 
terests in  Asia,  546-550;  forced 
to  accept  Austria's  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (1908), 
21-22;  increasing  armament  of, 
35;  critical  internal  situation  of 
each  power  of  (1914),  36;  en- 
deavors of,  to  secure  extention  of 
time  limit  of  Austrian  ultimatum, 
59-61,  270;  influences  Servia  to 
make  conciliatory  reply,  62-64, 
270;  urges  moderation  on  Austria, 
82;  efforts  of,  for  mediation,  270- 


INDEX 


727 


273;  England  refuses  to  take  side 
of,  273-282,  286-288,  293-295; 
Grey's  account  of,  288-292,  313; 
interest  of  England  to  preserve, 
311-316;  gaining  strength  over 
Triple  Alliance,  478. 

Triplice:  see  Triple  Alliance. 

Tripoli:  24-26. 

Troubetzkoy,  General,  Attache  to  the 
Military  Household  of  the  Tsar  of 
Russia. 

Tsar  of  Russia,  see  Nicholas. 

Tunis:  acquisition  of,  by  France,  8. 

Turkey:  befriended  by  Austria  and 
Germany,  19;  revolution  of  Young 
Turks,  20;  Russian  designs  upon, 
after  (190S),  93-94,  123-124; 
Turco-Italian  War  (1911-12),  24- 
26;  Balkan  Wars,  26-27;  Treaty  of 
London,  27;  von  Bulow  considers 
importance  of,  for  Germany,  27- 
28;  Treaty  of  Bukharest  (1913), 
29;  German  diplomacy  in  Turco- 
Italian  War,  458. 

Ubangi:  24. 

Ultimatum  (see  also  English  ulti- 
matum, German  ultimatum  to 
Belgium,  German  ultimatum  to 
France,  German  ultimatum  to 
Russia) :  defined,  51  n,  52;  pre- 
sented by  United  States  (1898) 
and  Austria  (1914),  584;  first 
Sazonof  formula  in  the  nature  of, 
245-246,  24S. 

United  States:  obligation  to  protect 
Belgium,  391;  unfavorable  im- 
pression caused  by  "scrap  of 
paper"  remark  in,  454  n;  interest 
of,  in  the  war,  474-475;  under- 
standing with  England,  498;  place 
of,  in  development  of  international 
law,  513;  negotiations  with  Span- 
ish Government  following  the  de- 
struction of  the  Maine,  579,  584; 
action  in  case  of  Maine  compared 
with  Austria's  action  in  regard  to 
Servia,  579,  583. 

United  States  Census:  475  n. 

Universities  of  America:  appeal  to, 
653. 

Unter  den  Linden:  105  n. 

Usher,  Roland  G.:  Belgium  and  the 
balance  of  power  (extract  from 
Pan-Germanism),  597. 

Uskub:33. 


Vallona:  see  Avlona. 

Valerland:  310  n. 

Venezuela:  difference  with  England 
concerning  boundary,  542-543. 

Victoria,  Queen :  speech  of,  regarding 
Anglo-American  cooperation  in 
American  affairs,  542;  speech  of, 
regarding  Anglo-American  arbi- 
tration, 543. 

Vienna:  Congress  of,  1815,  3-4. 

Villiers,  Sir  F.,  British  Minister  to 
Belgium. 

Vilna:  111,  113. 

Violation  of  Prussian  Constitution: 
Bismarck  guilty  of,  494. 

Vital  interest:  definition  of  a,  524; 
states  should  confine  policies  to, 
485  n;  independence  of  Servia,  for 
Russia,  524;  England  entered  war 
to  protect,  526. 

Vital  issue:  357-359  n. 

Viviani,  Rend,  Premier  of  France 
and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs: 
attitude  of  Germany  (July  31), 
162-163;  German  and  French 
mobilization,  169-172;  German 
ultimatum  to  France,  174-176; 
approves  Grey's  plan  of  mediation, 
206-207;  urges  Russia  to  adhere 
to  Cambon  suggestion,  238-239; 
describes  Austrian  diplomacy, 
258-259;  says  Russia  agrees  _  to 
arrest  mobilization,  259;  criticism 
of  statement  of,  concerning  Rus- 
sia's acceptance  of  mediation  pro- 
posal, 259-260  n;  mistake  of,  that 
Russia  agrees  to  arrest  mobiliza- 
tion, 260  n. 

Vosges:  169. 

Waiting  attitude:  Russia  willing  to 
maintain,  249. 

Waliszewski,  K:  537  n. 

War  (see  also  Causes  of  the  war  — 
Laws  of  war  —  Responsibility  for 
the  war) :  European  situation  pre- 
ceding, 34-37;  German  people  did 
not  want,  188;  efforts  to  prevent, 
188;  thrust  upon  Russia,  189; 
Germany  did  not  want,  191; 
avoidance  of,  by  acceptance  of 
Grey  proposal,  251;  Germany  be- 
lieves can  be  avoided,  251-252; 
Germany's  declaration  of,  forced 
by  Russian  mobilization,  251; 
Tsar  says  German  declaration  pre- 


728 


INDEX 


vents  acceptance  of  English  pro- 
posal, 254-255  n;  treaties  for  the 
event  of,  380^.;  right  to  make, 
391  ff.;  and  the  equality  of  states, 
391  ff.;  Italy  declares  Austrian 
action  aggressive,  470;  avoidable, 
considered  crime,  475;  why  mo- 
ment for,  opportune  for  Germany, 
479;  responsibility  for,  480;  Ger- 
many declares,  because  of  Russian 
mobilization,  488  n;  Grey  could 
not  have  prevented,  491;  respon- 
sibility for,  not  personal,  492; 
regarded  more  highly  in  Germany, 
495;  danger  of,  known  to  lie  in 
European  Dualism,  499 ;  cause  of, 
different  way  of  thinking,  508; 
results  of  the,  of  1914,  514-515; 
aim  of  diplomacy  to  avoid,  521; 
popular  reason  for  every  Russian, 
524;  public  opinion  in  Russia  con- 
cerning, 524;  Delbriick  predicts, 
between  Germany  and  England, 
560;  larger  meanings  of  (Gid- 
dings),  652;  issues  of,  as  affecting 
America  (Eliot),  655. 

War  Chronicle:  120  n,  285-286. 

War  party:  at  Vienna,  156. 

War  power:  distinguished  from 
"peace  power,"  500-501. 

Warning:  difference  between,  and 
threats,  306  n. 

"War-thought":  510. 

Warsaw:  110,  113. 

Washington:  effect  of  example  of, 
494;  Farewell  Address,  530-533. 

Waxweiler,  E. ;  La  Belgique  neutre  et 
loyale:  400  n,  409  n,  438  n,  453  n. 

Weltpolitik:  497. 

Westlake,  John:  consideration  to  be 
given  special  interest  and  prepon- 
derating power,  393  n;  the  alleged 


inherent  right  of  self-preservation, 
640. 

Westminster  Gazette:  224  n,  309  n, 
556. 

Wicker,  Cyrus  French;  Neutraliza- 
tion: extracts  from,  339,  432  n, 
639. 

William  II,  Emperor  of  Germany: 
interest  in  Morocco,  16,  23;  tries 
to  mediate  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  112,  115,  145-146  n,  329- 
330;  but  hampered  by  Russian 
mobilization,  115,  145-146  n;  af- 
fected by  monarchical  solidarity 
(J.  Cambon),  125,  145  n,  157; 
urges  Austria  to  continue  discus- 
sion, 242;  appeals  to  Tsar  to  sup- 
press regicide,  252  n;  holds  Tsar 
responsible  for  outcome,  253  n; 
telegram  to  King  George,  286  n; 
telegram  regarding  French  neu- 
trality, 328-329;  message  to  Sir  E. 
Goschen,  Aug.  5,  368-369;  has  had 
no  Chancellor,  495;  responsibility 
of,  for  the  war,  521;  Daily  Tele- 
graph's interview  with,  563. 

Wolff  Press  Agency :  80. 

World:  answers  question  of  respon- 
sibility for  the  war,  495-496. 

World,  New  York:  354  n,  407  n. 

World  organization  (see  also  Super- 
Empire)  :  495. 


Yellow  Book,  French:  mistakes  in, 

285-286  n. 
Young  Turks:  18,  20,  76  n. 

Zimmerman,  von,  German  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs:  believes  Russia  will  not 
act,  102. 


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